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‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE

TRAFALGAR’: THE BATTLE OF CAPE
MATAPAN AND SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE,
MARCH 1941
a b
L. Johnman & H. Murphy
a
University of Westminster
b
National Maritime Museum
Published online: 22 Mar 2013.

To cite this article: L. Johnman & H. Murphy (2005) ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE
TRAFALGAR’: THE BATTLE OF CAPE MATAPAN AND SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, MARCH 1941, The
Mariner's Mirror, 91:3, 436-453, DOI: 10.1080/00253359.2005.10656960

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2005.10656960

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 436 ‘THE FIRST FLEET
The Mariner’s VICTORY
Mirror SINCE
Vol. 91 No. 3 (August 2005),TRAFALGAR’
436–453

‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’:

THE BATTLE OF CAPE MATAPAN AND SIGNALS
INTELLIGENCE, MARCH 1941

By L. Johnman and H. Murphy

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T
he story of the battle is well known. What follows, therefore, does not
constitute some radically new interpretation of the battle but rather a synthesis
of the available material and some appreciation of the role played by ‘Ultra’
– the British decrypts of Axis signals – particularly in the lead up to the battle. Prior
to Matapan the Allies had done well in the Mediterranean theatre: General
O’Connor’s forces had reduced the Italian Army in North Africa to ruins by February
1941, the Greeks had forced the attempted Italian invasion back into Albania and,
despite some counsel and consideration to the contrary, the Royal Navy still
commanded the Mediterranean, in the face of Italian action. Mussolini’s idea of the
‘guerra parallela’ or parallel war, whereby the vast swathe of the European mainland
could be left to Germany whilst the Italians dominated the Mediterranean theatre,
was not going well. The situation though was perplexing. British/Allied convoys
were going east/west and north/south, supplying variously Gibraltar, Malta, Crete,
Greece and Egypt/North Africa. Axis convoys were sailing north/south to attempt
to maintain the Axis push in North Africa.1
Hitler, however, was now obsessed by new concerns: Operation Barbarossa, the
invasion of the Soviet Union; Operation Sealion, the invasion of England, had (for
all practical purposes) been abandoned and existed as little more than a feint; and the
situation in Norway was an increasing worry. But the dream of conquering the ‘British
lake’ from Gibraltar, through Malta and Crete to Suez, remained alive.2 As early as
September 1940 Raeder, the C-in-C Navy, had told Hitler that the ‘British have
always considered the Mediterranean the pivot of their world empire’ and that ‘Italy,
surrounded by British power, is fast becoming the main target of attack’. As such,
Raeder concluded that ‘the Mediterranean question must be cleared up during the
winter months’. By the near end of the year Raeder was reporting in somewhat
doleful terms that
There is a danger that the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean will not develop as
Germany had planned, but the enemy will take over the initiative and Italian activities
will encounter great difficulties. The Italian offensive against Greece is decidedly a serious
strategic blunder; in view of the anticipated British counteractions it may have an adverse
effect on further developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the African area,
and thus on all future warfare. The enemy clearly has supremacy in the Eastern
Mediterranean and will become so consolidated that it will no longer be possible to
drive the British Fleet from the Mediterranean.3
Raeder, however, considered control of the Mediterranean from west to east ‘decisive’
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 437

but viewed the Italian leadership as ‘wretched’.4 Thus came about the suggestion
that Germany should involve itself more thoroughly in the Mediterranean theatre
than it had done hitherto.
By the end of 1940 the situation, as far as the Germans were concerned, had
worsened. As Raeder put it to Hitler,
The fears of the Naval Staff regarding unfavourable developments in the situation in the
Eastern Mediterranean has proved justified. The enemy has assumed the initiative at all
points, and is everywhere conducting successful offensive actions – in Greece, Albania,
Libya and East Africa… The threat to Egypt, and thus to Britain’s position in the entire
Eastern Mediterranean, in the Near East, and in the North African area has been eliminated
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at a stroke.5

The Naval Staff continued to believe that the occupation of Gibraltar and Malta was
vital, that the Italian position had deteriorated markedly, and that therefore the
‘decisive action’ in the Mediterranean for which the Germans had hoped was no
longer possible.6 Indeed, crumbling Italian campaigns almost everywhere in the
theatre, in particular Greece and Libya, compelled Hitler to deploy the Luftwaffe in
support of the Italians.7 Despite this, Hitler’s main attention lay in the forthcoming
attack on the Soviet Union. It was, however, reported by Raeder that a conference
had been set up with the Italian Admiral Riccardi, to both review and influence
Italian naval forces (despite much muttering about Italy’s fuel stocks), and yet again
it was stressed that it was ‘particularly important to take Malta’ as so long as it
remained in British control it represented a threat to Axis troop and supply transports
to Africa and an essential supply base for Allied shipping plying the Mediterranean.
In pursuance of the aim of getting the Italian fleet actually to engage with the
British, an Italo-German naval conference was held at Merano on 13/14 February
1941. Fricke and Aschmann represented Germany whilst Riccardi, De Courten,
Brenta and Giartosio represented the Italians. The Germans desired better convoy
protection to Libya whilst the Italians wanted more oil. The Germans though urged
on the Italians a policy of offensive action in the Eastern Mediterranean and, as
Admiral Iachino would later comment, ‘the insistence on this idea which the Germans
later on displayed and pressed on our Naval Staff, was in the last analysis the
determining cause of our operation at the end of March’.8
These negotiations were carried out against an increasingly complex situation in
the Mediterranean as a whole. Prior to O’Connor’s stunning success in Egypt and
Libya, the Italian Navy had suffered the disaster of Taranto with the battleship Conte
di Cavour sunk, the Littorio and Caio Diulio disabled, and the heavy cruiser Trento
and a number of destroyers and a fuel storage depot all suffering bomb hits. The
same night (11 November) Force X under Vice Admiral Pridham-Wippell sunk an
Italian convoy in the Straits of Otranto. Mussolini’s concept of the ‘parallel war’ was
all but over.9 With the collapse of the Italian forces in North Africa and embroiled in
Greece, combined with British convoys plying between Alexandria, Crete, Greece,
Malta and Gibraltar, Hitler’s plans for a major offensive in the Balkans, Operation
Marita, were under threat. Accordingly, Hitler and his senior staff came to the decision
that the Italian ‘parallel war’ had to become an Axis war. In pursuance of this strategy
X Fliegerkorps – a mixture of Ju 52 transport aircraft, Ju 88 bombers, Ju 87 Stuka
dive-bombers, He III medium bombers and Me 110 fighters – was despatched to
 438 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’
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Map showing Greece and the Balkans. Source: S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol. I (HMSO,
1954).
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 439

