Existentialism of Sartre. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905- ), the leading figure of the existentialist movement in France, came under the influence of German existentialism as a student of Heidegger. He developed existentialism as a philosophical position in Being and Nothingness (L'Etre et le Néant), pub- lished in 1943, and gave literary expression to his existentialism in his poetry, fiction, and plays. His version of existentialism is, like that of his teacher, Heidegger, secular and atheistic rather than theological. To Nietzsche, he was indebted for the atheistic formula: “God is dead,” and his anti-intellectualism reflects the influence of Nietzsche both in form and substance. Like Heideg- ger, he combines existentialism with phenomenology, derived from Husserl: the subtitle of his main work is: Essay in Phenomenological Ontology (Essai dontologie phénomenologique). He owes little to the main tradition of French thought, save his subjectivist conception of consciousness, which is Cartesian in origin, i The basic ontological premise of Sartre’s existentialism is negative and atheistic: “existentialism is nothing but an attempt to draw all the conse- a ap £ consistent atheistic position.” ** He holds that the very notion Ngina Peete and relegates religious beliefs and theological feat pe , of pure mythology. He draws many consequences from Hee ee including the thesis that existence is prior aording to poe ic Se metal derives its name. The theistic position, esence oF nature " a a the existence of God and the world from the the ontological ar . 0 : a procedure which in its purest form constitutes y repudiating a ee for the existence of God. Sartre’s atheistic ontology, Ver existence, or Ae the theistic doctrine of the priority of essence Leis it rejects essence entirely in favor of existence. ialism, trans, by B, Frechtman, p. 5o.EXISTENTIALISM OF SARTRE 591 wo failure. Man’s exercise of liberty is inescapable: “man is cond jrees” for freedom is inherent in the very constitution of ee ae it persists until death supervenes and annihilates all future posit a ,cuon A man’s liberty is, while it lasts, unrestricted; it involves no subjection wo a universally binding moral law, no coercive moral ideal or system of obligations other than that projected by the freely acting agent himself. This fact does not, however, deprive man of responsibility; he is responsible for his freely chosen ideals and for the influence which their adoption by him exerts on the ideals and actions of others. Man's awareness of his s unrestricted and crucial decisions underlies the feeling angoisse). which accompanies all choice and ensuing action. “I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. | am creating a of man of my own choosing » - « This helps us to understand h rather grandiloquent words as anguish, forelorn- responsibility for hi of dread or anguish ( certain image what the content is of suc ness, despair.” ** an Hu oe Cp’ Extentialisme estMODERN PHILOSOPHY 500 “rherstn essentialism is replaced by atheistic existentialism. The ontologica} secalunnon effected thereby is. drastic one: essence, which is the realm of “il ravonal and antellectial inquiry, is displaced by existence, which spaque to reason. The subsirtion of existence for essence atthe ontlgica evel entails the rejection of rationalism in favor of irrationalism and ane, intellectualism. Atheistie existentialism states that “if God does not exis there 16 at least one being in whom existence precedes essence, a being whe exists before he can be defined by any concept, and this being is man” Sartre readily effects a transition from the ontological to the humanistic levels of his philosophy: his theory that existence rather than essence is a1 the core of being leads inevitably to an existentialist account of man. Sartre's interpretation of man, though derivative from his ontology, is perhaps the more significant and influential level of his philosophy. Central to his con- ception of man are the notions of conscious subjectivity, freedom, nothing rness—all of which have their ontological basis in existential reality. Sartre's existentialist theory of man departs from an examination of con. sciousness. Consciousness is always of something, and in being conscious of anything I am at the same time aware of my own consciousness. The obje.: of consciousness is, however, not constituted by the awareness of it, and thus Sartre's emphasis on subjectivity does not