2024 - Edwards - Managerial Control or Feedback Provision How Perceptions of Algorithmic HR

DOI: 10.1002/hrm.
22218
SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE
Managerial control or feedback provision: How perceptions

of algorithmic HR systems shape employee motivation,
behavior, and well-being
Martin R. Edwards 1 | Elena Zubielevitch 1 | Tyler Okimoto 1 | Stacey Parker 2 |

Frederik Anseel 3
1
UQ Business School, The University of
Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia Abstract
2
School of Psychology, The University of Algorithmic HR systems are becoming a more prevalent interface between organiza-
Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
3
tions and employees. Yet little research has examined how automated HR processes
School of Management and Governance,
Business School, University of New South impact employee motivation. In a three-wave study (NTime1 = 401; NTime2 = 379;
Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
NTime3 = 303), we investigated the motivational effects of HR systems that automati-
Correspondence cally capture—and make decisions based on—employee performance, and whether
Martin R. Edwards, UQ Business School, these effects depend on employee attributions regarding the organization's intended
The University of Queensland, St Lucia,
Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia. use of its automated HR metric system. Additionally, we test whether these motiva-
Email: martin.edwards@uq.edu.au tional states affect employee task prioritization and emotional exhaustion. Results
Funding information show that employees whose organizations use algorithmic HR systems, and who also
Australian Research Council, Grant/Award
attribute managerial control as intent to that system, experience higher levels of
Number: DP230100331; UQ Business School;
UNSW Business School extrinsic motivation at work. This, in turn, predicts greater prioritization of metricized
tasks and de-prioritization of non-metricized tasks. Conversely, employees who
believe the purpose of algorithmic HR systems is to provide them with constructive
feedback are more likely to experience intrinsic motivation, leading to reduced feel-
ings of emotional exhaustion, greater prioritization of metricized tasks, but reduced
non-metricized behavior de-prioritization. These results illustrate the critical impor-
tance of employee sensemaking around algorithmic HR systems as a precursor to the
impact of such systems on employee motivation, behavior, and well-being.
KEYWORDS
algorithmic HR, emotional exhaustion, HR attributions, motivation, self-determination theory,
task prioritization
1 | I N T RO DU CT I O N decisions based on, and even forecast, employee performance

(Edwards et al., 2022) and retention (Tambe et al., 2019). Although
The past decade witnessed rapid integration of digital technologies the dawn of “Algorithmic HRM” (Meijerink et al., 2021; Meijerink &
within HRM (Bag et al., 2022; Kim et al., 2021). Organizations can Bondarouk, 2023) heralds impressive potential to improve conditions
now deploy a myriad of tools to automatically capture, record, make for employees and organizations alike, these advances will
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© 2024 The Authors. Human Resource Management published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.
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2 EDWARDS ET AL.
undoubtedly pose challenges for practitioners seeking to recognize automate HRM activities” (p. 2546), a definition covering a wide range
and manage its impacts on employees. Yet evidence-based research of features and activities. More generally, Kellogg et al. (2020) define
on the effects of algorithmic HR systems continues to lag behind prac- algorithmic technologies as “computer-programmed procedures that
titioner developments, meaning we have little understanding of its transform input data into desired outputs in ways that tend to be
potential harms and benefits to employees (e.g., Kellogg et al., 2020; more encompassing, instantaneous, interactive, and opaque than pre-
Kim et al., 2021; Meijerink & Bondarouk, 2023). vious technological systems” (p. 336). Key to the idea of algorithmic
To progress this literature forward, we propose that a critical HRM systems, is the automated collection and processing of data as
issue presented by algorithmic HR systems is its motivational impact inputs and the automated application of analytic processes to produce
on employees. Drawing from Self-Determination Theory (SDT; Deci & an output that HR may use in decision-making. More specifically,
Ryan, 1985) and HR attribution theory (Nishii & Wright, 2008), we Meijerink et al. (2021) highlight that the breadth of activities covered
provide an explanatory framework for why and when we can expect by algorithmic HRM systems may include the “generation and use of
algorithmic HR systems to be beneficial or harmful to employees. Spe- digital data,” as well as the “deployment of software algorithms that
cifically, we argue that algorithmic HR performance systems will foster process digital data” and potentially the “partial or full automation of
distinct motivational states, which will in turn impact employees' pri- HRM related decision-making” (p. 2546). Advances in this area are
oritization of metricized tasks as well as their levels of emotional typified by the Microsoft Operating System, which elicited contro-
exhaustion. The use of performance metrics in performance manage- versy because of its ability to generate a productivity score for
ment systems to help organizations direct employees' focus has been employees based on automated surveillance of their digital activities
discussed by several scholars (Harris & Taylor, 2019; Likierman, (Hern, 2020). Clearly, for the HR function, such systems can provide a
2009). Specifically, the increased use of technology that automates layer of transparency, analytical power, and employee control, that
data collection and performance metric construction linked to can lead to greater cost efficiencies (Guerci et al., 2019), but has the
employee performance can be seen as a new and potentially useful potential to yield negative perceptions about its intended uses.
tool to help an organization direct its employees' behavior toward In the current study, we specifically focus on two broad auto-
achieving strategic aims. We draw on Kim et al.'s (2021) ensemble mated algorithmic functions linked to processing of employee
view of algorithmic HRM as we suggest that the impact of these tech- performance-related data: (1) automated monitoring and metricization
nologies will emerge through an interaction between employee per- of employee performance data, and (2) automated decision-making
ceptions and the organizational HR environment. Employees will based on those metrics. We distinguish between these algorithmic
sense-make about the intent of the algorithmic HRM systems and this capabilities because, although organizations may use both
will determine their impact. We expect that the impact of algorithmic (Bersin, 2023; Kellogg et al., 2020), it is also plausible that they may
HR systems on employee motivation, subsequent behavior, and well- use one over the other. For instance, a company may use technology
being will depend on employee attributions regarding the purpose of to automate monitoring and collection of performance data, but these
the algorithmic HR system, namely whether employees believe it is metrics may not directly inform HR decisions, instead providing infor-
intended to control, or to provide useful feedback to them. By adopt- mation for human consideration and analysis. Similarly, a company
ing an approach that considers both the potential harm and benefit of may not use technology to collect performance metrics, but their deci-
algorithmic HR systems from an employee perspective, we can pro- sions may nonetheless be driven by the application of automated
vide more practicable advice to HR practitioners seeking to yield stra- algorithmic HR processes. Thus, it is relevant to consider the distinct
tegic advantages from such technologies as an HR tool (Kim influences of automated monitoring and automated decision-making
et al., 2021), while also minimizing its drawbacks. on employee motivation.
1.1 | Algorithmic HR systems 1.2 | Algorithmic HR systems and employee