both the Italian mainland and to Sicily. The transfer of these aircraft were to serve a
number of purposes: to support the Regia Aeronautica – much vaunted but in fact
relatively ineffective; to support the arrival of Rommel and the Afrika Corps in
North Africa; to support Operation Marita by providing air cover for Axis convoys;
and to launch attacks against British convoys and naval operations in the
Mediterranean. As one commentator has noted, ‘for Raeder the Mediterranean
exerted an almost overwhelming fascination’.10 This thinking dominated Raeder’s
views, especially given the difficulty of getting any German naval units into the
Mediterranean, and thus the ‘offensive use of Italian naval forces’ became a major
priority. Indeed, some form of Italian offensive was essential to cover Operation
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Marita, although in Raeder’s view, given that ‘the Italian navy works very slowly…co-
operation must be ensured from the start’.11
Essentially what the Germans wanted was a major Italian fleet action to isolate
the Allied armies in Greece, facilitate the German occupation of the country (provide
a stepping stone to Crete) and tie up British forces to the extent that they could not
interfere with Axis convoys to North Africa and the Aegean and, by extension, disrupt
Allied convoys. On 19 March 1941 the German Naval Liaison Officer in Rome told
the Italians that
The German Naval Staff considers that at the moment there is only one British battleship
(Valiant) in the Eastern Mediterranean fully ready for action. It is not anticipated that
heavy British units will be withdrawn from the Atlantic in the near future. Force H is
also considered unlikely to appear in the Mediterranean. Thus the situation in the
Mediterranean is at the moment more favourable for the Italian fleet than ever before.
Intensive traffic from Alexandria to the Greek ports, whereby the Greek forces are
receiving constant reinforcements in men and equipment, presents a particularly
worthwhile target for the Italian Naval forces. The German Naval Staff considers that
the appearance of Italian units in the area south of Crete will seriously interfere with
British shipping, and may even lead to the complete interruption of the transport of
troops, especially as these transports are at the moment inadequately protected.
From the Italian perspective, despite the concerns over fuel and capability it was
considered that the proposed operation ‘possessed enormous moral value. If we could
carry it off successfully, it would give us a tremendous lift. It would show the world
that our fighting spirit and courage were the equal to any, than that dominated by
the British’.12 The road – or at least the sea passage – to Matapan had begun.
Much of the foregoing had been available through decrypts of Enigma via Ultra
of Luftwaffe and German railway traffic.13 The essence of this, although it was not
always clear, is given in Appendix A, references A to J, and Appendix B, references
A to H. In early 1941 it had become obvious to British intelligence that a major
German offensive in Greece (and possibly a wider Balkan campaign) was
forthcoming. Certainly the arrival of X Fliegerkorps had been noted but its strength
and purposes had not, nor had the information gone to the C-in-C (Mediterranean),
Vice Admiral Cunningham. The result was the immobilization of the aircraft carrier
HMS Illustrious, which was lucky not to be sunk.14 This was all the more disturbing
in that Operation Lustre – the delivery of Allied troops to Greece, an operation,
given other commitments, which exposed a range of Allied communications and
implied strength to exposure, and eventually halted O’Connor’s stunning advance –
marked a sudden shyness in British strategy. To bolster the position both the Foreign
 440 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’

Secretary, Anthony Eden and the Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Sir John
Dill were despatched to the Middle East but with little effect. Amidst a welter of
considerations it was felt that the British had little option but to support the Greek
resistance to the Italian campaign, although this was increasingly viewed as a lost
campaign, given the resources (or lack of them) deployed. Still the campaign went
on. Cunningham, however, whilst manifestly supporting all of this, expressed his
disbelief that the resources available were equal to the task. He did, however, have
the advantage of the Ultra decrypts, which had not availed much until now, but soon
would.
Under massive German pressure, the Italians conceived Operation Gaudo; sure
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of air support from the Regia Aeronautia and X Fliegerkorps, the Italians sailed –
with one battleship, eight cruisers and 17 destroyers – confident that they could pin
British convoys south of Crete. Whilst this operation has been variously entitled D-
day or X-day hardly matters, in that signals intelligence was being received by
Cunningham, and Ultra was reading Luftwaffe signals, Italian traffic and
Kriegsmarine material. The fact that the Italians had also broken the British codes
seems to have had little effect on their operations.15 The Ultra signals may not have
been terribly specific but they were enough to put Cunningham on the alert. For
example, Ultra revealed on 17 March ‘some landing operation probably in Central
Mediterranean to be expected in about ten days’ time’. Four days later the Ultra
decrypts specified North Africa as the likely area of operations, information which
was confirmed in a later signal. There was a change in emphasis on the same day
which informed that the operation was likely to be in the Aegean or East
Mediterranean ‘since Axis required knowledge of our sea traffic between Alexandria
and Piraeus and is also to attempt to neutralise our air cover’ (Appendix A, letter E).
Ultra had also highlighted the day for the Axis operation, with 25 March being
designated as D (in some accounts referred to as X) minus three, thereby citing 28
March as D-Day (Appendix A, letter D and Appendix B, letters D and E).16 The
significance of this was that the British had been operating Operation Lustre, the
supplying of Greece, since 6 March, which consumed much of the energies of the
Mediterranean fleet.17 Lustre was clearly the target of the Italian operation. Whilst
the signals do not spell out Lustre as the target, it did not need to (Appendix A,
letters F to M and Appendix B, letters C to H).
This was confirmed in a verifiable blizzard of Ultra material on 26 March. Air
reconnaissance of the Alexandria–Suda Bay route was to be heavily increased on D
minus two (26 March) and Cretan aerodromes were to be attacked on the night of D
minus one (27 March). On D day itself ‘intensive reconnaissance’ was to be carried
out between Crete and Athens and Alexandria and Crete, and further attacks were
to be mounted on aerodromes in Crete. Some hours later much of what had gone
before was confirmed and that the instructions had ‘emanated from Italian General
Staff’. Cunningham’s appreciation of the situation was sent to the Admiralty, and
the Vice Admiral Light Forces (VALF) Pridham-Wippell’s, in that
…operation is either a large-scale air attack on convoys or else a surface raid into Aegean.
I consider that if we now move out (? Large) forces these movements will only be delayed
until fuel obliges return to base. My intention therefore is to clear area concerned and so
endeavour to make enemy strike into thin air whilst taking all action possibly damaging
him whilst he is doing so.
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 441