commit him to idealism Self-consciousness is simply the universal concomitant of the apprehension of objects. Knowledge is described by Sartre in terms of a distinction between the conscious subject, with its attendant self-consciousness, and the object of consciousness, considered as a phenomenal appearance and not as a transcendent object behind appearances. In this context the conscious subject is referred to as the pour-soi (the for-itself); it is so designated because it exists for itself in every act of reflective self-consciousness. The object, if we strip from it all meaning and interpretation contributed by the subject. is designated the en-soi (the in-itself). The basic polarity between the poir-sot and the en-soj is the factor of negation, which is responsible for the feelings of tension, isolation. and frustration which characterize human existence: it i also responsible for man’s freedom. The life of man is a perpetual striving for a unity of the pour-soi and the en-soi, a unity which, though inherently unattainable, prescribes the inescapable condition of human know! edge, choice and action. The freedom of man consists in his conscious separation from the en-soi, his choice of an ideal for himself and his self Projection into the future. ‘The self is free in that man generates ideals for himself and thereby projects himself into the future. In so doing he aim’ at the union of the pour-sor and the ¢n-soi, an attempt which is foredeomed Op. pa.26 “CONDI MNED TO BE FREE” The Age of Beason 198 T b . losophy fighting for te tatthew a French professor of philoser eit faainst the German Army World War HI, proclaim hy of human freedom In Jean Paul Sartre s novel his Sartre $ philosep free for everything. free to act like an animal or like a machine He could do what he wanted to do, nobody had the right to advise him He was alone in a monstrous silence, free and alone, without an excuse, condemned to decide with- out an excuse, condemned to decide without any possible recourse, condemned forever to be free Sartre’s Life: The War Years Sartre is famous for the idea that we are condemned to be free—an idea which runs through all his writing. What do these frightening words mean? The meaning of human free- dom is disclosed in Sartre’s important philosophical treatise of 1943, Being and Nothingness. which was written during the bitter years of World War II in France. After the Germans. with little opposition, had seized Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the great Western powers entered the picture and World War II erupted in 1939. Sartre was drafted, and on the advice of Raymond Aron, his colleague in graduate school (now an internationally famous sociologist, philosopher and political analyst), Sartre served in the corps of mete- orologists, with considerable free time to write And when the French Army surrendered to the Germans in 1940, Sartre 349 ela San heeame a prisoner of war trom fy noe Dury his uiteriment he holed oi Lite? kept alive his pliny for Bein: and Noha Mb veted an an antilaseast phay which ahd sy prisoners at Christmas Cleverly he arrantn tlormed for reasons of health. and returned to teaching ye France, now ocenpied by the German a But the war and the experience of France rule transformed Sartie, the withihawn peli gt Cori. into a political being, He became active in the Frente Resistanc went, he did reporting for an wap se nd he wrote and produced antiNaee : " ‘ari plays 7 3. No Exit, 1944). These years of the Ger, he pation of France were to be the most astonishingly tive of Sartre's life. His major intellectual product 2 that period was the massive essay Being ‘and Nevin” Sartre had begun to write this systematic statement af. philosophic viewpoint during the gloomy winter of 1g." occupied France. 7 The Café Philosopher. Like most of the work of Sartre and de Beauvoir during this period, much of Being and Nothns. ness was written in the Left Bank cafés of Paris, in an atmo. phere filled with the sounds of voices and the clinking of silverware and dishes, the smells of coffee, cigarettes, food and wine, and the sights of the customers entering, leaving and circulating among their acquaintances at the brighth lighted tables. Sartre was at different times a “regular” at the Café de Flore, the Dome, and the Café des Deux Magots on the Boulevard St.