Gearbox Failure Investigation

DARoberts, LLC
GEARBOX FAILURE INVESTIGATION

P ORTSMOUTH , R HODE I SLAND A AER 1 500/77 W IND TURBINE
Report Number: DAR-‐EN-‐20120926

Principal Investigator: Don Roberts
Business Address: 4829 NE 75th St
Seattle, WA 98115
don@daroberts-‐llc.com
For: Portsmouth, Rhode Island

Contact: Mr. Gary Crosby
Title: Acting Town Planner
Business Address: 2200 E. Main Road
Portsmouth, RI 02871
Revision Description Date By
ø Final Release 27 September 2012
A Additional Information 14 October 2012
CONFIDENTIAL
This document contains business and technical information and data is confidential and proprietary to
Portsmouth, Rhode Island. Any unauthorized publication or disclosure of such information to any person, or
unauthorized use of such information without the express written consent of Portsmouth, Rhode Island is
strictly prohibited.
DAR-‐EN-‐20120926-‐revA Portsmouth Gearbox Failure Investigation 14 October 2012
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................................................ iii
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................................................................3
Background ......................................................................................................................................................................................3
Final Scope of Work .....................................................................................................................................................................3
Visual Inspection......................................................................................................................................................................3
Gearbox Inspection .................................................................................................................................................................3
SCADA Data Review................................................................................................................................................................4
Generator Alignment Check ...............................................................................................................................................4
Service Record Review .........................................................................................................................................................4
Reporting .....................................................................................................................................................................................4
Items Removed From Preliminary Scope of Work .................................................................................................4
Findings ..................................................................................................................................................................................................4
Visual Inspection......................................................................................................................................................................4
Gearbox Inspection .............................................................................................................................................................. 11
SCADA Data Collection ....................................................................................................................................................... 15
Generator Alignment Check ............................................................................................................................................ 17
Service Record Review ...................................................................................................................................................... 17
Financial Considerations ............................................................................................................................................................ 18
Other Observations ........................................................................................................................................................................ 20
Ice Throw .................................................................................................................................................................................. 20
Blades.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 20
Yaw Errors ............................................................................................................................................................................... 20
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 20
Appendix A Ȃ Gearbox borescope Inspection Report .................................................................................................. 22
Appendix B Ȃ Reference Documents ..................................................................................................................................... 23
1. ǲ Ȃ ǳǡǡ ǡ
Application Engineering, GE Energy, Greenville, SC ................................................................................................ 23
2. ǡǲͳ͵Ǥ ǳǡʹͲͳͳ
23
Appendix C Ȃ Contacts .................................................................................................................................................................. 24

