Posing The Problem of Criterion - Andrew D. Cling

Posing the Problem of the Criterion
Author(s): Andrew D. Cling

Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition , Sep., 1994, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 261-292
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320518
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ANDREW D. CLING
POSING THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION
(Received 27 February 1993)
Although it has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, the

problem of the criterion raises questions which must be addressed by any
complete account of knowledge. But the problem of the criterion suffers
not only from neglect but also from the lack of a clear, comprehensive,
and complete statement of the problem itself. As a result, it has been
unclear what must be done to solve it.
Discussions of the problem of the criterion rightly begin with the
work of Roderick Chisholm for he is virtually the only major contem-
porary epistemologist who has given sustained attention to this ancient
skeptical paradox.1 Chisholm provides an important formulation of the
problem itself and an influential description of the range of possible
responses. Unfortunately, Chisholm's statement of the problem of the
criterion is seriously flawed for it is unclear and incomplete in several
important respects. As a result, Chisholm's account of the range of
possible responses to the problem, his own proposed solution, and his
account of what is necessary to solve the problem are all deficient.
To address the important questions raised by the problem of the
criterion we need a new formulation of the problem itself, a different
understanding of the range of possible responses, and a fresh account
of the conditions which must be met by a satisfactory solution. I aim
to provide all three, using Chisholm's important work as a jumping-off
point and foil.
Chisholm poses the problem of the criterion as this argument for skep-
ticism:
Philosophical Studies 75: 261-292, 1994.

i 1994 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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262 ANDREW D. CLING
[1] You cannot answer question A ['what do we know?'] until you have answered
question B ['how are we to decide whether we know?']. And [2] you cannot answer
question B until you have answered question A. Therefore [3] you cannot answer either
question. [3a] You cannot know what, if anything, you know, and [3b] there is no
possible way for you to decide in any particular case.2
Chisholm says that there are only three possible responses to this prob-
lem: (i) adopt skepticism, (ii) claim to have an answer to 'how are
we to decide whether we know?' and use it to answer 'what do we
know?' (methodism), or (iii) claim to have an answer to 'what do we
know?' and use it to answer 'how are we to decide whether we know?'
(particularism).
Chisholm adopts particularism. He thinks that we grasp immediately,
without the help of a criterion, that there are some things that we do
know. These bits of knowledge form the basis for answering 'how are
we to decide whether we know?' Chisholm concedes that particularism
begs the question, but he claims that this is the price that any response
to the problem of the criterion must pay.3
II
Chisholm claims that the problem of the criterion arises from the ques-
tions 'what do we know?' and 'how are we to decide whether we know?'
These questions do lead to a serious problem, but that is because they
are special cases of the more general questions 'which statements4 are
true?' and 'how can we tell which statements are true?' The differences
between these pairs of questions must be clearly understood.
'Which statements are true?' asks for a list of true statements.
Our concerns are usually more focused. We do not typically ask,
'which statements are true?', we ask, 'which statements about tomor-
row's weather are true?', 'which statements about the rest mass of the
neutrino are true?', 'which statements about our moral obligations are
true?'; and so on. Each of these questions, however, is just a special
case of 'which statements are true?'
'How can we tell which statements are true?' asks for a criterion
of truth. An ideal criterion of truth would be a principle specifying a
detectable property5 C such that C is not a part of the meaning of 'true',

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POSING THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 263
but any statement would have C (in the appropriate circumstances)

if, and only if, that statement were true. We should, however, be
liberal in counting principles as criteria of truth even though they depart
somewhat from this ideal. Principles which specify only sufficient
conditions, only necessary conditions, only probabilistic necessary or
sufficient conditions, or principles which are limited to specific domains,
for example, should count as alleged criteria of truth. The problem of
the criterion calls all such principles into question.
Chisholm poses the problem of the criterion in terms of 'what do
we know?' and 'how are we to decide whether we know?'6 On one
reading - the lower-order reading - these questions are the same as
'which statements are true'? and 'how can we tell which statements
are true?', respectively. Sometimes when we ask what is known on a
particular subject we want a list of true statements about that subject.
"What do we know about the murderer?," Doright may ask, seeking a
list of true statements about the criminal he seeks. Similarly, when we
ask about how to decide what is known on some topic, sometimes we
simply want a procedure for distinguishing between true statements and
false statements on that topic. "How can I know who the murderer is?,"
Doright may ask, seeking a procedure for identifying the killer.
But that is not the only way to read Chisholm's questions. According
to the higher-order reading, 'how are we to decide whether we know?' is
not a request for lower-order information about some topic, but a request
for information about our knowledge of that topic.7 On the higher-order
reading 'how are we to decide whether we know?' means 'how can
we tell which statements about our knowledge are true?' Any respons
to this question would be a list of statements about knowledge, that
is, a set of epistemic propositions with the form s knows that p.8 Such
epistemic propositions are about the epistemic standing of a person's
belief and not, or at least not directly, about the subject matter of the
belief itself: Doright knows that Mugsy killed Squealer is not about
what Mugsy killed Squealer is about. On the higher-order reading, a
complete, correct answer to 'how are we to decide whether we know?'
would be a list of all true statements about our knowledge and, therefore,
would be but a proper subset of the complete correct answer to 'which
statements are true?'

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264 ANDREW D. CLING
On the higher-order reading 'how are we to decide whether we

know?' asks for a procedure for distinguishing true from false claims
about knowledge.9 Thus, on the higher-order reading a response to 'how
are we to decide whether we know?' would be a proposed criterion of
truth for statements about knowledge. It is one thing to have a procedure
for deciding whether or not Mugsy killed Squealer, it is quite another to
have a criterion for deciding whether or not Doright knows that Mugsy
killed Squealer. Since a criterion of truth for epistemic propositions
need not be a general criterion of truth, an answer to 'how are we to
decide whether we know?' (higher-order reading) would not necessarily
be an answer to 'how can we tell which statements are true?'
If 'what do we know?' and 'how are we to decide whether we
know?' are questions about epistemic propositions and criteria of tru
for epistemic propositions, respectively, then the skepticism which is t
conclusion of Chisholm's version of the problem is narrow in scope. For
on the higher-order reading of these questions, the skeptic's argument
concludes only that we cannot tell whether any proposition about our
knowledge is true, not that we cannot tell whether any proposition is
true. The former challenge, though important, is just a special case of a
more basic and comprehensive problem. For on the lower-order reading
of Chisholm's questions the skeptic's argument claims that we cannot
tell the true from the false on any topic.
Chisholm does not clearly distinguish between these two readings of
the questions.10 On the one hand, he says that the problem of the crite-
rion arises when we consider the question "'[w]hat can I really know
about the world'Il which is most naturally interpreted as a general
question about which propositions we can and which propositions we
cannot determine to be true. Similarly, he also approves of Cardinal
Mercier's claim that a criterion of truth would provide us with "a way
of distinguishing the true and the false ... "12
But Chisholm frequently seems to have the higher-order reading in
mind. For example, he claims that
... the problem is: How are we to distinguish the real cases of knowledge from what
only seem to be cases of knowledge? Or, as I put it before, how are we to decide in any
particular case whether we have genuine items of knowledge?13