-Germain, a street similar to Bleecker Street in New York's Greenwich Village. Sartre has occasionally been accused of being a “café philosopher,” suggesting that his writing is not serious schol- arship or that it is only a mirror for this passing human scene the fascinating but frivolous flux of the café, rather than being concerned with the serious realm of truth. But in defense of Sartre, it is only fair to say that many things recommended the café as a place to write at that time. First, and of immedi ate importance, the cafés were heated, unlike the bitter cold of the tiny, ugly Left Bank hotel rooms in which Sartre lived ing the war years. Moreover, the cafés of the great Euro- n cities have itionally been places. of intellectual ulation, gathering places for artists, intellectuals, radicals of the left and the right. But especially for Sartre, who Phiilrrse Heresyol payarnn tore HE ERED ee dk Sacrsche before hin to jong Ue Vand NO whicl will confront ‘ platosenhy of Mi auawndel, the tle of the eae is a vr ead tye enneeete: humane ¢ istet consi ' ys difficult plalosophieal trea " oes the mast ca te What Toe eae ness, this cae product i the harsh rae Beir a many gecnppation of Frame’ have to offer a vans hmmm evistenee? shite r Being and Nothingness Phenomenology Being and Nothingness reminds one of Hegel Phenom: enology of Spirit in its masstv ity, its philosophical density and Gificulty its subtle, ironic analy of the varieties of human consciousness. and. its wealth of insights into many dimen- sions of human life, But Being and Nothingness lacks Hegel's confident command of rational concepts which give dialecti- cally developing structure and truth to metaphysics. theory of knowledge, ethics, and to philosophy of nature, history. and aoe Hegel’: systematic philosophy and its claim to knowl, edge of total reality is rejected by Sartre as a failed product of abstract rationalism and essentialism. Being and Nothingness undertakes a much more modest philosophical project. It takes the standpoint of phenomenology, which was intro- duced by Husserl. Phenomenology rejects the endeavor of metaphysics to inquire into the nature of reality; it rejects as unattainable the ideal of philosophy which Hegel represents, the ideal of achieving a unified view of the world out of theory of knowledge, the natural and social sciences, history politics, religion, and art. Phenomenology also rejects all eo of empiricism, as we shall see. Phenomenology for Se ihe modest tidy of phenomena, of appearances in which they ap ate ures a human consciousness through iineanite pear to us as they do, Sartre proposed to study appears to human consciousness: Consciousness The introduetio The n of Being and Nothingn Pursuit of Being. ss carries the title Sartre wants to follow DescartesSARTO aking my aking My conscions not fel ness th cannot be dow low Descartes Desvartess snbted is iN thinkine argument ny own being ne. Lo was: ne thinking. V exist. hi Every Ss state have hei fin orach ein, But Sartre finds qtinking ea the ness is inds it nec aw not as Descart pary to revi inking substance exan thought twee, tees meats Substance examining it it was, the concen. accepts the cri B its owl pas from hig etek ety the criticism of les to see argues, in oppo of Edmund Has Desoartes which h i thak ysition to Di serl. Like “1 Sao ing cannc Ot eee ny being sition eth serl. Sart peeing cann t be said to prov hat my being conscious ego whos ence it is to think Te that I exist as 2 subsun a sence is to think Ta substance ea whove states and ieas have a spbstantial tk more,” as Nonmentin eg certainty. “iia nae srs ntin sai ~ ody Ti ay Second, in oppositi i vee sins * ‘s 0! s Husserl’s view of conselo to Descartes, Sartre ap Husserl’s view sciousness as intenti a ny to-an object. Consei entional, as intending or refering to an object, Consouses is always of an objet, « Spoil vhat is otk visel to the “whole world” of oi de a confront it (as the ugly root of the ‘ne a out aol foquentin’s consciousness) aan a fe itself, says Sartre, consci h a transporene, existing only as consciousne eet Be a : with Descartes that consciousness always conscious ness o itself to be aware of an object 's to be aware aware 1 a be unconscis ol Pee and this would pla the power of the Starting: {pon Ie asks ny Ph a Nilesat eat th Tam coneinn substance it which jousness is empty 23s 0 ce consciousness I sudian determinist which rob col aware, and responsibility unconscious and of Fre sciousness of its freedom Sartre has concluded at this point that consel starting point of philosophy the Cartesiat ¢ cogil oN , 1 nothingne™ consciousness 1S