On this basis Cunningham deployed VALF to be in position 50° south of Crete at

06.30 on 28 March. In addition major forces would be sailed from Alexandria on 27
March to rendezvous with VALF on 28 March. All Cretan and Greek forces were
put on full air and sea alert and the First Battle squadron including the aircraft carrier
Formidable was to sail. But as bait, Cunningham allowed one convoy AG9 (AG
equalled Alexandria to Greece) to sail, but with instructions to turn south at dusk on
27 March so that it would be to the east of the British fleet on 28 March. The sailing
of convoy GA8 from Piraeus was cancelled and the Greeks were asked to keep the
Aegean, as far as possible, clear of all shipping.18
Because of the Ultra information a considerable fleet put to sea: Force A consisted
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of the Warspite, Barnham, Valiant and Formidable, which were radar equipped, plus
four destroyers; Pridham-Wippell’s Force B consisted of the cruisers Orion, Ajax
(both having radar), Perth and Gloucester and four destroyers; and Force C of five
destroyers. All of this was set out by Cunningham to the Admiralty and VALF on
the morning of 27 March (Appendix B, letters J to L).19 On the same day Ultra
confirmed both its previous intelligence and Cunningham’s instincts arising from
this. It stated that the ‘operation is in eastern Mediterranean area’ and by 11.30 on
the 27th both the Admiralty and Cunningham were in agreement ‘that the operation
was a raid on our shipping probably by surface forces’. But even whilst Ultra was
providing intelligence to Cunningham, the Italians had some degree of information
about British intentions. Thus Italian intelligence informed its forces that the British
dispositions were two or three battleships somewhere between Mersa and Matruh,
two convoys at sea, ships at Suda Bay and rather little more. As was quickly observed,
this information was totally wrong: the Battle Fleet did not sail from Alexandria
until the night of 27 March (Appendix A, letter M and N and Appendix B, letters M
and N).20 Italian intelligence was such that by late on the same day, in contradiction
to that earlier, three battleships and one aircraft carrier were reported in Alexandria
and one battleship and one aircraft carrier were at sea, although this simply created
confusion. The Alexandria position was entirely wrong: although the position of the
ships at sea was accurate – but only up to a point – the Italians had no idea what was
really at sea.21
As later British sources would concede, intelligence was important prior to
Matapan but had little impact on the battle itself. There could, however, be little
doubt that without the intelligence the proposed Italian action, Operation Gaudo,
would not have been discovered, thus convoys would have been at sea and it was
doubtful that British forces could have intervened. Had it not been for intelligence
summaries it was unlikely that Cunningham would have put to sea. Put to sea he
duly did, but not until he was certain that the Italians themselves had sailed. Indeed
they had: on the evening of 26 March Vice Admiral Iachino sailed from Naples on
the battleship Vittorio Veneto accompanied by the destroyers Maestrale, Libeccio,
Scirocco and Grecale. At more or less the same time the 8th Cruiser Division, under
Vice Admiral Legnani, sailed with the Guiseppe Garibaldi and Duca Di Abruzzi
with the destroyers Da Recco and Pessagno of the 6th Flotilla. Later the 1st Cruiser
Division, commanded by Vice Admiral Cattaneo, comprising the Pola, Zara and
Fiume, sailed from Taranto accompanied by the 9th Destroyer Flotilla of Alfiei,
Gioberti, Carducci and Oriani. On the following day the 3rd Cruiser Division, under
Vice Admiral Sansonetti, sailed with the Trento, Bolzano and Trieste and three
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442
‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’

Map showing the movements of British and Italian fleets 28/29 March 1941 leading to the Battle of Cape Matapan. Source: S. W. Roskill,
The War at Sea, Vol. I (HMSO, 1954).
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 443

destroyers from the 12th Flotilla, Corazziere, Carabiniere and Ascari. The Italians,
therefore, had deployed one battleship, eight cruisers and 17 destroyers and had
been promised support by the Regia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe.22
Whilst Cunningham was about to deploy his forces the Italians were receiving
intelligence which may have led to the conclusion that they should abort their
operation. For example, X Fliegerkorps had reported three operational battleships
at Alexandria rather than one, as previously claimed. Riccardi would later claim that
this intelligence was never passed to him, and thus to Iachino. On 27 March a
Sunderland flying boat, on reconnaissance, spotted a force of enemy cruisers off
Sicily and radioed this information in. The message was intercepted and read by
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Italian cryptanalysts. Iachino was informed of this on the evening of 27 March, but
both the reconnaissance and the Axis air cover were in difficulty because of poor
weather. Earlier the same morning Iachino was aware that the Formidable was at sea
and could easily have concluded that any element of surprise had been lost. At this
point he perhaps could, and should, have turned for home (although it would have
represented a third humiliating climb down in one year) but pressed on. Finally, the
Italians had intercepted Cunningham’s long signal of 26 March, and although they
could not decode it, at least divined from its length that it was a major operational
signal bearing substantial weight. And indeed it was: Cunningham had put his fleet
to sea, organized his rendezvous, turned or cancelled convoys and was now engaged
on his ‘thin air’ strategy. The disappointments of Calabria and Cape Spartiverto were
about to be revenged, and fulsomely, if not totally.23 Thus two fleets were at sea: the
Italians with some reluctance and the British with some expectations.24
Following the Sunderland sighting report, Cunningham made two major
alterations to his dispositions, retaining Force C with the battle fleet and ordering
VALF (Force B) to rendezvous with the destroyers Ilex and Hasty at 06.30 on the
28th some 30 miles south of Gaudo island. At approximately 06.30 the Vittorio
Veneto’s spotter plane reported Pridham-Wippell’s force some 45 miles away and
steering roughly southeast at 18 knots. Some 40 minutes later aircraft ‘5B’ from the
Formidable reported four cruisers and four destroyers steering 230°. At 07.39 the
Formidable’s ‘5F’ aircraft reported four cruisers and six destroyers steering 220°.
These were in turn the Italian 3rd Cruiser Division (Force X) with three cruisers and
three destroyers and the 1st Cruiser Division (Force Z) with five cruisers and six
destroyers. The two reports, however, only served to create confusion in both the
VALF and the C-in-C, as the reports were close to the composition of Force B and
roughly where they were expected to be, and it was considered that Force B had
been misidentified twice. In actual fact the sightings were more or less correct: Force
X was some 15 miles north of the VALF’s forces and Force Z was 30 miles to the
northeast with the two Italian groups some 25 miles apart. The confusion was ended
at 07.45 when the Orion sighted smoke astern bearing 010° and correctly identified
Force X. At 08.00 Sansonetti’s group sighted the British forces. At 08.12 the Italians
opened fire but the range-finding was poor and the salvoes fell short. The Gloucester
returned fire at 08.29 but her three salvoes also fell short. What Pridham-Wippell
did not know was that Force Z was out of sight to the northeast, ideally placed to cut
him off from Cunningham, with the Vittorio Veneto only 16 miles away and like
Force Z steering southeast. At 08.55 Iachino ordered Sansonetti to turn away (slightly
north of west, which Force Z also executed), the intention being to draw Force B
 444 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’

