THEORY

OF ERROR
PRABH

of intrinsin
that according
to
the heory dity,
the
to be self-validisby
WE have seen

knowledge is held
knowledge, all
inherent in knowledge,
while nvalidity inierred on accou
invalidity 1s inferredah
Validity is c o n t r a d 1 c t i o n in
the causes ot knowledge. ut if
of some defect or at all arise? Prabhat
is-self-valid, how can
error d
knowledge
Kum pla give different answers to
this
as
question. Prabh kara
Viparitakhy ti.
abhkara's view is
known as Akhyti and Kum rila's
with his viewsense.intrinsic
of valid:.
accordance
Prabhäkara, in strict All knowlof
admit error in the logical
knowledge, does not

valid se. To experience is always to

experience validly. Error, the
per knowledge. All knowledos
truth. It is
imperfect
fore, is onlyispartial valid, though all knowledge is not necessarily períect
knowledge, quite
knowledge is commonly called 'error. But error is true so far
Imperfect far enough. All knowledge being true,
as it goes; only it does not go
there can be no logical distinction between truth and error. Prabhäkan
is true to his realistic position in maintaining that knowledge can never

misrepresent its object. Error is only, not of commission.

one of omission

It is only non-apprehension, not mis-apprehension. It is not a umitary

in fact, it consists of two
knowledge, not a Single psychosis, but, fall apart
psychoses, it is a composite of two cognitions which really
unrelated. Error is due to non-discrimination between these two cogmi
tions and their separa objects. It is a mere non-apprehension or the
distinction between the two cognitions and their objects. fence this
view of error is called akhyti or non-apprehension. Error arises wnen
we
forget the fact that instead of one cognition there are reallywo
cognitions denoting two separate objects and further torget the ia
that these two cognitions as well as their objects are distinct and
lated.
Two.factors areinvolved in error. One is positive and the o
negative. The positive factor consists in the presence of two cog tions

which inreveal theirrespectiveobjects only partially. The negav and

factor

Consists overlooking the distinction between these two cog y

their objects. Both these
cognitions may be presentat1ve or bntative
representative or one may be presentative and the other
If both the
cognitions are presentative, error is due to eperimina
tion between
perception and perception; if both arenonentativt
error is due to
non-discrimination between memory and opry: if on
is
presentative and the other
representative, mediscrim
nation between error
is due l s due
to
perception and Inmemory. all cases
non-discrimination which means distinc
non-apprehension of distun
 THEORY OF ERROR
'S
KUM

the intei.
maintaining
with Prabhäkara in inasm1
KUMARILA
agrees
Hut he
I r o m Prabhakara
difters und
mucherror. He recogn
as he müntaina
truth and
of knowledge.
distinction
between
mere
tro
logical and not as
the
unitary Prehen.
misapprehension

it as
a
such and regards is a single psychosis,
further holds that error Error i Oled
sion. He impertect
cognitions. not
of two of
and not a
composite commission.
Kumarila agrces with Prabh
of n
omission, but also of "this is silve
perception
maintaining that in the erroncusperceived as the
'this"' bereft of it
is
things are present. The shell in
ell
as silver bereft of :
ness and silver
is imported niemory merely it

thatness, on account t the qualiies

of
whiteness and brightness which
are common hoth shcll and silver. But he difers from1 Prabhäkan
to
and maintains that there is a positive Wrong synthesis of these two
clenents-the perceived and the remembered, and that error is not due
nierely to the non-apprehension of the distinction bctween them. The
two clements are not united in fact. But they apPear to be so in error.
Errur is partial misrepresentation. Eror is not akhyäti or non-appre
hension but viparita-khyti misapprehension. It is not due to nan
or

discrimination between
bhedägraha or asarmsarggraha),
two imperfect cognitions (vivekäkhyti or
but it is due to a positive wrong
synthesis of the two imperfect cognitions which, though in fact unre
lated. welded
are
together as a
unitary knowledge (sams in error
graha viparitagraha). Thus error becomes a single psyhos
or

unitary cognition, a positive misapprehension and theretore o

commission. The shel is
hension of one misperceived as silver.
ohject another object which in fact it
as Error is
a
apprr

misapprchension
and
ariscs due to some
defect in the
de
is set aside
by a suhsequent cause long
rror
s experienced sublating knuwledgr. Bu
Is *t as1de
it is val1d
by extranevus
asa
cognition per se. Its alidity
intrinsie vahdt,
ls
cgnituon or
a contradicting conditions like dctects in tn
c a u s e s

to
the extent cognition. rais
When error he adn1its the subjective Kunrila gves
or the ideal element in cro
is
creeps into it. regardedthe as

between ihem Though

is not
two misapprehcnsion,
relata are y e t t h e relation
so. scparately real *
 XI
NYAYA THEORY OF ERRoR
ARILA'S Viparita-khyäti is
much similar
va-Vaishe_ka, thougn
Nyäya- Anyathã-khyáti
there are certain of the
to

