How successful were Hitler's economic policies from 1933 – 39?

Superficially, Hitler's economic policies were extremely successful. He appeared to have

virtually eradicated unemployment, something no democratic Western power was able to achieve in
the 1930s and within three years of gaining office. Yet beneath the "economic miracle", as Ian
Kershaw points out, Hitler was pursuing economic policies in those early years which could only lead
to war or a loss of power. The reality was that Hitler understood little about economics and seemed to
care even less. His aims were to create full employment without inflation, to make Germany self-
sufficient and to create Wehrwirtschaft, a defence economy, but in pursuing these policies he created
problems which were to lead to serious differences within the Party and which drove Germany to war
earlier than intended.
One reason why the Nazis were successful with their economic policies was due to Dr
Hjalmar Schacht. Schacht directed the German economy from 1933 – 36, he believed in a steady
growth/currency. Schacht employed specific strategies which would subsequently improve the
German economy. Schacht took control of state finances within the economy, set low interest rates to
inspire investor confidence, rescheduled local authority debts and set about forming a public sector
investor programme, i.e. housing and jobs.
These targets were on the whole achieved successfully. Lower taxes brought prosperity to
farmers in particular, who were the hardest hit by the ‘economic slump’. Grants were provided for
homes, repairs and the rehiring of domestic service. State invested projects such as public works
programmes; rearmament, reforestation and a state labour service created the steps to solving
Germany’s social disharmony. Certainly this period, 33 – 36, is one where historians agree the
reconstruction, stabilisation and harmonisation of the Germany economy was successful.
A different sphere of success in the Nazi economic policies from 33 – 39 was the reduction of
unemployment. Unemployment in Germany in 1933 stood at well over 6 million; in fact Historians
now argue this value could be 9 million. Hitler had gained votes and confidence by the German
people to significantly lower this number. The number of unemployed dropped significantly and
rapidly, only 3.8 million by January 1934 and a minimal 0.4 million by 1938, Kershaw refers to this
as the ‘Economic miracle’, this was due to a variety of reasons. The expansion of production caused
by natural economic recovery, rearmament, agriculture and an increase in the civil service were all
factors which increased employment.
Work creation was planned by the Schleicher government and taken up by the Nazis in 1934.
It operated according to ‘Reichardt Plans’ announced in late 1933. Agriculture most certainly lowered
unemployment in 1933. Hugenberg, the minister of agriculture banned foreclosure in early 33, put
import taxes on agricultural products and made butter manufacturers put more margarine in their
produce (this benefited farmers). Consequently when Hugenberg resigned in June 33, the number of
jobs in agriculture had risen.
 Rearmament can also be seen as a success in terms of the economy. Rearmament was very
important to Hitler, one of his main aims when becoming Chancellor was Wehrwirtschaft, the
creation of a defence economy. Hitler planned to avoid the mistakes of the past. Spending for
rearmament was discretely concealed in work creation programmes, one example being the building
of new runways. The ‘second four year plan’ from 36 – 40, heavily focussed on rearmament.
Rearmament actually started in 1935 and was no real surprise, as “Mein Kampf” illustrates. Hitler in
1936 wanted Germany to be ready for war within 4 years. The rapid re-armament programme was
only successful at the expense of the economy which was overburdened by the vast imports necessary,
and the resulting foreign exchange crisis was not helped by the food shortages of 1935. Therefore,
although by 1939 Germany was able to pursue short, Blitzkrieg warfare, the economy was unable to
withstand a prolonged war of attrition with Russia. Not all aspects of Nazi economic policy from 1933
– 1939 were successful. There were ideological problems for the Nazis which restricted the quantity
of success.
‘Blood and soil’ is an area in which historians put forward constrained success in the
economy. The Nazis believed that intermarriage with other races happened less in rural populations,
which therefore meant German peasants were pure Aryan. The country was where heroes came from.
However the Nazis also wanted Germany to be autarkic – the best way to achieve this would be to
modernise farms resulting in less hand labour resulting in fewer peasants. The two views were
contradictory and couldn’t work.
A different area of failure in terms of economics was the ‘Guns versus Butter’ in 1936. The
Nazis wanted to concentrate on rearmament but arms industries needed to import materials such as
copper, aluminium, rubber and petrol. On top of all this, Germany could not afford to import food as
well but she wasn’t producing enough herself – what was the solution? This is the reason why
historians sometimes refer to ‘Guns versus Butter’ as a crisis. Germany would have to increase
agricultural production or rearmament would have to slow down.
In conclusion, there is evidence to suggest the economic recovery in Germany between 1933
and 1936 was real, not simply the product of statistical trickery and the stimulus of rearmament, and
that Nazi work creation programs played a significant role. By 1936, before Hitler's rearmament
program took hold of the economy, most of the jobless had disappeared from official unemployment
statistics. The standard of living increased as many Germans gained employment but did not reach the
standards of WeimarGermany.