motivation
The age of algorithmic HRM has well and truly arrived (Bersin, 2023).
Many common HR software systems (e.g., Oracle, Workday, Peakon, Despite rapid developments in algorithmic HR, it remains unclear how
Microsoft Viva) now have the capacity to collect employee experience algorithm-based performance systems will impact employee motiva-
data via automated data collection processes or data survey systems, tion. Prior research shows that algorithms can reduce a sense of
store a wide range of data (such as employee engagement scores and autonomy in employees and be used as a control mechanism by orga-
competency development), collect additional data such as employee nizations (e.g., Kellogg et al., 2020; Meijerink & Bondarouk, 2023).
peer satisfaction ratings, compare employee performance against set Although enhanced managerial control may not itself be problematic,
goals, criteria, or expected attributes, and increasingly incorporate most modern theories of motivation suggest that low employee
advanced algorithmic systems such as predictive analytics, machine autonomy will negatively affect motivation. According to SDT
learning, and AI (Bersin, 2023). The term Algorithmic HRM has been (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2017), employees vary in the
defined by Meijerink et al. (2021) as “the use of software that oper- extent to which they experience different motivational states, which
ates on the basis of digital data to augment HR-related decisions or can be conceptualized along a continuum that ranges from
EDWARDS ET AL. 3
amotivation (not motivated) to extrinsic (or controlled) motivation, up 1.3 | Attributions for algorithmic HR
to more internalized and autonomous motivational states, such as
intrinsic motivation. Distinguishing between these motivational states It is well-established that employee perceptions of HR practices are
is valuable given their distinct impacts on work outcomes. Overall, key in determining employee responses (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004;
more internalized motivational states (i.e., more autonomous versus Guest, 2011), and this process is likely to extend to the introduction
less controlled motivation) are associated with better employee out- of algorithmic HR. An employee's motivational response to algorith-
comes, including performance, well-being, and commitment (Gagné mic HR systems will depend on their sensemaking around the use of
et al., 2015; Van den Broeck et al., 2021). the HR system (Kim et al., 2021), making their beliefs about why those
Critically, these motivational states are likely to arise from the systems have been implemented critical. Research that has explored
extent to which environments support or thwart basic human needs, the potential impact of monitoring on employees has also considered
with autonomy being a core need. Early research in SDT identified a the importance of issues linked to why monitoring systems are uti-
range of contextual factors important for supporting (and not lized. This prior research has relevance to the current study as
obstructing) autonomy. Here, it was argued that factors like deadlines, employee monitoring will be a feature of algorithmic-based HR per-
monitoring, and evaluation can be experienced as controlling, which formance systems where they include automated metric tracking. As
thwarts the basic need for autonomy and thus limits the potential for identified in a recent review of the monitoring literature (Ravid et al.,
the internalization of motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1987). A large body 2020) a feature that is likely to be important in determining whether
of research has identified a range of factors evident in work environ- employees respond positively to monitoring are perceptions of the
ments that contribute to the full spectrum of motivation, for example, purpose of the monitoring in the first place. Organizations may have a
work design, leadership and co-worker support, and other work and number of reasons for monitoring employees, among these employees
organizational factors (Deci et al., 2017). Thus, a range of work may perceive that the monitoring is carried out for positive reasons
and organizational factors present in employees' work environments such as providing developmental feedback (McNall & Roch, 2009;
can contribute to the process of need satisfaction and the subsequent Wells et al., 2007). However, it can also be conducted for a negative
internalization of work motivation. In this research, we examine the purpose such as authoritarian surveillance (McNall & Roch, 2007;
extent to which algorithmic HR systems contribute to work motiva- Thompson et al., 2009). While this literature focuses more specifically
tion. We take this approach given the potential of these systems, with on monitoring, it has relevance to algorithmic-based HR performance
features including monitoring and evaluation, to help or hinder funda- systems given the automated monitoring aspects of such systems.
mental psychological needs. However, as these HR systems fall within the broader realm of HR
Specifically, an algorithmic HR system that monitors and quan- practices, a more relevant theoretical framework linked to the idea of
tifies performance provides targets (implicitly, or explicitly via goals/ employee perceptions of “purpose” can be drawn on to understand
benchmarks) that employees will attend to. This may be beneficial to the likely impact of these systems; that is HR attribution theory.
the organization given concrete performance targets provide a clearer HR attribution theory (Nishii & Wright, 2008) provides a theoreti-
direction and expectations for employees, making it easier to identify cal lens for understanding how sensemaking may impact employee
and act toward strategically important performance goals. Importantly, responses to algorithmic HR systems. HR actions and initiatives can
to the extent that employees become personally motivated to achieve be perceived by employees as instrumental for achieving different
those goals (Deci & Ryan, 2000), algorithmic HR systems can make it organizational goals, and the perception of this intent (i.e., HR attribu-
easier to internalize and act upon those goals, serving as a valuable tions) shapes reception of those actions. Specifically, Nishii et al.
informational tool to enable more autonomous self-regulation (Ryan (2008) present a typology of employee attributions for HR policies
et al., 1983), which has been linked to greater employee persistence, along a dimension of internal versus external attributions. External
performance, and well-being (Gagné et al., 2015; Van den Broeck attributions tend to focus on whether the organization is implement-
et al., 2021). ing practices in response to external pressures (such as trade union
However, if employees feel that algorithmic HR systems and pressure or legal compliance), whereas internal attributions focus on
the goals/benchmarks they introduce are being imposed on them the organization's intent being due to internal decision-making
as a form of organizational control, their sense of autonomy may be preferences (such as strategic direction or value-systems). The internal
reduced (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Such controlled forms of regulation attributions can be clustered into employee-centered, commitment-
are more commonly associated with an increased focus on perfor- focused intent, which is understood as an attempt to improve
mance quantity over quality (Cerasoli et al., 2014), decreased well- employee performance and consider employee well-being; versus
being, and fewer organizational citizenship behaviors (Van den organizational-centered, control-focused intent, which is understood
Broeck et al., 2021). Importantly, this suggests that algorithmic HR as seeking to achieve revenue gains or expenditure reductions, poten-
systems can potentially elicit both controlled and autonomous tially at the cost of employee exploitation (Hewett et al., 2019). Nota-
motivational states; therefore, how employees interpret and make bly, these perceptions can echo a simple, dichotomous perspective on
sense of these systems is key to understanding their motivational HRM that contrasts control-oriented models (i.e., “hard HRM”) against
consequences. more commitment-based systems (i.e., “soft HRM”) where the goals
4 EDWARDS ET AL.
of performance appraisal and management are less about control and development needs, they are more likely to foster higher levels of
more oriented toward providing useful feedback, encouraging intrinsic motivation. Formally:
employee development, and fostering commitment (Guest, 1987;
Legge, 1995). Hypothesis H2. Both (a) Automated monitoring and
Applied to the current context, employees may perceive the pur- metric system use, and (b) automated decision-making
pose of algorithmic HR systems as a cost-efficient control system, or system use, will be positively associated with intrinsic
as a mechanism to empower employee feedback and development. (i.e., autonomous) motivational states, but only when
There may be individual differences and idiosyncratic situations shaping employees attribute this HR practice to an intent to pro-
the degree to which employees imbue HR practices with different vide employee feedback.
intent on the part of the organization. However, one of the key fac-
tors driving perceived intent is how organizations frame the goals of,
and introduce, new HR practices whether algorithmic or not (Hewett 1.4 | Algorithmic HRM and employee outcomes
et al., 2019; Nishii et al., 2008). We argue that when employees per-
ceive the intention of algorithmic HR systems as a way to control The central aim of our study is to understand the potential impact that
employees there will be different reactions compared to when they algorithmic HRM systems have on employees and the conditions
perceive the purpose as to provide constructive employee feedback. under which this technology, when used as an HR management tool,
We view this distinction as involving a potential moderation. We sug- can have positive or negative impacts on employees. Central to our
gest that these HR attributions will moderate the motivational and argument is the idea that these systems can be both beneficial and
behavioral impact of the two different aspects of algorithmic HR dis- potentially harmful for workers, as discussed by Kim et al. (2021). We
cussed previously: (1) automation in monitoring and metricizing per- argue that these systems, through the use of monitoring and metrics,
formance data, versus (2) the automated use of that performance data can have positive outcomes for organizations as they can help direct
to make HR decisions. Importantly, both can be understood as a employee behavior toward strategic priorities. However, we recognize
means to control and/or to empower autonomy. that the systems may also have potentially deleterious impacts on
When considering these employee attributions through the lens workers. Algorithmic HR systems may encourage an overemphasis
of SDT (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2017), it follows that attri- on metric linked behavior prioritization at the cost of other important
butions for the use of algorithmic HR systems will shape the motiva- job behaviors. They may also end up having a harmful impact on
tional states of employees. Specifically, we argue that automated employee well-being as they may exert too much external pressure
monitoring and metricizing of performance data will trigger more on employees to achieve performance targets, ultimately leading to a
extrinsic motivational states, but only when these HR systems are state of emotional exhaustion. However, it is important to note that
perceived as an attempt to control employees. Similarly, where these we specifically argue that the impact of algorithmic HRM systems on
systems feed automated HR decision-making, this is also likely to pro- employee outcomes will be via a process involving the fostering of
duce a sense of extrinsic motivational states if employees perceive intrinsic or extrinsic motivational states. Thus, we do not anticipate
them as being intended to control employees. Formally: direct effects of these systems on outcomes.
We reason that these systems will have an impact on employees'
Hypothesis H1. Both (a) Automated monitoring and controlled and autonomous motivational states and that these motiva-
metric system use, and (b) automated decision-making tional states will have important downstream effects on employee
system use, will be positively associated with extrinsic outcomes. Previous research has shown that motivational states are
(i.e., controlled) motivational states, but only when linked to critical employee outcomes such as job effort, well-being,
employees attribute this HR practice to an intent for and turnover intention (Gagné et al., 2015). For our study, we focus
managerial control. on three important employee outcomes. The first of these is emo-
tional exhaustion (Maslach et al., 1996), which we focus on as it repre-
However, employees may also perceive that the organization sents a key negative affective well-being indicator that we expect
has adopted an employee-centric perspective (Hewett et al., 2019). should differentially relate to the motivational states we focus on
Under this commitment-based attribution, automated monitoring within our investigation. Indeed, recent meta-analytic findings (Van
and metric systems are more likely to be understood as an attempt den Broeck et al., 2021) show that extrinsic motivational states are
to provide timely feedback for development purposes, create trans- positively related to emotional exhaustion, whereas intrinsic motiva-
parency in goal setting, and empower employees to track and regu- tion shows a negative relationship with this core negative well-being
late their own progress toward their objectives and potentially help outcome. Importantly, our study focuses specifically on the emotional
trigger competence satisfaction (Gagné et al., 2022). This would exhaustion component of Maslach et al.'s (1996) burnout construct,
therefore foster more autonomous motivation states with higher which refers to the feeling of being overextended and exhausted by
levels of intrinsic motivation. Similarly, when commitment-based one's work.
attributions are made for automated HR decision-making, as a way We identify emotional exhaustion as a key feature that is
to be more responsive and accurate in supporting employee impacted by performance linked algorithmic HR systems because it
EDWARDS ET AL. 5
reflects the feeling of being overextended and exhausted by one's links to performance metrics (i.e., non-metricized behavior de-
work. Guided by our earlier theorizing and propositions of SDT, feel- prioritization [NMBD]).
ing controlled or coerced by an algorithmic HR system should increase Importantly, the potential downstream effects of metricized
extrinsic motivation, making the experience of working more emotion- algorithmic HR systems are likely to occur via the type of motiva-
ally taxing. We argue that algorithmic HR systems foster extrinsic tional states that they foster. Where they foster externally con-
motivational states, which are likely to subsequently promote harmful trolled motivational states, the focus of employee effort is likely to
well-being outcomes such as emotional exhaustion. However, our be the achievement of performance tasks dictated within the metri-
theorizing also suggests that when feeling empowered or supported cized system. If external control is the motivating mechanism driv-
by algorithmic HR practices, more intrinsic motivational states can be ing employee behavior, where this control is absent because tasks
fostered, which should make the experience of working more enjoy- are not linked to metrics, employees are less likely to exert effort
able (and less taxing). The increasing use of. These motivational states toward achieving these goals. If intrinsic motivation has been fos-
are key to how work is experienced, whether it feels more like some- tered by these systems however, employees are likely to continue
thing you have to do (i.e., is extrinsically motivated) rather than want to exert effort toward achieving important job-related tasks even if
to do (i.e., is intrinsically motivated; Deci et al., 2017), which can shape these tasks are not linked to metrics. Employees are more likely to
the extent to which one becomes emotionally exhausted from work. be motivated to do a good job in general and go beyond perfor-
A second key outcome that we focus on is metric-directed mance targets when they are intrinsically motivated to do so. In
employee work effort (Van Iddekinge et al., 2023). We consider the influ- summary:
ence of algorithmic HR systems as it affects self-reported employee per-
formance efforts, specifically where those efforts are being directed. We Hypothesis H3. Extrinsic motivation will be positively
suggest that these systems increase employee prioritization toward per- associated with (a) emotional exhaustion, (b) metricized
formance on those metrics that are directly captured in their algorithmic behavior prioritization, and (c) more non-metricized
HR system. We define prioritization as the degree to which employees behavior de-prioritization.
exert effort toward behavior that improves those performance aspects
that are made visible by the performance metrics (i.e., metricized behav- Hypothesis H4. Intrinsic motivation will be
ior prioritization [MBP]). In line with prior work showing that both con- (a) negatively associated with emotional exhaustion,
trolled and autonomous motivational states are positively related to job (b) positively associated with metricized behavior priori-
effort, proactivity, and performance (Van den Broeck et al., 2021), we tization, and (c) negatively associated with non-
anticipate that algorithmic HR systems are likely to be associated with metricized behavior de-prioritization.
higher MBP. Again, we emphasize that the impact these systems have
on MBP will be indirect via the fostering of extrinsic (controlled) or intrin- Together, our hypotheses imply a mediated sequence of effects.
sic (autonomous) motivation. Specifically, algorithmic HR systems precede intrinsic and extrinsic
We also argue that while these systems may successfully direct motivation, which subsequently impact employee outcomes. Further-
efforts toward prioritized behaviors, there is likely to be a concurrent de- more, Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that employees' HR attributions
prioritization of other work behaviors. Thus, our third expected employee will determine whether their use is likely to lead to intrinsic and
outcome is the de-prioritization of those aspects of performance that are extrinsic motivation in employees; thus, we would also expect the
not visibly captured by a metric system. Automated HR metric systems indirect mediated effects of the algorithmic HR systems on employee
are necessarily designed to capture and quantify a limited set of perfor- outcomes (through motivation) to also be moderated by HR attribu-
mance indicators, either because other measurable work tasks are less tions. With our study, we argue that the downstream impact that
important and thus should be de-prioritized (Kellogg et al., 2020), or algorithmic HRM systems have on important behavioral outcomes,
because certain behaviors are difficult to observe and/or quantify despite such as MBP and NMBD, as well as negative well-being states such as
their importance to the job (e.g., OCBs; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993). Simi- emotional exhaustion, will be indirect via the extrinsic or intrinsic
larly, automated HR decision algorithms are unlikely to be able to con- motivational states that have been fostered. However, whether these
sider the full range of work criteria if those aspects of the job are difficult mediated indirect effects are likely to occur will be dependent on the
to integrate into the performance equation. degree to which employees perceive these systems as being intro-
Therefore, a potential downside of metricized algorithmic HR sys- duced for managerial control or for performance feedback purposes.
tems is that they may discourage employees from engaging in behav- Thus, as an extension of hypotheses 1 and 3 we propose the following
iors that are important but not captured easily with standard metrics. moderated mediation hypotheses:
This idea is familiar as an HR issue, as any performance management
system that sets clear targets and goals can potentially elicit perverse Hypothesis H5. The indirect effect of automated
outcomes because “individuals' tenacious pursuit of their own perfor- metric monitoring and automated decision-making
mance targets may lead them to neglect other aspects of their job” systems on (a) emotional exhaustion, (b) metricized
(Bach, 2012, p. 230). Within the context of algorithmic HR, we define behavior prioritization, and (c) non-metricized behavior
this de-prioritization as the tendency for employees to reduce their de-prioritization (via extrinsic motivation) will be moder-
focus on behaviors or aspects of their job that do not have specific ated by HR attributions of managerial control.
6 EDWARDS ET AL.
F I G U R E 1 Theorized
conceptual model.
Furthermore, as an extension of Hypotheses H2 and H4, we pro- Automated metricized monitoring was measured with four items.
pose the following moderated mediation hypotheses: For these items, we drew on a measure from Bobe and Kober (2020).
Bobe and Kober's measure focused mainly on monitoring manage-
Hypothesis H6. The indirect effect of automated met- ment control systems in general and as such we therefore drew on