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Sometimes Chisholm is ambiguous. In the following passage, for

example, Chisholm builds on the idea that the problem of the criterion
is analogous to the problem of distinguishing good from bad apples:
In the case of the apples, we have a method - a criterion - for distinguishing the good
ones from the bad ones. But in the case of the beliefs, we do not have a method or a
criterion for distinguishing the good ones from the bad ones. Or, at least, we don't have
one yet. The question we started with was: how are we to tell the good ones from the
bad ones? In other words, we were asking: What is the proper method for deciding
which are the good beliefs and which are the bad ones - which beliefs are genuine cases
of knowledge and which beliefs are not?14
The final question in this passage is based on the higher-order reading of

the questions - 'which beliefs are genuine cases of knowledge and which
beliefs are not?' - but it identifies this with the ambiguous question,
'[w]hat is the proper method for deciding which are the good beliefs
and which are the bad ones ... ?' where 'good belief' could naturally
be taken to mean either 'true belief' or 'genuine case of knowledge'.
Sometimes Chisholm simply runs the two levels of analysis together.
Here, for example, is part of his discussion of the conditions under
which we would be adequately justified in believing propositions about
our own mental states:
Wishing, say, that one were on the moon is a state which is such that a man cannot be in
that state without it being evident to him that he is in that state. And so, too, for thinking
certain thoughts and having certain sensory or emotional experiences. These states
present themselves and are, so to speak, marks of their own evidence. They cannot
occur unless it is evident that they occur. I think they are properly called the "first truths
of fact." Thus St. Thomas could say that "the intellect knows that it possesses the truth
by reflecting on itself."' 5
Here Chisholm begins by discussing the conditions under which it is

evident (we are adequately justified in believing) that statements about
our own mental states are true. According to Chisholm, such statements
are evident whenever we are in the corresponding mental state. But the
quotation from Aquinas changes the focus. For it is not concerned
with the conditions in which non-epistemic propositions about our own
mental states are evident, but the conditions under which epistemic
propositions concerning our own grasp of the truth are evident or known
to be true. The conditions under which non-epistemic propositions about

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266 ANDREW D. CLING
our own mental states - I believe that there will be a performance of

Macbeth tomorrow - are evident are quite likely to be different from
the conditions under which propositions about the epistemic standing
of our beliefs - I know that there shall be a performance of Macbeth
tomorrow - are evident, for such beliefs have quite different contents.
It is one thing to know whether I have a belief; it is quite another to
know the epistemic value of that belief.
However these ambiguities in Chisholm's discussion are to be
resolved, the important thing to notice is that Chisholm poses the skep-
tic's argument in terms of the higher-order reading of the questions
'what do we know?' and 'how are we to decide whether we know?'
For the conclusion of that argument does not say that we can never
tell whether any statement is true. It makes the weaker claim that we
cannot tell whether we have any knowledge, that is, that we can never
tell whether any statement about our knowledge is true.16 This narrow
version of the problem of the criterion is just a special case of a more
fundamental and comprehensive skeptical challenge.
III
Since the questions which lead to Chisholm's higher-order version of

the problem of the criterion are special cases of 'which statements
are true?' and 'how can we tell which statements are true?' it might
seem that we can pose the most basic and comprehensive version of the
problem simply by substituting these questions into Chisholm's version
of the skeptic's argument. This is not the case, however, for Chisholm's
statement of the skeptic's argument is unclear and incomplete in other
ways.
Here is the argument that results from making these substitutions:
[1] You cannot answer question A ['which statements are true?'] until you have
answered question B ['how can we tell which statements are true?']. And [2] you
cannot answer question B until you have answered question A. Therefore [3] you
cannot answer either question. [3a] You cannot tell whether any statement is true or
not, and [3b] there is no possible way to decide in any particular case.

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This argument requires further clarification, for, re

ises are obviously false.
Premise (1) is false because it is clearly possible to answer 'which
statements are true?' without first having an answer to 'how can we
tell which statements are true?' Listing statements at random will do
it. The trick, of course, is not simply to answer 'which statements are
true?' but to provide an answer which has positive epistemic value. We
want statements which are true, known, justified, or some such thing.
Not just any answer to 'which statements are true?' will do: we want a
good answer.
Premise (2) suffers from a similar problem. It is clearly possible
to give an answer to 'how can we tell which statements are true?'
without first having an answer to 'which statements are true?' by
simply selecting a criterion at random. But we want a criterion with
positive epistemic value. In order to capture this important normative
dimension of the skeptic's premises and to cover the wide range of
specific epistemic values that we may want our statements and our
criteria to have, let us reformulate the premises of the argument using
'good' as the most abstract term of positive epistemic appraisal and as
a placeholder for terms which express more specific positive epistemic
values. I do not mean to suggest that Chisholm is confused on this rather
picky point. I only claim that with these modifications the argument
more explicitly captures what the skeptic must claim. The argument
now runs as follows:
[1] You cannot have a good answer to question A ['which statements are true?'] until
you have a good answer to question B ['how can we tell which statements are true?'].
And [2] you cannot have a good answer to question B until you have a good answer to
question A. Therefore [3] you cannot have a good answer to either question. [3a] You
cannot tell whether any statement is true or not, and [3b] there is no possible good way
to decide in any particular case.
There are several problems with this argument. The expression

'cannot ... until ...' in each premise can suggest that the problem of
the criterion is primarily a problem about the temporal order in which
'which statements are true?' and 'how can we tell which statements
are true'? must be answered. If this were so, then the problem of the
criterion would be a problem about what must be done first in time if

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268 ANDREW D. CLING
we are to acquire good beliefs or

problem does have implications for
inquiry, the fundamental priorit
The concept of epistemic priority
the problem of the criterion. In general, to say that P is epistemically
dependent upon Q is to say that P could be good only if Q were good,
that is, that P would not be good if Q were not good.'8
So the claim that we cannot have a good answer to 'which statements
are true?' until we have a good answer to 'how can we tell which
statements are true'? is at least the claim that having a good criterion of
truth is a necessary condition for having any good beliefs, that is, t
if a person has any good beliefs, that person must have a good criterion
of truth. The claim that we cannot have a good answer to 'how can
we tell which statements are true?' until we have a good answer to
'which statements are true?' entails a similar claim: that a person can
have a good criterion of truth only if that person has some good beliefs.
In short, the premises in the skeptic's argument make claims about the
epistemic dependence of good beliefs on good criteria of truth and vice
versa.
Here is how the argument runs when take 'cannot ... until . . . ' to
express the claim that good beliefs are epistemically dependent upon
good criteria of truth and vice versa:
[1] You can have a good answer to question A ['which statements are true?'] only if
you have a good answer to question B ['how can we tell which statements are true?'].
And [2] you can have a good answer to question B only if you have a good answer
question A. Therefore [3] you cannot have a good answer to either question. [3a] You
cannot tell whether any statement is true or not, and [3b] there is no possible good way
to decide in any particular case.
This cannot be all there is to the skeptic's premises, however, for the
conclusions - (3a) that we cannot tell whether any statement is true or
not and (3b) that we cannot have a good criterion of truth - do not follow
from them. The most that follows from (1) and (2) is that it is possible to
have a good answer to 'which statements are true?' if, and only if, it is
possible to have a good answer to 'how can we tell which statements are
true?': that good beliefs depend upon a good criterion of truth and vice
versa. But this does not entail (3a) nor does it entail (3b). It would entail