ii
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 -‐ Gearbox Installation Configuration ....................................................................................................................5
Figure 2 -‐ Blade Vortex Generators ..........................................................................................................................................7
Figure 3 -‐ Low Speed Shaft Spark Gap (one of two shown) .........................................................................................8
Figure 4 -‐ GasTOPS Wear Particle Monitor ..........................................................................................................................9
Figure 5 -‐ Vibration Switch ...........................................................................................................................................................9
Figure 6 -‐ Site of Portsmouth Turbine ................................................................................................................................. 10
Figure 7 -‐ Water Tank Near Turbine .................................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 8 -‐ Highway 24 cut Northwest of Turbine .......................................................................................................... 11
Figure 9 -‐ Gearbox Data Plate ................................................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 10 -‐ Gearbox Internal Configuration...................................................................................................................... 12
Figure 11 -‐ Gearbox Section Drawing .................................................................................................................................. 12
Figure 12 -‐ Output Shaft Seal .................................................................................................................................................... 13
Figure 13 -‐ Gearbox Housing Flange Holes ....................................................................................................................... 13
Figure 14 -‐ First Planetary Stage Ring Gear Damage ................................................................................................... 14
Figure 15 -‐ Second Planetary Stage Ring Gear Damage .............................................................................................. 14
Figure 16 -‐ Top Faults by Frequency .................................................................................................................................... 15
Figure 17 -‐666, 548, 824, and 536 Fault History ........................................................................................................... 16
Figure 18 -‐ Gearbox Bearing & Oil Tempterature Trend ........................................................................................... 17
iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Portsmouth wind turbine gearbox has suffered a significant, premature failure of the first and
second planetary stages. The gearbox must be replaced in order to return the turbine to service.
The failure occurred after 3 years of operation despite a design life of 20 years. Total operating time
on the turbine is approximately 21,000 hours, and total production in accordance with the
production meter is 9,898 MWh. Depending upon future gearbox reliability, the cost of one or more
replacements may exceed the potential future profit for the life of the turbine. Therefore, a clear
understanding of the root cause of failure and the reliability of the turbine moving forward is
critical to Portsmouth.
Due to the extent of the damage, replacement is most likely preferable to repair, depending upon
repair vs. replacement cost.
The root cause of failure was not determined during this investigation. Several potential causes
were ruled out as follows:
x Structural damage to critical support structure or looseness of components such as blades,
hub, tower foundation, and generator
x Generator misalignment
x Blade exterior condition such as cracks, delamination, or missing vortex generators
x High frequency of yaw error exceeding 10 degrees (nacelle direction vs. prevailing wind
direction
Possible root causes of failure that cannot be confirmed or ruled out are categorized as follows:
x High: Gearbox manufacturing error with respect to assembly quality and choice of materials
and specificationsȄcomplete teardown inspection is required as well as review of design
and build records
x High: Gearbox design error with respect to structural stiffness of housing-‐-‐ analysis
verification required
x Low: Wind turbine support structural stiffnessȄanalysis verification required of unique
ring mount design
x Low: Pitch asymmetry due to incorrect blade offsets
x Low: Service quality, especially after May 2011. However, failure to identify failure in a
timely manner resulted in unplanned failure and extensive gearbox collateral internal
damage.
x Low: SitingȄpossible wind shear from freeway cut. Nearby 47 foot-‐tall water tank is not a
likely contributor.
The gearbox configuration is not conventional by US industry standards. The make and model of
gearbox have a poor track record, with at least 3 of 5 installed in the US having gearbox failures
1
within the first 3-‐4 years of operation. Supply of replacement gearboxes is likely to be limited, and
the turbine is destined to become an orphan due to bankruptcy of the manufacturer (AAER) and
sluggish support from the designer (AMSC/Windtec). AAER purchased a license to build the 1650
kW AMSC/Wintec design but built a 1500 kW machine instead.
The AAER 1500/77 60Hz wind turbine or any other AMSC/Windtec design with the JaKe PPSC
1290-‐ A120 gearbox never received a Statement of Conformity or Type Certificate from a world-‐
recognized certification organization such as Germanischer-‐Lloyd or Det Norske Veritas. Therefore,
the turbines did not receive the level of verification and third party engineering review other
certified wind turbines.
The water tank to the North may wake the lower arc of the rotor creating asymmetric rotor loads,
and the cut for Highway 24 may create increased vertical shear across the rotor creating
asymmetric rotor loads. These conditions are dependent upon the frequency of operation and wind
speeds in the direction of the features. The ATM site suitability report did not provide a Wind Rose
as part of the wind resource assessment, nor did it mention effects of tower or highway.
Several significant opportunities to identify premature gearbox failure were missed from as early as
June 2011 through March 2012.
x Failure to monitor GasTOPS wear particle monitor data

x Failure to collect oil samples in Fall 2011 for analysis, and, possibly, failure to replace gear
oil filter element and inspect housing for wear debris.
x Failure to monitor SCADA data for key gearbox health trends such as gearbox bearing and
oil temperatures
While early detection cannot prevent failure, it can provide an opportunity to delay the failure, plan
for replacement and reduce collateral damage from a single component failure. Collateral damage
can significantly increase the cost of gearbox repair or result in the need to purchase a new
gearbox.
Recommendations:
1. Perform financial feasibility study for gearbox replacement options, including identical
gearboxes to failed unit, remediated but similar models, and alternative models
2. Perform forensic teardown of failed gearbox to narrow down root cause of failure.
3. Perform blade pitch calibration and determine blade offsets as a potential root cause
4. Issue RFQ for qualified service providers with skilled senior level troubleshooters
5. Obtain clear understanding of relationships with JaKe and AMSC/Windtec with respect to
orphaned product support and cost.
6. Inspect blades and determine repair costs prior to gearbox replacement in order to perform
complete financial analysis for return to service of the turbine

2
INTRODUCTION
The town of Portsmouth, Rhode Island (Portsmouth) commissioned a new AAER 1500-‐77-‐65 1.5
Megawatt wind turbine on March 24, 2009. On May 18, 2012, significant amounts of metal were
found in the gearbox oil filter housing and significant internal damage was observed with a
borescope. The filter element was replaced on May 25, and the turbine was returned to service.
The turbine was removed from service on June 18, 2012 after significant additional metal was
discovered in the filter housing.
BACKGROUND
The AAER 1500-‐77 was manufactured by AAER Wind Energy of Quebec, Canada. AAER declared
bankruptcy shortly after commissioning, and all service contracts and warranties through the OEM
were lost. AAER built the turbines under license from AMSC Windtec , who has licensed similar
designs to several manufacturers around the world. According to Alexander Groeber, Director of
ǡǲWe are not 100% sure what AAER has finally built Ȃ they have bought a
ͳ͸ͷͲͳͷͲͲǥ ǯt the whole detailed turbine
configuration.ǳ
Anecdotal information indicates several thousand are in operation, mostly with a different model of
gearbox. In 2009 and 2010, five similar AAER 1500-‐77 wind turbines with identical gearboxes
were installed in the United States1. Since then, at least 3 of the 5 turbines have experienced
gearbox failures (one is operating at 1000kW peak output due to grid limitations). The design
lifetime of the turbine is 20 years, including the PPSC 1290-‐A120 gearbox manufactured by Jahnel
Kestermann (JaKe) of Germany.
In order to return the wind turbine to service, the gearbox must be replaced or repaired at
significant cost to Portsmouth. The gearbox warranty was 24 months [from delivery?], and the
failure was discovered at approximately 38 months. The gearbox manufacturer has offered
replacement gearboxes at a significantly discounted price while supplies last.
DA Roberts, LLC (DAR) performed a site inspection and obtained documents and data for review on
August 28 and 29, 2012 to confirm the condition of the gearbox and to look for root causes of
failure.
FINAL SCOPE OF WORK
VISUAL INSPECTION
The purpose of the visual inspection was to become familiar with the installation configuration,
review blade pitch settings, and identify gear oil leaks, loose hardware, or other indications as
possible factors in gearbox failure.
GEARBOX INSPECTION

