MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND EDUCATION REPUBLIC OF

AZERBAIJAN
AZERBAIJAN STATE UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS
UNEC BUSINESS SCHOOL

Director of UNEC Business School

assoc. prof. Hajiyev Nazim Ozbey

“_______________” (signature)

“___” ____________ 2024-cü il

MASTER THESIS
on the topic:
IMPROVEMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS IN THE
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY

Code of specialisation and name: 060409 Business administration

Specialisation: Risk and engineering management
Group: E12-22

Graduation student: Supervisor:

Mirzayev Javidan Nabi Mirzagayev Hafiz Mirzaga

Program manager, Ph.D. in economics: PhD. In economics, Associate prof.

Shafizada Elnura Rafig Mammadova Sever Momin

BAKU - 2024
 “IMPROVEMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS IN THE
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY”

Abstract
The Actuality of the Subject:The oil and gas industry plays a key role in meeting the world's
energy needs. However, since this industry involves high-risk activities, it is important to
develop effective risk assessment methods. To prevent accidents and incidents, protect the
environment, and minimize financial losses, it is important to apply modern and scientifically
based risk assessment methods. Therefore, the improvement of risk assessment methods in the
oil and gas industry is vital for enterprises operating in this field.
Purpose and Tasks of Research:The main goal of this dissertation is to analyze and improve
existing risk assessment methods in the oil and gas industry. For this purpose, the advantages and
disadvantages of different risk assessment methods will be determined, as well as new and more
effective methods will be proposed. As a result of the application of the proposed methods, it is
aimed to increase the level of safety in the industry and achieve excellence in risk management.
Research Methods:The dissertation will utilize a combination of qualitative and quantitative
research methods to analyze existing risk assessment techniques, compare their effectiveness,
and propose improvements. This will include literature reviews, case studies, statistical analysis,
and possibly the development of new risk assessment models or tools.
The Information Base of the Research:The information base for the research will include
industry reports, academic journals, case studies, regulatory documents, and data from oil and
gas companies. This comprehensive information base will provide the necessary context and data
for a thorough analysis of risk assessment methods.
The Novelty and Practical Results of Investigation:The research aims to propose new and
more effective risk assessment methods that address the limitations of current practices. The
practical results will include enhanced methods that can be directly applied in the oil and gas
industry to improve safety, environmental protection, and financial stability.
Scientific-Practical Significance of Results:The continuous improvement of risk assessment
methods in the oil and gas industry is imperative to address evolving challenges and safeguard
operational integrity, environmental sustainability, and stakeholder interests. By embracing
advanced technologies, interdisciplinary collaboration, and stakeholder engagement, the industry
can enhance its ability to identify, assess, and manage risks effectively, thereby ensuring safe and
responsible operations in the ever-changing energy landscape.

Keywords: Oil and gas industry, risk assessment methods, safety, environmental protection,
financial stability
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My sincere thanks and appreciation go to everyone at the UNEC Business
School for the support and encouragement I receive from them. Specially I would
like to thank my supervisor Mirzagayev Hafiz for his tremendous on this journey.
It could not be achieved without his regular checks and feedbacks and prompt for
continuous improvement.
 TABLE OF CONTENT
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................5
CHAPTER I. OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY: INTRODUCE THE OIL AND
GAS
INDUSTRY............................................................................................................10
1.1. Natural gas market............................................................................................10
1.2. Natural gas market in the world.......................................................................11
1.3. Natural gas use in the world.............................................................................12
1.4. The importance and necessity of oil.................................................................14
CHAPTER II. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED METHODS.....................28
2.1. Turkey / USMB work accident rate analysis....................................................28
2.2. Turkey`s situation in terms of drilling occupational accidents in the
international area.....................................................................................................28
2.3. Turkey work accident frequency analyzes.......................................................31
CHAPTER III. METHODS IN MANAGING RISKS.......................................54
3.1. Fine -kinney method.........................................................................................54
3.2. Expert group analysis and data collection process...........................................57
3.3. Findings............................................................................................................57
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................62
LIST OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHIC LITERATURE..........................................65
LIST OF CHARTS……………………………....................................................68
LIST OF TABLES……………………………….................................................68
LIST OF FIGURES...............................................................................................68
 INTRODUCTION
The Actuality of the Subject: The oil and gas industry is one of the
most fundamental and critical industries of modern societies. This industry,
which meets a large portion of the world's energy demand, includes the
exploration, extraction, processing, distribution, and use of oil and natural gas.
The functioning of this industry is vital to economic development, industrial
production, transportation, and many other sectors. However, the oil and gas
industry brings several potential risks, and managing these risks is critical.
Problem Setting and Level of Learning: Although current risk
assessment methods are continually being improved to address specific
challenges in the oil and gas industry, they still face several challenges:
- The oil and gas industry often consists of complex and diverse operations.
Multiple activities, supply chains, geographic locations, and different
operational requirements can complicate the risk assessment process.
- Many variables are uncertain in the oil and gas industry. Uncertainties in
factors such as energy prices, geopolitical situations, environmental impacts,
and technological developments make risk assessment difficult.
- Reliable data is needed for an effective risk assessment. However, there are
some data gaps and data quality issues in the oil and gas industry. In some
cases, this data may be unreliable or incomplete, making it difficult to
conduct an accurate risk analysis.
- In some cases, risk management in oil and gas companies may have cultural
or organizational barriers. For example, in some cultures, it may be more
common to reduce or ignore risks rather than identify and assess them.
- Technological developments in the oil and gas industry are advancing
rapidly. However, existing risk assessment methods can often struggle to
keep up with technology. This can make it difficult to effectively assess the
risks posed by new technologies.

5
- The oil and gas industry is often exposed to global and geopolitical risks.
However, such risks are often filled with uncertainties that are difficult to
predict and manage.
Purpose and Tasks of the Research: The aim of proposing
improvements to risk assessment methods is to make risk management
processes in the oil and gas industry more effective and to create a stronger
basis for better identifying, analyzing, and managing potential risks. Improved
methods can help identify current and potential risks more comprehensively
and accurately. This involves assessing all aspects of industrial operations,
including environmental, safety, financial, and operational risks.
The Object and Subject of This Research: The object of this research
is the risk assessment methods used in the oil and gas industry. The subject of
this research focuses on the application of fuzzy Fine-Kinney risk assessment
method, coupled with fuzzy Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM)
techniques.
Research Question: How does the application of fuzzy Fine-Kinney risk
assessment method, coupled with fuzzy Multiple Attribute Decision Making
(MADM) techniques, enhance the selection process of high-performing
departments within universities.
Theoretical Perspectives of Research: The theoretical perspectives of
this research include:
- The principles of risk management and assessment in high-risk industries.
- The integration of fuzzy logic into traditional risk assessment methods to
handle uncertainties.
- The use of Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM) techniques to
improve decision-making processes in complex environments.
Research Methods: The research methods involve a combination of
literature review, case studies, and the application of fuzzy Fine-Kinney risk
assessment and fuzzy MADM techniques. These methods will be used to

6
 analyze and improve current risk assessment processes in the oil and gas
industry.

The Information Base of the Research: The information base of the

research includes academic journals, industry reports, case studies, and data
from oil and gas companies. This comprehensive data collection will provide
the necessary information for conducting thorough risk assessments.
The Novelty and Practical Results of Investigation: The novelty of
this research lies in the integration of fuzzy logic with traditional risk
assessment methods and the application of fuzzy MADM techniques. The
practical results include more effective and accurate risk assessments, improved
decision-making processes, and enhanced risk management strategies.
Research Limitations: Research limitations may include data
availability and quality issues, the complexity of integrating new methods with
existing practices, and potential resistance to change within organizations.
Practical Results of Investigation: These improvements support
operational excellence and sustainability by making risk management processes
in the oil and gas industry more effective. Additionally, compliance with
environmental and societal expectations is critical to maintaining reputation
and long-term success.

Chapter 1 discusses the oil and gas industry as it is highly capital-intensive,

involving significant costs and long lead times for establishing facilities and
operations, often in remote locations. Businesses in this sector face substantial
risks, including macroeconomic factors and environmental impacts. They
frequently engage in joint ventures to share the high costs of exploration,
development, and production. The industry involves complex processes from
exploration to marketing, with extracted products transported over long distances
via pipelines and tankers.

7
Natural gas has been used since 500 BC, starting in China. It became more
widespread and technologically advanced over time, with significant developments
in the 19th century, such as the first underground natural gas well in America in
1859 and pipeline transport in 1891. Raw natural gas requires processing to
become usable, primarily consisting of methane and other hydrocarbons. It is
favored for its clean and environmentally friendly properties, though there are
alternative fuels available. The natural gas market is international, involving
complex resource management, marketing methods, and regulatory frameworks.

Chapter 2 compares work accidents in the oil and gas industry internationally and
in Turkey from 2011 to 2018, analyzing factors such as seasons, professions,
location, body part injured, accident type, equipment, activity, accident time, and
age of those involved. Data is analyzed using percentage ratios for meaningful
comparisons.

Seasonal Trends:

 Most accidents occur in summer in the Middle East, America, and Europe,
while in Africa, they occur in autumn and winter.
 In Turkey, accidents peak in autumn due to contract renewals and new job
starts.

Professional Risk:

 Tower workers, riggers, machinists, and drillers are most accident-prone

globally and in Turkey.
 In Turkey, the lack of mandatory vocational training for drilling workers
contributes to high accident rates among inexperienced personnel.

Injured Body Parts:

 Fingers, head, hands/wrists, and feet are the most commonly injured body
parts both globally and in Turkey.

8
  Finger injuries are prevalent, with other countries reducing such injuries by
adopting new technology, whereas Turkey still uses old technology rigs.

Accident Types:

 Common accident types globally include being stuck inside, being hit by
something, slipping/falling at different and the same levels, and self-
exertion.
 In Turkey, traffic accidents are notably high, with a rate of 10.53%
compared to the global average of 1.37%.
 Traffic accidents, unlike in other countries, are among the top three causes
of accidents in Turkey, suggesting a need for safe driving training, traffic
awareness, and vehicle/road tracking systems to reduce these incidents.

The Fine-Kinney method was enhanced by blurring the probability, severity, and
frequency scales to eliminate uncertainties in risk assessments. Decision rules were
created, leading to increased sensitivity of risk levels. The probability, severity,
and frequency parameters were used as inputs, and the decision rules were coded
with the Matlab Fuzzy Logic Designer program using the 'mandani min max'
method to determine the risk level.

9
CHAPTER I. OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY: INTRODUCE THE OIL AND
GAS INDUSTRY
1.1. Natural gas market
The oil and gas industry is a capital-intensive industry. Establishing an oil
and gas facility requires extremely high costs. Although such facilities involve
various business risks, they operate in remote locations. All exploration,
evaluation, extraction, refining, transportation, and marketing processes in the
industry require a significant amount of time and cost. The purpose of the
operations of businesses operating in the oil and gas industry is to find, extract,
refine, and sell oil and gas products. Businesses operating in this sector endure
significant capital investment and long lead times to find and extract
hydrocarbons that can have uncertain consequences in harsh environmental
conditions (Aghel, B., Tavakkoli-Moghaddam, R., Pishvaee, M. 2021). They
engage in joint ventures or joint activities to share the often-significant capital
costs of exploration, development, and production. The extracted products may
need to be transported to final customers by traveling significant distances via
pipelines and tankers. Businesses in this industry have significant exposure to
macroeconomic factors such as commodity prices, currency fluctuations,
interest rate risk, and political developments. Assessing commercial viability
and technical viability is complex and involves several important variables. A
business in an industry can have a significant impact on the environment due to
its activities and often has to correct any damage that occurs.
Natural gas was first used in China in 500 BC. After it was determined that
the gas coming out of the ground was flammable, they started to carry this gas
to other places with the help of bamboo reeds and use it in settlements. It is

10
known that in the early periods, they obtained drinking water by heating
seawater. Natural gas was first used in city lighting, and this use was met with
natural gas obtained from coal mines in England in 1785 and America in 1816.
However, natural gas obtained from coal deposits is not as efficient, clean, and
environmentally friendly as the natural gas commonly used today. In 1859, the
first underground natural gas well was drilled successfully in America. In 1891,
natural gas was transported through pipelines, and subsequently, natural gas
became widespread and used in housing and industry. The state of natural gas
that first comes out of the reservoir is called raw natural gas. It contains heavy
hydrocarbons, water vapor, non-hydrocarbon gases, and sometimes sulfur. Raw
natural gas is not suitable for use in its current state. It goes through many
processes to become usable. The natural gas that becomes usable is a mixture
of methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, and hexane. Additionally, it
contains small amounts of CO2, helium, hydrogen sulfide, and nitrogen.
Natural gas is widely used all over the world because it is a clean,
environmentally friendly fuel and provides operational convenience. There are
also rival or alternative fuels to natural gas (Ahmadi, O., Saghafi, H.,
Mohammadi, M. 2020).
Natural gas has an important place among energy sources in today's world
due to its strategic and commercial advantages. The natural gas market is an
international market that covers resource management and marketing methods
on a country basis. In addition to international agreements regarding the supply
and demand of natural gas between countries, each country has its regulations
determining the distribution and trade of natural gas.

1.2. Natural gas market in the world

Although there is intense interest in renewable energy sources worldwide,
87% of the energy consumed in the world is still met by oil, coal, and natural
gas. While oil has the largest share, especially in the transportation sector, coal
and natural gas are mostly used in electricity production. As of 2016, natural

11
gas meets 24% of the world's energy needs. The world's total natural gas
consumption is 186.6 trillion m3 as of 2016.
Shale Gas: Also known as shale gas, this gas reserve is the fastest
developing resource among non-traditional resources. Shale gas generally
consists of small amounts of natural gas reserves stuck between rocks and
spread over large areas. Commercial production of shale gas was not common
before the 2000s due to reasons such as the cost of obtaining it, but
developments in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies have
facilitated the extraction of these resources. Shale gas is the gas formed in the
pores of the sedimentary rock called shale, consisting of quartz, clay, and
calcite minerals. In the horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing method used
as the production method, horizontal drilling is carried out at a depth of 2.5-3
km in the area to be drilled, and then 1-1.5 km drilling is carried out in both
directions with a special diamond-tipped drilling bit in the horizontal direction.
Afterward, cracks are created with special drilling fluid injected into the
boreholes. Due to the widening of the cracks, gas rises to the surface.
Depending on this welding method, studies have been carried out in many parts
of the world and new reserves have been found (Rzayeva, N. 2020).
For coal-based methane to be used as natural gas, some improvements need
to be made. First of all, components such as nitrogen, carbon dioxide, water
vapor, and oxygen must be removed. In the case of obtaining gas with lower
calorific values than natural gas, propane can also be added. There are practices
in Australia and China to obtain methane from coal deposits. In particular,
Australia is the world leader in projects related to the production of methane
from coal deposits. Both countries benefit from the methane obtained in
domestic natural gas consumption and by converting it into LNG and exporting
it (Ashour, Ü. 2020).
Tight Gas: It is also known as tight reservoir gas. It is a type of gas trapped
in an impermeable layer due to the geological movements of the rocks in the
region. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling methods are used in its

12
production, as in shale gas. In general, such reservoirs are located closer to the
surface.

1.3. Natural gas use in the world

According to 2016 figures, 22% of the electricity produced in the world
comes from natural gas. 3.3% of the fuel needs of the transportation sector are
met by natural gas. It is mainly preferred in sectors such as heavy
transportation and ship transportation. While it can be used directly in internal
combustion engines as natural gas, it is also used in the transportation sector as
CNG (compressed natural gas) and LNG (liquefied natural gas). Due to low
natural gas costs in North America and the Middle East, chemicals are also
produced from natural gas, especially ammonia, methanol, and ethanol
facilities are developing and growing rapidly (Akar, S., & Erdogan, S. 2023).
Today, it is thought that the word "Oil" originates from Latin. However,
although there is no unified definition of oil, it has been the subject of debate
many times. Therefore, there is no clear definition of oil. The word oil is based
on the Latin word "Petroleum". In other words, “Petro” means stone, and
“Oleum” means oil. Petroleum consists of a significant amount of
carbohydrates and a combination of other substances. It is an oily liquid that
burns easily and has a unique odor. The quality of oil is determined by the
amount of carbohydrates in it. Although oil is considered the world's most
important energy source, it is also an integral energy source for all sectors. It is
especially an important part of the chemical industry.
In addition to the lack of a clear idea of the definition of oil in the literature,
there is also no unified idea about the formation of oil. From the past to the
present, researchers have not yet reached a clear idea about the formation of oil.
However, in general terms, there are many different opinions. According to
these ideas, thousands of years ago, when the whole world was covered with
water, plant and animal remains decomposed and accumulated on the ground
floor. It is believed that as the waters receded over time, the ruins were covered

13
with sand and soil, and then, with the transformation of chemical reactions, oil
was formed under the influence of pressure and temperature under the ground
layer. As said, this process takes thousands of years. Even today, researchers
are still debating how true this idea is.
History of Oil
The history of oil dates back to as old as the existence of mankind.
Information about oil was first seen in Sumerian tablets. Sumerians used oil for
the first time in mosaics on walls and floors. Later, the word "Nafta", meaning
oil, was found in Babylonian tablets, according to the writings of the Greek
historian Herodotus, BC. Oil leaks were observed in the border regions of Iran
and Kuwait between 485 and 425. According to the writings of Marco Polo, it
was even possible to observe oil springs in Baku (Çınar, f., Solmaz, m. S.,
Çakmak, E. 2022).
Looking at the history of oil, oil wells were first found in Azerbaijan in the
9th century. After oil springs were discovered in Azerbaijan, the light fraction
called "Naphtha" was obtained. According to the information recorded by
Evliya Çelebi during his expedition in 1641, Azerbaijani oil was used for
different purposes in many lands, especially within the borders of the Ottoman
Empire (Quliyev, A. 2021).
However, according to other sources, the first oil well in the world was dug
at a depth of 21 meters in America by an operator named Edwin Drake.
According to another historical record, the first commercial oil production was
made in Russia in the 1820s. In the same year, facilities for oil production were
established in Baku, which was under Russian occupation (Çınar, f., Solmaz,
m. S., & Çakmak, E. 2022).

1.4. The Importance and Necessity of Oil

When we look at the distant past, we will be faced with a single truth.
Most of the problems, disputes, wars, or peace that exist all over the world,
from history to the present day, are based on natural resources. The most

14
valuable and important among these natural resources is oil. While oil is a
source of energy in the world, it is also an important raw material used in all
other sectors (Pourvakhshoori, N., Fouladgar, M. M., Tavakkoli-Moghaddam,
R. 2021). From this perspective, it can be seen how important a resource oil is.
In terms of economy, the economies of some countries in the world, namely
their income and expenditures, are largely based on oil. In other words, oil
production and sales are an indispensable economic resource for such
countries. Examples of countries with an oil dependence percentage of
approximately 60% and above in their economies are Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran,
Nigeria, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and others. we
can show it. Especially with the industrial revolutions, production became
widespread in the country's economies, and over time, with the invention of
machines, oil began to form the source of production. Due to all these factors,
the struggle between countries, that is, the desire to have power, has increased.
Recently, countries have been continuing their struggle using more serious
methods. From time to time, some important statesmen and politicians express
in their speeches the extent to which oil is a source of power. For example, the
sentence about oil made by British statesman Winston Churchill in his speech
in the 20th century explains what kind of power oil was at that time (Ruan, J.,
Guo, S., & Xie, S. 2021).
Interest in oil and natural gas has always been at the forefront of world
history. The history of oil is almost as old as the history of humanity. Although
humankind's interest in oil and natural gas has caused some problems from
time to time, it has also led to disputes with the increase in industries and
production. It is not a coincidence that energy resources, namely oil and natural
gas, have been the source of many wars and chaos throughout history in the
world. As time passed, the demand for oil and natural gas increased, and their
value also increased, thus having a significant impact on determining the
policies of all countries. Oil and natural gas in the world have had a unique
impact on making life easier for humanity. These positive effects include

15
cooking, heating, electricity, transportation, etc. It is reflected by factors such
as (Çınar, f., Solmaz, m. S., & Çakmak, E. 2022).
In the modern sense, oil and natural gas were thought to be an important
energy source starting from the last quarter of the 19th century. In history, in
1859, Drake began to produce crude oil by drilling for the first time in the
world, and with this, the concept of the oil industry began to emerge.
Rockefeller Standard Oil, founded by Rockefeller in 1863, brought innovation
to the industry by shipping oil via pipeline for the first time in world history. In
1864, the world's first oil well was dug using the mechanical drilling method.
With this method, very productive oil wells were dug first in Tatarstan and later
in Russia. As time progressed, with the increasing importance of oil and natural
gas, there was a need to establish oil companies for the revenue, production,
and sale of oil and natural gas, in short, for the use of oil and petroleum
products. As a result of these developments and various agreements, the world's
largest oil companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil began to be
established. Although these companies are generally based in America and
Europe, they establish their production facilities in various parts of the world.
In 1883, unlike Europe and America, the control of oil and natural gas in Asia,
or more precisely in Russia, was controlled by the Nobel brothers
(Cündübeyoğlu, İ., & Kayabaşı, R. 2022).
In 1883, approximately 60% of the existing oil production in Russia was
managed by the Nobel brothers. Most of the oil production under the control of
the Nobel brothers was carried out in Baku, which was under Russian control at
that time. Throughout history, Baku oil has been an important source of energy
and power for Russia. From this perspective, Baku oil is the source of the
victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. Against the background
of the wars in the world, oil, and natural gas management was now transferred
from the hands of the Soviet Union, America, and some European countries to
the hands of 7 major oil companies called "Seven Sisters".

16
 These oil and natural gas companies are the top 15 most valuable
companies producing oil and natural gas in various regions of the world. They
are also the most important companies selling oil and natural gas.
Risk, which everyone in the world is familiar with, mostly refers to
negative things that can happen. For example, in investing, there is always the
risk of losing money, the train being late, the car having an accident, and
getting sick. For managers, risk arises when things do not go as planned or the
normal process is interrupted (Əliyev, S. 2020). For example, sales of a newly
developed product are not as expected. Risk occurs because we do not know
exactly what will happen in the future. In this case, although the best forecasts
and analysts are used, there is always uncertainty with the future and this
creates uncertainty risk. As mentioned above, the concept of risk is often
associated with the probability of a negative outcome occurring. Risk is an
ambiguous term that is widely used in many senses. The root of the English
word risk is based on the Latin word "risicum", which refers to coral reefs that
hinder sailors. This word also means accidental but unpreventable event. Risk
consists of two components: "severity of the event" and "probability of the
event occurring". Risk perception is evaluated in terms of the severity of the
consequences of the event rather than its likelihood in some areas, especially in
advanced technology (Durmuş, H. , Yurtsever, Ö. & Yalcin, B. 2021). The
biggest reason for this is that events that occurred in the past and caused high
losses are present in human memory. Risk is generally defined as the
probability of an event occurring within a certain period that causes significant
damage to people, property, and the environment or causes financial loss.
Although the period in this definition is generally expressed as annual, other
periods can also be taken into consideration. The level of damage refers to the
expected impact level. For example, from a human perspective, this level can
range from death to injury. Although human, environmental, property and
financial loss are determined as risk takers in the definition, factors such as
legal rights and reputation should also be taken into consideration. Risk is

17
defined in different ways in different disciplines. While the definition of risk
used in the health and safety fields considers the combination of probability
and severity of the event, this definition is not sufficient for more general risk
management purposes. The concept of risk is at the heart of any discussion
about safety. Safety is defined in the literature review as the degree of avoiding
danger. Based on this definition, the concept of risk can be expressed as a way
of evaluating safety.
Organizations must take risks when the risk is inevitable, when the transfer
is not possible, or when the cost of mitigating the risk is too high. In such a
case, necessary precautions should be taken to prevent the risk and reduce its
impact, and the risk should be monitored carefully. Accepting the risk means
accepting the loss of time incurred and is an important strategy especially
applied in small-risk situations where prevention costs/insurance are high.
Accepting/taking risks is defined as risk tolerance by British Standards. If the
hazard risk is at levels determined by the organization, the risk can be tolerated.
The risk tolerance approach is associated with the probability of occurrence and
low impact. However, in cases where profitability is high, this level may be
considered higher (Duran, F. 2020).
Transfer of risk can be achieved in different ways, including insurance,
contract, risk sharing, and physical transfer. Organizations want to transfer the
risk to them if the probability of the risk is low but the potential is high.
Insurance is known as the most widely used method in controlling financial
losses caused by risk. However, some risks cannot be transferred because their
premiums are high or they are not insurable. Transferring the risk does not
mean that the probability of the risk occurring is reduced (Məmmədov, V.
2019). Here the risk is transferred to another party. In some cases where the
risk is transferred, the fact that the transferred party is not aware of exactly
what risk they are taking on increases the risk to a certain extent. Sharing the
risk is another method used to transfer the risk. In many countries and sectors,
there are formations with which organizations can cooperate to share risks.