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these things only if we already assume either that (3a) we cannot have
a good answer to 'which statements are true?' or that (3b) we cannot
have a good answer to 'how can we tell which statements are true?' In
short, this version of the argument is either blatantly question-begging
or incomplete.
What is needed is a pair of claims about the relative epistemic
independence of beliefs and criteria of truth. The temporal language
Chisholm uses in posing the problem can help us to see this: if we
could acquire good beliefs only after we had a good criterion of truth,
then not only would the goodness of those beliefs come later than (read:
depend upon) the goodness of our criterion of truth, but the goodness of
our criterion of truth could not come later than (read: would have to be
independent of ) the goodness of our beliefs. This is so since, according
to the skeptic, "prior" to having a good criterion of truth we simply
could not - hence, would not - have any good beliefs. The skeptic
must claim, therefore, not just that the epistemic goodness of any good
beliefs depends upon the epistemic goodness of some criterion of truth,
and vice versa, but also that the epistemic goodness of that criterion
cannot depend upon - must be independent of - the epistemic goodness
of those beliefs, and vice versa.
Here is how the argument runs when we insert these additional claims
into the premises:
[1] You can have a good answer to question A ['which statement are true?'] only if you
have an independently good answer to question B ['how can we tell which statements
are true?']. And [2] you can have a good answer to question B only if you have an
independently good answer to question A. Therefore [3] you cannot have a good answer
to either question . [3a] You cannot tell whether any statement is true or not, and [3b]
there is no possible good way to decide in any particular case.
This is a powerful argument for skepticism.
IV
It is important to have a complete version of the skeptic's argument both

in order to see that the premises really do entail the intended conclusions
and in order to understand the full range of possible responses to the

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270 ANDREW D. CLING
problem. Here, then, is the problem of the criterion master argument,

constructed from the version just given by eliminating potentially con-
fusing circumlocutions and supplying the necessary intermediate steps:
1. Good beliefs depend upon an independently good criterion

of truth. (Premise)
la. We can have no independently good beliefs. (from (1))

2. A good criterion of truth depends upon independently good
beliefs. (Premise)
2a. We can have no independently good criterion of truth. (from
(2))
3a. We can have no good beliefs. (from (1) and (2a))
3b. We can have no good criterion of truth. (from (2) and (la))
The logic of the master argument is largely straightforward.20 A p

sible source of confusion concerns the inference from (1) to (la) and th
parallel inference from (2) to (2a). Notice that (la) does not claim that
there cannot be any good beliefs, it claims only that there cannot be any
independently good beliefs, that is, beliefs whose epistemic goodness
does not depend upon the goodness of some criterion of truth. Since
(1) claims that the goodness of any belief depends upon the goodness
of some criterion of truth, it follows immediately that there cannot be
any independently good beliefs.21 Similar considerations explain why
(2a) follows from (2). Consequently, if the skeptic's main premises
- (1) and (2) - were true, then it would have to be true that (3a) we
can have no good beliefs and (3b) we can have no good criterion of
truth.
But premises (1) and (2) are at least primafacie plausible in light of
perfectly ordinary assumptions about what it would take to have good
beliefs or good criteria of truth. Short of lucky guessing, it seems that the
only way to have good beliefs is to employ a criterion of truth whose own
goodness is somehow settled independently of the beliefs it warrants to
be true. Yet it also seems that, again short of lucky guessing, in order to
have a good criterion of truth we must select from among alleged criteria
of truth on the basis of independently good beliefs. Unfortunately, if

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this reasoning is correct, then we cannot ever have good beliefs or a

good criterion of truth. This is the problem of the criterion in its most
basic and comprehensive form.
Because Chisholm's discussion of the problem of the criterion has been

so influential, it will be useful to follow his terminology in describing
the range of responses to the master argument and to evaluate his own
proposed solution as though it were a response to the master argument.
Even if it turns out that Chisholm has only the higher-order problem in
mind this should cause no confusion because the higher-order version of
the problem of the criterion is just a special case of the master argument,
and the premises with which the master argument begins - (1) and (2)
- are just generalizations of the premises in the higher-order version of
the argument.22 It is also reasonable to believe that Chisholm's response
to the master argument would be particularism.
Chisholm's defense of particularism runs as follows:
Going back to our questions A and B, we may summarize the three possible views as
follows: there is scepticism (you cannot answer either question without presupposing
an answer to the other, and therefore the questions cannot be answered at all); there is
"methodism" (you begin with an answer to B); and there is "particularism" (you begin
with an answer to A). I suggest that the third possibility is the most reasonable.23
Particularism is preferable to methodism, according to Chisholm,

because methodism begins with a very general criterion which can-
not be supported by reasons and which threatens to leave out whole
areas of knowledge.24 Particularism is preferable to skepticism becau
". . . [the skeptic's] view is only one of the three possibilities and in itself
has no more to recommend it than the others do. And in favor of our
approach there is the fact that we do know many things, after all."25
Chisholm's defense of particularism, therefore, is the following elim-
ination argument: (i) there are only three possible responses to the
problem of the criterion: skepticism, methodism, and particularism; (ii)
none of the possible responses is intrinsically better than any of the

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272 ANDREW D. CLING
others; but (iii) all things considered,

of the other possible responses, therefore (iv) particularism is the most
reasonable response to the problem of the criterion.
VI
Chisholm's defense of particularism fails because his claim that there

are only three possible responses to the problem is demonstrably false.
Hence, premise (i) in Chisholm's elimination argument is false and it
is, therefore, unreasonable to accept premises (ii) and (iii).
Chisholm thinks that there are only two possible anti-skeptical
responses to the problem of the criterion: particularism and
methodism.26 Although Chisholm does not describe particularis
methodism directly in terms of the skeptic's argument, it turns ou
they are complex variations on the straightforward idea that if
cism is false, then one of the major premises in the master argument -
(1) or (2) - must also be false. Since skepticism results from accepting
both (1) and (2), it is natural to individuate the alternatives to skepti-
cism at least partly in terms of the rejection of one or the other of these
premises.27
Chisholm, however, does not describe methodism and particularism
directly in this way. He describes them as general strategies for deciding
what is true and what are the criteria of truth. Thus, Chisholm:
There are people - philosophers - who think that they do have an answer to B ['how
can we tell which statements are true?'] and that, given their answer to B, they can then
figure out their answers to A ['which statements are true?']. And there are other people
- other philosophers - who have it the other way around: they think that they have an
answer to A and that, given their answer to A, they can then figure out the answer to B.
There don't seem to be any generally accepted names for these two different philo-
sophical positions. (. . . ) I suggest, for the moment, we use the expressions "methodists"
and "particularists." By "methodists," I mean ... those who think they have an answer
to B, and who then, in terms of it, work out their answer to A. And by "particularists" I
mean those who have it the other way around.28
To be a methodist, therefore, is to claim to have an independently

good criterion of truth and to use it as a basis for deciding which
statements are true. Likewise, to be a particularist is to claim to have

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at least some independently good beliefs and to use them as a basis for
validating a criterion of truth. According to this account, methodism
and particularism are not direct responses to the master argument: they
are strategies for belief formation.
Each of these strategies clearly presupposes that the skeptic's argu-
ment is unsound, and it is not difficult to see how each must reply to the
master argument. Consider methodism. Since to be a methodist is to
begin inquiry with a specific criterion of truth and to use it in deciding
which statements are true, methodists must accept (1) but reject (2).
Since particularists begin with beliefs alleged to be good independently
of any criterion of truth and use them as a basis for validating a criterion
of truth, they must accept (2) but reject (1). It is a serious mistake,
however, to think of these two positions solely in terms of premises
(1) and (2) of the master argument. To do so not only misrepresents
methodism and particularism, but also obscures the full range of possible
anti-skeptical responses to the problem of the criterion.
It is true that methodists must reject the claim that (2) a good criterion
of truth depends upon independently good beliefs. But the reason for this
is their more fundamental claim that there is, in fact, an independently
good criterion of truth. Methodists are committed to rejecting the
claim that (2a) we can have no independently good criterion of truth,
therefore they also reject the claim that (2) such a criterion depends
upon independently good beliefs and the claim that (3b) there can be no
good criterion of truth. On the other hand, methodists accept the claim
that (1) good beliefs require an independently good criterion of truth and
therefore also the claim that (la) there can be no independently good
beliefs. They also reject the skeptic's main conclusion that (3a) there
can be no good beliefs. At the heart of methodism, therefore, are the
claims that (1) is true and that (2a) and (3a) are false.
Particularism is similarly complex. To be a particularist is to claim
that some beliefs are independently good and that these beliefs suffice to
validate a criterion of truth. Therefore, particularists reject (1) and (3a)
because they reject the claim that (la) we can have no independently
good beliefs. Unlike methodists, particularists accept (2) and therefore
also accept the claim that (2a) there can be no independently good
criterion of truth. Like methodists, they reject (3b). In terms of the

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274 ANDREW D. CLING
master argument, therefore, the characteristic theses of particularism

are that (2) is true but that (la) and (3b) are false.
Chisholm thinks that methodism and particularism are the only sig-
nificant anti-skeptical responses to the problem of the criterion. He is
wrong. For there are as many different anti-skeptical responses to the
problem of the criterion as there are logically possible rejections of one
or more premises in the master argument.
One possibility not noted by Chisholm is a position we might call
coherentism. Like methodism and particularism, coherentism is rooted
in a strategy for belief formation. To be a coherentist is to reject the
epistemic priority of beliefs and criteria of truth. Instead, coherentists
recommend balancing beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs
until they all form a consistent, mutually supporting system. The coher-
ence strategy presupposes, therefore, that (1) and (2) are both false.29
This does not fully capture coherentism, however. For the key claims
behind coherentism are that although we cannot have independently
good beliefs or independently good criteria of truth - premises (la) and
(2a) of the master argument are both true - it is a mistake to suppose
that good beliefs or good criteria require such epistemic independence:
(1) and (2) are both false. According to the coherentist, the epistemic
goodness of beliefs and criteria of truth is to be found precisely in their
interdependence. So the characteristic theses of coherentism are that
(1), (2), (3a), and (3b) are all false, but that (la) and (2a) are both true.
We are in a position to count all possible anti-skeptical responses
to the problem. Each possible anti-skeptical response is a consistent
position which rejects at least one of the conclusions and, therefore, at
least one of the major premises in the master argument. Thus there is
a narrower and a broader count of the anti-skeptical responses. The
narrow count individuates anti-skeptical responses as the consistent
positions which reject both of the skeptic's conclusions: the claim that
(3a) we can have no good beliefs and the claim that (3b) we can have no
good criterion of truth. The broad count individuates the anti-skeptical
positions as the consistent positions which reject only the main skeptical
conclusion that (3a) we can have no good beliefs.
On the broad count, there are exactly eight anti-skeptical responses
to the master argument. Counting narrowly, there are six. Either way,

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Chisholm has overlooked quite a few possibilities. Here is the proof:

Assume that each of the statements in the master argument is either
true or false. There are exactly thirty-two different distributions of the
truth values "true" and "false" over the premises of the master argument
in which the claim that (3a) we can have no good beliefs is assigned
"false." But, since (1) entails (la), (2) entails (2a), (1) & (2a) entails
(3a), (2) & (la) entails (3b), (1) & (3b) entails (3a), (la) & (3b) entails
(3a), and (3b) entails (2a), the twenty-four remaining cases which are
incompatible with these entailments must be excluded. That leaves eight
cases. So on the broad count there are eight anti-skeptical responses to
the master argument. When we also exclude the two remaining cases on
which the skeptic's conclusion (3b) is assigned "true" we are left with
six cases. So on the narrow count there are six anti-skeptical responses
to the problem of the criterion.
So Chisholm's claim that there are only three possible responses to
the problem of the criterion - premise (i) in his elimination argument
for particularism - is false. As a result, his claim that there is no
positive reason to prefer any one response to any other and his claim
that particularism is superior to any other anti-skeptical response -
premises (ii) and (iii) in his argument - are dubious.
VII
Although Chisholm's elimination argument for particularism fails, his

claim that there is no positive reason to prefer any response to the
problem of the criterion to any other deserves special consideration,
for it has important implications for any attempt to solve the problem.
Chisholm claims that "in itself" skepticism has "no more to recom-
mend it than ... [methodism and particularism] do."30 Presumably he
would say the same for particularism and methodism since he believes
that any response to the problem of the criterion necessarily begs the
question against every other response. According to Chisholm, "one
has not begun to philosophize until one has faced ... [the problem of the
criterion] and has recognized how unappealing, in the end, each of the
possible solutions is."31 Each of the possible responses is unappealing,

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276 ANDREW D. CLING
according to Chisholm, becaus

the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by
begging the question. "32
Chisholm is therefore committed to the following claims: (i) skepti-
cism necessarily begs the question against the anti-skeptical responses
to the problem, (ii) every possible anti-skeptical response to the problem
necessarily begs the question against the skeptic, and (iii) every possi-
ble anti-skeptical response to the problem necessarily begs the question
against every other anti-skeptical response. I shall take these claims up
in turn and shall show that, as claims about the master argument, (i) and
(iii) are false, and that although (ii) is true, this is because any argument
against unlimited skepticism must beg the question. Some arguments
for skepticism are more serious than others, however, and once we see
what makes the problem of the criterion worrisome, we open up the
possibility of defusing it in ways which do not beg all of the questions
it raises.
We must first be clear about begging the question. In the simplest
case, to beg the question whether a statement P is true or false is simply
to assume without argument that P is true or that P is false. But giving an
argument does not prevent begging questions. Since all of the statements
which are given in support of a conclusion are relevant to the success of
an argument, we should individuate arguments as the premises advanced
in favor of a given conclusion together with the premises advanced in
favor of those premises, and so on. Arguments, therefore, terminate
with a conclusion and begin with one or more premises which are
assumed to be true without further explicit support. Call such premises
the initial premises of the argument.33 An argument A begs the questio
concerning the truth or falsehood of some statement P when some initi
premise of A simply assumes that P is true (or false).
This can happen in at least two ways. Consider, for example, this
argument: God exists because it says so in the Bible, and what the
Bible says is true because it is the inspired word of God. This argument
begs the question against atheism - the belief that God does not exist -
because the initial premise that the Bible is the inspired word of God is
logically incompatible with a consequence of atheism, namely, that the
Bible is not the inspired word of God.

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Not all question-begging arguments beg the question in this way.

Consider, for example, this argument against the agnostic's claim that
we cannot be justified in believing that God exists: God directly created
our minds and if God directly created our minds, then we can be justified
in believing that God exists, therefore we can be justified in believing
that God exists. This argument begs the question against agnosticism
even though no initial premise in the argument is logically incompatible
with the claim that we cannot be justified in believing that God exists.
It is question-begging because its premises could be justified only if
the agnostic's thesis were false. The probative force of an argument
depends not just upon the truth values of its premises but also upon their
justification. Thus it is possible for an argument A to beg the question
whether a statement P is true or false even though the initial premises
of A are logically compatible with the truth or falsehood of P.
Let us say, then, that an argument A begs the question whether P
is true or false if, and only if,34 there is an initial premise Q of A
such that either (i) P (or not-P) entails that Q is false or (ii) P (or not-P)
entails that Q is notjustified. According to this account, every argument
necessarily begs some questions since every argument has at least one
initial premise and, therefore, begs the question whether that premise is
true and also the question of whether it is justified.35 Consequently, to
say that an argument is unacceptable because it begs the question is to
say that it illicitly presupposes the truth or falsehood of some specific
proposition whose truth or falsehood is in question.
VIII
Now consider Chisholm's claim that the skeptic necessarily begs the
question against the anti-skeptical responses to the master argument.
Since, as we have just seen, every argument must beg some ques-
tions, we must be specific about which questions the skeptic allegedly
begs. Since the anti-skeptical responses to the problem of the criterion
necessarily deny either (1) or (2), the question is whether the skeptic
necessarily begs the questions about whether these premises are true or
false. Given our account of what it is to beg the question this will be

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278 ANDREW D. CLING
true only if either some initial premise P in the skeptic's argument is

logically incompatible with the denial of (1) or the denial of (2), or the
claim that P is justified is logically incompatible with the denial of (1)
or (2).
However unappealing the skeptic's conclusions may be, the skeptic
need not beg these crucial questions, for skeptics need not affirm (1)
and (2) uncritically. These premises are supported, as we have seen, by
plausible, independent considerations about the necessary conditions for
having good criteria of truth and good beliefs. Such considerations may
be mistaken but they scarcely appeal only to skeptics. This is shown
by the deep disagreements among anti-skeptics themselves about which
premises of the master argument should be rejected.
What makes the master argument important is that its conclusions are
consequences of independently plausible claims about what is required
for having good beliefs and good criteria of truth. Chisholm, therefore,
is wrong to claim that skeptics necessarily beg the question against
anti-skeptics. This further undermines his elimination argument for
particularism. Since skepticism does not necessarily beg the question
against methodism or particularism, Chisholm's claim that each possible
response to the problem of the criterion necessarily begs the question
against every other response - the crucial evidence for premise (ii) in
his elimination argument - is false.
The master argument does beg the question against one of its own
conclusions, for the claim that no beliefs are epistemically good (3a)
entails that the initial premises of the master argument are themselves
unjustified. It does not follow from this that the master argument is
unsound, only that we could never be justified in believing that it is
sound. Far from undermining skepticism, however, this is exactly the
kind of argument the skeptic wants, as we shall see.
Ix
Does every anti-skeptical response to the master argument necessarily

beg the question against the skeptic? More specifically, do anti-skeptics
necessarily beg the question whether (1), (2), (la), (2a), (3a), or (3b) are

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true or not? Chisholm is committed to the claim th

response must beg at least some of these crucial questions because
he believes that it is possible to develop an anti-skeptical response
to the problem of the criterion only by assuming that some particular
beliefs are independently good or that some specific criterion of truth
is independently good. As we have seen, his view is that to be a
particularist, for example, is to begin inquiry by assuming the truth o
list of specific propositions and to formulate criteria of truth using th
assumptions. Every particularist, therefore, is committed to a statemen
with the form statements P, Q, R, S, ... are independently good, wh
P, Q, R, S ... are to be replaced by the specific statements with which
a given particularist begins. Similarly, since to be a methodist is to
begin inquiry on the basis of some criterion of truth, every methodist
is committed to a statement with the form criterion C is independently
good.
If particularists and methodists must respond to the master argument
by assuming such statements without argument, then each of these
approaches to the problem would beg significant questions. Any such
version of particularism would beg the question whether (la) is true
and therefore it would also beg the question whether (1) and (3a) are
true. Methodism of this sort would beg the question whether (2a) is
true, and therefore also the question whether (2) and (3b) are true. Such
methodists and particularists would also beg the question against (3a)
since higher-order statements with the form the statement criterion
C is independently good is justified or with the form the statement
statements P, Q, R, S, .. . are independently good is justified are
logically incompatible with (3a). So it is clear that these types of
methodism and particularism would beg significant questions against the
master argument. I shall shortly show that these are not the only starti
places open to particularists or methodists, but first it is important to s
why any response to the skeptic necessarily begs important questions.
The skepticism at issue in the master argument is unlimited and
strong: the main conclusion, (3a), claims that no beliefs could be epis-
temically good. Consequently, we necessarily and immediately beg this
question when we make any statements at all in response to the master
argument since (3a) implies that those statements are unjustified. It is

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280 ANDREW D. CLING
logically impossible to give a non-question-begging argument against

the claim that no statement can be epistemically good (3a). We must
face up to this necessary limitation of replies to unlimited skepticism.
But this is a problem for responses to any argument for unlimited
skepticism, not just for replies to the master argument. Consider, for
example, the green cheese argument:
4. If the moon is made of green cheese, then we can have no

good beliefs.
5. The moon is made of green cheese.
3a. Therefore, we can have no good beliefs.
It is impossible to respond to this argument without begging the ques-

tion against the unlimited skeptic since any reply must begin with initial
premises and the claim that such initial premises are justified is incom-
patible with the claim that (3a) we can have no good beliefs.
There is an important difference between the green cheese argument
and the master argument. The premises of the master argument are
antecedently plausible claims about the conditions which must be sat-
isfied by good beliefs and good criteria of truth. The master argument
purports to show that unlimited skepticism is a consequence of condi-
tions on epistemic goodness which must be accepted by anti-skeptics
themselves. The master argument, unlike the green cheese argument,
is a proposed reductio ad absurdum of anti-skepticism.36 It poses an
important challenge because it purports to show that our best under-
standing of what is necessary for the attainment of epistemic goodness
implies that epistemic goodness is unattainable. Unlimited skeptics will
not care that the master argument undermines its own premises: that is
an important component of unlimited skepticism. The master argument
is designed to show that rationality is self-destructive.
Since any reply to the master argument necessarily begs the question
of whether there can be good beliefs - the question whether (3a) is true or
not - the best the anti-skeptic could do is to defuse the master argument.
It is impossible to prove that (3a) is false without begging the question.
But it might be possible to show that the master argument is no more
of a threat to epistemic goodness than the green cheese argument. This

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can be done if anti-skeptics can show that one of th

the master argument - (1) or (2) - is false without begging the question
of whether it is true or not.
Skeptics divide from anti-skeptics over (3a). Anti-skeptics agree that

(3a) is false but disagree about the other statements in the master argu-
ment. If anti-skeptics can defuse the master argument without begging
the significant questions which divide them, then Chisholm is wrong to
claim that anti-skeptics must beg the question against one another.
The master argument raises a number of difficult epistemological
questions: (i) whether there can be any good beliefs (whether (3a) is true
or not), (ii) whether there can be a good criterion of truth (whether (3b)
is true or not), (iii) whether there can be any independently good beliefs
(whether (la) is true or not), (iv) whether there can be an independently
good criterion of truth (whether (2a) is true or not), (v) whether any good
criterion of truth requires independently good beliefs (whether (2) is true
or not), (vi) whether any good criterion of truth requires good beliefs
(independent or not), (vii) whether good beliefs require an independently
good criterion of truth (whether (1) is true or not), and (viii) whether
good beliefs require a good criterion of truth (independent or not).37
Anti-skeptics must beg question (i) against the unlimited skeptic. But
if anti-skeptics can agree about the epistemic goodness of some beliefs,
then they can address the remaining questions without begging them.
The problem of the criterion does not prevent anti-skeptics from having
such agreement.
Epistemological theories must explain how, if at all, we can acquire
good beliefs. The task of an ,anti-skeptical epistemological theory is
to account for the goodness of our beliefs in a way which provides
significant guidelines for the conduct of inquiry. The various types of
anti-skeptical response to the master argument - particularism, method-
ism, coherentism, and so on - are consequences of such theories and,
as Chisholm's analysis itself presupposes, such theories are rooted in
practices of forming and validating beliefs and criteria of truth. Anti-

31.206.104.159 on Thu, 24 Nov 2022 16:37:23 UTC
282 ANDREW D. CLING
skeptical epistemology must begin by accepting, perhaps only tenta-

tively, that some specific beliefs, types of belief, or criteria of truth are
epistemically good. The task is to account for that goodness in a way
which defuses skeptical challenges and provides guidelines for inquiry.
Although particularists, methodists, and other anti-skeptics cannot help
begging the question of whether there can be good beliefs (the question
whether (3a) is true or not) against the unlimited skeptic, agreement
about the goodness of specific beliefs provides a basis for non-question-
begging arguments for (and against) the other statements in the master
argument and even for (and against) the goodness of specific criteria of
truth. Anti-skeptics do not necessarily beg the questions which divide
them, nor need they beg all questions against unlimited skepticism.
To show that this is possible I shall provide an abstract sketch of
one form of argument for particularism which does not necessarily beg
the question for or against any statement of the master argument except
(3a). Step One: claim that each member of a certain set G of statements
is epistemically good. Step Two: conclude that (i) each member of
a subset IG of G is independently good, (ii) the members of IG are
necessary and sufficient for the epistemic goodness of criterion C and
(iii) C is, in turn, sufficient for the epistemic goodness of the members
of G which are not in IG (evidence: from Step One, inference to the
best (normative) explanation). Step Three: conclude that (2) is true,
(la) is false, (3b) is false, and that C is a criterion of truth which can
guide future inquiry (evidence: from Step Two).
Other anti-skeptics - methodists, coherentists, and so on - can follow
the same general strategy. Call it the de.fusing strategy. Agreement
about the epistemic goodness of specific beliefs, or specific types of
belief, provides a basis for resolving disagreements about the general
conditions on epistemic goodness and even about specific criteria of
truth without begging the question for or against any of the statements
in the master argument (except (3a)) and without begging the question
for or against specific criteria of truth. Step One begs the question
against the main conclusion of the master argument (3a), but that is
unavoidable. That Step One does not beg any of the other questions is
shown by the fact that the truth or falsehood of the statement made at
Step One does not follow from the truth or the falsehood of any of the

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crucial statements in the master argument or from the claim that C is

not a criterion of truth; nor does it follow from the truth or falsehood of
any of those statements (except (3a)) or from the claim that C is not a
criterion of truth that the statement made at Step One is unjustified.38
Therefore it is false that anti-skeptical responses to the problem of the
criterion necessarily beg the question against one another and it is false
that anti-skeptical responses to the problem of the criterion necessarily
beg all of the questions against the unlimited skeptic.39
XI
Three objections are pressing. Two concern Step One in the defusing
strategy. Each of these two objections claims that the defusing strategy
already begs significant questions. One of these objections focuses on
the specific statements endorsed at Step One, the other targets the claim
that they are good. The third objection claims that this entire analysis
misunderstands Chisholm's claim that responses to the problem of the
criterion must beg the question.
The first objection begins by noting, correctly, that any argument
using the defusing strategy begins by assuming the epistemic goodness
of each member of a set of statements. Therefore, the objection contin-
ues, any such argument necessarily begs the question not only against
the unlimited skeptic's claim that (3a) we can have no good beliefs but
also against those anti-skeptics who do not accept the statements on
the list. For example, if our list includes electrons exist or abortion
is sometimes morally justified, we beg the question against those who
reject electrons and against those who oppose abortion. Consequently,
when it comes to defusing the master argument and arguing in favor of
a particular criterion of truth, anti-skeptics invariably beg the question
against one another.
The objection is right about one thing: the defusing strategy does not
eliminate the possibility of begging important questions. But we must be
specific about which questions a given argument begs in order to decide
whether that is a reason for rejecting it. Any argument which follows
the defusing strategy will beg both the general question of whether there

31.206.104.159 on Thu, 24 Nov 2022 16:37:23 UTC
284 ANDREW D. CLING
can be any good beliefs (the question whether (3a) is true or not) and
the specific questions of whether the beliefs listed at Step One are really
good. I claim only that by following the defusing strategy we need not
beg the questions about whether the remaining crucial statements of the
master argument - (1), (2), (la), (2a), and (3b) - are true or false, or even
the question of whether any specific criterion of truth is good or not.
Since the questions about (1), (2), (la), (2a), and (3b) are the questions
which divide the various anti-skeptical responses to the master argument
from one another, it is not true that those responses necessarily beg the
question against one another. The list at Step One cannot provide us
with a foundation capable of resolving all disagreements, but it can
provide us with a basis for responding to the master argument without
begging the significant epistemological questions it raises.
The objection confuses questions about the truth or falsehood of
the statements in the master argument with questions about the truth
or falsehood of other statements. To be a methodist is to believe,
among other things, that it is false that a criterion of truth depends
upon independently good beliefs (not-(2)). Commitment to a specific
criterion or to other specific beliefs does not follow. To be a particularist
is to believe, among other things, that it is false that good beliefs depend
upon an independently good criterion of truth (not-(l)). Commitment
to other beliefs or to a specific criterion does not follow. Disputes about
the statements which compose the master argument - the characteristic
theses of particularism, methodism, coherentism, and so on - cut across
disputes about the truth or falsehood of other beliefs and about the
goodness of specific criteria of truth.
Chisholm falls into this confusion. For he claims that empiricism -
the view, roughly, that sense experience is a reliable criterion of truth
- is a form of methodism.40 Thus he must claim that whoever believes
that sense experience provides us with a reliable way of distinguishing
true statements from false statements is committed to the characteristic
theses of methodism: that (1) is true, and that (2a) and (3a) are false.
With respect to the master argument, however, to accept empiricism is
to be committed only to the claim that there is, hence can be, a good
criterion of truth (not-(3b)). Perhaps many empiricists are methodists.
This is a question which can be answered only on the basis of a careful

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interpretation of the arguments and practices of specific thinkers. But

it is clearly false that empiricists must be methodists. For an empiricist
might be a particularist and argue that the reliability of sense experience
is validated by statements which are independently good. Empiricists
might also be coherentists and claim that sense experience is both val-
idated by and validates our good beliefs about the world. To suppose
that empiricism is a species of methodism is to confuse a claim about
the goodness of a specific criterion of truth with a more abstract claim
about the conditions which must be satisfied by any good criterion of
truth.
The objection gets its force from the fact that disagreements about
specific beliefs and about specific criteria of truth may run so deep that it
is impossible to resolve them without begging significant questions. For
example, persons who disagree about the morality of abortion and who
also disagree about how to decide whether a moral judgment is correct
might find it impossible to resolve their disagreements without begging
significant questions against one another. It all depends upon whether
what they can agree on provides a sufficient basis for resolving these
disagreements. There is no guarantee that our shared beliefs and shared
criteria, if any, provide us with a basis sufficient for resolving every
dispute without begging significant questions. Disagreements may run
deep. My point is that it does not follow from this that particularism,
methodism, and the other anti-skeptical responses to the master argu-
ment necessarily beg the question about whether the crucial statements
in the master argument are true or false. To suppose that it does is to
think, wrongly, that abstract, general claims about the necessary condi-
tions on epistemic goodness directly determine commitment to specific
beliefs or to specific criteria of truth.
This brings us to the second objection. Like the first objection, this
one begins by noting that any argument which follows the defusing
strategy begins with the claim that each member of a list of specific
statements is good. Unlike the first objection, it notes that even if we
could agree about which statements should be on the list, we must still
begin with the claim that they are good. We must, therefore, presuppose
that this higher-order epistemic proposition - that each statement on
the list is good - is itself independently good. Consequently any such