1 Barstow, CA (1, operating at 1000kW peak output due to grid limitations), Tehachapi, CA (2), Templeton,
MA (1)
3
The purpose of the borescope inspection was to inspect the internal condition of the gearbox and
obtain representative photographs of each gear and bearing that is accessible.
SCADA DATA REVIEW

Ten-‐minute SCADA data was requested for at least 5 days per month since January 2012 in order to
identify trends in turbine operating data that might provide evidence of the onset of failure or
operating conditions that may have contributed to gearbox failure. The review was limited to error
codes, gearbox operating data, and yaw performance.
GENERATOR ALIGNMENT CHECK

An alignment check of generator relative to the gearbox was performed in order to identify an out-‐
of-‐alignment condition that might have contributed to gearbox failure due to the interaction of the
high-‐speed shaft connecting the output shaft of the gearbox to the input shaft of the generator.
SERVICE RECORD REVIEW

Service records since commissioning were reviewed to obtain insight into the quality of service
provided leading up to and the discovery process of the gearbox failure. Records include the
Commissioning Report, Turbine Logbook, and service provider work orders.
REPORTING
Upon return from site, a draft letter report documenting findings and providing recommendations
was expected to be submitted within two weeks.
ITEMS REMOVED FROM PRELIMINARY SCOPE OF WORK

The final scope of work removes two items, vibration analysis and oil sample analysis, after
confirmation of the extent of gearbox damage. Vibration analysis equipment was shipped to the
site, but not installed since DAR considered the risk of structural failure to outweigh the benefit. Oil
analysis was not necessary since the oil must be replaced, and there is no diagnostic beyond oil
samples collected in May by the service provider.
FINDINGS
Findings are presented in accordance with the scope of work, and attempt to narrow down
potential root causes of failure.
VISUAL INSPECTION
The visual inspection focused on potential mechanical and environmental influences into to
gearbox failure.
Installation Configuration
The installation of the gearbox is structurally unique from t he more common models of turbines in
operation in the United States, and worth investigation as a possible root cause of failure. While it
is not possible within the scope of this effort to perform a structural evaluation, a search through
public documents for industry-‐accepted design review has provided some useful information.
4
In the AAER 1500, the rotor is cantilevered from the gearbox, which, in turn, is mounted to the
nacelle frame as shown in Figure 1. The gearbox housing incorporates an oil-‐lubricated main
bearing within the housing. The nose casing is mounted to a ring-‐type mount through elastomeric
elements, and non-‐torque rotor loads and the torque reaction loads are transferred to the tower top
through the ring-‐shaped weldment.

Figure 1 -‐ Gearbox Installation Configuration
Similar configurations have received statements of conformity or been type certified by both
Germanischer-‐Lloyd (GL) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV) on similar designs.2,3,4 However, there is no
published record indicating the specific combination of the AAER 1500/77 with the JaKe PPSC
1290-‐A120 nor any other make of the AMSC/Windtec design with the JaKe PPSC 1290-‐A120 has
any published record of final GL conformity or any type of final certification. DAR is concerned that
the Portsmouth configuration is now an orphan design, and without undue expense, a rigorous
evaluation to determine conformity with widely accepted industry standards will not be
forthcoming. The following configuration influences contributing to gearbox failure cannot be ruled
out:
x An increase in rotor loading and mass as a result of increasing the rotor diameter from 70 to
77m, resulting in higher overhanging moments on the gearbox and potentially higher non-‐
torque loading into the gearbox housing as a result of increased transient aerodynamic
imbalance.
x A change of gearbox internal tooth and bearing loading and life expectancy due to a ratio
change to accommodate 60 Hz from the more common 50 Hz configuration