into a trap squeezed between Forces X, Y and Z. A spotting report from the
Formidable reported three battleships at 08.54, a report which, although inaccurate,
gave Pridham-Wippell some idea that other ships were at sea. Still, and somewhat
obligingly, given the distance from Cunningham (some 70 miles), Pridham-Wippell
turned to pursue Sansonetti’s group.25
In the meantime, Cunningham detached the Valiant, Nubian and Mohawk to
join VALF, with the Warspite and Barham remaining with the Formidable. Some
time after 08.30 Cunningham ordered the Formidable to prepare a torpedo attack
and also ordered the aircraft at Maleme to do the same. (The signal to Maleme,
however, was not received until 10.05.) At 10.58 the reason for Sansonetti’s turn
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became all too apparent when the Orion sighted the Italian battleship and one minute
later Force B came under fire. Force X turned back to join the action but Pridham-
Wippell reacted by turning his force south and making smoke. The Italians fired
some 500 shells at Force B but obtained no hits. Force B was relieved just before
11.30 when eight aircraft from the Formidable arrived and attacked the Vittorio
Veneto, and although six torpedoes were launched no hits were achieved. This did
have the effect, however, of convincing Iachino that an aircraft carrier was at sea,
and he turned northwest. This took the pressure off Force B, but for Cunningham it
had the altogether negative impact of making it more difficult to bring the Italians to
action. Three Swordfish from Maleme also attacked Force X concentrating on the
cruiser Bolzano, but again no hits were scored. Meanwhile, Force B had been returning
towards the battle fleet and at 12.29 the two groups had sighted each other and
Cunningham was able to concentrate his forces in pursuit of the Italians, although it
was realized that somehow the Italians had to be slowed.26
Slowed they were, as at 15.25 three Albacores and two Swordfish, supported by
four Blenheims from mainland Greece, attacked the Vittorio Veneto. Lieutenant
Commander Dayell-Stead’s Albacore, before being shot down, launched a torpedo
from some 1,000 yards which hit the battleship on the port quarter and fractured the
outer screw. The ship was stopped for six minutes but was underway again making
16 knots, which was increased to 19 at 17.00. A near miss from a Blenheim also
temporarily disabled the steering gear. Iachino, however, was not too worried by the
situation as at 14.25 he had received a sighting report, which proved incorrect, that
Cunningham’s force was 80 miles away. Indeed, Italian air reconnaissance and the
poor delivery of intelligence would contribute to the forthcoming Italian disaster.
Aircraft reports at 13.00, 17.35 and 20.30 (at least one of which was accurate) were
slow to reach Iachino whilst the radio direction-finding stations at Porto Palo and
Borgo Piave reported the Warspite as being 110 miles off Tolbruk bearing 60° (i.e.
some 170 miles southeast of the Italians) and probably returning to base.
In contrast to poor Italian intelligence (although it has to be admitted that British
intelligence was doing little to clarify its own situation), the Warspite’s own spotter
plane, flown by Lieutenant Commander Bolt, after a five hour flight, was able to
tidy the plot. After being recatapulted at 17.45, Bolt sighted the Italian fleet at 18.20
and began to report the composition, disposition, position, speed and course at 18.30.
By 19.15 Cunningham had established both radar and visual contact with the rearmost
of the Italian ships. Bolt’s report, however, presented the British C-in-C with an
awkward problem. The Italians had formed a tight group of five columns. The Vittorio
Veneto was in the centre with two destroyers fore and aft; to port and starboard
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 445

were three cruisers each flanked by outer destroyer screens. Cunningham had to
decide whether to continue the pursuit until dawn, thus bringing his own fleet well
within aircraft range of Sicilian based aircraft, or to attempt an evening/night attack.
The C-in-C made a quick and crucial decision: another air strike from the Formidable
and Maleme and to detach a striking force of eight destroyers under Captain Philip
in the Jervis to attempt to close the Italian fleet.27
The British aircraft duly launched their assault. Six Albacores and two Swordfish
flew from the Formidable and two Swordfish flew from Maleme. The results were
remarkable in that the Pola was hit on the starboard side, between the engine and
boiler room, a hit which caused the main engines to fail, disabled all electrical power
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and thereby knocked out the turrets. The Pola was essentially ‘dead in the water’.
The ship though was in no difficulty as far as sinking was concerned, and her captain,
Manilo De Pisa, in a varying set of signals, eventually asked for a tow. At roughly
the same time Supermarina (the Italian Naval Intelligence Service) was telling Iachino
that the British fleet was 75 miles away but in fact it was only 55 miles away – and
closing rapidly. The British situation was not at all clear; the plot had again become
muddled and in the confusion of a darkening night, despite the advantage of radar,
this was hardly surprising. Accordingly the British destroyer squadron wandered
around to little effect. In the interim, however, Iachino had ordered Vice Admiral
Cattaneo’s group to turn and help the Pola. As the most authoritative of recent
historians have pointed out, it has long been assumed that this order was accepted; it
was, but only grudgingly.28 So a sizeable part of the Italian fleet turned back, more
or less into Cunningham’s advance. By 20.15 both the radar screens on the Ajax and
Orion had picked up the Pola and at 11.11 the Warspite’s radar also saw a ship dead
in the water. Not long afterwards HAMS Stuart was in visible sight of the approaching
Italian force. In fact the situation was rather more complicated than this.29
In the Official Account of the battle it was the Valiant’s radar which first ‘saw’
the Pola, but there is little doubt that it was Stuart which saw Cattaneo’s approaching
force. There was no doubt that these could only be the Zara and the Fiume returning
to help the Pola, in company with a number of (probably four) destroyers in
attendance. Force A, Cunningham’s group, originally closing on the Pola, having
mistaken her for Vittorio Veneto, now turned towards the approaching Italian group.
He had the Warspite, Valiant and Barham and the destroyers Havock, Greyhound
and Griffin, whilst the Formidable had quite reasonably turned away. The Pola was
trapped between the British and Italian forces. The action was as brief as it was
brutal. The Warspite hammered the Fiume, as did other ships, and then the Zara was
similarly pounded. The Pola, dead in the water, became a sitting-duck target for the
Barham but the C-in-C swung his group around and the Barham switched its fire to
the Zara. The Fiume, yet again, was targeted, and as Commander Guidi of the Fiume
was to recall,
The first two shots hit the stern, one between X and Y turrets and another more to the
stern, towards the point where I was. I was wounded, but the sailors and the boatswain
that were speaking to me disappeared and I did not ever again see them. Between the
two turrets raised a high flame. The stern deck remained strongly hunchbacked. Most of
the sailors at the stem were dead and there were cries from the severely wounded. In the
meanwhile the ship was heeling to starboard.30
In fact, both the Zara and the Fiume were sinking. After picking up many of the
 446 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’