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286 ANDREW D. CLING
argument begs the question ag

the very idea that there can be independently good beliefs. To adopt
the defusing strategy is to beg the question of whether there can be
some independently good beliefs (la) and, therefore, also the question
of whether good beliefs require an independently good criterion (1).
This objection succeeds only if anyone who follows the defusing
strategy is committed to the independent goodness of Step One and thus
to the claim that there can be some independently good beliefs (not-(l a)).
Notice that Step One will always be a higher-order epistemic proposition
about the epistemic goodness of some lower-order statement(s). In the
simplest case it will be a statement of the form P is good. Such a higher-
order statement will be independently good if, and only if, its goodness
does not depend upon the goodness of any criterion of truth. How, and
even whether, such higher-order epistemic statements can themselves be
good are important questions. But nothing about the defusing strategy
presupposes that such statements must be independently good. The
defusing strategy presupposes only that higher-order statements about
the epistemic goodness of other statements can be justified. Those who
agree about Step One may still disagree about the conditions under
which statements about epistemic goodness, including the statement
made at Step One itself, are justified.
The objection gets its force by confusing questions about the cir-
cumstances under which a given belief P is epistemically good with
questions about the circumstances under which higher-order claims -
statements of the form P is epistemically good - are themselves good.
The claim that there can be independently good beliefs (not-(la)) does
not entail that some higher-order claims are independently good, nor
does the fact that the defusing strategy begins with a higher-order state-
ment presuppose that there can be independently good beliefs of any
sort (not-(la)).
Finally, it may be objected that my analysis is unfair to Chisholm.
For, as we have seen, Chisholm describes particularism and methodism
as strategies for forming beliefs and criteria of truth, he does not describe
them in terms of the premises of the skeptic's argument. Thus, one way
to understand Chisholm's claim that there is no way to deal with the
problem of the criterion without begging the question is to understand

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him not as claiming that there can be no non-ques

ments about whether the crucial claims in the master
or false, but rather as claiming that there cannot be any non-question-
begging answers to the questions which raise the problem of the criterion
in the first place: 'which statements are true?' and 'how can we tell
which statements are true?' Is it really true that any attempt to answer
these questions must be question-begging?
What might this mean? There are three possibilities. First, it might
mean that persons who disagree about the answer to 'which statements
are true?' - persons with disagreements in belief - must beg the question
against one another. Second, it might mean that persons who disagree
about the answer to 'how can we tell which statements are true?' -
persons who accept different criteria of truth - must beg the question o
whether those criteria are good against one another. Third, it might mea
that persons who disagree both about which beliefs are true and about
which criteria are good must beg both questions against one another.
The first possibility cannot be right, for it would follow that no
disagreements in belief could be resolved without begging the question.
I have already shown that the second possibility is incorrect by showing
that there can be a non-question-begging argument for the goodness of
a specific criterion of truth.
The third possibility is more promising. For it might seem that per-
sons who disagree both about specific beliefs and about the procedures
which should be used for deciding which beliefs are true are fated to talk
past one another. But this appearance is misleading. For whether such
disagreements can be addressed without begging the questions at issue
will not depend upon the types of disagreements involved - whether
they are disagreements about beliefs, about criteria of truth, or both -
but upon the depth and breadth of what is in agreement. The claim
gets its plausibility from the fact that complete disagreement about what
is true and about how to tell what is true cannot be resolved without
begging the question. But this is just to say that it is impossible to
start inquiry from absolute scratch and show that specific beliefs and
specific criteria of truth are justified without begging any questions
whatsoever against persons who start by rejecting that very starting
place. To suppose that it is is to suppose that it is possible to make

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288 ANDREW D. CLING
no assumption not rejected by someone who rejects every assumption

we make. It is impossible to avoid begging the question against such
a person.41 It does not follow that less drastic disagreements - includ-
ing disagreements about both beliefs and criteria of truth - cannot be
resolved without question-begging. Some can, some cannot.
XII
Solving a problem requires being clear about what that problem is.
The problem of the criterion has suffered not only from neglect but
also from the lack of a clear, comprehensive, and complete statement
of the problem itself. The most basic and comprehensive version of
the problem of the criterion is raised by claims about the necessary
conditions on good beliefs and good criteria of truth: (1) that good
beliefs require an independently good criterion of truth and (2) that a
good criterion of truth requires independently good beliefs. Since it is
impossible to refute unlimited skepticism, what is needed is a theory
which defuses the master argument by providing a basis for rejecting
at least one of its major premises. Since it is unclear whether this can
be done, the challenge of unlimited skepticism remains serious. It is
wrong, however, to suppose that any attempt to respond to the problem
of the criterion must beg all of the significant questions it raises.42
NOTES
I shall focus on the discussion of the problem in Roderick Chisholm, The Problem
of the Criterion (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973), reprinted in Roderick
Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1982) since it contains his most complete treatment of the problem. Chisholm's other
discussions of the problem are to be found in his Perceiving (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1957), Theory of Knowledge, first, second, and third editions (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966, 1977, 1989) and his "Reply to Amico on the Problem
of the Criterion" Philosophical Papers, 17 (1988): 231-234.
2 Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion, p. 14.

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3 Ibid., p. 37.
4 Throughout I use 'statement' and 'proposition' interchangeably.
5 A detectable property need not be observable. It need only be possible to incorporate
the property into a procedure for sorting true from false statements.
6 Chisholm, The Problem of Criterion, p. 12.
7 This kind of distinction seems to be noted by R. P. Amico, "Roderick Chisholm and
the Problem of the Criterion" Philosophical Papers 17 (1988): 217-229, on pp. 223-
225. Amico does not recognize the connection between this distinction and the more
fundamental version of the problem of the criterion, however.
8 Somewhat more broadly, a response to 'how are we to decide whether we know?'
(higher-order reading) might also include other sorts of epistemic propositions, that is,
propositions about the epistemic value or standing of beliefs. For example, statements
with the form s is justified in believing p are important epistemic propositions.
9 Or, more broadly, true from false epistemic propositions generally.
10 William P. Alston, "Level-Confusions in Epistemology" in French, P. A., Uehling,
T. E., Jr. and Wettstein, H. K., eds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume V: Studies
in Epistemology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980): 135-150 shows
how level confusions make trouble for Chisholm and others when it comes to formu-
lating plausible versions of foundationalism. It also includes a brief discussion of one
version of the problem of the criterion (pp. 147-148).
Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion, p. 4.
2 Ibid., p.6.
13 Ibid., p. 6, my emphasis.
'4 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
5 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
16 Ibid., p. 14.
17 Jonathan Kvanvig helped me to see this important point.
18 Depending upon the specific epistemic good in question, the epistemic goodness of
a belief or criterion is usually relative to persons and times, but including such qualifi-
cations explicitly would unnecessarily complicate an already complicated discussion.
19 Specific versions of the problem of the criterion are just special cases of the master
argument. Each version results from one or both of two types of change in the master
argument. First, we can be more specific about the epistemic value in question by mak-
ing the appropriate substitution for 'good beliefs' and 'good criterion', that is, we can
replace 'good beliefs' in the master argument with 'justified beliefs', or 'knowledge',
or 'beliefs known for certain', and so on, and make the corresponding substitutions for
'good criterion'. For example, one important version of the problem of the criterion
claims that we can have no knowledge on the grounds that to know any proposition we
must have independentknowledge of a criterion of truth, but that we can know a criterion
of truth only if we have independent knowledge of some propositions. Second, we can
narrow the scope of the propositions and the criteria which are called into question by
focusing only on certain kinds of propositions. As we have seen, Chisholm sometimes