2 AMSC WT 1650 60 Hz, GL Statement of Conformity, DAA-‐GL-‐025-‐2010, 15 September 2009
3 Hyundai HQ 1650, DNV, Type Certificate, IEC TC222301-‐0, 23 September 2011
4 Fuhrlander FL 1500/77, GL (1999), Statement of Conformity WT-‐00-‐022A-‐2004, July 14, 2004
5
Additional insight into the gearbox design process was obtained by Portsmouth in an interview
with Martin Venne, a former Technical Director for AAER and responsible for the due diligence on
the 1290 gearbox. At the time Portsmouth was procuring the turbine, he was in Germany at the
JaKe factory. He was not convinced JaKe had solved the bending problem in their gearbox to his
satisfaction. He was aware of two 1281 (first generation) gearboxes that had failed within one year
which prompted JaKe to reinforce the second generation (1290) and provide finite element analysis
data to demonstrate they had solved the problem. He was skeptical that they had made the case,
called into question some of the assumptions in their study, and quite pointedly stated his
conviction that the root cause of our gearbox failure was lack of reinforcement in the gearbox to
accommodate high bending loads.
No other significant configuration differences in the Portsmouth turbine were noted that could
potentially contribute to gearbox failure.
Blade pitch s ettings

Wind turbine blades are airfoils that generate varying lift depending upon the angle of the blade
chord line relative to the wind. Ideally, all blades are installed and collectively pitched to operate at
identical angles. Transient conditions within the design envelope do exist where each blade may
create different lift forces, resulting in asymmetric loading of the rotor: these are considered
normal loads with the exception of extreme site conditions that exceed the IEC wind class the
turbine was designed to.
Asymmetric load can impart bending moments into the low speed shaft, and in the case of the PPSC
1290 design, into the gearbox. Shaft bending can result in uneven load distribution on bearings and
gear teeth in the 1st planetary stage of the gearbox as a result of bearing clearances, and may cause
structural deflections that also affect bearing and gear load sharing. While verification of design
loading against operating loads is well beyond the scope of this investigation, one potential cause
for constant asymmetrical loading is incorrect blade indexing. When the blades are initially
installed, the pitch system must be calibrated by measuring blade offsets from zero using pitch
index plates on the blades and entering the offsets into the controller. A visual check of the current
pitch settings was made and recorded as shown in Table 1. From the data, it appears there may be a
pitch imbalance; however, upon review of commissioning documents, a very specific procedure is
outlined in section 110.2 (page 36) of the Installation Commissioning document provided to
Portsmouth during commissioning. DAR recommends Portsmouth authorize and witness an
experienced service team to execute the pitch calibration procedure per the instructions and note
the new offset values. Allowable offset variances should be obtained from AMSC/Windtec. As a
result of the pitch inspection, pitch asymmetry due to pitch differences between b lades cannot be
ruled out as a potential influence into gearbox failure.
Table 1 -‐ Pitch Index Check
Blade Commissioning Blade Index check 29 Aug 12 Pitch difference Blade position
Offset April 29 Aug 29 Aug
2008
1 -‐1.6 .25 left (CW rotation) of mark -‐ Up left looking
s/n 156 forward
6
2 -‐2.7 .4 left (CW rotation) of mark + .15 Up right looking

s/n 160 left of 1 forward
3 -‐2 1.0 left (CW rotation) of mark + .75 down
s/n 158 left of 1

Blade Condition
The blades were photographed from the ground using a Canon 50D digital SLR with a 17-‐50mm
zoom lens. Images were reviewed, and no significant defects such as lightning strikes,
delamination, or missing vortex generators ( Figure 2) were noted. The surface condition of the low
pressure shell aft of the vortex generators and the trailing edges is very rough. While beyond the
scope of this report, DAR strongly encourages a thorough blade inspection from the manufacturer
(LM Glasfiber) or a qualified service provider.

Figure 2 -‐ Blade Vortex Generators
Mechanical Looseness
Inspection of the following hardware indicated periodic partial torque tests were performed, and
no loose or missing hardware that could induce abnormal vibration into the drivetrain was found.
1. Blade attach bolts

2. Hub attach bolts
3. Tower foundation
4. Generator footings
Lightning Protection System

An inspection of the lightning protection system protecting the gearbox from high-‐voltage arcing
indicates the turbine is equipped with a robust spark gap system containing two spark gaps
grounding the rotor to the nacelle frame. There is no indication of lightning damage on the blades.
Therefore, lightning damage has been ruled out as a potential root cause of gearbox failure.
7

Figure 3 -‐ Low Speed Shaft Spark Gap (one of two shown)
Gearbox Lubrication and Filtration System

The lubrication system is an industry standard Hydac NF series pump and filter and Hydac fan-‐
cooled heat exchanger. Hose condition and bend radii are acceptable. The desiccant breather is
partially used, and indicates adequate absorption of incoming moisture due to the blue coloration
of the desiccant particles at the top of the filter.
GasTOPS Wear Particle Monitor

The GasTOPS wear particle monitor installation is conventionally located upstream of the gear oil
pump as shown in Figure 4. However, there is no indication in the records or the data that the
monitor was detecting and/or sending particle warnings to the SCADA system or to Portsmouth. The
O&M service provider should have been aware of this monitor and should have been monitoring the
signal. Some installations of GasTOPS monitors require logging into a website published by the
data collector, or data monitoring directly by GasTOPS. This piece of equipment has a proven track
record of failure detection, and could have been extremely valuable in early detection of a gearbox
failure in progress. While the GasTOPS system could not have prevented a gearbox failure, early
detection could have provided sufficient warning for pro-‐active investigation potentially leading to
far less internal gearbox damage and possibly an extended operation at reduced power until a
replacement gearbox could be secured.
8

Figure 4 -‐ GasTOPS Wear Particle Monitor
Vibration S witch
The vibration switch is installed in the turbine protection system to detect large vibrations in the
nacelle that could lead to significant damage to the turbine. Due to the acceptable visual condition
and positioning of the switch, undetected, extremely high vibration leading to gearbox failure is
ruled out as a potential influence in gearbox failure.

Figure 5 -‐ Vibration Switch
Turbine Siting
Most wind farms are installed subsequent to a wind resource assessment and site suitability
analysis. Site selection was based upon a report titled Town of Portsmouth, RI Wind Resource and
Economic Assessment prepared in 2007 by Advanced Technology and Management (ATM). The
report was summarized by the Portsmouth Economic Development Council (PEDC) report Wind
Project for the High School and Middle School -‐ A Feasibility Study. According to the Portsmouth
Economic Development Council (PEDC), ATM provided ǲa detailed wind resource analysis, a
detailed energy use analysis, an electrical interconnection assessment, and a financial analysisǳ
the final site (the High School). ǡǲWithin the scope of
9
ǯǡment of a wind turbine

Ǥǳ
Figure 7 shows the physical location of the turbine relative to its surrounds.

Figure 6 -‐ Site of Portsmouth Turbine
While they were not considered fatal flaws for a site evaluation, two noticeable features stand out
that cannot be ruled out as potential causes of wind shear and subsequent asymmetrical rotor
loading.
A water tower, shown in Figure 7, is located within 600 feet North of the turbine base. The lower
arc of the rotor is 27.5 meters (90 ft.) above the ground. The height of the tower is 46 feet. Tower
waking can most likely be ruled out as a contributing factor to gearbox failure.

Figure 7 -‐ Water Tank Near Turbine
A freeway cut with a steep embankment is located approximately 600 ft to the Northwest of the
turbine. The cut may induce wind shear into the rotor during inflow angles perpendicular to the
cut.
10


Figure 8 -‐ Highway 24 cut Northwest of Turbine
The ATM report does not provide a wind direction frequency (Wind Rose). In the course of future
wind turbine operation, additional wind resource assessment of the site should be performed to
investigate shear influences on the turbine, and to determine the need for curtailment in the event
the geography adversely affects rotor loading.
GEARBOX INSPECTION
A detailed gearbox inspection report is provided in Appendix A . This section summarizes the
findings.

Figure 9 -‐ Gearbox Data Plate
The gearbox is a three-‐stage planetary design with two planetary and one parallel stage which is
offset to the right looking towards the rotor. In total, there are twelve gears and twenty-‐two
bearings producing an increase ratio of 120:1 to convert the 17 RPM speed of the rotor to the
nominal generator speed of 2000 RPM. The oil capacity of the gearbox is 685 liters (181 gallon).
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the internal arrangements.
11


Figure 10 -‐ Gearbox Internal Configuration

Figure 11 -‐ Gearbox Section Drawing
External Inspection
The external inspection did not reveal any damaged, loose or missing structural components. Oil
leaks were noted at the output shaft seal, and oil residue is evident as far away as the yaw deck.
The seal is partially dislodged from the shaft as shown in Figure 12. According to the service
technician, the seals slip out of their seats despite repeated reseating.
12


Figure 12 -‐ Output Shaft Seal
The gearbox housing has a radial pattern of unused holes. This appears to be by design, and
perhaps the holes are used in a different installation configuration, such as a different turbine make.
Examination of the mounting configuration revealed the gearbox is held in the housing using a
clamping arrangement rather than the through-‐holes on the casing. The flange appears to be solid,
and there is no possibility of fretting or breathing of the structure within the flange that would be
associated with mating flanges.

Figure 13 -‐ Gearbox Housing Flange Holes
Internal Inspection
The gearbox internal components that could be inspected without draining oil were viewed with a
GE XLGo+ borescope with a 6.1mm insertion tube with no lens or a 120 deg, standard focus tip for
close-‐in imaging. Inspection access was limited to one access cover on top of the second planetary
stage, and the desiccant breather fitting on the nose casing.
The inspection revealed severe abrasion and deformation of the first stage planetary ring gear and
severe Hertzian fatigue and debris damage to second stage planetary ring gear. The ring gears are
the largest gears in the gearbox. Failure of either gear requires removal of the gearbox from the
turbine. It is possible the damage observed is a secondary failure mode, with the primary failure
13

mode a planet bearing failure. The appearance of the damage on the ring gear indicates extreme
structural deformation of the housing due to overload, or cocking of one or more planet gears after
complete failure of a planet bearing or bearings.