survivors from the Pola, she too was sunk by a combination of the Havock, Jervis
and Nubian. The Italian destroyer Carducci was also sunk on the same night by a
combination of the Stuart and Havock, and the Stuart sank the destroyer Alfieri.
Cunningham had achieved what Jellicoe and Beatty could not: a successful night
action against an enemy fleet. For a man who was regarded as a nineteenth-century
conservative, with no appreciation of air power, it was a pretty remarkable strike.31
The Italians had lost three cruisers and two destroyers, the British one Swordfish
and one Albacore aircraft and no ship had sustained damage. British ships picked up
905 Italian survivors whilst the Italians lost between 2,300 and 2,400 dead. After an
action lasting less than five minutes Cunningham turned his battle group to the north,
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leaving his destroyers to finish off the Italian ships with orders to rendezvous at
07.00 on 29 March. The fleet arrived in Alexandria at 17.30 on 30 March. Cunningham
had won a stunning victory and, as one commentator would later note, ‘in the history
of maritime warfare the Battle of Matapan is particularly notable, because it was 160
years since the last night action between main fleets’. Some would take this further:
The Battle of Matapan is important from an historical point of view. It was the first fleet
action in which carrier-borne aircraft played a vital and indispensable role in search,
attack and defence. It was the first time that radar-equipped ships, acting as eyes in the
night, tracked down an unsuspecting enemy.32
And others would go even further:
On 26 March the Italian fleet sailed for its first large-scale offensive of the war. It was to
be its last of any importance… It (Matapan) was the first important operation in the
Mediterranean to be based on Sigint. It is true that no further Sigint came to hand after
the Italian ships had been encountered on 27 March and that the battle manoeuvres were
decided on the strength of sightings… But without the advance information provided by
Sigint the presence at sea of the Italian forces would not have been suspected in time and
the Mediterranean Fleet would not have been in a position to avert the probable
destruction of at least one of the two important convoys at sea in the threatened area.33

Indeed, Matapan was the result of a combination of good signals intelligence, excellent
air reconnaissance, radar, firm instincts and good luck.
It has recently been argued that Iachino was wrong to send ships back to aid the
crippled Pola, and that had he not done so he would only have lost one ship instead
of five, and ‘a national disaster’ would have been averted. Iachino would later reflect,
as many still do, that the engagements at Gaudo and Matapan should be considered
as separate actions. Indeed the very title of his memoir, Operation Gaudo e Matapan,
set the tone. Matapan was not the logical outcome of the action which began at
Gaudo and culminated at Matapan but rather the result of an ‘unexpected meeting’
between the whole British Mediterranean fleet and the Italian force sent to rescue
the Pola. Indeed Iachino would blame Cattaneo for not following standing orders,
although he would concede that the same standing orders took no account of a
possible night action. Cattaneo had wished to send only two destroyers to the Pola’s
aid, but was instructed by Iachino to turn his whole group, which would give them a
‘better chance’ of saving the Pola. Iachino would claim that Matapan would never
have occurred had the Italian ships had radar and/or the British had not been blessed
with this advantage. However, Iachino ‘had not the slightest idea that we were being
pursued so closely by the British Fleet’. Indeed, ‘I should have abandoned Pola
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 447