intentional, jyparent f itself 7 peing-in tel and teat is conscious 0) for-ltselti a his phew jousie there # reg pe peas " ns of Being: Being- laid the foundation to to conse as it appea® te kinds of bems pnsciousner> The Regio! Now Sartre has cal study of being two absolute spar thee ©Jp AINBD FO BE ERE cof that whieh + other ant the bea ic am the abject runsell 8 trom ivsell than mss! eanseious nsciousness; Without od; Without Freedom) sre is the opposing region ol bemy, the beng of the \ the heing of existing things pe Inble are the objects of conscious jousness, as indepen Things are subject to what they are mreness of any- I Independent of Co ausally Determt Being-in-Hisel! (Ir Consciousness: C But the shjects af CONSEIOHSHESS a chestnut tree The things which : gard ay independent of conse as things-in-themselves are cansally determined to he sss and. this no: aw They simply exist solidly like the root of the chestnut ing being-in-itself ness we Te dently real or causal laws and They have no conscionsnc thing other than themselves massively as what they are tree. Sartre will now call this region of he or the “in-itself” ("en soi’) Being-for-Itself (Conscious Bein B) 1. Conscious of Objects and Self-Conscious. Conscious being. Sartre now calls being-lor-itself, or the “for-itself” (pour- soi’). To be a conscious being, for Sartre, is to be a being-for- itself, by which he means, a being which is conscious of objects and of itself as conscious of them. Being-for-itself is never pure consciousness: it 1s always consciousness of an object, it is a mere transparency through which objects are known. Being-for-itself is also always self-conscious, that is, it is always aware of being conscious of the object. But its self-consciousness means nothing more than this—there is no inner life” of thoughts, beliefs, feelings within consciousness. of which it is aware. Consciousness is empty We move on now with Sartre from the introduction of Part Nea Bein gad hothineness entitled “The Problem of is to ean bea unui deing, Sartre has told us so tar confronting a kr 7 Hi eunse ious being, this being-tor-itsel! Secentns Kind of eng which it is not the being of a continue ning ie ermines things, of being-in-itselt, To be sciousness ani to he awar of a gap between my ¢ | and its objects; it is to be in the world, and pe aware of not heing one of the causally det sl objec Of the worlds i ee bot the causally determined 0 njects rap the sepangies gears ofa stance, an emptiness, & © from the region of things.- SARTHY Conscious Being 2. Brings Nothi Now argue that there is such World and that arises solely jy t is only through cor the world. To MEMES (Nopati scious beings be a conse fous being endlessly to bring INOS inte Hen heine fon is Santee ut bring nothingness into thy world of | ri mn Sartre is trying to shed li ‘ to show the crucial differ Separate canton and from the causal, deterministic und things. ean be being-in-itself, the determing order of things fi” they ent they are causally determined oy tt all ohne i i they e they are, as things-in-the nselves, ett out awareness of Zaps, without any possibilit moves on to show, by realm of being which has the power to Separate itself from its objects, to distinguish itself from the realm of things, to question, to doubt, to entertain Possibilities, to be aware of lacks. But all of these Separating, distinguishing, raising questions, having doubts, thi king of possibilities or def. ‘iencics—introduce a “negative element” into the world, involve what is not, or nothingnes: It is thus only in the distinctive capacities of a conscious being, a for-itself, that you can think of what you lack, da not have, and what your possib ies are. Only asa conscius being can you be dissatisfied with yoursel, an oan mee to-be what you are now, and desire to be 0 is Lip ine This is the meaning of Sartre's starkly contrasting of being-in-itself and being-for-itself: of questions or doubts, contrast, that conscious being is he it i x of for-itself ix ing is what it is... the being of | pf pide ite contrary, as being what it is not and ie] b ‘con not being what it al your awareness In all of these capacities on your var he . it atisfied desires, expec ssibilities, unsatisfi lacks, possibilities, coe case it t is not the & ou have been conscious of a“ eo ‘ure—Yy! : oer is not present, wl eon safous of negating what is. brought negation, nothingne ctual. Yoo at is not actual ‘ at ed so, says, Salle, into the worldye notion