Figure 14 -‐ First Planetary Stage Ring Gear Damage
The second stage ring gear appears to have Hertzian fatigue damage as indicated by macropitting
and spalling in the lower portion of the tooth flank. The teeth also show significant debris damage
from hard particles entrained in the gear mesh.

Figure 15 -‐ Second Planetary Stage Ring Gear Damage
The gearbox is not serviceable in this condition, and further operation of the turbine is not
recommended due to the certainty of additional d amage to the gearbox and risk of gearbox housing
structural failure.
14

Typical causes of premature bearing failure in wind turbines are due to poor lubrication or uneven
load distribution. A forensic teardown of the gearbox will provide a much greater opportunity to
investigate the primary failure mode of the gearbox.
SCADA DATA COLLECTION

Several days of 10 minute data in 2012, and an error list since October 2011 were reviewed.
Error List
͸͸͸ǡǲ ǳǡ indicates low
oil pressure after the pump is switched to high speed (for better cooling). This error causes the
turbine to shut down using Fast Stop mode (no mechanical brake).

Figure 16 -‐ Top Faults by Frequency
A time trace of fault 666 shown in Figure 17 indicates faults occurring as early as October, but
significantly increasing in February, 2012. Service records and the service provider (Solaya) report
titled Portsmouth Rhode Island Wind Turbine Maintenance Gearbox Analysis (undated, unsigned)
indicate technicians suspected and searched for a faulty sensor, ultimately finding significant metal
in the gear oil filter clogging indicator. The filter housing was cleaned, the sensor changed, and the
fault frequency decreased in late May 2012. It peaked again in early June. In all likelihood, the 666
fault increase was due to large amounts of metal in the gear oil pump and filter housing, resulting in
a restricted supply pressure downstream of the pump.
15


Figure 17 -‐666, 548, 824, and 536 Fault History
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show a high incidence of error 824, which is a yaw nuisance fault, and has
no bearing on the gearbox failure. However, it does prevent the turbine from yawing into the
prevailing wind during the extended downtime associated with the gearbox failure. The yaw fault
should be corrected in order to limit blade flapwise loading, which could cause blade damage in
high winds.
ͷͶͺǡǲ-‐Ͷǳǡǡaning the high-‐speed

mechanical brake is applied as well as a fast pitching of the blades. If the generator is turning at
high speed when this fault occurs, application of the mechanical brake against the interia of the
rotor could result in significant internal loads in the gearbox. At least nine events were recorded
between October 3, 2011 and May 9, 2012. An initial investigation of the 10 minute data indicates
most occurances happened at low speed in low wind. Additionally, the most likely damage from a
high-‐speed brake engagement is to the high speed gear mesh, and the high speed gears do not show
signs of overload.
10-‐Minute SCADA
This section is limited to a review of eight days of data with at least one hour of winds 6 m/s or
higher.
Key tags indicating gearbox health were reviewed for days operating at or near rated power in the
provided data set with wind speeds in excess of 12 m/s, were December 11, 2011 and March 27,
2012 only data to date, with the following results:
x Gearbox bearing temperature average rose from 69.8 °C to 81.5°C
x Gearbox oil temperature average rose from 69.3 °C t o 71.6 °C
x Ambient temperatures for December 11 were 15 °C and March 27 near 0°C
In a trend analysis of eight days of data with power output greater than 350 kW, gearbox bearing
temperature was providing predictive data indicating gearbox health issues as early as January,
well in advance of the severe failure finally noted in May and June.
16


Figure 18 -‐ Gearbox Bearing & Oil Tempterature Trend
Turbine operating conditions affecting drivetrain loads could include yaw error, or the difference
between the nacelle direction and the prevailing wind. A review of several days of data indicates
yaw error rarely exceeds 6 degrees. In addition, there is no clear correlation of increased tower
vibration or drivetrain swinging error that correlates with yaw error in the limited data set. It is
unlikely that the frequency of operation at yaw errors of less than 10 degrees introduce loads that
exceed the design load spectrum.
GENERATOR ALIGNMENT CHECK

A severely misaligned high-‐speed shaft could potentially input bending loads into the gearbox
output shaft, causing high gear and bearing loading. A generator alignment check was performed
by a technician from a different wind site hired by the service provider using an Easy Laser
alignment tool. DAR witnessed the alignment process. Three sequential measurements were taken
during light wind conditions, and it was determined by the technician that the shaft was within
alignment tolerances.
SERVICE RECORD REVIEW

Service records for the turbine include turbine logbook entries, work orders, oil analysis reports,
and special reports. It is apparent from the records reviewed that the turbine received frequent
troubleshooting and support from May 2009 through May 2010. From that point on, records are
much less frequent. The latest service provider, Lumus Construction, spent a large amount of time
troubleshooting 666 and 824 error codes. The (Solaya) report titled Portsmouth Rhode Island Wind
Turbine Maintenance Gearbox Analysis indicates scheduled maintenance was provided in the Fall of
2011, and more frequent troubleshooting began in February 2012. Oil analysis reports for June 21,
2011 and May 17, 2012 indicate a significant change in ferrous content, per the PQ Index, and a
drop in oil viscosity. There should have been a sample report from Fall 2011, which could have
indicated an increase in PQ Index well in advance of the severe failure events.
Logbook entries show repeated events of error 526, Gearbox Oil Filter at High Speed. This error
cannot be found in the current error listing, but it may relate to the 666 errors observed throughout
late 2011 and 2012. If so,
17

An emergency stop at 5 m/s was conducted for training purposes on September 10, 2009. This
stop activates the high speed brake and fast pitches the rotor. At 5 m/s the generator is rotating at
approximately 1250 RPM. The likelihood that this event resulted in gearbox damage is low.
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
In order to determine the profitability of continued turbine operation subsequent to a gearbox
replacement, two scenarios are considered, a three-‐year and a ten-‐year gearbox life. The three-‐year
life estimate assumes a larger maintenance reserve based upon current replacement costs divided
by three years. The ten-‐year estimate divides replacement costs by 10 years. Based upon the high
potential for curtailment of future operations to protect the gearbox under potentially damaging
conditions, and to protect the surrounds from potential ice throw, an availability estimate of 92% is
used. No additional major corrective events are factored in. At current power purchase prices,
annual revenue estimate of $160,000 is grossly insufficient to cover the costs of operation in either
case.
18

Table 2 Ȃ Income (Loss) Estimate, 3 and 10 year Gearbox Life
Gearbox Replacement Costs

One-‐time costs (for life of replacement gearbox)
Gearbox (2) $203,000
Removal and Installation $407,000
7 days Crane stand-‐by time estimate during swap-‐out of some gearbox parts to
new gearbox (2 days = $1,150) $32,200
Shipping of (2) gearboxes from Germany $30,000
shipping gearbox to West Virginia and back $4,000 ??
JaKe technicians and or support during commissioning (note: $43,400 already
included in Lumus quotation SDOC 6965) $0
Technical tear down of failed gearbox (2-‐3 days) with Gary Duke to witness $6,000
Vibration System plus installation $8,000
CCJ Off-‐line filtration plus installation (or increased capacity Hydac on-‐line filter) $5,000
Subtotal, gearbox replacement cost (non-‐recurring) $695,200
Recurring additional costs (annual)

Vibration monitoring (with integrated GasTOPS wear particle monitoring) $1,200
Borescope inspection (includes scope rental) $1,300
Oil filtration $500
Lost production for curtailment (reduced power, ice, water tower sector mgmt
Indoor storage of spare Gearbox with monthly rotation $3,600
Independent Engineering Support (i.e., DNV or GL Project monitoring) $8,000
Subtotal, recurring additional annual costs $14,600
Annual Revenue Estimate

Income
Rated Power 1.5 MW
Capacity Factor 22%
Availability Estimate (includes curtailment such as reduced power, ice, water tower
sector mgmt) 92%
Production Hours 1773 h
Gross Annual Energy Production 2660 MWh
Energy Consumption (rough estimate from 10 minute SCADA using 7.2 kWh avg
consumption per day) -‐2.63 MWh
Net Annual Energy Production 2662 MWh
Power Purchase Price $60 $/MWh
Renewable Energy Credit $0 $/MWh
Annual Production Revenue $159,730
10 Yr. Gbx 3 Yr. Gbx

Operating Cost Life Life
O&M Service Contract (sched maint. & light correctives) $40,000 $40,000
Unschedule Maintenance Reserve ($10/kWh) $49,220 $164,067
Additional Gearbox recurring O&M costs $14,600 $14,600
Initial Loan Payment (10 yr., $3.1mil, 4%, Principal + Interest) $372,000 $372,000
2nd Gearbox Loan Payment (10 yr, $700,000, 4%, P+I) $85,200 $85,200
Depreciation ? ?
Major Component Failure Insurance ? ?
Total Annual Operating Cost $561,020 $675,867
Net Revenue ($401,290) ($516,137)

19

OTHER OBSERVATIONS
ICE THROW
The initial site assessment did not adequately address the potential for ice throw, which presents a
significant risk to inhabited areas surrounding the turbine.
ǡǲ

and Ice Throw Ȃ ǳǡ Ǥ This recommendation takes
into consideration the ice thrown from the blades as a result of rotation.
The recommended ice throw calculation, 1.5 * (hub height + rotor diameter), indicates a minimum
safe distance of 213 meters (699 feet). Per Figure 6, Highway 24, portions of the High School and
several houses fall within this distance.
BLADES
The LM 34.5 blades are identical to blades used on other 1.5 MW wind turbines, which have had a
history of manufacturing defects and remediation for limited portions of the production run
approximately around the time the Portsmouth blades were manufactured. Portsmouth should
contact LM as soon as practical for a blade inspection and serial number check against blade serial
numbers with known manufacturing errors.
YAW ERRORS
The 824 yaw fault should be corrected immediately in order to allow the turbine to align with the
wind. High winds acting on the blades in a flapwise direction could result in blade structural
damage. In discussions with Windland technicians, the fault frequency can be reduced significantly
by increasing yaw pad pressure on the slewing ring until Yaw Power is 5-‐6 kW (or exceeds the
alarm threshold in the controller software). One other operator, Templeton Municipal Light and
Water, reports AMSC changed the parameter settings in the software.
CONCLUSION
The following conclusions should be taken into consideration during discussions involving
continued operation of the turbine:
1. The AAER 1500/77-‐65m turbine is an orphan turbine with very few operating in North
America, limited engineering and spares support, and a history of gearbox failures (3 of 5
installed).
2. The AAER 1500/77-‐65m design never received certification by any recognized certification
organization, though similar designs licensed from AMSC/Windtec have been certified by
GL and DNV.
20

