japan russia and their-territorial-dispute-2016

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Japan, Russia and their Territorial

Dispute
The territorial dispute between Japan and Russia over four islands off the north-
east coast of Hokkaidō has been an enduring obstacle to closer relations between
the two powers and therefore an important determinant of geopolitics in North-
East Asia. Having emerged at the end of World War II, this conflict has now
existed for more than seven decades. And yet, despite the passage of so much time,
within Japan there remains a resilience of belief that the islands will eventually
be returned.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s prospects of ever
recovering these “Northern Territories.” It offers an in-depth account of why the
Japanese side believe they still have a chance of securing the return of the four
islands, whilst providing an objective and methodical evaluation of the prospects
of these expectations being realised. The key finding is that Japanese policymakers
and scholars have consistently overestimated the extent of Japan’s leverage with
regard to Russia, and that there is, in fact, already no possibility whatsoever of
sovereignty over the four islands being restored to Japan. This has major implica-
tions for Japanese decision makers who must balance their principled commit-
ment not to compromise on territorial issues with more pragmatic considerations
of energy security and how to contain the rise of Chinese regional power.
Presenting a unique analysis and a strikingly different perspective on this
territorial dispute, the findings of this book are of considerable importance for inter-
national relations within the Asia-Pacific region. It will be of interest to students
and scholars of Japanese Politics, Russian Politics and International Relations.
James D. J. Brown is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Temple University,

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Edited by Kristina Iwata- Territorial Dispute
Weickgenannt and Roman The northern delusion
Rosenbaum James D. J. Brown
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Japan, Russia and their
Territorial Dispute
The northern delusion
James D. J. Brown
First published 2016
by Routledge
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© 2016 James D. J. Brown
The right of James D. J. Brown to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Brown, James D.J.
Title: Japan, Russia and their territorial dispute : the northern delusion /
James D.J. Brown.
Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge
contemporary Japan series ; 62 | Includes bibliographical references
and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015036389 | ISBN 9781138194144 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781315638980 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Japan—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) | Russia
(Federation)—Foreign relations—Japan. | Kuril Islands (Russia)—
International status.
Classification: LCC DS849.R7 B76 2016 | DDC 327.52047—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015036389
ISBN: 978-1-138-19414-4 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-63898-0 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman

by Apex CoVantage, LLC
To my wife and son


Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 History and international law 8

The claim of illegal occupation of “inherent” Japanese
territory 8
Rejection of Japan’s historical and legal arguments 13
Conclusions 27
3 Economic factors 33
The claim that economically Russia needs Japan 33
Rejection of Japan’s economic arguments 37
Conclusions 46
4 National security 52
The claim that Russia needs Japan to counter the China threat 52
Rejection of Japan’s security arguments 61
Conclusions 74
5 Social considerations and public opinion 80

The claim that Japan can depend on public support for
the return of the islands 80
Rejection of Japan’s arguments about social considerations
and public opinion 86
Conclusions 102
6 The northern delusion 107

Impossibility of the demands for the return of four islands 107
Source of the delusion 113
Conclusions 135
xii Contents
7 Conclusion 142
The value of two 144
Is a two-island deal still possible? 147
Can a two-island deal be successfully sold to the Japanese
people? 154
Index 159
Map 1 The Kuril Island Chain and Disputed Islands

Source: CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University

1 Introduction
The territorial dispute between Japan and Russia reached its 70th anniversary
in August 2015. A major impediment to bilateral relations, this continuing con-
flict has prevented the signing of a peace treaty between the neighbouring pow-
ers. This long-standing situation has significant costs for both sides and has been
acknowledged by the countries’ leaders to be “abnormal” (Khimshiashvili 2013).
The disagreement relates to several islands off the northeast coast of Japan’s
Hokkaidō, where the Sea of Okhotsk meets the North Pacific. There are three
main islands, which are known as Iturup, Kunashir, and Shikotan in Russian, and
Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan in Japanese. There is also a small group of islets,
known to both sides as Habomai. For simplicity, this latter archipelago is custom-
arily referred to as a single island, making it a four-island dispute.
While the islands are not vast in size, nor are they insignificant. Iturup/Etorofu
is 3,139 km2, Kunashir/Kunashiri 1,500 km2, Shikotan 255 km2, and the Habomai
chain 102 km2 (Lee 2001: 2). In terms of total landmass, this makes the islands
more than twice the size of all of Okinawa Prefecture and around 700 times the
size of the Senkaku Islands. Collectively known as the Southern Kurils in Rus-
sian and the Northern Territories in Japanese, the four islands have a population
of approximately 16,500 (Argumenty Nedeli 2014).1 They also feature several
volcanoes, a number of waterfalls, and hot springs. The surrounding waters are
rich fishing grounds.
The exact history of the dispute is a matter of significant contention and will
be discussed further in Chapter 2. In basic, uncontroversial terms, however, the
islands passed from the control of Japan to that of the Soviet Union in 1945. In
1956, on the occasion of the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations, Moscow
officially stated that it was willing to transfer the two smaller islands to Japan fol-
lowing the conclusion of a peace treaty. As confirmed by Vladimir Putin in 2000
and again in 2012, this remains Moscow’s position (Soejima and Komaki 2012).
Japanese leaders, however, have consistently refused to accept this offer, draw-
ing attention to the fact that Shikotan and Habomai represent only 7 percent of
the disputed territory (Prime Minister Noda cited in Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2012).
Despite the passage of much time and considerable diplomatic effort, the sides
have essentially been unable to proceed beyond this impasse.
2 Introduction
Although there has been little substantive progress for seventy years, many in
Japan still believe that there remains the possibility that the dispute will ultimately
be resolved in their favour. These hopes were most recently encouraged by the
marked improvement in Russian-Japanese relations that took place between 2011
and 2014 (Brown 2014). As a consequence, when it became known that Prime
Minister Abe had invited President Putin in February 2014 to make an official
visit to Japan, the media speculated that perhaps this could be the occasion when
a significant breakthrough could be achieved (Asahi Shimbun 2014). The rea-
son why the Japanese side has been able to remain so positive about its chances
of recovering the islands is because of a firm belief in the righteousness of its
position. Guided by the conviction that historically and in terms of international
law the islands are indisputably Japanese, Tokyo’s diplomatic efforts over the
years have stuck closely to the principle that all four islands must ultimately be
returned. While this has remained Japan’s consistent goal, there has been variety
in the proposed formula for achieving it.
The traditional position, which was developed during the Cold War years, is
that the four islands must be returned together, as a batch, and that only after this
may a peace treaty be signed. This policy (known as the yontō ikkatsu henkan-
ron) has been the dominant Japanese approach for the majority of the dispute. The
main alternative is the proposal that the return of the islands should be phased.
That is to say, Shikotan and Habomai would be returned first, since this is the
area of easiest agreement. Negotiations would then continue about the subsequent
status of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. This more flexible position (known as the
dankai henkan-ron) briefly came to prominence during the late 1990s and early
2000s, but is disliked by many foreign ministry officials and Japanese conserva-
tives. Tokyo’s current position is largely a reversion to yontō ikkatsu henkan-ron,
but with some added elements of compromise. Specifically, while Japan contin-
ues to insist that Russia recognise its rights to all four islands, it indicates that it
is willing to “respond flexibly to the timing and manner of their actual return”
(MOFA 2011).
The above is an extremely brief overview of the territorial dispute and of
the countries’ basic diplomatic positions. It serves to explain the nature of the
impasse – with Russia offering two islands and Japan insisting on four – but in
no way does it do justice to the full complexity of the issue. For that, readers are
advised to turn to the already extensive literature on this subject. There are several
excellent studies that chart the history of the dispute in comprehensive detail, pin-
pointing its origins and carefully cataloguing the various diplomatic manoeuvres
that have taken place over the decades (e.g. Hasegawa 1998a, 1998b). There are
also numerous works of scholarship that suggest creative means for breaking the
deadlock; indeed, John J. Stephan has identified no fewer than sixty-six (1995:
52). In addition to variations of the dankai henkan-ron (e.g. Tōgō 2013), other
imaginative proposals include the Hong Kong model, which would see the islands
fully returned to Japan after 100 years (Trenin and Weber 2012); the Åland model,
which foresees the islands becoming an autonomous demilitarised region with
dual citizenship and two official languages (Hara and Jukes 2009); and the peace
Introduction 3
park model, which advocates the creation of a jointly administered national park
spanning the disputed territory (Lambacher 2007).
The existing literature already has these aspects of the dispute well covered,
and it is not the intention here to return to this well-trodden ground. Instead, this
monograph has a much simpler and cruder purpose. Much of the thinking about
this topic is based on the belief that there is a credible possibility of the two
larger islands being returned to Japan, albeit only in the distant future (Trenin and
Weber 2012), in part (Iwashita 2005), or via the creation of some form of special
joint zone (Panov and Tōgō 2013). The suggestion is that a deal can be reached
just as long as the correct formula is identified. This is an assumption that is
rejected by this monograph. Indeed, it is argued here that such hopes are entirely
without foundation. The reality is that Russia, despite its willingness to hold
peace treaty discussions with Japan, has absolutely no intention of relinquishing
or in any way compromising its sovereignty over Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i.
What is more, Japan has no incentives it can offer, nor leverage it can apply, that
are sufficient to induce a change in Russia’s position. This is not merely some-
thing which applies to the present. Rather, for the foreseeable future there is no
set of conceivable circumstances that could lead to the resolution of the dispute
to Japan’s satisfaction.
These are bold claims and will not be popular amongst those who still long for
the day when all four islands will once again be Japanese. There are, however,
strong grounds for this unequivocal conclusion, and this evidence is presented in
detail in the four chapters that follow this introduction. These chapters each share
a similar structure. They begin by presenting a key element of the case made by
those who remain optimistic about the chances of the islands ultimately being
returned to Japan, before proceeding to explain why this argument is either flawed
or powerless to persuade Russia to make the necessary concessions.
To be specific, Chapter 2 addresses historical and legal issues. It sets out the
argument made by many on the Japanese side about the islands being “inherent”
Japanese territory and regarding the “illegal” nature of the Soviet occupation.
Such legal claims are central to the Japanese position, and it is the belief that jus-
tice is on Japan’s side and the sense of indignation at the Soviets having “stabbed
Japan in the back” (Kimura 2008: 48) that does much to animate Japan’s deter-
mination to see the islands returned. Having presented these claims, the chapter
proceeds to argue that the Japanese case is not actually as compelling as is often
thought and that it involves several instances of selective memory. Further to this,
it is explained that even if Japan were able to make a flawless case for its legal
claim to all four islands, it would make no difference to Moscow. This is because
the Russian side, despite insisting on the legality of its position, primarily con-
ceives of the islands as its own territory, not on the basis of a narrow interpretation
of legal texts, but rather due to a broader and less easily defined sense of justice
that regards the islands as Russian by right of the country’s status as a victor in
the Second World War and in partial recompense for the enormous sacrifice of
the Russian people in that conflict. This perspective, which is closely tied up with
Russia’s sense of national identity, is impervious to Japanese legal arguments.
4 Introduction
In Chapter 3, the focus is on economic arguments. Firstly, it is highlighted
that there remains a perception in Japan that Russia will eventually be forced to
come to terms over the territorial issue by powerful economic incentives. In par-
ticular, the point is often made that Russia requires substantial inflows of foreign
capital to modernise its dilapidated economy, especially in Siberia and the Far
East. This is certainly true, but it is demonstrated that this will not induce Moscow
to make territorial concessions. As this chapter explains, this is because this argu-
ment is based on an exaggerated sense of Japanese economic leverage. Russian
companies do indeed desire the financing, technology, and expertise that Japanese
businesses can provide, yet Japan is not alone as a potential source of investment.
What is more, Japanese firms have strong reasons of their own for seeking entry
to the Russian market, looking to the country for the growth opportunities it offers
and, above all, for its abundant energy resources. These incentives have already
led many large Japanese corporations to invest in Russia. The reason more have
not followed is shown to be not primarily due to the territorial dispute, but rather
because of concerns about the risky business climate. This being so, if the Russian
authorities wish to boost Japanese investment, the most rational policy would not
be to concede on the territorial issue, but rather to guarantee better legal protec-
tion of foreign investors’ property rights. Lastly, this chapter stresses the point
that if Japan could not succeed in securing the return of the islands at the time of
Soviet disintegration, when Japan’s economic strength was at its zenith and Rus-
sia’s approaching its nadir, it is difficult to envisage any future economic circum-
stances that would be sufficient to force a change in the status quo.
Having addressed these economic issues, attention in Chapter 4 turns to stra-
tegic and security questions. Here the Japanese hope is to capitalise on the idea
that Russia, despite its strategic partnership with Beijing, is deeply concerned
by China’s rise. These worries are exacerbated by the enormous demographic
imbalance across the Russian-Chinese border and the fact that swathes of Rus-
sian territory in the region were historically Chinese. This leads to fears that if
unchecked, China’s expanding power could come to represent a major threat to
the Russian Far East. The suggestion is therefore that there is a growing incen-
tive for Russia to balance with Japan against China. It is this line of thinking that
Tokyo has been seeking to encourage through the “2 + 2” talks between the Japa-
nese and Russian defence and foreign ministers that were initiated in November
2013. This argument undoubtedly has merit in the sense that Russia is indeed, at
some level, alarmed by China’s growing assertiveness and is quietly exploring
balancing options. As is explained in the chapter, however, it is wishful thinking
to believe that any expedient Russian-Japanese coordination in the security realm
could lead to a breakthrough on the territorial issue. For a start, the reality is that
Japan has more to gain from Russian support vis-à-vis China than vice versa. This
means that it is the Russians, if anyone, who have the greater ability to trade secu-
rity cooperation for political concessions. In any case, for the present, it remains
clear that Russia, despite some reservations, would still choose its relationship
with China over that with Japan. This is all the more so the case after Japan’s
decision to follow the United States in introducing sanctions against Russia in
2014. Lastly, further addressing broad geopolitical considerations, this chapter
Introduction 5
also enumerates the more pragmatic security reasons why Russia will not return
Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. Of central importance in this regard is the strategic
location of the islands at the gateway between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific
Ocean. This makes them of particular value to the Russian military, who also fear
that the islands, if returned to Japan, could be turned over to the US military.
Chapter 5 is the last of the chapters devoted primarily to explaining why Russia
will never consider returning all four of the islands. Its central focus is on social
issues and questions of public support. With regard to these considerations, the
optimistic view in Japan is that Tokyo’s campaign to hold out for the return of all
four islands has strong, nationwide support. What is more, it is anticipated that
following the territories’ restoration to Japanese sovereignty, former residents and
their descendants would return to the islands, accompanied by new settlers. As
for those currently living on the islands, it has been officially stated that “Japan
intends to respect the rights, interests and wishes of the Russian current residents”
and promised that they would not be forced to leave (MOFA 2011). As with the
preceding sections, it is found that the Japanese authorities’ hopes and policy
suggestions in this area are completely unrealistic. To begin with, the chapter
draws attention to evidence indicating that Tokyo exaggerates the extent of public
support for its yontō ikkatsu henkan policy and underestimates Russian public
opposition. In addition, with few of the original residents still alive and rural
Japan generally in a state of serious depopulation, the question is raised of how
many Japanese would actually go to live on these remote, fog-bound islands.
Lastly, it is argued that Tokyo’s position with regard to the current residents is not
well thought through. The notion that the local community could be persuaded
to embrace the transfer of sovereignty in return for the promise of higher living
standards completely fails to take account of the strength of Russian nationalism.
Additionally, it is highlighted that the proposal that the Russian residents could
remain on the islands under Japanese rule is deeply problematic, not least because
of Japan’s troubled history of dealing with minorities and Moscow’s self-ascribed
responsibility for upholding the rights of Russian speakers abroad.
Having demonstrated beyond doubt in Chapters 2 to 5 that Russia has no incli-
nation and few incentives to return the four islands, Chapter 6 turns to a different
question. Specifically, it asks why it is that despite an abundance of evidence to
the contrary, there remains a significant degree of optimism within Japan about
the prospects of recovering more than two islands and a strong aversion within
governing circles to accepting a more realistic solution. In seeking to answer this
question, this chapter considers a range of different explanations. To begin with, it
assesses the possibility that the Japanese authorities are fully aware of the fact that
Russia will never return the four islands but that they find it expedient to maintain
this pretence. Although given careful consideration, this argument is ultimately
dismissed because there are few electoral gains to be found in adopting such a
stance and because unrealistic assessments of the prospects of resolving the dis-
pute are shared far beyond the country’s ruling elite. The suggestion is therefore
that there is, in fact, a much broader misperception within Japan with regard to
this particular issue. Several further explanations are put forward to explain the
pervasiveness of this false belief. These include the prevalence of the mistaken
6 Introduction
view that Japan has been very close to achieving a breakthrough in the past. Also
mentioned is the likelihood that Russia deliberately misleads Japan on this issue,
finding it beneficial to periodically encourage Japanese leaders to believe that an
attractive deal is still possible. Separately, attention is given to the influence of
institutional factors within Japan, above all the dogmatic conservatism of Japan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last of all, some reflections are offered on the pro-
posal that there may be some subconscious benefit to Japan of retaining the ter-
ritorial dispute with Russia as a source of grievance with which to feed a wider
sense of national victimhood.

Finally, with these tasks complete, the concluding chapter summarises the key
points and suggests a viable solution to the islands problem. This proposal falls
well short of resolving the dispute to the full satisfaction of Tokyo and is there-
fore certain to be displeasing to many. The plan does, however, have the merit of
being deliverable and would result in the return of some territory to the people of
Japan. Although still possible at present, this compromise solution is likely to be
available for only the next few years. This being so, the book finishes by urging
Japanese policymakers to be bold and to take action to recover some territory
before it is too late.
Before proceeding to elaborate on the above arguments, one further point needs
to be made. This is to emphasise that in all of this, it is not my intention to make
a normative argument about who should possess the islands. Instead, my interest
is merely to evaluate objectively whether there is actually a realistic chance of
Japan’s current policy being successful. My conclusion is that there is not. It may
well be that some in Japan are willing to accept this reality and yet still remain
committed to the present course, preferring not to compromise on a point of prin-
ciple despite recognising that it will not result in the return of any territory. This
is a comprehensible position, though it comes at significant costs. What makes
less sense, however, is to persist in the belief that this uncompromising stance
actually has a genuine chance of success. Such false hope, held fervently in spite
of all evidence to the contrary, is simply a distracting delusion.2 Its persistence is
a serious obstacle to progress in bilateral relations, and if Japan wishes to see any
of the islands ever returned, it needs to be abandoned.
Notes
1 Although it is common to refer to all four islands as the Southern Kurils in Russian, offi-
cially only Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai are located within the Southern Kuril Dis-
trict of Sakhalin Province. Iturup is administered as part of the separate Kuril District.
2 There are several definitions of delusion but it is used here in its most straightforward sense,
i.e. “Delusions are incorrigible false beliefs” (quoted in Butler and Braff 1991: 634).
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over the Kurile Islands,” Boundary and Territory Briefing, 3(6): 1–55.
MOFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan] (2011) “Northern Territories Issue,” www.
mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html, accessed 20/08/14.
Nihon Keizai Shinbun (2012) “Shushō ’2-jima henkan, menseki 7-pāsento de hikiwake ni
naranai’ [PM: ‘The return of two islands, with an area of 7%, would not be a draw’],”
8 March.
Panov, Aleksandr and Tōgō, Kazuhiko (2013) “Kart-Blansh. Otsutstvie mirnogo dogovora –
nenormal’naya situatsiya [Carte blanche: The absence of a peace treaty is an abnormal situ-
ation],” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 July.
Soejima, Hideki and Komaki, Akiyoshi (2012) “Putin proposes starting over in negotia-
tions over Northern Territories,” Asahi Shimbun, 2 March.
Stephan, John J. (1995) “On the historiographical frontier,” ch. 5 in Goodby, James S.,
Ivanov, Vladimir I., and Shimotomai, N. (eds.) “Northern Territories” and Beyond:
Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger).
Tōgō, Kazuhiko (2013) Rekishi Ninshiki o Toinaosu: Yasukuni, Ianfu, Ryōdomondai
[Requestioning Historical Understanding: Yasukuni, Comfort Women, Territorial Prob-
lems] (Tokyo: Kadokawa).
Trenin, Dmitri and Weber, Yuval (2012) Russia’s Pacific Future: Solving the South Kuril
Islands Dispute (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center).
2 History and international law
The claim of illegal occupation of “inherent” Japanese territory

A highly significant factor in Japan’s determination to have the disputed territory
returned is the firm conviction that the islands are unquestionably Japanese by
right. Certainly, this discourages any compromise, for how can one countenance
permanently renouncing territory that one knows to be the nation’s legitimate
patrimony? This is a point made by Tanba Minoru, a prominent former diplo-
mat, who forcefully asserts: “For a state, its territorial land, waters and airspace
are central to its existence, namely they are the foundation of its existence, and
they are the root of national pride. If you thoughtlessly alter it, you will stain the
honour of the state” (2011: 166). Confidence about the righteousness of Japan’s
position also promotes optimism that given the clarity of the case, justice must
eventually prevail. Given these circumstances, “Japan should present itself as
slow and careful, unflustered, levelheaded and unwilling to give up. Now is the
time for patience and endurance” (Tanba 2011: 166).
Japan’s confident assertion of its rights to the islands is based on two intercon-
nected foundations. This can be seen from the words of Japan’s Minister for Oki-
nawa and Northern Territories Affairs, who, using a standard formulation, states
that “these islands are 100% Japanese territory both historically and according to
international law” (Yamamoto Ichita quoted in NHK 2014). Taking the historical
argument first, the Japanese government declares in unequivocal terms that
“[t]he Northern Territories are inherent territories of Japan” (MOFA 2011). In the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s (MOFA) Japanese-language documents, the term
koyū is used for “inherent” (MOFA 2014). This carries the sense of reinforced
possession or exclusive belonging. This is considered an accurate description of
Japan’s claim to the disputed territory, since “Japan discovered and surveyed the
Four Northern Islands before the Russians arrived there” (MOFA 2011). Further-
more, subsequent to becoming Japanese, “Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the
Habomai group, which constitute the Four Northern Islands, not once became the
territory of another country” (MOFA 2014).
While Japan’s historical claim to the islands is therefore very straightforward,
the legal argument is rather more complex. It begins with the first international
agreement signed between the two countries. This was the Treaty of Shimoda
History and international law 9
of 1855. Prior to this date, the Russians had already attempted to establish offi-
cial relations by means of the Laxman and Rezanov expeditions of 1792 and
1804, respectively. However, in accordance with Japan’s contemporary policy of
sakoku (isolation), these efforts were rebuffed (Kimura 2008: 13–4). It was only
after Japan was compelled to sign the Treaty of Peace and Amity with the United
States in 1854 that the door was opened for the Russians to do similarly. The
Treaty of Shimoda established diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia,
authorised bilateral trade via three Japanese ports, and, crucially, demarcated the
border between the islands of Urup and Iturup/Etorofu. This placed all of the
now-disputed islands within Japanese territory (Hasegawa 1998a: 24–5). In high-
lighting the significance of this treaty, the current Japanese authorities are keen
to stress that the agreement merely “confirmed the already established natural
boundaries”. They also underline that it was “concluded in a completely friendly
and peaceful manner” (MOFA 2011). Subsequent to this agreement, there were
alterations to the border prior to 1945. Specifically, in 1875 the two sides agreed
to a land swap whereby Sakhalin, over which sovereignty had previously been
shared, became exclusively Russian, and the entire Kuril chain, right up to the
Kamchatka Peninsula, became Japanese. Matters shifted again in 1905 when, fol-
lowing victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan took the southern half of Sakha-
lin (Kimura 2008: 31–5). None of these changes, however, altered the fact that
the original border was that which was freely established by the parties in 1855. It
is for this reason that the Japanese side places so much significance on the Treaty
of Shimoda. Indeed, Japan’s Day of the Northern Territories, the day selected for
raising annual awareness of the territorial dispute, is 7 February, the date on which
this initial agreement was signed.
It was in spite of this historical settlement that the islands of Iturup/Etorofu,
Kunashir/i, Shikotan, and Habomai were seized from Japan in 1945, during the
final days of World War II. Throughout almost the entirety of this conflict, Japan
and the Soviet Union had not been at war with each other. Indeed, in April 1941,
Moscow and Tokyo had signed a neutrality pact. This had explicitly committed
the parties to the following:
1 Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly

relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and
inviolability of the other Contracting Party.
2 Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on
the part of one or several third powers, the other Contracting Party will
observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.
3 The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both
Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of
the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expira-
tion of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the
next five years.
(Pact of Neutrality Between the USSR and Japan 1941)
The terms of this agreement could not have been any clearer, and yet, on 8 August
1945, just two days after the atomic-bomb attack on Hiroshima and less than a
week before the announcement of Japan’s final capitulation, the Soviet Union
violated the Neutrality Treaty and entered the war against Japan.
This Soviet action is viewed in Japan as great treachery. To make matters
worse, just prior to the Soviet attack, Japan had been seeking Moscow’s assistance
to mediate an end to the conflict. The Soviets never had any intention of fulfilling
such a role, yet, instead of refusing directly, Moscow prevaricated, giving hope to
some in Japan that there was a means of ending the war short of unconditional sur-
render. Meanwhile, all the time that Tokyo was waiting for a response, the Soviets
were preparing for war (Lensen 1972: 147–8).
Having finally revealed their true intentions on the evening of 8 August, just a
few hours later the Soviets launched large-scale attacks on Japanese positions in
Manchuria. Seriously outnumbered, the Japanese forces were soon overwhelmed
and the Soviet advance proceeded rapidly across Northeast China and into Korea.
The assault on Sakhalin began two days later on 11 August and was also quickly
concluded. Moreover, even after Emperor Hirohito’s broadcast on 15 August
announcing his country’s willingness to accept the Potsdam Declaration, and
thus unconditional surrender, the Soviet advance continued. On 18 August Soviet
forces landed on Shumshu, at the far northern end of the Kuril chain, before grad-
ually proceeding southwards (Garthoff 1969). The occupation of the four now-
disputed islands did not begin until more than a week later. Having disembarked
on Iturup/Etorofu on 28 August, Soviet troops took Kunashir/i and Shikotan on
1 September. The occupation of the multiple Habomai islets did not commence
until 3 September, meaning that this part of the operation was conducted after
Japan had signed the official Instrument of Surrender on 2 September (Hasegawa
1998a: 67–8).
From the Japanese government’s perspective, the seizure of these last four
islands, and their subsequent incorporation into the Soviet Union on 25 Febru-
ary 1947, was undertaken “without any legal grounds” (MOFA 2011). Not only
did this action disregard the border established in the 1855 Shimoda Treaty, it
is also seen as representing a blatant violation of the Atlantic Charter. Signed
on 14 August 1941, the Atlantic Charter committed signatories to the following
principles: “First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Sec-
ond, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned” (Atlantic Charter 1941). Although
the original document was signed by only President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill, on 24 September 1941 the Soviet Union also declared its agreement
with the charter’s fundamental principles. In so doing, the Soviet representative,
Ambassador Maiskii, made the following unequivocal statement: “The Soviet
Union defends the right of every nation to the independence and territorial integ-
rity of its country” (Inter-Allied Council Statement on the Principles of the Atlan-
tic Charter 1941).
The Soviet Union is accused of similar callous indifference to international
treaty obligations with regard to the fate of Japanese soldiers taken prisoner in the
course of its August and September advances. According to Article 9 of the Pots-
dam Declaration of 26 July 1945, which defined the terms for Japan’s surrender,
“The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permit-
ted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive
lives” (National Diet Library 2003). Again, the Soviet Union was not originally
party to the Potsdam Declaration, but it adhered to it when declaring war on Japan
on 8 August 1945 (Soviet Declaration of War on Japan 1945). However, despite
the Soviet Union’s commitment, Japanese prisoners of war were not returned to
Japan immediately after the war. They were instead transported to Siberia and
Mongolia for use as forced labour. Of the 609,000 Japanese soldiers to suffer this
fate, 62,000 perished due to the harsh living and working conditions, malnutri-
tion, and disease (Kimura 2008: 52). The Soviet authorities also subjected these
POWs to ideological indoctrination in the hope that they could be used to foment
revolution when finally returned to Japan (Kuznetsov 1997).
A final injustice was inflicted on Japan by the Soviet Union in its treatment of
the residents of the four occupied islands. According to contemporary US statis-
tics, there were 16,745 Japanese inhabitants at the end of the war, 11,702 on Iturup/
Etorofu, Kunashir/Kunashiri, and Shikotan, and 5,043 on Habomai (Hasegawa
1998a: 201). On Stalin’s orders, this entire population was “forcibly deported” in
1947 and 1948, with most islanders settling on nearby Hokkaidō (MOFA 2011).
Japan’s historical and legal claim to the islands is therefore emotionally com-
pelling and features many persuasive points. One seemingly serious weakness,
however, is the fact that Japan agreed to relinquish its claim to the Kuril Islands in
the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on 8 September 1951. The relevant section
is Article 2(c):
Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that por-
tion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sov-
ereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.
(United Nations 1952: 48)
Such an explicit statement would seem to be fatal to Japan’s territorial claims

to the four islands, but the Japanese authorities raise two objections to this
interpretation.
First, the San Francisco Treaty does not specify in favour of whom the islands
were renounced. Similarly, while the treaty was signed by forty-nine countries,
including Haiti, Liberia, and Luxembourg, whose contribution to the war with
Japan was rather limited, the Soviet Union was not a signatory. This is because,
although a Soviet delegation did attend the conference, they refused to sign the
final treaty, objecting to the exclusion of the People’s Republic of China and to
Washington’s refusal to consider Soviet amendments. As specified in Article 25,
this failure to sign meant that the Soviet Union, as a non-signatory, would not
be conferred “any rights, titles or benefits” detailed in the treaty (United Nations
1952: 74). In the opinion of some commentators, this fact entails that not only
does Moscow not have territorial rights over the four disputed islands, it also
does not have an internationally recognised claim over the entire Kuril chain
(Mine 2015).
This argument might be seen to damage Russia’s legal authority over the dis-
puted territory, but it still leaves intact the issue that Japan has formally relin-
quished its rights to the Kuril Islands. To this argument, however, Japan has the
ready response that the San Francisco Treaty does not define the Kuril Islands and
that according to the Japanese authorities, Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i, as well
as Shikotan and Habomai, are not actually part of the Kuril chain. The islands are
instead said to be a geographical extension of Hokkaidō. To make this distinction

clear, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines the four islands as “the Northern
Territories” and explicitly insists that “[t]he Northern Territories are not included
in the Kurile Islands” (MOFA 2011). According to this interpretation, the Kuril
Islands renounced by Japan in the San Francisco Treaty are those extending north-
wards from Urup. In other words, Japan only relinquished its claim to the islands
it acquired under the 1875 Treaty of Saint Petersburg, and not to those granted
under the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda.
Based on all of the above arguments, Japan believes that it has an impregnable
historical and legal claim to the islands, whilst “Russia does not have any interna-
tionally legal grounds” (Foreign Minister Maehara quoted in Ito 2011). As such,
Russia is considered legally obliged to return all four of the islands to Japanese
control. This is all the more the case given that the Tokyo Declaration, which
was signed between Prime Minister Hosokawa and President Yeltsin in 1993,
specifically commits the sides to resolving the dispute “on the basis of histori-
cal and legal facts and based on the documents produced with the two countries’
agreement as well as on the principles of law and justice” (MOFA 1993). Further
supporting Tokyo’s assertions is said to be the fact that “[t]he Government of
the United States of America has also consistently supported Japan’s position”
(MOFA 2011).
Last of all, in order to understand Japan’s position, it is necessary to empha-
sise not only the narrow legal arguments, but also the strong sense of victimi-
sation that continues to be felt in relation to this issue. As noted above, there
is a widespread belief in Japan that the Soviet Union deceitfully and opportu-
nistically subjected the country to “illegal and inhumane acts whilst Japan was
already on its way to defeat” (Iwashita 2013: 42–3). The aggressive seizure of
“inherent” Japanese territory that this entailed had no legitimate justification,
and until this manifest injustice has been rectified, Tokyo cannot consent to the
signing of a final peace treaty. This is very much the attitude of Kimura Hiroshi,
who concludes his book on the territorial dispute with the following emotional
statement:
Many Japanese thus consider that Russia should return the islands as a tan-
gible display of remorse. Japanese attribute this kind of symbolic meaning to
these four small islands. Russia’s return of the four Northern Islands seized
under Generalissimo Stalin’s orders would surely prove that Russians are
normal human beings and worthy to relate to as neighbors. Anything less
will leave the impression that Japan has again been duped, and a sense of
dissatisfaction that negates any feelings of obligation or gratitude engen-
ders no desire to work toward a cooperative relationship, leaving Japanese-
Russian relations neither ‘full-blooded’ nor ‘dynamic’.
(2008: 150)
Rejection of Japan’s historical and legal arguments

Looking solely at the above arguments, one can clearly understand why so many
Japanese remain indignant about the Soviet seizure of the four islands. Moreover,
since all of the historical and legal facts seem to be unequivocally in Japan’s
favour, it appears reasonable to believe that at some point justice must prevail
and the territory will be returned to Japanese control. The problem, however, is
that the above represents just one perspective on the dispute. As the following
paragraphs demonstrate, it is possible to construct an alternative narrative that
makes Japan’s historical and legal claims seem considerably less compelling. This
contrasting perspective is the one that predominates in Russia. Firmly established
and tied up with conceptions of Russian national identity, this opposing outlook
goes a long way towards explaining why any Russian government is extremely
unlikely ever to return all four of the disputed islands.
An ill-defined buffer zone

To begin with more distant history, based on Tokyo’s claims about the Northern
Territories being “inherently” Japanese, one might be inclined to assume that the
disputed islands had been Japanese territory since time immemorial and had always
been administered in much the same way as any part of Honshū. This is not the case.
Instead, as John J. Stephan describes, due to their “remote location in a climatically
inhospitable corner of the Pacific, the Kuriles eluded discovery until comparatively
recent times” (1974: 31–2). As a result, it was not until the seventeenth century
that the islands received serious attention from any outside group, including the
Japanese. This is not to say, of course, that the islands were uninhabited. They were
rather part of the territory of the indigenous Ainu, as was Hokkaidō itself. This fact
is reflected in the internationally recognised name of the island chain, since “Kuril”
is derived from the Ainu word for “man” (Kur) (Rees 1985: 3).1
Despite the late starting point, during the 1600s the Japanese did begin to
engage more intensively with this area. The relationship, however, was not that of
centralised control but rather that of trading partners, albeit unequal ones. Japa-
nese goods were sent northwards in exchange for Ainu furs. As this trade devel-
oped, a system of Japanese trading posts (basho) was gradually established on
Hokkaidō, including one at Akkeshi after 1620 (Rees 1985: 8). In terms of politi-
cal administration, Japan’s ruling Tokugawa shogunate entrusted the Matsumae
clan with responsibility for the land of Ezo, a vaguely defined territory includ-
ing Hokkaidō, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. This did not, however, imply the
incorporation of these areas. Instead, a very conscious effort was made to keep
Ezo apart from Japanese lands and to maintain a clear division between the two
territories’ peoples. As Tsuyoshi Hasegawa describes, “[t]he Matsumae Domain
did not consider the Ainu Japanese subjects and was not even remotely interested
in extending its jurisdiction over them” (1998a: 19).
This policy of seeking to profit from these northern borderlands yet simultane-
ously keep them at arm’s length continued into the eighteenth century. Gradually,
however, the Japanese relationship with the islands did become more involved.
Moving away from the previous reliance on Ainu intermediaries, a trading post
was established on Kunashir/i in 1754. This basho is the earliest recorded Japanese
settlement on the island (Rees 1985: 9). Gaining a foothold on the more distant
Iturup/Etorofu, however, took considerably longer. Indeed, it was not until 1786
that the first Japanese undertook an official visit to the island (Hasegawa 1998a: 20;
Koshkin 2010: 23).2 Interestingly, this means that the Russians may have actually
preceded the Japanese on Iturup/Etorofu. Having reached the Sea of Okhotsk in
1639, Russian explorers had advanced to Kamchatka and the northern Kurils by the
turn of the century (Rees 1985: 7). From there, over the course of the succeeding
decades, various expeditions began to follow the island chain southwards. It was
one such mission in 1778–9 that finally landed on Iturup/Etorofu and whose mem-
bers thereupon “took the Ainu as Russian subjects” (quoted in Hasegawa 1998a:
18). As a result, when the Japanese expedition arrived in 1786, it is claimed that they
found that many of the local inhabitants could already speak Russian (Sabov 2005).
With Russia’s sphere of influence now overlapping with that of Japan, the
Tokugawa shogunate was spurred into resistance and finally imposed direct con-
trol over Ezo. As John Harrison explains, the Japanese authorities’ fear was that
failure to take action would result in “the Northern Gate of the Empire” falling
permanently into the hands of the Russians (1953: 140–1). Driven by this con-
cern, in 1798 an expedition was dispatched to the frontier area, which, as well as
conducting a more thorough survey, erected a post on Etorofu with the inscription
“Dai Nippon Etorofu” (Great Japan’s Etorofu), thereby claiming the island as
Japanese territory.3 Between 1799 and 1804, steps then followed to replace the
loose feudal authority of the Matsumae clan with direct shogunal rule. Simultane-
ously, the shogunate ordered the Tsugaru and Nanbu domains in Northern Honshū
to dispatch 500 clansmen to Kunashir/i and Iturup/Etorofu to serve as a frontier
garrison (Kimura 2008: 16). In this way, at the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the status of the islands as Japanese colonies was clearly established.
Viewed from this perspective, the historical picture looks considerably more
complex than the current Japanese authorities would have us believe. Rather than
being “inherent” Japanese territory, the four islands, and indeed Hokkaidō itself,
instead appear as part of an ill-defined buffer zone that from the seventeenth
century onwards came to be progressively squeezed between Japan and Russia
(Stephan 1995: 47). Japan did finally establish its unequivocal authority over the
area, but this was only achieved around 200 years ago and in the form of colonisa-
tion at the expense of the local Ainu. This is the understanding of the issue shared
by many Russian historians, including Anatolii Koshkin, who forcefully asserts:
And so, if the island of Hokkaidō cannot even once be described as inherent
Japanese territory, how then is it possible to speak in this way of the lands far-
ther to the north, where from time immemorial lived Ainus, Nivkhs, Orochs,
and other aborigines? The fact of the matter is that the Japanese advance onto
the Kuril Islands constituted the seizure of territory and was accompanied
by the same annihilation of local tribes that occurred in America with the
Indians.
(quoted in Sabov 2005)
Those who subscribe to this outlook therefore dismiss the claim of the islands
being primordial Japanese land. At the same time, however, this does nothing to
change the fact that a clear border was established by mutual agreement in 1855,
placing the islands under Japan’s jurisdiction.4 This matters little, though, to the
majority on the Russian side, for whom this more distant period is of no more
than academic interest. The key to understanding Russia’s uncompromising claim
to the islands from historical and legal perspectives lies in developments in the
twentieth century.
Four decades of Japanese aggression

As has been explained, in Japan the Soviet Union’s attack of 9 August 1945 is
viewed as an act of unprovoked aggression. Presented in isolation from the his-
tory of the preceding four decades, Moscow’s violation of the Neutrality Pact
looks like a sudden and opportunistic shift from relations of friendship to those
of enmity. By contrast, Russian accounts typically place the Soviet Union’s entry
into the war firmly in the context of persistently antagonistic bilateral relations
since the start of the twentieth century (e.g. Koshkin 2010). In this way, the Soviet
declaration of war appears less like a sudden betrayal and more like the inevitable
culmination of a lengthy geopolitical struggle.
To a considerable extent, the prevailing Russian narrative has its origins in Sta-
lin’s victory speech of 2 September 1945. In this address, Stalin justifies Soviet
entry into the war against Japan by presenting a history of Japanese belligerence
against both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. In his words:
Japan commenced her aggression against our country as far back as 1904,
during the Russo-Japanese War. As we know, in February 1904, when nego-
tiations between Japan and Russia were still proceeding, Japan, taking advan-
tage of the weakness of the tsarist government, suddenly and perfidiously,
without declaring war, fell upon our country and attacked the Russian fleet
in the region of Port Arthur [. . .]. It is characteristic that 37 years later Japan
played exactly the same perfidious trick against the United States when, in
1941, she attacked the United States naval base in Pearl Harbor [. . .]. As we
know, in the war against Japan, Russia was defeated. Japan took advantage of
the defeat of tsarist Russia to seize from Russia the southern part of Sakhalin
and establish herself on the Kuril Islands.
(Stalin 1946: 208)5
Further concerning this humiliation, the speech also highlights subsequent attempts
by Japan “to deprive Russia of the whole of her Far East” (Stalin 1946: 208).
Specifically, attention is drawn to the Siberian intervention of 1918 when, tak-
ing advantage of the chaos of the Russian civil war, Japanese troops “attacked
our country, occupied the Far East and for four years tormented our people and
looted the Soviet Far East” (Stalin 1946: 208–9). Likewise, it is noted that hav-
ing signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, Japan attacked again in
1938 at Lake Khasan near Vladivostok, before launching a much larger offensive
the next year “in the region of the Mongolian People’s Republic, near Halhin-
Gol [Khalkhin-Gol], with the object of breaking into Soviet territory, severing our
Siberian Railway and cutting off the Far East from Russia” (Stalin 1946: 209).
These attacks were repulsed but it is suggested that the Japanese threat remained
imminent. According to this view, it was only through Soviet participation in the
defeat of Japan in 1945 that the “black stain upon our country” left by the defeat of
1905 was finally expunged and the persistent menace “of Japanese invasion in the
East” was permanently eliminated (Stalin 1946: 209).
Mutual disregard for the Neutrality Pact

Retribution for Japan’s earlier aggression as well as defensive necessity have
therefore been used as arguments to legitimise the Soviet attack on Japan in
August 1945. However, even if one accepts these claims, this still leaves the issue
of Moscow’s violation of the Neutrality Pact. This is an inconvenient fact, not
least because of its apparent similarity to Germany’s repudiation of the Nazi-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in June 1941. As a result, Soviet accounts of the con-
flict with Japan, and their Russian successors, have tended to avoid mentioning
the pact or at least to play down its significance (e.g. Sidorchik 2014; Zubov 2011:
181–3). Such interpretations are no doubt self-serving, yet it is nonetheless true
that the Neutrality Pact was indeed never more than a temporary tactical align-
ment and that, long before its final violation, it was already abundantly clear that
the Soviet-Japanese relationship was becoming increasingly antagonistic.
As George Lensen (1972) makes clear in his detailed history of the period,
Soviet-Japanese relations between 1941 and 1945 were a time of “strange neu-
trality”. This is because, just as the wartime agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union was a “strange alliance” (Deane 1947), the Neutrality Pact
between Japan and the Soviet Union was an alignment between countries ordi-
narily thought to be natural adversaries. What made the Soviet-Japanese pact all
the more fragile was the fact that not long after its signature, each party became
engaged in war with the other’s key allies. This being so, it is little surprise that
the Neutrality Pact almost broke down in the summer of 1941, just two months
after its ratification.
When Nazi Germany launched its invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June
1941, the Soviet authorities immediately sought assurances that Japan, Germany’s
ally, would continue to abide by the provisions of the Neutrality Pact. The answer
Moscow received, however, was far from encouraging. On 23 June, Foreign Min-
ister Matsuoka informed Ambassador Smetanin that while the treaty remained
valid, Japan did not consider that it applied to the Nazi-Soviet conflict (Hasegawa
1998a: 184). What is more, the Japanese foreign minister made sure to reaffirm
his country’s allegiances by telling the Soviet diplomat that if the Soviet-Japanese
agreement came to conflict with Japan’s participation in the Tripartite Alliance
with Germany and Italy, the Neutrality Pact would be considered to “have no
force” (quoted in Kimura 2008: 49).
Much more than just a wavering in commitment, it is now known that in 1941
Japan seriously considered casting aside the Neutrality Pact entirely and joining
Germany in its attack on the Soviet Union (Hasegawa 1998a: 41; Koshkin 2015).
Such a move was requested by Berlin and had significant strategic logic. Had
Japan invaded from the east, it would have opened up a second front against the
Soviet Union at just the time when the USSR was at its most vulnerable. As it was,
Nazi forces came close to capturing Moscow in November 1941, getting within
28 kilometres of the centre. Key to Soviet success in defending the capital was the
ability to bring in reinforcements from the Siberian and Far Eastern Military Dis-
tricts (Zubov 2011: 54–7). Had these troops been tied down fighting the Japanese,
it is likely that Moscow would have fallen. Following Soviet defeat, Japan could
have satisfied its expansionist urges by seizing resource-rich territory in Siberia
and the Russian Far East, thereby succeeding where it had failed two decades
earlier. These advances in the north could have reduced Japan’s desire to press
southwards, thereby obviating the need to attack Pearl Harbor.
The exact consequences of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union are mere
speculation, but what is evident is that the Japanese authorities gave the idea seri-
ous thought. For around a week after 25 June 1941 the Japanese leadership met
every day to discuss whether or not to enter the war against the Soviet Union.
Foreign Minister Matsuoka, despite having been the one to sign the Neutrality
Pact in April, was a particular advocate of its renunciation (Hasegawa 1998a: 41;
Koshkin 2015). Ultimately, however, the decision was taken not to invade. This
was not due to a reluctance to violate a treaty agreement; indeed, as Hasegawa
describes, “Legal obligations arising from the Neutrality Pact were not seriously
considered by the Japanese government” (1998a: 41). Rather, it was a question
of timing. Key figures, including Prime Minister Konoe and War Minister Tōjō,
argued for a delay until the military situation turned even more decisively in
favour of the Germans. As Tōjō memorably put it, the attack should not take
place until “the Soviet Union is ready to fall to the ground like a ripe persimmon”
(quoted in Slavinsky 2004: 65). The final decision, taken on 2 July at a Coordinat-
ing Committee session chaired by the Emperor, was as follows:
Although our attitude to the German-Soviet war is based on the spirit of the
‘Axis’ of three powers, we shall not intervene in it at present, and shall pre-
serve an independent position, while at the same time secretly completing
preparations against the Soviet Union. If the German-Soviet war develops
in a direction favourable for the Empire, it will resolve the northern problem
and ensure the stability of the situation in the north by resorting to armed
force.
(quoted in Slavinsky 2004: 64)
Essentially then, both Japan and the Soviet Union had the same strategy: to hold
to the Neutrality Pact while it suited their interests and discard it as soon as the
other party was sufficiently weakened. Perhaps influenced by memories of the
heavy defeat at Khalkhin-Gol/Nomonhan at the hands of Soviet forces in 1939,
the Japanese side hesitated in the summer of 1941 and a similarly propitious
opportunity never presented itself again. Given their own intentions, however,
Japanese leaders can hardly have been genuinely appalled by the Soviet Union’s
actions in August 1945, not least because Moscow had renounced the Neutrality
Pact on 5 April of that year. This fact, while sometimes glossed over in Japanese
accounts, does not change the illegality of the Soviet attack, since technically,
despite renunciation, the treaty remained valid for another year. It does, however,
mean that representations of the Soviet action as a sudden and unprovoked “stab
in the back” are rather misleading (Kimura 2008: 48).
Complicity of the United States

Adding to the differences in interpretations of the violation of the Neutrality
Pact, the two sides also do not see eye-to-eye on the role of the United States.
As noted above, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that “[t]he
Government of the United States of America has also consistently supported
Japan’s position” (MOFA 2011). An alternative reading, however, finds Wash-
ington very much complicit in the Soviet annexation of the Southern Kurils/
Northern Territories.
According to the predominant Russian perspective, the United States was active
in inducing the Soviet Union to violate the Neutrality Pact and join the war against
Japan, and it used the issue of territory as the chief means to achieve this. These
efforts began as early as December 1941, when the United States issued a request
to Maksim Litvinov, the Soviet ambassador in Washington. With its resources
entirely committed to the struggle against Nazi Germany, Moscow refused, yet
the United States continued to push its case throughout the war (Lensen 1972:
258). In particular, pressure was added in November 1943 by means of the Cairo
Declaration. This document, which was agreed among the US, UK, and National-
ist China, listed the territories of which Japan would be stripped after its defeat. It
makes specific mention of “islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied
since the beginning of the first World War”, as well as “all the territories Japan
has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores”
(Cairo Communiqué 1943). It did not make any direct reference to territories
coveted by the Soviet Union, and, as revealed by a Joint Intelligence Committee
report in 1944, the US calculated that this would spur the Soviet Union to enter
the war, since failure to do so would risk the permanent loss of South Sakhalin and
all of the Kurils (cited in Hill 1995: 8–9).
It was therefore only after considerable encouragement from the United States
that the Soviet Union finally consented to enter the war against Japan. This was
settled at the Yalta Conference attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in
February 1945. The precise arrangements were set out in a secret annex to the
conference protocol. This stipulated the following:
The leaders of the three great powers – the Soviet Union, the United States of
America and Great Britain – have agreed that in two or three months after Ger-
many has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union
shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:
1 The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic)

shall be preserved.
2 The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan
in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it
shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-
eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded,
and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad,
which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the
establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being under-
stood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be
safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;
3 The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.6
(Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference 1945)
Reinforcing the binding nature of these conditions, the penultimate sentence of

the annex concludes: “The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these
claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been
defeated.”
For the Soviet side, the Yalta agreement served as the primary justification for
the seizure of Japanese territory at the conclusion of the conflict. It has been con-
tended, however, that the inclusion of the Kuril Islands in this protocol was the
result of an error by Roosevelt. This theory is based on the claims of Charles E.
Bohlen, who was part of the US delegation at Yalta. In his memoirs, Bohlen writes:
The President evidently thought that both Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles
had been seized by Japan in the 1904 war, and that Russia therefore was only
getting back territories that had been taken from her. If the President had
done his homework, or if any of us had been more familiar with Far Eastern
history, the United States might not have given the Kuriles to Stalin so easily.
(1973: 196)
This ignorance theory is given significant credence by some commentators,

including Kimura Hiroshi, who describes “Roosevelt’s blunder on this occasion
[as] a source of great sorrow for me” (2008: 45). And yet, despite Bohlen’s status
as an informed insider, there are reasons to doubt his interpretation and believe
that his perspective may have been distorted by the passage of time.
First, the transfer of territory to the Soviet Union in exchange for its entry into
the war was not an issue that suddenly surfaced at the Yalta Conference. Roosevelt
had been aware since at least December 1944 that the price for Soviet participation
included both the Kuril Islands and Southern Sakhalin (Allison et al. 1992: 87).
As such, the president had plenty of time to do “his homework” had he been at all
minded to do so. Second, the Yalta protocol is carefully worded to make a very clear
distinction between Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils. The former is included in
Article 2 and is described as a territory where Russia’s rights were “violated by the
treacherous attack of Japan in 1904”. It shall therefore “be restored” to Moscow’s
control. By contrast, the Kurils feature in Article 3, which makes no mention of the
Russo-Japanese conflict and simply states that the islands “shall be handed over to
the Soviet Union” (Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference 1945). The like-
lihood is therefore that Roosevelt was indeed aware that the Kuril Islands were not
a territory that Japan had “taken by violence and greed” (Cairo Communiqué 1943).
In any case, even if he did not, it is highly unlikely that full knowledge would have
altered his decision. The United States was engaged in intense military conflict with
Japan, and the president is known to have developed a strong animus against his
country’s adversary (Neumann 1953). Roosevelt’s priority was therefore to find the
means to defeat Japan as quickly as possible, even if this meant infringing Japan’s
sovereign rights (Gallicchio 1991: 76–7). Indeed, there are grounds to believe that
the US leader may have been willing to concede more, since he was apparently
shocked by the modesty of the Soviets’ demands (Slavinskii 1993: 37).
During the war, therefore, the US was certainly not a supporter of Japan’s posi-
tion regarding the Kuril Islands; indeed, it played an instrumental role in their
annexation. Even after the conflict, as late as 1949, State Department documents
reveal that the United States intended to honour the Yalta agreement and recognise
the permanent exclusion of the islands from Japanese territory (Hasegawa 1998a:
84–6). It was only after this point, as the Cold War intensified, that the US found
it expedient to change position and encourage doubts about the islands’ status.
This was effectively achieved by keeping the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty
deliberately vague. Unlike Article 3 of this document, which gives a detailed
geographical definition of islands placed under US trusteeship, Article 2(c) gives
no comparable description of the Kurils. Additionally, the treaty deviates from
the Yalta agreement in stating that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to
the Kurile Islands” rather than specifying to whom they would be handed over
(United Nations 1952).7 By means of these subtle manoeuvres, the United States
was able to ensure that the territorial dispute would prove enduring. This served to
impede the development of closer relations between Japan and the Soviet Union
and helped redirect Japanese anger about territorial losses away from Okinawa
and towards the north (Hasegawa 1998a: 89–90).
The US tactics worked well but briefly threatened to come undone in 1956 when
the Japanese side revealed its willingness to grant Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i
to the Soviet Union. This would have ended the territorial dispute and enabled the
signing of a peace treaty. Wishing to prevent this outcome, the United States inter-
vened decisively. In what is known as “Dulles’ intimidation”, Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles informed his Japanese counterpart that Japan had no right to
grant the islands to the Soviet Union, since it had renounced all title to them in
the San Francisco Treaty (Hasegawa 1998a: 124). What is more, Dulles warned:
“If the Soviet Union were to take all the Kuriles, the United States might remain
forever in Okinawa” (quoted in Mabon 1991: 203). This threat was sufficient to
ensure that Japan quickly changed plans, and consequently no peace treaty with
Moscow was able to be signed then or since. It is therefore not without foundation
that Russian academic Anatolii Koshkin claims that “the Americans made us and
the Japanese hostages of the tangled Kuril problem” (quoted in Sabov 2005).8
The invention of the “Northern Territories”

Many of the above criticisms of Japan’s historical and legal claims may appear
effective, but their impact would be significantly reduced if the Japanese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs is correct in claiming that all four of the islands are not,
and have never been, part of the Kuril chain (MOFA 2011). In particular, if the
“Northern Territories” are indeed a distinct entity, the troublesome fact of Japan
having renounced “all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands” in the San Fran-
cisco Peace Treaty becomes insignificant (United Nations 1952). The attempt to
define and promote the “Northern Territories” as a stand-alone entity was there-
fore a clever piece of diplomacy. It is, however, unlikely to be truly persuasive in
strengthening Japan’s case for the return of the islands, since it does not withstand
close inspection.
To begin with, those Russian commentators who actually take note of the Jap-
anese concept of the “Northern Territories” give the idea short shrift. Koshkin
condemns it as “casuistry” (quoted in Sabov 2005), while Daniil Ivanov states
that “[t]he suggestion of the Japanese that the Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashir, and
Iturup are not included in the Kuril Islands (and therefore are not subject to the
1951 agreement) corresponds neither to geographic science nor to the history of
preceding Russo-Japanese negotiations” (2012). In support of this assertion, he
refers to the original bilateral discussions that preceded the 1855 Shimoda Treaty.
In the report of these negotiations, the Japanese side is shown to speak of Iturup/
Etorofu in the context of a discussion of the status of the Kuril Islands (quoted in
Plotnikov 2007: 77). In itself, this is not exactly compelling proof, but the prob-
lematic issue for defenders of the concept of the “Northern Territories” is that this
seems to have been a consistent feature of Japanese policy. Indeed, a full century
later, the country’s leadership is still found to be referring to Iturup/Etorofu and
Kunashir/i as constituent parts of the Kuril chain.
The first piece of evidence in this regard is a speech by Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru on 7 September 1951, the final day of the San Francisco peace conference.
As quoted on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s own website, Yoshida
explicitly referred to “Etorofu and Kunashiri of the South Kuriles” (MOFA 2001).9
In Yoshida’s view, therefore, it was only the islands of Habomai and Shikotan that
constituted part of Hokkaidō.10 This was also no momentary slip. During ratifica-
tion hearings for the peace treaty in the National Diet, Nishimura Kumao, director
of the Foreign Ministry’s Treaties Bureau, was asked whether the Chishima rettō
[Kuril Island chain] cited in the treaty referred only to those islands from Urup
northwards. Nishimura denied this interpretation, confirming that the islands
named in the treaty included both the Northern and Southern Kurils (Lee 2001:
15). Similarly, in the internal negotiating instructions issued to the Japanese del-
egation in advance of the talks with the Soviet Union in 1955, the Japanese gov-
ernment is found to refer to “Habomai and Shikotan, the Kurils, and southern
Sakhalin”, thereby seeming to locate the two largest of the disputed islands within
the Kuril chain (quoted in Hasegawa 1998a: 108). Lee details numerous further
instances of Etorofu and Kunashiri being recognised within Japan as part of the
Kuril chain up until the mid-1950s (2001: 15–17). His final conclusion is that
“[t]here seems, therefore, to be no sound legal reason for claiming that Etorofu
and Kunashiri are not part of ‘the Kurile Islands,’ the term employed in the Yalta
Agreement” (2001: 20). Perhaps more surprisingly, this judgement is shared by
Tōgō Kazuhiko, who, as a MOFA official, was closely involved in Japanese nego-
tiations with Russia between 1985 and 2001. In his subsequently expressed view,
“[Japan’s] legal position is not as predominant as the government has tried to
convince the people. In the mind of negotiators at San Francisco, Kunashiri and
Etorofu were included in the Kuril Islands that Japan renounced” (Tōgō 2012: 3).
Last of all, another piece of conclusive evidence is provided by Kimie Hara, who,
in the course of her doctoral research, uncovered a booklet issued by the Japanese
Foreign Ministry in November 1946, which defines the Kuril Islands as including
Kunashiri and Etorofu, but not Habomai and Shikotan (1998: 24–30).
Given Japan’s own contemporary definitions, it is no surprise to find that dur-
ing the immediate postwar period the United States also considered at least Iturup/
Etorofu and Kunashir/i to be part of the Kurils. This was expressed in no uncertain
terms in a US State Department missive of 1952 which stated that “there seems
to be no sound legal reasoning for claiming that Kunashiri and Etorofu are not
part of the Kuril Islands” (quoted in Hill 1995: 26). The same sentiment was later
expressed by William Sebald, deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
affairs, who told British counterparts that one would have to “chop logic pretty
thin to substantiate the inference in that statement that the two islands were not
part of the Kurils or alternatively that they could be part of the Kurils and part
of Japan proper at the same time” (quoted in Hill 1995: 41). As for Secretary of
State Dulles, it seems that, realpolitik aside, his honest opinion was that all of the
disputed islands were part of the Kuril chain with the exception of just Habomai
(Hasegawa 1998a: 91).
On the basis of the above, it can therefore be said with confidence that at the
time of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, Japan and the
United States fully recognised that “the Kurile Islands” renounced by Japan
included both Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i, though perhaps not the much
smaller islands of Shikotan and Habomai. Claims to the contrary were a post
hoc manoeuvre designed to partially release Japan from its treaty commitments.
According to Seokwoo Lee, the official initiation of these efforts can be dated to
11 February 1956 when Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Morishita stated to
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Japanese Diet that “the Kurile Islands” cited
in the Peace Treaty included neither Shikotan and the Habomais nor Kunashiri
and Etorofu (2001: 14). This new definition was later communicated to the Soviet
leadership when, in November 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda informed First Sec-
retary Nikita Khrushchev that Japan considered the islands renounced in Article
2(c) to be only those north from Urup (Hasegawa 1998a: 138). Despite the legal
opinions previously given by the State Department, this reinterpretation was also
firmly backed by the United States. In a May 1957 statement, the US’s revised
position was fully articulated:
[T]he ‘Kurile Islands’ in those documents [the Yalta Agreement and San
Francisco Peace Treaty] does not and was not intended to include the Hab-
omai Islands, or Shikotan, or the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu, which
have always been part of Japan proper and should, therefore, in justice be
acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty.
(quoted in Hasegawa 1998a: 136)
Assisted by consistent promotion by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the

course of several decades, the concept of the “Northern Territories” (hoppō ryōdo)
as a distinct geographical and historical entity from the Kuril Islands has gained
wide, though not universal (e.g. Wada 2012), acceptance within Japan.11 It there-
fore serves as an effective means of convincing a domestic audience that Japan’s
rights to the islands have not been permanently renounced. Any hope, however,
that this redefinition of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i could help persuade the
Russian side to return these two islands is forlorn. Indeed, since it is so clearly
contradicted by the historical record and by Japanese officials’ own statements,
persisting in this attempt at recategorisation could be said to do more to discredit,
rather than strengthen, the Japanese case.
An affront to Soviet sacrifice

A final factor in why the Japanese side’s historical and legal arguments are never
likely to sway any Russian government is that the portrayal of Soviet actions as
illegal and predatory runs so counter to the established domestic narrative about
the Soviet role during the Second World War. For the vast majority of Russians,
the Soviet Union was the victim of fascist aggression and suffered immense losses
in taking the principal burden in defeating the adherents to this belligerent ideol-
ogy. While such historical memory applies primarily to the struggle with Nazi
Germany, Soviet actions against Japan are also framed using the same template.
For instance, as Hasegawa notes, the customary view is that “Soviet participation
in the war in the Far East was an act of self-sacrifice intended to keep a wartime
commitment to its allies, liberate the Asian people from Japanese militarism, and
put an end to the miseries of war” (1998a: 72). Taking pride in this heroism was
a core feature of Soviet identity, and this has carried through strongly to the Rus-
sian Federation, where, deprived of the comfort of superpower status or a suppos-
edly appealing ideology, the inherited prestige of being the principal victor in the
world’s greatest ever conflict has taken on even more importance. In challenging
this black and white narrative, Japan is therefore not only questioning certain
accepted historical beliefs, it is undermining a central tenet of Russian identity.
This being so, Japanese attempts to highlight the illegal nature of the seizure of
the four islands are always likely to face vehement opposition. Moreover, in push-
ing this agenda, Japan risks being seen as attempting to rewrite the results of the
Second World War, thereby placing itself in the company of other “falsifiers” of
history, such as nationalist groups in Ukraine and the Baltic states (Gorenburg
2010).
This line of thinking is very much in evidence in a statement given by Ser-
gei Lavrov in May 2015. Asked by journalists from Rossiiskaya Gazeta about
the prospects of resolving the territorial dispute, the Russian foreign minister
immediately referred to the Second World War, giving the following impassioned
response:
We always ask the Japanese: “Gentlemen, do you acknowledge the results

of the Second World War?” They reply: “In general, yes, but on this ques-
tion, no.” Well, how is it then that you ratified the UN Charter? This includes
article 107, in which it is written: everything that the victorious powers did
is sacred and inviolable. That is to use different words, but the legal meaning
is – do not touch anything. We refer them back to the UN Charter and here
they cannot raise any objections, but we can say that Japan is the only country
which calls into question the results of the Second World War, no one else
does this.
(quoted in Dolgopolov and Shestakov 2015)12
To explain this marked difference in perspective a little further, it is worth high-

lighting the Japanese government’s official position that “nearing the end of the
Second World War, the Soviet Union, in violation of the Neutrality Pact that was
still in force between Japan and the Soviet Union, opened the war with Japan”
(MOFA 2011).13 As can be seen from the way this is phrased, the assumption is
that the conclusion of the war was already inevitable and that the Soviet entry
into the conflict had little or no bearing on Japan’s decision to surrender. Put a
slightly different way, the Soviet contribution was “not necessary” (Kimura 2008:
45).14 Additionally, since the occupation of the Kuril chain took place after the
announcement of Tokyo’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on 15 August,
the operation is presented as occurring after Japan had given up fighting and is
therefore seen as having been largely unopposed. As Kimura puts it, “Japanese
troops laid down their weapons and surrendered – except for some fighting on
Shumshu and Paramushir – so the Soviet occupation of Southern Sakhalin and
the Kurile Islands was carried out smoothly” (2008: 50). The sense is therefore
that the Soviet Union was not a genuine victor in the war against Japan. Rather,
once the outcome was already determined, the Soviet Union, “like a thief at a
fire” (Sawa 2013), opportunistically stole in to find profit amidst the destruction
and chaos.
Such claims are anathema to the Russian side, for whom the Soviet Union’s
actions are considered to have been a vital contribution to victory. Indeed, far
from being superfluous, the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan is
firmly believed to have been the key factor in forcing the Japanese leadership to
capitulate, more so even than the US atomic-bomb attacks.15 These views were
explicitly expressed by President Putin in 2014, when, during a visit to Mon-
golia to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the battle of Khalkhin-Gol, he
stated: “Later, shoulder-to-shoulder, we did battle on the hills of Manchuria and
in the mountain passes of the Greater Khingan, crushing the Kwantung Army,
and together we delivered a victorious end to the Second World War” (Kremlin
2014). It was also to emphasise this version of history that in 2010 the Russian
government passed a new law designating 2 September the official anniversary
of the end of the conflict, supplementing the traditional Victory Day on 9 May
which marks the defeat of Nazi Germany. In approving this law, Sergei Mironov,
chairman of the Federation Council, asserted that “it is a ‘historical fact’ that the
Soviet victory over Japan led to the end of World War II” (quoted in Japan Times
2010). This narrative is not just the preserve of politicians but is also the account
favoured by the media. For instance, the following is from a prominent Russian
news agency: “We remind readers that in the coming year the entire world will
mark the 70th anniversary of the conclusion of the Second World War, the result
of which was that the Soviet Union liberated Europe from Nazi occupation and
Asia from Japanese militarism” (Regnum.ru 2015). The role of the United States
or anyone else in defeating Japan does not get a mention.
Added to the Soviet Union’s legend of its vital contribution to sealing vic-
tory, Russian historical memory also stresses the sacrifices this entailed. Far from
being a summer stroll, Soviet forces are said to have come up against 713,000
Japanese troops in Manchuria, plus a further 280,000 in Korea, Sakhalin, and the
Kurils. Moreover, these “Japanese gave universally stubborn resistance, despite
the fact that their military might was by that time significantly eroded” (Zubov
2011: 181). As a result, there were heavy casualties, with Soviet statistics report-
ing 12,000 killed on the Red Army side versus 84,000 on the Japanese. Corre-
sponding Japanese figures put the losses at 20–21,000 each (Zubov 2011: 181).
Additionally, contrary to the commonly held misapprehension that the fighting
ceased following the Emperor’s speech, many of these casualties occurred after
15 August. In particular, fierce fighting was involved in the taking of Mutanchi-
ang in Manchuria and Chongjin in Korea on 16 August (Hasegawa 2005: 195).
Additionally, even after the surrender of the Kwantung Army on 18 August,
strong resistance persisted on Sakhalin and the Kurils, since Japanese troops on
these islands were not part of the Kwantung Army (Hasegawa 1998a: 61).
The key battle on the Kuril Islands occurred on Shumshu. Landing on the
island on 18 August, the Soviet attackers immediately came under heavy fire
from entrenched Japanese positions. The battle continued for four days until the
Japanese finally capitulated on 21 August (Hasegawa 1998a: 66). It was only
after this point that the occupation of the remaining Kuril Islands was able to
proceed smoothly. From a Russian perspective, therefore, the Kuril Islands are
not viewed as having been seized from an already defeated Japan, but rather val-
iantly conquered from a determined enemy. In this regard, drawing no distinction
between the Northern and Southern Kuril Islands, Ivanov describes the whole
chain as “a legal war trophy” (2012: 24).16 Similarly, Dmitrii Rogozin, Russian
deputy prime minister, states that “the four islands became Russian territory after
a bloody struggle and have now assumed the status of sacred territory” (quoted in
Kimura 2008: 145). Adding to this sense of the islands being somehow hallowed
ground is the fact that the battle of Shumshu was the last of World War II. This
being so, particular efforts are made to honour the 539 Soviet soldiers killed or
reported missing during the operation, as well as to note the contributions of the
9 soldiers awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (Myasnikov 2014). For
example, in September 2014 the Russian Defence Ministry sent a commemo-
rative expedition to the now uninhabited island and commissioned a television
documentary entitled “The Last Battle of World War Two” (RIA Novosti 2014).
Given this continued nurturing of historical memory, the relinquishing of any part
of the Kuril chain by Russia could be seen as a betrayal of those who gave their
lives in its capture.
Last of all, prevalent in Russia is the attitude that the Japanese actually got off
relatively lightly at the end of the war. Having engaged in aggressive expansion-
ism for decades, including against the Soviet Union, and stubbornly refused to
concede defeat, even when the writing was on the wall,17 Japan was lucky not to
have been permanently deprived of more of its own territory. After all, had Japan
been the victor, it would have retained vast swathes of others’ land. In making
this argument, Russian writers tend to stress alternative outcomes that could have
seen Japan lose much more to the Soviets. For instance, Anatolii Koshkin of the
Center for Strategic Research notes that according to Roosevelt’s original plan,
“the USA intended to dismember the country into four zones of occupation –
American, Soviet, British, and Chinese. Soviet forces were to occupy the island
of Hokkaidō, all of the northeast of the main Japanese island of Honshū, and the
Kuril Islands themselves” (quoted in Sabov 2005). Furthermore, even after this
idea was abandoned, there remained the likelihood that the Soviets would occupy
part of Hokkaidō. Indeed, on 18 August orders were issued to the commanders of
the First Far Eastern Army and Pacific Fleet to begin the attack the next day, and
a request was sent to the Americans to approve a Soviet zone of occupation in the
northern half of the island (Hasegawa 1998a: 63).18 The demand was rejected by
President Truman, who made a quid pro quo with Stalin according to which Mos-
cow would relinquish its demand for an occupation zone in Hokkaidō in exchange
for Washington dropping a request for landing rights on the Kurils (Hasegawa
1998a: 64–5). Had this agreement not been reached, around half of Hokkaidō
could have fallen behind the Iron Curtain for decades to come.
Conclusions
From the above, it is evident that the two sides have utterly incompatible perspec-
tives on the historical and legal aspects of the territorial dispute. On the Japanese
side, great emphasis is placed on the “inherent” status of the islands as Japanese
territory, on the 1855 Shimoda Treaty, and on the injustice of the Soviet Union’s
violation of the Neutrality Pact in August 1945. Meanwhile, the Russian side
questions Japan’s historical precedence on the islands while also stressing the
significance of the Yalta Agreement and the Soviet Union’s status as a victor in
the Second World War. It is possible to argue almost endlessly over these histori-
cal issues, especially with regard to who was first on the islands, what the Soviet
Union’s exact contribution was to Japan’s defeat, and how to define the Kurils.
Resolving these arguments was not, however, the primary purpose of this chapter.
Instead, the reason for raising these questions was to ascertain whether Japan’s
historical and legal claims to the islands are so compelling as to raise expectations
that Russia will eventually be forced to concede to the return of all four islands.
This has not been found to be the case.
Even if one believes that overall Japan has the stronger historical and legal
claims, this chapter has demonstrated that there are several considerations that
offer encouragement to the Russian side. In particular, Russian opponents of
territorial concessions can point to the fact that the islands only unequivocally
became Japanese in 1855, meaning that Japan only held them directly for ninety
years, just twenty more than they have now been under Moscow’s control. Sec-
ond, there remains the awkward fact that Japan relinquished its sovereign rights
to the Kuril Islands at San Francisco, and subsequent attempts to redefine the
four islands as a distinct entity known as the “Northern Territories” are less than
convincing. Japan’s position is also weakened by the knowledge that its leaders
were evidently willing to settle for the return of just Shikotan and Habomai in the
mid-1950s until their resolve was forcibly stiffened by the United States. Lastly
and most importantly, Russian intransigence on this issue has been shown to be
reinforced by the fact that the territorial dispute is closely tied up with histori-
cal memory of Soviet victory in the Second World War, something that remains
a core component of national identity. To many Russians, therefore, the idea of
revisiting the territorial settlement that resulted from this conflict is viewed as
akin to rewriting history and denigrating the achievements of their forebears; any
such suggestion is thus met with incomprehension and instinctively rejected. The
words of Ivan Mel’nikov, first deputy chairman of the State Duma, are typical
in this regard:
The Southern Kurils are our territory. [. . .] To be honest, I absolutely don’t

understand Japan’s position. [. . .] From our point of view, this question was
closed after the end of World War II. [. . .] The question can be resolved only
on the basis of recognising that this territory was, is, and will remain Russian.
(quoted in Sargin 2014)
With such views held so widely and tenaciously within Russia’s governing elite,
no historical or legal argument deployed by the Japanese side is ever likely to
induce a change in policy.
Notes
1 In Japanese the island chain between Hokkaidō and Kamchatka is known as the
chishima rettō, meaning the thousand-island archipelago.
2 There are contrasting claims that an earlier inspection tour of the islands was carried
out by the Matsumae clan in 1635. Evidence that such a mission took place is provided
by a Japanese map of the area that was presented to the Tokugawa shogunate in 1644
(Kimura 2008: 4). Others, however, contend that the existence of this map does not
confirm the visit and that, if anything, its wild inaccuracies suggest that its authors
had no first-hand knowledge of the islands and had based their cartography on hearsay
(Koshkin 2010: 18; Rees 1985: 8–9).
3 According to Anatolii Koshkin (2010: 29), prior to installing their own signpost, the
Japanese expedition of 1798 overturned preexisting posts claiming Russian dominion
over Iturup/Etorofu.
4 It is also worth noting that in 1821, more than three decades before the Shimoda Treaty,
Tsar Aleksandr issued a decree which defined Russian authority as extending no farther
than Urup, thereby placing Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i beyond the preserve of his
empire (Rees 1985: 10).
5 The speech is misleading because while Russia was indeed deprived of the southern
half of Sakhalin as a result of the Russo-Japanese war, the Kuril Islands had already
been voluntarily transferred to Japan under the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1875).
6 Emphasis added.
7 The Soviet delegation proposed the following amendment to this article: “Japan rec-
ognises the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the southern
part of Sakhalin Island with all of its adjacent islands and to the Kuril Islands, and will
renounce all right, title and claim to these territories” (quoted in Koshkin 2013). As
with the other proposed Soviet amendments, this was rejected by the United States.
8 Hasegawa shares this position, arguing that “[t]he Northern Territories question was a
creation of the United States” (1998a: 105).
9 Emphasis added. In his memoirs, Yoshida also repeatedly refers to Etorofu and
Kunashiri as the “Southern Kurils” (e.g. 1962: 256).
10 Additionally, although Japanese governments would subsequently dismiss the Yalta
Agreement as non-binding on Japan, since its provisions were not mentioned in the
Potsdam Declaration or Instrument of Surrender, Yoshida seems to undermine this case
in comments made in 1950 in which he recognises the significance of the document.
As noted by Lee (2001: 24), “Concerning statements by the Democratic Party as to the
territorial provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida said,
‘They should be reminded Japan surrendered unconditionally. I think they’d better
study [the] Yalta Agreement.’ ”
11 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs began its active efforts to propagate the concept of
the “Northern Territories” in 1964 when it issued a national directive requesting that
the term “Southern Kurils” be avoided (Kuroiwa 2013: 201).
12 Chapter 17, Article 107 of the UN Charter reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall
invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World
War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as
a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action” (United
Nations 1945). This article is seen as having particular relevance to the Yalta Declara-
tion. Although Japan was not party to that agreement, it is claimed that the country is
bound by its provisions due to Article 107 (Hasegawa 1998b: 307).
13 Emphasis added.
14 Emphasis in original.
15 This argument finds support in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Tru-
man, and the Surrender of Japan, in which he states: “I challenge the commonly held
view that the atomic bomb provided the immediate and decisive knockout blow to
Japan’s will to fight. Indeed, the Soviet entry into the war played a greater role than the
atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender” (2005: 5).
16 According to Kuroiwa Yukiko, the fact that the southern part of the Kuril chain was
seized after the end of the fighting is also obscured by the islands’ war memorial, which
“gives the impression of battles having taken place on the Southern Kuriles during
WWII” (2013: 202).

17 As Hasegawa emphasises, “Had the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Decla-
ration on 26 July, there would not have been either a Soviet-Japanese War or Hiroshima/
Nagasaki” (1998a: 72).
18 The line of division in Hokkaidō was to run between Kushiro and Rumoi (Kimura 2008:
50). Moscow also proposed to General Douglas MacArthur that Tokyo be divided into
separate American and Soviet zones of occupation (Hasegawa 1998a: 192–3).
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3 Economic factors
The claim that economically Russia needs Japan

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, there is little chance of historical and legal argu-
ments alone ever resulting in the return of all four islands. However, even if the
Russian side cannot be persuaded by appeals to justice, perhaps it can be forced
into concessions by more practical considerations. In particular, it is the hope of
many in Japan that Moscow will eventually be induced to trade in the disputed
islands in exchange for closer economic relations with the world’s third-largest
economy. The details of this argument and its prospects of success are assessed
in this chapter.
The core of the economic case is the claim that Russia badly needs major
inflows of foreign direct investment to revive its dilapidated economy. This capi-
tal is required firstly to modernise the country’s outdated infrastructure, a large
proportion of which remains unchanged since Soviet times. New technology
and foreign expertise are also needed to help rejuvenate Russian industry, much
of which is inefficient and uncompetitive internationally. The country does, of
course, have a strong natural resource sector, especially with regard to oil and
natural gas, but this too is seen as bringing problems. Specifically, the economy
has become excessively dependent on this one sector. Such dependence exacer-
bates the weakness of other industries, since scarce resources are monopolised
by the powerful oil and gas companies. It also leads to volatility, since a sudden
fall in global oil prices, such as that which occurred in the second half of 2014,
will significantly damage national finances. Added to these long-standing con-
siderations, Kimura Hiroshi, who is a well-known proponent of the argument
that economic incentives will eventually force Russian territorial concessions,
draws attention to the ongoing “shale revolution”. He claims that this phenom-
enon, which has led to a surge in oil and gas output from unconventional sources
in the United States and elsewhere, will substantially reduce global demand for
Russian energy, thereby further imperilling its national economy (2013 state-
ment to Lower House Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories,
cited in Kawauchi 2014: 118–20).
Acknowledging the reality of these structural weaknesses, in recent years suc-
cessive Russian governments have outlined plans to modernise the economy,
34 Economic factors
diversify away from the resource sector, and attract foreign investment, espe-
cially in high-technology industries. Such efforts are particularly associated with
Dmitrii Medvedev, who, when president between 2008 and 2012, proposed an
ambitious reform agenda. In addition to a prominent media article entitled “For-
ward Russia!” (Medvedev 2009), the most visible manifestation of this economic
programme was the creation of the Skolkovo Centre. Announced in 2009, this
government-backed science and technology cluster near Moscow is intended to
be Russia’s answer to Silicon Valley. Granted state subsidies totalling 85 billion
roubles (more than US$2 billion) for the years 2010–2015, Skolkovo is intended
to lead the way in attracting foreign investment that can be used to transform Rus-
sia into an innovative and technologically advanced twenty-first century economy
(Malle and Cooper 2014: 23).
Although particularly associated with the more liberal Medvedev, the reform
agenda has continued to be emphasised since Putin’s return to the presidency,
thereby confirming the urgency of the economic situation. The intention in this
regard was clearly signalled on 7 May 2012, the first day of Putin’s third term,
when he signed the Presidential Decree on Long-Term Economic Policy (Krem-
lin 2012). In this document, the newly returned head of state set out a series of
concrete goals deemed necessary for “achieving technological leadership for the
Russian economy”. Amongst these were the targets of “increasing the volume of
investment to no less than 25 percent of GDP by 2015 and 27 percent by 2018”
and “increasing the high-technology and knowledge-intensive share of economic
production by 1.3 times relative to 2011 by 2018”. The decree also sets out the
aim of “winning leading positions in the global markets for aviation, shipbuilding,
information-communication technology, and space technology” (Kremlin 2012).
There is consequently a growing recognition of the need to rejuvenate Russia’s
economy as a whole, but this imperative is particularly pronounced in the case
of Siberia and the Russian Far East. These territories account for two thirds of
the Russian landmass and are immensely rich in mineral and energy resources.
Indeed, Malle and Cooper estimate that “68–75 per cent of [Russia’s total] exports
[are] either extracted or processed in this macro-region, that provides 51 per cent
of revenues to the federal budget through tax (on subsoil and exports)” (2014: 37).
The regions themselves, however, have derived relatively little benefit from this
natural wealth and, despite sporadic attempts by Tsarist, Soviet, and Federation
authorities, have remained relatively underdeveloped. This is particularly true of
the Far Eastern district, which Viktor Larin describes as the Cinderella of Russian
politics (2013b). Never favoured by the central government, the region’s position
became particularly precarious after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when “the
Far East was practically abandoned to the tyranny of fate and survived on account
of its own efforts and resources” (Larin 2013a). As a consequence of this neglect,
the region remains riddled with serious economic, environmental, and social
problems. Most strikingly, it has lost 25 percent of its population since 1991, as
well as 90 percent of its heavy industry (Lee 2013: 316). Faced with figures such
as these, it is no surprise that the Russian Far East has a tendency to provoke
gloomy sentiments, though one journalist goes perhaps too far in suggesting that
Economic factors 35
“during winter, even in the [regional] capital, when you look out of the window
in the morning you begin to be struck by suicidal feelings” (Kolesnikov 2012).
Alarmed by the possibility that such problems could ultimately lead to Russia’s
loss of its eastern territories, whether to separatism or the predations of neigh-
bours, President Putin has described development of Siberia and the Far East as
“the most important geopolitical task” facing the country (quoted in Vostok-Media
2012). To address this vital challenge, in 2012 the Russian leadership established
a new federal ministry devoted entirely to Far Eastern development. The same
year Russia hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in
Vladivostok. This high-profile event was used to showcase the Russian Far East
to the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, and in preparation, the government lavished
200 billion roubles on rejuvenating the city, building roads and bridges, confer-
ence facilities and five-star hotels, and a new university campus (RT 2012). In
addition to this expensive window dressing, in June 2013 a Plan for the Develop-
ment of the Far East for 2013–2018 was published, outlining a series of ambitious
targets for bringing regional economic indicators up to the national average.
Substantial federal funds have therefore been earmarked for eastern devel-
opment, yet it is recognised that these will not be enough on their own. Such
are the enormous financial needs of the region, estimated at 10 trillion roubles
by 2025, that long-term development depends on the ability to attract foreign
investment, especially from neighbouring countries (Malle and Cooper 2014: 32).
Overall, the hope is that this can serve as the beginning of a broader “eastern
pivot” (Larin 2013b) through which Russia can reorient its economy away from
the European Union, which is described by Russia’s Minister of the Far East as
“the least dynamically growing region in the world” (Viktor Ishaev quoted in
Lee 2013: 318), and achieve integration with the vibrant economies of the Asia-
Pacific region.
In this task of promoting economic renewal, both in the Russian Far East and in
the country more broadly, it has frequently been suggested that Japan makes the
perfect partner. To begin with, it has long been noted that the countries’ economies
are complementary (Robertson 1988: 52–3). Japan is a resource-poor country
and therefore has a major interest in importing Russian raw materials, especially
energy, and investing in the development of this sector. Additionally, Japanese
firms, which are renowned for their technological prestige and efficiency, are
ideally placed to assist with the Russian government’s goal of modernising and
diversifying the economy. They also have the requisite finances, since many Japa-
nese companies are relatively cash rich and, with few options for expansion in the
domestic market, are attracted by investment opportunities in emerging econo-
mies (Ōwada 2014). As so often, Dmitrii Trenin is particularly pithy in describing
the role that Japan could come to play in the economic development of Siberia
and the Russian Far East. He projects a “vision of Japan as a Germany in the east
for Russia,” thereby indicating that Japan too could become a leading source of
high-value foreign investment (Trenin and Weber 2012: 4).
Based upon such considerations, it is common for Japanese observers to stress
the extent to which Russia would benefit from Japan’s economic assistance.
36 Economic factors
For instance, having noted the Russian economy’s contemporary difficulties, in
November 2014 one Japanese newspaper wrote that “Russia desperately needs
to strengthen cooperation with Japan, its large-scale economic neighbor” (Sankei
Shinbun 2014). Former prime minister Mori has also spoken of Russia having to
“borrow the power of the Japanese” if it is to succeed in developing its Far East
(Mori 2013). The clearest expression of this idea, however, is probably by Haka-
mada Shigeki who, during an April 2012 debate, stated:
Japan is the biggest source of interest for the Russians, not only for energy,
but also for technology; Russia wants to free itself from having an economy
dependent on energy and change to having an economy with high-tech mod-
ern industries. When you think about it, Japan is a major country with a huge
economy and modern technology and with no energy resources, which is
competing with the US for first place. There is a lot of potential in Japan, so
Russia wants to work together with Japan and develop.
(Ron wo tateru! 2012)
This argument also finds some support on the Russian side. Rossiiskaya Gazeta,
the Russian government’s official daily newspaper, declares effusively: “In Rus-
sia, Japanese capital is worth its weight in gold. It comes with advanced tech-
nology and management techniques, as well as a developed corporate culture”
(Zubkov 2014). The Russian Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, has made it a priority
to forge a “modernisation partnership” with Japan, and Foreign Minister Lavrov
has enthusiastically asserted: “We are interested in the deepest and widest coop-
eration in all directions” (MID 2012; RIA Novosti 2012a).
Linking these economic interests to the territorial dispute, it has long been
argued by the more uncompromising of Japanese commentators, such as Kimura
Hiroshi, Hakamada Shigeki, and Tanba Minoru, that Russia’s desire for Japa-
nese investment must be exploited for political leverage. Within foreign policy
circles, this approach is known as seikei fukabun (the indivisibility of politics
and economics) (Carlile 1994: 411). To be specific, the argument is that Japan
should withhold economic cooperation until Russia concedes to return all four
of the disputed islands. Although proponents of this argument must concede that
up until now economic incentives have failed to generate the desired effect, they
retain the hope that logic will eventually prevail. After all, the Southern Kurils/
Northern Territories are of trivial economic importance to Russia compared with
the prospective development of its Far Eastern regions. It is with this in mind
that Kimura states that it would be “a great bargain for Russia to return the four
islands which only make up 1/1250th of the Russian Far East” (quoted in Kawau-
chi 2014). Encouragement in this respect is also derived from the fact that in 2004
Russia agreed to settle its border dispute with China. This saw Russia consent to
relinquish sovereignty over one and a half islands at the confluence of the Amur
and Ussuri Rivers, a decision undoubtedly shaped by Moscow’s desire to elimi-
nate all political obstacles to closer economic cooperation with China. Viewing
this as a positive precedent, Iwashita Akihiro writes: “I keep thinking ‘can’t we
Economic factors 37
follow up this process and apply it to the Northern Territories dispute?’ ” (2013:
83). This concept of a land-for-investment quid pro quo is raised most frequently
by academics, but it is also periodically mentioned by Japanese politicians. An
example is the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) Sekō Hiroshige, who, when
serving as deputy chief cabinet secretary in 2013, told the Asahi Shimbun: “We
would like to demonstrate to Russia that if the problem of the Northern Territories
is solved rapidly, Japan would contribute to the development of Russia and espe-
cially Siberia” (quoted in Pavlyatenko 2013: 23).
Convinced of the inescapable logic of this economic argument, advocates urge

the Japanese government to show patience and to avoid any premature conces-
sions. This is because they believe that Japan’s position continues to strengthen.
For instance, according to Kimura, “the international situation and the Russian
domestic situation are moving in a direction favourable to Japan and therefore
Japan should wait until the right opportunity, which will come in 2017 or later”
(cited in Kawauchi 2014).1 Others are less inclined to believe that the change
will come soon, arguing that it may be necessary to wait as long as a generation
in order “to choose the right time to push the agenda when Japan is in a very
advantageous position” (Suematsu Yoshinori, senior vice-minister of the cabinet
office, quoted in Shūgiin 2010). Despite these differences on timing, there is a
shared conviction that the moment will eventually arrive when Russia is forced to
concede on the territorial issue in exchange for Japan’s economic assistance. This
time is most likely to follow a significant fall in international commodity prices
(Tanba 2011: 164).
Rejection of Japan’s economic arguments

There is much that is true in the case outlined above. In particular, there can be
no doubt that Russia does indeed continue to suffer from fundamental economic
weaknesses. This has already been apparent from the economy’s declining growth
rates since 2010, but the scale of Russia’s problems became especially evident
as a result of the precipitous fall in global oil prices during the second half of
2014. This event served as a stark reminder of the extent of Russia’s petroleum
dependence. The country therefore certainly needs to diversify and modernise
its economy, especially in the Far East and Siberia, and in this goal it would be
greatly assisted by larger volumes of high-tech foreign investment. Where the
argument breaks down, however, is in the assumption that these economic needs
could force the Russian authorities into territorial concession vis-à-vis Japan. For
the reasons outlined in the second half of this chapter, Russia’s economic difficul-
ties, no matter how serious they become, are extremely unlikely to result in the
return of the four islands.
Russia’s economic counter-leverage

To begin with, the arguments put forward by individuals such as Kimura and
Hakamada are based on an excessively optimistic view of Japan’s contemporary
38 Economic factors
economic position. Most notably, the claim by Hakamada that Japan continues to
be “competing with the US for first place” looks embarrassingly outdated (Ron
wo tateru! 2012). This is not to say that the Japanese economy is not stronger than
that of Russia. Even the briefest comparison shows that Japan is still much richer
and remains the home to many of the world’s leading companies in a diverse
range of fields. Anyone who has visited both countries will also be well aware of
the vast differences in the quality of national infrastructure. And yet, while Japan
continues to be in the better position, there can be no doubt that its economic
advantage has been eroded. In particular, during the 2000s, as Russia underwent a
period of oil-fuelled growth, the Japanese economy stagnated. As a consequence,
while in 1999 Japanese gross domestic product was approximately 23 times larger
than that of Russia, this had been reduced to just 2.3 times by 2013 (World Bank
2014). The seriousness of this decline has been all too apparent to Russian observ-
ers who no longer see Japan as such an attractive economic model. Indeed, Dmit-
rii Strel’tsov, one of Russia’s leading Japan experts, describes the current state of
the Japanese economy in strikingly gloomy terms:
Against a background of prolonged recession, from which no exit is in sight,

there is rooted amongst the public a sense of pessimism which borders on
the feeling of a country that has capitulated after a long and exhausting war.
Such a feeling is further fuelled by objective indicators that bear witness to
the intensification of the process of the loss of the country’s leading positions
in the global economy, which she [Japan] proudly held from the end of the
1960s but began to lose in the 1990s.
(2014: 78)
From a Russian perspective, therefore, Japan has lost much of its previous eco-
nomic allure. Moreover, while Russia still desires Japanese investment, there
is a belief that Japan has an economic need of Russia that is at least as strong.
This is seen as being the case because, as a result of the March 2011 earthquake,
tsunami, and resulting Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan’s demand for oil and
gas imports has increased sharply and will stay high for the foreseeable future.
Given the abundance of such resources in Russia, Japan’s geographical proxim-
ity to the Russian Far East, where many unexploited energy deposits are to be
found, and Tokyo’s desire to reduce its excessive dependence on fuel imports
from the Middle East, Russia is a potentially appealing partner (Brown 2013).
Noting these factors and Japan’s long-term energy insecurity, some within the
Russian hydrocarbon industry indicate that it is Russia that has economic lever-
age over Japan, rather than vice versa. In support of this claim, attention can
be drawn to the proposal for the building of an ambitious new gas pipeline to
run from Sakhalin to Hokkaidō, and potentially even as far as Tokyo. This idea
had been periodically discussed for some years, but it has recently come to be
more actively promoted by the Japanese side, including through the formation
of a group of thirty-three parliamentarians to lobby for its construction (Finmar-
ket.ru 2014). Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas giant, for its part, remains
Economic factors 39
reluctant, preferring to concentrate on developing exports of liquefied natural gas
(LNG), but in November 2014 Aleksei Miller, the company’s head, reported that
Gazprom had received and was considering a proposal from the Japanese side
according to which, in exchange for committing to the pipeline, Gazprom would
be granted access to Japan’s domestic gas distribution network and electric power
industry (RIA Novosti 2014d). To many on the Russian side, therefore, there is
the sense that Russia has the upper hand. For instance, in October 2014, Valerii
Golubev, another Gazprom executive, told journalists: “No, I don’t think Japan
has an alternative [to Russian gas]. They don’t have their own energy resources,
so they will need to buy. [. . .] For them, it is the shortest route. Therefore, in
any case for them our gas will be the most advantageous” (RIA Novosti 2014c).
Confident of Japan’s growing dependence in this regard, the Russian Ministry of
Energy predicts that Japanese consumption of Russian gas will double by 2025
and potentially rise as high as 50–60 million tonnes a year from its current level
of 10 million tonnes (Argumenty Nedeli 2014a).
Added to the leverage that Russian energy exports can provide, there is also
the belief that Russia has several attractive alternatives to Japan, both in terms
of trading partners and sources of investment. As highlighted above, Japanese
technology and know-how may be particularly prized, but if dealing with Japan
proves too difficult, Russia is not without other options. Specifically, South Korea
and Singapore have recently been highlighted by Russian officials as appealing
sources for investment and technology, while emphasis has also been placed on
the growing potential of India (Mallet and Hille 2014). This is to say nothing of
economic relations with China, which grew 17 percent in 2013 and are anticipated
by the Russian prime minister to soon double to $200 billion a year (ITAR-TASS
2014). A sizeable proportion of this increased figure is expected to be accounted
for by burgeoning Russian resource exports, but increasingly economic exchange
will also include Chinese investments and technology transfers of a type that one
would previously have been more likely to associate with Japan. For example,
in 2014, MegaFon, one of Russia’s major telecom companies, and Sberbank, the
country’s largest bank, both signed multimillion-dollar deals to import communi-
cations technology from China’s Huawei. At the same time, in a project that could
ultimately be worth as much as $25 billion, a memorandum of understanding was
signed that foresees Chinese companies taking a leading role in building a new
high-speed rail link between Moscow and Kazan (Business New Europe 2014).
Due to this eagerness to invest and the rapidly improving quality of its technol-
ogy, China has become Russia’s favoured partner for the development of its Far
East. This preference was reflected at the elite level with the signing in 2009 of
the “Programme of Cooperation between the Regions of the Far East and East-
ern Siberia and the Northeast of the People’s Republic of China, 2009–2018”.
It has also been given support by the Minister of the Russian Far East, who has
stated: “China, for the Far East, plays a key (klyuchevuyu) role. Like it or not, that
is the reality” (Viktor Ishaev quoted in Lee 2013: 319). Moreover, this outlook
appears to be shared by the general population. In answer to the opinion poll ques-
tion “With which countries and territories should your region primarily develop
40 Economic factors
relations?,” during the 1990s and early 2000s the largest number of respondents
in the Russian Far East put Japan first. By 2008, however, China had overtaken
it (Larin and Larina 2014: 11). The public also lists China as the country most
interested in the development of the Russian Far East and in its integration with
the Asia-Pacific region (Larin and Larina 2014: 12). Overall, the predominant
Russian view of the economic situation is summarised by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov,
a Russian journalist specialising in Asia. In his view, while Russia would like
Japan’s economic cooperation, it is not essential. If Japan continues to play hard-
ball and insist on holding back investment unless the four islands are returned,
Russia will simply do more business with China and other willing partners. This
may mean that Russia receives somewhat lower quality investment and may not
be able to demand such high prices for its energy exports, but ultimately it will be
the Japanese side that will lose out and be left with feelings of jealousy (cited in
Sobesednik 2014).
Japanese investors discouraged by the investment climate,

not the territorial dispute
The above indicates that there are likely to be limitations to the effectiveness of
Japanese attempts to use the promise of investment as an inducement to Russian
territorial concessions. However, perhaps this does not go far enough. Those on
the Japanese side who promote the idea that Russia will eventually be brought to
terms by economic incentives presume that the territorial dispute is a major obsta-
cle preventing more Japanese investment in Russia. This is a reasonable assump-
tion, but is it really true? Would a sudden end to the four-island problem really
lead to a marked improvement in economic relations between the two countries?
A careful examination of the situation suggests that there are serious grounds for
doubt.
In the past, there have certainly been cases of Japanese governments pursuing
policies of seikei fukabun vis-à-vis Moscow. Most notable in this regard were the
attempts during the 1980s and early 1990s, when Japan was in its pomp and the
Soviet Union staggering towards collapse, to make any improvement in bilateral
economic relations conditional on political progress. In particular, Japan adopted
an uncompromising stance within the G7, refusing to approve emergency financ-
ing unless Moscow gave ground on the territorial question. This approach contin-
ued after the creation of the Russian Federation, with the result that Japan opposed
granting a package of economic assistance at the July 1992 G7 summit in Munich
until a clause on the Northern Territories was included in the final summit com-
muniqué. This tactic was never greatly successful, since it depended on maintain-
ing a unity of purpose within Japan, whereas, in reality, it was strongly supported
by only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and hawkish politicians, such
as Watanabe Michio, whilst both the Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try (MITI) and representatives of major Japanese corporations were always far
less enthusiastic. The policy also caused annoyance amongst other G7 members,
who were frustrated by Japan’s willingness to hold up the disbursement of critical
Economic factors 41
financial assistance over an issue that was seen as being of no importance to any-
one but itself (Carlile 1994: 425–7).
Finding itself diplomatically isolated and with little to show for its efforts, from
the mid-1990s the Japanese government gradually began to shift towards a dif-
ferent approach. Instead of strict linking of economics and politics and insistence
that territorial concessions must precede financial aid (the so-called iriguchi or
“entrance” approach), Japanese decision makers started to adopt a more accom-
modating stance (Carlile 1994: 421, 426–7).2 This progressive abandonment of
seikei fukabun has been clearly discernible to those on the Russian side with a
long record of dealing with Japan. For example, Viktor Ozerov, representative of
Khabarovsk in the Federation Council, describes his experience as follows:
Beginning in 1994, I have been to Japan many times. At the time of my first
trips, as soon as the Japanese asked, ‘Are you going to give up the islands?’
and I said, ‘No’, the negotiations immediately ended. However, during my
last visit, a Japanese legislator told me that at a parliamentary level people
have started to believe that economic development of our relations is a step
towards resolution of the territorial problem and not the reverse.
(quoted in Sargin 2014)
Valerii Kistanov, head of the Japan Research Centre at the Institute of Far Eastern
Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, tells much the same story. In his
words, “Previously the Japanese rigidly linked the development of economic rela-
tions with Russia to the resolution of the territorial question. However, now this
linkage has been weakened and Tokyo no longer emphasises it in the way they did
in the 1990s” (quoted in Palunin 2014).
Further evidence that the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories dispute has
become a steadily less important obstacle to Japanese economic dealings with
Russia is the progressive growth in volumes of trade and investment between the
two countries. In particular, in the decade since 2003, bilateral trade has increased
seven times, reaching an all-time record of just short of $35 billion in 2013 (Bely-
aev and Golovnin 2014; Minekonomrazvitiya 2013). This figure includes already
significant Japanese commercial activities in the Russian Far East. For example,
according to Aleksei Starichkov, director of the Department for International
Cooperation and Development of Tourism for Primorskii Krai, “within the region
there is around 2 billion roubles of Japanese investment in the spheres of forestry,
car production, and others” (Vostok-Media 2014). This makes Japan the largest
source of foreign investment for Primorskii (Panischenko and Chukov 2014).
Japan also has substantial economic involvement with Sakhalin, where bilateral
trade volumes amounted to $3.7 billion for the first half of 2014 (Novikov 2014).
It is here that one finds the vast oil and gas projects of Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2
in which Japanese energy companies hold significant stakes. These are long-
standing investments for which the original agreement was signed as long ago as
1974, but more recently Japanese corporations have been actively pursuing fur-
ther involvement in Far Eastern oil and gas projects, including Gazprom’s plans
42 Economic factors
for increased LNG production and Rosneft’s oil exploration in the Sea of Okhotsk
(Haines 2014: 591; Motomura 2014: 71–3). In committing to these efforts, Japa-
nese decision makers appear to share the opinion of the chief researcher of the
Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) that “[n]ow is the
time to expand efforts into East Siberia, since this is both the nearest and safest
oil and gas source” (Motomura 2014: 77). Overall, given this evident willing-
ness for Japanese firms to do business with Russia when it suits their economic
interests to do so, it is little surprise to find it reported that “Russian officials have
concluded, correctly, that they can challenge Japan aggressively regarding the
[disputed] islands and still secure considerable Japanese investment and com-
merce” (Weitz 2011).
Japanese economic involvement in Russia and its Far East is therefore already
far from insignificant, yet it is nonetheless true that the levels of bilateral trade
and investment fall well short of their enormous potential. Specifically, while
Japan is the world’s third-largest economy, it is only Russia’s seventh-largest trad-
ing partner (Naka 2014). While natural to assume that this gap is attributable to
the territorial dispute, this does not find support in the statements of Japanese
business leaders. Instead, when asked about what discourages Japanese compa-
nies from greater economic dealings with Russia, these individuals focus on the
unattractive investment climate and poor quality of infrastructure. For instance,
Sasaki Norio, deputy chair of Keidanren (Japan’s Federation of Economic Organ-
isations), emphasises:
Japanese companies’ dissatisfaction with administrative barriers and the level

of business security. [. . .] Another problem is transport. It would be logical
to use the potential of the Trans-Siberian Railway for the exchange of goods
between Japan and Russia, and onward to the countries of the EU. However
the Trans-Siberian is too slow for the Japanese and transportation on it is
expensive.
(quoted in Zubkov 2014)
Similar complaints are made by Saitō Daisuke of ROTOBO (the Japan Associa-
tion for Trade with Russia and NIS [the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union]). In an extensive interview about obstacles to further development
of economic ties, he makes no mention of the territorial dispute, concentrating
instead on taxation rates and lack of support from Russian local government
(PrimaMedia 2014b). Undoubtedly the most memorable example, however, is
that provided by Sakane Masahiro, former president of Komatsu and head of the
Public-Private Development Council of Japanese-Russian Relations. As Sakane
recounts to Vedomosti, a Russian business newspaper:
[T]he largest problem we faced when building a factory in Russia was the
enormous amount of time and effort spent in registering all of the paperwork.
Afterwards we calculated that the documents for the construction of the fac-
tory which we submitted to various Russian agencies came to a height of four
Economic factors 43
metres! I think that many Japanese companies would like to enter the Russian
market but are afraid of this type of difficulty.
(quoted in Gubskii 2014)3
The logic of all of this is therefore clear. If Russia really wants to attract more
Japanese investment, especially in the country’s Far East, it would be best advised
to concentrate not on resolving political issues, but on creating an appealing eco-
nomic environment by cutting bureaucracy and corruption, providing reliable
legal protections for business owners, and investing heavily in infrastructure. In

fact, the importance of such reforms does seem finally to have been grasped by
some within Russia’s governing structures, and in recent years there have been
increased efforts to make the country a more attractive investment destination.
Namely, a new series of priority development zones has been created, many of
which are in Siberia and the Far East, which offer foreign investors preferential
tax treatment, simplification of administrative procedures, and dedicated sup-
port by local administrations (PrimaMedia 2014a). Ambitious plans have also
been unveiled for major improvements to transport infrastructure, especially the
Trans-Siberian Railway (Lo 2013). To encourage such efforts, on 7 May 2012
President Putin issued a decree that established a formal goal of “[i]ncreasing the
position of the Russian Federation in the World Bank’s rating of conditions of
doing business from 120th place in 2011 to 50th by 2015 and to 20th by 2018”
(Kremlin 2012). Some progress has already been made in this direction, with
Russia climbing 19 places in the ranking in 2013 and a further 30 places in 2014
(Skove 2014).
There remain significant grounds for scepticism as to whether Russia can really
transform itself into a leading investment destination capable of attracting global
companies across a range of sectors. However, were this actually to be achieved,
there can be no question that Japanese firms would join the rush to profit from
the opportunities available and would not be dissuaded by the continuing South-
ern Kurils/Northern Territories issue. After all, deep-rooted political tensions,
including a territorial dispute, did not prevent Japanese companies from investing
heavily in China, leading to a situation dubbed seirei keinetsu (cold politics, hot
economics) (Koo 2009). If Russia were ever to get its economic conditions right,
there would be nothing to prevent a similar situation from emerging with regard
to economic relations with Japan.
Economic value of the islands to Russia

A final reason why the lure of increased Japanese trade and investment is not
likely to persuade Russia to return the disputed territories is the economic value
of the islands themselves. Those who argue that they are worth vastly less than
the enormous potential of the Russian Far East as a whole are undoubtedly correct
(see Kawauchi 2014). However, this does not mean that the islands and their sur-
rounding waters are entirely without material value. Indeed, looking closely at the
area, one finds that although relatively small and remote, the islands actually have
44 Economic factors
more than sufficient natural wealth to ensure that any Russian government would
be reluctant to relinquish them. Added to this is the fact that having been previ-
ously neglected, the islands in recent years have come in for increased spending
on development by the authorities. As this investment programme continues, it
becomes progressively less likely that Russia will ever countenance giving the
islands up.
To begin with the natural resources, the islands contain considerable mineral
deposits. For example, according to one reported estimate, Iturup/Etorofu con-
tains the world’s largest source of rhenium. This metal is a key component in
a number of aeronautic and space technologies and, given that it is one of the
world’s rarest elements, it commands a high price. The rhenium on Iturup/Etorofu
is the output of the island’s Kudryavii volcano. Producing around 20 tonnes of
rhenium a year, this single source accounts for around half of global output. It is
also the only place in the world where the naturally produced rhenium is entirely
pure. Given rhenium’s commercial value, as well as its importance to technolo-
gies of military significance, Russia can be expected to be extremely hesitant
about parting with its prime source of this metal. Separate from this bounty of rhe-
nium, the four islands are also estimated to possess approximately 2 billion tonnes
of hydrocarbons, 2000 tonnes of gold and silver, 40 million tonnes of titanium,
and 270 million tonnes of iron (Rossetti 2014).
A second source of resource wealth is the islands’ surrounding waters. These
represent one of the most productive fishing grounds in the world, and before
being lost to the Soviet Union, around one ninth of Japan’s total seafood report-
edly came from this area (Lee 2001: 28). The reason the waters are so productive
is that they are an area where turbulence caused by the meeting of warm and cold
currents causes a steady stream of nutrition to rise from the seabed. This attracts
huge numbers of fish, making it a particularly profitable zone for fishing. The
total value of seafood produced from this area is estimated to exceed US$4 billion
a year (Rossetti 2014).
It would be a mistake to suggest that the mineral resources and fish stocks in
the immediate vicinity of the islands are the primary reason for Russia wishing to
retain them. As detailed in Chapter 2, more important in this regard are issues of
historical memory and national pride. At the same time, however, economic fac-
tors clearly do play a part in Russian politicians’ thinking. This much is apparent
from the comments of Svetlana Goryacheva, deputy chair of the Duma committee
on rules and organisation of State Duma work. When asked about her position on
the territorial dispute, Goryacheva replied:
Of course, I would never give up the Southern Kurils! I did not acquire them
for Russia and it is not for me to dispose of them. Why does Japan put up such
a fight for these islands? Yes, this country has territorial problems, but, on
the other hand, these islands are especially rich in fish and mineral resources.
That is, the Japanese have something to gain and we have something to lose.
There are really valuable natural resources there!
(Sargin 2014)
Economic factors 45
Such economic considerations have come to attract more attention in recent times
as the Russian authorities have sought to execute their “eastern pivot”, placing
more emphasis on Far Eastern development and integration with the Asia-Pacific
region. Added to this is the fact that the economic significance of the islands has
been further magnified by legal developments in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Flanked by Sakhalin Island in the west, Khabarovsk Krai and Magadan Oblast’
in the north, and the Kamchatka peninsula and the Kuril chain to the east and
southeast, the Sea of Okhotsk is ringed by Russian territory. As a result, Russia
has long controlled the majority of the sea as part of its exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). Until recently, however, there was a 52,000 square kilometre section at
the centre of the sea that remained international waters. Known as the “peanut
hole” on account of its shape, the continued existence of this area limited Rus-
sia’s economic control over the sea. This finally changed in March 2014 when,
after years of intense Russian lobbying, the United Nations Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf formally certified Russia’s claims to the peanut
hole (Zykova 2014). Effectively transformed “into a Russian lake”, the Sea of
Okhotsk is now open to full economic exploitation by Russia, and the resources
on offer are thought to be extensive (Haines 2014: 601). Indeed, the Russian envi-
ronment minister describes the sea as a “real Ali Baba’s cave” (Sergei Donskoi
quoted in Haines 2014: 591). This is because, according to data from the Ministry
of Natural Resources, oil and gas deposits are to be found in 40 percent of the
area. Preliminary figures from Rosneft for just the northern section of the sea also
estimate reserves of 1.1 trillion tonnes of oil and 2 trillion cubic metres of gas
(Zykova 2014). Separate from these energy deposits, the sea is also an important
fishery. According to the coordinator of the maritime programme for the World
Wildlife Fund for Nature in Russia, “the Sea of Okhotsk is primarily the fish
basket of our country; it is one of the foundations of our food security. Around
40 percent of Russian catches of pollock, halibut, coastal salmon, cod, and west
Kamchatka crab [come from this area]” (Konstantin Zgurovskii quoted in Zykova
2014). Given the extent of these resources, the award of the entire sea to Russia
opens up considerable new economic opportunities.
The Sea of Okhotsk as a whole is very large, and only a small portion of it is
close to the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories. Despite this, the new status of
the Sea is nonetheless relevant to the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan.
This is because, having worked diligently for years to win economic rights over
almost the entire sea, Russian diplomats will be strongly opposed to allowing any
other state to regain a foothold. Such would be the effect of returning the four
islands, because along with the land, Japan would gain the right to claim an EEZ
of up to 200 nautical miles. Extending north from Iturup/Etorofu, this EEZ would
give Japan exclusive economic rights over a significant slice of the southern part
of the Sea of Okhotsk and over all of the economic resources to be found there.
Further concerning the valuable natural resources of the Southern Kurils/
Northern Territories and neighbouring Sea of Okhotsk, a final economic consider-
ation is Russia’s accumulated stock of investment on the islands. In truth, for most
of the Soviet period very little attention was given to the area, leaving the islands
46 Economic factors
without proper roads, airports, and docks, as well as lacking satisfactory hospitals
and schools (RIA Novosti 2014b). Matters then became even worse during the
1990s when, amidst Russia’s general economic turmoil, Moscow’s long-standing
inattention turned to almost complete abandonment. As a result, the islands came
to be mired in poverty and their landscape blotted by dilapidated housing and the
rusting hulks of ships (Orttung 2000: 482). In the 2000s, however, this situation
began to change as the federal authorities made use of the Russian economy’s
prolonged period of oil-fuelled growth to direct increasing volumes of investment
to the four islands.

The first major step in the development programme was the allocation of 30
billion roubles for the period 2007–2015. These funds were directed to thirty-
eight different projects, including a new hospital at Krabozavodskoe (Shikotan),
a wind-diesel hybrid power plant at Golovnino and geothermal plant at Men-
deleevo (Kunashir/i), and renovated water treatment facilities at Yuzhno-Kuril’sk
(Kunashir/i) (Interfax 2014a). The most eye-catching recent development, how-
ever, has been the construction of airport facilities. Following the completion of
extensive renovations to the airport on Kunashir/i in 2011, a brand new facility
was opened on Iturup/Etorofu in 2014. These airports are served by regular flights
from regional centres, such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, and are intended
to better integrate the islands with the rest of the economy of the Russian Far
East (Interfax 2014b). Subsequent to the completion of the current development
programme, a further 20 billion roubles has been allocated for the period 2016–
2025. These funds are intended to deliver further improvements in port facilities
on Kunashir/i and Shikotan, better roads for Kunashir/i, and generally upgraded
facilities to serve all of the islanders’ educational, health, residential, and cultural
needs (Interfax 2014a).
This influx of new investment has encouraged more positive attitudes regard-
ing the economic prospects of the islands. Indeed, some recent assessments are
little short of hyperbolic. For example, in emphasising the scale of the improve-
ments under way, one newspaper reports: “In short, the islands are being trans-
formed from a godforsaken edge to a downright paradisiacal corner of Russia”
(Argumenty Nedeli 2014b). This is clearly an exaggeration, since, no matter how
much investment they receive, the remote and chilly islands are never likely to
reach high on the list of most desirable places to live. Nevertheless, there can
be no doubt that the allocation of federal funds has had a significant impact and
that Russia’s economic stake in the islands has increased substantially since the
1990s. It is also important to note that the financing is being directed to projects
not only on Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i, but also on Shikotan. As these invest-
ments accumulate, Russian opposition to returning even the smaller two islands,
as anticipated in the 1956 Joint Declaration, is likely to strengthen considerably.
Conclusions
In summary, this chapter has interrogated the claim that economic incentives will
eventually drive the Russian side into territorial concessions and that Japan must
therefore resolutely maintain its uncompromising stance and await economic logic
Economic factors 47
to take inevitable effect. It is understandable why this argument has gained traction
in Japan, since Russia undoubtedly does face serious economic challenges, espe-
cially in Siberia and the Far East. As several Russian officials have noted them-
selves, there is also no question that Japanese investment would indeed be welcome
in assisting in the task of modernising and diversifying the Russian economy.
As superficially attractive as these arguments may be, this chapter has demon-
strated why economic factors are not likely to cause Russia to relinquish control
over the four islands. Firstly and most fundamentally, the claims have been shown
to be based on exaggerated assumptions of Japanese strength and Russian weak-

ness. Quite simply, Japan is no longer the economic powerhouse it was during the
bubble era and Russia no longer the supplicant of the early 1990s. Having stabi-
lised its economy and grown strongly during the 2000s, Russia can now be said to
more desire than need Japanese investment. This being so, it seems fair to ask, if
Tokyo was unable to use its financial leverage to prise the islands from Moscow’s
grip at the time of Soviet collapse, what hope is there of this being achieved now
that the economic disparity between the two sides has closed considerably? It is
true that Russia entered economic difficulties in 2009 and again in 2014, but, as
serious as these may be, it is all but inconceivable that Russia’s economic woes
of the first half of the 1990s, when GDP fell around 50 percent (Cooper 1998),
will be repeated.
To further address this key consideration, this chapter has raised the issue that
it is actually far from clear to what extent the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories
dispute really is a significant obstacle to greater Japanese investment in Russia.
Japanese businesses are primarily driven by commercial considerations, and a
more important disincentive to investment is Russia’s continuing lack of adequate
legal protections. Last of all, this chapter has noted the increasing economic value
of the islands to Russia, both in terms of raw materials and with regard to the
accumulated volumes of federal spending which have recently been devoted to
the islands’ development.
Taking all of these factors together, Professor Iwashita’s hope that Moscow’s
decision to cede territory to China in exchange for future economic cooperation
could be repeated vis-à-vis Japan looks entirely forlorn (2013: 83). When agree-
ing to the deal with China in 2004, Russia was making a rational choice to grant
340 square kilometres of almost entirely uninhabited land to a country enjoying
double-digit growth rates and on course to become the world’s largest economy
(Pravda 2008). By contrast, with regard to Japan, Russia would be volunteer-
ing to hand over nearly 5,000 square kilometres of territory, with a population
of almost 17,000, in return for the vague promise of closer economic ties with
a country whose economy has been in the doldrums for more than two decades
and that is slipping in the global rankings. Few Russian strategists are likely to be
convinced of the value of such a deal.
Notes
1 It is interesting to note that Kimura has been saying much the same thing for three
decades. For instance, writing in 1986, he claimed: “While Japan can do without the
48 Economic factors
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is increasingly moving in a direction that requires
Japan” (quoted in Hasegawa 1998: 242).
2 The iriguchi-ron (entrance approach) contrasts with the deguchi-ron (exit approach).
The latter suggests that Japan should pursue various forms of cooperation with Russia
without prior conditions in the belief that the closer relations that this would engender
would increase the chances of a territorial resolution. For criticism of the deguchi argu-
ment, see Sawa 2013.
3 These problems affect all foreign investors in Russia, though they may have a particu-
larly discouraging impact on Japanese firms, which are well known for their risk-averse
corporate culture (see Brinton and Yamagishi 2010).
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4 National security
The claim that Russia needs Japan to counter the China threat
For the reasons outlined in the preceding two chapters, neither claims about the
disputed territory being “inherently” Japanese, nor reference to historical legal
documents, nor even the lure of supposed economic benefits can be expected to
persuade the Russian authorities to return all four of the islands. What, however,
of national security arguments? This could be considered Japan’s area of greatest
remaining hope. Few governments are ever likely to be convinced to relinquish
territory by appeals to their sense of justice, and it is not uncommon for national
leaders to prioritise political over economic goals. However, if anything is likely
to succeed in inducing a country to transfer territory to another, it will be the cal-
culation that such a sacrifice is necessary to uphold the nation’s broader security
interests. After all, this is why states defeated in war have traditionally accepted
peace treaties that include territorial concessions. The loss of a portion of national
territory is judged to be preferable to the security risks of continued fighting.
With regard to the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories problem, the security
argument favoured by several Japanese observers is the contention that geopoliti-
cal changes in the East Asian region are creating a situation that is increasingly
perilous to Russia’s national interests. In response to this mounting threat, Russia
will find itself in ever greater need of regional security partners and, in particular,
of Japan, the only country with sufficient economic heft and military capacity to
fulfil this function effectively. At present, the territorial dispute stands in the way
of the realisation of such a close relationship ( just as was originally intended by
the United States). However, so great is the emerging threat to Russian security
that it is deemed likely that Moscow will, in time, become willing to consider
returning the islands to Japan in exchange for closer security ties. Evidently this
is not an ideal outcome for Moscow, yet it is suggested that this relatively small
transfer of territory will come to be seen as highly favourable compared with the
alternative of much more fundamental losses (see Hyōdō 2014b; Kimura 2014).
The geopolitical shift that these Japanese commentators have in mind is, of
course, the rise of China. It is acknowledged that Moscow and Beijing have
recently been enjoying unprecedentedly close relations, framed as a strategic
partnership and featuring burgeoning trade ties. Nonetheless observers contest
National security 53
that while Russian leaders may publicly insist that there is “not a single irritat-
ing factor” in relations with China (Interfax 2012), in reality Moscow is deeply
anxious about the growing disparity in the countries’ power and the implications
that this has for Russia’s regional influence and even for its ability to continue as
a major player in international politics. For this reason, the relationship between
Russia and China is alleged to have already “peaked”, and from now on, tensions
are anticipated to become increasingly pronounced (Hyōdō 2014b : 863).
To begin with, China’s eclipse of Russian power is said to represent an expand-
ing threat to Moscow’s “sphere of privileged interests” (Medvedev quoted by

Trenin 2009: 3). This term refers to those countries in which, due to their close
proximity to Russia’s borders and long history of Russian economic and cultural
penetration, the Kremlin deems it both natural and essential that Russia maintain
an active guiding role. Since these countries are thought of as a protective buffer
zone around Russia’s open frontiers, the establishment of excessive political and
economic influence within this area by an external power is likely to be vehe-
mently resisted. This understanding of Russian security interests within its “near
abroad” goes a long way towards explaining Moscow’s hostile response to the
change in government in Kiev in February 2014. Believing the new authorities to
be intent on reorienting Ukraine away from Russia and placing it within the orbit
of the West, Moscow intervened militarily to seize Crimea and undermine Kiev’s
hold over the east of the country.
With regard to China, it is less Ukraine that is the focus, although Hyōdō Shinji
does suggest that Russia will be concerned by Beijing’s increased dealings with
Kiev in the areas of agriculture, infrastructure, and arms (Hyōdō 2014a). More
conventional is the claim that China is usurping Russia’s place in Central Asia.
The argument here is that despite Moscow’s historical dominance of the region,
Russia’s economic interests are being rapidly overtaken by those of China. Indeed,
following the global economic crisis of 2008, China’s share of trade with Central
Asia exceeded that of Russia for the first time (Ziegler 2014: 604). Much of this
increase is accounted for by energy. Whereas previously Central Asian oil and gas
exports went almost exclusively north and Russia used its monopsony position to
secure low purchase prices, these flows now increasingly go east. In particular,
in 2006 the first supplies were transported via a new oil pipeline from Kazakh-
stan to China. This was followed by the inauguration in 2009 of a gas pipeline
from Turkmenistan to China (via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan). China also lent
Ashgabat $4 billion in 2010, thereby enabling Turkmenistan to withstand a gas
dispute with Russia (Kaczmarski 2012: 6). As a result of these developments,
energy trade between Turkmenistan and Russia has fallen sharply, with supplies
declining from 41.6 billion cubic metres in 2007 to just 10.7 billion cubic metres
in 2010 (Mitchell 2014: 22).
As significant as these changes already are, it is anticipated that they mark
just the beginning of Chinese economic involvement in the region. In October
2013, the Chinese president unveiled plans for the creation of a “Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt”. This grand scheme to revive the ancient trade route between Asia
and Europe is anticipated to involve over forty countries, but the belt’s buckle will
54 National security
be Central Asia (Zhang 2014). This project is a priority for the Chinese authori-
ties, not least because it has the personal backing of President Xi, who has spoken
of the scheme in the following romanticised terms: “My home, Shanxi province,
is the start of the ancient Silk Road. I can almost hear the ring of the camel bells
and smell the wisps of smoke in the desert” (quoted in Coomarasamy 2014: 48).
China is therefore certain to continue its rapid increase in trade with the region,
as well as to commit to further large-scale investments. Although the emphasis
is primarily on economic exchange, it is inevitable that this will be accompanied
by increased political influence. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the

Chinese president has already begun to speak of Central Asia and China having
“a sense of common destiny” (quoted in Rolland 2015: 1). This being so, it may
just be a matter of time before Beijing comes to regard the region as its own “near
abroad”.
Further to the prediction of frictions in Central Asia, it is suggested that the
Arctic could also become an area of strategic rivalry between Russia and China
(Hyōdō 2014b; Hyōdō 2014a). This is a region in which Moscow claims signifi-
cant proprietary interests, as vividly symbolised by the placing of a Russian flag
on the seabed of the North Pole in 2007. Part of the importance Russia attaches to
the region is determined by basic geography, since Russia has almost 20,000 km
of Arctic coastline (Fenenko 2012: 8). The area, however, also has more specific
economic and strategic significance. One quarter of Russia’s energy reserves are
estimated to be in the Arctic, and as production from other areas declines, these
deposits are anticipated to become the mainstay of the Russian energy industry
in the twenty-first century (Gorenburg 2012: 5; Voronov 2012: 60). Adding fur-
ther value is Russia’s control of the Northern Sea Route, which, as ice coverage
retreats, is expected to become an important alternative trade route from Europe
to Asia (Fenenko 2012: 23). Militarily too, the Arctic region is important, since
it provides a secure bastion for Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines (Gorenburg
2012: 3). It is also the location for significant components of Russia’s Missile
Attack Warning System (Fenenko 2012: 8).
Given these economic and strategic considerations, Russia is determined to
retain a leading position in the Arctic. To this end, Moscow has unveiled plans
to build a new generation of icebreakers, modernise its Arctic search-and-rescue
services, and develop new communications, navigation, and surveillance systems.
Further to these improvements in civilian infrastructure, Russia has also enhanced
its military standing. This has included creating the Northern Fleet–Unified Stra-
tegic Command in 2014, as well as reopening a series of Soviet airfields (Zysk
2014: 31–2). In addition to supplementing its capabilities in this way, Russia has
focused on the diplomatic task of ensuring that the region does not become fully
internationalised but instead remains the preserve of the five Arctic states: Can-
ada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States. As Katar-
zyna Zysk describes, in support of this policy “Russian officials, including the
country’s long-standing ambassador to the Arctic Council, have insisted that only
Arctic states should have direct responsibility for practical management, security,
and navigational safety in the Arctic” (2014: 33).
This emphasis on keeping non-Arctic states out of the region is at odds with
Beijing’s growing interest. As with other states, China is attracted by the resource
potential of the Far North, as well as by the future significance of the Northern
Sea Route. Its priority is therefore to promote international access and ensure that
the region’s transportation routes remain open to all. This position was expressed
most emphatically in March 2010 by Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, who
claimed: “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has
sovereignty over it” (quoted in Blank 2012: 43). To ensure that its interests are
upheld in the region, China has therefore begun to imaginatively define itself as
a “near-Arctic state” and, since 2006, has sought permanent observer status in
the Arctic Council (Wright 2013: 8). It has also steadily increased its maritime
activities in the northern seas. China’s icebreaker, the Xuelong [Snow Dragon],
has made several visits to the Arctic and in 2012 became the first Chinese ship to
traverse the Northern Sea Route (Xinhua 2012). While not yet progressing as far
as the Arctic Ocean, China’s military has also been venturing ever farther north.
Most notably, in July 2013 warships from the country’s Northern Fleet made their
first entry into the Sea of Okhotsk, while in September 2015 Chinese naval ves-
sels were spotted off the coast of Alaska in the Bering Sea (Asahi Shimbun 2013a;
Sevastopulo and Clover 2015). Not unreasonably, it is proposed that such devel-
opments are causing unease within Russia (Hyōdō 2014b). This contention finds
support in the fact that although China was finally granted permanent observer
status in the Arctic Council in May 2013, Moscow sought to indicate that this
would be the extent of concessions. Speaking in June 2013, Prime Minister Med-
vedev stated: “We can trust China, but the rules of the game need to be imposed
by the Arctic countries.” This is “our region, we live here, it’s our land” (quoted
in Zysk 2014: 34).
Based on these observations, it is possible to make a persuasive case that Chi-
na’s expanding international ambitions will lead to growing frictions with Russia
in Central Asia and the Arctic. There are, however, those who take this argu-
ment further, making the case that China is developing into a significant threat to
Russia itself. The claim here is that China is a revisionist power intent on creat-
ing an international order that better reflects its now considerable economic and
military might. This trend is already clearly visible in the East and South China
Seas, but it is proposed that it is only a matter of time before Beijing turns its
attention north (Hyōdō 2013). In particular, it is suggested that China will seek
influence over, and may even covet parts of, Siberia and the Russian Far East
(Kaplan 2010; Lo 2008). The immediate allure of these territories would be their
enormous resource riches. Moreover, they have low population density, thereby
seeming to offer open space into which China could expand. A further incentive
(or convenient justification) could be historical injustice, since large swathes of
the Russian Far East were historically Chinese until the “unequal treaties” of 1858
and 1860. Excited by such facts, some observers have gone so far as to predict
that “China will reclaim Siberia” by force and advance as far as the Urals (Jacobs
2015). A rather more credible version of events is that China will progressively
come to dominate the Russian Far East via accumulated investment and Chinese
migration. This will eventually lead to the region’s drift away from Moscow’s
control and towards that of Beijing (Karaganov 2012; Mankoff 2015: 72). Need-
less to say, such an outcome would be catastrophic for Russia. The Siberian and
Far Eastern Federal Districts account for two thirds of Russian territory, and much
of the country’s wealth originates in these regions, even if it does not remain there.
Losing these lands would also have the effect of reversing a full five centuries of
Russian empire building. In so doing, all pretence to global power status would be
immediately extinguished and Russia would be returned to being no more than an
unusually large state on the fringes of Europe, and a rather backward one at that.
Drawing upon these arguments, several Japanese commentators have reached
the conclusion that Russian leaders must be profoundly in fear of China. For
instance, Tōgō Kazuhiko, the former Japanese diplomat and prominent interna-
tional affairs scholar, has stated:
Russia is a country that has inscribed in its DNA a sense of fear of being
attacked by those surrounding it. This happened with the Mongols, Napo-
leon, and Hitler. [. . .] I think they certainly feel that China is a latent threat.
They would never, however, say that. Russia claims that they do not feel
threatened by China, that Russia and China are on good terms. My gut feel-
ing, however, is that this is not true.
(Ron wo tateru! 2012)
Progressing beyond this reasonable premise, other scholars assume that Russia’s
insecurity will lead it to seek closer relations with Japan as a way of balancing
China’s growing power. Such security ties would also be in Japan’s interests, but
the suggestion is that Russia needs Japan more than vice versa (Kawaraji 2014;
Kimura 2014). This is because Japan is able to depend on the security guarantee
of the United States and also benefits from the strategic buffer of the East China
Sea. As a consequence, compared with Japan, “Russia, which shares a border
more than 4,000 km long with China, is more eager for the talks” (Hyōdō Shinji
quoted in Lulko 2013). Taking advantage of Russia’s weaker hand, Japan should
therefore play “the China card” and seek to exchange enhanced bilateral security
ties for territorial concessions on the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories (Hyōdō
2013, 2014b; Kimura 2014). As with the arguments about historical-legal issues
and economic incentives, the ultimate policy recommendation is that the Japanese
government be patient, hold its ground, and wait for Russia to recognise the full
extent of its vulnerability and thus begin to bargain for Japan’s help (Kimura
2014; Kimura and Hakamada 2007).
As will be seen in the next section, there are a number of flaws in this reason-
ing. Before getting to these, however, it is worth noting that advocates of this
argument can find some encouragement within international relations theory.
Specifically, realists hold that growth in the relative power of one country will
create insecurity amongst its neighbours. A threatened state will therefore be pro-
voked into balancing behaviour in order to neutralise the advantage of the rising
power. This balancing can be both internal and external, with the former referring
to attempts to build up capabilities domestically and the latter signifying efforts to
forge a countervailing coalition of similarly threatened states (Elman and Jensen
2014: 101–2). In the case of Russia in East Asia, if Moscow does indeed perceive
China’s rise as a threat, one would expect it to increase military capabilities in the
Russian Far East and to forge closer relations with other Asian states. Review-
ing the evidence of the last few years, it is apparent that Japanese analysts such
as Hyōdō and Kimura are correct insofar as it is clear that Russian policy does
indeed show signs of some balancing behaviour vis-à-vis China, including by
building closer ties with Japan.

To begin with internal balancing, since 2010 Russia has undertaken a major
programme of military modernisation, including a planned 50 percent increase
in defence spending (Renz and Thornton 2012: 44). The aim has been to raise
national capabilities as a whole, but it is notable that particular emphasis has been
placed on enhancing military strength east of the Urals. To facilitate this process,
Russia’s system of military districts was reorganised in 2010 and an expanded
Eastern Military District was created. Accounting for 44 percent of Russian terri-
tory, this newly constituted district has more formations under its control than any
other (RIA Novosti 2013). It is also scheduled to receive considerable additional
resources. These will include new Ka-50 attack helicopters, Mi-8 AMTSh assault
transport helicopters, Mi-26 heavy transport helicopters, and Su-30 fighters.
There will also be significant upgrades to the district’s air defences, including the
most advanced S-400 missile systems. The region’s Pacific Fleet is also expected
to receive more than forty additional combat ships by 2020 (RIA Novosti 2013).
This figure was expected to include two of the four Mistral-class amphibious
assault ships ordered from France, though this contract was ultimately cancelled
following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 (Stothard 2015).
Further indications of the perception of China as a threat can be found in Rus-
sia’s nuclear policy. In particular, analysts make the case that Russia’s vast arsenal
of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) is directed not primarily at the United States,
but rather at China. TNWs have a smaller yield than intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and are chiefly
designed for battlefield use. They would be of limited value in a nuclear exchange
with the United States but would be vital in counteracting a Chinese land invasion
of the Russian Far East, especially given China’s conventional military advantage
(Blank 2012: 36; Renz and Thornton 2012: 53). Such an attack might seem purely
hypothetical, but an analysis of recent Russian military exercises suggests that it
is a scenario that the country’s military strategists are seriously considering.
The Vostok-2010 exercises were the largest Russian military drills held since
the end of the Cold War, involving tens of thousands of troops, as well as dozens
of military aircraft and warships. The purpose of the exercises was to rehearse
repulsing efforts by hostile forces to occupy territory in the Russian Far East and
separate it from the rest of the country. While the ostensible enemy was a terrorist
group, analysts identified China as the real target (Kipp 2010). In part, the war
games were seen as Russia’s response to China’s 2009 Great Stride exercises.
These involved 50,000 troops and were aimed at strengthening China’s ability to
conduct military operations over long distances. The drills were considered by
many in Russia as menacing, including it would seem by Lieutenant General Ser-
gei Skokov, chief of the ground forces main staff. Asked about threats to Russian
security, Lieutenant General Skokov responded: “If we speak about the East, this
can be a millions-strong army with traditional approaches to conducting combat
operations – straightforwardly, with great concentration of manpower and fire-
power in individual areas” (quoted in Blank 2012: 45). Given that this description
fits the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) better than any other likely opponent,
Vostok-2010 came to be understood as directed against China. It is interesting

to note that Vostok-2010 also included simulated tactical nuclear strikes, thereby
seeming to confirm the importance of TNWs in Russia’s military strategy vis-à-
vis China (McDermott 2010). Overall then, it appears that while Russian politi-
cians have been speaking about the problem-free state of relations with China, the
countries’ militaries have been planning for war.
Comparable signs of balancing can also be found in Russia’s external behav-
iour. In particular, Moscow has strived to forge closer links with other Asian
states, including those with strained relations with China. For example, Russia
has actively cultivated ties with Asia’s other rising superpower, India. This is in
spite of the territorial disputes between India and China which periodically lead
to the outbreak of tensions. During the Cold War, Moscow and New Delhi were
on good terms, yet, as with much else, these relations were neglected during the
turmoil of the Yeltsin years. It was not until the Putin era that the relationship was
revived with the signing of a strategic partnership in 2000. This was later upgraded
to a “special and privileged strategic partnership” in 2010, thereby appearing to
give this relationship a higher status than that which Russia has with China (Pant
2013: 6–7). Further concerning the impressive title, Russian-Indian relations also
have considerable substance, especially in the arms sector. Russia is India’s larg-
est supplier of defence equipment and has been willing to provide even the most
advanced systems that it has tended to deny to China (Radyuhin 2013). The two
countries also cooperate in joint research, design, development, and co-production
of weapons, and several Russian military systems are now locally produced in
India, including the T-90 tank, Brahmos supersonic missile, and Sukhoi fighter
(Pant 2013: 7). Beyond the arms sector, cooperation has also progressed in energy,
and Indian companies are now key investors in several of Russia’s most important
energy projects, including Sakhalin-1 and Yamal LNG (Pant 2013: 7). Lastly, Rus-
sia has been eager to secure full membership for India in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation. This move is understood to be an attempt by Moscow at counterbal-
ancing China’s growing influence in Central Asia (Mankoff 2015: 81).
Another Asian state to which Russia has devoted considerable attention is
Vietnam. As does India, Vietnam has territorial disputes with China. These relate
to competing claims to the South China Sea and have previously led to violent
clashes. The most serious incident occurred in 1988 when a naval skirmish over
the Johnson South Reef resulted in the deaths of 74 Vietnamese troops (Fravel
2011: 298). More recently, in May 2014, China dispatched an oil rig to waters
claimed by Hanoi to fall within its 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In
the resulting turmoil, a Vietnamese fishing boat was sunk, while four Chinese
workers were subsequently killed during two days of rioting in Vietnam (Econo-
mist 2014). Despite these serious tensions with China, Russia has continued to
prioritise closer relations with Hanoi. Prime Minister Medvedev has spoken of the
Russian-Vietnamese “special relationship”, President Putin made an official visit
in 2013, and it is even reported that Moscow has invited Hanoi to join the Eur-
asian Customs Union (Wishnick 2013: 6). Moscow no doubt hopes to develop a
broad-based political and economic relationship, though, so far, the most notable
progress has been made in the usual Russian fields of arms and energy.
With regard to weapons sales, in 2009 Vietnam briefly became Russia’s larg-
est customer (Kim and Blank 2013: 146). This owed much to the agreement that
year of a $2 billion deal for Hanoi to purchase six Kilo-class attack submarines.
This was followed by contracts for Su-30 fighters, coastal-defence missile sys-
tems, advanced frigates, and attack boats (Mankoff 2015: 81). Ties between the
countries’ militaries have also been revived. In April 2013 three Russian warships
visited Ho Chi Minh city (Wishnick 2013: 3), while in November 2014 an agree-
ment was struck for the Russian military to resume usage of the Cam Ranh naval
base, which had been leased by Russia until 2002 (Mankoff 2015: 81). Given that
the most likely adversary for Vietnam is China, this increase in Russian arms sales
and defence ties has caused irritation in Beijing. Indeed, Li Jian, a researcher at
the Chinese Naval Research Institute, has criticised Russia’s increasingly close
relations with Vietnam, stating that they will complicate issues in the South China
Sea (cited in Wishnick 2013: 6).
A similar situation exists in the energy sector. In 1981, a joint oil venture was
launched by the Vietnamese and Soviet authorities. Known as Vietsovpetro, the
project remains in operation and now accounts for around half of Vietnam’s oil
output. It was therefore largely to this successful ongoing concern that Vietnam-
ese President Truon Tan Sang was referring when he stated that “cooperation in
the sphere of oil represents the clearest achievement in bilateral relations” (quoted
in Wishnick 2013: 4). These long-standing ties were further strengthened when,
as part of the December 2009 Strategic Partnership Agreement, PetroVietnam was
invited to participate in upstream projects in Russia, including in the develop-
ment of gas deposits in the Yamal-Nenets region (Wishnick 2013: 4). This is a
significant deal, since Russia is selective in whom it permits to gain access to
its domestic energy reserves. Much more controversial in terms of relations with
China, however, is PetroVietnam’s joint venture with Gazprom, which will see
the state-owned companies cooperate in the exploitation of two offshore oil and
gas blocks in the South China Sea. The area originally considered for develop-
ment is said to have been within waters over which China extends a claim to
national jurisdiction. This plan was abandoned due to pressure from Beijing, yet,
even when the sides selected alternative development blocks outside of China’s
proclaimed “9-dash line”, this Russian-Vietnamese energy cooperation appears
to have provoked the ire of the Chinese authorities. In an April 2012 editorial in
the state-owned Global Times, which was subsequently reprinted on an official
Chinese government website, Russia was criticised for “ ‘sending mixed signals’
and ‘meddling’ in the South China Sea, which was tarnishing Russia’s reputation
in China” (quoted in Wishnick 2013: 4).
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Russia has also been seeking better ties with the
other state with which China has particularly tense relations. As does Vietnam, the
Philippines has a territorial dispute with China over the waters and land forma-
tions of the South China Sea. In January 2013, Manila sought to gain international
support for its claims by taking its case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in
The Hague (Page and Areddy 2014). In this political context, China is unlikely
to have been pleased by Russia’s attempts to forge closer relations with the Phil-
ippines. Given Manila’s strong links with the United States, this relationship is
much less developed than that which Russia has with Vietnam. Nonetheless, Mos-
cow has been actively seeking to sell Yak-130 aircraft to the Philippines, and in
January 2012 three Russian naval ships visited Manila. This was the first time the
Russian Pacific Fleet had visited the Philippines in over ninety years (Wishnick
2013: 2–3).
On the basis of the above evidence, it does indeed appear that Russia, in response
to the perceived China threat, is engaging in balancing behaviour. Does this, how-
ever, extend to seeking closer relations with Japan? Supporters of the argument that
security concerns will ultimately incline the Russian leadership to make conces-
sions on the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories are convinced that it does. This
point is made most explicitly by Hyōdō Shinji, head of the America, Europe, and
Russia Division of the National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS), a branch of
Japan’s Ministry of Defence. In Hyōdō’s view, “Recently, Russia has been placing
greater importance on cooperation with Japan in the security field as a means of
maintaining a balance in its diplomatic relations with China” (Hyōdō 2014b: 860).
These efforts are said to have begun in earnest in September 2012 when the Russian
and Japanese leaders, meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit, confirmed a plan for increased maritime cooperation. Further progress fol-
lowed the next month when Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security
Council and close Putin ally, travelled to Tokyo to sign a memorandum on security
cooperation between the Russian Security Council and the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. It is also claimed that Moscow, while deeply uncomfortable about
China’s pursuit of observer status in the Arctic Council, actively supported Japan’s
application for the same position (Hyōdō 2014b: 863).
Even more significant in this regard is judged to be the Russia-Japan “2 + 2”
meeting, which was held for the first time in November 2013. Bringing together
the countries’ foreign and defence ministers, this format is usually reserved for
close allies; for example, prior to the 2 + 2 meeting with Russia, Japan had only
previously held such meetings with the United States and Australia. The start of
these discussions was therefore heralded as marking a new stage in bilateral secu-
rity cooperation (Hyōdō 2014b: 866–7). They also appeared to deliver something
concrete, since the sides agreed to carry out joint anti-terror and anti-piracy exer-
cises, to conduct regular exchanges of naval officers, to establish regular consul-
tations on cybersecurity, and to increase cooperation in peacekeeping operations
(Asahi Shimbun 2013b).
On account of these clear signs of progress in bilateral security relations,
Hyōdō concludes that the “two sides have begun to view one another as strategic
partners” (Hyōdō 2014b: 867). What is more, this trend is thought likely to only
intensify as China increasingly comes to challenge Russia’s regional interests,
thus making it all the more urgent for Moscow to find means of restoring balance.
As this occurs, Japan’s position relative to Russia will be gradually strengthened
and this may open up opportunities for Tokyo to extract concessions from Mos-
cow on the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories issue. In Hyōdō’s own words:
From the perspective of making progress in negotiations on a solution to the

long-standing territorial dispute, too, this [Russian-Japanese security] coop-

eration will, so to speak, broaden the arena in which such negotiations can be
conducted, and may give Japan some additional leverage.
(Hyōdō 2014b: 870)
Rejection of Japan’s security arguments

It is therefore evident that Russia is not truly as comfortable about China’s grow-
ing power as the public rhetoric would suggest. Those who argue that Moscow
will continue to seek to strengthen its military power in the Far East and retain an
interest in developing closer relations with other Asian states, including Japan, are
therefore on firm ground. Where solid analysis deteriorates into wishful thinking,
however, is in the assumption that security concerns about China could somehow
lead Moscow to make concessions on the sovereignty of the Southern Kurils/
Northern Territories.
To begin with, this argument overlooks the fact that Japan’s incentives to seek
closer security relations with Russia are at least as strong as vice versa. As such,
Tokyo is in no position to exert leverage and would be rational to pursue rapproche-
ment even if Moscow remains intransigent on the territorial issue. Second, the Japa-
nese commentators cited above have a tendency to exaggerate the extent to which
Russia may be willing to oppose China directly. Although it has certainly been
engaged in a careful hedging strategy, there are definite limits to Moscow’s willing-
ness to risk antagonising China. This has been the case for some years, but it has
become even truer following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, when the
introduction of Western sanctions had the effect of making Moscow more dependent
on Beijing. Last of all, when arguing that security incentives could impel Russian
leaders to return the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories, Japanese analysts often
overlook the security value to Russia of the islands themselves. This consideration
ensures that the Russian military, in particular, will always be stridently opposed to
relinquishing any of the islands. As will be demonstrated in more detail below, the
combination of these factors ensures that the security arguments examined in this
chapter also amount to no more than another area of false hope for Japan.
Japan’s desire for security cooperation with Russia

In the preceding section, it was explained that realist international relations the-
ory can be used to make the case that China’s rise will compel Russia to seek
closer relations with Japan. What was not mentioned, however, is that the same
logic can also be applied to Japan itself. Indeed, since the growth in Chinese
power is perceived to be a greater threat to Japan than it is to Russia, it can be
argued that Japan’s need for balancing relations with Moscow will be stronger
than vice versa.
To explain this further, while the threat that China poses to Russia is a matter
of speculation and is contradicted by the governments’ friendly public pronounce-
ments, the antagonism between China and Japan is much more direct and uncon-
cealed. This is most overtly demonstrated by the countries’ territorial dispute over
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, a conflict that escalated so far in 2013 as to see a
Chinese frigate targeting its weapons system on a Japanese warship and helicopter
(Soble and Hill 2013). The rhetoric of the Chinese military is also openly hostile.
For instance, in September 2014 Major General Peng Guangqian publicly boasted
of the ease with which the Chinese armed forces could crush those of Japan, saying
“we would not even have to use all of our army. Half or even a third of our armed
forces is enough to teach the Japanese a good lesson” (quoted in Kir’yanov 2014).
It also seems that any such military action would have the support of the Chinese
people. Surveys report that 87 percent of Chinese have an unfavourable attitude
towards Japan, while 53 percent expect an actual war (Sevastopulo 2014b).
An important qualifier in this regard is that Japan does not stand alone against
China but is able to draw strength from its security relationship with the United
States. The US remains by far the world’s preeminent military power and its
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan remains very much in
force. Despite this, Japan’s sense of insecurity vis-à-vis China is profound and
continues to deepen. In part, this is a result of the relative decline in American
power. While the United States has faced defence cuts as a consequence of the
Budget Control Act of 2011, China’s military spending has continued to advance
at double-digit rates (Bitzinger 2015). More importantly still, there is the concern
that in the aftermath of the enormously costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
United States is in an isolationist mood and would be reluctant to confront China
over issues seemingly peripheral to national interests. Above all, questions have
been raised over whether the United States would really risk war with China over
less than 7 km2 of uninhabited territory in the East China Sea, more than 10,000
km from the US mainland.
Further fuelling such anxieties are possible ambiguities in the US’s security
position. Firstly, Article 5 of the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty states:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the ter-
ritories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.
(MOFA 2014)
While generally assumed that this agreement entails a commitment on the part of
the United States to respond militarily to any attack on Japan, it is notable that
this article is significantly vaguer than its equivalent in the North Atlantic Treaty.
Article 5 of NATO’s founding document reads:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and con-
sequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other

Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,
to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
(NATO 1949: 1)
As can be seen, while the North Atlantic Treaty explicitly mentions “the use of
armed force”, the US-Japan Security Treaty commits each side to nothing more
specific than acting “to meet the common danger”. From the Japanese perspec-
tive, the fear must therefore be that there will come a time when the United States
will make use of this ambiguity to give it the option of not coming to Japan’s aid
militarily in the event of conflict with China.
With specific regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, there is an added worry.
The United States has made apparent that it considers the disputed islands to be
covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. This position was articulated by Presi-
dent Obama in April 2014 when he stated: “The policy of the United States is
clear – the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the
scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security”
(quoted by Panda 2014). This would seem to be an unequivocal commitment, but,
once again, a closer look at the wording reveals some elements of uncertainty. To
be specific, the US president’s statement stipulates that the islands are covered by
the Security Treaty because they are “administered by Japan”. This phrasing is
not accidental but is rather a reflection of the fact that the United States actually
maintains a position of neutrality with regard to which country holds sovereignty
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. This being so, the question arises of what would
happen if China succeeded in gaining de facto control of the islands in a manner
that fell short of a direct military attack. This could be achieved by the landing
of unarmed, non-state Chinese activists on the islands, followed by the blockade
of surrounding waters by Chinese maritime surveillance vessels to prevent the
Japanese coast guard from removing them. If this were to occur, no armed attack
could be said to have taken place, yet the islands would no longer be under the
administration of Japan. In this scenario, the United States might assess that it was
under no obligation to intervene on behalf of Japan, and the Security Treaty would
cease to apply to the islands.
As can be seen, despite its alliance with the US superpower, there remains
much for Japan to be worried about and therefore strong incentives for it to sup-
plement its relationship with the US with closer security ties with other Asian
countries. These considerations have led to a discernible shift in Japanese foreign
policy. As explained by Miyake Kunihiko, a former Japanese diplomat with close
ties to Prime Minister Abe: “We are transforming. We are more inclined to col-
lective and multilateral alliance networks than before. We believe the US-Japan
alliance is not enough” (quoted in Sevastopulo and Anderlini 2014). This change
is also confirmed in Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy, which, after noting
the shift in the regional balance of power, describes how “Japan needs to expand
and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S.
Alliance as the cornerstone” (Kantei 2013: 14).
Given its proximity to Japan, as well as its shared status as a democracy and
major US ally, the Republic of Korea might seem the obvious choice in this
regard. Much to Washington’s frustration, however, cooperation between Tokyo
and Seoul is made exceptionally difficult by the countries’ territorial dispute over
Dokdo/Takeshima and by disagreements over history, above all related to the issue
of “comfort women”, the predominantly Korean and Chinese women who were
coerced into serving in Japanese military brothels during the 1930s and 1940s.
Indeed, the shared sense of outrage at Japan’s perceived lack of remorse for its war-
time misdeeds, as well as burgeoning trade relations, has meant that South Korea
enjoys significantly better relations with China than it does with Japan. Meanwhile,
closer ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is also obviously not
an option since it is a treaty ally of China and has no official relations with Japan.
To find regional security partners with which to potentially balance against
China’s rise, Japan must therefore look elsewhere. It is not, however, entirely
without options. Two promising countries in this regard are India and Austra-
lia, and the Abe government has been very active in seeking to deepen security
relations with each (see Brookes 2014; Panda 2014). The strengthening of these
relationships is undoubtedly important, yet both countries are distant from the
crucible of Japanese-Chinese competition in East Asia.
Rather closer to the action are the Philippines and Vietnam. They also make
appealing security partners for Japan because, as noted, they both have their own
territorial disputes with China over the water and land features of the South China
Sea. Prime Minister Abe has therefore made a point of prioritising relations with
Manila and Hanoi. Indeed, unusually for a Japanese leader, Abe, soon after his
return to the prime minister’s office, made Vietnam his first overseas destination;
he was also explicit in announcing that the purpose of the visit was “strategic
diplomacy” (quoted in BBC 2013). Six months later a trip to the Philippines fol-
lowed, which was expressly targeted at strengthening the countries’ “strategic
partnership” (MOFA 2013). Furthermore, Japan has also pledged material support
to assist the maritime security of both Vietnam and the Philippines, including via
the supply of patrol boats (Sevastopulo 2014a). Relations with these two South-
east Asian nations are therefore evidently valued by Tokyo, not least because they
add voices to Japan’s criticism of what it views as Chinese expansionism in East
Asia. Given the poverty of both countries, however, there are clear limits to the
extent to which they can assist Japan in the containment of China.
Japan is therefore in the position of still desiring additional security partners
within the region to ease its anxieties about whether it can rely indefinitely upon
the United States. It is in this regard that one can make the case that in the long-
run, Japan needs Russia. Not only is Russia an immediate presence in Northeast
Asia with a long coastline on the Sea of Japan, it also has the economic, military,
and geopolitical heft to make a major difference to the regional balance of power.
Furthermore, developing closer ties with Russia would bring an end to the uncom-
fortable situation for Japan of having poor relations with all four of its closest
neighbours.
Another crucial factor when it comes to strategic considerations is Russia’s
vast land border with China. While the Japanese scholars cited above are entirely
correct to note that this exposed frontier is a security concern for Russia, the same
can also be said for China. From the 1960s to the 1980s, tense relations across this
frontier ensured that much of China’s military potential had to remain focused in
the northeast. It was only with the improvement in bilateral ties after 1989 and the
later settling of the countries’ border dispute in 2004 that China was able to turn
its attention decidedly elsewhere and concentrate on expanding its influence to the
south and east. Friendly relations with Russia are therefore enormously important
to Beijing in providing it with a solid defensive rear that gives it sufficiently high
levels of domestic security for it to be able to focus on projecting power farther
afield. An instructive parallel is the way in which stable relations with Canada and
Mexico have served as the foundation of the US’s broader international strength.
Conversely, if Russia were to be drawn away from China and serious frictions
were to reemerge, Beijing would be deprived of its secure northeastern flank and,
with every increase in tension along the Russian-Chinese border, Chinese mari-
time ambitions in the East and South China Seas would need to be scaled back.
Japan consequently has much to gain if it can cultivate closer ties with Russia
at the expense of the latter’s relationship with China. This conclusion is only rein-
forced if one reflects on the possible alternative. If Japan does not attempt to lure
Russia away from China, the chances are raised that the already well-developed
strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing will eventually solidify into a
full alliance. With China the more powerful of the two, this development could
lead Russia to be pressured into adopting a more hostile attitude towards Japan. At
a time when serious questions are being raised about the strength and durability of
the US commitment to the region, such a Sino-Russian alliance would be disas-
trous for Japanese security. Indeed, Tōgō Kazuhiko goes so far as to warn of “the
mortal danger for Japan if Russia is driven into the arms of China” (Tōgō 2014).
This logic has apparently not escaped Japan’s decision makers, since, although
it is true that the Russian side has been receptive to the prospect of closer security
ties with Japan, the evidence suggests that it was actually Tokyo that initiated the
move in this direction in 2012. In particular, it appears that Prime Minister Abe is
personally convinced of the importance of this relationship to regional security.
For instance, in April 2013 he told journalists:
It seems to me that quite a dangerous situation has developed in the sphere

of security in the Asia-Pacific region. The transformation of it into an area
of peace and stability is, without any doubt, in the interests of Japan and
Russia. Widening our cooperation in this direction corresponds not only to
the national interests of our two countries, but will also contribute to the
development of the entire region.
(quoted in Gusman 2013)
Even more significantly, Japan’s contemporary desire for closer security ties with
Russia is expressed in the country’s National Security Strategy. This December
2013 document states:
Under the increasingly severe security environment in East Asia, it is critical

for Japan to advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including secu-
rity and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole, in order to
ensure its security. Based on this recognition, Japan will cooperate with Rus-
sia in securing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
(Kantei 2013: 25)
By contrast, Japan does not get a single mention in Russia’s National Security
Strategy (Sovet Bezopasnosti 2009).
Further evidence of Japan’s enthusiasm can be found in the details of the 2 + 2
talks. It was the Japanese side that provided the impetus for holding discussions
in this format in November 2013. These talks also appear to have held greater
significance for the Japanese side than for the Russian. For instance, while Japan
has reserved this diplomatic format for its closest allies, previously holding 2 + 2
meetings with only the United States and Australia, Russia seems to regard the
arrangement as less exclusive. Prior to the 2 + 2 with Japan, Russia had already
held such meetings with the United States, UK, France, and Italy. In other words,
Moscow is evidently willing to hold 2 + 2 meetings with countries with which it
does not have especially close security relations.
Counter to this argument that Russia is potentially a more important security
partner to Japan than vice versa could be raised the evidence of the sanctions
introduced by Tokyo against Russia following its annexation of Crimea in 2014.
After all, if the Japanese authorities were really so intent on building closer secu-
rity ties with Russia, would they really risk damaging the relationship by intro-
ducing such sanctions? This is a legitimate question and one that, at first glance,
seems to contradict the case made above. A closer examination of the nature of the
Japanese sanctions, however, suggests a different conclusion.
In comparison with the restrictions imposed by other G7 members, Japan’s
sanctions against Russia were slow to be introduced and are significantly weaker.
The measures brought into force by the United States and European Union have
targeted entire sectors of the Russian economy and feature long lists of named
Russian officials. Japan, by contrast, has no sectoral sanctions and has never even
published the names of those to whom it has applied visa bans. The seniority
of the officials on the list is therefore not publicly known, though it is apparent
that neither Sergei Naryshkin, Speaker of the Russian Duma nor Igor’ Sechin,
chairman of Rosneft, are on the list. These two prominent Putin allies, who have
been sanctioned by Western countries, both visited Tokyo in 2014. Other Japa-
nese sanctions have been similarly weak. Tokyo has banned certain arms exports
to Russia, though it was not, in any case, a buyer. Restrictions were also intro-
duced to prevent five Russian state-controlled banks from issuing new securities
in Japan, though none actually had any more than minimal previous involvement
in the Japanese market.
Overall then, the Japanese sanctions seem explicitly designed to ensure that
they have no tangible impact on Russia. The intention therefore seems to have
been to demonstrate a sufficient degree of conformity with the policy of the United
States – something deemed necessary, since the US remains Japan’s key security
guarantor – yet to do so in such a way as to avoid undoing the progress made in
Japanese-Russian relations since 2012. This interpretation is strengthened by the
fact that despite the introduction of the sanctions, Abe has shown himself still
eager to meet with Putin, holding bilateral talks in both Milan in October 2014
and Beijing in November, and continuing to discuss the possibility of the Russian
leader’s visit to Japan (RIA Novosti 2015).
The Russian side, for its part, seems to have acknowledged Japan’s reluctance
to join the Western sanctions and its intention to maintain a carefully balanced
position. For instance, although Russian officials have expressed disappointment
at Tokyo’s policy, they have been restrained in their criticism. Indeed, prominent
politicians have directly blamed the United States for “blackmailing” Japan and
forcing it to introduce sanctions that are against its own national interests (ITAR-
TASS 2014). It is also notable that while Russia introduced bans on the import
of agricultural products from the European Union, United States, Canada, and
Australia, no such counter-sanctions were targeted against Japan. To this extent,
Japan’s policy seems to have been successful and it can remain hopeful that the
rapprochement with Russia will indeed resume once the Ukraine crisis finally
subsides.
Overall then, the Japanese sanctions merely confirm the broader image. That
is, rather than the possibility of security cooperation being something that Japan
could potentially leverage into Russian concessions, it is evident that the desire
for a stronger bilateral relationship in this area is as strong, if not stronger, on the
Japanese side. As a result, Japan is likely to agree to closer security ties with Rus-
sia even if Moscow offers nothing additional in return. Indeed, if anyone is to be
impelled to make policy changes in order to secure cooperation, it will be Japan.
Russia–China relations
A second reason why the vision of Russia coming to court Japan for security
cooperation vis-à-vis China is unrealistic is because it is based upon a misreading
of the extent to which Moscow would be willing to oppose Beijing. While Russia
is indeed concerned about the implications of China’s rise and has been show-
ing some signs of balancing behaviour, it has no intention of being drawn into a
position of direct confrontation. Moscow’s ideal situation is instead to maintain
excellent relations with Beijing yet simultaneously seek to avoid the emergence
of Chinese hegemony in East Asia. Russia has therefore sought to maintain a
flexible foreign policy, building closer ties with all countries in the region and
not becoming overly dependent on one relationship. Younkyoo Kim and Stephen
Blank characterise this trend as Russia’s attempt to remain a “swing state” in
Asia and to avoid geopolitically “leaning to one side” (2013: 141). Cautiously
cultivating closer relations with Vietnam and Japan would therefore be seen to
be consistent with this policy. Any action that would risk seriously antagonising
China, however, would be deemed strictly off limits.
Quite apart from the commercial incentives to maintain close ties with what
will soon be the world’s largest economy, there are several other reasons why
Moscow will be disinclined to oppose China. Firstly, on a theoretical level, while
regional balance of power thinking suggests that Russia should be liable to bal-
ance against China’s growing dominance of East Asia, applied at the global level
the conclusion would be the opposite. Specifically, since the US remains the
pre-eminent military power on the broader international stage, the theory would
predict that Russia would actually seek to balance with China against the United
States (Lukin 2012).
More concretely, Moscow and Beijing are united by their similar outlooks on
international politics. Unlike Western countries that place emphasis on universal
liberal values, such as human rights and democracy, Russia and China prioritise
the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. As a result, Russian
and Chinese policymakers have tended to see eye-to-eye on key international
issues, such as the 2003 Iraq War and the 2013 Syrian conflict. This is confirmed
by the Russian Foreign Ministry itself, which states: “Moscow and Beijing hold
similar or identical positions in relation to the majority of international problems
and we intend to continue to closely coordinate our foreign policy efforts” (quoted
in TASS 2015). This also extends to the sides’ mutual suspicion of Washington’s
activities in East Asia, especially with regard to the deployment of the US’s
anti-ballistic missile system, including the installation of a new X-band radar in
Japan and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea.
Although the United States insists that these systems are only intended to counter
the North Korean threat, both Moscow and Beijing suspect that this is merely a
pretext and that the real targets are the Russian and Chinese strategic arsenals
(Muraviev 2015: 15).
Further making it easier for the sides to cooperate on international issues, the
shared emphasis on national sovereignty helps endear China to Russian policy-
makers with regard to domestic politics. Whether on the subject of democratic
shortcomings, human rights abuses, or corruption allegations, Western countries
are inclined to criticise Russian officials and even to target them with sanctions,
as seen in the case of the US’s Magnitsky Act (US Senate 2012). They also seek
to promote an alternative model of governance and openly assert that they would
ultimately like to see it applied in Russia. This represents a challenge to the Rus-
sian ruling class’s financial and political interests. China, by contrast, represents
no such threat, since it also follows a state-dominated political model and has no
intention of involving itself in Russia’s domestic affairs. According to Marcin
Kaczmarski, it is largely due to these individual interests, rather than those of the
country as a whole, that the Russian foreign policy elite are particularly disposed
to favour relations with China (2012: 15).
Lastly, as noted in Chapter 1, while historical memory is a factor that continues
to divide Russia and Japan, it is a unifying force in Russian-Chinese relations.
In particular, Moscow and Beijing are as one in their fervent and unequivocal
condemnation of the aggression perpetrated by Imperial Japan during World War
II and are similarly forthright in championing the role of the Soviet Union and
Chinese Communist Party in defeating it. Moreover, as relations between Russia

and China have continued to improve, efforts have been intensifying to com-
memorate these historical events jointly. For instance, speaking on 2 September
at the Chinese embassy in Moscow, Mikhail Titarenko, director of the Institute of
Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, remarked: “Today we
mark our common celebration of the victory over militarist Japan and the end of
the Second World War.” He continued by stressing the enormous suffering of the
Chinese people “as a result of the policy of genocide carried out by Japan”, and
concluded by emphasising the Soviet Union’s vital contribution to terminating
the conflict, claiming that “[i]n the strategic situation prevailing in summer 1945,
only the Soviet Union was capable of fulfilling its historical mission of achiev-
ing the rapid defeat of the main forces of the army of militarist Japan” (RAN
2014). As have their Chinese counterparts, prominent Russian figures have also
become vehement in their condemnations of what they view as Japanese attempts
to rewrite the history of the conflict. For example, when Foreign Minister Kishida
characterised the Soviet attack on the Kuril Islands as an attempt to change the
international status quo by force, he was forcefully rebuked by the Russian side.
Indeed, in words that could have come from a Chinese official, a spokesman for
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Kishida of “trying to turn history
on its head and revise the generally accepted understanding of the causes and
results of the war”. He also affirmed that “it was actually militarist Japan together
with Nazi Germany that, in trying to assert their dominance of the world, used
force to destroy the status quo that existed until the start of the Second World
War and occupied a whole series of states” (MID 2015). With their views on
these historical issues increasingly aligned, it was therefore logical for Russia and
China to make a point of marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the conflict
together. This was achieved by President Xi travelling to Moscow for Victory Day
on 9 May 2015 and President Putin visiting Beijing on 3 September for China’s
own anniversary commemorations.
Russia is therefore pulled closer to China by these strategic and historical con-
siderations. As a result, although Moscow’s overall ambition is to remain an unat-
tached actor in Asia and it is willing to explore security ties with other regional
players, it will not allow itself to be drawn into a position of opposition against
China. This strict boundary to Russia’s security policy was explicitly communi-
cated to Japan during the 2 + 2 meeting of November 2013. Specifically, when
the Japanese side sought to raise the issue of China, the Russian negotiators flatly
refused to address this topic. Explaining their position afterwards, the Russian
deputy foreign minister stated: “China is our strategic partner and we will not con-
duct discussions about her behind her back” (quoted in Asahi Shimbun 2013b). In
case this was not clear enough, Foreign Minister Lavrov later reasserted Russia’s
position by telling reporters that “we understand” but “we generally are never
friends with someone against someone else” (quoted in Lulko 2013).
Even at the high point in recent Russian-Japanese relations at the end of 2013,
it is therefore apparent that Russia never had any thought of joining forces with
Japan against China. This is all the more so the case in the aftermath of the
Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014. This is because
the introduction of Western sanctions has caused Moscow to seek to compen-
sate for reduced political and economic ties with the European Union and United
States by rapidly deepening its relations with China (Brown 2015). Indeed, the
unintended consequence of the West’s response to events in Ukraine may be to
induce a lasting shift in Moscow’s policy in Asia. Having long sought to maintain
a position of “equilibrium” and avoid excessively “leaning to one side” (Kim and
Blank 2013: 141), Moscow now seems to have set aside many of its previous
reservations and to have cast in its lot with Beijing. As a result, far from having
“peaked”, as suggested by Hyōdō (2014b: 860), we find instead that Russian-
Chinese relations after the Ukraine crisis are scaling ever greater heights. Stress-
ing the unprecedented closeness of current ties, the Chinese foreign minister has
spoken of the relationship “entering a new stage of strategic partnership” (quoted
in Latukhina 2015), while President Putin has even begun to flirt with the idea
of alliance, saying: “We are natural partners, natural allies, we are neighbours”
(AFP 2014).
Aside from the lofty rhetoric, evidence of the new level of closeness in bilateral
relations can be found in the energy sector. Specifically, it was in May 2014 that
agreement was finally reached on the thirty-year, $400 billion deal for Russia to
supply China with Far Eastern gas via the new Power of Siberia pipeline (Weitz
2014). After more than ten years of inconclusive negotiations, it seems that West-
ern sanctions were instrumental in breaking the impasse on this agreement by
pushing Russia to accept China’s price terms. Having achieved this breakthrough,
a second deal swiftly followed in November, with the sides this time signing a
framework agreement for the supply of western Siberian gas to China’s Xinjiang
region (Hornby 2014). In the Russian leader’s words, by means of such contracts,
“We [Russia and China] are progressively moving towards the formation of a
strategic energy alliance” (Putin quoted in Zamakhina 2014).
Simultaneously, bilateral military ties were also taken to a new level. In May
2014, joint exercises were held by the Russian and Chinese navies in the East
China Sea. Given China and Japan’s dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands,
these drills were a matter of serious concern to Tokyo (Mankoff 2015: 78). During
a visit to Beijing in November by Russian defence minister Shoigu, the sides also
vowed to move forward with plans for future exercises in the Pacific and even
in the Mediterranean (Anderlini 2014). In the arms sector too, having previously
denied China access to its most advanced weaponry due to concerns over theft
of intellectual property, in 2014 Russia made it known that it was now willing
to supply Beijing with Su-35 combat aircraft and the S-400 air defence system
(Keck 2014; Novichkov and Hardy 2014). These technologies will help China
extend its defensive coverage and strike range, thereby strengthening its position
with regard to Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.
Last of all, Russia’s post-Crimea foreign policy shift is also reflected in pub-
lic opinion, with attitudes towards China rapidly improving as those towards
the West have soured. Indeed, according to an opinion survey conducted by the
Levada Center in December 2014, a full 80 percent of Russians now have positive
views of China, while 81 percent regard the United States negatively. Each figure
is the highest recorded in the history of the survey. More narrowly, the same study
found that 47 percent believe that Russia’s long-term foreign policy should centre
on developing stronger relations with China, an increase of 26 percent since 2013
(Interfax 2015).
Russia’s anger at the sanctions has mostly been directed at the United States
and European Union. Nonetheless, although Russian officials have recognised
Tokyo’s clear reluctance to join the sanctions regime and acknowledged the delib-
erate weakness of its measures, their introduction has still damaged Japan’s posi-
tion. Not only have these developments led to closer relations between Russia and
Japan’s main strategic rival, they have also reminded Russian decision makers that
on major political questions, Tokyo will ultimately always side with Washington.
From the Russian perspective, this makes Japan a dubious security partner.
For the reasons outlined above, the claim that Japan could exploit Russian fears
of China and extract territorial concessions on the Southern Kurils/Northern Ter-
ritories in exchange for closer Japanese-Russian security ties was never particu-
larly persuasive. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, the idea is little more than
a fantasy. With Russian-Chinese relations becoming ever closer, if Japan wishes
to promote an alternative geopolitical alignment in the region, it will have to work
very hard to induce Moscow to distance itself again from Beijing. In this context,
it will not be Russia needing to offer incentives to Japan to accept security coop-
eration, but vice versa.
The strategic significance of the islands

A final consideration when it comes to security issues is the strategic significance
of the islands themselves. This is a factor that is often overlooked by those Japa-
nese commentators who remain optimistic about the possibility of all four islands
one day being returned. In particular, the strategic value of the archipelago guar-
antees that the military, an influential constituency within Russian foreign poli-
cymaking, will remain obdurate in their opposition to any territorial concessions.
The strategic importance of the islands is determined by their geographic
location. Stretching from Kamchatka to Hokkaidō, they create a physical bar-
rier between the North Pacific and the Sea of Okhotsk. This gives the islands
natural military significance, which John J. Stephan emphasises by poetically
describing them as a “1000-kilometer Cossack saber” (1974: 185). When under
Imperial Japan’s control from 1875 to 1945, the island chain played an important
role in Japan’s naval strategy. As Tsuyoshi Hasegawa explains, “Under Japanese
occupation, the Kuril arc could cut off Kamchatka from the strategic areas cen-
tered around Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, while limiting the access of Russian
ships in Vladivostok, the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Ocean”
(1998a: 7). It is also a historically interesting fact that it was from these islands,
specifically from Etorufu/Iturup’s Hitokappu Bay, that the Japanese carrier task
force departed in November 1941 to carry out its mission against Pearl Harbor
(Kuroiwa 2013: 190).
It is precisely this strategic value that led the Soviet Union to prioritise the
islands’ seizure during World War II. This goal was outlined in a report on Soviet-
Japanese relations presented by Ambassador Iakov Malik in July 1944. Of the
twenty-seven items mentioned in this document, the islands issue was given the
highest priority, with Malik recommending that “the entire Kurils, which has shut
off our entrance into the Pacific, should be handed over to the Soviet Union”
(quoted in Hasegawa 1998a: 45). Once this goal had been achieved, Soviet lead-
ers were also quite explicit in appealing to strategic logic when explaining their
occupation of the islands. For instance, in his famous victory speech of 2 Septem-
ber 1945, Stalin proclaimed:
This means that the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands revert to
the Soviet Union and henceforth will serve not as a barrier between the Soviet
Union and the ocean and a base for Japanese attack upon our Far East but as a
direct means of communication between the Soviet Union and the ocean and
a base for the defence of our country against Japanese aggression.
(Stalin 1946: 209)
Khrushchev also emphasised the islands’ military significance, especially that of

Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. As Hasegawa reports, the Soviet leader told for-
eign dignitaries, “Economically these islands had no significance whatever [. . .].
On the contrary, they were a tremendous financial burden to the Soviet govern-
ment. But what is decisive is the prestige of the country as well as the strategic
side of the issue” (quoted in 1998a: 131–2).
The islands were therefore clearly judged to be strategically significant during
and after the Second World War, but does this remain a factor in discouraging Rus-
sia from returning the four southernmost islands today? An analysis of the work
of Russian security and military experts indicates that it certainly does. To begin
with, these specialists highlight that although the total number of islands in the
Kuril chain is fifty-six, there are only five channels that are of sufficient depth and
width to make for ideal points of access for surface ships and submarines. Three of
these are in the northern half of the chain, but two are in close proximity to the dis-
puted islands. The first of these is Proliv Friza between Urup and Iturup/Etorofu;
the second, Proliv Ekaterina between Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i (Haines 2014:
589–90). Of particular military significance is the fact that by means of these deep,
ice-free channels, Russian submarines can exit into the wider Pacific without
detection (Klimenko 2002). Even more important, however, is the consideration
that, by controlling the islands, Russia is in a position to restrict access to the Sea
of Okhotsk. As Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer explains, this means
that “[i]n times of conflict, the Russian military could mine the straits between
the Kurile Islands and effectively isolate the Sea of Okhotsk, allowing strategic
nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles to deploy in relative safety” (2010). It
was to prepare for this eventuality that the Soviets militarised the disputed islands
in 1977–8, installing extensive radar and sonar facilities, as well as stockpiling
mines and depth charges (Haines 2014: 595). Although the Cold War may now
have ended, this strategic option has actually become more prominent, since,
according to Felgenhauer, the “Russian navy does not have sufficient numbers
of nuclear attack submarines and surface ships to defend the deployment of the
newest Borey submarines in the open Pacific. The only safe option seems the semi-
closed Sea of Okhotsk, guarded by the Kurile Islands chain” (2010).
The Sea of Okhotsk is therefore vital to Russia’s nuclear deterrent and has
rightly been described as akin to the country’s “last line of defense” (Shikata
Toshiyuki quoted in Haines 2014: 596). Ceding any of the islands that ring this
sea would therefore be viewed as an unacceptable security risk by most Russian
strategists. For some, the danger is Japan itself. In particular, Anatolii Klimenko
warns that “the Kurils are a very convenient bridgehead for creating a threat to
Russian security.” He continues with the claim that “[t]he mentality of the Japa-
nese is such that a concession [on the four disputed islands] would only awaken
their appetite for the rest of the Kurils and Sakhalin” (2002). Klimenko is not
alone in this concern, but it is more customary for Russian observers to focus on
the perceived risk that if the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories were returned
to Japan, at some point Tokyo would permit its US ally to establish military bases
there. This has been a long-standing worry for Moscow and, in fact, it was this
concern that caused the Soviet government to revoke its 1956 commitment to
return Shikotan and Habomai after the signing of a peace treaty. That decision
came in January 1960 following the conclusion between Japan and the US of
the revised security treaty which included, as Article 6, the agreement that “the
United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of
facilities and areas in Japan” (MOFA 2014).1 Clearly it would be possible for
the Japanese authorities to attempt to assuage Russian fears by promising that
if returned, the islands would be permanently demilitarised. This is, however,
unlikely to prove persuasive. After all, it is widely believed in Russia that the West
made a similar pledge not to expand NATO after the end of the Cold War, only to
go back on this promise within a few years (Bradley 2009). It is also not fanciful
to suspect that the US might desire bases on the Kurils. For instance, on 18 August
1945 President Truman sent a telegram to Stalin, telling him that the United States
government “desires air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some of the Kurile
Islands, preferably in the central group, for military purposes and for commercial
use” (quoted in Hasegawa 1998a: 63–4). It is also known that during the Cold
War, in the event of conventional conflict breaking out in the region, US strategy
was to capture key points on the Kuril Islands and Kamchatka Peninsula with the
specific aim of countering Soviet naval operations in the Sea of Okhotsk (Haines
2014: 592). Given the continued importance of this maritime area to Russia’s
nuclear strategy and the tense nature of contemporary US-Russian relations, there
is every reason to suspect that the US military would still be interested in estab-
lishing a presence on the islands.
Last of all, if any further confirmation were needed of the continued strategic
significance of the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories to Russia, it can be found
in the recent increases in investment in their defence. Most strikingly, in April
2014 it was announced by Sergei Surovkin, commander of the Eastern Military
District, that 150 defensive installations would be completed on Iturup/Etorofu

and Kunashir/i by the end of 2016. The purpose of this programme is to make
the islands’ military camps fully autonomous and to provide them with improved
social infrastructure, including new military housing as well as cultural and rec-
reational facilities (Naranovich 2014). The most important project, however, is
undoubtedly the new airport on Iturup/Etorofu. Officially opened in September
2014 and with a 2,300-metre runway, this facility is designed for both civilian and
military purposes (Siberian Times 2014).
Further concerning these investments on the islands themselves, Russia has
also been seeking to strengthen its ability to defend the archipelago using naval
and air force assets stationed in the broader Eastern Military District. Specifically,
John Haines states that one of the main purposes for Russia’s attempt to acquire
the two Mistral assault ships for the Pacific Fleet had been to ensure the security
of the disputed islands (2014: 593). It is also notable that there has been a marked
increase in Russian military aircraft operating in the vicinity of the islands as well
as more generally in close proximity to Japanese airspace. Indeed, in the first half
of 2014 alone, Japan was forced to scramble its jets more than 300 times to inter-
cept approaching Russian aircraft (Makarov 2014).
Evidently none of these activities is suggestive of a willingness on the part
of Russia to consider relinquishing the four islands. What is more, as Moscow
continues to execute its “eastern pivot” and as the security situation in the Asia-
Pacific region becomes ever tenser, Russia’s commitment to retaining the islands
is only likely to intensify.
Conclusions
Reflecting on the above, it is apparent that Japan’s hopes that security consid-
erations will help it to retrieve the four islands are as illusory as the previously
assessed arguments about history and economics. This is in spite of the fact that
Japanese commentators are entirely correct to draw attention to Russian jit-
ters about China’s rise. As has been shown, Moscow is indeed worried about
the implications of China’s growing power, especially for its own influence in the
strategically important regions of Central Asia and the Arctic. Additionally, while
unlikely that Beijing would ever seek to seize the Russian Far East by force, there
are genuine worries that the region will progressively come to be dominated by
China, resulting in what Sergei Karaganov describes as “a second epic edition of
Finlandization, this time in the East” (Karaganov 2013). These concerns caused
Moscow to develop a subtle balancing strategy, which involves building up its
military forces in the Asia-Pacific region and carefully cultivating closer ties with
other Asian powers, including India, Vietnam, and Japan itself. There is no doubt
that these signs of balancing behaviour have encouraged Japanese strategists to
believe that Moscow’s anxieties about China could represent a strategic opportu-
nity for Japan.
While the rise of China does indeed increase the logic of closer relations between
Russia and Japan, Japanese observers are quite wrong to assume that this could
somehow compel Russia to soften its position on the Southern Kurils/Northern
Territories. As has been clearly demonstrated in this chapter, Japan is in no posi-

tion to exploit Russian anxieties about China as leverage with which to extract ter-
ritorial concessions. First, given the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and tense political
relations, Japan’s security fears about China are much more intense than those of
Russia. This being so, over the long term, Tokyo will be inclined to favour closer
security ties with Russia even if the latter gives absolutely no encouragement to
Japan with regard to their territorial dispute.
Second, Japanese analysts have been shown to misunderstand the extent to
which Moscow would be willing to oppose Beijing. While Russian leaders cer-
tainly would like to avoid a situation in which China achieves hegemony over
East Asia, they will not countenance antagonising Beijing by engaging directly
in any containment efforts. Instead, Moscow’s actual ambition is to operate as
a major independent power in the Asia-Pacific region, remaining aloof from
regional power blocs so as to be able to act as a counterweight to any bids for
regional hegemony (Lukin and Lee 2015: 176). This may be Russia’s overall goal,
but, as has been seen, the rise of East-West tensions as a result of the Ukraine cri-
sis has forced Russia to move away from this strategy and embrace much closer
relations with China. As a result, Japan’s already doubtful prospects of cultivating
security relations with Russia against China currently appear particularly forlorn.
Finally, in the last part of the chapter, attention was drawn to the strategic impor-
tance of the islands themselves. This finding indicates that even if there were to be
potential security advantages to relinquishing the islands in exchange for closer
relations with Japan, the Russian authorities would have to weigh up these gains
against the evident security losses that returning the four islands would entail.
This factor ensures that the Russian military will remain committed in its opposi-
tion to any territorial transfer, especially since the islands are judged significant to
Russia’s nuclear deterrent, the cornerstone of the country’s defence.
Overall then, this chapter’s assessment of security issues only reinforces the
view that Russia will not be induced to return the four islands. More forcefully
expressed, Dmitrii Polyanskii, a former Soviet ambassador to Japan, draws upon
strategic considerations to reach the conclusion that Russia “has no intention of
transferring to Japan a single piece of stone, let alone an island” (quoted in Haines
2014: 592).
Note
1 It was not until after Vladimir Putin became president in 2000 that the Russian side
unequivocally reaffirmed its commitment to the 1956 Soviet-Japan Joint Declaration.
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5 Social considerations and
public opinion
The claim that Japan can depend on public support

for the return of the islands
The final area of Japanese optimism with regard to the Southern Kurils/Northern
Territories is in terms of public opinion. In particular, the government presents the
unwavering support of the Japanese people for the principle of the return of all
four islands as a source of great strength. Simultaneously, Japanese commentators
find encouragement in the frustration of residents of the Russian Far East with the
federal authorities and hope that this could lead to local support for the transfer
of land to Japan. Others draw attention to the fact that several prominent Russian
figures have previously spoken in favour of Moscow making concessions on the
territorial dispute. Lastly, both the Japanese authorities and academic observers
remain sanguine about the prospects of resolving the difficult issue of what to do
with the thousands of Russian residents who currently live on the islands if the
area were indeed returned to Japanese administration.
To begin with the first point, the Japanese leadership likes to emphasise that its
position of demanding the return of all four islands has the determined backing
of the Japanese public. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states promi-
nently on its website that
return of the Northern Territories has been the ardent wish of the people of
Japan, and a deep-rooted movement among the general public for the return
of the islands has developed national-wide. With this strong support from
the people of Japan, the Government of Japan, under a consistent policy, has
persistently called on the Soviet Union, and subsequently the Russian Fed-
eration, to conclude a peace treaty between the two countries, contingent on
the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.
(MOFA 2011)
Prime Minister Abe has expressed the same sentiment in stressing his conviction
that the return of the islands is “the long-held dream of the Japanese people”
(quoted in Novaya Gazeta 2014). He also makes the claim that this public sup-
port could have a positive influence on the outcome of discussions with Russia,
saying: “We want to continue to negotiate tenaciously for the return of the four
Social considerations and public opinion 81
northern islands. In this regard, if everyone expresses their thoughts, I believe it
will be enormously powerful” (Kantei 2015). This message is also propagated in
government publicity, such as a video advertisement in which the Japanese minis-
ter of state for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs asserts: “The voice of the
people is the power to resolve the Northern Territories issue” (Yamamoto 2014).
While public support for the return of the four islands is said to be general and
nationwide, those with the greatest stake in the issue are the Japanese residents
who were tragically expelled from the islands after their seizure by the Soviet
military. In 1958 these former islanders formed the League of Chishima-Habomai

Residents, a group that continues to work to raise awareness of the territorial dis-
pute and to campaign for the islands’ return. Given the passage of so much time,
the majority of the former residents have now passed away, though in March 2014
it was estimated that as many as 6,596 remain. Their descendants are thought
to number a further 28,830 (Chishimahabomai Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei 2014).
Besides the League, there are several other related campaign movements, includ-
ing a petition drive that has gathered almost 84 million signatures (Hokkaidō Gov-
ernment 2014). The most important date of the year for these groups is 7 February,
the Day of the Northern Territories, when several public events are held, especially
in Tokyo and Nemuro, the Hokkaidō town closest to the disputed islands. These
activities are primarily directed at a domestic audience but there is also hope that
if the issue were more widely publicised, international opinion would also come
to support Japan’s position. For instance, in 2011 Asano Takahiro, a Hokkaidō
representative, told the lower house of parliament: “The Northern Territories dis-
pute is a problem which both Russia and Japan have but, at the same time, I
think it is important to ‘form a correct international opinion’ by appealing to the
international community that these four islands are part of our inherent territory”
(Shūgiin 2011).
Further concerning drawing strength from public support within Japan, as well
as potentially from the broader international community, Japanese observers find
encouragement in the perceived lack of interest in the islands from many on the
Russian side, including the federal authorities. For instance, Koike Yuriko, a
hawkish defence minister during Abe Shinzō’s first premiership, has said of the
islands that “as elsewhere in Russia, their residents have been impoverished by
consistently incompetent and corrupt government, whether run by Communists or
today’s crony capitalists” (Koike 2014). Her suggestion is therefore that if given
the chance to participate in a referendum, it could not be taken for granted that the
current inhabitants would vote for the territory to remain Russian. In addition to
the lure of higher living standards under Japanese administration, Koike claims
that 60 percent of the islands’ residents have Ukrainian roots and may therefore
be liable to turn against Moscow following Russia’s annexation of Crimea (Koike
2014).
Although Koike does not do so herself, it is possible to put together some cred-
ible evidence in support of her argument. To begin with, the Southern Kurils/
Northern Territories undoubtedly suffered serious economic neglect following
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, as a result of the end of central
82 Social considerations and public opinion
government subsidies, living standards declined precipitately. Summing up the
difficult situation during these years, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Kunadze
described the islands as “[o]ne of the most beautiful and potentially rich cor-
ners of Russia, but in reality monstrously poor and desolate” (quoted in Rich-
ardson n.d.: 9). In response to this near abandonment by the Russian authorities,
in the early 1990s the islanders increasingly came to rely upon supplies of food-
stuffs, consumer goods, and fuel from Japan. This situation only became more
pronounced following the large earthquake that struck the area on 4 October
1994. Japan acted quickly in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, providing
emergency assistance and airlifting the injured to hospitals on Hokkaidō. Tokyo
also contributed greatly to the subsequent rebuilding of infrastructure, providing
$10 million of humanitarian aid in 1998 and 1999 (Koval’ 2001: 16).
Although some degree of economic hardship was perhaps inevitable given the
financial problems that Russia was generally facing during the 1990s, other evi-
dence suggests that the authorities’ neglectful attitude was not simply due to a
lack of resources. Specifically, as highlighted by Paul Richardson, throughout
this decade and on into the 2000s there were numerous cases of Russian pub-
lications mistakenly representing the disputed islands as being under Japanese
administration, thus suggesting a lack of knowledge and interest in the area. Such
errors were committed by major news outlets such as ITAR-TASS and Argumenty
i Fakty, as well as by more official sources, including the magazine of the rul-
ing Edinaya Rossiya [United Russia] party and Rossiiskaya Gazeta, the Russian
government’s own newspaper. More embarrassing still was the revelation in 2005
that 200,000 copies of a newly published school geography textbook had entirely
omitted the Kuril Islands from its map of Russia (Richardson 2015: 164).
Unsurprisingly, this combination of economic deprivation and apparent indiffer-
ence from the federal centre has had an impact on local public opinion. To begin
with, a 2013 survey of residents of the Russian Far East reveals that 44 percent
consider lack of interest by the federal authorities as the principal security threat to
Pacific Russia. The same poll also finds generally positive attitudes towards Japan.
To be exact, when asked to name a country that they regard favourably, 53 percent
of respondents cited Japan, a higher number than for any other country. China was
selected by only 19 percent. Similarly, only 6 percent described Japan as definitely
threatening and 25 percent as probably threatening. The comparable figures for
China were 16 and 34 percent. As for the reasons for liking Japan, 47 percent
drew attention to the country’s level of economic development, just ahead of the
45 percent who mentioned Japanese culture and tradition (Larin and Larina 2014).
These statistics can be taken as a sign that the juxtaposition of Japan’s rela-
tively high living standards with the much lower levels of economic develop-
ment within the Russian Far East has indeed had an effect on public attitudes.
Clearly however, just because there is widespread admiration or even envy of
Japan does not mean that local residents would necessarily favour territorial con-
cessions. That said, it is possible to identify more specific figures that do pro-
vide some evidence of support amongst the islands’ current inhabitants for their
return to Japan. Most notable in this regard is the finding that in July 1992 a full
64 percent backed some form of territorial transfer, against 17 percent who were
stridently opposed (Hasegawa 1998b: 452). Admittedly, such high levels of sup-
port were limited to the early 1990s, yet, even several years later, many islanders
were evidently not unwilling to consider compromise. For instance, in a poll of
1,000 residents conducted in 1998 by NHK (Nippon hōsō kyōkai, the Japanese
Broadcasting Corporation), 44 percent were found to be in favour of either the
unconditional or conditional return of the territory versus 42 percent who were
entirely opposed (cited in Kataeva 2006). The strongest support for concessions
has consistently been found amongst inhabitants of Shikotan. This was where a
local referendum on 25 April 1993 returned an overwhelming majority of 83 per-
cent in favour of upholding the 1956 Joint Declaration; that is, conceding to the
transfer of Shikotan and Habomai in exchange for a peace treaty (Williams 2007:
140). In November 1998 more than half of the island’s residents also signed a let-
ter to Sakhalin governor Farkhutdinov demanding the return of all of the islands
to Japan on a ninety-nine-year lease (Richardson n.d.: 24). As on Iturup/Etorofu
and Kunashir/i, the enthusiasm of Shikotan residents has ebbed over time, yet,
according to a Hokkaidō Shinbun survey, in 2005 a majority of respondents still
backed the conditional transfer of the islands to Japan. When questioned about
exactly what conditions they had in mind, 83.7 percent cited monetary compensa-
tion (Iwashita 2006: 49).
Besides these indications of favourable local opinion, the Japanese side can
draw encouragement from the knowledge that several prominent Russian think-
ers have also argued for territorial concessions. The most celebrated of these is
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the late Nobel Prize–winning author. In a telephone call
with Boris Yeltsin in 1992, Solzhenitsyn is reported to have told the Russian presi-
dent, “I have studied the whole history, beginning from the 12th century. These
islands are not ours. Give them back. But for a high price!” (quoted in Medvedev
2000). At around the same time, Grigorii Yavlinskii, a liberal politician who was
influential in Russian politics during the early 1990s, was also calling publicly
for all four of the islands to be returned (Hasegawa 1998b: 422). More recently,
Dmitrii Trenin, Russia’s best-known liberal scholar, has put forward the following
inventive proposal. Russia should immediately return Habomai and Shikotan but
should be permitted to retain sovereignty over the other two islands for a period of
fifty years. During these five decades, a joint economic zone will be in operation
and Japanese investment will be encouraged in Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i.
After the expiry of this “lease”, the islands will be fully returned to Japanese
sovereignty, though the joint economic zone will continue for a further fifty years
(Trenin and Weber 2012: 11–12). Trenin views this solution not only as an elegant
means of ending the territorial dispute, but also as a way of delivering prosperity
to the area. Indeed, in his strikingly optimistic assessment, “Russia is not so much
giving up the islands as gaining a Hong Kong, and the long-term beneficiary
would be the entire Pacific coast of Russia. Vladivostok would become a Russian
Shanghai” (Trenin and Weber 2012: 13).
With regard to public attitudes, it can therefore be claimed that there are ele-
ments of both popular and elite opinion within Russia that are not hostile to a
solution that could be regarded as positive for Japan. Aside from public opinion,
however, there is one further important social consideration for the Japanese side.
That is, what would happen to the current residents if all four of the islands were
returned to Japanese control? This would seem to be a potentially serious prob-
lem for Japan, since the number of people involved is not insignificant. There are
approximately 8,000 inhabitants of Kunashir/i; 6,400 of Iturup/Etorofu; and 2,100
of Shikotan. Only the Habomai islands have no permanent residents (Argumenty
Nedeli 2014). What is more, while it may be possible to argue that some of these
inhabitants favour territorial concessions, what is beyond doubt is that none of

