Meaning of Interpretation and

Construction
 MEANING OF INTERPRETATION OR
CONSTRUCTION
Introduction
• Enacted laws, specially the modern Acts and
Rules, are drafted by legal experts and it could be
expected that the language used will leave little
room for interpretation or construction.
• But the experience of all those, who have to bear
and share the task of application of the law, has
been different.
• It is quite often that we find courts and lawyers
busy in unfolding the meaning of ambiguous
words and expressions and resolving
inconsistencies.
• The age old process of application of the
enacted law has led to formulation of certain
rules of interpretation or construction.
• Interpretation of a legal provision and its
application to a set of facts are two different
exercises requiring different approaches.
• While interpretation of a legal provision is
always independent of the facts of any given
case, the application of a statutory provision
would always depend on the exact facts of a
given case.
 Meaning
Interpretation Or Construction
• Salmond: "the process by which the courts seek to
ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the
medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”
• It has been said that there is a distinction between
the two expressions.
• According to Cooley: “Interpretation is the art of
finding out the true sense of any form of words; that
is, the sense which their author is intended to convey;
and of enabling others to derive from them the same
idea which the author intended to convey.
• Construction, on the other hand, “is the drawing of
conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the
direct expression of the text from elements known from
and given in the text; conclusions which are in spirit
though not within the letter of the law.”
• This distinction, however, "has been largely
relegated to the realm of academic discussion",
and has been criticised as "erroneous".
• Even conceding that there may be some abstract
distinction between the two, it cannot be
doubted, as was observed by White J that :
• "in common usage interpretation and
construction are usually understood as having the
same significance".
• It may be added that the present work has
followed this common usage and the two
expressions, have been used as synonymous.
 Basic Principles
INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE
• A statute is an edict of the Legislature and
the conventional way of interpreting or
construing a statute is to seek the "intention"
of its maker.
• A statute is to be construed according "to the
intent of those that make it".
• "the duty of judicature is to act upon the true
intention of the Legislature—the mens or
sententia legis".
• The expression "intention of the Legislature" is a
shorthand reference to the meaning of the words used
by the Legislature objectively determined with the
guidance furnished by the accepted principles of
interpretation.
• If a statutory provision is open to more than one
interpretation the court has to choose that
interpretation which represents the true intention of
the Legislature- in other words the "legal meaning or
"true meaning" of the statutory provision.
• The task is often not an easy one and the difficulties
arise because of various reasons.
For Instance: Words in any language are not scientific
symbols having any precise or definite meaning, and
language is but an imperfect medium to convey one's
thought, much less of a large assembly consisting of
persons of various shades of opinion.
• It is impossible even for the most imaginative
Legislature to forestall exhaustive situations and
circumstances that may emerge after enacting a
statute where its application may be called for.
• The function of the courts is only to expound and not
to legislate.
• The numerous rules of interpretation or construction
formulated by courts are expressed differently by
different judges and support may be found in these
formulations for apparently contradictory propositions.
• The problem of interpretation is a problem of
meaning of words and their effectiveness as a medium
of expression to communicate a particular thought.
• words of any language are capable of referring to
different referents in different contexts and times.
• Moreover, there is always the difficulty of borderline
cases falling within or outside the connotation of a
word.
• Language, therefore, is likely to be misunderstood.
• In ordinary conversation or correspondence it is
generally open for the parties to obtain clarification if
the "referent" is imperfectly communicated.
• The position is, however, different in the
interpretation of statute law.
• A statute as enacted cannot be explained by the
individual opinions of the legislators, not even by a
resolution of the entire Legislature.
• After the enacting process is over, the Legislature
becomes functus officio so far as that particular
statute is concerned, so that it cannot itself
interpret it.
• The Legislature can no doubt amend or repeal any
previous statute or can declare its meaning but all
this can be done only by a fresh statute after going
through the normal process of law making.
• There are no doubt references that in good old days
it was permissible for the judges to go to the
Legislature and enquire what they meant, where
the language of an Act was ambiguous or
contradictory but happily enough the practice is
dead.
• There may be certain objects or situations which may
without any controversy fall within the content of a
word, but there may be many others on or near the
borderline in respect of which it may be a matter of
doubt and serious argument whether they are within
or outside the connotation of the word.
For Instance : The Word “ Building” was subjected to
various meanings through interpretation by courts :
• the structure in which the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh is located is a "building" but it may be a
matter of surprise to find that an open platform having
no wall or roof is a building.
• whereas a brick kiln (a pit dug in the ground with
bricks by its side) is not a building.
• To take another example, the question, whether a
railway workman who was engaged in cleaning and
oiling a permanent way, was engaged in repairing it,
was answered in the negative by a margin of the
question is essentially one of degree and that it is
impossible to fix any definite point at which
'maintenance' ends and 'repair' begins.
• Such problems will be faced by the courts conscious of
a dividing line.
• But in doing so the courts should avoid laying down
so-called tests to be applied in every case for the
danger in prescribing and designating tests is that it
may divert attention from the language used in the
statutory provision and encourage an approach not
intended by the Legislature.
• Legislation in a modern State is actuated with some
policy to curb some public evil or to effectuate some
public benefit.
• The legislation is primarily directed to the problems
before the Legislature based on information derived
from past and present experience.
• It may also be designed by use of general words to
cover similar problems arising in future..
• But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to
anticipate fully the varied situations arising in future in
which the application of the legislation in hand may be
called for, and, words chosen to communicate such
indefinite "referents" are bound to be, in many cases
lacking in clarity and precision and thus giving rise to
controversial questions of construction..
•
• The legislative intent in such cases is a fiction
representing the attitude of judges in arriving at a
solution by striking a balance between the letter
and spirit of the statute without acknowledging
that they have in any way supplemented the
statute.
• That the duty of judges is to expound and not to
legislate is a fundamental rule.
• There is a marginal area in which the courts "mould
or creatively interpret legislation" and they are
thus "finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation
which comes to them in a state requiring varying
degrees of further processing”.
Examples:
1. In deciding that "repair" does not include cleaning and oiling that
there is notional extension of employment in the phrase
"accident arising out of and in the course of employment";
2. that the word "accident" in the same phrase includes murder;
3. that telephone is "telegraph" within the meaning of that word in
Acts of 1863 and 1869 when telephone was not invented,
• and in all alike cases of which examples can be multiplied, the
courts have in effect added a definition clause either to include or
exclude something which was not prima facie included or
excluded in the words used by the Legislature.
• Today there are indeed opinions where the fiction of intention is
lifted and judges are seen acknowledging that they are filling in
the gaps or that they have, by construction "added".
• certain words not contained in the enactment, or that the
conclusion reached by them is as if a like definition clause existed
in the statute itself.
• Some judges proclaim that they perform creative functions even in
• interpretation.
• But such an attitude may lead less disciplined amongst them
to conclusions which have a strong legislative flavour.
• So it is wise to adhere to the traditional expression and to
call every process of construction a search for "intention“
express or implied in the statute, to reduce judicial law
making to its necessary minimum.
• The intention of the Legislature thus assimilates two
aspects: In one aspect it carries the concept of "meaning",
i.e., what the words mean and in another aspect, it conveys
the concept of "purpose and object" or the "reason and
spirit" pervading through the statute.
• The process of construction, therefore, combines both literal
and purposive approaches.
• In other words the legislative intention, i.e., the true or legal
meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the
meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of
any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the
mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed.