Russian Influence in the Balkans

Melanie Constuble
Summer 2020
 Throughout Balkans history, Russia has sought to sponsor or support local Rebellions,

especially against the Ottoman Empire. They have manipulated many situations in the Balkans

by claiming historical ties, financially, economically, militarily, and by deceit. Russia’s

existence in the Balkans has always been one of sewing discontent and generating friction.

At the outset, Russia many times has leveraged a role as protector of the independent

states; and touted the historical ties between the Orthodox Church and ethnic Slavic ties. 1

Moreover, as Nationalism grew out of the declining Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century;

Russia advanced a claim that they were the legitimate successor of the Byzantine Empire. 2

Russia saw this ploy as a way to advance trading links between Russia, Greece, Bulgaria, and

Montenegro. However, while this subterfuge failed, Russia did gain Montenegro as a financial

dependent.3

Russia would use this tactic again, in their constant fight with Turkey for territorial

control. In 1829 Russia and Turkey were at war; which would result in Russia controlling

Wallachia and Moldavia.4 In 1860-1870, Russia upped the ante by creating a Nationalistic

scheme to cause agitation within the Balkan populace. This Pan-Slavic movement was created

and sponsored by Russia to remove all Slavs from foreign rule; and organize them into a

federation. This Pan Slavic movement saw Bulgarian and other students of Slavic descent

brought to Russia. Russia thought that the Balkan Nationalism movements would bring prestige,

1
David Clark and Andrew Foxall, “Russia's Role in the Balkans Cause for Concern,” June 2014, 5.
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Russias-Role-in-the-Balkans.pdf.
2
George Kelly, Outcast Europe: the Balkans, 1789-1989 From the Ottomans to Milosevic (London:
Routledge, 2005), 73-74. https://apus.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?
docid=cdi_askewsholts_vlebooks_9781134957422&context=PC&vid=01APUS_INST:01APUS&lang=
en&search_scope=MyInst_and_CI&adaptor=Primo%20Central&tab=Everything.
3
Ibid., 73-74.
4
Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York, NY: Penguin
Books, 1999)., 60.
power; and a world-wide leadership role.5 Reflecting this theme, Russian Diplomat M.A.

Khitrovo alludes to the necessary liberation of the Slavic peoples in his diplomatic reports; from

his travel experiences throughout the Balkans.6

While the Ottomans still menaced Serbia in 1877, the Russian support for the movement

generated solidarity with the Southern Slavic people.7 The confrontation lasted with Turkey until

1878 when the Ottomans were driven from Bulgaria and ultimately from Europe.8 The Treaty of

San Stefano would provide Russia dominance over the Balkans much to the chagrin of the other

European Powers.9

In a similar vein twenty-two years later, Russia still using the nationalistic ploy tried to

pressure Prince Alexander Battenberg of Bulgaria to join forces with St. Petersburg. He

refused.10 After the Russian loss to Japan in the 1900s; attention was turned once again to the

Balkans for fear the other great powers would dissect the region.11 In this instance, however, the

powers turned to Russia to mediate disagreements related to the divvying of the region. To keep

the peace, Russia suggested that the Balkans question be delayed. Due to concerns of a South

Slavic reunion, the Viennese civil and military leaders did not delay in a decision. As a result of

this meeting, the powers would ally themselves – France, Britain, Russia and Germany and

Austria and Turkey which would later prove disastrous line up in World War One.12
5
Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York, NY: Penguin
Books, 1999)., 90
6
M.A. Khitrovo, “NEW MATERIALS ON THE HISTORY OF SOUTH SLAVS (From the Manuscript Inheritance
of M. A. Khitrovo),” http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Serbien/XIX/1860-1880/Chitrovo/doklady_1.phtml?
id=9071 (Brigham Young University / Euro Docs, 2007),
http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Serbien/XIX/1860-1880/Chitrovo/doklady_1.phtml?id=9071.
7
Ibid., 95-96.
8
Ibid., 96-103.
9
“San Stefano Preliminary Peace Treaty February 19 / March 3, 1878,” San Stefano Preliminary Peace
Treaty (Russian Military Historical Society, 2019), http://doc.histrf.ru/19/san-stefanskiy-preliminarnyy-mirnyy-
dogovor-19-fevralya-3-marta-1878-g/.
10
Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York, NY:
Penguin Books, 1999)., 124
11
Ibid., 127.
12
Ibid., 127.

3
 By early 1914, Germany and Russia were still on the same page to preserve Serbia.

Unfortunately, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand pitted the nations against one

other.13 The Balkans question would never be answered. In 1914, Russia went to war to defend

Serbia.

Tsar Nicolas II spoke out about defending Slavic ties:

Russia, related by faith and blood to the Slav peoples and faithful to her historical

traditions, has never regarded their fates with indifference…Today it is not only the

protection of a country related to us and unjustly attacked that must be accorded, but we

must safeguard the honour, the dignity, and the integrity of Russia and her position

among the great powers.14

During World War Two, Russia changed track and ran a campaign of deceit with the

Allies. While the Allies welcomed the Soviet intervention in the Balkans; the Soviets were on a

popularity campaign. If they saved the Balkans from the Nazi repression and economic plunder,

this would garner the support from the Southern Slavic lands which would allow a high

popularity rating. Russia also lent a hand in raising members for local communist resistance

groups.15

The Soviets took advantage of both the United States and Great Britain in this situation,

as Stalin knew that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt were going to station Allied Forces in the

region.16 In fact, Stalin knew that until 1945, the United State preferred Russia to have a free

13
Ibid., 133-139.
14
David Clark and Andrew Foxall, “Russia's Role in the Balkans Cause for Concern,” June 2014, iii.
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Russias-Role-in-the-Balkans.pdf,5.
15
Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York, NY:
Penguin Books, 1999)., 234.
16
Ibid., 248-249
hand in Eastern Europe.17 After the war, Stalin used this to his advantage. In October of 1944,