them is currently Japanese.
Although the population question might therefore appear to be a serious obsta-
cle, many on the Japanese side remain confident that it too can be overcome. To
begin with, it is worth restating the Japanese government’s official position in full.
According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan:
Japan’s position is that [. . .] since Japanese citizens who once lived in the
Northern Territories were forcibly displaced by Joseph Stalin, Japan is ready
to forge a settlement with the Russian government so that the Russian citizens
living there will not experience the same tragedy. In other words, after the
return of the islands to Japan, Japan intends to respect the rights, interests and
wishes of the Russian current residents on the islands.
(MOFA 2011)
This is a respectable policy, though it is rather lacking in clarity. In particular, it is

not made clear what exactly the hoped for settlement with the Russian authorities
would entail or precisely how binding the commitment would be to respect the
rights, interests, and wishes of the current residents.
Some Japanese observers have suggested more specific solutions. Kimura
Hiroshi, for instance, proposes the St Petersburg Treaty of 1875 as a useful model.
This was the agreement that saw the Japanese empire cede its rights on Sakhalin
in exchange for sovereignty over the islands of the Kuril chain that it did not
already control, i.e. the eighteen islands from Urup to Shumshu. In addition to
setting out the details of this territorial exchange, the treaty specified that existing
inhabitants would not be deported but be permitted to maintain their place of resi-
dence and respective nationalities. Furthermore, residents were granted religious
freedom, as well as rights to engage in business and to own property. Making use
of this provision, many Japanese fishermen remained on Sakhalin after its transfer
to Russia, and their numbers actually increased significantly after 1875, reach-
ing a total of 7,000 in 1904 (Saveliev 2015: 49). According to Kimura, “[T]his
precedent could serve as a point of reference for guaranteeing the rights of current
Russian residents, if at some stage in future the four disputed islands were to be
returned to Japan” (2008: 31).
Another scholar to have given the fate of existing residents significant consid-
eration is Kimie Hara. In her case, rather than drawing on an example from the
history of Russian-Japanese relations, Hara explores the experience of the Åland
Islands (2009). Located in the Gulf of Bothnia, these islands came to be disputed
between Sweden and Finland when the latter gained independence in 1917. The
islanders are Swedish by origin and a majority had desired for the islands to be
integrated with Sweden rather than joining the newly independent Finland. To
resolve this dispute, in 1921 the League of Nations awarded sovereignty to Fin-
land, yet brokered a settlement that made significant concessions to the wishes of
the residents. Specifically, this agreement provided the islanders with consider-
able political autonomy, as well as guaranteeing “the preservation of their lan-
guage, of their culture, and of their local Swedish traditions” (League of Nations
1921). It was also agreed that the islands would remain neutral and demilitarised.
Were the Åland model to be applied unaltered to the Southern Kurils/Northern
Territories dispute, it would suggest that all four islands should be awarded to
Japan. Seeing this as difficult to achieve, however, Hara suggests that “it is pos-
sible that both Japan and Russia would share partial sovereignty” (2009: 5). This
would entail existing residents gaining dual Japanese and Russian citizenship.
Politically, the islands’ governors would be appointed collectively by the cen-
tral authorities of Japan and Russia but would require the further approval of the
islands’ own local governments. Political representatives of the islanders would
also be sent to both the Japanese Diet and the Russian Duma. Unlike in the case
of the Åland Islands, whose sole official language is Swedish, Hara recommends
that both Japanese and Russian be used as official languages. This would reflect
the interests of current residents whilst also taking account of the culture of earlier
inhabitants (Hara 2009: 4–6).
While Kimura and Hara therefore favour finding a basis for cohabitation, other
scholars advocate solutions that involve the relocation of at least some of the cur-
rent residents. First of all, Iwashita Akihiro proposes a compromise that would see
Iturup/Etorofu conceded to Russia while an agreement would be made to divide
Kunashir/i, with the eastern half remaining with Russia and the western half going
to Japan. To complete the deal, there would then be a transfer of some of the
population on that island. As Iwashita explains, “There are several villages on the
western side of Kunashiri, such as Golovnino (Tomari), but there are only a few
hundred villagers living there, so this issue would be solved by getting them to
move to the surrounds of Furukamappu [Yuzhno-Kurilsk] where it is easy to live”
(Iwashita 2013: 136–7).
An even greater population shift is hoped for by Yamada Yoshihiko, a profes-
sor at Japan’s Tōkai University. His suggestion is that Russian residents could
be induced to depart from all of the disputed islands. To achieve this, Yamada
proposes that “Japan could construct large-scale factories and LNG plants in
Khabarovsk and Sakhalin and incentivise people to move from the four islands
where there are few jobs. If things get going, the Russian population in the North-
ern Territories will fall dramatically.” Some encouragement in this regard might
be found in the fact that the current population of the islands is already well
below its peak. Having reached a total of 29,500 in 1989, the number of residents
fell precipitously during the 1990s, dropping below the level of 20,000 in 2002
(Kuroiwa 2013: 198). Further concerning this plan for reducing the number of
Russians on the islands, Yamada is notable for his optimism about the prospects of
Japan securing the return, not only of Shikotan and Habomai, but also of at least
one of the two larger islands. In his words, “The impression that I have got from
going to the Northern Territories several times is that it is more than possible that
Russia would return Kunashiri” (quoted in Imoto 2014).
It is apparent therefore that the presence of 16,500 or so Russian residents is
not viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to the islands’ return. At the same time,
however, there are several Japanese observers who express concern that the situa-
tion is not necessarily moving in Japan’s favour and that Tokyo should be certain
to act quickly. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, there is the desire to see
the territory returned whilst at least some of the former Japanese islanders remain
alive. It is with this in mind that the Liberal Democratic Party’s Hirasawa Kat-
suei says that “the Northern Territories dispute is a fight against the clock” (Ron
wo tateru! 2012). The second reason is the fear that the Russian presence on the
islands will only become more entrenched over time, thus making the return of the
islands more difficult. This is a point made by former diplomat Tōgō Kazuhiko,
who warns that “the way the four islands look is rapidly changing. Each year, the
islands are becoming different from the year before. In short, they are being Rus-
sified” (Ron wo tateru! 2012). In a similar fashion, Japan’s highest-circulation
newspaper has recently criticised Moscow’s “attempts at ‘Russification’ in the
Northern Territories” (Yomiuri Shinbun 2014), while questions have also been
raised in the Diet about how “to stop the ‘de-Japanising’ [hi-nihon-ka] of the
northern four islands” (Shūgiin 2013). The overall view of such figures is there-
fore that there remains a reasonable chance of securing a satisfactory deal with
regard to the islands at present but that this will become progressively more diffi-
cult the longer the territory remains under Russian control. It is therefore impera-
tive that the Japanese government act urgently to make use of the current window
of opportunity (Tōgō 2013a).
Rejection of Japan’s arguments about social considerations

and public opinion
As has been the case previously in this monograph, while many of the arguments
rehearsed in this chapter seem superficially convincing, deeper evaluation reveals
them as having weak foundations. Indeed, rather than there remaining a window
of opportunity for Japan to make progress towards the return of the four islands,
it is actually the case that this window has already long ago been closed, if not
shuttered and barred. As outlined in the remainder of this chapter, whether on
the question of Japanese or Russian public opinion, or indeed on the issue of the
islands’ existing residents, Tokyo has many reasons for pessimism.
Strength of Japanese public opinion?

When it comes to social considerations, the Japanese government is not far wrong
in claiming that the return of the Northern Territories is the genuine wish of the
people of Japan. This is something that is evident from the results of numerous
opinion surveys. What is far less certain, however, is exactly how “ardent” this
desire is. For instance, a poll conducted by the Sankei Shinbun in 2008 revealed
that while most respondents would like the islands to be returned, few were seri-
ously concerned about this issue, and even fewer were willing to become actively
involved. Such apathy was particularly pronounced amongst those under forty
(O’Shea 2015: 32). These findings have been confirmed more recently in a sim-
ilar survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office in 2013. This poll found
that although 81.5 percent of respondents were aware of the dispute and had at
least some knowledge of its specifics, a mere 3.2 percent were willing to consider
actively participating in the movement to secure the islands’ return (Naikaku-fu
2013). Further evidence of this relative indifference amongst the Japanese popula-
tion can be found in the low prominence of the annual Day of the Northern Ter-
ritories. While admittedly there were noisy protests outside the Russian embassy in
Tokyo in 2011, these were an unusual occurrence that was directly related to Presi-
dent Medvedev’s visit to Kunashir/i in November 2010. By contrast, in most years
the day’s events pass off largely unnoticed. This was certainly the case on 7 Febru-
ary 2012, when so low key were the protests that one Russian newspaper claimed
that “the Day of the Northern Territories had become the day of silence” (Golovnin
2012). Having been outside the embassy that day to observe the protest activities,
I can confirm that there were significantly more police in the area than protesters.
As well as passion about this issue not being widely shared throughout the
population, it also seems that many Japanese do not support the government’s
determined insistence upon yontō ikkatsu henkan; that is, the demand for all four
islands to be returned together as a batch. For instance, a survey conducted by
the Yomiuri Shinbun in October 2006 found that only 39.5 percent supported
the yontō ikkatsu henkan-ron versus 45.2 percent who favoured a more flexible
approach (Bukh 2012: 502). By 2013 this gap had further widened. In March of
that year a Mainichi Shinbun survey revealed that just 29 percent of respondents
supported the government’s policy, against 67 percent who stated that they would
prefer to see more compromise (Mainichi Shinbun 2013).
One might expect to find a more active approach and hard-line attitude in
Hokkaidō, especially around the city of Nemuro, where many of the former Japa-
nese islanders and their descendants now live. This does not, however, seem to be
the case. For instance, amongst the approximately 30,000 relatives of the former
islanders, only 1,607 are members of the League of Chishima-Habomai Residents
(Kuroiwa 2013: 196). Furthermore, there are also concerns that younger citizens
are not taking advantage of the visa-free scheme to visit the disputed islands.
Established in April 1992, this programme is principally designed to enable for-
mer residents and their descendants to visit the islands without the need to apply
for a Russian visa, an act that would imply recognition of Russian sovereignty.
Despite efforts to promote this scheme, in recent years the numbers taking part
have stagnated (Sankei Shinbun 2014).
There are of course a sizeable number of Nemuro residents who do take a lively
interest in the territorial dispute. It is notable, however, that many of these also
advocate a more moderate position than that favoured by the central government.
For instance, in May 1956 an Assembly of Nemuro Residents for the Restoration
of Japan-Soviet Relations was held to argue for the resolution of the territorial
dispute via agreement on the return of only the islands of Shikotan and Habo-
mai. This position was reaffirmed in March 1960 when an Assembly of Nemuro
Residents for a Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty called for “the signing of a peace treaty
with the return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, with an agreement to ensure
safe fishing conditions” (quoted in Kuroiwa 2013: 199). In more recent times,
local residents have argued more expansively for the return of all four islands,
though considerable scepticism has been expressed about the wisdom of the gov-
ernment’s insistence upon yontō ikkatsu henkan. Most notable in this regard was
when, in June 2006, Nemuro mayor Fujiwara Hiroshi announced to the city coun-
cil chambers that he would formally support the “two islands first” solution; that
is, to secure the return of Shikotan and Habomai before subsequently continuing
negotiations over Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i (Kuroiwa 2013: 200). Further
evidence of such local flexibility can be found in the fact that in 1998 the Nemuro
Chamber of Commerce established a Russian Economic Exchange Project Office
and began to discuss the possibility of establishing a Nemuro–Northern Terri-
tories Economic Zone (Kuroiwa 2013: 200). Such an idea is directly counter to
Tokyo’s policy of discouraging Japanese business activity on the islands so long
as they remain under Russian control.
As such, in terms of Japanese public opinion, there can be said to be a broad
consensus on the desire for the islands to be returned. However, both throughout
the general population and in the Hokkaidō community most directly affected, the
majority of people are passive in their attitude to this issue. Furthermore, there is
surprisingly little support for the policy prescription consistently promoted by the
central government.
Fervent Russian public opposition

While Tokyo may have some problems with regard to the level of active sup-
port provided by the Japanese population, this is nothing in comparison with the
obstacle presented by Russian public opposition to the return of the islands. This
hostility is evident both at the national level and within the Russian Far East.
Additionally, despite the ability of Japanese optimists to point to a few statistics
that suggest a willingness amongst some of the islands’ residents to consider ter-
ritorial concessions, the overwhelming weight of evidence indicates that most
islanders are strongly opposed to such an outcome. What is more, with Russian
nationalism on the rise of late, especially after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis
in 2014, the determination not to relinquish any “Russian land” is currently espe-
cially pronounced.
To begin on the national level, opinion surveys leave little room for doubt as
to the Russian public’s stance on this issue. According to a 2009 All-Russia Pub-
lic Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) poll, 89 percent of Russians are against
returning the disputed islands to Japan, against 4 percent who are in favour. This
represents a significant increase since 1994, when only 76 percent expressed oppo-
sition (Burrett 2014: 169). Given, then, the growing extent of popular resistance
to territorial concessions, it is little surprise to find that major political groupings
in Russia also support this position. This is certainly the case for United Russia
[Edinaya Rossiya], the country’s dominant “party of power”, but it also applies
to Russia’s official opposition parties. Specifically, Sergei Mironov, leader of A
Just Russia [Spravedlivaya Rossiya], has gone beyond the government’s position
and argues against even discussing the issue. In his view, “[t]here is no territo-
rial dispute with Japan. The Kuril Islands are our territory” (quoted in RT 2012).
Equally, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has shown itself now to
have more nationalist than internationalist instincts. Indeed, it was this party that
submitted a proposed law to the Russian State Duma that criminalises the promo-
tion of separatism. Although originally conceived with regard to the North Cauca-
sus, this could also have application to individuals arguing in favour of dividing the
Southern Kurils from Russia. The measure was signed into law by President Putin
in December 2013 and those found guilty could face up to five years in prison (RIA
Novosti 2013). Of course, it could be pointed out that these parties represent no
more than “virtual” opposition and actually exist primarily to support the Krem-
lin’s agenda (Wilson 2005). This is no doubt true, but the picture remains much the
same when it comes to Russia’s genuine, extra-parliamentary opposition. In par-
ticular, Aleksei Naval’nyi, who secured second place and more than 27 percent of
the vote in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election, owes much of his popularity to his
strong nationalist views and emphasis on upholding the rights of ethnic Russians
(Laruelle 2014). In short, while there remain a few individuals who argue in favour
of territorial concessions to Japan (e.g. Trenin and Weber 2012), it is apparent that
these are isolated voices with no real influence in Russian domestic politics.
While it is therefore difficult to find figures in Russia who promote a more
moderate position than the government, there is no shortage of those who argue
for a more vociferous approach. Indeed, with nationalism in the ascendancy in
Russia, it is not uncommon to find politicians and activists criticising earlier con-
cessions and arguing in favour of the recovery of what is considered to be Rus-
sian territory. For instance, Leonid Kalashnikov, a Communist Duma deputy and
first deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on international affairs, is
forceful in his criticism of Moscow’s 2010 deal that settled a border dispute with
Norway over jurisdiction in the Barents Sea. While no land was involved and
both sides made compromises, Kalashnikov is forceful in his condemnation of
the agreement, claiming that “not only has Moscow made huge territorial conces-
sions to the Norwegian side, but it has also significantly reduced our capacity
for fish production.” Seeing this as an alarming precedent, he opposes even the
transfer of two islands to Japan (Sargin 2014). A similarly strong line on territo-
rial issues is taken by Dmitrii Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister. Indeed, he
has even gone so far as to support claims for the return of Alaska and the Aleutian
Islands by contributing the foreword to Alaska Betrayed and Sold: The History
of a Palace Conspiracy by Ivan Mironov. This book makes an argument for “the
historical and judicial right of Russia for the return of the lost colonies, Alaska
and the Aleutian Islands, over which the Russian flag flew 150 years ago.” In his
foreword, as well as praising Mironov’s thesis, Rogozin takes the opportunity
to criticise the weakness of Moscow’s foreign policy during the late 1980s and
1990s when “our diplomacy in the era of Gorbachev and Yeltsin [consisted of]
trading away pieces of the Soviet Empire” (quoted in Balzer 2014).
More specifically worrying for Japan is the fact that some in Russia evidently
believe that Hokkaidō could legitimately be claimed as Russian land. In support
of this argument, Russian historians note that the island was not historically popu-
lated by the Japanese but rather by the Ainu. What is more, it is claimed that there
is evidence that some of these Ainu communities paid tribute to Russia at the end
of the eighteenth century, thereby acknowledging Russian suzerainty over the area
(Ivanov 2012: 4). This is not an argument that one finds repeated by the Russian
leadership, but it has been taken up by some opposition groups. In particular, in
2013 members of the Other Russia [Drugaya Rossiya] party staged a protest out-
side the Japanese embassy in Moscow. They strongly condemned Japan’s claims
to the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories, before unveiling a banner reading
“Hokkaidō is a Russian island”. They also made the following statement:
What is more, Russia has full rights to what is currently the Japanese island
of Hokkaidō. Until the appearance of the Japanese, the local residents – the
Ainu – were subjects of the Russian Empire. Subsequently Japan undertook
the genocide of the Ainu and illegally appropriated this territory to the detri-
ment of the national interests of Russia.
(RBK 2013)
Nationally then, there is clearly firm public and political opposition to any sug-
gestion of territorial concessions to Japan. However, as robust as this sentiment
may be in central Russia, it is only stronger in the Russian Far East, especially
in Sakhalin Oblast’, which administers the disputed islands. For instance, sur-
vey data reveal that a tiny minority of Sakhalin residents, just 2.7 percent, are
in favour of returning the four islands (Haines 2014: 587). Incidentally, recent
opinion polls also indicate that although locals may still quite like Japan, they are
coming to regard relations with the country as generally less important. While
previously most residents of the Russian Far East identified Japan as the country
with which the region should prioritise relations, by 2008 it had been overtaken
by China (Larin and Larina 2014: 11). This is significant because it suggests that
any remaining potential for Tokyo to use the Russian Far East’s desire for better
economic relations with Japan as leverage with regard to the territorial dispute is
rapidly fading.
Another striking feature of political debate within the Russian Far East is the
willingness of local politicians and activists to threaten to defy the central authori-
ties over this issue. As is well documented by Paul Richardson, deputies within the
Regional Duma have forged a parliamentary faction, “For the Russian Kurils” [Za
Rossiiskie Kurily], with the explicit purpose of opposing any signs of willingness
on the part of Moscow to consider territorial concessions to Japan (Richardson
2015: 163). It is also common for local politicians to make emotional declarations
on this topic, such as the Sakhalin Regional Duma’s announcement in 2001 that
through the efforts of our grandfathers and fathers, all of the Kuril Islands
were returned to be constituents of our state, and the current leadership of
the country does not have the right to distribute, nor promise to transfer to
anybody that which was not gathered for them, nor is owned by them, but
is instead for all Russians, including our children and grandchildren, all our
future generations.
(quoted in Richardson 2015: 162)
In much the same fashion, in 2005 Sakhalin’s representative in the Russian Fed-
eration Council warned his colleagues that “[i]t is forbidden to give away Russian
soil; it is especially forbidden to give it away in the Far East. Over there, there are
no spare metres. Also over there everything flows after the blood of the people,
who work there and who defend this land” (quoted in Richardson 2015: 162).
Such is the strength of regional opinion on this issue that there are signs that any
actual attempt by Moscow to relinquish the islands would meet with fierce local
opposition. Indeed, one opinion poll from 1995 reports that 80 percent of Sakha-
lin residents would demand the president’s resignation if the islands were to be
returned. Moreover, as many as 17.8 percent admitted that they would be willing
to commit extreme acts, including taking up arms, if it were necessary to protect
the status of the Southern Kurils as Russian territory (Williams 2007: 189). Ten
years later, local opinion showed no signs of having mellowed. This was evident
from a petition that was conducted in Sakhalin in advance of Putin’s official visit
to Japan in November 2005. Designed to caution the Russian president against
any territorial concessions, the petition gained more than 6,000 signatures, with
several individuals adding their own personal comments. Many of these were
angry warnings, such as the message from one individual which directly informed
the Russian head of state that “[i]f after your visit to Japan, Russia loses just one
small island . . . you will be remembered as a perjurer and plunderer of the land of
Russians” (Richardson 2015: 167).
There is therefore very little encouragement for the Japanese side to be found
amongst public opinion within the Russian Far East as a whole – but what if the
focus is narrowed to just the residents of the islands themselves? Surveys of this
population have indeed generated some statistics that could be seen as somewhat
positive for Japan, and in general, the islanders appear to be less hostile to territo-
rial concessions than the residents of Sakhalin Oblast’ as a whole. Having said
this, a fuller analysis indicates that there are certainly no grounds for Japanese
optimism.
In terms of public opinion across the three inhabited islands, the most recent
surveys show that approximately 60–70 percent are opposed to any territorial
concessions. While a clear majority, this is considerably less than the figures for
the Sakhalin region or for the Russian population as a whole. Japanese research-
ers are also correct in claiming that the residents of Shikotan have been the most
willing to consider a transfer to Japan. Although an important finding, it is worth
putting this into some perspective by highlighting that even if as many as half
of all adult residents of Shikotan are in favour of a conditional transfer to Japan
(Iwashita 2006: 48), this still amounts to less than 1,000 people. Troubling also
for the Japanese side is the fact that these figures are not moving in their favour.
Indeed, the number of supporters of a territorial handover has been falling since
2000, including on Shikotan (Kuroiwa 2013: 197). This is unquestionably a con-
sequence of the marked improvement in economic conditions on the islands.
During the 1990s, the islanders, largely abandoned to their fate by the central
government, came to rely increasingly on trade and humanitarian aid from Japan.
Looking to derive some political gain from this situation, the Japanese authorities
sought to make the provision of assistance at least partially conditional upon the
islanders’ support for Japan’s position on the territorial question. Put rather more
bluntly, Brad Williams alleges that Tokyo went so far as to “use economic aid as
a weapon to ensure local Russian officials do Japan’s bidding” (quoted in O’Shea
2015: 30). This tactic may have been somewhat effective in the short term. How-
ever, since this support was no more than instrumental, and had to some extent
been bought by the Japanese side, it was always likely to be rapidly eroded as
soon as Moscow was able to reassert its economic control and bring an end to the
area’s dependence upon Japan. This being so, as Russia’s investment programme
on the islands continues to gain pace, it can be anticipated that residents’ back-
ing for Japan’s position will continue to decline. At least one Russian magazine
believes this shift in attitudes to already be complete, claiming in 2014 that, as a
result of the recent improvements in living conditions, “already on the Kurils no
one wants a transfer to Japan” (Argumenty Nedeli 2014).
Considering the strength of Russian public opinion nationally, as well as in the
Far Eastern region and on the islands themselves, it is certain that any attempt by
the central government to return the islands to Japan would face significant oppo-
sition. A small indication of this was given in May 1992 when, in response to the
perception that President Yeltsin was preparing to agree to a territorial deal, the
Russian parliament declared that it would not ratify any agreement on the transfer
of any of the islands to Japan and that the settlement of the issue is not “a matter of
today, tomorrow or even the day after tomorrow” (quoted in Lee 2001: 6). Despite
the presence of this serious obstacle, however, hope springs eternal on the Japa-
nese side. This is in part due to the considerable faith that is placed by Japanese
politicians and scholars in Vladimir Putin’s ability to overcome public opposition
and achieve an end to the territorial dispute. This belief is based on the observa-
tion of the Russian president’s extraordinary popularity as well as his flawless cre-
dentials as a defender of his country’s national interests. Due to these strengths, it
is argued that Putin has the requisite power and authority to push through territo-
rial concessions, even if this is against the wishes of the Russian people and their
parliament. In illustrating this line of thinking, Tōgō Kazuhiko draws a parallel
with US president Richard Nixon. As a strong nationalist leader, Nixon was able
to face down conservative critics and drive through the normalisation of relations
with Communist China, something that would have been impossible for a more
liberal president, such as Jimmy Carter. In a similar fashion then, Putin’s presi-
dency is viewed as representing a valuable opportunity for Japan that needs to be
seized before he is replaced by a weaker successor (Tōgō 2013b).
Further concerning Putin’s status as a strong leader, Japanese observers draw
additional encouragement from the fact that the Russian president has already
agreed to other territorial concessions. As Kimura describes:
Between autumn 2004 and early 2005 Putin brought an end to territorial dis-
putes with China and Kazakhstan by dividing the disputed territories equally.
He could have taken the easy way out and left such bothersome problems to
the next generation of leaders, but instead he took it upon himself to find a
solution. If we apply this interpretation, it is quite possible that he has what it
takes to end the territorial problem between Japan and Russia.
(2008: 158)
It is also widely believed that Putin has a much more favourable attitude to Japan
than his successor/predecessor, Dmitrii Medvedev, and that this adds momentum
to his “extraordinary interest in resolving the Northern Territories dispute” (Fude-
saka 2012).
Encouraged by this existing optimism about Mr Putin, enormous excitement
was generated in Japan when, in March 2012, the Russian leader spoke of his
desire to conclusively end the territorial problem and to do so in a way that would
be acceptable to both countries (RIA Novosti 2012). In particular, his use of the
word hikiwake (meaning “draw” in Japanese) to describe the envisaged final
settlement was taken by many Japanese commentators as a clear sign that Putin
was willing to go beyond the 1956 Joint Declaration and return more than just
Shikotan and Habomai. This was an interpretation shared by many in Japan (e.g.
Akizuki 2014: 306–11; Hirose 2015; Satō 2012), but perhaps the most enthusias-
tic was Suzuki Muneo, a veteran politician with a long history of involvement in
Japanese-Russian relations. In his view, by making this statement,
Putin made it public that he was considering more than the return of just two
islands. It was extremely brave of Putin to make such in-depth statements
about the Northern Territories dispute, which has to do with national sover-
eignty, at a conference days before the presidential election. Putin’s affection
for Japan and his determination to resolve the territorial problem also come
across. It is a very sincere attitude and you feel that he has the political tough-
ness and the good judgement of a leader. That is why, without a doubt, we
have a chance with Putin. What happens next depends on which card Japan
plays. Conversely, we must resolve the Northern Territories dispute whilst
Putin is president.
(Suzuki 2012: 198–9)
The opinions of prominent Japanese observers are of course important. However,

what makes this interpretation of Putin’s position particularly significant is the fact
that it is evidently shared by Prime Minister Abe. No doubt influenced by Putin’s
hikiwake statement, since being returned to power in December 2012 the Japanese
leader has prioritised developing close personal ties with the Russian president. To
fulfil this aim, Abe has employed the straightforward tactic of, in his own words,
holding “as many meetings as possible” with Putin (quoted in Makarov 2014). In
2013 he managed to notch up four such summits, including one in April during
Abe’s official visit to Moscow, the first by a Japanese head of government in over
ten years. It was during this trip that Abe told the press with great satisfaction that
“relations of personal trust and confidence have been established between Presi-
dent Putin and me” (Kremlin 2013). An even bolder move was the prime minister’s
decision to be present in Sochi for the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics
in February 2014. This was in spite of the fact that the event happened to be sched-
uled on Japan’s Day of the Northern Territories, the most sensitive date of the year
for Japanese-Russian relations. Mr Abe was also one of the only G7 leaders to be
in attendance, since the heads of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States all boycotted the ceremony due to concerns over Moscow’s human
rights record. In return for his efforts, Abe was given a warm welcome by Putin,
and the two agreed to move to calling each other by their first names (NHK 2014).
Matters certainly became much more difficult following Russia’s annexation of
Crimea in March. Nonetheless, although Tokyo did introduce some symbolic sanc-
tions in conformity with its G7 partners, Prime Minister Abe continued his policy
of meeting with President Putin whenever possible. This he did at the Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM) in Milan in October, as well as at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing in November. More problematic, however,
was Abe’s invitation for Putin to visit Japan. This was initially expected to take
place in 2014 but was delayed due to the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis and conse-
quent deterioration in East-West relations. The Japanese side has made apparent,
however, that it remains eager for the trip to take place and will move quickly to
facilitate this as soon as the international context allows it (TASS 2015). If and
when the visit finally occurs, it is Abe’s great hope that his investment in building
close personal relations with his Russian counterpart will pay dividends and that
he can succeed in encouraging Putin to defy Russian public opinion and deliver a
historic breakthrough on the territorial dispute by promising to recognise Japanese
sovereignty over more than just two islands.
The Japanese government’s strategy is entirely understandable. It is also almost
certainly wrong. To begin with, while Putin is indeed an unusually strong national
leader with rare liberty in his ability to decide foreign policy, this does not mean
that he would casually agree to give up parts of his country’s territory. After all,
he owes his enormous popularity as a leader not simply to manipulation of the
political system and control over the domestic media, but in large part to pur-
suing policies that are consistent with the wishes of a large proportion of the
Russian population. This is not to say that he will not periodically go against
public opinion, but he will only do so after careful consideration and when there
are powerful incentives. Such was the case with the territorial deal with China
when the Kremlin could be confident that public anger would be limited (due to
the fact that the islands were almost entirely unpopulated) and the economic and
political gains from improving relations with the world’s emerging superpower
would be enormous. As this monograph has demonstrated in detail, there are no
comparable incentives for Russia to cede the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories
to Japan. Such concessions would not bring transformative economic benefits
but would be seen as leading to significant strategic losses. What is more, as has
been explained, a transfer of the islands would almost certainly lead to a sizeable
public backlash due to the perception that this would be a betrayal of the current
Russian residents as well as of Soviet soldiers believed to have died in achieving

their capture. Given this equation, President Putin would have to be a very poor
strategist to agree to any more than minor territorial concessions to Japan.
This does, however, leave open the question of what precisely Mr Putin meant
by the term hikiwake. According to the Russian president’s own explanation, this
would be an outcome in which neither side can be considered to have lost. Add-
ing to this, Putin has said of Russia that “[w]e don’t have to achieve victory. In
this situation, we have to reach an acceptable compromise” (Soejima and Komaki
2012). This is rather vague but it does seem to suggest that the final outcome may
not involve Russia controlling all four islands. The most likely reading, however,
is not that Putin is considering a fifty-fifty territorial split, which would see Japan
regaining Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir/i, and a portion of Iturup/Etorofu. Instead,
it is more probable that he is simply reaffirming his willingness to abide by the
1956 agreement, which would entail Russia transferring Shikotan and Habomai
(just 7 percent of the total landmass) following the conclusion of a peace treaty
and Japan’s renunciation of any further territorial claims. While this is judged
deeply unsatisfactory by many on the Japanese side, Putin seems to regard this as
the “acceptable compromise” that would ensure that neither country could be said
to have lost. Indeed, examining the Russian leader’s other comments on the dis-
pute, it would seem that he considers this a highly generous proposal and the very
most that Moscow would ever be willing to offer. For instance, on other occasions
President Putin has simply stated that the issue is already closed, saying:
[T]he four islands in question are Russian sovereign territory. Their status is
fixed in international law as a result of the Second World War. We of course
want to settle all disputes with all our neighbors – including Japan, with
which we have friendly relations – but we do not intend to discuss this par-
ticular point.
(quoted in Haines 2014: 593)
The islands’ residents

The final reason why Japan should not be at all optimistic about ever securing the
return of the four islands is the issue of the current residents. This is not to reiter-
ate the point about the islanders’ opposition to any transfer, but rather to highlight
that even if their opinions were entirely ignored and Moscow were somehow to
concede to all of Tokyo’s demands, Japan would still be faced with a serious
problem. As highlighted above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses vague
confidence that a solution can be found that satisfies “the rights, interests and
wishes of the Russian current residents on the islands” (MOFA 2011). Meanwhile,
scholars have proposed various ways of achieving cohabitation or the voluntary
repatriation of the Russian residents (Hara 2009; Imoto 2014; Kimura 2008: 31).
It is apparent, however, that all of these suggestions seriously underestimate just
how difficult this situation would be.
First of all, is it conceivable that the current inhabitants could be induced to
leave by financial incentives? One might believe this to be possible, since the
remote and chilly islands would not be most people’s first choice of a place to
live. It is also true that the population fell significantly during the 1990s due to
the poor economic situation. However, given the scale of the deprivation that the
islanders suffered during that decade, what is really remarkable is that so many
residents actually remained. Further testifying to the strength of emotional attach-
ment to the area is the fact that, of those who did leave, many soon returned.
One journalist explains this phenomenon as follows: “Many people who left for
the mainland during the 1990s are now returning to the islands. They say that
they cannot adapt there: there is not the same way of life or the nature, it lacks
the ocean and the endless expanses” (Pisarenko 2014). Seemingly encouraged
by such sentiments, in contrast to many parts of Russia, the population of the
disputed islands is actually growing, at a rate of 2–3 percent per year (Argumenty
Nedeli 2014). Hypothetically then, if the Russian government were inexplicably
to decide to suddenly return the four islands, it is likely that several thousand resi-
dents would stubbornly opt to remain and could not be persuaded to abandon the
territory they regard as home. This prediction is backed up by survey data which
suggest that as many as 70 percent of current residents would opt to remain on
the islands (Hasegawa 1998b: 453). As such, Japan would need to find a way of
dealing with a new Russian minority within its population.
Successfully incorporating such a disgruntled minority that is culturally and
linguistically very different and is concentrated in an area where there is no
representation of the country’s titular ethnic group would be a major challenge
for any government. It is likely to be almost completely unmanageable for
Japan. As is well known, Japan is an unusually homogenous country with a
strong sense of national identity that has been based on ethnic rather than civic
conceptions of nationality (Doak 2001). This outlook has long been reinforced
through the Japanese education system, the country’s restrictive immigration
policy, and the refusal to permit Japanese adults to hold dual citizenship. These
features make it much more difficult for Japan to address minority issues com-
pared with a multicultural state. This is compounded by the highly centralised
nature of the Japanese political system, which does not include provisions for
significant autonomy for subnational groupings, as would be the case in a fed-
eral system.
To gain an idea of how troubling Japan would be likely to find the task of
assimilating a Russian minority, one need only look at the history of Japan’s
relations with its Korean community. Despite their presence in Japan for many
decades and the fact that they are mostly physically and culturally indistinguish-
able from their Japanese peers, many zainichi Koreans continue to complain of
covert forms of discrimination and exclusion from Japanese society. In response,
many opt to conceal their identity (Kim 2011). In relation to this issue, both the
United Nations and transnational civil society groups have sought to pressure
the Japanese government to take stronger action to tackle discrimination against
minorities. In particular, Amnesty International has alleged that the Japanese
authorities have “continued to move away from international human rights stan-
dards” due to their failure to introduce legislation outlawing hate speech (Japan
Times 2015a). A further example of this broad lack of sensitivity towards minor-
ity issues was the publication in Sankei Shinbun, one of the country’s leading
newspapers, of an article by Sono Ayako, a conservative commentator and former
adviser to Prime Minister Abe, in which she advocated racial segregation within
Japan and appeared to praise the example of apartheid South Africa (Sono 2015).
None of this encourages the view that Japanese politics or society is sufficiently
equipped to make a success of relations with a new Russian minority.
When reflecting on possible issues related to a Russian-speaking community
outside of the borders of the Russian Federation and its impact on a territorial
dispute, it is logical to draw parallels with the prominent recent case of Crimea.
Indeed, following Russia’s annexation of that peninsula in March 2014, several
Japanese commentators sought to understand what implications this contro-
versy may have for the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories question. Surpris-
ingly, however, rather than regarding this instance of highly assertive Russian
foreign policy as ominous for Japan, many took the position that Russia’s seizure
of Crimea could potentially be a positive development (Sankei Shinbun 2015).
There seem to be two main reasons for this. First, there is the belief that hav-
ing achieved the stunning coup of delivering the return of Crimea, Moscow can
afford to be magnanimous in making territorial concessions elsewhere. Second,
and more frequently mentioned, is the idea that if the same principles that Rus-
sia used to justify its annexation of Crimea were applied to the territorial dis-
pute with Japan, Moscow would be forced to recognise the legitimacy of Japan’s
claims. Specifically, one of the arguments used by the Russian authorities was that
Crimea is historically Russian territory. As such, since the Northern Territories are
regarded as historically Japanese land, the Russian leadership should, as a matter
of principle, recognise that these too should be returned to their rightful owner.
It was this line of thinking that prompted a Japanese journalist to ask a question
of President Putin after his “Direct Line” television appearance on 16 April 2015,
resulting in the following exchange:
Question: When you spoke of the accession of Crimea to Russia, you often
said this was indigenous Russian territory and it should remain Russian.
Vladimir Putin: Not exactly.
Question: This was one of the arguments you made. The thing is that Japan
has the same approach to countries [sic] on the Southern Kuril Ridge. Over
these 15 years, you often met with the Japanese Prime Minister, spoke to
him and even agreed to resolve the issue on a ‘hikiwake’ basis, meaning ‘no
winners, no losers,’ a draw. Now that this has happened with Crimea, could
you say that your approach to the matter has changed? What is your current
approach to the Kuril Ridge issue?
(Kremlin 2015)
The logic of this argument is easy to follow, though it does demonstrate remark-
able confidence in the desire of governments to be scrupulously consistent in

the conduct of their foreign policies. In any case, the Russian leader gave the
idea short shrift. Indeed, not only did Putin dismiss out of hand the suggestion
that there might be a post-Crimea softening of Russia’s position on the South-
ern Kurils/Northern Territories issue, he also continued by making apparent why
events in Ukraine are actually unequivocally negative for Japan.
Vladimir Putin: No, Crimea has had no influence on our relations with Japan
regarding the peace accord and the territorial issue. At the same time, I would
like to draw your attention to the fact that when we speak of Crimea being an
indigenous territory, we are also referring to the people living there. We are
saying that democracy – and this is something our partners who disagree with
this, be it in the East or West, in Europe or on the American continent, should
remember – democracy is power of the people and power resting on the will
of the people. Crimea is not just a territory. There are people living there who
came to the referendum and voted in favour of reunification with Russia. And
we have to respect their choice. As for the islands that you mentioned, there
are people living there who would hardly vote in favour of joining Japan.
(Kremlin 2015)
By emphasising in this way the rights of the residents of both Crimea and the
Southern Kurils/Northern Territories, Putin is highlighting what has become an
increasingly salient feature of contemporary Russian foreign policy. That is, the
Kremlin’s portrayal of itself in the role of defender of all Russian speakers and
“compatriots” (sootechestvenniki), even if these individuals are not Russian citi-
zens and are resident outside the borders of the Russian Federation. With this rhet-
oric having become such a key feature of Putin’s foreign policy, especially after
the Crimean annexation, it seems inconceivable that the Kremlin would now, of
all times, jeopardise this carefully constructed image by abandoning nearly 17,000
Russians to be ruled by the Japanese. In the hypothetical event of this occur-
ring, however, the Crimean precedent and Putin’s emphasis on self-determination
raise another intriguing possibility. This is the idea that if, despite everything,
the Kremlin were suddenly to acknowledge Japanese sovereignty over all four
islands, what would stop this intergovernmental settlement from subsequently
being challenged from below? Specifically, following transfer to Japan, would
there not be the possibility of the islands’ residents, with connivance from within
Russia, campaigning for separation from Japan and reunification with Russia?
Again, as in the Ukrainian case, advocates of rejoining Russia would no doubt
seize upon any possible instance of infringement of the Russian community’s
linguistic or political rights to argue for the urgent need of a referendum. On the
basis of current opinion polls, such a vote would be strongly in favour of reunifi-
cation. If this were to occur, Russia could conceivably give in to Japan’s demands
to return the territory, yet end up getting the islands back anyway. All of this may
seem highly improbable, but it is a scenario that has been given consideration by
both Russian and Japanese observers, including by Satō Masaru, a former intel-
ligence analyst and Russia expert at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Satō
2014; Shafran 2015).
Evidently, in response to Russian appeals to self-determination for the islands’
residents, the Japanese side would argue historical precedence, claiming that the
current inhabitants do not have the right to decide the territory’s status because
they have only arrived comparatively recently and the previous Japanese inhabit-
ants were forcibly removed. Although initially convincing in the immediate post-
war period, there must be a concern that this argument is progressively losing
cogency. As outlined in Chapter 2, while the islands were indeed legally Japanese
territory before being occupied by the Soviet Union, they actually only had a
relatively short history under official Japanese authority. Having originally been
Ainu lands, Etorofu/Iturup, Kunashir/i, Shikotan, and Habomai only indisputably
became Japanese territory by means of the Shimoda Treaty that established the
border between Japan and Russia in 1855. This means that the four islands were
under Japanese authority for ninety years (1855–1945). By contrast, the area has
now been controlled by the Soviet Union and its official successor, the Russian
Federation, for over seventy years. If there is no change in the status quo by 2035,
the islands will come to have been ruled by Moscow longer than they ever were
by the Japanese.
Given this state of affairs, the question must surely arise, At what point do the
Russian inhabitants obtain rights over their place of residence, even if the way in
which the territory was initially acquired is not considered to have been legal?
The answer from many on the Japanese side might well be never, yet this does not
seem to fit with common sense or the opinions of legal scholars. For instance, as
highlighted by Thomas Franck, a prominent twentieth-century expert on interna-
tional law, the legal norm when it comes to historical disputes is that “established
boundaries must be respected and can only be changed with the free consent of
the people living in each territory” (1976: 695). As Franck goes on to explain, the
reasons for this are essentially practical:
This paramountcy of contemporary self-determination over historic claims

and the alleviation of ancient wrongs is based on two considerations. First,
there is the assumption that any other approach would lead to endless con-
flicts, as modern states found themselves under pressure to join a general
reversionary march backward to a status quo ante of uncertain age and valid-
ity. Second, it is widely observed that states or even colonies with estab-
lished boundaries and fixed populations, however unjustly or serendipitously
arrived at, soon develop a cohesive logic of their own that should not be
lightly overridden.
(1976: 698)
Although not phrased in such fine language, this more or less seems to be the
justification for retaining the Southern Kuril Islands that is used by Andrei Kli-
mov, first deputy chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Rus-
sian State Duma. As he puts it, “By the way, San Francisco was once a Russian
city. . . . But after 200 years it wouldn’t be right for us to start asking stupid
questions” (quoted in Sargin 2014). Furthermore, it might be added that the claim
that territorial rights can be acquired by virtue of long-term possession might
have particular application in the case of the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute,
since Japan renounced “all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands” in Article
2(c) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (United Nations 1952: 48). Although, as
previously noted, the Soviet Union did not sign the document and the “Kurile
Islands” were not explicitly defined, some scholars nonetheless consider that this
agreement left the islands in “a legal ownership vacuum”, which has gradually
been filled through the Russian residents’ presence (Lee 2001: 39). Interestingly,
just such an eventual outcome seems to have been the expectation of the US gov-
ernment during the 1950s. Following the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Joint
Declaration in 1956, the State Department sent a cable to the British embassy in
Washington informing it that “it was unlikely that Japan would regain Etorofu and
Kunashiri, and that the Soviets would eventually acquire a prescriptive right to the
islands by virtue of possession” (quoted in Hasegawa 1998a: 140).
Taking into account all of these considerations about self-determination, it
seems that even if Moscow were unexpectedly to return all four islands, their
status as Japanese territory would be extremely fragile so long as the majority of
residents remained Russian. The only way of counteracting this problem would
be for the authorities to encourage large numbers of Japanese to resettle on the
islands, thereby changing their demographic balance. This is precisely the solu-
tion proposed by Satō Masaru. In his view, so as to ensure that the newly returned
islands would not immediately face a Crimea-style threat, “Now is the time for
the Japanese government to think seriously about creating a mechanism that
allows Japanese permanently to reside on the Northern Territories” (Satō 2015).
As it happens, in 2015 the Liberal Democratic Party did begin to develop a law
designed to encourage Japanese to reside on remote islands near the country’s
borders. The bill offers financial support to inhabitants and provides funding for
infrastructure projects. Although the law is primarily aimed at protecting islands
that are already under Japanese control from perceived encroachment from China,
it is possible that similar measures could be employed in an attempt to recolonise
the Northern Territories (Japan Times 2015b).
Is it possible that such a repopulation plan could be successful? It seems highly
unlikely. Without question, a few die-hard enthusiasts would take the opportunity
to relocate to Japan’s long-lost territory. In order to create a sustainable Japa-
nese majority on the islands, however, it would be necessary for several thou-
sand to move there. Specifically, even if half the existing Russian residents could
somehow be induced to leave, as many as 8,000 Japanese would be needed to
shift the demographic situation in Japan’s favour. Where could these numbers
be found? The most obvious option would be amongst the community of for-
mer residents. In this regard, one can immediately disregard the Ainu, since there
remain no direct descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the disputed islands
(Kuroiwa 2013: 194). There are, however, the over six thousand former Japa-
nese islanders who were evicted by the Soviets after the end of the war. Given
the advancing years of this community (their average age in March 2014 was
79.6 years), very few of these individuals would be in a position to start a new
life on the islands, even if they were to be returned tomorrow (Chishimahabomai
Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei 2014). As for their descendants, as highlighted above,
many of these appear to have relatively little interest in the territorial issue and it
is questionable how many would be willing to relocate to a place where they have
no personal experience of ever having lived. For instance, according to a survey
conducted by Hokkaidō Prefecture in the mid-1970s, less than 50 percent of for-
mer residents and their direct descendants expressed a wish to return to live on the
islands (Bukh 2012: 501–2). Following the passage of another four decades, it is
probable that this figure is now considerably lower still.
Unable to generate sufficient numbers from amongst those who have a direct
connection to the islands, the success of any repopulation plan would depend on
encouraging members of the wider Japanese population to move permanently to the
area. In particular, to create a sustainable Japanese community that will endure for
several generations, it would be necessary to persuade young families to relocate
there. Such an idea, however, is pure fantasy. If the majority of Japanese express
little interest in the territorial problem and very few are willing to join groups that
campaign on the issue, surely it is not credible to suggest that thousands could be
convinced to give up the comforts of life on the main islands and to move to a
remote periphery where, in addition to the lack of jobs and paucity of infrastructure,
they would have to contend with an unwelcoming climate, including an average of
twenty-five days of fog in July and twenty in August (Kimura 2008: 1). Added to
this is the broader issue of Japan’s intensifying demographic crisis. In 2014 Japan
registered a total population decline of over 270,000. This was an annual record, yet,
according to Japan’s National Institute of Population and Social Security Research,
this rate of decline is expected to accelerate rapidly, reaching a level of more than
700,000 per year by 2025. The worst-affected area will be Hokkaidō, where the
population has already been falling precipitately for some years (Harding 2015).
For instance, to take the example of Nemuro, the city on Hokkaidō that is closest
to the disputed islands, it had a population of close to 50,000 in the 1960s. By 2011
this figure had fallen to as low as 29,139 (Kuroiwa 2013: 201).
Last of all, it is worth noting how Tokyo’s own policy has compounded the dif-
ficulty of potentially persuading Japanese to return to the islands. The Japanese
government’s position has consistently been to strongly urge Japanese citizens not
to visit the disputed area, except by means of the few official visa-free trips that
operate during the summer months each year. The purpose of this policy is to avoid
cases of Japanese citizens going to the islands by using Russian visas, an action
that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs fears would imply “submitting to
Russian ‘jurisdiction’ ” (MOFA 2011). Although the intention is understandable,
the effect of this decision has been to severely circumscribe Japanese engage-
ment with the islands for several decades. In the opinion of Diet member Suzuki
Takako, this approach has resulted in public knowledge of the islands becoming
severely limited and has actively contributed to the “de-Japanisation [hi-nihon-
ka] of the Northern Territories” (Shūgiin 2014). In essence, the Japanese govern-
ment has therefore achieved the exact opposite of what was intended; they have
alienated the Japanese people from these islands and transformed them into an
almost entirely foreign territory.
Conclusions
In this fifth chapter, the final basis for Japanese optimism about the potential
return of the four islands has been examined. Adding to the earlier sections on his-
torical and legal rights, supposed economic incentives, and security factors, this
chapter has focused on social considerations and public opinion. As previously, I
began by presenting the positive elements of the Japanese case, drawing attention
to the fact that the Japanese population is broadly in favour of the islands’ return.
It was also noted that certain prominent Russians have argued for territorial con-
cessions, while there have been some indications, especially during the 1990s,
that the population of Shikotan was not altogether opposed to a possible territorial
transfer. It was further highlighted that seizing upon such hopes, several Japanese
scholars have outlined scenarios for how, following the territory’s return, Rus-
sian residents could either be integrated into Japanese society or induced to “go
home”.
Although trying to be fair, these arguments were not found to be convinc-
ing. Indeed, more so than in previous chapters, the Japanese case with regard to
social considerations and public opinion is notably weak. First, while true that the
majority of the population would indeed be pleased to see the islands restored to
Japanese control, this is not an issue of pressing public concern within Japan. In
fact, surveys show that knowledge of the dispute is patchy and very few Japanese
are interested in actively working towards securing the territory’s return. In fact,
even among nationalist groups, the territorial issues with China and Korea tend
to inflame much greater passions, despite the fact that the dispute with Russia
involves a much greater expanse of land.
This less than overwhelming enthusiasm amongst the Japanese public contrasts
with the strong determination within Russia to oppose any territorial concessions.
This applies to the Russian population as a whole but is particularly pronounced
in the Russian Far East, where the expressed willingness to defy the central
authorities over this issue is particularly striking. On the islands themselves, it
was demonstrated that there is a powerful and consistent majority in favour of
remaining under Russian sovereignty. While Shikotan does remain somewhat of
an outlier, even on that island it is clear that due to the improvement in the eco-
nomic situation, the number of residents willing to consent to a transfer to Japan
has been declining.
Last of all, this chapter’s discussion of possible scenarios related to the future
of the islands’ residents really drives home the bleakness of Japanese prospects.
As has been emphasised, even in the improbable case of all four of the islands
suddenly being returned, large numbers of Russian residents would be likely to
remain. Culturally very different and concentrated in proximity to their former
homeland, this Russian community would not be easily integrated into Japanese
society, especially since Japan has struggled to deal with minority groups in the
past. What is more, there is also the issue that few Japanese would be likely ever
to consider resettling on the islands. As such, with Russians remaining in the

majority, there would always be the concern that this community would seek to
undermine Japanese authority and campaign for reunification with Russia. Fur-
ther concerning this Crimean-style threat, there is also the broader implication
that even in the unlikely event of Russia relinquishing all claims to sovereignty,
the islands would never again become culturally or demographically Japanese.
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Territories day’],” 23 February, www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0wKP-WuN5k, accessed
27/04/15.
Yomiuri Shinbun (2014) “Hoppōryōdo enshū Roshia no chōhatsu wa kanka dekinai [Exer-
cises in the Northern Territories are a Russian provocation that cannot be overlooked],”
17 August.
6 The northern delusion
Impossibility of the demands for the return of four islands