Naishe_ika also believes like dafferences details. The in

ng synthesis ot the
presented Kumärila
and the that errot due
resented object contused with the represented objects. toThe
a
1s

anyatha' means 'elsewise and "elsewhere" andpresented

both
one. The wurd

hrought out in error. The presented object is these meanings are

he represented object perceived clsewise and
exists clsewhere, The shell and the silver
both separately real; only their synthesis, their relation are

is unreal. The shell 1s

misperceived 'shell-silve'
as silver which exists elsew
as

the here,
e.g., in
market (apanastha). The Nyya-laishesika, like Kuniärila.
recognizes the subjective clement in error. Error is due to a
synthesis ot the presented objects. \ätsyäyana says: "\Vhat is setwron
aside
by true knowledge is the wrong apprehension, not the
object.
tddrota
kara remarks: "The object all the while remains what it actually is..
the error lhes in the cognition'. Gangesha observes:. "A real object is

mistaken as another real objectwhich exists elsewhere The ditferenc

between the Naiyäyika and Kumärila is that while Kumärila is beillly
to forsake his realism to the extent of maintaining the ideal
prepared
element in error, the Naiyäy1ka in order to perserve his realism vainly
revival of
falls back upon extraordinary percepion to explain the
SEr in memory. He maintains that the revIval of salver in meniory
s due to complicated perception gninalak_aFapratyak_a) which is
varnety of extraordinary (alaukika) perception. Thus be_Wants to make
uC represented silver as actually perceived, though in an extraordinary

such e traordinary perception. The Naiy-

ay. Kumrila admits Kurnrila no

in maintaining that knowledge is

not
turther differs frum
a becomes so on actuunt
of extraneous conditions.
Tinsically valid but
correspondence as the
ot
truth. But
realhzing the
nature
regards test
ot truth, he
that correspondence
cannot
serve as the and
y (samvdipravrttu), as
of
the test truth
S s successful activity
as the
criterion ot truth 1s concerned, Auma-
so far regards all
p s pragmatism of
truth and when
non-contradiction to be the nature invalid
seme

know valid. Knowledge becomes it is sel

when
as intrinsically or
def g the auscs ot knowledge K u m ä n l a takes a
defects discovered in Thus
sid e knowiedge.
Subsequent sublatingtruth error. Prabhäkaia,
as ell of
as
detach scientiflic view
of
validity of truth and the
a and theory ol extrinsic misapprehcnsion
Naiy yika's
N like the ot
positive
error
as

A S and Kumänla s account

9
 distinction between truth and err
no logical agreeine f
and maintaining
test
pragmatic or tuth eing with him
back the Naiyäyika's
on and
error s that ch does not
which
hat which works and
that truth is
lacks practical worth.

XIII
THEORY OF ERROR
RAMANUJA's
and in Rminuja
view of error in carlier Sänkhya techni ly
called sat-khyäti is similar to view of Prabhäkara's akhyati
the

Sänkhya, Prabhäkara
and Rimänuja all be>ieve that' error
not misapprehension.
Error is only partialn
al
truth.
apprehension and
Cognition s such is never invalid. Error mens imperlect and incom

plete truth. The way to remove error

is to acquire more perfem
ect nd
complete knowledge. no subjective
There is or ideal element In error.
Truth only supplements error and does not cancel it. Rimänuja adopu
Prabhäkara's theory with
some modihcation and his theeoryoris 'Non
caled
yathärthakhyäti or satkhyti or akhyäti-samvalitasatkhy ti
apprehension-cum-apprehension of Reality'. Ramánuja goes to the
extent of
saying that the shell appears as silver because there are some
particles of silver in it and explains this by his of interpretation triplica-
tion or
quintuplication
sion is real
(trivrt-karana or pañchí-karana). Al apprehen-
(yathärtam sarvavijnänam). Error
only it does not go sufficiently far enough. The 1sdistinction right far
as ft
so goes;
between error
and truth, therefore, not logical,
is but only practical. The difference
between Prabhätara and Rmnuja is that while the former is
with the content
non-apprehension of the distinction between
perceived shell
andsilver
remembered silver, the latter advocates
real
of in the shell, and while the former takes perception ofthe element
knowiedge, regarding knowledge as only a meansfully
a
pragmatic
to successful
view o

Rimánuja' values
fruits it bears. Theknowledge
more for the light it
brings
activiy
later
bebeve in Sadasatkhyäti which Sänkhya, like the Sñkhya-sütra, than for u
and Jauns
rih and agrees mainly with the view
and is need
not be
repeated. Error of
held as due toa wrong is here regarded as misapprehe
*parately real (sat), though the synthesis of two
synthesis itself is cognitions
are
wne
unreal (asat).
XIV
THEORY OF
ERRoR VEDNTA
AND ADVAITA iN
WE have thus MaHAY
far
which claim to be considered the theories
realistic in one of error in schoos

way or tho
the other. These1 isC
 divided in their view of error
ools are
and may be
ser wo
under t groups accrang as they broadly classi fied
regard error as mere
non-apprehen
s
misapprehesionthe
rati of
fact which
divides Prabhäkara and
he Prabhäkara, the satkhyäti of earlier
Sänkhya
and the akhytisarhvalitasatkhyti or the