18
Sharing the risk here is generally about reducing the costs that the risk will
cause. Similarly, special expressions in the contract between the parties mean
the transfer of risk. Lease agreements used in maritime transportation can be
given as an example of this situation. Risk transfer is evaluated on costs
through the methods mentioned above. In addition, the transfer of risk in terms
of people, environment, and property is discussed. This method, called physical
transfer of risk, is applied in different modes of transportation. Using sea
transportation instead of land transportation to reduce the risk of air pollution
and changing routes to prevent ships carrying dangerous cargo from using
sensitive sea areas can be given as examples of physical transfer of risk.
After determining the risk levels of the identified hazards, some of them
may need to be reduced. The approach referred to as risk reduction is possible
by reducing the severity or probability of the outcome of the risk. In some
cases, it is possible to reduce both components. While reducing its severity is
usually possible at the design stage of the process, reducing its likelihood is
possible at any time. Risk reduction is divided into 4 basic categories. The first
of these is to train the staff to gain awareness of possible risks. Secondly,
taking physical precautions to reduce the possibility of loss. For example, it is
to reveal overlooked risks by agreeing with an independent auditor for the final
checks of any project of the company. Thirdly, by instilling a "what if"
mentality into employees, consistency is ensured against potential dangers that
may occur within the system. Finally, it is taking physical measures to protect
people, property, and the environment. Determining the appropriate level of
risk reduction is provided by the ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable)
principle. The acceptable level of risk was introduced by Sir Frank Layfield in
1987 (Erdebilli, b., & Gür, L. 2020). • It is the upper band that indicates that the
risk level is intolerable, regardless of the benefit that the activity will bring.
Here, risk intervention is essential, regardless of the cost. If it is not possible to
reduce the risk due to cost, options such as abandoning the project or finding
another alternative should be considered. • It is the middle band where costs

19
and benefits are taken into account and possibilities are balanced against
possible adverse consequences. For the hazards in this section, the questions
are asked, respectively, how close the danger is to the unacceptable section and
whether mitigation can be done within the framework of benefit and cost. If the
answer to the first question is positive, risk reduction should be considered,
even if it is costly. A positive answer to the second question means that the risk
should be reduced regardless of where the danger acceptable zone is. • It is a
sub-band where the risk level is considered insignificant or so small that risk
intervention measures cannot be taken. Here, the risks should be left as they are
without the need to take additional precautions. However, if risks can be further
reduced with minimal effort, additional measures should be implemented.
Risk aversion is a special case of risk reduction. Here, it is aimed to
completely avoid undesirable events by applying different methods. Risk
avoidance strategies are directly related to eliminating the risk or significantly
reducing its probability. In cases where both the likelihood and impact of the
risk are high, organizations tend to terminate or eliminate the risk. Giving up on
the work done under these conditions, evaluating alternative processes, and
outsourcing the service that may cause risk are among the methods of
eliminating risk. In some cases, the process that creates the risk may be very
important for the organization. In this case, it is necessary to apply alternative
control methods instead of eliminating the risk. An example of this could be
that a land transportation company chooses experienced personnel instead of
ceasing its operations to eliminate the risk of accidents (Fang, X., & Zhang, Y.
2023).
Risk assessment techniques are divided into three classes: quantitative,
qualitative, and semi-quantitative techniques in terms of estimating risks, their
probability of occurrence, and their possible effects. Quantitative risk analysis;
is based on probabilistic and statistical methods. In this risk assessment
method, the probability of a hazardous event occurring and the impact of the
hazard are defined by numerical probability values. Numerical values used in

20
the quantitative risk assessment method are obtained using experimental data,
expert opinions, or historical data. Probability, Bayesian networks, fuzzy logic,
Dempster Shafer theory, and Monte Carlo simulation are shown as quantitative
risk analysis methods frequently used in different sectors (Ruan, J., Guo, S., &
Xie, S. 2021).
Since numerical risk assessments are more descriptive than qualitative
estimates, they should be preferred in cases where information and data on the
subject are sufficient. Quantitative assessments can be deterministic or
probabilistic, depending on the ability of the person to assess the risk, the type
of uncertainties, the available data, and the nature and robustness of the
assumptions being evaluated. In general, quantitative risk assessment has more
detailed solution questions than qualitative assessment. This detailed structure
gives rise to more sophisticated treatment requirements for uncertainties in risk
assessment.
The quantitative risk assessment method alone is not sufficient if there is
insufficient data regarding the system or activity to be analyzed and if there is
not enough information about the human factor and the subject. In such a case,
a method that involves comparative semi-quantitative or qualitative grading of
risks, performed by experts on the subject, may be preferred. Qualitative risk
analysis; Instead of mathematical risk assessment, it determines the
consequences, probabilities, and levels of risks with severity levels such as
"high", "medium" and "low". It evaluates the final risk level in line with
qualitative criteria by combining results and probabilities. Qualitative risk
analysis uses expert opinions and judgment to determine the values of
probabilities and outcomes. This subjective approach is sufficient for risk
assessment depending on the available resources. The expert performing the
application estimates the risks and risk priority values based on his own
experience and intuition (Kodalak, A. 2009).
The important point is to choose the right approach to reduce risk. In
general, qualitative approaches are easier to implement because they require

21
fewer resources and do not require much detail. Conversely, the quantitative
approach is much more related to resource adequacy and the skill of risk
assessors. However, this approach provides a very detailed understanding. The
semi-quantitative approach lies between these two extremes (Shao, L., Wu, J.,
& Zhang, G. 2022).
The fact that there is more than one method for risk assessment and it is not
clear which one to choose makes the job of risk assessors difficult. There may
not be one right approach for a particular activity. It is not very simple to create
a yes or no flowchart that will determine the risk assessment method. In
addition to these negativities, several factors will help us choose the risk
assessment method: • Life cycle stage, • Major hazard potential, • Risk decision
situation (novelty-uncertainty-stakeholder concern). Hazard potential is related
to the total loss and multiple death consequences that the risk will cause. In
situations where the danger is low, conventional decision-based approaches
will be sufficient for decision-making. Finally, risk decision-making situations
involving high uncertainty and stakeholder concern will reveal the need for
more comprehensive risk assessment. Once these factors are identified, it will
be more possible to choose one of the available methods. The HSE (2006)
described risk assessment approaches according to the degree of detailed
assessment, from lowest (qualitative-Q) to highest (quantitative-QRA). Two
dimensions should be considered in the selection of the above-mentioned
approaches. The first of these is the level of the estimated risk and its distance
from the negligible level. Another factor is the complexity of the problem and
the need for more efforts to reduce the risk (Gul, M., Yucesan, M., & Ak, M.
2022).
Qualitative and semi-quantitative evaluation techniques are classified as
low-level evaluation methods and are mostly suitable for use in identifying
hazards and events that require more detailed evaluation. As seen in Figure 6,
low-risk assessment levels should be used if the complexity is low, the solution
is clear and the events are within the scope of certain standards. On the

22
contrary, quantitative assessment is preferred in cases where the risk becomes
complex and the solution is difficult. However, this assumption is not always
true. In some cases, a qualitative approach alone may be sufficient in the
evaluation of risk analyses of complex events (Shimshek, S. 2020).
Another method used to determine the appropriate risk assessment level is
to start the assessment with a qualitative approach. If this approach is
insufficient to understand the risks and distinguish the difference between risks
and events, the evaluation should continue with other approaches. In addition,
the evaluation can be started directly with semi-quantitative or fully
quantitative methods to prevent the loss of time that would occur by using
qualitative methods first and then quantitative methods if they are insufficient.
There are many risk assessment techniques among the risk assessment
approaches defined as qualitative, semi-quantitative, and fully quantitative.
Hazard is defined as events that have the possibility of harming human
health, the environment, property, or business. The first step in risk analysis is
to identify the hazards associated with the operation. The output of this stage is
the identification of sources of potential danger. In other words, it is to reveal
factors such as human errors, external causes, and equipment errors that will
cause the accident. Determining the causes of the accident plays a key role in
risk and safety assessment. Qualitative methods have generally been developed
to identify hazards. Qualitative methods are mainly based on expert opinions.
Considering the small number of individuals with expertise on all hazards, it is
necessary to establish expert groups in identifying hazards. Due to the diversity
of hazards, a wide variety of methods are used to identify hazards. Frequently
used methods include hazard checklist, hazard rating index (Hazard Index
Method), hazard and operability analysis, failure mode and effect analysis, and
what if. ) and hierarchical tree analysis. These methods are also used as
complements of each other when identifying hazards (Tang, Y., & Zhu, Q.
2022). The following features are necessary for identifying hazards: • The
process of identifying hazards should be creative in a way that encourages the

23
identification of hazards that have not been considered before, • A structured
approach should be used to prevent seemingly unimportant hazards from being
overlooked and to examine the relevant hazards in detail. , • Past accident
reports, if any, should be used to draw lessons/reasons from them, • The
hazards to be identified should be determined, which hazards will be included
and which will be excluded (Kök, O. E., Erdoğan, Y., & Babaoğlu, S. 2018).
The fault tree analysis method is a systematic approach that uses the
deductive method to identify the relationships between the main and
intermediate faults that cause the peak event fault through a logical tree
representation. This methodology was developed by H.S. in 1962 during the
“Minuteman” rocket combustion chamber studies. It was developed by Watson
at the Bell Telephone Laboratory. Fault tree analysis consists of the reasons
that cause the undesirable event to develop. The probability of this undesirable
event, also defined as the peak event, should be predicted before creating the
fault tree. The fault tree helps to reveal the reasons that cause this undesirable
event. This method plays a very important role in identifying hazards as well as
in assessing them. Fault tree analysis should start from the peak event and
continue until it reaches the simplest fault that caused it to occur. During this
process, their frequencies should be determined along with the root and
intermediate causes. Two connection approaches are used in creating the fault
tree: “AND” and “OR” gates. The “AND” gate is used when two fault tree
components must be present at the same time for the event to propagate. On the
other hand, the “OR” gate is used when only one component is sufficient to
propagate the event (Li, H., Wang, H., & Li, D. 2020).
An event tree is used to show the events and results following one or more
triggering events through a flow diagram. Although this method was initially
developed for use in the chemical and nuclear industries, where safety is
considered the main factor, it is now used in many areas where dangerous
consequences may occur due to equipment and procedural errors. In this type
of analysis technique, it is possible to qualitatively identify possible dangerous

24
 events caused by various problems arising from triggering events and also
determine the frequency of occurrence of events quantitatively (Naeini, A. R.,
Bakhshandeh Amnieh, H., Fouladgar, M. M. 2020).

Figure 1: Event Tree Risk Assessment Representation

Source: Prepared by the author

Event tree analysis is a complement to fault tree analysis. In fault tree

analysis, the peak event is reached by tracking the errors in the components
within the system, while event tree analysis evaluates the possible
consequences of this event, starting from the peak event. In other words, while
the event tree analyzes the possible consequences of an undesirable event, the
fault tree examines how other events will cause an undesirable event. Event
tree analysis is performed by posing a series of questions to which the answers
are “YES” or “NO”. Figure 1 shows a simple representation of the event tree.
Here, the total number of deaths and costs or both that will occur due to the
occurrence of the gas leak "A" and ignition "B" and escalation "C" are
indicated by the event tree method with the letter "Y". If both events B and C
occur as a result of a gas leak, which is the triggering event, the number of
deaths is shown as Y2, if B occurs and C does not occur, Y1, and if event B
does not occur, Y0. As can be seen from this example, when evaluating the
event tree, the best scenario is at one end and the worst scenario is at the other

25
end. As the number of questions that form branches in the event tree increases,
the resulting events increase. The first step in creating the event tree is to define
the triggering event that will cause the accident or dangerous event. Then,
safety systems, mechanisms, and events that will prevent dangerous
consequences from developing during the process are determined in a
sequence. The probability of the outcomes of each binary event is determined
and the beginning of the event tree is created. The probabilities of these events
generally depend on each other to some degree. These dependencies are related
to time, place in the sequence, and conditional probabilities based on previous
events. Once these relationships are determined, the event tree is finalized and a
risk assessment is made.
The bowtie analysis is a simple and effective risk assessment method and
has become widely used. In this method, the connection between the
consequences of the accident, control measures, and possible causes is shown
in diagram form. Bowtie analysis diagrams also help illustrate the results of
various risk assessment methods. Due to its high level of complexity, this risk
assessment method can also be used together with semi-quantitative risk
assessment methods such as LOPA.
Bowtie's risk analysis begins with identifying the hazards within the
organization that will cause damage if they go wrong. These hazards are placed
on the left side of the bowtie diagram. The next step after selecting the hazard
is to determine the main event that will occur as a result of loss of control over
the hazard. The main event should be selected from the events before the
damage occurred. Threats that will cause this main event must be identified.
The results that will occur from the main event should be defined on the right
side of the bowtie diagram. These results may be more than one. Thus, the risks
that need to be controlled in the process are identified.
Checklist analysis is a qualitative approach based on using a written list or
procedure to describe the status of the system and process. These written lists
include the causes of dangerous events and their possible errors. Although this