to her fate’.34 Nor did he have the slightest idea of the British intelligence break-
throughs.
It was a sore and doleful reflection. Iachino’s operational orders were to ‘attack
enemy traffic on the route Greece to Alexandria, passing westward of Crete’, sink
any merchant ships on sight and engage any enemy warships. He did though have
some intelligence. The sighting report of 12.20/27 had been read on both the Vittorio
Veneto and in Rome. The Italians then flew off three spotting aircraft but only one
reported, having sighted Pridham-Wippell’s Force B of four cruisers and four
destroyers. Iachino thought that he could pin this force between his groups, although
he had no knowledge of the disposition of the main fleet. Given the British success
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in aircraft spotting and attacks, Iachino would bemoan the total failure of the Regia
Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe to provide almost any form of support. He did,
however, receive some reconnaissance, almost all of it bad. In the afternoon of 27
March it was reported that three battleships, two aircraft carriers and some cruisers
were in Alexandria. At 12.00/28 Iachino received information that the Formidable
had left Alexandria but he assumed that any ‘fleet’ was still some 300 miles away.
This seemed to be confirmed by a German report at 12.30/28 which noted Force B
but saw no sign of Force A, which led Iachino to believe that any heavy ships must
still be in harbour. In fact the Warspite was only 60 miles from the Vittorio Veneto.
At 14.25/28 Force A was reported, but as Iachino commented, ‘I was not a little
surprised, since none of our own or German A/C had sighted enemy units of heavy
type so close to us, and the doubt was whether the signal was a bad mistake… I
waited for further news of this force…’. He was further concerned by the W/T, D/
F signals received at 15.04/28, and he concluded that any enemy fleet must be some
‘170 miles S.E. of Vittorio Veneto’. This information was confirmed by Rome at
16.00/28 but Force A was actually some 60 miles away.35 Error was thus piled upon
error and despite later rationalizations Iachino was culpable in the disaster which
befell his fleet. On the other hand, Cunningham managed to combine intelligence,
radar, reconnaissance and instinct to achieve his success.36
Some writers have concluded that Matapan was merely a prelude to disaster in
the Mediterranean. Greece fell, Crete fell, Rommel achieved stunning success in
North Africa and more symbolically than strategically, the Ark Royal was sunk. But
despite a swing to the Axis, Malta was held, Rommel could not engage Hitler –
totally obsessed by the Eastern Front and Norway – in North Africa, and Operations
Harpoon, Pedestal and Torch would turn the balance of advantage back to the Allies.37
Combined with El Alamein and Operation Husky the balance was decisive. Between
them Ultra and Cunningham had achieved a ‘tipping point’ in the Mediterranean.
The Axis was fatally weakened in that the Italians would fight shy of any further
surface action. British convoys, despite some grim hardships, would get through
and whilst following a severe dip in early 1942, British success against Axis convoys
would increase prodigiously. It confirmed to Hitler that no further resources should
be drawn off from Operation Barborrasa (although the history of the impact of the
Mediterranean campaign on the Eastern Front remains to be written) and that the
Italians were verging on the useless. As a result of Matapan the British held their
‘lake’. It and North Africa were not cut off from the main action – a potential disaster
– but actually allowed the Allied fightback to begin from there. Signals intelligence
had won its first battle.
 448 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’
References
1 There is considerable literature on the
Battle of Cape Matapan. The interested reader
is referred to the following volumes and notes
and bibliographies therein of some. The place
of publication is London unless otherwise stated:
M. A. Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War
II (1957); C. Barnett, Engage The Enemy More
Closely (2001 edn); G. Bennett, Naval Battles
of World War Two (Barnsley, 2003 edn), A.
Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey (1957); J.
Downloaded by [Lulea University of Technology] at 05:52 26 November 2014
Greene and A. Massignani, The Naval War in
the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (2002 edn); R.
Ollard, Fisher and Cunningham (1991); S. W.
C. Pack, The Battle of Matapan (1961); S. W. C.
Pack, Night Action Off Matapan (1972); I. S. O.
Fairplay, The Mediterranean and the Middle
East, vol. I (1956); J. J. Sadkovich (ed.),
Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of
World War II (1996); R. Seth, Two Fleets Sur-
prised: The Story of the Battle of Cape Matapan
(1960); M. Simpson (ed.), The Cunningham Pa-
pers, vol. 1 (1999); M. Stephen in E. J. Grove
(ed.), Sea Battles in Close Up: World War II
(1988). Also, R. Woodman, Malta Convoys
(2000) and J. Holland, Fortress Malta (2003).
2 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs
1939–45 (HMSO, 1990).
3 Ibid, Unsigned Memorandum to the
Naval Staff, 154.
4 Ibid, 155. Raeder’s scorn stemmed in
large part from two utterly inconclusive actions
where superior Italian forces had attempted to
draw the British into well-set traps: off Calab-
ria on 9 July 1940 and off Cape Spartivento on
27 November 1940. The equivocal nature of Sig-
nals Intelligence was, however, revealed in both
actions. Calabria, for example, saw the British
well provided with intelligence material, which
allowed them to realize what was developing.
Other than Matapan, however, the British would
not enjoy the luxury of Italian material. By mid-
July the Italians had changed their codes at all
levels, and with the British ‘blind’ the Italians,
with a combination of its own signals intelli-
gence and aerial reconnaissance, gained an ad-
vantage. As Cunningham was to tell Pound (his
predecessor), ‘we cannot move without our
movements being known’ (see Barnett, Engage
the Enemy, 219–21 and 236–43). For Raeder
these actions, or lack of them, only served to
increase the developing view that the Italian fleet
was ineffective and that it should engage in more
direct action against the British. For the back-
ground to much of this see the National Archive,
Public Record Office (hereafter NA PRO) Adm.
186/800, Naval Staff History, Mediterranean,
September 1939 to October 1940 and Adm. 186/
801, Naval Staff History, Mediterranean, No-
vember 1940 to December 1941. Also, Adm.
199/1048, Naval Operations in the Mediterra-
nean, 1940–1941.
5 NA PRO, Fuehrer Conferences, Raeder
to Hitler, 27 December 1940, 160.
6 For the course of the Anglo-Italian War
in the Mediterranean in general see Simpson,
Cunningham Papers, 55–227.
7 Fuehrer Conferences, Hitler Directive,
10 December 1940 and Report on Conferences
with the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces at the Berghof (Obersalzberg)
on 8 and 9 January 1941, 169–73.
8 Ibid, Report by the C-in-C Navy to the
Fuehrer on 18 March 1941, 182–8, and NA PRO,
Adm. 186/795, Naval Staff History; Battle Sum-
maries (BS), ‘The Battle of Cape Matapan, 28
March 1941’, 2.
9 See Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 244–9;
Greene and Massignani, Naval War, 101–14, S.
W. Roskill, The War at Sea (HMSO, 1954), 300–
1 and Simpson, Cunningham Papers, 174–90.
10 See Greene and Massignani, Naval War,
131–2.
11 Fuehrer Conferences, Report by C-in-
C Navy to the Fuehrer on 18 March 1941, 186.
12 Cited in Greene and Massignani, Naval
War, 141. Quoted in Pack, Night Action, 15–16.
NA PRO, Adm. 186/795, 63.
13 Some, but not all, of the intelligence
material follows F. H. Hinsley, British Intelli-
gence in the Second World War, vol. 1, ch. 11–
12.
14 Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 321; Simp-
son, Cunningham Papers, for the general situa-
tion before Matapan, 253–307.
15 Greene and Massignani, Naval War, 147.
16 NA PRO, Adm. 223/88, Admiralty Use
of Special Intelligence in Naval Operations,
1941–1944. A full listing of Ultra material is
given in Appendices A and B.
17 For Cunningham’s views on Lustre, see
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 449

Simpson, Cunningham Papers, 297–308.
18 NA PRO, Adm. 223/88, Admiralty Use
of Special Intelligence in Naval Operations,
1941–1944.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid, Adm. 186/795, 4, and Greene and
Massignani, Naval War, 168.
23 NA PRO, Adm. 186/795, 4–5, Greene
and Massignani, Naval War, 148–9 and Barnett,
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Seth, Two Fleets, xvii. The so-termed ‘last night
action’ referred to is Rodney’s taking of five ships
off Cape St Vincent in 1780.
32 Pack, Night Action, 7.
33 Hinsley, British Intelligence, 403–5.
34 Iachino, quoted in Seth, Two Fleets, xiii–
xv.
35 NA PRO, Adm. 186/795, 30–1.
36 Ultimately, Ultra or Sigint could pro-
vide vital information but it could hardly win
any battle. Matapan broadly conforms to the