group which holds erroryathrtha-khyti Rämänuja

na-khyåti of Rämänu of
fall under ne on-apprehension and
rejects the subjective element in error l
p a r t i a l truth. n e viparitakhyäti of Kum rila, ther anyathäkhyäti
s h e r e treated
of

va. and the sadasatkhyti of later Sänkhya and of Jainism fall

second group which regards error misapprehension
the s as
under
the subjective cietnent in error. Error is here treated as partial misrepre and admits
Sentation. But al these theories tail to account satisfactorily for the fact
of error. Error cannot be taken as mere non-apprehension, for there is
de finitely a subjective element involved in error which is later on con-
tradicted by the sudlaing cogniti0n. This view ignores the fact that as
long as error asts,t 13 taken as true and prompts activity though it may
result in tailure. 1 herc is actual presentation of silver to consciousness
and not a mere memory-Image. It the two cognitions stand apart un
related and if error is due to mere non-apprehension of their distinction,
the natural question which arises il-Do these two cognitions appear
n consciousness or nott It they do, then there must be the cognition ol

their distinction also; if they do not, they are unreal, Agan, neither
correspondence can be taken to be the nature of truth nor pragmati
Prabhäkara at least has right maintain
activity its test. Again, no to
non-apprehension,
when he
rejects negation itself as
an independen
category. The other group which regards crror as misapprehension
cqually fails to explain error. error purely subjective, if knowledge
If is

misrepresent its object, then realism stands rejected. How

can
the
Can it is
shell
bemisperceived as silver?
Silver cannot
be perceived because
hOY there and there can be no sense-contact with it. It cannot be a mere

lasts, there actual presentation

is
because as long as error
Ory-image,
to consciousness. The extraordinary Jnanalargana percpton
Silver I
he diemma belore
is a mere arbitrary assumption.
itted by Nyya afterwards
If silver is real, cannot be contradicted
it
ealist is this: how t
is
unreal, can
cognition of shell; and ifsliver atis
Re sublating error? Realism cannot give any
to consciousness during
ar is answered by
the
idealst schools
to this. This question Vedänta. Shünyavda, Vijnana
ofanswer and Advaita
2ahayana Buddhism advocate view
known as anirvacntnya
Vedänta the original
a n d Advaita due to the tact that the
khyäti. nodox tradition, probably not available to
it, acribes
Worke and Vijniänavida were that the object of
which means
toSh unyavida view of asatkhyäti Vijñ naväda
the view
vada the
to
18 and
vosd, the of the
or reality itselt
Cop
gnition i
superimposition

is
that error
t ank
yati
which means

2
 ucen twocognitions and their objects. It is called
dgraha or armsarggraha. Let us take some ilustrations. vivekkhyäti or

suffering from jaundice sees white conch

person s a When
ris. There is cognition of the conch the "this'
a yellow, twócogni-
as
minus its white
colour,
and there is also
cognition of the yellow colour alone of the
a

Both these cognitions are partial and imperfect, though quite valid
far they go. The conch s peroeived as the "this' and not as the
as

eonch'. The bile is perceived as the 'yellowness' and not the bile'. as
And the distinction between the "this' of the conch and the
yellowneas'
of the bile is not apprehended. Here, there is non-discrimination beween
perception and perception, as both the cognitions are presentative in
character. Similarly, when a white crystal is perceived as red on account
of a red fower placed near it, there is non-apprehension of the
distinction between cognitions which are partial and imperfect
two
the cognition of the crystal minus ib whiteness and the cognition of the
edness alone of the 1ower. Here also, there is non-discrimination
between two partial perceptions. Again, if person recollects that be

w yesterday a long snake lying on the road when really he sawonly a

piece of rope, here also two imperfect cognitions arise--the recollection
of the rope as the 'that' minus its ropeness and the recollectionof
the snake 'robbed of its thatness'. Here, there is non-discrimination
eween two memory-images. Again, when a person mistakes a shell
a piece of silver and-says, "this is slver, two impertect cognitions
arise. The 'this' of the shell is actually perceived
together with certain
in
alitieslike whiteness and brightness which the shell shares
common with silver, but shellness.
minus its The_ common qualities
the person has
eve impression of silver which
in memory the
s
imported in memory merely
Perceived previously elsewhere. Silver(pramugtatattakasmaraFa. Silver
silver, 'robbed of its thatness the fact of its
represented memory-image, though at the time
as a

memory-image and not peroeption forgotten due to

s

eng only a
the between the
discrimination
i n defect (smstipramoga). And its
erceived 'this' of the shell and the remembered aulver without
atness is not apprehended. Here,
there is
non-discrimination between
Perception and memory, betweena presented thing and a represented

these
mage. There is only non-pprenenson or tNe austinction between
and their partialy presented objects. But there
wo imperfect
mpertect ccognitions
ecuse the shell' is not mis-perceived as 'silver,
8 no misapprehensio
a the shell never enters consc0uineis.
T
he this' is never sublated for
is known, the penon says: this is shell'.
ben the error

nePius
ple camere a i