ric monitoring and automated decision-making systems the key elements of these measures and applied the content to metri-
on (a) emotional exhaustion, (b) metricized behavior pri- cized monitoring. Importantly we added an aspect to the items that
oritization, and (c) non-metricized behavior de- included the “digital systems in place to automatically…” as this more
prioritization (via intrinsic motivation) will be moderated closely reflects the idea of algorithmic HRM. Participants were asked
by HR attributions of employee feedback provision. to rate their agreement with statements such as “My Organization
has digital systems in place to automatically monitor my performance
The moderated-mediation model is summarized in Figure 1. on key performance metrics/measures.” The measures are set out in
Table 1. We ensured that the scales covered four key features includ-
ing monitoring, tracking, collecting information, and recording perfor-
2 | METHODS mance. This scale therefore can be considered to cover the features
of automated “mechanical” (Kuncel et al., 2013) collection of data that
2.1 | Measurement validation pilot study would be used to track or form algorithmic judgments of performance.
The measure taps an algorithmic activity that Kellogg et al. (2020,
The specific focus of our study has not been directly examined before, p.378) refer to as “algorithmic rating.”
which necessitated adapting and building upon existing measures to Automated metricized decision-making was measured with five items
fit the context of our research. For this, we first launched a pilot study that tapped aspects of automated HR decision-making discussed in Kel-
to test the validity of the current study's measures in a unique sample logg et al. (2020). Kellogg et al. (2020) discuss aspects of algorithmic
of full-time working participants recruited from Prolific Academic. The processes linked to “replacement” and “rewarding” which center
invite specified that they be above the age of 25 and that they work around the idea that automated process set in place to automatically
in jobs which included some degree of performance monitoring, in monitor and track performance leading to different algorithmic
either the United Kingdom, United States, or Australia. This initially decision-making recommendations. Importantly these recommenda-
yielded responses from 250 participants, but after screening out inat- tions may automatically reward employees in different ways
tentive and incomplete responses, the final sample was 225. In this (e.g., financially, development or promotion opportunities), but they
pilot survey, we included the two measures of algorithmic HR use, the may also have negative job related consequences (e.g., performance
two measures of MBP and NMBD, and two measures capturing HR warnings of recommendations that may lead to firing). We specifically
attributions of managerial control versus feedback. draw on these ideas in constructing our automated metricized decision-
making measure. Participants were asked to rate their level of agree-
ment with statements about how their organization has systems that
2.1.1 | Measures automatically make decisions based on their performance. Examples
include: “My organization has digital systems in place that automatically
All scales were assessed on a response scale from 1 (strongly disagree) feeds information linked to my performance on key performance met-
to 5 (strongly agree) unless otherwise stated (see Table 1 for further rics/measures into processes involved in career progression
measurement details). (e.g., whether I may be considered for promotion).”
EDWARDS ET AL. 7
TABLE 1 Study 1—Pilot testing modified scales, CFA loadings.
Factor
Measure/item loading
Automated monitoring and metric measurement. My organization has digital systems in place to automatically…
Monitor my performance on key performance metrics/measures 0.882
Track my performance on key performance metrics/measures 0.946
Collect information about my performance on key performance metrics/measures 0.942
Record my performance on key performance metrics/measures 0.944
Automated monitoring and metric decision-making: “My organization has digital systems in place that automatically…”
Make reward decisions (e.g., feeding into a bonus or pay system) based on my performance on key performance metrics/measures 0.828
Make development decisions (e.g., recommending me for certain training programs) based on my performance on key performance 0.815
metrics/measures
Make recognition decisions (e.g., whether i may be considered for an award or given formal recognition for performance) based on my 0.899
performance on key performance metrics/measures
Feeds information linked to my performance on key performance metrics/measures into processes involved in career progression (e.g., 0.862
whether i may be considered for promotion)”
Trigger performance warnings (e.g., i may be flagged as having problems with my performance by the system if i do not do well) based on 0.639
my performance on key performance metrics/measures
Non-metricized behavior de-prioritization. “In my job…”
I tend to neglect job obligations that aren't linked to any performance metric or evaluation 0.742
I avoid doing things that won't improve my performance evaluation linked to metrics or targets 0.759
I avoid helping others out if it takes me away from hitting my own targets 0.913
The only activities I focus on at work are things that will have a positive impact on formal performance metrics 0.846
Metricized behavior prioritization. “In my job…”
I pay particular attention to tasks if they are likely to boost how I am evaluated on performance metrics 0.677
I always make sure that I meet formal performance requirements that are linked to performance metrics 0.619
I always engage in activities that directly affect how I am rated on performance evaluation/metrics 0.741
I focus lots of my attention on making sure that I improve my rating on performance targets or metrics 0.877
I focus lots of effort with activities likely to boost my evaluations against performance metrics 0.829
I spend a good deal of time thinking about how I can improve my ratings against performance metrics 0.744
I work with intensity to ensure I do things that will be reflected in my performance metrics 0.779
I strive as hard as I can to ensure that I do well on metrics associated with my performance 0.788
I exert a lot of energy to ensure that I perform well against performance metrics 0.730
Managerial control HR attribution. My organization electronically monitors my day-to-day activities…
Because managers want to know what employees are working on to ensure they are working sufficiently hard 0.793
Because the mere idea of the organization monitoring employee performance, measures and metrics helps control employee behavior 0.884
Because monitoring performance measures and metrics help managers control employee behavior 0.850
Feedback provision HR attribution—My organization electronically monitors my day-to-day activities…
To get a picture of employees' performance to share with employees 0.580
Because employees value feedback on their performance 0.855
Because employees want to know how they are doing in their jobs 0.941
Because employees can tell what they need to work on to improve their job performance 0.879
HR attributions were captured by asking participants questions versus commitment generating feedback provision attributions. After
linked to why their organization monitors their day-to-day activities. the introduction statement indicating that the questions were “about
The opening prompt asked them to rate their agreement with state- why your organization electronically monitors your day-to-day activi-
ments indicating attributions of control vs. feedback. The scale was ties” the following question stem “My organization monitors my day-
created for the purposes of the current study but inspired by Nishii to-day activities…” was used for each set of items. HR control attribu-
et al.'s (2008) control and exploitation versus commitment HR attribution was measured with three items, as an example: “Because moni-
tions measure. Importantly we focus on the control of employees toring performance measures and metrics help managers control
8 EDWARDS ET AL.
employee behavior.” HR feedback attribution was measured with four extrinsic and intrinsic motivation mediators at Time 2. Subsequently,
items, as an example: “Because employees want to know how they the dependent variables of emotional exhaustion, MBP, and NMBD
are doing in their jobs.” were measured at Time 3. The three waves of data collection were
MBP was measured with nine items based on a selection of ques- separated by three-week intervals to mitigate common method biases
tions from work effort measures used by Brown and Leigh (1996) and (Podsakoff et al., 2012). Thus, data collection spanned 6 weeks.
work effort features discussed by Van Iddekinge et al. (2023). We uti-
lized nine items to ensure that we covered enough features of work
effort that should encompass likely behavior prioritization linked to 2.2.1 | Participants
metric use. Participants were given the stem “In my job…” and asked
to rate their agreement with statements such as, “I focus lots of effort Participants were full-time employees recruited via the online plat-
with activities likely to boost my evaluations against performance form Prolific Academic. They were invited to participate in three
metrics.” waves of data collection (matched via unique/anonymous ID) and
De-prioritization of non-metricized behavior (NMBD), here we used were remunerated a pro-rata amount of £9 per hour for each wave
the same question stem “In my job…” but included four new items they completed. The study was originally opened to 425 participants,
that emphasized de-prioritization by neglecting or avoiding non- though 427 began the survey. We restricted our recruitment efforts
metricized behaviors or only focusing on metric linked activities. As an to people aged 25 or older, to decrease the chance that our sample
example: “I tend to neglect job obligations that aren't linked to any would include employees who worked in more transitory jobs
performance metric or evaluation” (see Table 1). (e.g., students) and therefore may not yet have meaningful experience
with algorithmic HRM systems. After screening out inattentive or
incomplete responses, our initial sample size at Time 1 was 401, com-
2.1.2 | Measurement validation analysis prising 40.6% women and 59.4% men. The majority of the sample
were younger than 40, with 29.7% being between 25 and 29; 38.4%
We ran a six-factor confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) measurement between 31 and 39; 19.2% between 40 and 59; 1.5% were above 60.
model that loaded all respective items described above (see Table 1) The majority had at least an undergraduate degree (81.3%), with 4.5%
onto their theorized factors. This six-factor model fit the data well being educated up to a certificate/diploma level or below; 11.7% had
(X2 = 827.90, df = 362; X2/df = 2.29, RMSEA = 0.076; CFI = 0.91; a postgraduate certificate or diploma, and 2.5% had a Master's degree.
SRMR = 0.074). All factors showed strong loadings for each item onto Just over half (54.6%) managed others. Where participants indicated
their corresponding latent variable. We compared this theorized six- country of residence, almost half (48%) of respondents worked in the
factor model with a range of different models that combined items United Kingdom, 20% in South Africa, 19.4% in Europe, 8%
across different combinations of latent measures. This included: a sin- United States, 1.6% Australia and New Zealand, and the remaining
gle factor model that combined all items (X = 3972.70, df = 377; X /
2 2
participants (3%) were from other geographical locations. The partici-
df = 10.54, RMSEA = 0.206; CFI = 0.289;SRMR = 0.179); a five- pants were employed in a wide range of occupations, ranging from
factor model that combined the two algorithmic HR measures admin clerk, accounting manager, call center agent, logistics and ware-
(X2 = 1411.682, df = 367, X2/df = 3.85, RMSEA = 0.112; CFI = house manager, primary school teacher, police officer, senior graphic
0.79; SRMR = 0.115); a five-factor model that combined the two designer, software analyst, sales director, security consultant. Details
behavior prioritization/de-prioritization measures (X2 = 1331.40, of the occupations of the participants are set out in the supplemental
df = 367; X2/df = 3.63, RMSEA = 0.108; CFI = 0.81; SRMR = material.
0.109); and a five-factor model that combined the two HR attribution In total, 329 respondents completed Time 1 and Time 2, 303
measures (X = 115.681, df = 367; X /df = 3.15, RMSEA = 0.098;
2 2
completed Time 1 and Time 3, and 267 respondents completed all
CFI = 0.84; SRMR = 0.094). In all cases, the six-factor model showed 3 waves of the survey (i.e., a 66.6% retention rate from Time 1). Given
a significantly better fit to the data (X2 diff test p < 0.001) than the the inevitable attrition rates that occur with time-lagged studies, we
more parsimonious model. Reliability analyses showed good reliability used full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) to deal with missing
for automated monitoring (α = 0.961); automated decision-making data. Notably, FIML uses available data from all participants, providing
(α = 0.876), HR attributions of control (α = 0.887), HR attributions of greater statistical power while also yielding less biased parameter esti-
feedback (α = 0.914), MBP (α = 0.911), and NMPD (α = 0.878). mates and reducing Type I errors compared to other approaches, such
as listwise deletion (Enders & Bandalos, 2001). Relationships tested
across Time 1 to Time 2 thus involved 329 responses, those across
2.2 | Main study design Time 1 to Time 3 were restricted to 303 responses, and those
across Time 2 to Time 3 were restricted to 267.
Our focal study captured employee responses across three waves. We tested whether participants who only completed Time 1 var-
We first measured the independent variables of automated monitor- ied across key demographics and focal outcomes relative to those
ing and decision-making at Time 1 along with the two moderators of who also responded on a subsequent occasion. Analyses revealed that
control versus feedback HR attributions. This was followed by the these two samples did not show any appreciable difference in gender
EDWARDS ET AL. 9
frequencies (χ2 = 1.14, df = 1, p > 0.05); age categories (χ2 = 14.57, motivation, 0.859 to 0.940 for intrinsic motivation, 0.753 to 0.922 for
df = 8, p > 0.05); country region (χ2 = 2.30, df = 6, p > 0.05); or edu- HR attributions of managerial control, 0.616 to 0.903 for feedback
cation level (χ = 9.41, df = 6, p > 0.05). We also tested (t tests)
2
attributions, 0.623 to 0.837 for MBP, 0.661 to 0.856, for NMBD, and
whether the participants who only answered the survey at Time 1 dif- 0.759 to 0.912 for emotional exhaustion. We ran a similar range of
fered on any of the main study constructs compared to those who measurement tests to check against the theorized measurement
responded again; none of these comparisons yielded any significant model, like our validation study. When combining various similar con-
differences. structs this resulted in a series of comparisons of eight-factor models
compared to the theorized nine-factor model. More specifically, these
involved an eight-factor model that combined the two motivation
2.2.2 | Measures constructs into a single factor, the two automated monitoring and
automated decision-making measures into a single measure, the two
The scales used in the main study were the same as those reported in HR attribution measures and the two metricized behavior measures
the validation study (see Table 1). These measures included automated (see Table 5 in the online supplementary material). In all cases the
monitoring (α = 0.965), automated decision-making (α = 0.858), HR nine-factor model showed a significantly better fit (X2diff test
attributions of control (α = 0.887), HR attributions of feedback p < 0.001) to the data than the more parsimonious eight-factor
(α = 0.924), MBP (α = 0.920), and NMPD (α = 0.845). However, this models. We also ran a model that included a common methods latent
main study also captured mediator and outcome measures at Times factor variable cross loaded onto all items (Podsakoff et al., 2012). As
2 and 3, respectively, specified below. would be expected this measurement model with a CMV factor
Employee motivations were assessed using established SDT showed an improved fit (which is expected as the model is catering
scales (Gagné et al., 2015): “There are many different reasons why for more shared variance in the dataset). Adding the CMV factors did
people put effort into their work. Why do you put effort into your reduce some factor loadings; however, these factor loadings remained
job?” For extrinsic motivation, we used three items (α = 0.795): strong across all variables. The latent correlations between the factors
“because others will reward me financially only if I put enough effort when including a CMV latent variable are presented in the supple-
in my job,” “because others offer me greater job security if I put mentary online material in Table 6. Note that the correlations showed
enough effort into my job,” and “because I risk losing my job if I don't only minimal changes when the CMV variable was included.
put enough effort in it.” For intrinsic motivation, we used three items
(α = 0.928): “because I have fun doing my job,” “because what I do in
my work is exciting,” and “because the work I do is interesting.” 3.2 | Analytic approach and hypotheses testing
Emotional Exhaustion was measured with five items from the
Maslach Burnout Inventory (Maslach et al., 1996) focusing on We tested the model in Figure 1 with latent variable moderated struc-
the emotional exhaustion facet. These were “I feel emotionally tural equation modeling, which provides more accurate parameter
drained from my work,” “I feel used up at the end of the workday,” “I estimates than traditional regression approaches (Cheung &
feel tired when I get up in the morning and have to face another day Lau, 2017). We first ran the mediation aspects of our model (Model 1)
on the job,” “Working all day is really a strain for me,” and “I feel with automated metric monitoring and automated decision-making
burned out from my work,” (α = 0.795). predicting intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as mediators, and these
motivational states then predicted the three outcome variables. We
then tested if the indirect effects were contingent on whether people
3 | RESULTS believed their organization monitored their work for control purposes
or to enable feedback using latent variable moderation testing.
3.1 | Measurement model testing Although the latent variable moderation testing is more precise than
traditional approaches, it is computationally demanding (Preacher
Table 2 displays the reliability statistics, latent variable zero-order cor- et al., 2016) and complex models are often intractable (Asparouhov &
relations between observed variables and demographic controls of Muthén, 2021). As such, to reduce model complexity, we included
gender, education, and managerial status. Latent variable analyses each latent interaction separately when conducting our analyses
were conducted in Mplus version 8.8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017) using (i.e., we estimated our model four times with only one of our pro-
FIML to handle missing data. We ran a CFA to examine whether all posed moderators). Note that as recommended (Zyphur et al., 2023),
respective items loaded onto their theorized factors. The proposed we used the Bayesian method of estimation which is less biased with
nine-factor model fit these data well (X2(704) = 1499.55, X2/ smaller samples; as such we report the 95% credibility intervals asso-
df = 2.13, RMSEA = 0.053, SRMR = 0.055, CFI = 0.926, TLI = ciated with parameter estimates. We report the results of the first-
0.917), and all standardized factor loadings were higher than minimum stage moderated latent variable structural paths in Tables 3 and 4, and
expectations on subsequent latent variables: with loadings ranging the second-stage latent variable model structural paths in Table 5 with
from 0.922 to 0.950 for automated monitoring and metrics, 0.678 to the results of the moderated mediation presented in Table 6.
0.868 for automated decision-making, 0.614 to 0.867 for extrinsic With these analyses, due to model complexity we ran the model
10
TABLE 2 Descriptives: Latent variable correlations.
Auto monitor Auto decision HRA control HRA feedback Extrinsic mot' Intrinsic mot' Emotional exhaustion MBP NMBD Meansa S.D.a
b
1 Auto monitoring T1 0.965 3.55 1.31
2 Auto decision T1 0.475*** 0.885 2.42 1.13
3 HRA control T1 0.294*** 0.308*** 0.887 3.52 1.13
4 HRA feedback T1 0.311*** 0.455*** 0.383*** 0.924 3.39 1.12
5 SDT extrinsic Mot' T2 0.207** 0.156** 0.200** 0.147* 0.795 3.41 1.07
6 SDT intrinsic Mot' T2 0.019 0.134** 0.081 0.209*** 0.011 0.928 3.30 1.13
7 Emotional exhaustion T3 0.075 0.045 0.135* 0.038 0.143* 0.470*** 0.950 2.82 1.26
8 MBP T3 0.209*** 0.285*** 0.180** 0.315*** 0.389*** 0.256*** 0.042 0.920 3.66 0.78
9 NMBD T3 0.168** 0.251*** 0.261*** 0.183** 0.265*** 0.166*** 0.237*** 0.428*** 0.845 2.35 0.92
10 Gender (0 = M; 1 = F) 0.041 0.031 0.033 0.095 0.152* 0.061 0.196** 0.190** 0.134* 0.406 0.241
11 Education 0.047 0.031 0.068 0.042 0.077 0.028 0.071 0.046 0.016 6.087 0.404
12 Manager 0.044 0.043 0.011 0.013 0.025 0.129* 0.027 0.157* 0.030 0.546 0.248
Note: N = T1 <-> T2 = 329; N = T1 <-> T3 = 303; N = T2 <-> T3 = 267.