The protracted inability of Russia and Japan to settle their dispute over the South-
ern Kurils/Northern Territories has been a source of bafflement for some observ-
ers. For instance, Kimura Hiroshi, one of Japan’s best-known Russia experts,
concludes his book on the topic by claiming: “That Japan and Russia have been
unable, in more than sixty years since World War Two ended, to resolve the terri-
torial problem, or conclude a peace treaty, is one of the great mysteries of modern
international affairs” (2008: 141). He proceeds by declaring that the unwilling-
ness of the countries to come to an agreement “suggests that international rela-
tions cannot always be satisfactorily explained by the ‘rational actor model’ ”
(148). This may well be so – yet, as the preceding chapters have sought to demon-
strate, at least when it comes to the territorial dispute with Japan, the Russian side
does not appear to be acting in an irrational way. The simple fact of the matter is
that Japan is not going to invade the islands militarily. It is also not going to mimic
the Chinese strategy in the South China Sea of gradually increasing its presence
around the disputed territory with a view to squeezing out its adversary and estab-
lishing de facto control (Taffer 2015). This being so, the only way that Japan
could possibly regain sovereignty over the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories
is if the Russian government were to decide that it is in its own best interests to
return them voluntarily. For this to occur, there would have to be powerful incen-
tives. However, as has been outlined in detail in this monograph, whether in terms
of historical/legal considerations, economic and security factors, or calculations
about public opinion, such inducements are notably lacking. As such, there should
be little surprise that Russia has not opted to return the four islands. Indeed, what
would be truly mystifying and indicative of a lack of rationality would be if the
Russian authorities were to decide suddenly to defy entrenched domestic opposi-
tion and willingly give up land that is considered by the majority of its citizens to
be their country’s reward for noble wartime sacrifice in exchange for uncertain
promises of economic and security gains from a country with which Russia has
typically had adversarial relations.
The basic conclusion of this research is therefore that the Japanese government
has no hope whatsoever of achieving its professed goal of persuading the Russian
side to recognise Japanese sovereignty over all four of the disputed islands. On its
own, this claim adds little to the existing literature, since it is not uncommon for
observers to note that the position of demanding yontō ikkatsu henkan (the return
of the four islands as a batch) is unrealistic. Indeed, within Japan, one will some-
times find sharp criticism of those who remain wedded to this “principled” posi-
tion. Specifically, former prime minister Mori Yoshirō rather unkindly describes
such individuals, including Kimura Hiroshi, Fukiura Tadamasa, and Hakamada
Shigeki, as “the fossil men of Russo-Japanese relations”. In his view, these figures
“have no interest in Russia and Japan compromising and finding a constructive
solution. They say that Japan must get the four islands back in one go” (Mori
2013: 51).
Where this monograph offers something more original is in arguing that such is
the weakness of Japan’s position that it is not only the return of four islands as a
group that is beyond reach, but indeed any proposal that envisages Russia conced-
ing any sovereignty over the islands of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. This means
that those within Japan who take a more pragmatic or flexible position on the
dispute are also generally mistaken about what sort of compromise is possible. To
begin with, the lack of strong incentives rules out the possibility of Russia agree-
ing to a fifty-fifty division by land area. This was the basis of Russia’s 2004 border
agreement with China and it has been mentioned by prominent Japanese officials,
including both Asō Tarō and Yachi Shōtarō, as a possible model (Mainichi Shin-
bun 2009; Sarkisov 2009: 45). Such a split would see Japan regaining Habomai,
Shikotan, and Kunashir/i, and a new international border being established part of
the way up the island of Iturup/Etorofu. Despite being controversial in Japan, this
suggestion goes far beyond what the Russian side has incentive to offer. The same
applies to the three-island solution that has been raised by former prime minis-
ter Mori (Mori 2013), as well as to Iwashita’s suggestion of splitting Kunashir/i
(Iwashita 2013: 136–7).
The Japanese scholar who comes closest to a realistic proposal is Tōgō
Kazuhiko. Fully recognising that yontō ikkatsu henkan “has no possibility what-
soever of being accepted,” Tōgō urges that Japan abandon this position as soon
as possible (Tōgō 2012: 3). Instead, in combination with Aleksandr Panov, an
unusually compromise-minded former Russian diplomat, Tōgō proposes that the
sides make arrangements for the transfer of Shikotan and Habomai, as envisaged
in Article 9 of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956. Furthermore, in
addition to these two smaller islands being handed over, “negotiations are to be
carried out in parallel about the creation of a special joint economic zone on the
islands of Kunashir and Iturup with a legal status that is acceptable to both sides”
(Panov and Tōgō 2013). This plan would not actually lead to a final settlement of
the territorial dispute, as the question of sovereignty over the two larger islands
would be effectively shelved and no peace treaty would be signed. In the view of
the two former diplomats, however, this approach would successfully break the
current impasse and deliver a significant improvement in bilateral relations.
Mr Tōgō should be applauded for his determined efforts to find a constructive
means of resolving the territorial dispute. This is especially the case because his
advocacy of this “phased-return” approach contributed to the premature end of
The northern delusion 109
his diplomatic career when he was forced to retire from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in April 2002 “on the grounds of inappropriate meddling in the Ministry’s
policy-making, especially over the Northern Territories issue” (Kimura 2009:
28–9). And yet, while members of the Japanese establishment may regard Tōgō
as unacceptably radical, his suggested compromises actually do not go nearly
far enough. What he fails to explain convincingly is why a Russian leader would
accept his proposed deal. After all, as noted, Tōgō’s plan does not end the territo-
rial dispute; if anything, it would intensify it. This is because, after the return of
the two smaller islands, Japanese hopes would inevitably be raised and, despite
promises to shelve the question of sovereignty over Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i,
the country’s leadership would come under pressure to push for the return of these
other two islands. In essence, such an arrangement would simply shift the status
quo in Japan’s favour. As such, in return for taking on the inevitable domestic
backlash for giving up this territory, the Russian leadership would be rewarded
with nothing more than intensified badgering from Tokyo and the vague promise
of contributions to joint investment projects on Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. All
in all, weighing up the costs and benefits for the Russian side, it is apparent that
even this most accommodating of Japanese approaches remains significantly too
ambitious. Unless Japan is willing to go further by agreeing to sign a peace treaty
and put a definitive end to the territorial dispute, Moscow cannot be anticipated to
give up even the islands of Shikotan and Habomai.
This conclusion that Russia will not countenance anything more than the return
of two islands applies to all probable scenarios. However, it is worth at least briefly
considering some more unlikely situations that might suddenly shift the balance
in Japan’s favour. It is no doubt just such a scenario that those on the Japanese
side who reject all compromise and insist upon nothing less than the simultaneous
return of all four islands are stubbornly waiting for.
One radical development would be the fall of the Putin regime and Russia’s
reorientation towards a more democratic political system. At the time of writing,
this seems a remote possibility since the Russian president has approval ratings
of 86 percent and the liberal opposition is in disarray (Monaghan 2015). How-
ever, even supposing that such a political upheaval were to occur, it is unlikely
to lead to a new Russian government offering more generous concessions to the
Japanese side. First, as explained in the previous chapter, public opinion in Rus-
sia is deeply opposed to the central authorities relinquishing any of the islands.
At present, Putin, as an unusually strong leader with an authoritative grip on the
levers of power and the country’s media, has some scope to go against the wishes
of the Russian people. By contrast, a truly democratic figure operating within an
environment of much more open political competition would find it much more
difficult to pursue unpopular policies. This being so, democratic reforms in Russia
would be more likely to lead to the election of leaders who are not even willing to
consider the transfer to Japan of the two smaller islands.
What, however, if the imagined political changes went beyond democratic
regime change? For example, what if Russia were to undergo a much more dra-
matic collapse, involving the outbreak of civil conflict and the disintegration of
the country’s territorial integrity? This is surely not something that anyone would
wish for, but, even if it were to occur, it is not certain that it would result in Japan
regaining the lost territory. When the Soviet Union fell, it led to enormous turmoil,
including a decline in Russian GDP of 40 percent between 1991 and 1996 (Klug-
man and Braithwaite 1998: 39). Nonetheless, it did not lead Moscow to release its
grip on the disputed islands. The hypothetical collapse of Russia would therefore
have to be of an even greater magnitude. However, even if the country were bro-
ken up into several smaller units, it is unlikely that some future independent Far
Eastern republic would voluntarily hand over the territory. After all, as previously
noted, it is those who reside in the Russian Far East who are most deeply attached
to the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories and are vehemently opposed to a ter-
ritorial deal. Instead of seeking to negotiate a transfer, the Japanese government
could theoretically take advantage of the chaos to launch an operation to seize
the islands on the pretext of establishing security on its northern border. Even in
this highly improbable context, however, the idea of Japan engaging in another
Siberian intervention is all but inconceivable. Being contrary to the will of the
Russian residents, such an operation would have to involve an element of force.
It would also undoubtedly be condemned internationally as an opportunistic land
grab. Utterly against Japan’s postwar constitution and the pacifist instincts of the
majority of the population, it is difficult even to imagine Japan undertaking such
action.
In addition to considering extreme scenarios within Russia, it is worth reflect-
ing on whether there are any hypothetical developments in Japan that could
prompt Moscow to change its long-term position and accept the sacrifice of all
four islands. This could not simply be a vast financial offer, since, as explained
later in this chapter, this approach has already been tried by the Japanese side.
Rather than offering cash, however, what if Japan were to make the radical pro-
posal of abandoning its Security Treaty with Washington and ordering US forces
out of the country? Evidently this is not going to happen, since Japan’s national
security as a whole is valued more highly than the objective of regaining the
Northern Territories; it is also the case that Tokyo is currently in the process of
strengthening its alliance with the United States. Nonetheless, were such an offer
to be made, would Moscow consider returning all four of the islands? It is worth
giving this idea a few moments thought since dividing Japan from the United
States was one of Moscow’s primary strategic objectives in East Asia during the
Cold War, and the Soviet leadership previously sought to use the islands as lever-
age to achieve this goal. To be specific, in January 1960 Khrushchev responded
to the signing of the revised US-Japan Security Treaty by unilaterally abrogating
the 1956 Joint Declaration. Making this linkage to the territorial issue explicit,
Khrushchev informed his Japanese counterparts: “Only when all foreign troops
are withdrawn from Japanese territory and a peace treaty is signed between the
USSR and Japan will the islands of Habomai and Shikotan be handed over to
Japan” (quoted in Hasegawa 1998a: 137).
At the height of bipolar rivalry, Moscow’s unequivocal objective in the region
may have been to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States, but this is
no longer a leading priority. Putin’s Russia certainly remains opposed to US-led
military blocs, and relations between the United States and Russia in 2015 were
extremely tense. Nonetheless, Moscow’s current concerns are almost exclusively
focused on the European theatre, where it believes the US and its NATO allies are
engaged in determined efforts to change the status quo by pressing eastwards and
threatening Russian influence in Ukraine and elsewhere. By contrast, the Rus-
sian leadership is broadly satisfied with the situation in East Asia. In this region,
US power is in relative decline and Japan is not regarded as a threat. Moscow’s
priority here is therefore not to push back against Western influence but rather to
maintain a stable environment that is conducive to achieving Russia’s integration
into the Asia-Pacific region and the economic development of its Far East. Given
these goals, Russia might actually not favour Japan’s abandonment of the Security
Treaty, since it would be deeply destabilising. Firstly, by dramatically weaken-
ing the US’s position in East Asia, this development would inevitably embolden
China. Of course, Moscow currently has excellent relations with Beijing, yet it
is unlikely to welcome anything that encourages China to try for regional hege-
mony. Secondly, shorn of US protection and confronted by a rampant China,
Japan would be forced to rapidly become a “normal” power. This would involve
abandoning its pacifist constitution and developing military forces more propor-
tional to the size of its economy. In such circumstances, it is entirely possible that
Japanese leaders would also judge it necessary to develop nuclear weapons. This
being so, according to Rajan Menon, it is now the case that
neighboring countries are united in the belief that the best Japan is a militarily
weak Japan that pursues its ends through economic and political means. . . .
[A] Japan that is cut adrift from, or that abandons, the U.S. alliance would
destabilize Northeast Asia, a region pivotal to the world’s prosperity and
stability. Even Japan’s traditional adversaries – China, North Korea, and
Russia – prefer a Japan tethered.
(quoted in Midford 2015: 479)
All in all, then, even if Japan were willing to sacrifice its most sacred of cows, it
could not induce the Russian side to return all four of the islands.1
These improbable scenarios demonstrate the full hopelessness of Japan’s
claims to Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. What is more, the reality of this situation
should be blindingly obvious to the Japanese side. The vast majority of the mate-
rial that this monograph is based upon is publicly accessible, at least to those able
to read Russian. In addition, the Soviet/Russian leadership has consistently made
explicit that it will never consider returning the two larger islands. For example,
in October 1956 Khrushchev bluntly told the Japanese negotiators:
The Japanese side wants to obtain Habomai and Shikotan without conclud-
ing a peace treaty and decide later on other territorial questions [. . .]. The
Soviet government wishes to come to an agreement with Japan as quickly as
possible, and it does not exploit the territorial question for bargaining. But I
must once again completely, definitively, and categorically declare that we
do not and should not accept any other territorial claims from Japan, other
than Habomai and Shikotan, and refuse to discuss any proposal whatever on
this question.
(quoted in Hasegawa 1998a: 130)
Despite the passage of sixty years, this remains the Russian government’s posi-
tion. It is willing to consider the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan, but only fol-
lowing the conclusion of a peace treaty and only on condition that this would put
a conclusive end to the territorial dispute.
This state of affairs is seen as so self-evident in Russia that Japan’s continued
insistence upon the return of all four islands is regarded with a mixture of annoy-
ance and amusement. An example of the former is Prime Minister Medvedev,
who, in response to a journalist’s question during his return visit to Kunashir/i
in July 2012, declared: “As for the reaction of our Japanese partners, I do not
care about it. I do not care about it so much that I will not be wasting my time
answering this question. . . . What do we have to discuss with them? The issue of
the Russian prime minister’s presence on the Russian territory?” (quoted in Rich-
ardson 2013: 224). For his part, Sergei Ivanov, chief of staff of the presidential
administration, takes a more relaxed stance, regarding Japanese complaints as no
more than a minor irritant that can be easily ignored. In his words, the Japanese
reaction “is like a ritual dance: I come here [to Iturup/Etorofu], I listen to their
expressions of regret. . . . I come here again” (quoted in Sargin 2014). The Rus-
sian media, meanwhile, express some bemusement that the Japanese side retains
such optimism and that it finds positive means of interpreting the statements of
Russian politicians (RIA Novosti 2014). Last of all, the most lighthearted response
I have heard to Japan’s claims is that of an academic at the Moscow State Insti-
tute of International Relations (MGIMO), the university affiliated with Russia’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that scholar’s view, the only way for Japan to get
back all four of the disputed islands is in exchange for four other islands; namely,
Hokkaidō, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyūshū!
While regarded as a joke by many on the Russian side, there remains consider-
able optimism within Japan that it is possible to regain sovereignty over Iturup/
Etorofu and Kunashir/i, as well as Shikotan and Habomai. Indeed, at the time
of writing, expectations appear to be growing. In particular, there are hopes that
President Putin’s forthcoming visit to Japan could be the moment for the break-
through. Originally expected to take place in 2014, this trip was postponed due to
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. However, despite the continuation of the Ukraine
crisis, throughout 2015 the Japanese government sought to maintain engagement
with the Russian leadership. Indeed, Prime Minister Abe used the occasion of the
G7 summit in Bavaria in June to explain to other member countries that despite
the sanctions against Russia, his government intended to continue high-level con-
tacts with President Putin (Rossiiskaya Gazeta 2015). The reason for this urgency
is Abe’s belief that Japan needs to seize what he perceives to be a serious oppor-
tunity to resolve the territorial dispute. This is something that the Japanese leader
has made a key feature of his premiership, taking personal control over the Russia
brief and making a point of stressing that he can deliver a solution within the next
few years. For instance, in December 2014 Abe declared with determination that
“my mission as a politician, as prime minister, is to achieve this [the resolution
of the Northern Territories problem] no matter what” (quoted in Naka 2014). The
Japanese leader is also far from being alone in expressing this optimistic outlook.
On this issue he is cheered on by academics such as Yamada Yoshihiko, who has
said that “we now have a major chance of getting the big islands back. We should
not stop the negotiations” (quoted in Imoto 2014).

Given that it has been clearly demonstrated that it is all but inconceivable that
Russia would agree to compromise on the sovereignty of Iturup/Etorofu and
Kunashir/i, it is puzzling that this view remains so prevalent in Japan. The remain-
der of this chapter is therefore devoted to examining possible explanations for the
persistence of this delusion.
Source of the delusion
Illusion, not delusion?

The first possible explanation for the surprising pervasiveness of the view that
Japan might actually be able to persuade Russia voluntarily to recognise Japanese
sovereignty over all four islands is the suggestion that this is actually not a delu-
sion at all, but rather a deliberately crafted illusion. What I mean by this is the idea
that the Japanese leadership knows perfectly well that Russia has absolutely no
intention of compromising over Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i yet finds it politi-
cally expedient to pretend otherwise. There could be two possible reasons for this,
one domestic and one international.
Firstly, the domestic argument would be that Japanese leaders keep up the pre-
tence about four islands feasibly being returned in response to public pressure.
In particular, it might be claimed that the ruling party considers it impossible to
pursue a more realistic compromise due to the negative electoral implications that
this would have. Alternatively, perhaps it is the case that Japanese politicians find
it convenient to use this issue to distract the public from domestic issues and to
unite the people around a popular nationalist cause. In general, it is not uncom-
mon for governments to exploit territorial disputes in this way with a view to
generating a favourable “rally round the flag” effect. Prominent examples could
be said to be the usage of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute by various Argentinian
governments, as well as the exploitation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue by
the Chinese Communist Party.
Secondly, in terms of international considerations, it could be highlighted that
in addition to the island dispute with Russia, Japan has territorial disagreements
with Korea and China. As such, it might be argued that Tokyo opts to take an
unrealistically bold and intransigent stance on the Southern Kurils/Northern Terri-
tories because it fears that taking a more constructive position could be interpreted
as a sign of weakness by policymakers in Seoul and Beijing. Above all, it could
be posited that Japan’s number one foreign-policy priority is to avoid doing any-
thing that could possibly embolden China and encourage it to more aggressively
challenge Japan’s administration over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This being
so, perhaps a sensible policy towards Russia is being sacrificed for the benefit of
Japan’s China policy.
These arguments are well worth considering and in other circumstances they
no doubt provide useful insight. On this occasion, however, such analysis cannot
provide a satisfactory explanation for the Japanese authorities’ approach. To take
the domestic claims first, it is simply not the case that Japanese leaders are under
intense public pressure to take a hard line on this issue. There are, of course,
campaign organisations, such as the League of Chishima-Habomai Residents, to
whom this subject is deeply important. However, these groups are small, mainly
moderate and have extremely limited influence on national politics. For the vast
majority of the Japanese public, this is not even close to being a priority issue.
Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter 5, opinion polls reveal that less than a third of
Japanese people support the government’s uncompromising position of demand-
ing all four islands, while more than two thirds favour a more flexible approach
(Mainichi Shinbun 2013). This being so, there seems little electoral advantage to
be gained by remaining wedded to yontō ikkatsu henkan. Indeed, far from being
a useful means of drumming up popular support, the government’s policy is more
likely to be a liability with the public. In particular, Prime Minister Abe’s habit of
continually talking up the chances of soon resolving the dispute is likely to raise
expectations. When these high hopes are not fulfilled, as certainly they cannot
be, the Japanese people will be inclined to think that their government has failed.
All considered, if it were truly the case that the Japanese leadership understood
the reality of the situation yet was worried about whether it could express this
honestly to the public, they would be better advised to kick the issue firmly into
the long grass.
Turning to international considerations, it is certainly true that Japan’s stance
on the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories has implications for the country’s
other territorial disputes. It is therefore understandable if this line of thinking
makes Japanese strategists somewhat hesitant about accepting the permanent loss
of the two larger islands. However, this consideration cannot explain why the
Japanese government should so regularly draw attention to this issue and persis-
tently peddle an unrealistically positive view of the prospects of its favourable
resolution. What is more, if broader strategic thinking were really at the heart of
this matter, one would have thought that Japanese policymakers would have taken
the view that what really presents a serious security threat to the country is not
the risk of Japanese concessions emboldening China with regard to the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands, but rather the more serious and already emerging danger of Russia
being drawn into an ever closer economic, political, and security partnership with
China. Given that this development would have a much more dramatic embolden-
ing effect on China, as well as potentially dire consequences for Japanese national
interests, it would seem that if Japanese leaders were really being guided by cold
strategic calculation, they would have long ago recognised the logic of accepting
the reality of the permanent loss of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. While repre-
senting no material loss from the status quo for Japan, this step would enable the
signing of a peace treaty and thereby considerably assist efforts to draw Russia
away from China.
Having taken these various considerations into account, and also having noted
that the optimism is not restricted to politicians but is also frequently to be found
amongst bureaucrats and academics, it is apparent that Japanese talk about the
prospects of more than two islands being returned is not simply some craftily
constructed illusion. Instead, it is a genuine and deeply held misconception.
The return of the Northern Territories was before our eyes.

(Suzuki 2012: 197)
Having satisfied ourselves that the claim that four islands could actually be
returned is something more than just political theatre, the task remains to iden-
tify the source of this delusion. There are several plausible explanations, but
perhaps the most influential is the belief that Japan has been on the verge of
securing the return of territory on several occasions in the past. This is a view that
is widely shared in Japan, though commentators differ on how many opportunities
there have been and on exactly when Japan has been closest to a breakthrough.
For instance, Kimura Hiroshi states that Japan has had two main opportunities
(Kimura 2015). Tōgō Kazuhiko, meanwhile, goes into much more detail and lists
as many as five between 1986 and 2001 (Tōgō 2007). Of such apparent chances,
four are worthy of more detailed discussion.
The first “missed opportunity” is said to have occurred in 1990–91, towards
the end of the Soviet Union. At this time Ozawa Ichirō, then secretary general of
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), sought to take advantage of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s reformist tendencies and Moscow’s desperate need for hard cur-
rency, by seeking to broker a “cash-for-islands” deal. Living up to his reputation
as somewhat of a shadow shogun, Ozawa used back-channels to propose a deal to
the Soviet leadership that entailed Japan promising large volumes of emergency
aid, as well as longer-term infrastructure investment and low-interest loans, if
Moscow would concede to the return of the four islands. The entire financial
package is estimated to have been worth US$26 billion, and it was hoped that
it could be concluded in time for it to be announced during Gorbachev’s visit to
Japan, which eventually took place in April 1991 (Radchenko and Tarlow 2013:
119–20). As Ozawa later revealed, despite his own best efforts and the parlous
contemporary state of the Soviet economy, the offer was ultimately rejected by
Gorbachev (Japan Times 2013).
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of the Russian
Federation in December 1991, another promising chance is said to have presented
itself. Tōgō Kazuhiko colourfully describes this opportunity as the “non-existent
secret proposal” (Tōgō 2013: 96). According to his account, this offer was made
by Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s strikingly pro-Western foreign minister, to his Japa-
nese counterpart, Watanabe Michio, during the former’s visit to Japan in March
1992. The proposal is claimed to have consisted of four distinct steps. First, nego-
tiations would be conducted on the return of Habomai and Shikotan. Second,
following the conclusion of these talks, a legal agreement would be signed on the
transfer of these two islands. Third, negotiations would then proceed on to the
status of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. Fourth, after the successful completion
of these second-stage talks, a peace treaty would be concluded, thereby finally
settling the status of all four islands. What makes this apparent offer so strik-
ing is that it appears to indicate that the Russian side was willing to agree to the
transfer of the two smaller islands without prior conclusion of a peace treaty. This
represents a major change from Russia’s usual position, which, as outlined in the
Joint Declaration of 1956, foresees Moscow transferring Shikotan and Habomai
to Japan as a gesture of goodwill after the signing of a peace treaty. Despite this
seemingly major concession from the Russian side, Tōgō states that the offer was
summarily rejected by Japanese negotiators due to their mistakenly optimistic
belief that if they persisted, they could achieve their desired goal of securing the
return of all four islands at once ( yontō ikkatsu henkan) (Tōgō 2013: 98–9).
While the first and second “opportunities’ came in quick succession, the third
did not follow for another five years. It is said to have finally arrived, however, in
November 1997 at the unofficial “no-neckties” summit between President Yeltsin
and Prime Minister Hashimoto in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. Evidently in an emotional
frame of mind and eager to make a grand gesture to his guest, Yeltsin report-
edly told Hashimoto: “We should settle the territorial problem and conclude a
peace treaty today” (quoted in Okabe 2015). Interpreting this as meaning that the
Russian leader was willing to agree to the immediate return of all four islands,
the Japanese prime minister was left jumping for joy. According to subsequent
Japanese press reports, it was only the rapid intervention of Boris Nemtsov that
prevented this opportunity from being exploited (Katō 2008). Nemtsov would, of
course, later become a prominent critic of the Putin government, and he was noto-
riously assassinated in February 2015 just beyond the walls of the Kremlin. In
1997, however, he was Yeltsin’s first deputy prime minister and a trusted adviser.
Nemtsov considered the president’s remarks to be ill-considered and urgently
persuaded him to reconsider. In the end, Yeltsin committed to the looser aim of
striving to resolve the territorial dispute and sign a peace treaty by the year 2000.
Lastly, the fourth of these “windows of opportunity” is said to have opened
after the end of the Yeltsin era and following Putin’s election to the presidency in
2000. Meeting in March 2001 and once again in Siberia, the Russian and Japanese
leaders agreed to the Irkutsk joint communiqué. According to this document, both
sides
[c]onfirmed that the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration is a basic legal

document that established the starting point in the negotiation process for the
conclusion of a peace treaty subsequent to the restoration of diplomatic rela-
tions between both countries;
Based on this confirmation, agreed to promote future negotiations to
accomplish complete normalization of Japan-Russia relations by means of
concluding a peace treaty through the solution of issues concerning the attri-
bution of the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai, on the
basis of the 1993 Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations.
(MOFA 2001)
This communiqué is regarded as significant because it unequivocally confirms

the continued validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, as well as reaffirming Rus-
sia’s willingness to discuss the status of not only Shikotan and Habomai, but also
Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. Furthermore, Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō, who

had succeeded Obuchi Keizō as Japanese leader in April 2000 following the lat-
ter’s ultimately fatal stroke, took the opportunity offered by the Irkutsk meeting
to enact a notable change in Japan’s negotiating position. Rather than persist-
ing blindly with the implausible demand for yontō ikkatsu henkan, Mori instead
proposed to his Russian counterpart that the status of the two larger islands be
discussed separately from that of the two smaller ones (Masaki 2005). Tōgō,
who coordinated the Japanese negotiating efforts at Irkutsk and is a prominent
advocate of this more flexible approach, regards Mori’s proposal as having been
a momentous stride forward and describes the Irkutsk meeting as “the day that
the islands came closest” (Tōgō 2007: 463). This apparent progress, however,
proved short-lived. The next month Mori was replaced by Koizumi Jun’ichirō,
who, along with his new foreign minister Tanaka Makiko, immediately reverted
to the usual blunt insistence that Russia recognise Japanese sovereignty over all
four islands as a precondition to the signing of a peace treaty (Buszynski 2006:
297). The following months witnessed significant political turmoil within Japan,
including the resignation of Foreign Minister Tanaka, Suzuki Muneo’s ouster
from the LDP and subsequent arrest, and Tōgō Kazuhiko’s own removal from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with his younger colleague and leading Russia
expert Satō Masaru. In Tōgō’s view, this vicious political bloodletting resulted in
the squandering of Japan’s best chance to resolve the territorial dispute.
On these various occasions, Japan is therefore believed to have come very
close to making a breakthrough and commentators consequently bemoan the fact
that had it not been for just one or two minor factors, the islands may already
have been returned. For some, this was simply a matter of bad luck. For instance,
if Boris Nemtsov had not intervened when he did, perhaps Yeltsin would have
followed through with his apparent intention to put an immediate end to the
dispute in 1997. Suzuki Muneo, for his part, greatly regrets the sudden death
of Prime Minister Obuchi in 2000. In his view, “the Northern Territories have
come close to us, just before our eyes, on several occasions. I seriously think that
if Obuchi had not suffered a stroke, we would have without doubt resolved the
Northern Territories dispute. The birth of the Koizumi regime killed any prospect
of a resolution” (Suzuki 2012: 198–9). In contrast, those on the right of the politi-
cal spectrum have a different interpretation, attributing the failure to secure the
return of the islands to a lack of strong national leadership. For instance, Kimura
Hiroshi considers this to be the key reason for Japan’s inability to take advantage
of the opportunity presented by the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as of the
chance that he believes arose in the 1970s following President Nixon’s landmark
visit to Beijing in 1972 and the resulting rapprochement between the United
States and China. Specifically, Kimura states that “Russia had lost its strength
and needed economic and other assistance from Japan. However, the weak or
inept governments of Tanaka Kakuei and Hosokawa Morihiro did not make use
of these chances to the full extent” (Kimura 2015). Others express this view more
forcefully. Above all, Sakurai Yoshiko, a journalist and member of the nation-
alist Nippon Kaigi, has written that she takes the view that in order to resolve
Japan’s territorial disputes “it is necessary to have a political administration that

is as strong as one that can carry out a war” (Sakurai 2012). These conserva-
tive observers are therefore encouraged by the return to power of Abe Shinzō in
December 2012. Given Abe’s nationalist views and firm grip on the premiership,
it is hoped that he could be the leader with sufficient strength and determination
to overcome the obstacles and wrestle back the islands from Russia. Kimura
therefore regards the current Abe administration as representing another win-
dow of opportunity. As he explains, “I am not saying that the four islands will
be immediately returned this year. Nonetheless, this is truly a rare chance. It is
essential to fully recognise this and not to go for simple compromises that leave
[Japan’s] trump cards idle” (Kimura 2015).
Never any genuine opportunity to regain the two larger islands

When one reads that in the past Japan was within a whisker of securing the return
of the disputed territory, it does not seem so surprising that many Japanese con-
tinue to believe that a favourable deal is still possible. However, how close was
Japan really to achieving a decisive breakthrough? Looking closely at each of the
four occasions mentioned above, it is questionable to what extent they represent
genuine opportunities to secure the return of the four islands.
In the case of the “cash-for-islands” proposal of 1990–91, Ozawa Ichirō was
certainly of the opinion that a deal was a definite possibility. He was no doubt
encouraged in this view by public statements by radical reformers within the
Soviet Union. Perhaps the most prominent example of this was in October 1989
when Yurii Afanas’ev, a member of the new Congress of People’s Deputies of the
Soviet Union, called for the return of all four of the islands (Hasegawa 1998b:
331). Thanks to the introduction of Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’ , this period
also saw the publication of several notable newspaper and journal articles that
advocated a revised approach to the territorial dispute with Japan. For those
accustomed to dealing with a more authoritarian Soviet Union, in which politi-
cal debate and the media were tightly controlled, it was tempting to believe that
these liberal statements represented a shift in the government’s official position
(Hasegawa 1998b: 338–9). In reality, however, there is little to suggest that the
Soviet authorities truly considered radical concessions at this time.
With regard to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has been found that at
this point in time, officials were actively considering two proposals for addressing
the territorial dispute with Japan. The first of these was to affirm the continued
application of the 1956 Joint Declaration and thereby commit to handing over
the two smaller islands. The second was merely to recognise the existence of a
territorial dispute yet concede to no transfer of territory (Radchenko and Tarlow
2013: 118). As can be seen, both options fall well short of Japanese contemporary
hopes. As for the Soviet leader himself, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who provides an
exceptionally detailed account of negotiations at this time, argues that Gorbachev
was strongly against making major concessions. Indeed, Gorbachev seems to
have thought that the Japanese overestimated the strength of their position, telling
Foreign Minister Uno in May 1989 that Japan should give up on the notion that
the Soviet Union wanted better bilateral relations more than the Japanese side
did (Hasegawa 1998b: 313). He also expressed frustration that Japanese inter-
locutors always insisted on bringing up the territorial issue. Specifically, in an
outburst to a visiting Japanese parliamentary delegation in July 1990, Gorbachev
threatened, “If the Japanese keep harping on the territorial question . . . we may
have no choice but to answer that there is no such thing as a territorial question. Is
there anything else the Japanese are prepared to speak about other than this ques-
tion?” (quoted in Hasegawa 1998b: 351). Based on his evaluation of the evidence,
Hasegawa therefore concludes that far from seriously considering recognising
Japanese sovereignty over all four of the islands in 1990–91, it is rather the case
that Gorbachev did not, neither then nor later, even really think about settling the
dispute on the basis of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Instead, Gorbachev’s favoured
policy is said to have been to copy the approach taken by Deng Xiaoping in 1978
with regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute; that is, to maintain the territorial sta-
tus quo, concentrate on developing closer bilateral relations, and shelve discus-
sions of sovereignty for several decades (Hasegawa 1998b: 314).
Sergey Radchenko and Lisbeth Tarlow take a slightly different perspective
on the situation in 1990–91. In their view, Gorbachev was actually inclined, in
principle, to return the islands, yet he considered this to be politically impos-
sible (Radchenko and Tarlow 2013: 127). He had acquiesced to the liberation
of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 but had opted to take a much harder line
against Lithuania’s declaration of independence in March 1990. While striving
to prevent the breakup of the Soviet Union, therefore, he could ill afford to be
seen as weak by conceding any territory to Japan. Added to this is the fact that
following the introduction of democratic reforms, the Soviet Politburo and Gor-
bachev himself were no longer in a position to decide crucial matters, such as the
revision of the country’s borders, without securing broader popular consent. In
particular, after the March 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies,
the Soviet Union had a new legislative body whose members were eager to exert
independent influence, including over foreign policy issues. Added to this was the
increasing assertiveness of the Russian Republic, which, by means of its procla-
mation of sovereignty in June 1990, had made clear that its agreement would be
required for any territorial deal with Japan. To emphasise this point, Boris Yeltsin,
having become chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Republic, made a visit to Kunashir/i in August 1990. He also asserted his opposi-
tion to concessions, playing up his Russian nationalist credentials and stating:
“We will not make any deals with anybody. We shall not give away the Kurile
islands” (quoted in Radchenko and Tarlow 2013: 124). This stance was evidently
in line with that of the Soviet public, 77.6 percent of whom told a 1988 opinion
survey that they believed that the border determined as a result of World War II
was justified (Hasegawa 1998b: 296). Similarly, within the Soviet Far East, only
2 percent of respondents considered Japan’s claims to the islands to be fully justi-
fied (Hasegawa 1998b: 317). Given this intense opposition, even if Gorbachev
had wanted to make a deal with Japan in 1990–91, he would have found it excep-
tionally difficult to push through.

Turning to the “non-existent secret proposal” of 1992, closer inspection reveals
that it also was not the opportunity that it is often presented as being. In par-
ticular, Georgii Kunadze, who was then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, gives
a markedly different version of events to that provided by Tōgō Kazuhiko. In an
interview he gave to Hokkaidō Shinbun in 2012, Kunadze confirms that an infor-
mal proposal was indeed made by Foreign Minister Kozyrev during his visit to
Tokyo in March 1992. He also concurs that this proposal consisted of four distinct
steps. However, the details of these steps are not the same as those listed by Tōgō.
According to Kunadze:
The contents were (1) to agree to the procedure, conditions, and schedule
for the handover of the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan (based on the
1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration that promises the return of Habomai
and Shikotan after the conclusion of a peace treaty), (2) to conclude a peace
treaty, (3) to hand over the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan, (4) after
that, to observe the development of Japanese-Russian relations and, if there
is a suitable atmosphere, to discuss the remaining two islands.
(Hokkaidō Shinbun 2012)
Evidently, this proposal is far less dramatic than the one described by Tōgō. Most
crucially, while Tōgō claims that the Russian side offered to return Habomai and
Shikotan before the conclusion of a peace treaty (Tōgō 2013: 98–9), Kunadze
suggests nothing of the sort.2 Indeed, the former Russian diplomat is very clear
on this point, saying, “In accordance with the Joint Declaration, Habomai and
Shikotan were to be handed over to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty.”
He also emphasises that “there were no promises about Kunashir and Etorofu”
(quoted in Hokkaidō Shinbun 2012). Other than revealing the modest nature of
the proposal, Kunadze also raises doubts about the seriousness of the offer. As
he explains, “This was a way of laying groundwork, and the purpose was to find
out what Japan’s reaction would be. We did not have the approval of the presi-
dent” (Hokkaido Shinbun 2012). Furthermore, even if one imagines that Yeltsin
and Kozyrev did favour major concessions at this point, there remains the issue
of domestic opposition within Russia. The importance of this factor was clearly
demonstrated six months later when, faced with determined opposition from con-
servative groups within the Russian parliament, Yeltsin was forced to cancel his
September trip to Japan just four days before his scheduled departure. Overall
then, what is most striking about developments in 1992 is not how close to a
solution the parties came; it is rather the fact that at the time when the Russian
Federation was going through its period of most radically pro-Western and liberal
foreign policy under Kozyrev, the Russian side was still not willing to go beyond
the provisions of the 1956 Joint Declaration.
With regard to the third “opportunity”, at Krasnoyarsk in November 1997, the
image of the youthful Nemtsov begging the erratic Yeltsin on his knees not to
give away the country’s patrimony is a particularly memorable one. It is far from
clear, however, that this moment represented a genuine chance for Japan to get
all four of the islands back. It was certainly rash of Yeltsin to propose to resolve a
fifty-year-old dispute in one single meeting, and Nemtsov has confirmed that he
did indeed urge the Russian president to take a more restrained approach (Katō
2008). And yet, what exactly was it that Yeltsin was suggesting in his comments
at this time? Many Japanese commentators have taken the view that by proposing
to bring an immediate end to the dispute, the Russian leader necessarily intended
the rapid return of all four islands (Katō 2008). There is every chance, however,
that this represents a case of analysts’ perceptions being shaped by their desires. In
fact, if one looks at what Yeltsin actually said, it is notable that there is no specific
mention of any territorial transfer. This being so, it is equally possible to take the
view, as Gilbert Rozman does, that it was actually Yeltsin’s intention to get Prime
Minister Hashimoto to sign a peace treaty without prior agreement on the return
of any territory (Rozman 2000: 4–5). This much more discouraging conclusion
finds support in the Japanese government’s response to a parliamentary question
submitted by Suzuki Muneo in 2008. When asked whether Yeltsin at Krasnoyarsk
had offered the prompt return of all four islands, the government replied that there
had been no such proposal (Okabe 2015).
Of the four “windows of opportunity”, it is therefore only the final one that
represented a real chance for a breakthrough. To reiterate, this was the moment, in
Irkutsk in 2001, when the Japanese side abandoned (albeit briefly) its obsession
with yontō ikkatsu henkan and instead promoted the idea of discussing the status
of Habomai and Shikotan separately from that of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i.
In response to the Japanese negotiators’ adoption of a more realistic approach,
the Russian side affirmed the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, and, in so
doing, President Putin committed himself to the possibility of transferring the
two smaller islands. This was therefore a genuine point in time when the gap
between the countries’ positions was narrowed and the outlines of a viable deal
became apparent. It is essential to emphasise, however, that this progress was only
achieved as a result of the Japanese side offering concessions and that it did not
provide a plausible route to the return of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. Although
the Russians did indicate a willingness to speak about the two larger islands, there
is nothing to suggest that they had any intention whatsoever of compromising on
the issue of their sovereignty. For the Putin administration in 2001, the transfer of
Habomai and Shikotan was therefore not seen as a starting point in the process of
resolving the territorial dispute; instead, this was regarded as a final and conclu-
sive goodwill gesture that would only be undertaken after the signing of a peace
treaty. In other words, Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i remained as distant from
Japan as always.
The whole idea was to hang noodles on Japanese ears.