Engage the Enemy, 333–5.
24 As the Italian Deputy Chief of Staff of
the Navy, Admiral Campioni, put it to the liai-
son officer in Berlin, Admiral Marghini, there
were reasons for the operation: ‘the volume of
shipping between Egypt and Greece, the require-
ment for the Italian Navy to go into action, and
the pressure from Germany’.
25 NA PRO, Ad. 186/795, 4–7.
26 Ibid, 8–10.
27 Ibid, 11–15.
28 Greene and Massignani, Naval War, 156.
29 NA PRO, Adm. 186/795, 16–18 and 32–
3.
30 Quoted in Greene and Massignani, Na-
val War.
31 Admiral Sir William James, quoted in
distinction first established by Blackett and fur-
ther enunciated by W. J. R. Gardner, Decoding
History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra
(1999). Albeit in a different context the system
of what became known as ORCA can be ap-
plied to Matapan. Essentially, ‘outer’ would re-
fer to received intelligence and action based upon
this, ‘reconnaissance’ to searches by aircraft or
radar equipped ships, ‘closure’ to coming up
with the enemy on a combined basis of air re-
connaissance and ship sighting/radar, and ‘attack’
to the final phase which involved engagement.
The theory and the process as applied to the
Battle of Atlantic is analysed by Gardner, 72,
83, 88 and 157–8.
37 See Woodman, Malta Convoys, and P.
C. Smith, Pedestal (1999).

Appendix A
The Ultra signals prior to Matapan: summary of situation as it developed in Admiralty

Ref. March ’41 Messages Appreciation

letter
A AM 1708/17 List of vessels etc. to be available Some landing operation probably in
(Ultra) available from German sources in Central Mediterranean to be expected in
Central Mediterranean for landing about ten days’ time.
purposes on or about 26 March.
B AM 1229/21 Further message re above. Gave indications that area was North
(Ultra) Africa.
C AM 0915/25 German fighter aircraft being flown Linked up dates - i.e. aircraft to Palermo
D (Ultra) from N. Africa to Palermo for a 25/3 for operation and the German
special operation. material being ready by 26/3.
E AM 0820/26 Orders for Axis air reconnaissance Indicate operation likely to be in Aegean
(Ultra) and attacks on aerodromes in Aegean or eastern Mediterranean, since Axis
for two days before and on main day required knowledge of our sea traffic
of operation. between Alexandria and Piraeus and is
also to attempt to neutralize our air cover.
F AM 1007/26 Further orders for Axis Air Forces Note: Operation Lustre (transport of
(Ultra) on day of main operation. British troops to Greece) commenced on
 450 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’

6 March and was in full swing during the

latter part of March. (The Germans began
hostilities against Greece on 6 April.)
G AM 1224/26 Gives enemy source of information in Links up AM 1705/25, 0820/26 and
(Ultra) AM 0820/26. 1107/26. It appears that landing operation
in messages A, B and C are not connected
and although they were instrumental in
putting Admiralty on the alert, they now
‘fade out’.
H C-in-C Med. Appreciates operation was either a C-in-C Mediterranean appreciates on
1728/26 large-scale air attack on convoys or same lines as Admiralty. VA Light Force
else a surface raid into Aegean and to be in position 50° south of Crete at
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C-in-C’s intentions. 0630/28. Position selected to enable VALF

to withdraw in face of superior force or to
intercept force as it returns.
I C-in-C C-in-C’s dispositions.
Med. 1814/26
J AM 0025/27 Admiralty appreciation of operation. Suggests military forces may be employed.
(Ultra)
K AM 0846/27 Italian appreciation of British forces. Confirms that operation is in eastern
(Ultra) Mediterranean area.
L C-in-C Med. Ref. AM 0025/27 C-in-C The position at dawn 28/3 was therefore:
1131/27 Mediterranean’s appreciation is much (1) Admiralty and C-in-C Mediterranean
the same – battleships and Formidable were agreed that the operation was a raid
to take part. on our shipping probably by surface
forces.
M C-in-C Med. First battle squadron and Formidable (2) The British fleet was concentrated S of
1219/27 to put to sea tonight (26/27). Crete and convoys had been stopped.
N AM 1510/27 Italian appreciation of disposition of Appreciation was wrong as our battle fleet
(Ultra) British fleet at 1800/26. did not leave Alexandria till after dark
(1) That battleships and an aircraft 27/3.
carrier were in zone north of Mersa
Matruh.
NA PRO, Adm. 223/88, Admiralty Use of Special Intelligence in Naval Operations, 1941–1944.

Appendix B
Full text of Admiralty and C-in-C Mediterranean’s messages before Matapan

Ref. TOO From To Text

letter
A March Admiralty C-in-C Med. The following will be available from German
1708/17 FO Force H sources on about 26 March in the Central Med.
VA Malta for landing purposes:
COIS Alex. (a) 10 motorized SS ferries
(b) 40 landing ferries on floats (Landungsfloss-
C-in-C Med. faehre) with outboard motors
to pass to (c) 1 landing battalion
C-in-C (d) 1 windlass apparatus (Trossengeraot)
Middle East The above will be ready to move in ten days.
and AOC in C Ends. Reliability 75%.
Comments are as follows:
(a) These are probably of the drifter type fitted for
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 451

carrying and possibly mounting 8.8com HA/LA

guns.
(b) These are timber and barrel rafts 13–15ft long
carrying a light howitzer or anti-tank gun.
(c) Expression ‘landing battalion’ has not been
used before in these messages.
Comment will be sent later if such can usefully be
made on receipt of any further messages.
B 1229/21 Admiralty C-in-C Med. My 1708/17. On 18/3 further report apears to
FO Force H indicate that (a), (b), (c) and (d) are to be used for
VA Malta supplying German Air and Military forces along
COIS Alex. the North African coast, in order to restrict the
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necessity for shore supply columns. It is stated that