Abbreviations: MBP, Metricized Behavior Prioritization; NMBD, Non-Metricized Behavior De-prioritization.
a
Reliability, means, and S.D. based on within wave N (T1 = 401; T2 = 379; T3 = 303).
b
Cronbach alpha on the diagonal.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
EDWARDS ET AL.
EDWARDS ET AL. 11
T A B L E 3 First-stage latent variable model structural paths predicting extrinsic motivation with automated metricized monitoring and
automated decision-making: HR attribution of control V feedback as moderators (N = 331).
DV: Extrinsic motivation
Mediated Moderated mediation Moderated mediation

(Model 1) Beta Mediation (Model 2) (Model 3) Beta (Model 4) Beta
T1 IVS (95% LLCI:ULCI) Beta (95% LLCI:ULCI) (95% LLCI:ULCI) (95% LLCI:ULCI)
Auto metric monitoring à 0.176 (0.042: 0.307) 0.137 ( 0.004: 0.273) 0.169 (0.027: 0.305) 0.147 (0.005: 0.283)
Auto decision-making à 0.066 ( 0.073: 0.202) 0.013 ( 0.136: 0.161) 0.003 ( 0.153: 0.149) 0.001 ( 0.155: 0.151)
HR attribution control 0.153 (0.009: 0.291) 0.132 ( 0.004: 0.268) 0.166 (0.029: 0.299)
HR attribution feedback 0.062 ( 0.087: 0.203) 0.080 ( 0.064: 0.222) 0.055 ( 0.089: 0.197)
HRA control monitoring 0.187 (0.061: 0.314)
HRA control decision-making 0.166 (0.038: 0.296)
Low control ( 1 SD Moderator) 0.018 ( 0.169: 0.129) 0.191 ( 0.437: 0.037)
High control (+1 SD moderator) 0.294 (0.124: 0.474) 0.186 ( 0.035: 0.414)
R2 0.050 (0.012: 0.112) 0.086 (0.032: 0.160) 0.134 (0.062: 0.232) 0.125 (0.055: 0.216)
Note: N = T1 <-> T2 = 329; N = T1 <-> T3 = 303; N = T2 <-> T3 = 267. The indirect coefficients are indicated followed by the 95% confidence
intervals (Index (95% CI LL:UL) - these are Bayesian statistics and as such the confidence interval ranges give an indication of the significants
(in bold).
T A B L E 4 First-stage latent variable model structural paths predicting intrinsic motivation with automated metricized monitoring and
automated decision-making: HR attribution of feedback as moderators.
DV: Intrinsic motivation
Mediated Moderated mediation Moderated mediation

