Operation Trikora: “Expansionistic” Sukarno on West Papua Dispute

By Azza Bimantara
After 4 years of War of Independence against Netherland, Indonesia’s sovereignty was concluded
through Round Table Conference held at The Hague in 27th December 1949. However, Netherland
excluded West Papua (then, Netherland New Guinea) from recognized territorial transfer to Indonesia
until “further negotiation” (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004, p. 6). Better than nothing, Indonesian Government
accepted that term. Between 1954-1957, Indonesian President, Sukarno, sent his Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Subandrio, to United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to propose 3 resolutions which could
give Indonesia advantages over West Papua dispute. He failed to achieve 2/3 votes from all members
(Tarling, 2008) as Netherland had international supports from Australia, New Zealand, and several Latin
American and Western European countries that could divide votes in favor of Indonesia. United Kingdom
reasoned that Indonesia's campaign for West Papua was "strategically undesirable" as it would encourage
territorial changes based on mere (unstable) political prestige and geographical proximity (Tarling, 2008,
p. 19). Despite of its support for Netherland, United States chose to be neutral and abstained every vote
(Kahin & Kahin, 1995, pp. 77-79). Upset with diplomatic deadlock, Sukarno launched military operation
in 19th December 1961 to “liberate” West Papua from Netherland. The so-called “Operation Trikora”
ended in 15th August 1962 as Indonesia and Netherland signed New York Agreement that concluded the
handover of West Papua to Indonesia by the provision of United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
(UNTEA) until Act of Free Choice among Papuans in 1969.
How can we make sense Sukarno’s eventual military approach on West Papua? His role as
predominant leader and Indonesia’s top foreign policymaking at that time can be justified by firstly
pointing at Indonesian period of “guided democracy.” After his presidential decree in 5th July 1959,
Sukarno disbanded legislature body who failed to issue new constitution and maintained the older one,
created his own parliament, and incorporated national army into his executive power to eradicate
oppositions (Ricklefs, 2008). Such conditions gave Sukarno full control of statecrafts, including defense
and foreign policy. Secondly, he was highly motivated to incorporate West Papua into Indonesia as he
analogized Papuans as parts of Indonesian “body” that was “painfully amputated” by Netherland (Adams,
2014). Such nationalist-irredentist stance was supported by his political coalition from nationalist and
communist counterparts (Sitompul, 2019). He also had economic interest in Papua as his geological
team’s exploration in 1950s stated about potential mineral resources there (Sitompul, 2018).
Thirdly, he was quite selective in accepting information that could strengthen his claim over West
Papua. One thing that was missing from, if not ignored by Sukarno’s consideration, was knowledge about
West Papuans' perception on Indonesia's campaign on Papua. Despite of lacks of information about
Papuan stance on self-determination prior popular plebiscite in 1969, one certain thing is that Sukarno
dominated public discourse by labelling future independent West Papuan state at that time as Dutch
"puppet-state". During pre-independent nation-building discussion on May-July 1945, Sukarno (and
majority members) despised Muhammad Hatta's argument against incorporation of Papua into newly
independent Indonesia out of cultural and racial differences and of fear of being labelled as imperialist
unless Papuans voluntarily joined (Sitompul, 2019).
Finally, change in foreign policy tendency also influenced Sukarno’s challenging, coercive
approach on West Papua. Realizing that Western countries did not want to help Indonesia’s cause,
Sukarno sought for Communist bloc’s help. Soviet Union with the help from Poland and Czechoslovakia
agreed to give military aids for Indonesia such as weaponries, battleships, submarines, aircrafts, and
missiles worth around US$703 million in total between 1958-1964 (Easter, 2015, p. 204). Henceforth,
Indonesia’s increasing military power was a tempting alternative for Sukarno in the midst of diplomatic
failure. Still, Dutch military power still decisively outpowered Indonesia during “Operation Trikora.”
However, Indonesia’s military rise successfully convinced Western bloc to push Netherland to hand West
Papua to Indonesia as “appeasement” because they worried that Sukarno would be prone to Communist
bloc (Djiwandono, 1996). Given personal characteristics shaped by both domestic and international
situations, Sukarno chose to deal with West Papua dispute by becoming “expansionistic” leader,
according to Margaret Hermann et al. (2001), whose objective was to reclaim its status as full successor
state of all former Dutch East Indies territories.
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