(Saplin quoted in Radchenko and Tarlow 2013: 119)
If these four moments during the 1990s and 2000s were not real opportunities
to resolve the territorial dispute in Japan’s favour, why is it that so many Japanese
observers regard them as a source of optimism? Part of the explanation is likely

to be a degree of deception from the Russian side. If one takes the trouble to look
into the issue in detail and especially if one reads the Russian-language literature,
it is abundantly clear that Russian decision makers have absolutely no intention
of recognising Japanese sovereignty over the four islands. However, this is not
always the impression that they give to an international audience. In particular,
unlike the approach adopted by the Soviet Union for most of its history and in
contrast to Japan’s own position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute with China, Rus-
sia acknowledges the existence of the territorial dispute over the Southern Kurils/
Northern Territories and has shown itself willing to hold negotiations. Russian
leaders will also periodically offer a few vague words of encouragement that seem
to suggest that a favourable deal might still be possible. Why is it that the Russian
side should engage in this charade?
The main reason for this behaviour is because, by creating the impression that
progress is still possible on the territorial issue, Russia can induce the Japanese
side to take a more generally positive attitude towards bilateral relations. This
is valuable to Russia because although economic ties with Japan are not so vital
as to cause Moscow to offer major territorial concessions, they are nonetheless
clearly desirable. Added to this is the fact that by not entirely ruling out the possi-
bility of the islands’ return, the Russian side can attempt to periodically lure Japan
away from its customary support of US foreign policy. To put this another way,
Russia’s tactic is to encourage Japan to pursue the “exit approach” to resolving
the dispute. This strategy is based on the assumption that by developing closer
economic and political ties with Russia, Japan can establish a relationship of trust
and gradually persuade the Russian leadership to recognise Japanese sovereignty
over the four islands. Those on the right of Japanese politics criticise the “exit
approach” as being naïve and argue instead for an “entrance approach” that would
see Japan withhold cooperation with Russia until the latter concedes on the ter-
ritorial issue (e.g. Sawa 2013). To an extent, the conservative critics are correct,
since the development of better bilateral relations will not cause Russia to return
the two larger islands. Instead, Russia intends to behave like a flirt; that is, to
enjoy the benefits of Japan’s courtship, to show a bit of leg now and then to
keep up its suitor’s interest, and yet never to allow the relationship to be consum-
mated to Japan’s satisfaction. What is more, it is in Russia’s interests to keep this
game going for as long as possible. The more time that elapses, the longer the
islands will have been under Russian control, the fewer former Japanese islanders
will remain alive, and the stronger Russia’s position will become. Eventually, the
Russian side may hope that bilateral relations reach such an advanced level that
the Japanese government becomes hesitant about raising the territorial dispute for
fear of jeopardising the economically and politically beneficial status quo.
Moscow has been leading the Japanese side on in this way for some consider-
able time. In particular, it is clear that Gorbachev engaged in this type of behaviour.
As highlighted above, those who have studied the period most thoroughly con-
clude that Gorbachev had no intention of conceding any territory to Japan; indeed,
unlike Khrushchev and Putin, he was not even willing to recognise the validity
of the 1956 Joint Declaration (Hasegawa 1998b: 389–97). And yet, despite his
determination not to provide the Japanese side with anything of substance, Gor-
bachev did not immediately rule out the possibility of a deal, thereby encouraging
the Japanese side to believe that they had an opportunity for a breakthrough. His
reason for doing this was, of course, because of the Soviet Union’s urgent need
of financial assistance; he was also reportedly eager to stop Japan from joining
the US’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an anti-ballistic missile system (Tōgō
2011: 126). In the hope of achieving these goals, Gorbachev engaged in exten-
sive talks with his Japanese interlocutors and expressed a willingness to discuss
the territorial issue. In practice, however, Gorbachev’s tactic was to take every
opportunity to steer the talks away from the islands issue and to focus instead on
promoting cooperation in the fields of trade, economics, science, and technology
(Hasegawa 1998b: 393). Gorbachev also sought to play for time and to avoid
providing the Japanese side with definite answers. A good example of this is with
regard to Ozawa Ichirō’s “cash-for-islands” proposal. When Ozawa visited Mos-
cow in March 1991, Gorbachev agreed to meet with him twice, despite the fact
that Ozawa was only the LDP’s secretary general and not the Japanese leader.
Ozawa sought to press Gorbachev on whether the Soviet leader would agree to a
transfer of the islands during his forthcoming visit to Tokyo in April. In response,
Gorbachev served up some first-class political waffle. As Radchenko and Tarlow
recount:
Gorbachev avoided giving a direct answer. He spoke instead about ‘cross-

fertilization’ of the ‘processes’ of growing Soviet-Japanese cooperation and
peace treaty negotiations. “Here history must take care of itself. Perhaps it is
very close, and perhaps far away. [. . .] I think that life will make that clear,”
Gorbachev said. “I am proposing what will help to resolve all the issues.
And life changes the times. If we want to ennoble our relations in the future,
to deepen trust, then this is just what is needed. I am convinced that this is
a realistic prospect.” Ozawa noted his confusion: “I do not fully understand
what you just said. What concretely stands behind that?” Gorbachev restated
his ideas in vague terms, leaving Ozawa, according to Chernayaev’s recollec-
tions, “both inspired and puzzled.”
(Radchenko and Tarlow 2013: 126)
Overall, then, Gorbachev can be seen to have sought to leave the Japanese side
with a sense of false hope. Indeed, according to Vasilii Saplin, who was involved
in the back-channel negotiations that led to Japan’s “cash-for-islands” proposal
and was present at Gorbachev’s meeting with Ozawa, “the whole idea was to hang
noodles on Japanese ears [naveshat’ lapshi na ushi’, meaning ‘to fool them’] as
if we were prepared to discuss the matter seriously – just to give us the credits”
(quoted in Radchenko and Tarlow 2013: 119).
The approach taken under Putin’s leadership has not been altogether dissimi-
lar. Above all, it is still the Kremlin’s ambition to improve relations with Japan
in order to promote Japanese investment in Russia, especially in Siberia and the
Russian Far East, as well as to encourage greater distance in the relationship

between Japan and the United States. The value of this tactic became apparent in
the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Although Japan
did ultimately follow its G7 partners in introducing sanctions against Russia, the
punitive measures were deliberately weak and adopted only with evident reluc-
tance. The reason for this hesitance was an unwillingness to jeopardise the steady
development of closer bilateral ties that had been under way since 2012 and had
culminated in Prime Minister Abe’s bold decision to attend the opening ceremony
of the Sochi Winter Olympics in February 2014. Having thus invested heavily
in the relationship with President Putin and believing that close ties between the
countries’ leaders could be the source of a breakthrough in the territorial dispute,
the Abe administration was left in a difficult position. As a result, at the same
time as expressing solidarity with the G7, Prime Minister Abe continued to grant
meetings to Russian officials who had been placed on the EU and US sanctions
list and also persisted with preparations for the anticipated visit of President Putin
to Japan (Petrov 2015).
In order to encourage Japan to behave in this way, Putin has consistently voiced
his eagerness for Russia and Japan to become closer economic and political part-
ners. More artfully, when addressing international audiences, the Russian Presi-
dent has also made it a habit to make comments that, although sufficiently vague
to avoid any specific commitments, are deliberately crafted to spur optimism
in Japan. One example of this was at the St Petersburg International Economic
Forum in May 2014. At this high-profile event, in addition to telling the assem-
bled international journalists that Russia is sincerely interested in solving the ter-
ritorial problem, Putin got Japanese pulses racing by declaring that a resolution
would necessarily require compromises. He also included a call to begin bilateral
discussions, declaring: “Are we ready for negotiations? Yes, we are ready” (RIA
Novosti 2014). One year later in June 2015 the Russian leader made similar com-
ments. Once again taking the opportunity of a meeting with foreign reporters,
Putin stated positively that “all problems can be resolved” and that “we are wait-
ing for a move from the Japanese side” (Zakharchenko 2015).
The current Russian leadership therefore seeks to be very encouraging when
it comes to the idea of talks with Japan. And yet, when one looks more closely,
it can be seen that the Russian side has a very specific concept about how these
negotiations should progress. To begin with, as one would expect from the side
that is favoured by the status quo and whose position becomes ever stronger over
time, Russian officials are in no hurry for the talks to be brought to a conclusion.
Indeed, Evgenii Afanas’ev, Russia’s ambassador to Japan, rejects the notion of
applying any time limit whatsoever, saying, “Negotiations on a peace treaty have
already lasted several decades, not taking account of the intervals, and we are not
hurrying anywhere” (quoted in Interfax 2014). It is also apparent that Russian
officials’ real aim is to use the talks as a means of promoting better economic ties
with Japan. They do this by leading the Japanese to believe that closer bilateral
relations are a prerequisite to a final settlement of the territorial dispute. This tac-
tic of promoting the “exit approach” is made explicit by Afanas’ev. In his words:
[I]t is only the development of broad ties in all spheres, in all areas, political,
economic, cultural, and scientific, that will enable us to approach the issue of
signing a peace treaty. [. . .] We need an entirely different level of trust. It is
very important that we have a channel for negotiations on a peace treaty. It is
important to value this channel. But it is also important to create favourable
conditions for this channel to work.
(quoted in Lenin 2015)
The reality, however, is that there is no exit at the end of this pathway that leads
to Japan regaining the four islands. In fact, while encouraging the Japanese to
view the talks as a means of achieving a territorial settlement, the Russian side
actually does everything possible to direct negotiations away from the islands
issue; indeed, they do not even like to mention the islands as being an explicit
subject for discussion, preferring instead to describe the talks as being about the
peace treaty. This being so, it would seem that Dmitrii Strel’tsov of MGIMO is
correct in his judgement that the talks are nothing more than a show and that
they have no chance of leading to a resolution of the territorial problem (cited in
Hakamada 2015).
Although Moscow has engaged in a degree of diplomatic dissimulation with
regard to the islands for some time, this tactic seems particularly well suited to
Mr Putin himself. This is because scholars who have closely studied the Russian
president conclude that one of his key strengths as a leader is the ability to get oth-
ers “to see him as what they want him to be, not what he really is” (Hill and Gaddy
2013: 5). With regard to relations with Japan, Putin appears to have exploited this
talent to convince Japanese interlocutors that he is particularly pro-Japanese in his
outlook and that his presidency represents a valuable opportunity to resolve the
countries’ territorial dispute. As a result, Putin has come to look like a leader who
needs to be courted by Tokyo. If this has indeed been the goal, it has certainly been
fulfilled with regard to Prime Minister Abe. In the course of several summit meet-
ings, Abe has clearly been given the impression that he has successfully forged
strong personal ties with the Russian leader and that the two have established a
meaningful level of mutual understanding. For instance, Abe has spoken openly
of his admiration for Putin, something that Western leaders would be extremely
unlikely to do. This he did in April 2013 when he said in an interview: “President
Putin has a clear goal, to build a strong, flourishing Russia. My current goal is to
build a strong Japan. In this way, the President and I share common values and
ideals. I feel considerable affinity with him” (quoted in Gusman 2013). Two years
later and subsequent to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Abe continued to speak
proudly of their relationship, claiming, “Putin and I have established personal rela-
tions of trust by means of successive meetings. I intend to achieve a conclusive
solution [to the territorial question]” (quoted in Nezavisimaya Gazeta 2015). It is
therefore evidently Abe’s belief that he can make use of Putin’s favourable attitude
towards Japan and his own close relationship with the Russian leader to force a
breakthrough on the territorial issue. This explains the Japanese prime minister’s
determination to press ahead with plans for Putin’s visit to Japan, even when the
US president was urging him to be cautious (Japan Times 2015a).
An element of Russian manipulation is therefore likely to have played a role in
encouraging the Japanese side to believe that it has been close to a breakthrough
in the past and that a deal may still be within sight now. And yet, no matter how
well chosen the words in press conferences with foreign journalists and no matter
how engaging President Putin may be in one-to-one summit meetings, this is not
a particularly sophisticated deception. Above all, for every statement in which an
official indirectly implies that the door may be open to Russian concessions on
the status of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i, there are dozens that make it perfectly
clear why there is absolutely no prospect of this happening. This information is
publicly available and many of these sources have been cited in this monograph. It
is therefore not difficult for anyone who takes the trouble to look to gain an accu-
rate understanding of the reality of the situation. This being so, in order to under-
stand Japan’s persistence in believing that an entirely unrealistic policy position
could actually be realised, it is necessary to consider a number of domestic fac-
tors. In particular, part of the explanation seems likely to be found in enduring
institutional and ideational structures within Japan.
Institutional restrictions
We shall turn momentarily to the task of assessing the domestic institutional fac-
tors shaping Japan’s Northern Territories policy. However, before doing so, it is
necessary to say a few words about US influence. Specifically, is US pressure the
reason why Japan has stuck so intransigently to its demand for all four islands?
There is no doubt that this has been a factor at times. Most famous, of course, was
“Dulles’s intimidation” in 1956. As explained in Chapter 2, this was the occasion
when the US secretary of state intervened to ensure that Japan would not solve
the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union by settling for the return of just the
two smaller islands. This was done by threatening that if Japan were to accept
Moscow’s proposed solution to the dispute, the United States might opt never to
return Okinawa (Mabon 1991: 203). On other occasions, so-called beiatsu (US
pressure) has also played a role. To take one of the most recent examples (which
was alluded to above), during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Washington in April
2015, President Obama warned his guest to be cautious in dealing with Russia.
The US leader’s concern was evidently that his Japanese counterpart could go
weak on Russia in pursuit of a territorial deal (Japan Times 2015b).
The US has therefore periodically sought to place obstacles in the path of
Japanese-Russian rapprochement. In general, however, beiatsu has not been the
leading determinant of Japan’s policy on this issue. Indeed, there have been times
when the US has despaired at the obsessive inflexibility of Japan’s stance. This was
most obvious during the late 1980s and early 1990s when the US was attempting
to support democratic and market reforms within the Soviet Union/Russia. Wash-
ington wished Tokyo to join it in this endeavour but found Japanese policymakers
reluctant to do so in the absence of progress on the territorial issue. Most strikingly,
while the US immediately condemned the coup carried out by Gorbachev’s reac-
tionary opponents in August 1991, the Japanese government held off taking sides
for three days in the apparent hope that a hard-line, yet internationally isolated,
post-coup regime might prove more willing to consider territorial concessions
(Hasegawa 1998b: 417–9). As such, rather than being caused by US pressure, what
has been described as “Japan’s ‘Northern Territories syndrome’ ” instead seems to
be predominantly of domestic origin (Hasegawa 1998b: 295).
The first significant feature of Japanese policymaking structures in this regard
is the customary weakness of the country’s politicians. In particular, the tenure of
most Japanese prime ministers and foreign ministers is infamously short. This is
not due to interparty competition, since Japan has largely been a one-party state
since 1955. It is rather due to the intensely factional nature of the dominant Lib-
eral Democratic Party, which means that frequent cabinet reshuffles are needed to
keep the various powerful factions satisfied. This system may have the advantage
of ensuring tough internal scrutiny of the cabinet’s performance, yet it has the
disadvantage of making it exceptionally difficult for a government to devise and
implement any major foreign policy endeavour. All too often, no sooner has a
foreign minister gained a good understanding of the role and become acquainted
with key international interlocutors than s/he is replaced. This encourages inertia
in Japanese foreign policy thinking. It also results in much responsibility being
deferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a factor which, as will be seen, has
major consequences for Japanese policy.
It is, of course, true of any country that professional diplomats will have more
foreign policy expertise than their political masters and will therefore be liable
to seek to protect the diplomatic process from “interference” by clumsy ama-
teurs. This tendency is, however, particularly pronounced in Japan, where the
bureaucracy is famously powerful and its members often seem to have a rather
high opinion of themselves. This characteristic element of self-confidence, if not
arrogance, within Japanese bureaucracy is especially prominent amongst MOFA
officials, who, coming almost exclusively from the top universities and having
progressed through the most demanding of selection processes, are liable to view
themselves as an elite within the elite (Takemoto 2011: 384).
In itself, there is little necessarily wrong with technocratic dominance of for-
eign policy. Indeed, in most circumstances it might be anticipated to result in bet-
ter informed and more coolly rational foreign policy decision making. In the case
of the territorial problem with Russia, however, MOFA’s powerful influence has
actually been an obstacle to the resolution of the dispute. This is because MOFA
has long been a bastion of supporters of the claim that Russia must return all four
of the islands at once; indeed, former prime minister Mori complains of MOFA
officials repeating yontō ikkatsu henkan as if it were a religious chant (2013: 51).
As a consequence of its inflexible commitment to this principle, the ministry has
fiercely resisted the attempts of those, both within and outside the organisation,
to promote a more realistic approach. In fact, on several occasions foreign min-
istry bureaucrats have actively sought to sabotage proactive reform efforts. The
favoured way of doing this has been by leaking negotiation proposals to the press
and seeking to provoke a public backlash. In his history of Japanese-Russian ter-

ritorial negotiations, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa highlights several such occasions when
“the Gaimushō [MOFA] played a crucial role in killing any prospect of an early
agreement” (Hasegawa 1998b: 367). Even conservative leaders were not spared
such treatment. In particular, when Prime Minister Nakasone proposed a concil-
iatory approach towards Moscow in October 1985 and suggested a resumption
in peace treaty negotiations, the “Gaimushō immediately assailed Nakasone’s
‘personal’ move. Behind his back, an anonymous source within the Gaimushō
castigated Nakasone’s proposal as ‘utterly ridiculous’ (kōtōmukei)” (Hasegawa
1998b: 231). Tōgō reports having encountered the same problem of destructive
MOFA press leaks in 2000 (2011: 138). Although the perpetrators of this sabo-
tage unquestionably believe they are acting in the national interest, this dogmatic
approach, so long as it lasts, actually ensures that none of the territory will be
returned, since, as has been demonstrated, the demand for all four islands goes so
enormously far beyond what Moscow could possibly consider agreeing to.
It is an interesting question as to why the Japanese foreign ministry has so con-
sistently supported this intransigent policy position. After all, given that MOFA
officials are surely the ones with the greatest expertise, contacts, and language
skills with regard to Russia, one would expect that they would be the individu-
als most likely to recognise the completely impossible nature of the demand for
all four islands at once. Rather surprisingly, one possible answer to this ques-
tion is that perhaps MOFA actually does not have such significant analytical and
language skills with regard to Russia and may therefore struggle to understand
what constitutes a realistic policy approach. This theory is given some credence
by the well-known fact that MOFA’s greatest resources are devoted to support-
ing relations with the United States. Considerable and growing emphasis is also
placed on managing the relationship with China. By contrast, far fewer personnel
and resources are assigned to the section that deals with Russia. Adding to the
plausibility of this argument are certain claims made by Satō Masaru, the former
MOFA intelligence analyst and Russia expert who was pushed out of the ministry
in the early 2000s for alleged malpractice. In his subsequent career as a political
writer, Satō has been highly critical of the lack of analytical and language capabil-
ities within MOFA’s “Russia School”. In particular, he highlights the example of
MOFA’s failure to anticipate President Medvedev’s trip to Kunashir/i in Novem-
ber 2010, despite what Satō considers to have been clear signals from the Russian
side that such a trip was soon to take place (Satō 2014: 21–30). More embarrass-
ingly, later in the same text Satō also mocks the factual mistakes and poor Russian
language capabilities of some of his former MOFA colleagues. Specifically, in
a section entitled “Japan’s Shame”, Satō recounts one occasion when he had to
interpret for a senior MOFA colleague and supposed Russian specialist when the
latter was attempting to negotiate with a Russian-speaking prostitute. The same
official also apparently caused embarrassment by repeatedly confusing Latvia and
Lithuania in an official meeting and having to be corrected by his interlocutors.
These examples are from 1991, but Satō claims that MOFA’s Russian capabilities
have actually declined further of late. To support this accusation, he goes on to
relate the example of a recent Japanese Consul General in Sakhalin whose spoken
Russian was so poor that when making a speech the local audience did not actu-
ally realise that the Japanese diplomat was attempting to speak in Russian. Lastly,
Satō goes into great detail criticising the Russian translation of a speech given by
former prime minister Koizumi in 2009, accusing the MOFA translator of inad-
vertently changing the meaning of the address and not even having a vocabulary
comparable to that of a Russian middle-school child (Satō 2014: 223–36).
These examples suggest that MOFA does indeed suffer from a shortage of gen-
uine Russia experts. At the same time, it is necessary to be a little careful with
Satō’s claims. As a disgruntled former employee, he has a potential interest in dis-
paraging MOFA and exaggerating the scale of his loss to the organisation. Taking
this into account, one should probably not get too carried away by Satō’s stories
of MOFA incompetence. Instead, rather than being simply the product of a lack of
knowledge about Russia, it is more likely that MOFA’s enduring dogmatism with
regard to this policy area is instead significantly added to by lasting structural and
cultural characteristics of the institution.
As already noted, in terms of institutional culture, one of the most prominent
features of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is its dedication to the relation-
ship with the United States, or what is known as bilateralism (Krauss and Pem-
pel 2004). Further to having a significant impact on the distribution of resources
within MOFA, this norm also directly shapes Japanese policy towards third coun-
tries. Above all, bilateralism ensures an instinctive opposition within MOFA to
anything that could possibly be perceived as harming relations with the United
States. Described by Hasegawa as “unnecessary obsequiousness”, this obsessive
tendency has led Tokyo to abandon efforts at rapprochement with Moscow even at
times when Washington was actually in favour of better relations between Japan
and Russia (Hasegawa 1998b: 225, 302).
A second notable feature of MOFA’s culture is a strict hierarchical structure
and an emphasis on conformity of thinking within the organisation that is known
as the “big room principle” (ōbeya shugi) (Takemoto 2011: 380). This system
discourages subordinates from challenging the opinions of their superiors and can
lead policymaking to become inflexible and dogmatic. In addition to these prac-
tices being ingrained in the customs of the organisation, they are reinforced by
the formal rules of MOFA’s promotion system. Promotion decisions are based on
evaluations which use the “subtraction principle” (genten shugi) (Takemoto 2011:
380). This means that emphasis is placed on penalising officials for any mistakes
that they have made rather than rewarding them for their positive action. Evi-
dently such an approach will incentivise risk-averse behaviour, especially since
it is combined with the usual Japanese employment practice of directly linking
promotions to years of service. Under this arrangement, for any bureaucrat who
wishes to be certain of having a good career, it is logical to keep one’s head down,
avoid undertaking any bold initiatives that could potentially be perceived as errors,
demonstrate undivided loyalty to one’s boss, and patiently wait one’s turn for pro-
motion. As a consequence, the organisation will struggle to adopt new thinking
and mistaken policies will often remain unopposed. These institutional features
are, of course, not limited to MOFA but are a more general feature of many Japa-
nese organisations. They were cited as having contributed to the Toshiba account-
ing scandal of 2015; and, most notoriously, an institutional culture of “reflexive

obedience” and “reluctance to question authority” was strongly criticised in the
independent report into the causes of the Fukushima nuclear disaster (quoted in
Inagaki 2015). In the case of Northern Territories policy, MOFA’s culture of con-
formity seems to go a long way towards explaining why Japan has continued to
adhere so rigidly to the demand for the return of all four islands at once, despite
the fact that this policy has consistently failed in the past and holds no prospect
of being successful in the future. In other contexts, such conservatism would be
likely to be challenged by business groups eager for the Foreign Ministry to adopt
a more pragmatic approach so as to assist with their commercial activities. With
regard to Russia, however, since Japanese businesses remain wary of investing in
the country, there is limited pressure from groups such as keidanren (Japan’s busi-
ness federation) or even the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) for
MOFA to show greater flexibility.
Lastly in this section, some mention needs to be made of the role of Japan’s
academic community. In general, one would expect the country’s area specialists
to recognise the reality of the situation and criticise the flaws in their govern-
ment’s position. To an extent, this does happen, since there is a lively debate
between those who fervently cling to the demand for the simultaneous return of
all four islands and those who favour greater flexibility. In reality, however, this is
a futile discussion, since all of the proposed outcomes are unrealistic. This is due
to the fact that even the most compromising position being proposed by Japanese
scholars still anticipates some measure of sovereignty eventually being restored
over the islands of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. There is no mainstream Japa-
nese scholar who publicly acknowledges the reality that the two larger islands
have been lost forever.
The narrowness of the academic debate on this issue may owe something to the
cautious nature of many Japanese scholars and their reluctance to become targets
for criticism by the country’s right-wing activists. An added consideration is the
limited number of Russia experts in Japan, especially those of a younger genera-
tion. This is partly due to the insular attitudes of many young Japanese today and
also a product of the fact that amongst those thinking about specialising in the
study of a particular foreign country, Russia is not likely to be the most popular
choice. As a consequence, few younger scholars have come through to replace
Japan’s cohort of Soviet specialists and there is a growing shortage of skilled
Russian analysts. One indication of this problem is the report produced for MOFA
by a team of scholars headed by Professor Hosoya Yūichi of Keio University.
Entitled “The Asia-Pacific Regional Order in 20 Years and Japan’s Role within
it,” this report contains chapters on China, the Koreas, and the United States, but
no section on Russia (Hosoya 2015). When asked why this was the case, Profes-
sor Hosoya replied that it was due to the lack of availability of any suitable Russia
expert.3
The relatively few Japanese specialists in this field are overwhelmingly the
same scholars who have been writing about the Northern Territories dispute for
the last twenty or thirty years. These academics are undoubtedly knowledgeable
about the topic but have well-entrenched positions that they have developed over
the course of many years and now have absolutely no intention of changing their
minds. This is especially problematic given the significant changes that have
occurred in the international standings of Russia and Japan over the last two to
three decades. In particular, the arguments based on “Japan’s status as an eco-
nomic superpower” and Russia’s desperate need for financial assistance (Kimura
2008: 146), which may have appeared credible at the start of the 1990s, now seem
woefully outdated. Mori is therefore not entirely without reason in describing
some of the scholars writing on the territorial dispute as “fossil men” (2013: 51).
Although Mori’s assessment is harsh, he is not as damning of Japanese scholar-
ship as Suzuki Muneo. Rather than describing Japanese academic commentators
as simply old-fashioned and ossified in their views, Suzuki accuses some of them
of being deliberately opposed to a territorial resolution for selfish reasons. In his
words, he vehemently criticises
the good-for-nothings who flock together for “the Northern Territories busi-
ness”. Basically, there are people who earn money by lecturing about the
Northern Territories and appearing on TV. Since the source of income of
these people would disappear if the Northern Territories dispute were to be
resolved, they say high-spirited things in what seems like a nationalistic way,
such as ‘do not yield even a millimetre’, and by raising an aim which is actu-
ally impossible to materialise they are obstructing the Northern Territories
negotiations.
(Suzuki 2013: 36–7)
Whether this claim is fair criticism or not, it is certainly true that Japanese schol-
arship features a significant degree of intellectual inertia. Moreover, this applies
as much to those who favour a degree of compromise, such as Suzuki, as to those
conservatives that he is explicitly criticising. So long as Japanese commentators
continue to argue that some form of sovereignty could be restored over Iturup/
Etorofu and Kunashir/i, they are adding to the delusion that prevails in Japan with
regard to this issue.
Ideational factors
Last of all to be considered in this chapter are ideational factors. Although diffi-
cult to measure precisely, these undoubtedly play a significant role in accounting
for why Japan not only refuses to accept the loss of the two larger islands but also
actively persists with forlorn efforts to secure their return. Most interesting in this
regard is the concept that Japan actually derives certain benefits from continu-
ously drawing attention to the territorial dispute. We are not talking here about
any material advantages, but rather less easily defined benefits in terms of Japan’s
identity, both domestically and as an international actor. This is a complex topic
to which I cannot do full justice here (for a much more detailed discussion of such
issues, see Bukh 2011). In basic terms, however, an argument can be made that
the territorial dispute with Russia is useful because it enables Japan to cast itself in
the role of a victim. This is valuable because the dominant narrative about Japan’s
international behaviour during the twentieth century so strongly emphasises the
country’s identity as the ruthless perpetrator of aggression against its neighbours.
Any examples that can be found of Japan being the victim of illegal predations
rather than the victimiser are therefore highly valuable as a partial corrective to
this principal discourse. Such considerations matter a great deal because all gov-
ernments wish to promote a national identity of which their people can be proud
and which can serve as a source of popular unity. Evidently this can be done by
promoting national achievements, but it can also be very useful to draw attention
to instances in which the country was the victim of injustice. As well as distract-
ing attention from the state’s own wrongdoings, a strong feeling of grievance
can bring the people together around a central rallying point. It can also serve a
useful “othering” function; that is, to help forge a sense of cohesive self-worth by
contrasting one’s own positive features with the negative traits of a deviant other.
In Japan’s case, the need for the psychological relief that the victimhood nar-
rative can provide is particularly acute. This is because Japanese imperial his-
tory is commonly regarded as having been especially notorious, with the “rape of
Nanking”, the coercive recruitment of “comfort women”, and the brutal treatment
of POWs having become infamous internationally. In addition, as a result of the
country’s relatively late development, in comparison with other imperial powers
there is rather less historical material around which to build the country’s modern
identity. This being so, it becomes all the more important for Japan to find means
of rehabilitating elements of its wartime history, rather than simply turning to
other decades to locate more appropriate sources of national pride.
Seizing every opportunity to draw attention to the territorial dispute with Rus-
sia therefore serves a useful purpose in terms of national identity, even if there is
actually no prospect that raising the issue will lead to the return of the four islands.
A very similar claim can also be made about the abduction problem with North
Korea. This relates to the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by the Pyongyang
regime during the 1970s and 1980s. Although undoubtedly tragic for the innocent
victims and their families, it is argued that this issue receives disproportionate
attention within Japanese politics and society precisely because it also represents
an instance in which Japan can present itself as the victim of an international
atrocity rather than the perpetrator (Hagström and Hanssen 2015). The abduction
issue has therefore come to function in Japan as “a ‘vicarious trauma,’ in which
repeated media representations of North Korea as ‘evil and strange’ have ‘fostered
a sense of unity based on a common sense of indignation and fear’ ” (Hyung Gu
Lynn quoted in Hagström and Hanssen 2015: 73). This perspective is especially
helpful with regard to relations with Korea, as it provides a means of counteract-
ing the narrative (promoted by both Pyongyang and Seoul) that stresses the brutal-
ity of Japan’s thirty-five years of colonial rule.
Both the territorial dispute with Russia and the abduction problem with North
Korea have therefore become highly symbolic within Japanese politics. This
makes these issues particularly hard to resolve, since Japanese policymakers and
scholars are liable to approach them in a rather emotional fashion. As a conse-

quence, the tendency becomes to concentrate on the determined defence of prin-
ciples rather than on seeking a realistic solution. This is something that Paul
O’Shea has noted with regard to Japanese discourse about the territorial prob-
lem with Russia, stating that “the dispute was framed in Manichean moral terms
which resulted in an absolutist approach based upon the return of all four islands”
(O’Shea 2015: 31). What is more, so strongly held are these beliefs that those who
do attempt a more logical and pragmatic approach may find themselves subject
to fierce attack. This is because their criticisms not only challenge the established
means of approaching the topic itself but also are felt to traitorously undermine
a cherished aspect of national identity. Evidence of this can be found in the out-
raged reaction to Wada Haruki’s promotion of a “2 plus alpha” solution, which
abandons the principle of the simultaneous return of the four islands (Wada 1991).
In response to this entirely sensible proposal, Itō Ken’ichi, a professor at Aoyama
Gakuin and former Gaimushō official, condemned Wada for having “the face of
a Japanese but the heart of a Soviet (nichimen soshin)” (quoted in Hasegawa
1998b: 252). Even more alarmingly, those who have encouraged a more flexible
approach to relations with Pyongyang have been subjected to death threats (Hag-
ström and Hanssen 2015: 76–7).
These types of argument about the influence of ideas and identity issues are, of
course, those favoured by international relations scholars from the field of con-
structivism. This school of thought promotes the view that political outcomes do
not follow automatically from material facts but are rather significantly shaped by
actors’ shared ideas about the world. These ideas are themselves repeatedly con-
structed and reconstructed by means of social interaction and discourse. As has
been skilfully demonstrated by Alexander Bukh (2012), this theoretical approach
is particularly helpful in analysing Japanese attitudes towards the territorial dis-
pute with Russia because Japan’s contemporary understanding of the “Northern
Territories” problem is so evidently the product of social construction.
To begin with, as highlighted in Chapter 2, Japanese policymakers did not
always take the view that the return of all four islands was the only acceptable
solution, nor did they consistently claim that Etorofu and Kunashiri were not part
of the Kuril chain and therefore unaffected by Japan’s acceptance of Article 2(c)
of the San Francisco Treaty. For instance, in 1952 the Commission to Petition for
Returning Islands Attached to Hokkaidō, which had been formed by Andō Ish-
isuke, the mayor of Nemuro, took the position of considering “the two islands of
Kunashiri and Etorofu as lost and focused on the issues related to the Habomais
and Shikotan” (Bukh 2012: 491). On a national level too, during the negotiations
that ultimately led to the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1956, Foreign Min-
ister Shigemitsu Mamoru was fully prepared to settle the dispute with the return
of only Habomai and Shikotan. As explained earlier, it was only the late threat
by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the US might respond by perma-
nently retaining Okinawa which ensured that Japan would not agree to this deal
(Sarkisov 2009: 40–1).
The reason for the US’s seemingly harsh intervention was, of course, the emer-
gence of the Cold War, and it was this conflict that played a crucial role in shaping
Japanese attitudes to the Soviet Union/Russia and the territorial dispute. With
Japan having been firmly installed on the Western side of the bipolar divide and
with Cold War tensions becoming ever more intense during the 1960s, it became
increasingly convenient to promote the image of the Soviet Union as Japan’s prin-
cipal adversary. Above all, the issues of the Soviet Union’s opportunistic attack
on an all-but-defeated Japan, its inhumane treatment of POWs, and its “illegal”
seizure of “historically” Japanese land became useful targets towards which Japa-
nese could freely direct their frustrations about the outcome of the war. This also
helped to distract attention away from problematic aspects of the relationship with
the United States, especially the atomic-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Naga-
saki, the lengthy occupation of the country and significant remaking of its politi-
cal and social institutions, and the seizure of substantial tracts of land for use as
US military installations. Constructing an image of the Soviet Union as Japan’s
main “other” also fitted well with the LDP’s domestic goals, since the party was
firmly committed to the US alliance and continuation of the Security Treaty. In
addition, denigration of the Soviet Union had the benefit of raising public suspi-
cions about Japan’s domestic socialist opposition.
It was therefore in this Cold War context that the now predominant understand-
ing of the territorial dispute was forged in Japan. As noted in Chapter 2, this
included the postwar coining of the term “Northern Territories” (Hoppōryōdo)
itself, as well as the promotion of the claim that the four islands were actually
never part of the relinquished Kuril chain. Similarly, as Bukh relates, “the islands
came to be narrated within the dominant discourse as inherent Japanese territory
(nihon no koyū no ryōdo) in spite of the rather recent history of Japan’s coloniza-
tion of the islands along with other Ainu territories” (Bukh 2011: 50). What is
more, as time passed, the Japanese government actually came to devote more
attention to this issue. In 1981 the Day of the Northern Territories was inaugu-
rated, and the next year a new cabinet position was created with responsibility
for this topic. In addition, increased government funds were allocated with the
aim of promoting greater public awareness. In 2010, the total amount devoted
to this cause exceeded one billion yen (O’Shea 2015: 23). Given that this money
does nothing to change the fact that Russia has little incentive to return the four
islands, it might be thought that these funds have been wasted. On the other hand,
if one takes the view that the real merit of the campaign is simply to encourage
public anger against the Soviet Union/Russia and thereby promote Japan’s sense
of victimhood, it could be said that these efforts have really been quite successful.
One indication of this is the somewhat surprising level of animosity that con-
tinues to be felt towards Russia by many groups within Japan in connection with
the Second World War. As Hasegawa explains:
It is difficult for the Japanese to accept that the Soviet Union was a part of the
larger war, that it joined the war against Japan at the request of the Allies, and
that the Soviet-Japanese War had a decisive impact on the termination of the
war. To many Japanese the Soviet-Japanese War served as a psychological
means by which the Japanese acquired a sense of victimization, which served

as a major excuse to avoid atonement for the Pacific War.
(Hasegawa 1998a: 71)
As a consequence of the prevalence of such views, it is not uncommon to find arti-

cles in Japan’s mainstream media that are stridently critical of Russia as a whole
and place great emphasis on Moscow’s “inexcusable” actions towards Japan dur-
ing and after the end of World War II. One notable example is a recent newspa-
per article entitled “The Tragedy of Having Russia as a Neighbour” (Satō 2015).
More remarkably, according to one report, as many as 25 percent of Japanese
schoolchildren believe that it was the Soviet Union that perpetrated the atomic-
bomb attacks against Japan in August 1945 (Pravda.ru 2015).
On this reading then, the territorial dispute with Russia persists as a major
preoccupation within Japanese politics, not so much because of a belief that the
islands can actually be recovered, but rather because discussion of the dispute
itself satisfies certain Japanese needs in terms of defining its national identity and
place within international politics. This claim finds some support from former
Russian ambassador to Japan Aleksandr Panov, who states: “I am deeply con-
vinced after many years of negotiations with the Japanese on this problem that the
majority of the country’s political elite are not interested in solving this problem”
(quoted in Baranova 2015). If this is indeed the case, it would fit neatly with the
broader framing of Japan’s approach to the territorial dispute as being something
of a delusion. This is because psychologists understand one of the primary reasons
for delusional thinking as being “relief from aversion” and “a form of cognitive
coping” (Butler and Braff 1991: 637, 638). It is not difficult therefore to make the
case that there is certain utility for Japan in maintaining a rigidly uncompromising
position that ensures that the dispute remains unresolved and that Japan’s sense of
grievance can remain undiminished. At the same time, however, such intangible
benefits have a serious material cost, since they prevent any territory whatsoever
from being returned to Japan.
Conclusions
The purpose of this final substantive chapter has been twofold. To begin with, the
first half served to bring together the findings of the preceding four chapters and,
in so doing, to emphasise the unambiguous conclusion that Japanese hopes for the
return of the four islands are without any serious foundation. What is more, going
beyond previous studies, it was highlighted that this judgement applies, not only
to the truly unthinkable proposal that Japanese sovereignty be recognised over all
four islands at once, but also to the seemingly much more reasonable suggestion
that the two smaller islands be transferred first, followed by the continuation of
discussions about the status of the other two. In order to drive home the true hope-
lessness of this situation for Japan, it was also demonstrated that this conclusion
holds even in the event of a range of improbable geopolitical scenarios.
The second half of the chapter then proceeded to the rather more difficult task
of analysing why it is that so many decision makers and influential observers

in Japan remain remarkably positive about the prospects of the islands one day
being returned. Firstly in this regard, consideration was given to the plausible idea
that Japanese policymakers actually understand the reality of the situation full
well, yet, for practical reasons, maintain the pretence of believing that a favour-
able deal is still possible. Although an entirely logical suggestion, it was found
that neither domestic political calculations nor international considerations could
adequately account for the Japanese side’s approach to this issue. In particular,
it was noted that domestic pressures on politicians with regard to this issue are
actually rather limited, and the general public as a whole are more in favour of
compromise than are the country’s ruling class. Building up popular expectations
with regard to the territorial issue does not therefore make sense for the govern-
ment as an electoral gambit, especially since suggested hopes of a breakthrough
will inevitably be disappointed. As for international considerations, the Japanese
leadership certainly does not want to look weak when it comes to relations with
Russia for fear of encouraging China’s efforts to secure control over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands. At the same time, however, it was argued in this chapter that if
Japan’s actions were really motivated by long-term geostrategic calculations, one
would actually expect Tokyo not to adopt a symbolically obstructionist stance on
the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories dispute, but rather to use all means nec-
essary to promote reconciliation with Russia in order to draw it away from China.
This is because the prospect of ever closer relations between Beijing and Moscow,
including the very real likelihood of Russia taking an increasingly favourable
view of China’s claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Brown 2015), threatens
to significantly alter the strategic balance in Northeast Asia in a direction that is
obviously unfavourable to Tokyo.
Overall then, the conclusion was reached that Japan’s persistently positive
approach is more likely to be a consequence of misperception rather than careful
calculation by its own political leaders. Having established this, the final part of
the chapter proceeded to discuss the potential sources of this delusion in more
detail. First in this regard was highlighted to be the widespread belief that Japan
has been very close to a breakthrough in the past, especially during the early
1990s and early 2000s. Understandably, the conviction that they have been on the
brink of achieving an acceptable deal in the recent past encourages confidence
that with just a little more determination or by means of a slight adjustment to
their proposal, a favourable resolution could still be reached. Although this belief
is commonly expressed within Japan, it was demonstrated that it is clearly false
and that Japan actually has never been close to achieving the return of the four
islands at any point during the postwar era.
Having made this point, the next section turned to assessing the interesting pos-
sibility that the Russian side itself may have had a hand in deliberately sustaining
Japanese hopes. Their reason for doing so is because a Japanese leader who has
the impression that he/she may be able to achieve a historic breakthrough on the
territorial issue and thereby secure his/her political legacy will be likely to adopt
a more accommodating stance towards Russia, promoting closer economic ties

and perhaps creating some distance between Japan’s foreign policy and that of
its US ally. This is therefore the reason why Russian leaders, especially Putin,
periodically take the opportunity of press conferences with foreign journalists,
including those from Japan, to make vaguely worded statements about the pros-
pects of resolving the territorial dispute in a way that would also be accept-
able to Japan. However, as was discussed, no matter how enthusiastically Japan
responds to these apparent openings and no matter what economic and political
benefits it offers, Russia will not be induced to compromise in any way on the
sovereignty of the two larger islands. Instead, the Russian side will, as they say
in Japan, simply “eat and flee” (kuinige suru) and it will be Japan who is left to
pay the bill.
Skilful Russian diplomacy therefore plays its part in the deception, but it was
noted that certain domestic factors within Japan also contribute significantly
towards making Japanese policy on this issue rather obtuse. With regard to institu-
tional constraints, it was highlighted that the frequent turnover of Japanese prime
and foreign ministers makes it difficult for them to build up experience of han-
dling international relations and to have the chance to initiate major reassessments
of foreign policy. This also has the effect of deferring considerable responsibility
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an organisation defined by its conservative,
hierarchical culture and that is seemingly lacking in its numbers of skilled Russian
specialists. Matters are also not helped by the apparent dearth of young Japanese
scholars with an interest in Russian politics.
Last of all, in the final section, brief consideration was given to ideational factors
and, in particular, to the theory that Japan may actually derive some non-material
benefits from the persistence of its territorial dispute with Russia. Specifically, the
idea was discussed that emphasising the “Northern Territories” issue may have
significantly helped Japan to rehabilitate its postwar self-image. This is because
promoting the national identity of Japan as a law-abiding country that has been
the victim of injustice by its neighbours serves to partially dispel memories (at
least domestically) of Japan’s history as aggressor and victimiser. Added to this,
drawing on the work of constructivist scholars in this field, it was highlighted that
encouraging a strong sense of grievance against the Soviet Union/Russia has also
proved useful in redirecting public anger away from continuing problems in the
relationship with the United States, and, in so doing, has assisted in cementing
Japan’s place as a solid US ally.
Notes
1 It is worth also highlighting that, as made clear from Khrushchev’s statement quoted
above, even when the Soviet leadership was eagerly seeking to use the islands to
encourage Japan to distance itself from the United States, the Kremlin still only con-
sidered transferring Habomai and Shikotan. If the Security Treaty had been abandoned,
Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i would still have remained under Moscow’s control.
2 By his own admission, Tōgō does not have first-hand knowledge of the “non-existent
secret proposal”, since in 1992 he was stationed at the Japanese embassy in Washington,
DC (Tōgō 2013: 96).
3 This explanation was provided by Professor Hosoya during a public lecture he gave at
Temple University, Japan Campus on 8 June 2015.
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7 Conclusion
Having systematically assessed the prospects of the dispute over the Southern
Kurils/Northern Territories being resolved, this monograph has reached the firm
conclusion that there is no realistic possibility whatsoever of the four islands being
recovered by Japan. International politics is, of course, notoriously unpredictable,
and dramatic shifts can suddenly occur. For example, at the end of 2013, no one
predicted that within three months Crimea would be returned to Russia’s control.
Nonetheless, even making allowances for unexpected turns of events, one can be
highly confident that the four islands will not be restored to Japanese sovereignty.
Japan is obviously not going to seize the islands by force, nor is it in a position to
wrench them from Moscow’s grasp by means of some crafty political manoeuvre.
As such, Japan’s chances of regaining the territory are entirely dependent on the
Russian leadership deciding that it is in the country’s (and their own) best inter-
ests to voluntarily relinquish the islands. As has been demonstrated in great detail
throughout this book, this condition clearly is not being fulfilled. Indeed, whether
considered from the legal-historical perspective, in terms of economic and secu-
rity considerations, or with regard to social issues and public opinion, there are
evidently insufficient incentives for any Russian leader to rationally decide to
give up the territory. This being so, no amount of determination from the Japa-
nese authorities, mobilisation of popular opinion, or ingenuity from scholars in
proposing solutions will make the slightest bit of difference. In fact, so distant is
the prospect of all four islands once again being controlled by Japan that what is
really remarkable is that this delusion remains so prevalent and that the Japanese
government will devote so many resources and be willing to compromise on other
policy goals in pursuit of so manifest a lost cause.
In addition, this gloomy conclusion has been shown to apply not only to Japan’s
obviously impractical demand for the return of all four islands at once, but also to
the seemingly more realistic suggestion that Shikotan and Habomai be returned
first, followed by longer-term discussions over the status of Iturup/Etorofu and
Kunashir/i. If this comparably moderate proposal were ever truly viable, it cer-
tainly is not now. In particular, what advocates of this plan fail to adequately
explain is why Russia, which is now much strengthened from its weak position
during the 1990s, would ever opt to surrender the two smaller islands without
an accompanying agreement to put a decisive end to the territorial dispute as a
Conclusion 143
whole. Doing so would merely have the effect of shifting the status quo in Japan’s
favour and serve to encourage Tokyo to badger Moscow at every opportunity over
the fate of the other two islands. The Kremlin would have to be exceptionally
foolish to concede to such a deal.
If neither “four islands at once” nor “two islands first” are viable options, what
then is the best approach for resolving this decades-old dispute? As is no doubt
already clear to the attentive reader, this monograph takes the position that the
1956 Joint Declaration provides the most realistic and fairest basis for resolving
the territorial conflict. To reiterate the key details of this document, which are
outlined in paragraph 9, Moscow
desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the inter-
ests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands
and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to
take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and Japan.
(Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and Japan 1956)
Within Japan it is sometimes suggested that this agreement could serve as the start-
ing point of a process that could ultimately lead to the return of more than just two
islands. This was, for instance, the proposal of Foreign Minister Watanabe during
the early 1990s (Hasegawa 1998: 461). This is, however, entirely to misinterpret
how the statement was intended and how it continues to be understood by propo-
nents within Russia. For the Russian side, the 1956 Joint Declaration is significant
not in serving as some initial step towards resolution, but rather in providing a deci-
sive end to the dispute. The intended meaning is very clearly that the two smaller
islands would only be transferred (note the use of “transfer” rather than “return”)
at some point after the conclusion of a peace treaty in which the borders of the two
countries would be definitively demarcated. In effect then, Japan is being asked to
give up its claims to the disputed territory and, in exchange, as a gesture of goodwill
and not as a response to legal obligation, Russia would transfer Shikotan and Habo-
mai. What is more, this would be the full extent of the Russian concessions. The
Russian side will no longer countenance any further sweeteners (any “plus alpha”)
with regard to the other two islands, such as a promise of demilitarisation or any
special arrangements that hint at recognition of the legitimacy of Japan’s claims.
The 1956 Joint Declaration is therefore the agreement that could have and, in
this author’s view, should have settled the territorial dispute some six decades
ago. In arguing in its favour again now, three further questions need to be con-
sidered. First, are the two smaller islands of sufficient value to Japan to be worth
making painful sacrifices in order to secure their return? Second, is Russia actu-
ally still prepared to uphold its commitments within the 1956 Joint Declaration
to relinquish Shikotan and Habomai if a peace treaty is signed? And third, can a
deal involving the return of only the two smaller islands be successfully sold to
the Japanese public?
144 Conclusion
The value of two
To begin with the first of these questions, what value would the return of just Shi-
kotan and Habomai have to Japan? As already noted, these two islands represent
only approximately 7 percent of the total landmass of the disputed territory. As
such, an end result that saw only these two islands being returned could in no way
be considered to be a draw. Added to this, even if one accepts the reality of the
situation that the two larger islands have, in fact, already been permanently lost,
conceding to a two-island deal still represents a further setback for Japan, since
accepting the terms of the 1956 Joint Declaration entails abandoning its long-held
commitment to the principle that all four islands represent “inherent” Japanese
land and must be returned to Japanese sovereignty. On this basis, it might be
thought that regaining no islands whatsoever, yet remaining true to one’s prin-
ciples, is the better option for Japan. In my view, this would be a serious error of
judgement.
Most basically, while Shikotan and Habomai represent only a small proportion
of the total disputed territory, this is largely a reflection of the very substantial
size of both Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. Were these two larger islands to be
controlled by Japan, they would be the country’s fifth and sixth largest, exceeded
in size by only the main islands of Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, and Shikoku.
Shikotan and Habomai are much smaller than these two, but they still represent
a landmass of 255 km2 and 102 km2, respectively (Lee 2001: 2). By comparison,
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and Dokdo/Takeshima rocks, which the Japanese
authorities are so eager to retain/regain authority over, are only 7 km2 and 0.2 km2.
More important than the land, however, are actually the surrounding waters.
This is a point made by former prime minister Mori, who, as an advocate of
the return of the two smaller islands first, highlights that “[w]hilst Habomai and
Shikotan may not be very big in terms of area, they have a big influence when
it comes to fishing rights” (Mori 2013b: 52). This is of particular importance
because fishing is one of the region’s main industries and, prior to the capture of
the islands by the Soviets, the northeastern tip of Hokkaidō, the four islands, and
their surrounding waters constituted a single economic zone, with Nemuro serv-
ing as the “mother city of the Northern Territories” (Kuroiwa 2013: 201). This
former state of affairs can never be fully restored, since the two larger islands
will remain part of Russia. Nonetheless, regaining the two smaller islands and
establishing Japanese control over their surrounding waters would be a welcome
fillip to the local economy. At present, Japanese ships are already able to operate
in the area but they do so subject to the approval of the Russian state. This situa-
tion leads to frequent disputes. For instance, between 1946 and 2008, according
to statistics compiled by the Nemuro branch of the Japanese Coast Guard, 1,339
Japanese vessels and 9,489 individuals were detained by the Russian authorities.
Most tragically, in August 2006 Russian border guards shot dead a crew member
of a Japanese fishing boat (Kuroiwa 2013: 191, 198). The Russian government is
also in a position to alter the rules whenever it wishes. An example of this was in
summer 2015, when the Russian parliament approved a new law banning the use
Conclusion 145
of drift nets within Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Since fishermen in
Hokkaidō commonly use this fishing practice, the city of Nemuro estimated that
the Russian ban would lead to economic losses of approximately ¥25.1 billion
(Japan Times 2015). Although the waters around Habomai and Shikotan are just a
small percentage of the area in which Japanese fishing boats wish to operate, the
recovery of control over these waters and the establishment of a clearly defined
border would help to provide safer and more profitable fishing conditions for the
local community.
Another major advantage of settling for the return of Shikotan and Habomai is
that it will have the effect of reestablishing wider Japanese access to the other two
islands. As noted in Chapter 5, at present Japan is almost completely cut off from
developments on the four islands; indeed, Japanese nationals are more isolated
from them than individuals from third countries. This is because of the Japanese
government’s policy of seeking to prevent citizens from visiting the disputed ter-
ritory, except on officially approved trips, and of opposing Japanese investment
there. Although undertaken to avoid acknowledgement of Russian sovereignty,
this policy makes it difficult for Japanese people to engage in any significant
way with this supposedly “inherent” Japanese land, and as time passes, this has
the effect of making the islands ever more foreign to Japan. Ending the dispute
by signing a peace treaty and accepting a return of the two smaller islands would
put an end to this anomalous situation and immediately enable Japan to reestab-
lish closer links with Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. Regular ferry services could
quickly be established from Nemuro, as well as flights from major Japanese cities.
Visitors could therefore travel to the islands for short trips or indeed for longer
periods of time if they were so inclined. There would also be substantial economic
opportunities for Japanese companies, since the Russian authorities have made
it clear on numerous occasions that they will welcome joint development of the
islands, albeit on the understanding that this implies no recognition of Japanese
sovereign rights. A recent example of such an offer was in July 2015, when Oleg
Kozhemyako, acting governor of the Sakhalin region, told journalists, “We will
actively offer participation in joint projects on the Kurils to our neighbours from
the land of the rising sun” (quoted in Baibarza 2015). In general then, instead of a
status quo in which Japan is, and will remain, almost entirely disconnected from
all four islands, Japan has the chance to opt for a situation in which it regains full
control over two islands, plus the opportunity of extensive access to the other two.
Curiously, it is therefore by renouncing Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i that Japan
would be able to bring these islands closer.
Settling for the return of the two smaller islands also has considerable practical
benefits when it comes to population issues. As noted in Chapter 5, in the hypo-
thetical case of all four islands being returned, Japan would face significant prob-
lems in dealing with the almost 17,000 current Russian residents of the islands. It
would also find itself in the embarrassing situation of having regained the territory
at long last only to have very few Japanese willing to settle there permanently.
Such problems would be considerably eased if only Shikotan and Habomai were
to be transferred. The Habomai islets have no permanent settled population and
146 Conclusion
their transfer could be effected almost immediately after the signing of a peace
treaty. Shikotan is more difficult, since it has a population of almost 3,000. It is
no longer the case that a majority on the island favours a transfer to Japan (as
during the 1990s), yet Shikotan residents continue to be less opposed to such an
arrangement than the inhabitants of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i. Having known
about the details of the 1956 Joint Declaration for some time, they have also had
the chance to become somewhat accustomed to the possibility of the island being
transferred to Japan in the event of the signing of the peace treaty. Public opposi-
tion on the island itself is therefore likely to remain within reasonable limits. This
being so, although by no means easy, the transfer of Shikotan appears to be a man-
ageable task. Ideally it would be carried out over the course of ten years, giving
current residents the option to relocate (with financial assistance) to elsewhere in
Russia, perhaps to one of the other Kuril Islands, or to gradually prepare for life
under Japanese authority, including by attempting to learn the language. During
this transitional period, any Japanese who wished to move to Shikotan, including
any remaining former islanders, would be granted the right to do so.
The basis for this settlement is, of course, the 1956 Joint Declaration, a docu-
ment that was ratified by both the Japanese parliament and the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR. What is more, from a legal point of view, this arrangement has other
features that recommend it. True, it does not satisfy Japanese ambitions to return
to the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 as the model for the countries’ border demarcation.
A two-island deal would, however, be fully consistent with the stipulations of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, which clearly states: “Japan renounces all
right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands” (United Nations 1952: 48). Although,
as noted in Chapter 2, the Japanese authorities subsequently came to claim that
none of the four disputed islands are included in “the Kurile Islands”, this is a self-
serving fiction that does not stand up to any serious scrutiny. Conceding the loss
of Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i would therefore enable Japan to end this awk-
ward pretence. By contrast, Japan is on stronger ground in claiming that Shikotan
and Habomai are genuinely geologically and historically distinct from the Kuril
chain and were therefore not renounced at San Francisco.1 It might also be noted
that a two-island settlement would uphold the promises made to the Soviet Union
in the Yalta Agreement. This document has less bearing on Japan, since it was not
a signatory, yet the Yalta Agreement does represent a solemn commitment on the
part of the United States and the United Kingdom that in exchange for the USSR
entering the war against Japan, “[t]he Kurile Islands shall be handed over [to] the
Soviet Union” (Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference 1945). An agree-
ment that sees Russia retain the two larger disputed islands yet return Shikotan
and Habomai can therefore be said to respect this agreement between the wartime
allies and to be consistent with the results of World War II, a consideration that is
of major importance to the Russian side.
Last of all in terms of the merits of settling for the two smaller islands are the
potentially vital gains for Japan in terms of its national security. In the coming
years East Asia will become an arena of increasingly tense geopolitical competi-
tion as a rising China comes to challenge the established influence of the US
Conclusion 147
hegemon. We all hope that this shift in the distribution of power can be handled
peacefully, but history tells us not to be optimistic. This being so, Japan must
actively plan for scenarios in which conflict breaks out between the United States
and China. If this occurs, Japan’s national security will be under major threat,
since, as Washington’s major ally in the region and host to the largest concen-
tration of US forces, Japan will be an obvious target for attack. In such circum-
stances, Japan’s relationship with Russia would take on pivotal importance. A
Japan that had settled its territorial dispute and signed a peace treaty would be in
a strong position to attempt to draw Russia away from China, thereby increasing
China’s isolation and encouraging restraint in its actions. By contrast, a failure to
resolve the territorial conflict will leave a serious wedge between Japan and Rus-
sia, making any such strategic manoeuvring much more difficult. As a result, it
will be all the more likely that Northeast Asia will develop into two rival camps,
with China and Russia firmly entrenched on the one side and the United States
and Japan on the other. In effect, Japan would then be faced by serious security
threats from both the north and the southwest, to say nothing of the maverick role
of North Korea to the west across the Sea of Japan. At the same time, Japan’s con-
cerns about the endurance of the US commitment to security in East Asia would
be multiplied. Taking account of this not unlikely turn of events in the region
over the next few years, striking a deal on the islands now, and fully normalising
relations with Russia could prove to be one of the greatest investments in Japan’s
long-term security that any national leader could possibly make.
Is a two-island deal still possible?