o ion ol hinnsell who is not there ith its: custome’rs, Med lights and its smoky mirrors, s jatter of CUPS: ‘and saucers, filled with the cl . ile i ea thing full of being ‘mosphere the sound of vorees and solid; it is what it is, The cal 8a being: in-itself, massive, “full of being.” But chen Sartre fails to sec Pierre, the being of the cafe dissolves. becomes a nothing. The café is reduce aeee rere background for the figure of Pierre that he is Heokane for. The being of the vate is made into nothing, it is negated, nihilated by the question ‘Where is Pierre?” The judgment “Pierre is not here” discloses “a double nihilation” Tt announces the negation o! f Sartre's expectations to meet Pierre. and it accordingly introduc r absence, the non-bein: of Pierre. nothingness, into the being of the café. “The v : sary condition for our saying "says wi etic z not,” says Si i i say ying, not,” says Sartre ith poetic ts that non-bet i thal noe be in he a perpetual presence in us and of us, that nothingness haunts being, Mu 1 th peeves is Sartre, nothingness, tif inal fiuestioning and of “all philosophical or sciet questioner is detaching any question about the world. the dustoner is detaching, dissociating himself % ah ting himself from the causa conscious being i world of things, of vel on aly existence of thine his capacity to withdraw fr s nly part of that oniee® wt the causal urder, the e: m the bare wand to introduce a gap capacity not to be ousness and the realms of things vathing: negation, 1 ness between con:ae “= 356 sani And so Sartys He te mater Ws throngh man that nothing Tent rage heme “Man present Winns ne Comms ine SS UO anise ts abl nN auses nothingne OWN nothingness Nothingness is the finneann vital Nothingness We Nave seen the lor itselfcay to arise m the world” in HS capacity toy hen difference between conseion and its oie. the reals of the initsell and the jan) in the of what Tack and of my possibilities sn tlesie T am-not and no-to-be what Tam. and iy m question the world, to detach inysell fry negate or nihilate being, Sartes world ay tm the : fh, Conscious Being 3. Has Freedom from Objects and from the Causally Deter mined World; Has Power of Negation. Suddenly. how Sartre shows that nothingness, the negation which cons beings bring into the world, is at the same time freedom. And suddenly I see that to be a comstion en to be free—free in relation to any particu ary consciousness; free from the causally determined wor i } negate—to say no, to raise doubts ue things: free to are not pr nt; free to reduce to nothune ibilities which are not present; fi al Pee tO. ihilate the region of things. o s te and nihilate the regi thinsnes Tit ‘by questions-—as the café dissolves into 1 ice by a ene the absent Pere when Sartre looks for the sheet verre eedom as bein And 1 now become aware that m Tt itself is my power. As conscious being I have tv ae ny pejentical power of Hegels Princ the powe to negate, nihilate and ue Megel’s prt the power Sto show that just as Se est Sartre wants to , reaks up © eth desttoy egates, nihilates, cance Is, bret ean LBS negation ne re sss no as a conse ss ialectic a sate, Sel thee and the power to negalt P osciwusnes> hal tion, deny any object of my Seing, E think ot question, us : i ab pos fer as conscious jurure OP Po freedom a Pi not the case, of wht "nk al how | f vat 1s Os . » ty bes absent ot ny do nt exist at preset ve oy nicl ties are, w! eran “ appear” ness © hange my personally ik ta future grea like to cha w. 1 think o ' are no’ « than what they 4 aur CONDEMNED FOnE FREE 7 he present time Sartre s ad States whieh at Tacks at the 4 United ar pir eanscrons being as 10 be free “There is ne point | hetween the being af man and his difference, he says being {ree Conscious Being 4. Has Total Freedom in Is Own Existence: Versus Deter fn But now, dramatically, Sartre says that my freedom nea conscious boing enters my ewan existence. Consciousness is totally tree, undetermined, and thus spontaneous. Since am totally free, my past does not determine what [am tow Between myself as Tam now and my past P have put a gap nothingness. Tam free from my past Take the case of a gambler, Sartre says, who has resolved that he will gamble no more. When he i: confronted with the gaming tables today, his past resolution does not determine what he does now. He finds that he is totally free, he is not determined by his past resolution. This new situation re- quires that he make a new choice, a choice that is