26
method is based on personnel experience, it is very useful in identifying
common hazards. The checklist, which is considered one of the simplest
methods used in identifying hazards, is created from lessons learned from
experience. It is very unlikely to be used in processes that require high-standard
risk assessment.
Occupational safety analysis is a simple qualitative risk assessment
approach used to identify hazards related to the work performed. This method
is based on the checklist method. Generally, the person who plans the work
should be on the analysis team. This method, also called occupational hazard
analysis, is used effectively to reveal the underlying causes of the accident.
Today, many businesses in the oil and gas industry use this method effectively
to prevent and reduce workplace accidents. This method is also an excellent
tool for orienting new staff and investigating accidents. In general, this analysis
method should be used for low-risk and known tasks. JSA should not be used
as the primary method in situations where risk is high, where work will be done
for the first time, or in complex situations, and where any equipment will be
used for the first time. The success of the JSA method is directly proportional
to the experience and knowledge of the practitioner. JSA should be carried out
immediately before carrying out work where potential risks are identified.
However, if the procedure is for correction purposes, it can be performed at any
time. An effective occupational safety analysis begins with a clear definition of
the job and continues with the identification of hazards. Sufficient time should
be created for this process, experienced personnel should be used and all
resources should be utilized. Most importantly, enough time should be
allocated for this job. The first stage of job safety analysis is the job
description. The next step is to determine the steps to complete this work
(Tang, Y., & Zhu, Q. 2022). Potential safety and health hazards must then be
identified for each identified step. After the hazards are identified, effective risk
control methods available for these hazards should be determined. Finally,
hazards should be rated, and as a result of this rating, if the hazard cannot be

27
resolved with existing methods, additional methods should be determined to
reduce the risk. Before starting work, working and environmental conditions,
equipment, people, and control methods should be taken into consideration.
Once these variables are considered, the hazards that will occur if one of them
goes wrong must be identified.
One of the most important methods used among semi-quantitative risk
assessment methods is the layers of protection analysis (LOPA) developed by
Dow Company. LOPA is created by developing independent layers around the
trigger event. Its basic principle is that if one of the layers around the triggering
event fails, the other layers prevent this event from spreading. Although LOPA
is a method similar to the event tree analysis method, it differs from this
approach by monitoring only error branches in each layer.
LOPA is based on estimating the severity of the risk when making the risk
assessment of the selected scenario. LOPA, which is a semi-quantitative
approach, requires numerical values of the frequency of the event and the
probability of error to estimate the risk. After the estimated risk is compared
with the risk tolerance criterion determined by the relevant business, it is
evaluated whether the existing layer is sufficient to prevent this risk. At this
point, if the layers are insufficient, additional risk mitigation measures are
applied. Risk tolerance criteria must be determined in the LOPA application.
Otherwise, there will always be a tendency to add additional risk mitigation
measures to the process, which will lead to an unnecessary increase in cost.
LOPA, which is a scenario-based approach method, is one of the qualitative
risk assessment methods, especially HAZOP, and "what if?" It is applied to
predefined scenarios through methods. In scenarios determined as cause-effect
pairs, if the result has more than one cause, each cause-effect pair is analyzed
as a separate scenario.
Similarly, if the reason causes different results, additional scenarios are
developed. Cause-effect pairs are often evaluated by considering the severity of
the outcome. LOPA application steps are as follows. 1. Determining and

28
 defining the scenario, 2. Selecting the event scenario, 3. Identifying the event
that triggers the scenario and determining the annual frequency of this event, 4.
Determining the independent protection layer and estimating the error
probability for each layer, 5. Independent protection layer and error probability,
the risk of the scenario is estimated by the combination of the triggering event
and the outcome.

CHAPTER II. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED METHODS

2.1. Turkey / USMB work accident rate analysis
Comparisons between Turkey and other world countries in terms of
occupational accidents were made using data published in the USMB Accident
Statistics Program. Analyzes were made on accidents between USMB and
Turkey from 2016 to 2023. Here, a comparison is made based on total recorded
accidents. It was made to show Turkey's sector-specific situation through the
analysis in question (Turkey Petrolleri A.O. 2020).

Chart 1. USMB / Turkey work accident frequency rate comparison

WORK ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RATIO

ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RATIO = NUMBER OF
ACCIDENTS
/ HUMAN HOUR)* 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Turkey USMB

120,00

100,00 96,36

80,00

60,00
48,18
40,00 42,42
35,12 33,42
26,36 29,38
25,02
20,00

5,00 5,21 5,01 4,40 3,69 2,76 3,25 4,51

0,00
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

29
Source: Prepared by the author

In Chart 1, the formula corresponding to 1,000,000 working hours given in

equation 2.1 published by USMB was used for the work accident frequency
rate. A comparison was made between 12 542 accidents in USMB data and 646
accidents that occurred in Turkey. Accident rates are used here for comparison.
Because of the work done in addition to the number of accidents
Since the volume and number of employees are different for each country,
a comparison was made based on the work accident rate.
Total recorded accident data was used for the accident rates given in Figure
1. and Figure 2. Since accident classifications are different, a comparison of
data from other accident classes was not made.
The man-hour data in the denominator of the equation for Turkey was
calculated based on the database created by compiling and aggregating the
work scorecards. For USMB, it was calculated based on published annual
statistical data.
As seen in Chart 1, while the accident frequency rate for 2011 was 5 for
USMB, the same rate was 26.36 in Turkey. According to USMB data in 2018,
while the accident frequency rate was 4.51, the same rate for Turkey was 96.36.

Chart 2. USMB / Turkey work accident rate comparison

WORK ACCIDENT RATE ACCIDENT RATE= NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS / MAN

HOURS)* 2 0 0 . 0 0 0
Turkey USMB

25,00
7 ,88 ,00
19,27
15,00

,00 ,04 ,00 ,88 9,64 ,74 ,55 ,65 ,90

8,48
7,02 6,68
5,00

0,00
011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018
Source: Prepared by the author

30
In Chart 2, the formula corresponding to 200,000 working hours given in equation
2.2 published by USMB is used for the work accident rate. USMB formulas were
used in Chart 1. and Chart 2. for comparison purposes.
As seen in Chart 2, while the accident rate for 2011 was 1 for USMB, the
same rate was 5.27 in Turkey. According to USMB data in 2018, while the
accident rate was 0.90, the same rate for Turkey was 19.27.
As seen in Chart 1 and Chart 2, Turkey is above the world average in terms
of oil and gas drilling occupational accidents, but it shows an increasing trend
over the years.
2.2. Turkey's situation in terms of drilling occupational accidents in the
international area
In terms of work accidents, the accidents that occurred internationally and
the accidents that occurred in Turkey were evaluated in terms of seasons,
professions, place of occurrence, body part, accident type, equipment, activity,
accident time, and ages of those who had the accident. The variables mentioned
here are the variables used in USMB analyses. These evaluations were made
based on accidents from 2011 to 2018. Here, a comparison was made based on
total recorded accidents, without distinguishing between accident types. For the
comparison data to be meaningful, analyses were carried out by taking
percentage ratios.
When comparisons are made according to seasons, taking into account the
North-South hemisphere, the most accidents occur in the summer in the Middle
East, America, and Europe, and the general average, while in Africa, the most
accidents occur in autumn and winter, and in Turkey, the most accidents occur
in autumn. In Turkey, contract renewal periods and new job starts occur mostly
in the autumn periods. Since new business starts occur in the autumn months in
Turkey, accidents have occurred during this period.
When accidents are examined according to professions, the ones that have
the most accidents in the Middle East, America, Africa, Europe, South
America, and on average are tower workers, riggers, machinists, and drillers.

31
Similarly, in Turkey, those who have the most accidents are tower workers,
derikmen, and machinists (Figure 2). Since tower workers are the personnel
most exposed to danger, they are the group of workers who have the most
accidents in the world industry average and similarly in Turkey. Although
vocational training has been made compulsory for many professional groups in
Turkey, vocational training has not yet been made compulsory for drilling
workers. For this reason, new workers in the sector are the group that is most
exposed to danger and at the same time, they are the group that has the most
accidents because they are untrained and inexperienced personnel. To reduce
accidents, a special training program should be implemented for these workers
and their competence should be increased (Yalçın, Z. G. , Dağ, M., Aydoğmuş,
E. 2018).
When looked at according to the most injured body part, the most injuries
occurred in the Middle East, America, Africa, Europe, and South America, and
on average in the fingers, head, hands/wrists, and feet. In Turkey, finger, head,
hand/wrist, and foot injuries are observed in the same way (Figure 2). Finger
injuries are the most common here in Turkey, as in other countries. However,
in terms of accident rate, in other countries, new technology towers have started
to be used to prevent finger injuries, and a decrease in accidents has been
achieved by reducing the number of manual tasks. However, drilling activities
are still carried out in Turkey with old technology rigs. By reducing manual
work, hand and finger injuries can be reduced.
According to the type of accident, Middle East, America, Africa, Europe,
South America, and the general average, respectively, being stuck inside, being
hit by something/falling on something, slipping/falling: different level,
slipping/falling: the same level, self-exertion-excessive effort. accidents have
occurred. In Turkey, it happened at different levels: something crashing/falling
on something, being trapped inside, traffic, slipping/falling. In Turkey, traffic
accidents are among the most common types of accidents. However, when we
look at the industry averages in the sector, traffic accidents are not among the

32
most common types of accidents in any country as in Turkey. While the traffic
accident rate in the drilling sector in Turkey is 10.53%, the global industry
average is 1.37. In terms of accident types, drilling accidents are no longer the
most common traffic accidents in other countries. However, traffic accidents
are still among the top three causes of accidents in Turkey. For this purpose,
traffic accidents can be reduced with applications such as special safe driving
training, traffic awareness applications, and vehicle/road tracking systems.
When we look at the equipment accidents, in the Middle East, America,
Africa, Europe, and South America and the general average, respectively,
casing pipe/production pipe/rod/tubular, hand tools, tongs, machines/pumps
caused work accidents. Unlike this, in Turkey, occupational accidents occurred
due to casing pipe, production pipe, rod, tubular, transportation/vehicles, hand
tools, machinery/pumps, and materials, respectively. Since improvements have
been made to the most used equipment throughout the industry, that is, the
transition to new technology products, fewer equipment-related accidents have
occurred. In Turkey, since there is no transition to new technologies, drilling
pipes, one of the most used equipment, are still the cause of accidents.
Regarding this issue, Turkey has a new way to use technologies and ensure that
the number of human-made works is reduced. Ranking of occupational
accidents according to activity in the Middle East, America, Africa, Europe,
and South America, and the general average (Yuvakur, S. 2005): tower,
assembly/disassembly/transportation, descent-ascension maneuver, tower
/equipment repair or maintenance was carried out as a routine drilling
operation. In Turkey, the ranking of work accidents according to the activity
performed; tower/equipment repair or maintenance, routine drilling operation,
travel/transportation, and walking. In Turkey, most accidents occur in
maintenance activities. To reduce accidents, maintenance should be done
regularly and maintenance should be done by more competent people. In
addition, preventive maintenance systems can be used, checks can be increased,
and new equipment can be provided instead of old maintenance equipment.

33
 According to the location where they occurred, the industry average of
occupational accidents occurred in the table, drilling platform/location, flood
pool, and tower areas, respectively. In Turkey, according to the places where
work accidents occurred, they occurred in the following order: tower, table,
truck/car/bus, drilling mud mixing area, crane/forklift areas. Vehicle accidents
in Turkey are among the top three. Sector-specific measures need to be taken to
reduce traffic accidents.
Accident analysis according to the experiences of those who had a work
accident is given in Figure. In the industry and Turkey, most personnel with 1-5
years of experience experience accidents. In Turkey, drilling sector employees
are still not included in the scope of vocational training. On the other hand,
there are not enough departments and training institutions for intermediate staff
who will work in drilling. For this reason, there are very few trained and
experienced personnel in the sector. For this reason, personnel with little
experience are employed, and these personnel experience work accidents.
Accidents occurred between the same hours in Turkey and throughout the
industry. Most accidents occurred between 09:00-10:00 and 15:00-16:00. This
shows that accidents increase close to break times. The industry-wide and
Turkey distribution is similar in terms of the ages of accident victims.
Accordingly, personnel between the ages of 26-35 have the most accidents.