Although the transfer of only Shikotan and Habomai may seem woefully inad-
equate to many Japanese, there is a serious concern that despite Moscow having
made the offer in 1956, it may actually have become too great a concession for
the Russian side to fulfil. At present, the Russian leadership is spared any serious
difficulties on this matter, since Japan’s consistent refusal to accept the offer made
within paragraph 9 of the Joint Declaration enables Moscow to avoid having to
think seriously about whether and how such an agreement could be implemented.
However, if Japan were suddenly to express an interest in signing a peace treaty in
return for the transfer of the two smaller islands, the Kremlin would come under
serious domestic pressure not to uphold its side of the deal. This is because there
is a very strong current of opinion within Russian politics, society, and academia
that is firmly against any territorial transfer whatsoever, and this view has become
ever more prevalent in recent years. There is a danger therefore that it may already
be too late for Japan to regain any territory at all.
The most obvious indication of the hardening of Russia’s position is the
increased profile and frequency of official visits to the disputed islands. The most
memorable of these was, of course, President Medvedev’s trip to Kunashir/i in
November 2010, the first ever such visit by a Soviet or Russian head of state.2
Since then, there have been several further trips by prominent Russian officials,
including two more visits by Medvedev himself, albeit now in the role of prime
148 Conclusion
minister and not president. The first of these additional trips was a return to
Kunashir/i in July 2012, followed by a journey to Iturup/Etorofu in August 2015.
On each occasion, Medvedev made uncompromising statements, such as telling
the islanders in 2010: “This is our land, our native land and we will not give up
one inch of it” (Pravitel’stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2010). Similarly, in August
2015, he declared that the islands were part of Russia and that “[t]his is how it
is and how it will be” (quoted in Harding 2015). The Russian Foreign Ministry
was also highly dismissive of the inevitable Japanese complaints, stating that they
had no intention of taking any account of the opinions of Japan on this issue
(cited in Samozhnev 2015). There have been numerous other recent ministerial
visits, including by the ministers for foreign affairs and defence, though these
have tended to attract less attention. One interesting exception, however, was the
trip in July 2015 by Russian health minister Veronika Skvortsova. This official
visit was particularly significant, not because of the profile of the minister, but
rather because it was not to Kunashir/i or Iturup/Etorofu, but rather to Shikotan
(Kommersant 2015). Evidently, this new willingness to send government officials
to this island is not consistent with an intention to transfer Shikotan and Habomai
to Japan at some point in the near future.
The purpose of the health minister’s visit was to attend the opening of a new
hospital on Shikotan, and this points to another area of increasing concern for
Japan. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Russia has been engaged in an active invest-
ment programme on the Kuril Islands in recent years, with the latest plans allocat-
ing 70 billion roubles for the 2016–2025 period. These funds will be directed to a
variety of projects on the islands, including on Shikotan (Kuz’min 2015). What is
more, the Russian government has unveiled a new policy whereby unused land in
the Russian Far East will be distributed to Russian citizens with a view to promot-
ing economic development. Within this scheme is expected to be included land
on the disputed islands (Jiji 2015). Clearly, if this programme leads to an increase
in the number of legal landowners on Shikotan, or even on Habomai, it will make
any prospective transfer increasingly difficult. Likewise, the plans, which were
announced in July 2015 by Aleksandr Galushka, minister for Far Eastern develop-
ment, to increase the number of people living on all of the inhabited Kuril Islands
to as high as 24,000 will, if successfully implemented, create further obstacles
to any territorial transfer (Kuz’min 2015). Last of all, at the same time as calling
for Japan to participate in joint development of the islands, the local Sakhalin
authorities have recently renewed warnings that they will invite third countries,
above all South Korea, to invest on the disputed islands, thereby creating a situ-
ation in which external parties also have an interest in maintaining the status quo
(Baibarza 2015).
On the basis of the government’s deeds, there are therefore serious reasons
to doubt whether Russia would really honour its commitments within the 1956
agreement. The same conclusion can also be drawn from an analysis of officials’
public statements. I have already mentioned Medvedev’s bullish words above.
These comments were, however, made in meetings with the islanders and there is
clearly an element of political theatre to them. What should perhaps be of greater
Conclusion 149
worry for the Japanese side are the less publicised comments by prominent Rus-
sian figures which indicate that many of them take the view that really there is
no territorial dispute with Japan. This is, of course, the approach that Japan itself
takes with regard to its contest with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
More pertinently, it is also the stance that was maintained by Moscow for the
majority of the Soviet period. At that time, the official position was that there
was no genuine dispute with Japan and that claims to the contrary were merely
an invention of Japanese rightists who were intent on denying the results of the
Second World War and on demonising the Soviet Union. It was only when Gor-
bachev came to power and introduced a radically new approach to foreign policy
that it was acknowledged that there really was a territorial dispute with Japan. An
official return to this position by Moscow would therefore deliver a major blow to
Japan’s chances of negotiating any form of territorial settlement.
Evidence that Russia has indeed moved in this direction can be found in the
claims of leading Russian specialists in the field of Japan studies. Where once
such figures might have been expected to advocate a more liberal position, there
is now a tendency for them to promote a harder line. For instance, Viktor Pavly-
atenko, senior fellow at the Centre for Japanese Studies at the Institute of the Far
East of the Russian Academy of Sciences states: “My fundamental view is that
we have no territorial dispute with Japan, but that Japan makes territorial claims
against Russia.” He goes on to explain that Moscow’s earlier recognition of the
existence of a territorial dispute was an error committed when the country was
weak and undergoing political turmoil. In his words, “At that time some ‘clumsy’
steps were taken on behalf of Russia with regard to the Japanese demands. This
began under Gorbachev, then continued in the 1990s. There was at that time a
failure in our diplomacy in relation to Japan’s claims. It is now time to finish
‘cleaning up’ ” (quoted in RIA Novosti 2015).
These are just the words of an academic, and as we all know, scholars’ opinions
usually have little impact on policy. On this occasion, however, it is worth paying
close attention to Pavlyatenko’s arguments because they are clearly in harmony
with those of many leading Russian officials. Specifically, Oleg Morozov, a for-
mer deputy Duma Speaker and close Putin ally, has stressed his own view that
“there were no disputed territories in Russia, and the Russians ‘are not discussing
territorial problems with Japan’ ” (quoted in Sarkisov 2009: 46). Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov, another prominent Putin loyalist, has been even more outspoken
on this issue. When asked in 2014 about the prospects of resolving the dispute
with Japan, Lavrov replied bluntly that “Russia does not consider this situation to
be a territorial dispute” (MID 2014). Lastly and most alarmingly for Japan, Putin
himself has expressed some sympathy with this view, claiming in 2007: “As to the
‘disputed islands’ . . . we don’t see them as ‘disputed’.” He did, however, soften
this somewhat by proceeding to say that “we understand the motives of our Japa-
nese partners’ behaviour. We want to get rid of all irritants of the past and with
Japan are searching for a solution of this problem” (quoted in Sarkisov 2009: 48).
Over the last few years there have therefore been expanding grounds on which
to question the continued viability of a two-island deal. This is all the more so
150 Conclusion
after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, since these events have had the
effect of focusing Russia’s attention on protecting the rights of compatriots from
perceived threats posed by neighbouring states. The resulting East-West ten-
sions also led Japan to join G7 partners in introducing sanctions against Russia,
which, despite their deliberate weakness, caused many Russian politicians to react
negatively against Japan and take a stronger position on the territorial issue. For
example, Leonid Kalashnikov, first deputy chairman of the Duma committee on
foreign affairs, responded as follows:
Japan’s chances [on the territorial issue] have been restricted by themselves
to the lowest possible level in connection with the fact that, having joined
Western sanctions, they have now openly become an adversary or even an
enemy of Russia. If prior to the sanctions there was some logic in holding
negotiations, there is not now.
(quoted in Lenta.ru 2015)
Adding to such sentiments has been the 70th anniversary of the end of World
War II. As well as generally promoting patriotism, these commemorations have
glorified Soviet contributions to victory in both Europe and Asia and encouraged
the fervent rejection of anything that is seen as questioning the righteousness of
Soviet actions during that conflict.
In the present circumstances it is therefore not at all unthinkable that Russia
might move to formally revoke its 1956 offer to transfer the two smaller islands
after the signing of a peace treaty. After all, Moscow has done this once before.
There are even some interesting parallels with that situation, since in 1960 Prime
Minister Kishi was engaged in ramming through against popular opposition a
renewal of the Security Treaty with the United States. In 2015, Prime Minister
Abe, Kishi’s grandson, is involved in forcing through similarly unpopular collec-
tive self-defence legislation that will enable Japan to come to the military aid of
its US ally. While the former law was a much more momentous development for
Soviet security, the latter change is also apparently being viewed with suspicion
in Moscow (Bhadrakumar 2015).
Of course, were the Russians really to abandon the key provision of the 1956
Joint Declaration, it would represent a major setback to any hopes they have
of signing a peace treaty. This is the area in which Japan supposedly does still
have some leverage, since obviously the treaty cannot be signed without Tokyo’s
agreement and this will not be forthcoming absent some form of territorial con-
cessions. This is, after all, why a peace treaty has not been signed until now.
And yet, while Kimura Hiroshi might optimistically assume that this is “a peace
treaty which Russia badly needs” (2009: 29), the evidence would actually seem
to indicate that many on the Russian side are actually increasingly unconcerned
as to whether a peace treaty is concluded or not. This is certainly the opinion of
Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, the well-known Russian journalist and East Asia special-
ist. As he argues, although there might be no treaty between Russia and Japan,
“we also don’t have a peace treaty with Germany. With Germany there is an act
Conclusion 151
of capitulation, by means of which the former Königsberg became Kaliningrad”
(quoted in Sobesednik 2014).3 Several Russian officials also appear to take the
same view. In particular, in 2011 Russian deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov
told the Shangri-La Dialogue that between Russia and Japan the “old World War
II book” should be closed but that this did not necessarily require a peace treaty
(IISS 2011: 71). The Russian ambassador also plays down the need for a formal
agreement, saying: “We are not in a state of war, we have normal, peaceful rela-
tions that we hope will become even better” (Interfax 2014). Moreover, 55 per-
cent of the Russian population are reported as agreeing that a peace treaty with
Japan is not necessary (Richardson 2013: 223). These perceptions are no doubt
informed by the belief that a peace treaty would deliver few substantive benefits
to the Russian side and that, as argued in Chapter 3, an agreement would not sud-
denly open the floodgate to large-scale Japanese investment in Russia.
It is apparent therefore that even a two-island deal is now under threat. And
yet, despite the obstacles outlined above, it remains the case that at present Rus-
sia will likely continue to abide by the stipulations of the 1956 Joint Declaration.
The reason for this is President Putin himself. In spite of his 2007 comments
raising doubts about whether there really is a territorial dispute, on several other
occasions Putin has explicitly stated that he considers the 1956 agreement to be
still in effect. Most importantly, he committed himself to this position during his
first visit as president to Tokyo in September 2000 (Tōgō 2011: 135). In so doing,
Putin became the first Soviet/Russian leader since Khrushchev to officially take
this stance. By contrast, Gorbachev had refused to recognise the 1956 Joint Dec-
laration and Yeltsin had only acknowledged it indirectly by means of the 1993
Tokyo Declaration, which notes that negotiations should be “based on the docu-
ments produced with the two countries’ agreement” (MOFA 1993). In the course
of his long leadership, Putin has reaffirmed his commitment on several occasions,
including in 2015 (Sakhalin Media 2015). Being such an unusually strong leader,
Putin also has the capacity to push through territorial concessions. This does not
mean that he is going to throw away his reputation and rashly give up the four
islands in exchange for little in return. It does, however, suggest that Putin does
have the political capital to see through a two-island settlement should he wish
to do so.
One might very well ask why it is that Putin is willing to openly commit himself
to the 1956 Joint Declaration when so many of his predecessors and contemporary
colleagues have been unwilling to do so. This is a question to which Konstantin
Sarkisov has devoted some attention. His answer is as follows:
Putin’s political philosophy, his inclination to abide by law (“dictatorship

of law”) and his frequent use of remarks such as “as a lawyer, I think . . .”
also worked. In this sense his KGB education gave him a good sense of the
importance of international law. So he could understand far better than his
predecessors that the 1956 Joint Declaration, determining that the two islands
must be returned to Japan, is obligatory, since it was ratified by both parlia-
ments and became law. He argued this several times in private conversations.
152 Conclusion
It is also widely known that he has an attraction towards Japan; he practices
judo, and his second daughter is at St Petersburg State University studying
Japanese, not Chinese she learned at high school.
(Sarkisov 2009: 40)
Russia’s former ambassador to Japan, Aleksandr Panov, also cites Putin’s legal
background as the key explanation (Baranova 2015). Following the criminal pros-
ecution of domestic critics, such as Mikhail Khodokovskii and Aleksei Naval’nyi,
as well as the annexation of Crimea, many might scoff at the idea of Putin’s prin-
cipled commitment to the rule of law. At the same time, however, it is true that
Putin did opt to abide by the constitutional requirement to leave the presidency
after two consecutive terms in 2008, even though he easily could have sought to
revise the constitution.
Whatever the exact reasons, Putin’s explicit support for the 1956 Joint Declara-
tion is unusual within Russian politics. This being so, there is every chance that
the opportunity for Japan to settle for a two-island deal will expire when Putin
leaves the political stage, whether that is after the completion of an additional two
extended presidential terms in 2024 or some time sooner. As noted, Putin is the
only recent national leader to clearly commit himself to the 1956 agreement and
it is probable that his successor will not choose to follow him in this regard. This
is firstly because Russia’s next president will almost inevitably be weaker than
Putin and will therefore eschew unpopular foreign policy positions. Secondly,
this outcome is likely because, as alarming as it may seem to his Western crit-
ics, Putin is actually a relative moderate within Russian politics. His replacement
may well therefore be more stridently nationalist. For an indication of how a true
zealot might approach the territorial dispute with Japan, it is possible to look at
the example of Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party
of Russia (LDPR). In one particular outburst, Zhirinovskii made the following
threat.
The Japanese won’t get the Kurils! If they demand the Kurils, I will send the
navy up the shores of Hokkaido. We will demand the annexation of Hok-
kaido! The Japanese already have the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
But fifty years have passed and perhaps they’ve forgotten what it means. I’ll
remind them.
(quoted in Haines 2014: 587)
Although the LDPR is Russia’s fourth-largest party and its leader received almost
4.5 million votes in the presidential elections of 2012, Zhirinovskii is a clown-
ish politician and is extremely unlikely ever to be Russia’s head of state. More
mainstream figures, however, are also not entirely dissimilar in their aggressive
dismissal of Japan’s territorial claims. For example, Dmitrii Rogozin, Russia’s
outspoken deputy prime minister, responded in August 2015 to Japanese com-
plaints about Medvedev’s visit to Iturup/Etorofu by placing a comment on social
media stating: “If they [the Japanese] were real men, they would follow tradition,
Conclusion 153
commit hara-kiri [ritual suicide] and at last quiet down. All they’re doing is mak-
ing noise” (quoted in Vedomosti 2015).
Given that such views are so prevalent (though not always expressed in such
offensive terms), it can be predicted that Russia will move steadily towards a
position in which it is unwilling to countenance any concessions whatsoever on
the territorial dispute. This is likely to take place in a number of stages. First,
Russia will seek grounds to cancel or permanently suspend the visa-free visits to
the islands, perhaps claiming that they are being used for political ends by Japan
rather than for the originally intended humanitarian purposes. This will become
easier for Russia to allege, as ever fewer of the former Japanese islanders remain
alive and healthy enough to take part in the trips. There were already hints at this
development in 2015, when Russia, seemingly to punish Japan for the introduc-
tion of sanctions, postponed several of the planned visa-free exchanges (Takagi
2015; Yomiuri Shinbun 2015). At the same time, there will come to be ever more
claims that in fact, there is no territorial dispute between Russia and Japan. This
trend can be expected to culminate in an explicit revocation of the 1956 Joint
Declaration.
Of course, the Russian side will not want to be seen to be unilaterally abrogat-
ing a freely agreed upon international agreement for no reason other than self-
interest. They will need therefore to find some pretext for doing so. One option
will be to blame Khrushchev for foolishly agreeing to the conditions of the Joint
Declaration in the first place. This argument already seems to have been rehearsed
by Rossiiskaya Gazeta. In the pages of this state-controlled newspaper, Khrush-
chev’s assent to the agreement has been described as “short-sighted and personal”,
as well as being condemned for “breaking the international legal basis of the Yalta
and Potsdam Agreements and for contradicting the San Francisco Peace Treaty,
in which Japan’s renunciation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was fixed”.
In the same article it is also claimed that the offer of two islands, as well as other
elements of the deal, represented “gratuitous gifts to Japan” and that the Japanese
side “could not believe their ears” (Sabov 2005). This criticism of Khrushchev
coincides conveniently with the popular denunciation of his other controversial
decision to transfer Crimea from the administration of the Russian Republic to
that of Ukraine in 1954. A rejection of the 1956 Joint Declaration could therefore
be presented as correcting another of Khrushchev’s reckless and arbitrary policy
decisions.
An alternative proposal has also been made for escaping from Russia’s legal
commitments. This is the suggestion, made by Anatolii Koshkin amongst others,
that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was signed in December
1982 and ratified by both Russia and Japan, represented a “fundamental change
of circumstances” for the two countries, since it introduced the principle of states
being able to declare a 200-mile EEZ. Since Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties cites a “fundamental change in circumstances” as repre-
senting potentially legitimate grounds for the termination of a treaty, Russia could
therefore invoke this article in justifying revocation of the Joint Declaration of
1956 (Ivanov 2012: 22–3; Sabov 2005). Clearly the introduction of EEZs does not
154 Conclusion
necessarily invalidate the commitment to transfer Habomai and Shikotan, but it
would provide Moscow with a fig leaf of respectability when annulling the agree-
ment. More straightforwardly, if a future Russian leader were feeling brazen, he/
she might abandon such pretences and simply state that the offer of two islands
had been “removed by history”. This, after all, is what Gorbachev had said of the
1956 agreement (quoted in Sarkisov 2009: 41).
Overall, those in Japan who see the Putin presidency as a window of oppor-
tunity are therefore correct in the sense that the next Russian leader is likely to
be considerably less accommodating. Where they are quite wrong, however, is

in their assessments of what currently remains possible. It is not the case, as the
Japanese government proposes, that Japan needs to seize the opportunity through
determined negotiation to forge a settlement that ultimately gives Japan sover-
eignty over all four islands. It is not even the case, as moderates suggest, that
Japan needs to push for a deal that sees the delivery of the two smaller islands
first, followed by longer-term discussions about the status of the other two. Both
of these options, if they ever existed, are now long gone. The remaining Putin
years are instead a window of opportunity for Japan in the sense of being the
country’s last chance to get back even the islands of Shikotan and Habomai.4
Can a two-island deal be successfully sold to the Japanese

people?
This monograph has highlighted the true weakness of Japan’s position with regard
to the territorial dispute with Russia. Despite persistent Japanese hopes to the con-
trary, it has been demonstrated that there are simply not the incentives for Russia
rationally to return the two larger islands or to agree to any form of divided or
shared sovereignty over them. It has also been shown that time is very much not
on Japan’s side. Russia no doubt faces some difficult economic and political times
ahead. Nonetheless, as proved by the collapse of the Soviet Union, such troubles
will not lead to territorial concessions. Instead, as the years pass, Japan’s posi-
tion will simply continue to deteriorate as the time the islands have spent under
Russian control further lengthens, the last of the former Japanese islanders passes
from the scene, and Russian attitudes continue to harden. Added to this, Japan’s
projected demographic collapse will render it an increasingly second-rank coun-
try and unable to wield so much influence internationally. For instance, according
to conservative estimates, in 2035, the year in which the islands shift to hav-
ing been under Russian rule for longer than they were ever controlled by Japan,
the Japanese population is expected to have fallen to 112 million, down from
128 million in 2010. Moreover, 33 percent of the population is anticipated to be
over sixty-five years of age (National Institute of Population and Social Security
Research 2012: 16). This will not be a country that will need or be able to push for
the recovery of additional territory.
The logical conclusion to this argument is therefore apparent. If Japan wishes to
regain any of the disputed islands, it must act quickly to accept the provisions of
the 1956 Joint Declaration and express a willingness to end the territorial dispute
Conclusion 155
by signing a peace treaty in return for the transfer of Shikotan and Habomai. This
sudden change in policy will catch the Russian side on the hop, and many within
that country will be strongly against making these concessions. Nonetheless, so
long as Putin is still president, his repeatedly expressed commitment to the 1956
agreement should ensure that he is forced to push through the transfer of the two
islands.
Evidently it will not be easy to convince the Japanese public that this is indeed
the best possible deal that can be hoped for. For decades they have been misled
by their politicians into thinking that the return of four islands remains a viable
possibility, if only the country is able to show enough perseverance and deter-
mination in pursuing this option. Added to this is the more general obstacle that
studies suggest that individuals are often psychologically inclined to reject what
they regard as an unfair distribution, even if the alternative is to receive nothing
at all (Stein 2012: 142). Having said this, there remain reasons to believe that if
given the opportunity to make an informed choice, many in Japan would opt for
the return of the two smaller islands.
To begin with, as noted in Chapter 5, surveys have shown that the Japanese
public as a whole are already more flexible in their attitudes towards the ter-
ritorial dispute with Russia than is the country’s political class. This being so, if
presented with more information about the reality of the situation, it is likely that
more people would come to accept the logic of a two-island deal. In particular,
were it more widely known that Japan renounced the Kuril Islands (including, by
all reasonable assessments, Iturup/Etorofu and Kunashir/i) in the San Francisco
Treaty of 1951, that its diplomats had been prepared to accept a two-island deal in
the run-up to the 1956 agreement, and that Russia has absolutely no intention of
ever compromising on the sovereignty of the two larger islands, many Japanese
might well take the view that it would be sensible to take the offer of two islands
while it is still available. In any case, they have the right to be told the truth about
this matter and to make up their own minds. As such, instead of the tired pat-
tern of the government wasting public money on promoting conformity to the
demand for yontō ikkatsu henkan and instead of newspapers publishing the same
antiquated articles that overestimate the strength of Japan’s position and foolishly
urge patience, there should be a much more wide-ranging and open public debate
about how best to address this issue. Ideally this should be initiated by a politician
or political party that is willing to confront the conservatism of Japan’s bureau-
cracy and academia and to lead a fresh debate that highlights the real options that
Japan retains and what the true costs and benefits are of this decision.
In the end, by means of such an open discussion, it would no doubt become
much more widely apparent that Japan essentially faces a choice between, on the
one hand, holding firmly to its convictions yet regaining no territory at all, and,
on the other, showing a willingness to compromise on a matter of principle but
thereby regaining two islands. Ultimately, it is possible that, even after a much
broader debate, the weight of opinion still comes to favour the first option. This
is a respectable decision, albeit one that comes at the cost not only of more than
350 km2 of territory, but also in terms of Japan’s longer-term geopolitical position
156 Conclusion
within the region. What is less acceptable, however, is to persist in the fiction that
Japan can remain unbending in its principles yet also regain sovereignty over all
four of the disputed islands. Such a position is not honest and responsible govern-
ment policy, it is rather little more than the perpetuation of a delusion.
Notes
1 Seokwoo Lee takes a different view, arguing that only Habomai can truly be claimed
to have always been distinct from the Kuril chain. According to his research, “various
pre-1945 Japanese records, such as travel guides, administrative handbooks, and other
publications, recognised Shikotan as a part of Kurile Archipelago” (Lee 2001: 19).
2 Yeltsin also travelled to Kunashir/i in August 1990, but this was when he was chairman
of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and therefore
still a republic- rather than a state-level leader.
3 Ovchinnikov does not mention, however, that a Treaty on the Final Settlement with
Respect to Germany (the Two Plus Four Agreement) was signed by the two Germanys
and the Soviet Union, United States, France, and United Kingdom in September 1990.
An alternative example of where the absence of a formal peace treaty has little bearing
on current bilateral relations is between Italy and Japan. Italy declared war on Japan in
July 1945, just a few weeks before Japan’s ultimate capitulation. However, since it was
not invited to sign the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, Italy did not actually conclude a
peace agreement with Japan.
4 One further piece of evidence that Japan’s window of opportunity to negotiate the return
of any territory is rapidly closing is the public statement made by Igor’ Morgulov in
September 2015. Morgulov is Russia’s deputy foreign minister and the individual who
led peace treaty negotiations with Japan in 2013 and 2014. It was therefore of particular
significance when he declared unequivocally that “[w]e are not conducting any form of
dialogue with Tokyo on the ‘Kuril problem’. This question was resolved 70 years ago”
(quoted in Tarasenko 2015).
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the-shangri-la-dialogue-2011-fa85, accessed 26/08/15.
Conclusion 157
Interfax (2014) “Posol Rossii v Tokio o mirnom dogovore s Yaponiei [Russian ambassador
in Tokyo on the peace treaty with Japan],” 7 February.
Japan Times (2015) “Abe urges Putin to push Ukraine truce, reaffirms invitation to visit
Japan,” 25 June.
Jiji (2015) “Russia to allocate Japan-claimed islands to citizens,” 5 August.
Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan (1956), The World
and Japan Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19561019.D1E.html, accessed 17/08/15.
Kimura, Hiroshi (2009) “The Northern Territories issue: Japanese-Russian relations and
domestic concerns in Japan,” ch. 2 in Hara, K. and Jukes, G. (eds.) Northern Territories,
Asia-Pacific Regional Conflicts and the Åland Experience (Abingdon: Routledge).
Kommersant (2015) “Yaponiya sozhaleyet po povodu poyezdki ministra zdravookhraneniya
Rossii na Kurily [Yapan expresses regard over Russian health minister’s trip to the
Kurils],” 21 July.
Kuz’min, Vladimir (2015) “Vernut’ zhizn’ na ostrova [Return life to the islands],” Ros-
siiskaya Gazeta, 23 July.
Lenta.ru (2015) “V Gosdume posovetovali Tokio zabyt’ o nadezhdakh na ustupki po
voprosu Kuril [In the State Duma they tell Tokyo to forget about hopes for concessions
on the Kuril question],” http://lenta.ru/news/2015/02/07/nohope, accessed 26/08/15.
MID [Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (2014) “Otvet S.V. Lavrova na vopros o rossiysko-
yaponskom territorial’nom spore [Answer by S. V. Lavrov to a question about the Russian-
Japanese territorial dispute],” 18 February.
MOFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan] (1993) “Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia
Relations,” 13 October, www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/declaration.html,
accessed 18/09/14.
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2012) “Population Projec-
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esuikei/ppfj2012.pdf, accessed 28/08/15.
Pravitel’stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii (2010) “Predsedatel’ Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii
D.A. Medvedev posetil yuzhnokuril’skii ostrov Kunashir, gde osmotrel mestnyi rybo-
kombinat, bol’nitsu, pobyval na meste stroitel’stva khrama, a takze poobshchalsya s
zhitelyami [Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visits the South Kuril island of Kunashir,
where he inspected a local fish processing plant and hospital, visited a church under con-
struction, and talked with local residents],” http://archive.government.ru/docs/19558/
print/, accessed 25/08/15.
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RIA Novosti (2015) “Vostokoved: predlozheniye yaponskogo politika – obmen Kuril na
‘nichto’ [Orientalist: Offer of Japanese politician is to exchange the Kurils for ‘noth-
ing’],” 12 August.
Richardson, Paul (2013) “ ‘A Germany in the Pacific’: The role of Japan in Russia’s turn to
Asia,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, 32(May): 215–229.
158 Conclusion
Sabov, Aleksandr (2005) “Za Kurily. Istoriya ostrovov preduprezhdaet: Peregovory o
‘severnykh territoriyakh’ opasny dlya zdorov’ya natsii [For the Kurils. The history of
the islands is a warning: Negotiations about the ‘Northern Territories’ is a danger to the
health of the nation],” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28 October.
Sakhalin Media (2015) “Dialog po territorial’nomu razmezhevaniyu v rayone Kuril sver-
nut Yaponiyey – Vladimir Putin [Vladimir Putin: Dialogue about territorial delimitation
in the Kuril area is being restricted by Japan],” 17 April, http://sakhalinmedia.ru/news/
politics/17.04.2015/432853/dialog-po-territorialnomu-razmezhevaniyu-v-rayone-kuril-
svernut-yaponiey-vladimi.html, accessed 26/08/15.
Samozhnev, Aleksandr (2015) “MID: Pravitel’stvo RF budet poseshchat’ Kurily bez

ucheta mneniya Yaponii [MFA: Russian government will visit the Kurils without taking
account of the opinion of Japan],” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 22 August.
Sarkisov, Konstantin (2009) “The territorial dispute between Japan and Russia: The ‘two
island solution’ and Putin’s last years as President,” ch. 3 in Hara, K. and Jukes, G. (eds.)
Northern Territories, Asia-Pacific Regional Conflicts and the Åland Experience (Oxon:
Routledge).
Sobesednik (2014) “‘Yaponiya skandalit s Rossiyey, chuvstvuya, chto nachinayet chto-to
teryat’, – Vsevolod Ovchinnikov [‘Japan is making trouble with Russia because they
feel they are starting to lose something’ – Vsevolod Ovchinnikov],” 24 September,
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chto-nachinaet-chto, accessed 26/08/15.
Stein, Janice Gross (2012) “Foreign policy decision making: rational, psychological, and
neurological models,” ch. 7 in Smith, S., Hadfield, A., and Dunne, T. (eds.) Foreign
Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Takagi, Keiichi (2015) “Ro ‘bizanashi kōryū chūshi’ yomenakatta Gaimushō [Foreign
Ministry failed to read Russia’s ‘suspension of visa-free exchanges’],” Sankei Shinbun,
26 May.
Tarasenko, Pavel (2015) “Dialog s Tokio po ‘kuril’skoy probleme’ my ne vedem [We are not
conducting dialogue with Tokyo on the ‘Kuril problem’],” Kommersant, 2 September.
Tōgō, Kazuhiko (2011) “The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories:
Five lost windows of opportunity,” Japan Forum, 23(1): 123–145.
1832.
Vedomosti (2015) “Rogozin predlozhil yapontsam sdelat’ kharakiri iz-za poseshcheniya
Medvedevym Kuril [Rogozin suggests the Japanese commit hara-kiri following Medve-
dev’s visit to the Kurils],” 24 August.
Yomiuri Shinbun (2015) “Hoppōryōdo bosan chūshi ‘teishutsu shorui, kon’nan’na shūsei
yōkyū’ [Suspension of Northern Territories grave visits, ‘request for difficult corrections
to submitted documents’],” 2 September.
Index
abductions 132–3 G7 40, 66, 94, 112

Abe S. 2, 64–7, 80–1, 94, 112–14, 118, Galushka, A.S. 148
124–6, 150 gas see energy
Afanas’ev E.V. 125, 151 Gazprom 39, 41–2
Ainu 13–15, 90, 101, 134 Germany 35, 150–1
Åland Islands 84–5 Golovnino 46, 85
Alaska 89 Gorbachev, M.S. 115, 118–19, 123–4, 127,
Amnesty International 97 149, 151, 154
Anti-Comintern Pact 16
Arctic 54–5 Hashimoto, R. 116, 121
arms exports 58–60, 70–1 hikiwake 93–5, 98
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) 35, 60, 94 Ikeda, H. 23
Asō T. 108 India 39, 58, 64
Atlantic Charter 10 Irkutsk 116–17
Atomic bombings of Japan 25, 134–5, 152 Ivanov, S.B. 112, 151
Australia 60, 64
JOGMEC 42
Cairo Declaration 18
Central Asia 53–4 Kalashnikov, L.I. 89, 150
China 4, 11, 36, 39–40, 47, 52–62, 65, Keidanren 42, 130
67–71, 111, 114–5, 136, 146–7 Khalkhin Gol (battle of ) 16, 25
constructivism 133–4 Khodorkovskii 152
Crimea 53, 66, 70, 81, 94, 97–100, 112, Khrushchev, N. 23, 72, 110–11, 123, 151,
124, 152–3 153
Kishi N. 150
Day of the Northern Territories 9, 81, 87, Koike, Y. 81
94, 134 Koizumi, J. 117, 129
Deng X. 119 Komatsu 42–3
deportation of islanders 11, 84 Kozhemyako O.N. 145
Dokdo/Takeshima 144 Kozyrev, A.V. 115, 120–1
Dulles, J.F. 21–2, 126, 134 Krabozavodskoe 46
Krasnoyarsk 116, 121
energy 33, 38–9, 41–2, 44–5, 53–4, 58–9, Kunadze, G.F. 82, 120
70
European Union 35, 42, 70 Lake Khasan (battle of ) 16
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 45, 144–5, landmass of islands 1
153 Lavrov, S.V 36, 70, 149
League of Chishima-Habomai Residents
fishing industry 44–5, 144–5 81, 87, 114
Fukushima nuclear disaster 38, 130 Liberal Democratic Party 127, 134
160 Index
Manchuria 10, 18–19, 25 ROTOBO 42
Matsuoka, Y. 16–17 Russo-Japanese War 15, 19–20
Medvedev, D.A. 34, 55, 87, 93, 112, 128,
147–8, 152 Sakhalin 19–20, 24, 41, 73, 84–5, 90–1
Mendeleevo 46 sanctions 66–7, 70, 124, 150
military modernisation 57, 74 San Francisco Peace Treaty 11–12, 20–3,
mineral resources 44 100, 146, 153, 155
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Sea of Okhotsk 5, 14, 45, 55, 73
(MOFA) 6, 8, 80, 84, 96, 127–30, 137 Sechin, I.I. 66
Mironov, S.M. 89 seikei fukabun 36, 40–1
Mori, Y. 36, 108, 117, 128, 131, 144 Sekō H. 37

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 62–3, 70–1,
Nakasone, Y. 128 113–14, 119, 122, 136, 144
Naryshkin, S.Y 66 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 58
National Security Strategy 64, 66 Shigemitsu M. 134
Naval’nyi, A.A. 89, 152 Shigeru, Y. 21–2
Nemtsov, B.Y. 116–17, 121 Shoigu, S.K. 70
Nemuro 81, 87–8, 101, 144–5 Shumshu 10, 24–6
Neutrality Pact 9, 15–18, 24 Siberian intervention 16, 110
Nixon, R.M. 92–3, 118 Singapore 39
Nomonhan see Khalkhin Gol Skvortsova V.I. 148
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Sochi Winter Olympics 94, 124
(NATO) 63 Solzhenitsyn A.I. 83
Northern Sea Route 54 Sono, A. 97
“Northern Territories” (as a term) 12, South China Sea 58–60, 64, 107
21–3, 134 South Korea 39, 64, 148
North Korea 64, 132–3, 147 Soviet attack on Japan 10, 24–6
Norway 89 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956
nuclear strategy 54, 57–8, 68, 72–3 1, 46, 73, 93, 108, 110, 116–17, 120–1,
123, 143–4, 146, 150–3, 155
Obama, B. 63, 126 Soviet occupation of islands 10, 24–6
Obuchi, K. 117 Stalin, J.V. 12, 15–16, 18, 26, 72, 84
oil see energy Suematsu, Y. 37
Ozawa, I. 115–6, 118, 123–4 Suzuki, M. 93, 117, 121, 131
Patrushev, N. 60 Tanaka, M. 117

peace treaty 1–2, 12, 21, 73, 80, 83, 88, 95, Tōjō, H. 17
107–12, 115–17, 120–1, 125, 128, 143, Tokyo Declaration 12, 151
145–7, 150–1, 154–5 Treaty of Portsmouth 9, 11
Pearl Harbor 15, 17, 72 Treaty of Shimoda 8–10, 12, 15, 21, 99,
Philippines 60, 64 146
population of islands 1, 11, 84, 96, 100–1, Treaty of St. Petersburg 9, 12, 84
145–6, 148 Truman, H.S. 26, 73
Potsdam Declaration 11, 153 2 plus alpha 133
POWs 10–11, 134 2+2 meeting 4, 60, 66, 69
Putin, V.V. 1–2, 25, 34–5, 67, 69–70, 89,
91–5, 97–8, 109, 112, 121, 123–5, 151–2 Ukraine 53, 61, 70, 81, 88, 94, 111–12,
150
rhenium see mineral resources UNCLOS 153
Rogozin, D. 26, 89, 152–3 United Nations 24, 45, 97
Roosevelt, F.D. 10, 18–20, 26 United States of America 12, 18–20, 22–3,
Rosneft 42 62–3, 67–8, 73, 110–11, 126–7, 134
Index 161
Vietnam 58–9, 64 Yachi, S. 108
visa-free visit programme 87, 153 Yalta conference 18–20, 23, 27, 146,
Vladivostok 35, 72, 83 153
Yavlinskii G.A. 83
Watanabe, M. 40, 115, 143 Yeltsin B.N. 83, 92, 116, 119–21, 151
World Bank 43 Yuzhno-Kuril’sk 46, 85
Xi, J. 54, 69 Zhirinovskii V.V. 152


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Japan, Russia and their Territorial

James D. J. Brown is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Temple University,

1 A Japanese Company in Crisis 9 Adoption in Japan

5 Shinkansen 12 Political Reform in Japan

8 The Changing Japanese Family 15 Japanese Love Hotels

18 A Japanese Joint Venture in the

23 The Novels of Oe Kenzaburo 34 Language Life in Japan

37 Social Networks and Japanese 46 EU–Japan Relations, 1970–2012

in East Asia Vanoverbeke and Franz

38 Dealing with Disaster in Japan 47 Japan and the High Treason

49 Sound, Space and Sociality in

in the 21st century

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has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the

Typeset in Times New Roman

To my wife and son

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2 History and international law 8

5 Social considerations and public opinion 80

6 The northern delusion 107

Map 1 The Kuril Island Chain and Disputed Islands

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sense of national victimhood.

The claim of illegal occupation of “inherent” Japanese territory

1 Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly

Such an explicit statement would seem to be fatal to Japan’s territorial claims

instead said to be a geographical extension of Hokkaidō. To make this distinction

Rejection of Japan’s historical and legal arguments

An ill-defined buffer zone

Four decades of Japanese aggression

Mutual disregard for the Neutrality Pact

Complicity of the United States

1 The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic)

Reinforcing the binding nature of these conditions, the penultimate sentence of

This ignorance theory is given significant credence by some commentators,

The invention of the “Northern Territories”

Assisted by consistent promotion by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the

An affront to Soviet sacrifice

We always ask the Japanese: “Gentlemen, do you acknowledge the results

To explain this marked difference in perspective a little further, it is worth high-

The Southern Kurils are our territory. [. . .] To be honest, I absolutely don’t

WWII” (2013: 202).

Ivanov, Daniil (2012) “Kuril’skie ostrova v istorii russko-yaponskikh otnoshenii [The

The claim that economically Russia needs Japan

Convinced of the inescapable logic of this economic argument, advocates urge

Rejection of Japan’s economic arguments

Russia’s economic counter-leverage

Against a background of prolonged recession, from which no exit is in sight,

Japanese investors discouraged by the investment climate,

Japanese companies’ dissatisfaction with administrative barriers and the level

legal protections for business owners, and investing heavily in infrastructure. In

Economic value of the islands to Russia

to the four islands.

to be based on exaggerated assumptions of Japanese strength and Russian weak-

ru/page.aspx?1610833, accessed 01/12/14.

Pavlyatenko, V. N. (2013) “Ob ofitsial’nom vizite prem’er-ministra Yaponii Sindzo Abe v

Strel’tsov, Dmitrii (2014) “Ekonomicheskaya politika yaponskogo pravitel’stva S. Abe

ing threat to Moscow’s “sphere of privileged interests” (Medvedev quoted by

by increased political influence. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the

building closer ties with Japan.

Vostok-2010 came to be understood as directed against China. It is interesting

From the perspective of making progress in negotiations on a solution to the

long-standing territorial dispute, too, this [Russian-Japanese security] coop-