C-in-C Med. further development of coastal ship traffic is
to pass to imperative and that (a), (b), (c) and (d) are to be
C-in-C sent off in ten days.
Middle East
and AOC in C
C 0915/25 Admiralty C-in-C Med. Available heavy German fighter aircraft being
VA Malta flown from North Africa to Palermo am 25 March
COIS Alex. for special operation.
D 1705/25 Admiralty C-in-C Med. Rome informed Rhodes that today 25 March is day
VA Malta minus three.
COIS Alex. Comment: Signal refers to a message from Rhodes
to Rome on 24 March. Any further information
will be forwarded if possible.
E 0820/26 Admiralty C-in-C Med. Following presumably refers to my 1705/25. Air
VA Malta reconnaissance of Alexandria–Suda Bay and traffic
COIS Alex. routes am of the two days preceding the main
operation. Attacks on Cretan aerodromes to be
carried out the night before main operation. On
day of main operation intensive reconnaissance to
be carried out from dawn to noon between Crete
and Athens. Also at dawn of this day attacks on
Cretan aerodromes will be carried out and
reconnaissances of traffic routes Alexandria to
Crete.
F 1007/26 Admiralty C-in-C Med. My 0820/26. Reconnaissance on day of main
VA Malta operation.
COIS Alex. (1) Intensive reconnaissance of area bounded by
coast of Crete, east coast of Greece, Gulf of
Athens and the line Kea, Milo, Cape Sidero, from
dawn to noon.
(2) Dawn reconnaissance of routes Gavdos–
Alexandria and Caso–Alexandria.
(3) Dawn attack on Cretan aerodromes.
G 1244/26 Admiralty C-in-C Med. My 0820/26. Instructions emanated from Italian
VA Malta General Staff and do refer to my 1705/25.
COIS Alex.
H 1728/26 C-in-C Med. VALF Following information received from a most secret
Admiralty source:
for info. (a) Large number of heavy German fighters to be
at Palermo am 25 March for special operation.
(b) 25 March is day minus three.
 452 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’

(c) Reconnaissance of Alexandria–Suda Bay and

traffic route Alexandria–Piraeus to be carried out
for two days before main operation.
(d) On the day of the actual operation intensive
reconnaissance of area bounded by coast of Crete,
east coast of Greece, Gulf of Athens and line Kea,
Milo, Cape Sidero from dawn to noon. Also dawn
reconnaissance of route Gavdos–Alexandria and
Caso–Alexandria.
(e) Dawn attack on aerodrome in Crete on day of
operation and probably on day preceding it.
2. My appreciation is that operation is either a
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large-scale air attack on convoys or else a surface

raid into Aegean. I consider that if we now move
out (?large) forces these movements will only be
delayed until fuel obliges return to base. My
intention therefore is to clear area concerned and
so endeavour to make enemy strike into thin air
whilst taking all action possible damaging him
whilst he is doing so.
3. Instructions to carry out this policy follow.
I 1814/26 C-in-C Med. VALF My 1728/26. You should complete Force B 7th CS
Repeated HMS Gloucester and destroyers with fuel pm 27
Admiralty and sail for R/V with Force C. HMS Nubian,
Mohawk, Havock, Hotspur, Greyhound at
0630/28in position 034°20´N 024°10´E. They will
be sailed from Alexandria pm tomorrow 27th.
(ii) Convoy AG9 will be turned back for
Alexandria at dusk 27th and GA8 will not be sailed
until situation clears.
(iii) HMS Hereward, HMAS Vendetta will be
ordered to Suda Bay to join you on 27th.
(iv) HMS Juno, Jaguar, Defender will be kept at
immediate notice at Piraeus.
(v) HMS Rover is being ordered to patrol off Suda
Bay and HMS Triumph South Milo.
(vi) Greeks are being warned to clear area of
shipping and will be asked to keep their destroyers
at short notice.
(vii) Maximum scale shore based air
reconnaissance will be laid on to westward Kithera
Channel.
(viii) Fleet Air Arm Maleme will stand by with
(?Torpedo aircraft) and fighters airborne at dawn.
Arrangements will be signalled.
(ix) SBNC Suda Bay is being warned to withdraw
patrol craft under defence of Suda Bay.
(x) HMS Carlisle will be ordered to Suda Bay to
reinforce AA there as intense air activity is
expected.
(xi) All authorities Crete? are being warned to
stand by for trouble.
(xii) Your action must depend on circumstances.
Your dawn position has been selected to enable
you to withdraw in face of an unreasonably
superior force or to intercept force as it returns.
 ‘THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR’ 453

J 0025.27 Admiralty C-in-C Med. We have been studying the possible implications of
(R) AT 1705, AT 0820/26, AT 1007/26, AT 1244/26
VA Malta and at first came to the conclusion that only
COIS Alex. attacks by surface craft on our convoys were
intended.
B. It is possible, however, that military forces are
also to be employed as some of the above signals
were signed by a high official in Italian War Office.
Also one cannot leave out of account the
information sent you in AT 1708/17 C. The only
thing we cannot fit into the picture is the
concentration of German heavy fighters at
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Palermo reported in Admiralty 0915/25.

K 0846/27 Admiralty C-in-C Med. At 1200 26 March Rome informed Rhodes that
VA Malta presumed situation at 12.00 26 March was as
COIS Alex. follows:
two battleships, one aircraft carrier and 7th
Cruiser Division at sea off Crete. Convoy between
Suda and Piraeus. One battleship, one aircraft
carrier at Alexandria.
L 1131/27 C-in-C Med. Admiralty 756. Reference 0025/27 from Admiralty. Our
appreciation is much the same. In addition
measures set out in my 1814/26 intended
battleships and HMS Formidable should be south
of (?Crete) at dawn Friday 28th.
M 1219/27 C-in-C Med. VALF (R) 760. My 1814/26. I have now decided to take 1st
Admiralty BS and HMS Formidable to sea after dark tonight
RA (A) Med. Thursday to proceed westward south of Crete.
BS1 (ii) Force C will accordingly not be sent to join
RA Alex. you, being required to screen battle fleet.
(iii) Convoy AG9 will only be turned back
sufficiently to be to eastwards of battle fleet at
dawn and will then resume passage.
(iv) If no developments have taken place RV with
me in position 034°10´N 025°50´E at 17.00
tomorrow 28th.
N 1510/27 Admiralty C-in-C Med. At 2000/26 Rome informed Rhodes, Tripoli and
VA Malta Valona that from WT situation of British Force at
COIS Alex. 1800/26 was:
(a) 2 or 3 battleships and an aircraft carrier Mersa
Matruh area.
(b) 2 convoys in area 80 miles south of Gavdos.
(c) 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers at Suda.
(d) By D/F some units in Piraeus zone and north of
Naxos.
(e) Convoy arriving in Piraeus.
(f) Force H in Atlantic.
NA PRO, Adm. 223/88, Admiralty Use of Special Intelligence in Naval Operations, 1941–1944.

Lewis Johnman is Principal Lecturer at the
University of Westminster, and Secretary of the
British Commission of Maritime History. He is
also on the Council of the SNR. Hugh Murphy
is Research Fellow at the National Maritime
Museum having previously held two Caird Fel-
lowships at the same institution. He is the book
reviews editor of the Journal of Maritime Re-
search. Together they won the Anderson Medal
for their book British Shipbuilding and the State
since 1918: A Political Economy of Decline
(2002).