2.3. Turkey work accident frequency analyzes

In the study, histogram graphs of the variables in the database were drawn.
Analyzes include accidents by tower types, accidents by years, accidents by
days, accidents by months, accidents by hour, accidents by age, accidents by
hours on the job, accidents by title, accidents by tower age, accidents by report
period, and accidents by equipment. , accidents by operation, accidents by
capacity, accidents by location, accidents by accident types, accidents by body
part, accidents by experience, accidents by training.

34
 According to tower type, the towers with the most accidents are
mechanical. The fewest accidents occurred in electric towers. According to the
years in which accidents occurred, the most accidents occurred in 2023 and the
least in 2019-2020. When looked at by month; most accidents occurred in
October, November, and December. It was observed that accidents occurred
between 09:00-10:00 and 14:00-15:00. The most accidents occurred in towers
with a pump power of 1350 and 2000 hp. According to the capacity, the most
accidents occurred in machines with a capacity of 4000 m and 6200 m.
Accident classification is the process of determining the situations or
conditions in which accidents occur and grouping them according to the
similarities of their consequences and is discussed in detail below, as explained
in detail in the Third Chapter.
Cluster analysis with existing classes
There is no specific legislation or standard for accident classification in
Turkey, and a classification similar to the accident classes determined by the
USMB is used for the drilling sector. The accident classes observed in four
classes are, respectively, Fatal Accident, Lost Time Accident requiring a
medical report of 3 days or more, First Aid Accident requiring a medical report
of up to 3 days, and Near Miss Accident with no injury or no reporting date.
Although accident classes were tried to be created by applying clustering
analysis on the new database according to this accident classification, a
clustering that matched the accident classes in use could not be obtained. It has
also been revealed that accident classification cannot be separated solely based
on the report duration and must be evaluated together with other accident-
related variables. Therefore, according to the cluster analysis results,
It has been concluded that determining the accident groups used as 4 is not
sufficient (Table 1.).

Table 1. According to clustering analysis, clusters and observation numbers of 4 groups

From each observation and The average
Number of cluster weight distance from the
Clusters Observations the sum of squares of center

35
 deviations from the center
Cluster 1 559 1459, 33 3657,40
Cluster 2 65 1028,32 3687,90
Cluster 3 21 1348,82 2885,37
Cluster 4 1 0,00 0,00

Source: Prepared by the author

For the 4 available accident classifications; accident year, accident day,

month, accident time, start year, year of birth, age, title, report period/lost days,
work class, equipment, operation, location, accident type, injured body part,
experience, pump power, capacity, cluster analysis was performed with hook
load variables. As stated in Table 1, it includes observations in class 1: 559,
class 2: 65, class 3: 21, and class 4: 1. The distribution of clusters is shown in
Figure 2.

Figure 2. Cluster analysis dendrogram plot for existing classes

36
Source: Prepared by the author

Cluster 4 represents a single accident situation, and is located separately

from the others, and although it seems that no accident similar to this type of
accident has occurred when classified into the currently used classes, it is seen
that the accidents are evaluated in different classes despite their similarities, or
are placed in the same accident class despite their different situations and
characteristics.
This situation allows undesirable results to occur in the cause-effect-
precaution relationships of accidents.
For the new classification study, clustering analyses were made on the data
using the variables of work class, operation, equipment, location of the
accident, injured body part, pump power, capacity, hook load, tower value,
tower construction year, and Dendrogram graphics were prepared for the
consistent clustering (Appendix). -5). The data is divided into 8 classes with
95% similarity. The number of elements per class is presented in Table 2, the
dendrogram graph is presented in Figure 2.
Table 2. Clusters and observation numbers of the data
Clusters Number of
Observations
Cluster 1 210
Cluster 2 62
Cluster 3 113
Cluster 4 89
Cluster 5 73
Cluster 6 47
Cluster 7 25
Cluster 8 27
Source: Prepared by the author

Clustering analyses were repeated by standardizing the data of the

variables used as input, and 8 classes were created according to 95% similarity.
Since the results obtained with the raw and standard forms of the variables
were the same, it was deemed appropriate to give them in the appendix instead
of presenting them here.

37
 The clusters mentioned here show accidents that are in similar situations
according to the 10 variables taken into account. When clusters are sorted
according to their distance from their centers; Clusters 4 and 8 represent the
clusters that are furthest from each other, followed by clusters 2, 7, 1,5, 3, and
6, respectively, according to their distance.

When sorting the clusters according to accident severity, it seems possible

to characterize the accident classes as follows:
- Accident class I (Severe accidents): Accidents that result in death, very
serious injury, and long-term absence from work,
- Accident class II (High severity accidents): Loss of limb, permanent
disability, accidents that require long-term absence from work,
- Accident class III (Moderate to severe accidents): Accidents that do not
require permanent disability but cause conditions that require long-term
treatment,
- Accident class IV (Moderate severity accidents): Accidents that do not
require long-term treatment but require treatments such as professional
healthcare,
- Accident class V (sub-medium severity accidents): Accidents requiring
short-term hospital treatment
- Accident class VI (Low severity accidents): Accidents that require daily
treatment in hospital but do not cause time away from work

Figure 3. Cluster analysis dendrogram plot for classification study

38
 Source: Prepared by the author
- Accident class VII (Mild accidents): Accidents that do not require
professional healthcare and result in short interventions such as first aid.
- Accident class VIII (Very mild accidents): Mild accidents that do not
require hospitalization or first aid and do not cause injury.
Accident classes corresponding to the clusters resulting from the cluster
analysis results here:
- Accident class I: cluster no. 4
- Accident class II: cluster no. 2
- Accident class III: cluster 7
- Accident class IV: cluster 1
- Accident class V: cluster no. 5
- Accident class VI: cluster 3
- Accident class VII: cluster 6
- Accident class VIII: Shown as cluster no. 8.
According to the descriptive statistics results of the variables forming the
clusters and the calculated cluster center results;

39
 - Work Class: Accidents in clusters 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 are accidents that occur
during drilling operations, and accidents in clusters 2, 4, and 8 are accidents
that occur in well-completion works.
- Equipment: The accidents in clusters 1, 3, 6, and 7 seem to be caused by
kelly and bushing equipment, the accidents in clusters 2,4,5 seem to be caused
by vehicles, and the accidents in cluster 8 seem to be caused by materials.
- Operation: The accidents in clusters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 occur during heavy
vehicle transportation, the accidents in clusters 5 and 6 occur during crane
transportation, and the accidents in cluster 9 occur during manual
transportation.
- Location of the accident: The accidents in cluster 1 are in the area where
the mud pool and tanks are located, the accidents in clusters 2, 3, 4, and 8 are
near the drilling mud mixture, the accidents in clusters 5, 6 and 7 are where the
sieve tanks are located.
- Body part injured: Foot injuries occur in clusters 1, 3, 5, and 6 accidents,
finger injuries occur in Cluster 2, leg injuries occur in clusters 4 and 7
accidents, and neck injuries occur in cluster 8.
- Pump power: cluster 1: 1263 hp, cluster 2: 602 hp, cluster 3: 2000 hp,
cluster 4: 454 hp, cluster 5: 1350 hp, cluster 6: 800 hp, cluster 7: 630 hp and
cluster 8: It refers to towers with a pump power of 1500 hp.
- Capacity: According to tower capacities, cluster 1: 3910 m, cluster 2:
2508 m, cluster 3: 6200 meters, cluster 4: 946 meters, cluster 5: 4000 meters,
cluster 6: 2500 meters, cluster 7: 1500 meters and cluster 8: These are towers
with a capacity of 5000 meters.
- Hook load: According to hook load, respectively cluster 1: 222 tons,
cluster 2: 211 tons, cluster 3: 320 tons, cluster 4: 93 tons, cluster 5: 200 tons,
cluster 6: 158 tons, cluster 7: 136 tons, Cluster 8: Accidents that occurred in
towers with a capacity of 453 tons.

40
 - Tower value: In terms of tower value, the average of the tower values
within the clusters where accidents occurred are respectively; 5 030 952, 1 512
903, 9 000 000, 1 184 270, 6 500 000, 4 000 000, 3 000 000, 16 000 000.
- Tower construction year: The average construction years of the towers in
the clusters where the accidents occurred are respectively;
A grouping study was carried out by taking into account the reported work
accidents. Since there is missing data in the variables used here (for example, in
near-miss accidents, there is missing data because there is no data on the person
who had the accident), the existing 560 data were included in the clustering
analysis. As variables taken for analysis; report time, work class, equipment,
operation, location, accident type, injured body part, pump power, capacity,
hook load, tower value, education, tower construction year, and tower age were
taken. The relevant dendrogram graph is presented in Figure. The accident
classification was prepared as 8 groups by the initial analysis, the number of
accident observations falling into these classes is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Clusters and observation numbers of reported accidents

Cluster 1 179 Cluster 5 60
Cluster 2 60 Cluster 6 42
Cluster 3 94 Cluster 7 24
Cluster 4 85 Cluster 8 16
Source: Prepared by the author

The clusters mentioned here appear to be accidents that are in similar

situations according to the 14 variables taken into account. When the
clusters are ranked according to their distance from the center; Clusters 4
and 8 are seen as the clusters farthest from each other. Then come clusters
5, 7, 6, 1, 2 and 3, respectively.

41
 Figure 4. Cluster analysis dendrogram chart for reported accidents

Source: Prepared by the author

Accident classes corresponding to the clusters resulting from the cluster

analysis results here:
- Accident class I: cluster no. 4
- Accident class II: cluster no. 5
- Accident class III: cluster 7
- Accident class IV: cluster 6
- Accident class V: cluster no. 1
- Accident class VI: cluster no. 2
- Accident class VII: cluster no. 3
- Accident class VIII: Shown as cluster no. 8.
As a result of the clustering analysis, according to the "sum of squares of
deviations from each observation and the cluster center of gravity" values given
in the table, the values given in cluster 5 are far from each other, that is, the
variance is high, and the values in clusters 2 and 6 have low variances. That is,
it shows that the similarity rates are high.
According to the descriptive statistics results of the variables forming the
clusters and the calculated cluster center results;
42
 -Report time: According to the report time received by the personnel who
had an accident, that is, the lost daytime, the average values are given
according to the clusters, respectively: the time for the accidents in clusters 1,
2,6 is 4, 3 for cluster 3, 7 for cluster 4, 5 for cluster 5, It was 1 for cluster 7 and
2 for cluster 8.
- Work class: The accidents in Cluster 1,2,3,6,7 occurred during drilling
operations. The accidents in numbers 4, 5, and 8 occurred during well
completion works.
- Equipment: The accidents in Clusters 1,3,6,7 are caused by Kelly and
bushing equipment, the accidents in Cluster 2 are caused by machinery and
pumps, the accidents in Clusters 4 and 5 are caused by transportation/vehicles,
the accidents in Cluster 8 are caused by machinery and pumps. It was caused
by BOP/well control material.
- Operation: The accidents in clusters 1,3,4,5,6 are carried by heavy
vehicles, the accidents in Cluster 2 are transport by crane, the accidents in
Cluster 7 are manual transportation, and the accidents in Cluster 8 are by
forklift. occurred during transportation.
- Place where the accident occurred: The accidents in cluster 1 are in the
area where the mud pool and tanks are located, the accidents in clusters 2, 3, 4,
5, and 8 are in the drilling mud mixing area, the accidents in cluster 6,7 are in
the area where the pier and tanks are located. occurred in the tower.
- Body part injured: Finger injuries occurred in accidents in clusters 1, 2,
and 5, and leg injuries occurred in accidents in clusters 3, 4,6, 7, 8.
- Pump power: The accident occurred in towers with pump power of cluster
1 1262 hp, cluster 2 1350 hp, cluster 3 2000 hp, cluster 4 455 hp, cluster 5 606
hp, cluster 6 800 hp, cluster 7 630 hp, 1500 hp.
- Capacity: According to the tower capacities, cluster 1 is 3902 m, cluster 2
is 4000 m, cluster 3 is 6200 meters, cluster 4 is 947 meters, cluster 5 is 2533
meters, cluster 6 is 2500 meters, cluster 7 is 1500 meters, cluster 8 is 5000
meters. Happened.