3. The gearbox design may be defective, specifically having insufficient structural stiffness
resulting in uneven 1st stage planet bearing load distribution and premature failure, or
having defective bearings.
4. A similar make and model turbines based upon the AMSC Windtec design, the Fuhrländer in
Princeton, NJ, has had a similar gearbox failure, though the gear ratios are slightly different.
5. Subsequent similar turbine models licensed by AMSC Windtec, the AMSC wt1650df and the
Hyundai HQ 1650 appear to have nearly identical nacelles, but may incorporate an
improved gearbox. Retrofit options should be considered. Attempts to obtain confirmation
of compatibility via AMSC Windtec or Hyundai to date have been difficult.
6. Based upon a preliminary profit/loss estimate, it does not appear the turbine can be
operated profitably, even if the gearbox is replaced and operates without failure for at least
10 years. A detailed 10-‐15 year pro forma with anticipated operating costs, debt servicing,
revenues, energy credits, maintenance reserves, and insurance should be developed with
assistance from a recognized authority such as DNV-‐Kema or GL Garrad Hassan.
7. Due to limited service experience in the region, a collaborative users group should be
developed. Potential collaborators are Windland (operates 3 AAER 1500 in California),
Templeton Municipal, and Princeton.
8. A procedure to prevent operation of the turbine with ice on the blades should be
implemented, and a study of anticipated loss of energy production due to curtailment
should be commissioned.
9. The blades should be inspected by LM Glasfiber, and specifically checked for manufacturing
defects by serial number.
10. In the absence of a highly experience service provider, an Independent Engineer with
intimate knowledge of wind project operations should be contracted to perform annual
project monitoring.
11. The GasTOPS wear particle monitor should be returned to service. This monitor will
provide sufficient advance warning of a similar failure to plan for repair or replacement at
lower cost and less downtime than the current event.
12. A 24/7 vibration monitoring system should be installed. Bachmann Electronics is highly
recommended for the turbine due to the Bachmann controller used in the turbine.
13. Turbine SCADA gearbox bearing temperature should be more closely monitored for
opportunities to obtain advance warning of bearing failure.
14. The blade pitch system calibration should be verified by a qualified technician, and existing
offsets should be recorded to determine whether the blade pitch is properly set. Incorrect
calibration may have been a contributing factor to gearbox failure.
15. Portsmouth should enroll in the free National Renewable Energy Collaborative (NREL)
Reliability Collaborative to keep up to date on most pressing reliability issues, learn
methods to improve reliability, and network with other owners.
21

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DARoberts, LLC

GEARBOX FAILURE INVESTIGATION

Report Number: DAR-­‐EN-­‐20120926

For: Portsmouth, Rhode Island

Revision Description Date By

ø Final Release 27 September 2012

A Additional Information 14 October 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

x Failure to monitor GasTOPS wear particle monitor data

FINAL SCOPE OF WORK

SCADA DATA REVIEW

GENERATOR ALIGNMENT CHECK

SERVICE RECORD REVIEW

ITEMS REMOVED FROM PRELIMINARY SCOPE OF WORK

Blade pitch s ettings

Table 1 -­‐ Pitch Index Check

2 -­‐2.7 .4 left (CW rotation) of mark + .15 Up right looking

1. Blade attach bolts

Lightning Protection System

Gearbox Lubrication and Filtration System

GasTOPS Wear Particle Monitor

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SCADA DATA COLLECTION

ͷͶͺǡǲ-­‐Ͷǳǡǡaning the high-­‐speed

GENERATOR ALIGNMENT CHECK

SERVICE RECORD REVIEW

Table 2 Ȃ Income (Loss) Estimate, 3 and 10 year Gearbox Life

Gearbox Replacement Costs

Recurring additional costs (annual)

Annual Revenue Estimate

10 Yr. Gbx 3 Yr. Gbx

Net Revenue ($401,290) ($516,137)

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Report Number: DAR-‐EN-‐20120926

Table 1 -‐ Pitch Index Check

2 -‐2.7 .4 left (CW rotation) of mark + .15 Up right looking

ǯǡment of a wind turbine

ͷͶͺǡǲ-‐Ͷǳǡǡaning the high-‐speed

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