(Model 1) Beta Mediation (Model 2) (Model 5) Beta (Model 6) Beta
T1 IVS (95% LLCI:ULCI) Beta (95% LLCI:ULCI) (95% LLCI:ULCI) (95% LLCI:ULCI)
Auto metric monitoring à 0.109 ( 0.008: 0.110) 0.102 ( 0.231: 0.026) 0.064 (0.200: 0.074) 0.090 ( 0.218: 0.043)
Auto decision-making à 0.185 ( 0.008: 0.110) 0.121 ( 0.022: 0.260) 0.104 ( 0.037: 0.247) 0.093 ( 0.050: 0.235)
HR attribution control 0.189 ( 0.320: 0.056) 0.180 ( 0.310: 0.045) 0.188 ( 0.318: 0.054)
HR attribution feedback 0.260 (0.121: 0.395) 0.250 (0.109: 0.389) 0.270 (0.126: 0.406)
HRA feedback monitoring 0.123 (0.004: 0.242)
HRA feedback decision-making 0.136 (0.017: 0.254)
Low feedback ( 1 SD moderator) 0.193 ( 0.355: 0.040) 0.102 ( 0.385: 0.171)
High feedback (+1 SD moderator) 0.084 ( 0.112: 0.290 0.319 (0.093: 0.573)
R2 0.030 (0.004: 0.112) 0.099 (0.041: 0.173) 0.110 (0.050: 0.190) 0.123 (0.056: 0.209)
intervals (Index (95% CI LL:UL) - these are Bayesian statistics and as such the confidence interval ranges give an indication of the significants (in bold).
presented in Figure 1 four times, each time with a separate latent vari- attribution automated decision-making latent variable predicting
able interaction in the first stage of the model. The first-stage modera- intrinsic motivation (Model 6 in Table 4). Note that each of these
tion tests are set out in Tables 3 and 4. The first interaction model models also sets the two motivational states, the theorized mediators,
(as reflected in Figure 1) includes the control HR attribution as predictors of the three outcome variables. For parsimony, we only
monitoring and metric latent variable where the extrinsic motiva- report one set of coefficients for the stage b-paths produced with the
tion mediator was regressed onto the latent variable interaction, the mediated model only. However, the models (3–6) produce very slight
two HR attribution measures and the two algorithmic HR variables variations in these coefficients (the coefficients may vary by 0.01
(Model 3 in Table 3). The second latent interaction model included a across the models, but the variation is immaterial, details available
control HR attribution automated decision-making latent variable from the authors).
predicting extrinsic motivation (Model 4 in Table 3). The third latent As we report all coefficients in Tables 3–6, we only report the key
interaction model included a feedback HR attribution monitoring findings related our hypotheses below. We report the indirect effects
and metric latent variable predicting intrinsic motivation (Model 5 in with the mediated model (combining stage 1 and 2 coefficients with
Table 4). The fourth latent interaction model included a feedback HR Model 1) and moderated indirect effects (utilizing stage 1 and
12 EDWARDS ET AL.
TABLE 5 Second-stage latent variable model structural paths: Including indirect effects results.
Emotional exhaustion MBP NMBD