43
 - Hook load: According to the hook load, accidents occurred in towers with
an average capacity of cluster 1 221, cluster 2 200, cluster 3 320, cluster 4 92,
cluster 5 214, cluster 6 158, cluster 7 136, cluster 8 453 tons.
- Tower value: In terms of tower value, the average of the tower values
involved in accidents within the clusters are; 5 030 726, 6 500 000, 9 000 000,
1 183 529, 1 515 000, 4 000 000, 3 000 000, 16 000 000.
- Educational status of those who had accidents: Those who had accidents
in clusters 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were primary school graduates, and in clusters 2
and 4, they were high school graduates.
- Tower construction year: The average construction years of the towers in
the clusters where the accidents occurred are respectively;
In accident analysis, only report periods, that is, the number of days lost,
are considered as variables in the literature. In the clustering analyses
conducted here, analyses were also carried out by excluding the report period,
as we wanted to test whether the report duration was a sufficient variable in the
cluster analyses or to what extent the results changed when this variable was
not included.
For this purpose, a regrouping study was carried out by excluding the
reporting period from the variables given in Article 5.5.3. The variables taken
for the analysis in question are; work class, equipment, operation, location,
accident type, injured body part, pump power, capacity, hook load, tower value,
training, tower construction year, and tower age. A dendrogram has been
drawn. The dendrogram graph is given in Figure. The number of staff per class
is given in Table 4.
The clusters mentioned here show accidents that are in similar situations
according to the 13 variables taken into account. When we sort the clusters
according to their distance from the center; Clusters 4 and 8 are seen as the
clusters farthest from each other. Then come the clusters 5, 7, 6, 1, 2, 3
respectively.

44
 Figure 5. Dendrogram graph for accidents excluding report period

Source: Prepared by the author

Table 4. Clusters and observation numbers of the data, excluding the report period
Clusters Total Square The average
deviations from distance from
Number of each observation the center
Observations and the cluster
centroid

Cluster 1 179 2.58103E+12 57678.4

Cluster 2 60 1.35896E+04 13.3
Cluster 3 94 2.18463E+04 13.9
Cluster 4 85 4.96955E+11 31008.0
Cluster 5 60 6.16539E+11 57004.8
Cluster 6 42 1.24692E+04 14.9

45
 Cluster 7 24 4.76879E+03 13.6
Cluster 8 16 2.98356E+03 13.2
Source: Prepared by the author

Accident classes corresponding to the clusters resulting from the cluster

analysis results here: Accident class I: Cluster no. 4
Accident class II: cluster no. 5 Accident class III: cluster no. 7 Accident
class IV: cluster no. 6 Accident class V: cluster no. 1 Accident class VI: cluster
no. 2 Accident class VII: cluster no. 3 Accident class VIII: cluster no. 8 is
shown.
As a result of the clustering analysis, according to the "sum of squares of
deviations from each observation and the cluster center of gravity" values, the
values given in cluster 5 are far from each other, that is, the variance is high,
and the values in clusters 2 and 6 have low variances. That is, it shows that the
similarity rates are high.
According to the descriptive statistics results of the variables forming the
clusters and the calculated cluster center results;
- Work class: Accidents in Cluster 1, 2, 3,6, and 7 occurred during drilling
operations. The accidents in numbers 4, 5, and 8 occurred during well
completion works.
- Equipment: The accidents in Clusters 1,3,6,7 are caused by Kelly bushing
equipment, the accidents in Cluster 2 are caused by power tools, the accidents
in Cluster 4 and 5 are caused by transportation/vehicles, the accidents in
Cluster 8 are caused by BOP / occurred due to well control material.
- Operation: The accidents in Cluster 1,3,4,5,6 are carried by heavy
vehicles, the accidents in Cluster 2 are transported by crane, the accidents in
Cluster 7 are manual transportation, and the accidents in Cluster 8 are by
forklift. occurred during transportation.
- Place where the accident occurred: The accidents in cluster 1 are in the
area where the mud pool and tanks are located, the accidents in clusters 2, 3, 4,

46
 5, and 8 are in the drilling mud mixing area, the accidents in cluster 6,7 are in
the area where the pier and tanks are located. occurred in the tower.
- Accident type: The type of accidents in Cluster 1,2,3,5,6,7,8 is Slip / Fall:
Same Level, in Cluster 4 it is in between.
- Body part injured: Finger injuries occurred in accidents in clusters 1, 2,
and 5, and leg injuries occurred in accidents in clusters 3, 4, 6, 7, 8.
- Pump power: The accident occurred in towers with pump power of cluster
1 1262 hp, cluster 2 1350 hp, cluster 3 2000 hp, cluster 4 455 hp, cluster 5 606
hp, cluster 6 800 hp, cluster 7 630 hp, 1500 hp.
- Capacity: According to the tower capacities, cluster 1 is 3902 m, cluster 2
is 4000 m, cluster 3 is 6200 meters, cluster 4 is 947 meters, cluster 5 is 2533
meters, cluster 6 is 2500 meters, cluster 7 is 1500 meters, cluster 8 is 5000
meters. Happened.
- Hook load: According to the hook load, accidents occurred in towers with
an average capacity of cluster 1 221, cluster 2 200, cluster 3 320, cluster 4 92,
cluster 5 214, cluster 6 158, cluster 7 136, cluster 8 453 tons.
- Tower value: In terms of tower value, the average of the tower values
involved in accidents within the clusters are; 5 030 726, 6 500 000, 9 000 000,
1 183 529, 1 515 000, 4 000 000, 3 000 000, 16 000 000.
- Educational status of those who had accidents: Those who had accidents
in clusters 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were primary school graduates, and in clusters 2
and 4, they were high school graduates.
- Tower construction year: The average construction years of the towers in the
clusters where the accidents occurred are respectively; These are 1978, 1980, 1987,
2006, 2004, and 2014.
- Tower age: According to the clusters, the tower ages are 37, 36, 28, 8,11 and
4, respectively.
In Article 5.5.2, discriminant analysis was performed with the data used in
the cluster analysis for the classification study. The clusters resulting from the
cluster analysis were chosen as the dependent variable; Work class, equipment,

47
 operation, location, injured body part, pump power, capacity, hook load, tower
value, and tower construction year were selected as independent variables, and
discriminant analysis was performed. Values were assigned to the correct group
at a rate of 100% (Table 5.).
Table 5. Discriminant analysis result classification summary chart
Real Group
The group to which the observation is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
predicted to belong
1 210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 62 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 113 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 73 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 47 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27
Total number of observations 210 62 113 89 73 47 25 27
Number of correctly placed observations 210 62 113 89 73 47 25 27
The proportion of observations correctly
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
placed in each true cluster
Total number of Number of correctly placed Correct classification rate for
observations = 646 observations = 646 all clusters = 1
Source: Prepared by the author

In terms of variable weights, according to discriminant functions; The most

effective variables in accidents within clusters 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 are tower
construction year and hook load, and the least effective variable is work class.
Standardization was carried out because the measurement units of the data
in the data set are different from each other and the data scale values are
different from each other. 5 different options are offered in the Minitab
program for the standardization process.
In Article 5.5.2, the clusters resulting from the cluster analysis performed in
the standardized form of the data were selected as the dependent variable;
Work class, equipment, operation, location, injured body part, pump power,
capacity, hook load, tower value, tower construction year were selected as
independent variables and discriminant analysis was performed. According to
the discriminant analysis results, 86.5% of the data could be assigned to the
correct groups. Then, the observations incorrectly assigned to the clusters were
48
 arranged iteratively and the clusters were separated with 100% accuracy (Table
6.).

Table 6. Standardized data discriminant analysis result classification summary

chart
Real Group
The group to which the observation is predicted to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
belong
1 163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 144 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 113 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27
Total number of observations 163 144 30 113 56 17 96 27
Number of correctly placed observations 163 144 30 113 56 17 96 27
The proportion of observations correctly placed in 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
each true cluster
Total number of observations = 646 Number of correctly placed observations = 646 Correct
classification rate for all clusters = 1
Source: Prepared by the author

In terms of variable weights, according to discriminant functions; The most

effective variables in accidents within cluster 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 are business class
and tower construction year. The least effective variables are location and hook
load.
The clusters resulting from the cluster analysis in Article 5.5.3 are the
dependent variable (given in Table 7.); Discriminant analysis was performed by
selecting report time, work class, equipment, operation, location, accident type,
injured body part, pump power, capacity, hook load, tower value, training,
tower construction year, tower age as independent variables.

In terms of variable weights, according to discriminant functions; The most

effective variables in accidents within cluster 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 are business class

49
 and tower construction year. The least effective variables are location and hook
load.
In accident analysis, only report periods, that is, the number of days lost,
are considered as variables in the literature. In the discriminant analyses
conducted here, analyses were carried out by excluding the report period, as we
wanted to test whether the report duration alone was a sufficient variable or to
what extent the results changed when this variable was not included.

Table 7. Reported accidents discriminant analysis classification summary chart

Real Group
The group to which the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
observation is predicted to
belong
1 179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 94 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Total number of observations 179 60 94 85 60 42 24 16
Number of correctly placed 179 60 94 85 60 42 24 16
observations
True to every real set 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total number of observations = 560
Number of correctly placed observations = 560
Correct classification rate for all clusters = 1
Source: Prepared by the author

The clusters resulting from the cluster analysis performed in Article 5.5.4
are the dependent variable (given in Table 7.);
Discriminant analysis was performed by selecting the type, injured body
part, pump power, capacity, hook load, tower value, education, tower
construction year, and tower age.
All of the data were distributed correctly to the groups at a rate of 100%
(Table 8.).
In terms of variable weights, according to discriminant functions; The most
effective variables in accidents within cluster 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 are tower
50
 construction year and tower age. The least effective variables are job class and
education.

Using discriminant analysis functions, the determined grouping distribution

of the remaining data out of 646 was made.
Since all analyses give the same results, the functions calculated in
Classification Study 1, which was done with the raw data, can be used here.

Table 8. Discriminant analysis classification summary chart excluding report time

Real Group

The group to which the observation is1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

predicted to belong
1 179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 94 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Total number of observations 179 60 94 85 60 42 24 16
Number of correctly placed 179 60 94 85 60 42 24 16
observations
True to every real set 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
The group to which the observation is1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
predicted to belong
Total number of observations = 560
Number of correctly placed observations = 560
Correct classification rate for all clusters = 1
Source: Prepared by the author

Discriminant equations to be used in determining accident classifications:

Accident class I = − 464 011 − (2 228 × Work Class) + (15 × Equipment) −
(1 × Operation) + (3 × Location) − (14 × Incident Type) + (12 × Body Part) −
(2 × Pump Power) + (1 × Capacity) + (3 × Hook Load) − (162 × Training) +
(464 × Tower Construction Years) + (410 × Tower Age) (Eq. 2)

51
 Accident class II = − 461 550 − (2 195 × Work Class) + (16 × Equipment)
+ (3 × Location) − (13 × Incident Type)+ (12 × Body Part) − (2 × Pump Power)
+ (1 × Capacity) + (3 × Hook Load)− (168 × Education) + (461 × Tower
Construction Year) + (406 × Tower Age) (Eq. 3)
Accident class III = − 464 336 − (2 229 × Work Class) + (16 × Equipment)
− (1 × Operation) + (3 × Location) − (14 × Event Type) + (12 × Body Part) −
(2 × Pump Power) + (1 × Capacity)+ (3 × Hook Load) − (165 × Training) +
(464 × Tower Construction Year) + (409 × Tower Age) (Eq. 4)
Accident class IV = − 462 451 − (2 206 × Work Class) + (16 × Equipment)
+ (3 × Location) − (14 × Incident Type) + (12 × Body Part) − (2 × Pump
Power) + (1 × Capacity) + (3 × Hook Load) − (166 × Education) + (462 ×
Tower Construction Years) + (407 × Tower Age) (Eq. 5)
Accident class V = − 465 726 − (2 237 × Work Class) + (15 × Equipment)
− (1 × Operation) + (3 × Location) − (14 × Event Type) + (12 × Body Part) −
(2 × Pump Power) + (1 × Capacity)+ (3 × Hook Load) − (162 × Training) +
(465 × Tower Construction Years) + (410 × Tower Age) (Eq. 6)
Accident class VI = − 461 916 − (2 165 × Work Class) + (17 × Equipment)
+ (3 × Location) − (13 × Incident Type) + (13 × Body Part) − (1 × Pump
Power) + (1 × Capacity) + (4 × Hook Load) − (171 × Education) + (460 ×
Tower Construction Years) + (404 × Tower Age) (Eq. 7)
Accident class VII = − 463 959 − (2 226 × Work Class) + (16 ×
Equipment) − (1 × Operation) + (3 × Location) − (14 × Event Type) + (12 ×
Body Part) − (2 × Pump Power) + (1 × Capacity) + (3 × Hook Load) − (165 ×
Training) + (464 × Tower Construction Years) + (408 × Tower Age) (Eq. 8)
Accident class VIII = − 468 055 − (2 100 × Work Class) + (18 ×
Equipment) + (2 × Location) − (11 × Incident Type)+ (13 × Body Part) − (1 ×
Pump Power) + (1 × Capacity) + (4 × Hook Load) − (181 × Education) + (465
× Tower Construction Years) + (397 × Tower Age) (Eq. 9)
Classification studies and variables used are shown in Table 8. given in. As
stated in Table 9, primarily a classification study was carried out on accident

52
 classes in the existing literature. Then, respectively, a new classification study,
a classification study for the reported accidents, and then a classification study
for the reported accidents, excluding the reporting period, were carried out.
For each of the new classification studies, discriminant analyses were
performed after the clustering analysis. According to the results of all three
classification studies; accident data could be divided into clusters at a rate of
100%. At the same time, using the data in its normal or standardized form did
not affect the result. For this reason, since all three methods give the same
results, it is recommended to use a method that has fewer variables and is easier
to use.
As a result, within the scope of this thesis study, it is recommended to use
"classification study 1", which is the simplest and easiest to use among
different clustering processes and has fewer variables. The variables to be used
in the classification study are given in Table 9.