Churchill and Stalin discussed the Balkan states. They settled affairs by creating a contract to

split up the countries.18

Briefly, Russia used political mechanisms in the aftermath of World War One. In 1919,

Romania voted in a socialist government system complete with land reform measures. Romania

also used many open contracts with Russia, to regularize the frontier between them.19 Similarly,

after World War II, Moscow began to champion a Trotskyite movement in Greece and

Bulgaria.20 Both the Romanian and Bulgarian Communist party followed the Soviet model,

creating a state based on a working-class revolution. Both Romania and Bulgaria wooed their

peasantry from private ownership of land. Three years after the war, the Romanian Communist

Party had 200,000 members. Unlike Romania, the Soviets used force in Bulgaria to convert the

populace; where wartime executions of state enemies totaled 2138. 21

Russia’s considerable economic exploitation of the Balkans began after World War II. In

Romania, Russia owned all of its oil assets.22 The Communist Parties in the Balkans especially

ignored making rural investments, and instead invested in the politically linked industry. Across

the board, collectivization was analyzed, and or used to destroy the peasant class.23 By Stalin’s

death, Romania and Bulgaria were dependent on the Soviets for raw materials and machinery.

All countries went through an economic crisis, as the new Soviet leadership had delayed any

allied supplies and deliveries.24 Khrushchev specifically let Albania fall into decay. Eventually,

17
Ibid., 251.
18
Ibid., 265-266.
19
Ibid., 174.
20
Ibid., 195.
21
Ibid. ,521-523.
22
Ibid., 523.
23
Ibid., 546.
24
Ibid., 556.

5
economic ties were cut, as Khrushchev preferred farming over the Albanian industry.25 Likewise

in Romania, the Soviet leadership preferred the Romanians to produce food and stay peasant

class.26

After the various wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, Soviet economic manipulation came

to the forefront of Soviet Policy due to Putin's aggressiveness. 27 Undeniably the Putin Doctrine

justifies the Soviets the privilege to oversee a sphere of influence using historical ties. 28 In

modern times this means becoming the dominant energy provider for the Balkan states, as well

as creating trade and investment opportunities, creating political influence and tourism

opportunities. 29

Russia has capitalized on selling hydrocarbons under the guise of goodwill and economic

incentives. They have reduced the competition, to create local networks for energy and invested

in both private and state-owned facilities. The Soviets have invested in the Serbian Energy

Company Naftna that is used to supply both Montenegro and Macedonia. They also own two oil

refineries and many gas terminal stations throughout the Balkans.30 The Soviet banking

company Sberbank is a major institution throughout the Balkans. There are 295 branches and

600,000 customers. The institution gives loans to create motorways and support food

production.31

Militarily Russia’s ambition is two- fold. The first goal to prevent Montenegro, Bosnia –

Herzegovina, and Macedonia from becoming North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
25
Ibid., 565.
26
Ibid. 596-597.
27
David Clark and Andrew Foxall, “Russia's Role in the Balkans Cause for Concern,” June 2014, iii.
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Russias-Role-in-the-Balkans.pdf.
28
Vladimir Ryjkov, “The New Putin Doctrine,” The New Putin Doctrine (Boulevard Extérieur, April 3, 2014),
https://www.boulevard-exterieur.com/The-New-Putin-Doctrine.html.
29
David Clark and Andrew Foxall, “Russia's Role in the Balkans Cause for Concern,” June 2014, iii.
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Russias-Role-in-the-Balkans.pdf., 3.
30
Ibid., 7.
31
Ibid., 9.
members and unbalance the perceived sphere of influence. Secondly, Russia is continuing to

increase their Black Sea fleet to become the largest naval presence in Crimea. In the same vein,

Russia and Serbia have signed joint defense pacts which allow joint training, exercises,

procurement of Russian made weapons, and intelligence sharing.32

Unfortunately, Russia will continue to create friction and havoc in the Balkan Region for

years to come. As long as the Putin Doctrine and sacred Slavic ties are promoted as means to an

end, Russia will always be able to court the areas economy, tourism base, military industry and

industrial base.

Bibliography

Clark, David, and Andrew Foxall. “Russia's Role in the Balkans Cause for Concern,” June 2014.
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Russias-Role-in-the-Balkans.pdf.

Glenny, Misha. The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New York,
NY: Penguin Books, 1999.

32
Ibid., 13.

7
Kelly, George. Outcast Europe: the Balkans, 1789-1989 From the Ottomans to Milosevic.
Richard Treyfry Library. London: Routledge, 2005.
https://apus.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?
docid=cdi_askewsholts_vlebooks_9781134957422&context=PC&vid=01APUS_INST:01APUS&lan
g=en&search_scope=MyInst_and_CI&adaptor=Primo%20Central&tab=Everything.

Khitrovo, M.A. “NEW MATERIALS ON THE HISTORY OF SOUTH SLAVS (From the
Manuscript Inheritance of M. A. Khitrovo).” Brigham Young University / Euro Docs, 2007.
http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Serbien/XIX/1860-
1880/Chitrovo/doklady_1.phtml?id=9071.

Ryjkov, Vladimir. “The New Putin Doctrine.” The New Putin Doctrine. Boulevard Extérieur,
April 3, 2014. https://www.boulevard-exterieur.com/The-New-Putin-Doctrine.html.

“San Stefano Preliminary Peace Treaty February 19 / March 3, 1878,” San Stefano Preliminary
Peace Treaty (Russian Military Historical Society, 2019), http://doc.histrf.ru/19/san-
stefanskiy-preliminarnyy-mirnyy-dogovor-19-fevralya-3-marta-1878-g/.