Mediator à DV
Beta (95% LLCI:ULCI) Beta (95% LLCI:ULCI) Beta (95% LLCI:ULCI)
T2 extrinsic motivation 0.161 (0.035: 0.282) 0.371 (0.255: 0.481) 0.278 (0.150: 0.412)
T2 intrinsic motivation 0.461 ( 0.558: 0.362) 0.214 (0.098: 0.328) 0.192 ( 0.310: 0.065)
IV auto monitoring 0.057 ( 0.069: 0.179) 0.064 ( 0.061: 0.185) 0.010 ( 0.128: 0.147)
T1 auto decision 0.027 ( 0.157: 0.099) 0.167 (0.040: 0.292) 0.229 (0.089: 0.368)
R2 0.257 (0.165: 0.349) 0.273 (0.177: 0.372) 0.188 (0.097: 0.280)
Indirect effectsa Indirect Indirect Indirect
IV à Med à DV beta (95% CI LL:UL) beta (95% CI LL:UL) beta (95% CI LL:UL)
Auto monitoring- > extrinsic Mot' 0.025 (0.000: 0.059) 0.032 (0.007: 0.064) 0.027 (0.004: 0.056)
Auto monitoring- > intrinsic Mot' 0.047 ( 0.011: 0.106) 0.011 ( 0.028: 0.003) 0.011 ( 0.003: 0.030)
Auto decision- > extrinsic Mot' 0.012 ( 0.018: 0.051) 0.016 ( 0.019: 0.054) 0.013 ( 0.018: 0.049)
Auto decision- > intrinsic Mot' 0.109 ( 0.200; 0.028) 0.025 (0.005: 0.053) 0.026 ( 0.057: 0.002)
a
Indirect effects calculated with Model 1 stage 1 coefficients combined with stage 2 model coefficients above.
TABLE 6 Second-stage latent variable model structural paths: moderated mediation results.
Mediator à DV Emotional exhaustion MBP NMBD