Table 9. Discriminant analysis classification summary chart excluding report time

ClassificatiYear of accident, day of accident, Month, Time of accident, Year of employment,
on for Year of birth, Age, Title, Report period/ lost days, Work class Equipment,
existing Operation, Location, Type of accident, Body part injured, Experience, Pump
classes power, Capacity, hook load
New Work class, Equipment, Operation, Location, Injured body part, Pump power,
Classific Capacity, Hook load, Tower value, Tower Construction Year
ation
Study 1
New Work class, Equipment, Operation, Location, Injured body part, Pump power,
Classific Capacity, Hook load, Tower value, Tower construction year, Report period,
ation Accident type, Training, Tower age
Study 2
New Work Class, Equipment, Operation, Location, Injured Body Part, Pump
classific Power, Capacity, Hook Load, Tower Value, Tower Construction Year,
ation Accident Type, Training, Tower Age
study 3
Source: Prepared by the author

Summary explanations about the new accident classification are given in

Table 10.

53
 The distribution of variables that are effective in the classification of
accidents in the database according to accident classes was examined.
Explanations of the codes of the variables are given in Table 11.
According to this;
- Accident class VII and V accidents occurred only in drilling operations,
and cluster VIII only occurred in well completion operations. There is no
difference in terms of work done for other types of accidents.
- Accident class IV accidents have occurred on all equipment. Distribution
details according to equipment are given in 7.
- Accidents with accident class IV in terms of where they occur appear to
have occurred in all places.

Table 10. Accident class descriptions and clusters

Accident Explanation New classification study
class 1 2 3

accident class SI erious accidents: With death, very 4 4 4

serious injury, very long duration

accident classAccidents resulting in time away 2 5 5

II from work

accident classHigh-severity accidents: Loss of limb, 7 7 7

III permanent disability, accidents
requiring long-term absence from
work
Accident classProfessional healthcare service that does not 1 6 6
IV require long-term treatment
Accident classAccidents requiring treatments 5 1 1
V
Accident Low-severity accidents: Require daily 3 2 2
class VI hospital treatment but

Accident Accidents that do not cause time away from

6 3 3
class VII work

Accident Mild accidents: Accidents that do not require8 8 8

class VIII professional healthcare and result in short
interventions such as first aid.

54
Source: Prepared by the author
- In terms of incident type, accident class IV and accident class V accident
include all event types. However, entrapment-type accidents occurred only in
accident class VII accident class.
- In terms of the injured body part, lung injuries only occur in accident class
IV accidents. Elbow injuries occur in accident class III accidents.
- The most distinguishing features in determining the accident class are the
pump power, capacity, and hook load of the tower.- When looked at in terms of
educational status, it is seen that personnel of all educational backgrounds
experience all types of accidents, regardless of their educational status.
However, in terms of frequency, it was observed that personnel with primary
education had more accidents. - When looked at in terms of tower age, it is
seen that accident classes III, VI, and VIII, which are accident classes with less
serious injuries, occur in new-type towers, while accidents causing more severe
injuries occur in old towers.

Table 11. Accident classes and the variables they contain

ACCIDENT CLASSES
Accident class IV
Accident class II

Accident class III

Type 1 Accident:
Accident class I

Type 2 Accident:

Type 4 Accident:
Type 3 Accident:
Variables
done

1—2 1—2 1—2 1—2

Work

1-2-3-4-5-6-
2-4-8-9- 7-8-9-10-
10-12-13- 2-3-4-6-7-8-9- 11-12-13-
3-5-6-7-8-10-12-
Equipment

14-16-17- 10-12-13-16- 14-16-17-

13-14-21-22-
18-20-22- 17-22-23-24- 18-20-21-
23-27-28
23-25-26- 25-28 22-23-24-
27-28 25-26-27-
28-29

55
 1-3-4-5-6-7-
8-9-10-11-

occurred
1-3-4-5-6- 1-4-5-6-7-8-9-11-

accident
Where the 7-8-11-12-13-14 12-13-14-15-
4-7-11-18- 12-13-14-
19-22-24 15-16-17-
15-17-18 21-23 16-18-20-23
18-19-20-
21-23-24
1-3-4-5-6-7-
1-3-4-5-6- 1-4-5-6-7-8-10-11-
Event

1-4-5-6-8- 8-9-10-12-
type

7-8-10-12-14-15- 12-14-15-16-
14-16-18 14-15-16-
18 18
17-18
1-3-4-5-6-7-
3-4-5-6-7-
Injured

3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10- 8-9-10-11-
body
part

8-9-10-11 13-14- 4-5-8-9-11-16-18

11-14-16-18 13-14-15-
16-18
16-18
160-440- 425-440- 900-1000-
Capacıty pow

630
Pump

750 540-700-750 1350

er

107,5-
1524-1982 2440-
735,68-
2750 1500 2745-4000
929,28-
-4500
2440
Source: Prepared by the author
Table 11 continued:
95-125-
25-76-96-
Hook
load

132.5-158 136 200-340

158
200-350
1962-1967- 1965-1977
1975-1978-
Status

1974-1975- 1994-2010 2004

1979
1976-982-1988 2012-2013 2015
constructıon year cation

1--2--3 1--2--3 1--2--3 1--2--3

Edu-

24-25-26-
27-28-29-
30-32-33- 3-5-6-8-7-18-35-
Tower

34-35-36- 36-37-41-46- 8-9-10-13-14 32-33-34-35--36-37-38-39-40-43

39-40-41- 47-48-49
42-43-44-
48-52-53

3-4-5-6-7- 3-4-5-6-7- 3-4-5-6-7-8-

Tower age

3-4-5-6-7-9-11-12-
21-8-9-11 12-13- 11-13-14- 9-11-12-13-
13-15-16-17-
14 15-16-17 19- 16-19-20- 14-15-16-
20-25-18-23
20-25 25-18 17-19-20-25

Table 12. Accident classes and the variables they contain

56
 Accident class VI

Accident class VII

Accident class V

Accident class VIII

Type 6 Accident:
Type 5 Accident:

Type 7 Accident:

Type 8 Accident:
Variables

1 1 1—2 2

1-2-3-4-6-7
1-2-3-4-8-9-10-
8-10-11-12- 2-8-9-10-
12-13- 2-3-6-8-9-10-11-12-
Work
done

13-14-16- 12-13-16-
16-17-18- 13-17-18-
17-18-20- 18-20-25-
20-22-23-25- 21-22-23-25-28
21-22-23- 27-28-29
28-29
26-28

4-5-6-7-8-9- 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-
Equipme

4-5-7-8-
11-12-15- 11-12 13-14-15
1-3-4-6-7-9-11-12-13-15-
nt

11-12-14-
16-17-18- 16-17-18-19 20- 16-18-19-20-24
16-18
19-20-23 21-23
Source: Prepared by the author

Table 12 continued:
Where the

1-3-4-5-6-7-
occurred
accident

1-2-3-4-5-6-7- 1-4-5-6-7-
8-10-11-12-
8-9-10-12-14-
1-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-16-18 8-10-12-
13-14-16-
16-18 16-18
17-18

3-4-5-6-7-8- 3-4-5-6-7-8-9-
Event
type

4-5-7-8-9- 4-7-8-9-
9-10-11-14- 10-11-13-14-16-
11-15-16-18 11-16-18
16-18 17-18
body part
Injured

1350 2000 800 1500

Pump power

4000 6200 2500 500

Capacıty

200 320 158 453

2010-
2004-2006-
Hook
load

1978-1979 1977-1978 2013-

2007
2015

57
 Status
1--2--3 1--2--3 1--2--3 1--2

constructıonEdu- cation
33-34-35-36-
33-34-35-36 37-38- 4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 3-5-8
39-40-41

3-4-5-6-7-9-
3-4-5-6-7-9-11- 3-4-5-6-7-
11-14-15- 3-4-5-6-7-8-9-11-12-14-
year
Tower

12-14-15-16-17- 11-13-14-
16-20-18- 16-19-20
19-20-25-18-23 16-20-25
23-22

3-4-5-6-7-9-
3-4-5-6-7-9-11- 3-4-5-6-7-
Tower age

11-14-15- 3-4-5-6-7-8-9-11-12-14-
12-14-15-16-17- 11-13-14-
16-20-18- 16-19-20
19-20-25-18-23 16-20-25
23-22

Table 13. Code list of variables

VARIABLES CODES
WORK DONE Drilling 1, Well Completion 2
EQUIPMENT Working Platform 1, Tong 2, Elevator 3, Slip 4, Spin chain 5, Iron
Roughneck, Pipe Spinner etc. 6, Rotary Table 7, Casing Pipe,
Production Pipe, Rod, Tubular 8, Sling 9, Hand tool 10, Hand tool
electric 11, Machinery/pumps 12, Transportation/Vehicles 13, Kelly
Bushings (master bushings) 14, Well Control/ BOP 16, Material 17,
Pressure Hoses and Lines 18, Crane/ Crane truck 20, Forklift 21,
Stairs/ Steps 22, Decks/ Walkways 23, Welding/ Cutting/
Sandblasting/ Sanding 24, Chemical 25, Top drive/ Swivel / Kelly
26, Anchor chain/ Cable/ Winch
WHERE THE Crane 1, Forklift 2, Table 3, Drilling platform/Location 4, Pipe stand 5,
ACCIDENT Pier 6, Tower 7, Wellhead 8
OCCURRED
Drilling mud mixing side 9, Screen tanks 10, Mud pool and tanks 11,
EVENT TYPE Engine Room/Generator room 12, Stairs and steps 13, Electrical shed
14, Sheds (dressing rooms, warehouses) 15, Living rooms/camp
INJURED BODY
Lung/respiration 1, Digestion 2, Eye 3, Head/face 4, Back-waist 5, Trunk
(torso) 6, Arms 7, Hand/wrist 8,
DEPARTMENTToe 9, Leg 10, Toe 11, Heel 12, Neck 13, Shoulder 14, Elbow 15, Knee
16, Leather 17, Other 18
EDUCATION Assembly/disassembly/transportation 14, Well control/wellhead valve
system 15, Tower repair or maintenance 16,

58
 Mud mixing/pump 17, Cementing 18, Special operations 19, Walking 20,
Training 21, Wellhead testing 22, Jacking 24, Other 25
Source: Prepared by the author

CHAPTER III. METHODS IN MANAGING RISKS

3.1. Fine-kinney method
The method, which was proposed by Fine in 1971 and developed and used
by G.F.Kinney and A.D.Wiruth in 1976, was initially seen in the construction
and cement industry. However, today it is seen that it is used in almost every
sector. This method is quantitative. Numerical data is used to calculate. There
are three important parameters in calculating the risk score. These are
probability (O), frequency (F), and intensity (S). The risk score (Table 13.) is
obtained by multiplying these three values, each of which has a specific scale
(Table 13.). Risk scores are divided into 5 separate classes and are shown in
Table 13. With this classification, risks are prioritized according to their scores.
An intervention/solution plan should be created and flow should be taken
according to the categories of the results.