totally free and wholly unpredictable as to its consequences—since con- scious beings are totally free. We may add to Sartre's exam- ple of the gambler other cases of the spontaneity of con- sciousness and its freedom from the past—doesn't every alcoholic, every compulsive eater, everyone addicted to ciga- rettes or drugs recognize the truth of Sartre’s point that conscious beings are totally free? Every time I am confronted by whatever my temptation, I discover that I am free, that yesterday's resolution does not determine what I do now, that now I must choose again. Will I or will I not stick to my resolution not to drink, take drugs, smoke, or overeat? This is the freedom of conscious being which we all painfully discover Just as my past does not determine what I am now, so what I am now does not determine my future. Suppose I choose from among my possibilities to become a writer. Since | am totally free, my future actions are not determined by this choice to become a writer, What I will actually do at a future moment of uncertainty about my writing career will be a totally free action on my part, a new choice, and_ wholly unpredictable. Every writer who has eve! suffered from publisher's rejections or from writer's block is painfully aware of this. And so | begin to understand what it is to be totally freene aber ahah he develope nthe tare Means Prend argues that Tae cannot loercalls be as cata d Scrous forces. hy antecedent psrehokagea! ines Aeuinet Marc. Sartre argues that se the mode of production and class eon according tSarte in priority of object over subject” But dona the Roenticth century regard me as tena ‘deter sciences af te frees Do thes nat explin me as the ‘neuthie: na ath product of an overwhelming set of condition of Revchologal. socal conor, “a onan a these conditions determine me, are they not respenitict alee de Fe they not responsible Sartre savagch denounces determinisns of ay Manaan, Freudian, or scientific, for viewing h : Wither were causally determined things, wiin the raneat beingvin-itself. rather than as free conscious being. Sate argues that my “facticity,” by which he means the contnget Garcumstances or facts of my life, may be biologically, psych tally. socially. and economically determined, but asco ‘tows being, i choose the meaning they have for me. Ass free, active consciousness, 1 transform this factcty by m seeice of meanings and possibilities, by my projets tom chelation. By situation Sartre means an organization ol be sorld into a meaningful totality from the viewpoin'¢4 wotwidual, I live in the situation 1 have structured, shove ogy of my own making, the world as it ir Os, meaning I choose to give The projects 1 choose for my future | cae ne as Lam and ot der which T have lived have contin vet FP ra te Wrone the Beta Anan ts abways trees ad Sartre: dicing the German iuan to the free wall versus determunism seme that we make ourselves wi ja canditions have made of as, ont of our past, We sini chamage these: facts but wee are free im giving them Vag neon axon situations, sshich we construct and tat as aur neaniugs and projects change. And so, seit to the view that the facts of the world make a man Malle of a deug addict, Sartre argues that an aleoholi ies a world of hiv awn making, by the meaning he has Wve his Iie and by: choosing to live it as an Keane. Are you an alcohol or food or drug or tobacco or pomogeaphy addict? Arc you addicted to masochism or to Cidisa as a way of hfe? Sartre says you have chosen this and that you are free to choose another way to live your life. you ate free to construct a new situation for yourself with mean- ings and projects which you choose. Nothing in your past prevents you—you are not solely determined by your past secugetion of Th Sartee Weare free 1 Conscious Being: 5. Hay Total Responsibility for Own World. But now Sartre discloses th, ial 4 an 7 greater depth to my freedom as the situation in which I live, [alone ‘o world The on af Lict has only the me: of © meaning to my ng that consciouscashe n Psee thy ny Tonger turn ‘ct upon my activities aye nite truth to which | pins for any Ii hut I woutd like to becumne Thi Nor ‘can T turn to! God as my fou Gord is dead, says Sartre rth and ‘alue ete he See that T alone am thes ony" world has Te ean nye cxistenc of God. the universal tthe of scence Meee old beliefs in political authority. None uf these sect stitute realm of ab Conscious Being yees Anguish. And now, 1 have the shat aware hat by being totally free. 1 am totally respi for my choices, totally responsible for what Uam and dy totally responsible for giving meaning and value to my wa nd without any support from God or any other foundation of trath and values. 