a
Moderated indirect effects Index of Mod' Med' Index of Mod' Med' Index of Mod' Med'
IV à Med à DV Index (95% CI LL:UL) Index (95% CI LL:UL) Index (95% CI LL:UL)
With HRA control included as moderator
Model 3: Auto monitoring- > extrinsic Mot'- > DV 0.028 (0.004: 0.066) 0.036 (0.011: 0.071) 0.032 (0.009: 0.067)
Model 4: Auto decision- > extrinsic Mot'- > DV 0.033 (0.004: 0.086) 0.043 (0.009: 0.089) 0.038 (0.008: 0.083)
With HRA feedback included as moderator
Model 5: Auto monitor- > intrinsic Mot- > DV 0.071 ( 0.151: 0.002) 0.017 (0.000: 0.044) 0.017 ( 0.045: 0.000
Model 6: Auto decision- > intrinsic Mot- > DV 0.108 ( 0.223: 0.013) 0.026 (0.003: 0.062) 0.026 ( 0.068: 0.002)
a
Moderated Indirect effects calculated with Models 3–6 stage 1 coefficients and their resulting stage 2 coefficients.
2 coefficients from Models 3–6) along with 95% credibility intervals. significant (Beta = 0.187, LLCI = 0.061; UCI = 0.314) supporting Hypothe-
We estimated models with FIML (Little & Rubin, 1986), which uses all sis H1a. Specifically, Figure 2a shows that the association between metric
available data and estimates parameters across waves where there is monitoring and extrinsic motivation was positive and significant at high
data for that particular path in the model. This approach is less biased levels (+1 SD) of HR control attribution (b = 0.294, LLCI = 0.124;
than other estimation procedures such as listwise deletion UCI = 0.474), but this was not significant at low levels ( 1 SD) of HR con-
(Newman, 2014). The moderation testing involves modeling latent trol attribution (b = 0.018, LLCI = 0.169; UCI = 0.129).
variable interaction terms, which enable the production of simple
slopes for the first-stage interaction (Stride et al., 2015) and indices of
moderated indirect effects (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). 3.4 | Interaction between HR control attribution
and metric decision-making on extrinsic motivation
(Model 4)
3.3 | Interaction between HR control attribution
and monitoring on extrinsic motivation (Model 3) The interaction effect between HR control attribution and metric
decision-making on extrinsic motivation was significant (Beta = 0.166,
Results in Table 3 (Model 3) show that the interaction effect between HR LLCI = 0.038; UCI = 0.296). As illustrated in Figure 2b, see Table 3
control attribution and metric monitoring on extrinsic motivation was (Model 4) supporting Hypothesis H1b; the association between metric
EDWARDS ET AL. 13
F I G U R E 2 (a–d) First-stage moderation of the relationship between autonomous monitoring and autonomous decision with extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation: Human Resource attributions of control versus feedback provision as moderators.
decision-making and extrinsic motivation was positive at high levels of significant and in the direction predicted (with high feedback attributions
HR control attribution (b = 0.186, LLCI = 0.035; UCI = 0.414), but leading to a more positive relationship compared to low feedback percep-
negative at low levels of HR control attribution (b = 0.191, tions, which here produced a negative relationship).
LLCI = 0.437; UCI = 0.037). Note that although the moderation is posi-
tive and significant as predicted with Hypothesis H1b, the simple slope
at high levels of control attribution does not quite reach significance 3.6 | Interaction between HR feedback attribution
(one-tailed test p = 0.051), thus although the significant positive moder- and metric decision-making on intrinsic motivation
ation supports Hypothesis H1 and is in the direction predicted, strictly (Model 6)
speaking the lack of significant simple slopes with high control attribution
means that there is only partial support for this hypothesis. Table 4 shows that the interaction effect between HR feedback attri-
bution and metric decision-making on intrinsic motivation was signifi-
cant (Beta = 0.136, LLCI = 0.017; UCI = 0.254) which supports
3.5 | Interaction between HR feedback attribution Hypothesis H2b. As illustrated in Figure 2d, the association between
and monitoring on intrinsic motivation (Model 5) metric decision-making and intrinsic motivation was significantly posi-
tive at high levels of HR feedback attribution (b = 0.319,
Table 4 shows that the interaction effect between HR feedback attribution LLCI = 0.093; UCI = 0.573), but was not significant at low levels of
and metric monitoring on intrinsic motivation was significant (Beta = 0.123, HR feedback attribution (b = 0.102, LLCI = 0.385; UCI = 0.171).
LLCI = 0.004; UCI = 0.242). As illustrated in Figure 2c, the association
between metric monitoring and intrinsic motivation is positive but not signifi-
cant at high levels of HR feedback attribution (b = 0.084, LLCI = 0.112; 3.7 | Extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation
UCI = 0.290); however, this relationship is significant and negative at low on (a) emotional exhaustion, (b) MBP, and (c) NMBD
levels of HR feedback attribution (b = 0.193, LLCI = 0.355; UCI =
0.040). As we predicted that the association between metric monitoring Table 5 displays the results of the second-stage latent variable model
and intrinsic motivation would be positive at high levels of HR feedback attri- structural paths. It shows that extrinsic motivation significantly posi-
bution, Hypothesis H2a was not supported even though the moderation was tively predicts emotional exhaustion (Beta = 0.161, LLCI = 0.035;
14 EDWARDS ET AL.
ULCI = 0.282), MBP (Beta = 0.371, LLCI = 0.255; UCI = 0.481), and MBP and indirect b = 0.093 (LLCI = 0.032; ULCI = 0.181)
also NMBD (Beta = 0.278, LLCI = 0.150; UCI = 0.412); thus, support- onto NMBD. The same pattern is found with automated decision-
ing Hypotheses H3a–c. Conversely, intrinsic motivation significantly making at higher levels of HR attributions of control (+2 SD), indirect
negatively predicted both emotional exhaustion (Beta = 0.461, b = 0.065 (LLCI = 0.003; ULCI = 0.179) onto emotional exhaustion,
LLCI = 0.558; UCI = 0.362) and NBDP (Beta = 0.192, indirect b = 0.085 (LLCI = 0.009; ULCI = 0.185) onto MBP and
LLCI = 0.310; UCI = 0.065), but positively predicted MBP b = 0.074 (LLCI = 0.008; ULCI = 0.171) onto NMBD.
(Beta = 0.214, LLCI = 0.098; UCI = 0.328); thus hypotheses H4a–c is For Hypothesis H6a–c, the moderation of the indirect effects of
supported. The key coefficients produced in the moderated mediation the two automated systems by HR attributions of feedback are also
analyses are presented in Figure 3. found onto the outcomes of emotional exhaustion, MBP, and NMBP.
The indirect relationship between both automated monitoring
through intrinsic motivation states onto the three outcomes is moder-
3.8 | Moderated indirect effects of automated ated by HR attributions of feedback (index of moderated
monitoring and automated decision-making through mediation = 0.071, LLCI = 0.151; ULCI = 0.002; index = 0.017,
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on (a) emotional LLCI = 0.000; ULCI = 0.044; index = 0.017; LLCI = 0.045;
exhaustion, (b) MBP, and (c) NMBD ULCI = 0.000, respectively). The indirect relationship between auto-
mated decision-making through intrinsic motivation states onto the
Table 6 shows the moderated mediation results linked to Hypotheses three outcomes is moderated by HR attributions of feedback (index of
H5 and H6. The indirect effects of automated monitoring and metrics moderated mediation = 0.108, LLCI = 0.223; ULCI = 0.013;
via extrinsic motivation onto the outcomes of emotional exhaustion, index = 0.026, LLCI = 0.003; ULCI = 0.062; index = 0.026;
MBP and NMBP are moderated by HR attributions of control (index LLCI = 0.068; ULCI = 0.002, respectively). Here the indirect effects
of moderated mediation = 0.028, LLCI = 0.004; ULCI = 0.066; of automated monitoring onto emotional exhaustion and NMBD
index = 0.036, LLCI = 0.011; ULCI = 0.071; index = 0.032; LLCI = through intrinsic motivation are significant and positive at lower levels
0.009; ULCI = 0.067, respectively). The moderated mediation was ( 2 SD) of feedback (indirect effects b = 0.170, LLCI = 0.035;
also significant for the indirect effects of automated decision-making ULCI = 0.331 for emotional exhaustion and b = 0.040, LLCI = 0.006;
via extrinsic motivation onto the outcomes of emotional exhaustion, ULCI = 0.100 for NMBD), though negative and not significant with
MBP and NMBD (index of moderated mediation = 0.033, LLCI = higher levels of feedback. The indirect effects of automated monitor-
0.004; ULCI = 0.086; index = 0.043, LLCI = 0.009; ULCI = 0.089; ing onto MBP through intrinsic motivation are significant and negative
index = 0.038; LLCI = 0.008; ULCI = 0.083, respectively). Thus, at the lower levels of feedback attribution (b = 0.041, LLCI = 0.095;
Hypothesis H5a–c is supported with automated monitoring and met- ULCI = 0.007) but not significant at higher levels of feedback. The
ric systems and with automated decision-making usage. indirect effects of automated decision-making onto emotional exhaus-
With HR attributions of control as a moderator, the general pat- tion and NMBD through intrinsic motivation are significant and nega-
tern with the significant moderated mediations is that we find signifi- tive at higher levels ( 2 SD) of feedback (indirect effects b = 0.271,
cant positive indirect effects of monitoring onto emotional LLCI = 0.514; ULCI = 0.077 for emotional exhaustion and
exhaustion, MBP and also NMBD through extrinsic motivation at b= 0.066, LLCI = 0.161; ULCI = 0.012 for NMBD) though posi-
higher levels of perceptions of HR attributions of control (+2 SD), tive and not significant with lower levels of feedback. The indirect
indirect b = 0.081 (LLCI = 0.015; ULCI = 0.179) onto emotional effects of automated decision-making onto MBP through intrinsic
exhaustion, indirect b = 0.105 (LLCI = 0.041; ULCI = 0.191) onto motivation are significant and positive at the higher levels of feedback
F I G U R E 3 Latent variable
model results: HR attributions
moderate the impact of
automated monitoring and
decision-making.
EDWARDS ET AL. 15
attribution (b = 0.065, LLCI = 0.016; ULCI = 0.143) but negative and utilizes automated HR decision-making systems with a positive intent,
not significant at lower levels of feedback attribution. such as providing developmental feedback and useful performance infor-
mation, these systems are likely to instigate higher quality intrinsic moti-
vational states (Rigby & Ryan, 2018). In addition, when these feedback
4 | DISCUSSION attributions are absent, automated monitoring and metric systems will
likely reduce autonomous motivational states. Importantly, we find that
The increasing use of algorithmic HR systems has the potential to pro- the greater an employee's sense of autonomous motivation, the lower
foundly impact employees in the workplace and could lead to benefi- the likelihood that they will report emotional exhaustion. Thus,
cial and/or harmful outcomes for workers (Kim et al., 2021). As these employee-centered HR attributions of feedback provision are likely play
systems become more sophisticated and pervasive, there is a risk that a key role in determining whether employees go on to experience nega-
employees feel increasingly controlled in their everyday work lives tive well-being states in the context of algorithmic HR systems.
(Kellogg et al., 2020; Meijerink & Bondarouk, 2023), which could
impact their motivational states (Rigby & Ryan, 2018). Our study
shows that algorithmic HR systems that automatically monitor and 4.1 | Paradoxical outcomes of algorithmic HR
track performance against metrics, and that lead to automatic HR systems
related decision-making, affect employees' motivational states. These
motivational states encourage employee effort prioritization and can One of the striking findings of the current study is that algorithmic HR
also have consequences for their well-being. Our study is unique in systems are not overwhelmingly beneficial or harmful to employees.
showing that the impact of these systems does not have uniform Rather, the outcomes of such systems depend on how employees
advantages or disadvantages, but rather depends upon employee per- interpret their intended use. Our findings show that algorithmic HR
ceptions of why the organization uses these algorithmic HR systems. systems can lead to extrinsic motivational states where employees
More specifically, outcomes are contingent on whether employees feel controlled as well as intrinsic motivational states where
believe the organization is using automated systems to exploit or con- employees feel autonomous. Both motivational states follow the utili-
trol them, or whether it is intended to support their efforts and foster zation of these systems, with extrinsic motivation being linked to neg-
their commitment (Hewett et al., 2019; Nishii et al., 2008). ative employee outcomes and intrinsic motivation linked to positive
In general, our results show that the use of algorithmic HR sys- outcomes (Gagné et al., 2015; Van den Broeck et al., 2021). The moti-
tems fosters greater extrinsic motivation, whereby employees feel vational implications of these systems, moderated by HR attributions,
their behavior is regulated by external controls (Deci & Ryan, 1985). then further shapes the effort employees exert toward metricized
However, this relationship hinges on the attributions employees make behaviors, but also whether they de-prioritize other (non-metricized)
about the organization's intended use of the algorithmic HR systems. behaviors.
Interestingly, the use of algorithmic HR systems can increase or That algorithmic HR systems have the potential to be beneficial
decrease employees' sense of intrinsic motivation, which suggests the or harmful depending on employees' interpretation of their intended
potential for important processes of internalization of the goals or tar- use is important both for theory and practice. While recognizing that
gets associated with the metrics that drive the decision-making in we did not assess objective characteristics of the algorithmic HR sys-
these systems. Again though, this relationship is dependent upon the tems (e.g., the exact data being collected, the digital design, the user-
attributions that employees make about the organization's intent, here friendliness) and their use in decision-making, the important role that
regarding the extent that these systems are seen as intending to pro- attributions appear to play in determining employee reactions may
vide constructive performance feedback. Importantly, the intrinsic and suggest that workforce perceptions of why these systems are intro-
extrinsic motivational states fostered by algorithmic HR systems go duced is a crucial factor in determining their impact.
on to impact how employees prioritize metric linked behaviors and It would therefore be valuable for future research to consider the
de-prioritize work activities that are not linked to metrics. In addition, design and contextual factors that lead employees to interpret
these motivational states impact employee well-being, more specifi- the intent of these systems as being one of control versus empower-
cally levels of emotional exhaustion. However, a core finding of our ment. For example, taking a justice perspective lens (Colquitt, 2001),
study is that these effects will be conditional on employee attributions the fairness of specific design principles (e.g., transparency, metric
of why the organization utilizes automated metric systems. accuracy, voice and employee input or influence on the metrics
We show that where employees perceive that the organization's monitored) that signal employee autonomy could well foster more
intent for introducing these systems is to increase managerial control favorable attributions of managerial intent (Van den Bos et al., 2001);
(Hewett et al., 2019), the use of these systems can increase a sense of such design features could also foster more positive sense of auton-
extrinsic motivation. This may subsequently foster greater prioritization omy with employees which would be more likely to lead to autono-
of effort into behaviors that have the potential to boost the metrics. mous motivational states.
However, paradoxically, it also means that employees are less likely to If, as we show, employee attributions are key to determining
prioritize other important work behaviors that are not metricized in the downstream consequences of algorithmic HRM, then understanding
HR system. Conversely, when employees perceive that their employer what shapes those attributions is of paramount importance. For
16 EDWARDS ET AL.
example, are those attributions primarily shaped by process and alignment, shared purpose) that do not seem directly related to the
design characteristics of the algorithmic HR system, or are they algorithmic HRM system itself. Finally, the most evident but no less
informed by relatively stable individual differences, the broader orga- important conclusion of our study is that if the systems are introduced
nizational context, or the existing employee-employer relationship as a form of managerial control of the workforce, harmful rather than
(see Hewett et al., 2019). Recent work is beginning to show that beneficial outcomes may result.
numerous factors contribute to employees' attributions of HR prac-
tices. For example, Meier-Barthold et al. (2023) have shown that attri-
butions can be influenced by the signals that are sent to employees 4.2 | The internalization (or not) of algorithmic HR
(by HR communication) and how these signals fit (or not) with the HR system metrics
practices in place. Given how important these attributions are in
influencing potential harms and/or benefits for employees, a solid Our study also identified motivational states as a key mechanism for
understanding of factors determining the attributions employees how algorithmic HR systems direct behavior and employee well-being.
make about algorithmic HR systems is something that warrants fur- Specifically, we show that algorithmic HR systems—which set external
ther investigation. Our study clearly shows how important percep- expectations linked to performance metrics—are linked to controlled
tions of the purpose of an algorithmic HRM system will be for and autonomous motivational states. Importantly, autonomous moti-
determining its beneficial or potentially harmful impact on workers. vational states can be fostered within these systems through a pro-
Beliefs about how and why an organization introduces such a system cess of internalized regulation. As discussed by Hewett (2023), there
will therefore be a crucial determinant of whether they do harm or are are several possible processes through which employees internalize
beneficial to their employees. externally-derived expectations. This may involve internalization facili-
From a practical perspective, the neither-good-nor-bad conclu- tated by existing alignment with individual values and motivational
sion should caution organizations to assure the very careful and priorities (e.g., high achievement orientation); but it might also come
appropriate introduction of algorithmic HR systems as a key step as a cognitive adaptation driven by dissonance, as a follow-on from
toward their successful adoption. Clear, transparent, and consistent being entrenched in an aligned organizational culture, or via proce-
communication about the reasons why algorithmic HR is introduced dural habits built over time. The results of the current study provide
and how it is to be thoughtfully implemented will no doubt influence further nuance to the likelihood and processes of internalization
employee attributions and later outcomes once implemented. These within metricized algorithmic HR systems. The finding that intrinsic
ideas fit with the HR System Strength model set out by Bowen and motivation can be experienced here, contrary to earlier theorizing
Ostroff (2004) who highlight that employees' perceptions of the what about the autonomy thwarting nature of monitoring and evaluation
and why of HR practices will determine whether they are likely to lead (Ryan & Deci, 1987), suggests that a process of internalization (poten-
to positive outcomes. Such a point also tallies with arguments tially of performance metrics targets) can occur within these Algorith-
highlighted by Nishii and Wright (2008) in their process model of mic HR systems. Importantly, however, this seems to have occurred
HRM, where they suggest that employees' experiences of an HR prac- to a greater extent when employees feel that the monitoring and met-
tice following implementation will determine the likelihood that it ric system is in place for positive, developmental, and supportive pur-
achieves the outcomes desired. Given how dependent the outcomes poses, rather than to control them. This highlights how critical
of these algorithmic HR systems are on employee attributions, our employee sensemaking is in leading to an adaptive process that will
study highlights the potential importance of messaging on intent, likely foster an internalized motivational state. Although our findings
introduction, and domains of application, which may help generate show some nuanced effects of algorithmic HR systems that depend
possible benefits and avoid harm to employees. Consistent messaging upon employee perceptions of intent of the systems, these findings
and communication are key in this regard. Crucially, how these sys- also provide important evidence that highlight the dangers of intro-
tems are introduced and the policies and practices surrounding their ducing algorithmic HR systems as a management control. If worker
implementation will determine if they have a positive or negative control is a key reason for an organization to introduce such systems,
impact on employees (a point also made by Gagné et al., 2022). Before and employees accurately perceive this as such, then harmful rather
introducing these systems, organizations may want to pause and than beneficial outcomes are likely to result.
reflect on the exact use and range of applications and communicate
transparently on their purpose and intent. Credible and clear commu-
nication should go a long way to helping these new systems be 4.3 | Practical implications
accepted by the workforce. However, building on the broader per-
spective on employee attributions discussed above, communicating If organizations consider metricized algorithmic HR systems to be an
purpose and intent of new technologies may be in vain if workers hold effective hands-off management tool to deploy in order to control
strong prior beliefs that introduction of new technologies is driven by employees and foster high performance, they need to understand that
other motives. A counterintuitive implication of our findings may when used for this purpose there is a likelihood that these systems
therefore be that organizations may need to focus on other interper- will lead to harm. Importantly, this harm may negate any potential
sonal aspects of organization-employee relationships (e.g., trust, value beneficial performance outcomes that such a system could foster. The
EDWARDS ET AL. 17
cost of this harm, that is, fostering emotional exhaustion and a limitation, as such samples have been criticized because monetary
de-prioritization of important non-metricized behaviors, may well be incentives may lead to inattentive responding. However, multiple
substantial. Importantly, the potential harm of misdirected implemen- studies have shown that careful response checks, such as those
tation of these systems should not be ignored or downplayed. This of included in this study, can mitigate concerns about validity and reli-
course has important implications that need to be considered when ability (e.g., Porter et al., 2019).
HR is planning the deployment of algorithmic HR systems. Bowen and Third, it should be noted that there are inherent limitations with
Ostroff (2004) argue that the purpose of HR practice implementation self-report studies, which the current study involves. Given our focus
is a central consideration when building strong HRM systems, includ- on measures linked to motivation and emotional exhaustion (which
ing how managerial intentions for such systems are communicated necessarily require self-reports), we consider this to be less of an
during implementation. Line managers who are working in organiza- issue. Nonetheless, we also ask self-report questions about participant
tions that deploy algorithmic tools in this way face a conundrum. They behavior and effort put into their job, which may introduce demand
will be expected to use these tools in their management practices but effects, inflated self-views, or common method variance. Using alter-
may see the potential downside play out in their teams. For line man- native data sources, such as supervisor ratings of participant effort
agers, the most important implication is therefore to focus on manag- and behavior would improve the objectivity of our current measure-
ing employee attributions. They need to communicate and ment approach. It should also be noted that some of the key scales
demonstrate how they are using the metrics generated by the algo- used in our study were developed for this study. Although based on
rithmic system to convince people that they have genuine feedback existing measures and research, we did determine it was necessary to
and developmental intentions. conduct a pilot study to test these novel measures. This was deemed
Bowen and Ostroff (2004) emphasize the need for the HR func- necessary given the field of algorithmic HR is relatively new and mea-
tion to have legitimate and fair reasons for introducing HR systems. surement development work is still needed in the area. We should
Clearly, our study highlights that algorithmic HR systems should be also highlight that our measures of algorithmic HR practices used in
introduced and communicated as an attempt to be fairer and more the current study focus on automated digital systems that either auto-
supportive of employees rather than to exploit and control them matically monitor and present metrics against performance or feed
(Guest, 1987; Legge, 1995). This should be a central aim of the into decision-making or recommendation processes. Such systems do
deployment of these systems and this aim should be clearly communi- not necessarily reflect or make explicit reference to more advanced
cated. Importantly, employees' attributions may or may not be rooted algorithmic processes that may include predictive machine learning or
in fact—it is their perception about those underlying intentions that AI and are only a subset of possible practices that may come under
determine their reactions. The current research suggests that auto- the umbrella of “algorithmic HRM.” Therefore, our focus limits the
mated metricized monitoring and decision-making systems can clearly degree to which we can generalize our findings to much broader and
have a meaningful impact on employees' motivation and subsequent all-encompassing forms of algorithmic HRM.
behavior prioritization. Given their rapid adoption in organizations, Fourth, the sample included participants based in different coun-
these systems are likely to have profound effects on employees in the tries, which could have impacted the results where cultural differ-
future. If such systems are introduced as part of a new digitized HR ences come into play. In addition, gender, education, and managerial
system without careful consideration, organizations may well end up status could also be associated with the focal variables in the study.
fostering negative experiences for employees. Our results suggest While this limitation should be acknowledged, we conducted addi-
those detrimental consequences may include an over focus on target- tional supplementary analyses to control for geographical region, gen-
oriented behavior and an emotionally exhausted workforce. Fortu- der, education, and managerial status. These analyses are set out in
nately, organizations can take steps to mitigate these potential threats the online supplemental analyses material, and including these addi-
during implementation by fostering opportunities for feedback and tional controls did not substantively impact the results.
commitment-focused attributions through formal and informal com- Finally, beyond these issues of research design, some limitations
munications, change processes, and value alignment. are worth noting that may provide a roadmap for future research. For
instance, the current study cannot answer why and how employees
come to form attributions of feedback or control intent of their algo-
4.4 | Limitations rithmic HR systems, only how these perceptions may impact
employee outcomes. There may be individual or situational
The study has some limitations that are important to highlight. differences in the likelihood or tendency for employees to imbue such
First, the use of time separated data collection, where participants attributions and they may also differ in how much importance they
complete survey questions at different time points, is not a longitu- place on either of these motives (see Hewett et al., 2019). As
dinal design and thus does not allow analyses of causal order or highlighted by Bowen and Ostroff's (2004) HR System Strength
change across the three time periods. Future research could use framework, the message communicated by HR when introducing a
panel methods and explore the degree to which employees within practice is likely to have an impact on how employees understand and
an organization experience change after the introduction and use perceive the HR policies. Future research could explore how impor-
of these systems. Second, the use of an online panel could be a tant organizational framing is in influencing employees' interpretation
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cations for strategic human resources management. In D. B. Smith
(Ed.), The people make the place: Dynamic linkages between individuals Martin R. Edwards is based in the Business School at the
and organizations (pp. 225–248). Taylor & Francis Group. University of Queensland, Australia. His research focuses on the
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2012). Sources of areas of HR Analytics, organizational identification, employee-
method bias in social science research and recommendations on how
organizational linkages, social and multiple identities in organiza-
to control it. Annual Review of Psychology, 63, 539–569.
Porter, C. O. L. H., Outlaw, R., Gale, J., & Cho, T. (2019). The use of online tions, employee voice, employer branding, and employee
panel data in management research: A review and recommendations. responses to organizational change.
Journal of Management, 45(1), 319–344.
20 EDWARDS ET AL.
Elena Zubielevitch is a Research Fellow at the University Frederik Anseel studies the psychological microfoundations of
of Queensland's Business School. Her research focuses organizational learning, innovation, and entrepreneurship and the
on how political attitudes shape, and are shaped by, our work- role of leadership in these processes. Recent work focuses on
ing lives. how individuals can overcome motivational obstacles during the
innovation and entrepreneurial process to “keep their fire burn-
Tyler G. Okimoto is an Associate Dean Academic in the Faculty
ing.” His research has been published in leading journals such as
of Business, Economics, and Law at the University of Queensland.
Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Management, Research Pol-
His research examines how collaboration and consensus can
icy, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and
shape social justice in organizations and society: both how a lack
Psychological Science.
of consensus contributes to injustice and inequality, and how peo-
ple can effectively collaborate to move past conflict and repair
cooperative relationships.
Stacey Parker is an organizational psychologist and academic at SUPPORTING INF ORMATION