Table 14. Fine-Kinney Probability, Severity, Frequency Scale

59
 Probability Scale Severity Scale

ValueCategory Value Effect

0,1 Almost impossible 1 Near miss

0,2 Impossible 3 Minor Injury
0,5 Low probability 7 Serious Injury
1 Pretty unlikely 15 Permanent Damage, Environmental
Damage
3 Rare but possible 40 Fatal Accident
6 Highly likely 100 Multiple Fatal Accidents
10 Very likely
Frequency Scale

ValueExplanation Category
0,5 Very rare Once a year or less
1 Quite rare Once or more per year
2 Rare Once a month or more
3 Now and again Once or twice a week
6 Often Once or more a day
10 Continually Continuously or more than once an hour
Source: Prepared by the author

Table 15. Fine-Kinney Risk Status Scale

Risk Value Risk Situation

R>400 Intolerable risk (Work should be stopped and precautions should be taken
immediately)
200<R<400 High Risk (Must be improved in the short term, controls should not be disrupted)
70<R<200 Significant risk (Must be improved in the long term and monitored carefully)
20<R<70 Possible risk (Must be kept under supervision)
R<20 Insignificant risk (Precaution is not a priority)
Source: Prepared by the author

Fuzzy Fine – Kinney Method

To eliminate the uncertainties encountered in the evaluations as a result of
the risk assessment carried out with the Fine-Kinney method; Probability,
severity, and frequency scales have been blurred and as a result, decision rules
have been formed. As a result of the fuzzy Fine-Kinney method, the sensitivity
60
 of risk levels has increased. Probability, severity, and frequency parameters
were input; To determine the risk level, the applied decision rules were coded
with the Matlab Fuzzy Logic Designer program using the 'mandani min max'
method.

Table 15. Fine-Kinney Probability, Severity, Frequency Scale, etc. Fuzzy Fine- Kinney
Probability, Severity, Frequency Scale
Value Explanation Category Blurry Fine- Kinney

0,5 Very rare Once a year or less 0 / 0,5 / 1

1 Quite rare Once or more per year 0,5 / 1 / 2
2 Rare Once a month or more 1/2/3
3 Now and again Once or twice a week 2/3/6
6 Often Once or more a day 3 / 6 / 10
10 Continually Continuously or more than once an hour 6 / 10 / 10
Source: Prepared by the author

Table 15. above shows the comparison of the Fine-Kinney and Fuzzy Fine-
Kinney methods. When we look at the fuzzy Fine-Kinney method, it is seen
that the frequency, probability, and intensity scales are in wider ranges. This
provides us with a broader analysis when evaluating risk assessments prepared
with fuzzy logic.
Triangular fuzzy numbers are represented by triples such as [a1,a2,a3]. The
parameters a1, a2, and a3 represent the smallest value, the largest possible
value, and the largest value, respectively. In this method, the fuzzy
transformation scale is shown in Table 3.1.3. The scale was handled using
fuzzy numbers in Mikhailov (2003).
Table 17. Probability Scale
Severity Scale

Value Category Category Value Effect

0,1 Almost impossible Almost impossible 1 Near miss
0,2 Impossible Impossible 3 Minor Injury
0,5 Low probability Low probability 7 Serious Injury
1 Pretty unlikely Pretty unlikely 15 Permanent Damage,
Environmental
Damage
3 It is rare but possible 1/3/6 40 Fatal Accident
6 Highly likely Highly likely 100 Multiple Fatal Accidents

10 Very likely Very likely

61
 Frequency Scale
Source: Prepared by the author

Table 18. Selecting the high-performing departments within universities applying the fuzzy
MADM methods
Importance Intensity Triangular fuzzy scale
1 (1,1,1)
2 (1.6, 2.0, 2.4)
3 (2.4, 3.0, 3.6)
4 (3.2, 4.0, 4.8)
5 (4.0, 5.0, 6.0)
6 (4.8, 6.0, 7.2)
7 (5.6, 7.0, 8.4)
8 (6.4, 8.0, 9.6)
9 (7.2, 9.0, 10.8)
Source: Prepared by the author (Babak Daneshvar Royyendegh - Scientific Research and
Essays, 2011)

3.2. Expert group analysis and data collection process

As a result of the literature review, a total of 10 sources of danger were
identified from 5 different sources. These dangers should be asked of experts in
the field. From the perspective of expert groups, these 10 dangers are likely to
change or remain the same.
For the expert group, people with qualifications such as occupational safety
expert and hazardous material safety consultant were selected. A group of 10
people was determined. The people in this expert group have 4-10 years of
experience and 5 of them are Dangerous Goods Safety Consultants. This
designated expert group includes experts from all classes, including A, B, and
C classes.
As a result of the half-hour Zoom meeting with each of the experts, it was
decided that all 10 dangers mentioned were important. And these dangers have
been shown to remain the same. Much emphasis has been placed on the critical
success factor of 'public awareness'. Although there was an explanation about
this in only two sources in the literature review, it was mentioned that it is more
important. As a result of the experiences, it was determined that customers and
people passing through the station did not comply with the necessary rules; It

62
 was mentioned that it puts themselves and the environment into serious
possible emergencies. As a result of this situation, all of the criteria determined
in Table 1. were approved by the experts.

3.3. Findings
As a result of the study, 10 hazards were identified as a result of the
literature review. These dangers were asked to experts in the field and
confirmation was received. Identified sources of danger; cigarettes etc. These
are the use of flammable materials, periodic electrical controls, periodic
lightning rod controls, the presence of pits and basements in the area, the use of
telephones in the station area, awareness of the staff and the public, periodic
controls of fire extinguishers, missing warning signs and tank controls. If the
controls of these dangerous sources are inadequate, we are faced with fire,
explosion, and hazardous substance poisoning. The score of the identified
hazards was calculated with the help of experts.
Risk importance ranking was made with the values obtained as a result of
converting the Fine-Kinney risk assessment prepared with classical logic into
fuzzy logic. (Table 3.3.1)

Table 19. Fine-Kinney Risk Assessment

Dangers Possibility Frequenc Violen Risk Risk Situation
y ce Degre
e
Cigarettes etc. use of 6 10 40 240 High risk
flammable substances
Periodic electrical checks 1 1 40 40 Possible Risk
Periodic lightning rod 1 1 40 40 Possible Risk
checks
Finding pits and basements1 2 40 80 Significant Risk
Phone use 6 10 40 240 High risk
Staff awareness 3 10 40 120 Significant Risk
Public consciousness 3 10 40 120 Significant Risk
Controls of fire 1 2 40 80 Significant Risk

63
 extinguishers
Warning signs 0,5 6 15 45 Possible Risk
Tank controls 1 1 40 40 Possible Risk
Source: Prepared by the author

CONCLUSION
The most serious problem encountered when performing Fine Kinney risk
analysis is that different probability, severity, and frequency groups can create
the same risk score, even if the risk is completely different. Thanks to the fuzzy
approach, these three criteria can be evaluated separately. And a more sensitive
result is obtained. Therefore, when the risk score is ranked, the ranking changes
according to the degree of importance.
• In the classical Fine-Kinney method, 'cigarettes, etc.' are ranked first in
the order of importance. 'use of flammable substances'; When calculated with
64
the fuzzy method, it ranks 3rd. This result shows that this danger is still a risk,
but it is in the background of taking precautions.
• 'Periodic electrical checks', which ranks 5th in importance in the classical
Fine-Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks 6th.
This result shows that this danger is still a risk, but it is in the background of
taking precautions.
• 'Periodic lightning rod controls', which rank 5th in importance in the
classical Fine-Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks
1st. This result shows that controls should be made more strictly.
• 'Finding pits and basements', which ranks 3rd in importance in the
classical Fine-Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks
5th. This result shows that this danger is still a risk, but it is in the background
of taking precautions.
• 'Phone use' ranks first in the order of importance in the classical Fine-
Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks 2nd. This
result shows that this danger is still a risk, but it is in the background of taking
precautions.
• 'Staff awareness', which ranks 2nd in importance in the classical Fine-
Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks 4th. This
result shows that this danger is still a risk, but it is in the background of taking
precautions.
• 'Public awareness', which ranks 2nd in importance in the classical Fine-
Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks 4th. This
result shows that this danger is still a risk, but it is in the background of taking
precautions.
• 'Control of fire extinguishers', which ranks 3rd in importance in the
classical Fine-Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks
5th. This result shows that this danger is still a risk, but it is in the background
of taking precautions.

65
 • 'Warning signs', which rank 4th in importance in the classical Fine-
Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks 8th. This
result shows that this danger is still a risk, but it is in the background in the
precautionary order.
• 'Tank controls', which ranks 5th in importance in the classical Fine-
Kinney method; When calculated with the fuzzy method, it ranks 7th. This
result shows that this danger is still a risk, but it is in the background of taking
precautions.
It is observed that Fine-Kinney results made with fuzzy logic are more
sensitive and realistic. Despite all its plus points, the complexity of risk
assessments made with fuzzy logic can be considered as the only disadvantage.
However, since the result of the risk assessment made with fuzzy logic is
evaluated specifically for each risk, it is recommended in the production sector
and workplaces in the very hazardous class.
• Future Research Directions
Future research directions for further exploration and practical testing of
proposed methods in the oil and gas industry could include:
Conducting field trials and case studies to assess the effectiveness of
proposed methods in real-world oil and gas operations. This could involve
implementing the methods within specific projects or operations and evaluating
their impact on efficiency, safety, and overall performance.
Collaborating with oil and gas companies, research institutions, and
academic partners to conduct comprehensive research projects. These projects
could involve interdisciplinary teams working together to develop, test, and
refine the proposed methods in various aspects of oil and gas exploration,
production, refining, and distribution.
Utilizing advanced data analysis techniques and modeling approaches to
analyze large datasets from oil and gas operations. This could involve using
machine learning algorithms, statistical methods, and predictive modeling to

66
identify patterns, optimize processes, and make data-driven decisions regarding
the implementation of proposed methods.
Exploring opportunities to integrate proposed methods with emerging
technologies such as artificial intelligence, Internet of Things (IoT), and
automation systems. This could involve developing software applications,
sensors, and control systems that incorporate the methods to enhance
operational efficiency, reduce costs, and minimize risks in oil and gas
operations.
Conducting environmental and social impact assessments to evaluate the
implications of implementing proposed methods on environmental
sustainability, community relations, and stakeholder engagement in the oil and
gas industry. Working with regulatory agencies and industry organizations to
ensure that proposed methods comply with existing regulations and industry
standards in the oil and gas sector. This could involve participating in
standardization processes, developing best practice guidelines, and advocating
for the adoption of innovative methods that improve industry performance
while meeting regulatory requirements.
By pursuing these pathways for further exploration and practical testing,
researchers can advance the development and implementation of innovative
methods in the oil and gas industry, leading to improved efficiency,
sustainability, and competitiveness in the sector.

67
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 18. Cündübeyoğlu, İ., Kayabaşı, R. (2022). Seramik Fabrikasında Fine-
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In Azerbaijani
25. Rzayeva, N. (2020). "Neft və qaz sənayesi risk qiymətləndirmə metodlarının
təkmilləşdirilməsi: Azərbaycanın təcrübəsi." Bakı Dövlət Neft və İnşaat
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71
 LIST OF CHARTS
Chart 1. USMB / Turkey work accident frequency rate comparison.........................26
Chart 2. USMB / Turkey work accident rate comparison..........................................27

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. According to clustering analysis, clusters and observation numbers of 4
groups...........................................................................................................................32
Table 2. Clusters and observation numbers of the data...............................................34
Table 3. Clusters and observation numbers of reported accidents..............................37
Table 4. Clusters and observation numbers of the data, excluding the report
period............................................................................................................................41
Table 5. Discriminant analysis result classification summary chart............................47
Table 6. Standardized data discriminant analysis result classification summary
chart..............................................................................................................................44
Table 7. Reported accidents discriminant analysis classification summary chart.......45
Table 8. Discriminant analysis classification summary chart excluding report
time...............................................................................................................................46
Table 9. Discriminant analysis classification summary chart excluding report
time...............................................................................................................................48
Table 10. Accident class descriptions and clusters......................................................49
Table 11. Accident classes and the variables they contain..........................................50
Table 12. Accident classes and the variables they contain..........................................50
Table 13. Code list of variables....................................................................................53
Table 14. Fine-Kinney Probability, Severity, Frequency Scale...................................54
Table 15. Fine-Kinney Risk Status Scale.....................................................................55
Table 16. Fine-Kinney Probability, Severity, Frequency Scale, etc. Fuzzy Fine- Kinney
Probability, Severity, Frequency Scale........................................................................55
Table 17. Probability Scale..........................................................................................56
Table 19. Selecting the high-performing departments within universities applying the fuzzy
MADM methods...............................................................................................................56
Table 19. Fine-Kinney Risk Assessment.....................................................................58

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Event Tree Risk Assessment Representation...............................................22
Figure 2. Cluster analysis dendrogram plot for existing classes….............................33
Figure 3. Cluster analysis dendrogram plot for classification study….......................34
Figure 4. Cluster analysis dendrogram chart for reported accidents...........................37
Figure 5. Dendrogram graph for accidents excluding report period...........................40

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