1 totter on the brink of nothingness | cxperience dizziness, vertigo. anguish. Anguish i the ral fie that my total freedom is also my total responsibly tlefine my situation, to choose the meaning of my word 1d myself at once as totally free [ble to derive the meaning ofthe from myself Jn anguish 1 apps and as not being al world except as coming sn freed 2 He has ung me from fresdom ¢ iiiee says Sartre, but my freedo What has Sartre indeed wer anguish, Tam deed fe, oe nl dreaded freedom! went ut I dl rat chame thing Vary ing, Lam condemned (0 The means that nnn can tae found casey fay vadful freedom, we try to avoid re when we are face-tofaer find it hard to endure this total jsibility. I long not to be condemned to freedom ner ay to live as a nibilating consciousness, endlessly choosing Nd of person Lam, choosing the projects by which Teas ict new situations, and bearing responsibility for the: yy world and my actions in it. T would wish to be itself, like a stone or an inkwell. is massive and solid to itself, Things have no gaps, they do not bring the world, they do not feel lack or dis: Mtsfaction, they do not endlessly pursue possibilities and prajects which they never fulfill, they do not freely choose tind bear the responsibility Dut we try toe the anviety which we € {ath ur own freedom. resp have and 2 wothinaness. int Conscious Being Escapes into Bad Faith, But to seek to escape, as we all Ju. fem freedom and responsibility Sartre calls: bad faith Bad faith 1s the attempt to escape from my freedom by pretending that human affairs are unavotdable’ of necessar, Ws the casa order of things. “We Mle from dread” nays Sartre bitinaly, “by pretending to look at ourselves aa thin.” But bad fath is selEdeception; it a He we tell te nirseves, it 6 "a hie in the soul” says Sartre. ‘We are nee Caunally necessitated things, we are totally ree consciows lings” But endlessly we escape from this painful trath aboct onselves, by the many forms of bad faith Sarire now presents his famous example of bad faith. Take the case ofthe courtship, says Sartre, a woman and 4 man on thei frst date, perhaps in a theater The woman knows vere well the intentions of the man, and she also knows. savy Sartre, that sooner or later she will have to make a decision Bat when he takes her and, she postpones the decision of Whether or not to accept him, and so she pretends th tas not noticed that he has taken her hand. "She does = ‘notice because it happens by chance that she is at this mo.+ Sea ale ec Sat i oe ir Tet ste amovem are a Tittle Loo precise. loo: (e. saays Sart is ang ne cent aie beds Shee hae tows for fares ts in te i a ie ever ean mechan he eat te Saker haste Seren’ But he cannot be a waiter “as an inkwell lan ney Ue dhaniem from which he will gxin social approval Bet pesicton of the perforane Titan ei pore fr de Pe comists in the pretense of being Wen of bal (Or, Sartee continues, take the ee pate wh a oe art omovontal oi he ts 0 by nature, ares says ug that fs his destiny, that it is involontary on he Par that its something whieh he eannot elpauy ee ile can be ba 4 Table, arn relbalred won seh rae eared. This homosestal, too, isin bad faith Te is trying to escape his freedom and his responsibil eyposing. what he is and what he poral Fe what he is and what he does, by thinking of hinsel cooetning, totally determined by nature, a a cabbage cat help being a cabbage and is incapable of change, Ths uped cP etn denies responsibility by pretending to be de via cd by mature, But a second pervon denies th! hs Tromosesual although admitting t a patter ‘of certain a He claims that these past actions have no significance fr is a He cla avon that he Tis been bom anew: Te eeercexmal’s type of al faith is the PpPOe te afte et pore bad faith for pretending 9 De tate second is bad faith by denying ny ee pein whatever frown his past actions upon his present cond, Another type of bad faith 5 Semitism. In Sates Ivctions on the Jewish Question, welt a anderstand the Frenne Beanite. The Frenchine! ‘semites, who are antis from scious bx ethics, of moral PI vie yma a i rade, bees Babes ich wives them a e ay he more ntellnge dette vide tng a wel haunt Being and Nothinan ther goth (ath possible fect reo Gath? This ithe meohee japhy. We turn to Sartre's ethics