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290 ANDREW D. CLING
seems to interpret the problem of the criterion as a problem just about the goodness of
our beliefs about epistemic propositions and the goodness of our criteria of truth for
epistemic propositions.
20 If we stipulate that an argument must have one, and only one, conclusion, then there
are two connected arguments here: one for (3a) and one for (3b). Since I am interested
in these considerations as a unit and in the various ways of responding to this important
skeptical challenge as a whole, I shall take the entire set of statements to be a single
argument. Note, however, that although (3a) and (3b) are important conclusions of the
argument, neither is a premise for the other.
21 Notice that (la) does not entail (1), however. (la) is equivalent to the claim that
there could be no good beliefs unless there were a good criterion of truth, which is not
equivalent to, nor does it entail, the claim that there could be no good belief unless there
were an independently good criterion of truth (1).
22 Not all responses to the higher-order argument can succeed as responses to the
master argument, however. Since the higher-order problem calls only our knowledge of
epistemic propositions into question, one might appeal to non-epistemic propositions as
a basis for resolving disputes about the higher-order epistemic propositions and criteria.
Although he does not distinguish between the lower-order and higher-order versions
of the problem of the criterion in epistemology, Michael R. DePaul, "The Problem of
the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18
(March 1988): 67-86 shows that the higher-order problem is analogous to the problem
of accounting for the justification of general principles and particular judgments in
ethics. In the case of higher-order epistemic propositions and ethical propositions it is
possible to appeal to propositions outside the suspect classes to attempt to resolve skep-
tical doubts about the propositions in question. This is the strategy of "wide reflective
equilibrium." Since the most comprehensive version of the problem of the criterion
calls all beliefs into question, this alternative is not a possible response to the master
argument.
24 Ibid., p. 17.
25 Ibid., p. 38.
26 Ibid., p. 14. Chisholm actually says at this point only that "there are at least two other
possible views" (my emphasis) which leaves open the possibility that there are more,
but he goes on to say that in deciding how to respond to the problem of the criterion
"we may choose among three possibilities" including skepticism (p. 14). In any case,
it is clear that Chisholm thinks that the three views he discusses are the only serious
contenders.
27 James Van Cleve, "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Cir-
cle" The Philosophical Review 88 (January 1979): 55-91 sets up the problem of the
Cartesian Circle and the responses to it in a similar way. He also claims, rightly, that
the problem of the Cartesian Circle is just a special case of the problem of the criterion
(p. 56, n. 1).

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28 Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion, pp. 14-15.

29 DePaul, "The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Et
this gap in Chisholm's analysis and defends coherentism as more reasonable than either
methodism or particularism. DePaul's interesting and useful discussion focuses on two
higher-order versions of the problem of the criterion: the problem about the relative
priority of epistemic propositions and criteria of truth for epistemic propositions, and the
analogous problem about the relative priority of ethical generalizations and particular
ethical judgments.
31 Ibid., p. 1.
32 Ibid., p. 37.
33 I am not claiming that such premises could not be supported, only that life is short.
Such premises are "initial" only relative to the argument in question. A premise that
is initial relative to one argument may be the conclusion of another. Whether human
knowledge requires the existence of beliefs that are initial, or foundational, in some
ultimate sense is a separate, and very difficult, question.
34 'If and only if ' is actually too strong since there are other ways in which arguments
can be question-begging. For example, an argument which has God exists as an initial
premise not only begs the question whether God exists and whether the claim that God
exists is justified but also whether 'God' is meaningful. There is also the important
question about our justification for believing that the conclusion of an argument follows
from the premises. For we can be justified in accepting the conclusion of an argument
on the basis of its premises only if we are justified in believing that the conclusion
follows from those premises. It is a difficult question what is required for this and how
this affects an account of begging the question. I shall ignore such complications since
they do not bear on the evaluation of Chisholm's claims.
35 Circular arguments, therefore, are arguments which beg the question whether their
own conclusions are true or justified.
36 Ernest Gellner, Reason and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) usefully describes
such arguments as instances of the alleged "suicide of reason" (p. 103): rational argu-
ments against reason itself. Although Gellner presents a useful catalog of such argu-
ments against reason (pp. 132-135) an explicit version of the problem of the criterion
is not in it.
37 I do not claim that this list is complete.
38 I am, of course, assuming that the beliefs claimed to be good at Step One do not
simply include the characteristics theses of the anti-skeptical position in question.
39 Chisholm's practice may be better than his preaching. For his many defenses of
various epistemic principles might be reconstructed along just these lines. My analysis
shows that the crucial question for Chisholm, as for anyone else, is not whether his
defense of his epistemological principles begs the question against unlimited skepti-
cism but whether those principles provide the best account of the practices through
which we have acquired our good beliefs. I have severe doubts about the ability of any

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292 ANDREW D. CLING
foundationalist account of epistemic justification to provide a satisfactory account of

these practices, but that is a separate issue.
40 Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion, pp. 15-18. Notice that this identification
shows that he is here thinking of the problem of the criterion in terms of general criteria
of truth and not just criteria of truth for statements about knowledge.
41 Contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind show that it is an important and
difficult question whether we could recognize such an individual to be a person at all.
See, e.g., Steven Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge: MIT/Bradford,
1990): Chapter 2.
42 My thanks to Scott Arnold, David Burns, Fred Elbert, Rick Garlikov, George Gra-
ham, Craig Hanks, David Hiley, Jonathan Kvanvig, Margaret Lang, Robert Lehe, Brian
Martine, Paul Moser, Arthur Nunes, John Post, Dan Rochowiak, Lynn Stephens, Jeffrey
Tlumak, and all members of the UAH College of Liberal Arts Colloquium (RELACS)
for helpful comments on ancestors of this essay.
Department of Philosophy
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Huntsville, AL 35899
USA

31.206.104.159 on Thu, 24 Nov 2022 16:37:23 UTC

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POSING THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION

(Received 27 February 1993)

Although it has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, the

Philosophical Studies 75: 261-292, 1994.

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but any statement would have C (in the appropriate circumstances)

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On the higher-order reading 'how are we to decide whether we

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Sometimes Chisholm is ambiguous. In the following passage, for

The final question in this passage is based on the higher-order reading of

Here Chisholm begins by discussing the conditions under which it is

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our own mental states - I believe that there will be a performance of

Since the questions which lead to Chisholm's higher-order version of

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This argument requires further clarification, for, re

There are several problems with this argument. The expression

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we are to acquire good beliefs or

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This is a powerful argument for skepticism.

It is important to have a complete version of the skeptic's argument both

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problem. Here, then, is the problem of the criterion master argument,

1. Good beliefs depend upon an independently good criterion

la. We can have no independently good beliefs. (from (1))

The logic of the master argument is largely straightforward.20 A p

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this reasoning is correct, then we cannot ever have good beliefs or a

Because Chisholm's discussion of the problem of the criterion has been

Particularism is preferable to methodism, according to Chisholm,

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others; but (iii) all things considered,

Chisholm's defense of particularism fails because his claim that there

To be a methodist, therefore, is to claim to have an independently

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master argument, therefore, the characteristic theses of particularism

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Chisholm has overlooked quite a few possibilities. Here is the proof:

Although Chisholm's elimination argument for particularism fails, his

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according to Chisholm, becaus

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Not all question-begging arguments beg the question in this way.

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true only if either some initial premise P in the skeptic's argument is

Does every anti-skeptical response to the master argument necessarily

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true or not? Chisholm is committed to the claim th

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logically impossible to give a non-question-begging argument against