the School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Australia. Additional supporting information can be found online in the Support-
Her research focuses on how employees manage their energy ing Information section at the end of this article.
during work, how employees recover from work stress in off-
the-job time, and how jobs and careers can be designed to maxi-
How to cite this article: Edwards, M. R., Zubielevitch, E.,
mize well-being, motivation, and performance. She has explored
Okimoto, T., Parker, S., & Anseel, F. (2024). Managerial control
this phenomenon in a range of high-performance settings
or feedback provision: How perceptions of algorithmic HR
(e.g., small business owners, professional musicians, elite athletes,
systems shape employee motivation, behavior, and well-being.
and in safety critical work). She serves on the Editorial Boards for
Human Resource Management, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1002/
the Journal of Occupational Health Psychology and the European
hrm.22218
Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology.

2024 - Edwards - Managerial Control or Feedback Provision How Perceptions of Algorithmic HR

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DOI: 10.1002/hrm.

SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

Managerial control or feedback provision: How perceptions

Martin R. Edwards 1 | Elena Zubielevitch 1 | Tyler Okimoto 1 | Stacey Parker 2 |

1 | I N T RO DU CT I O N decisions based on, and even forecast, employee performance

Hum Resour Manage. 2024;1–20. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/hrm 1

1.1 | Algorithmic HR systems 1.2 | Algorithmic HR systems and employee

TABLE 1 Study 1—Pilot testing modified scales, CFA loadings.

TABLE 2 Descriptives: Latent variable correlations.

Note: N = T1 <-> T2 = 329; N = T1 <-> T3 = 303; N = T2 <-> T3 = 267.

DV: Extrinsic motivation

Mediated Moderated mediation Moderated mediation

DV: Intrinsic motivation

Mediated Moderated mediation Moderated mediation

Emotional exhaustion MBP NMBD

Mediator à DV Emotional exhaustion MBP NMBD

Stacey Parker is an organizational psychologist and academic at SUPPORTING INF ORMATION

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