Logical atomism

Logical atomism is a philosophical view t hat originat ed in t he early 20t h cent ury wit h t he
development of analyt ic philosophy. It holds t hat t he world consist s of ult imat e logical "fact s"
(or "at oms") t hat cannot be broken down any furt her, each of which can be underst ood
independent ly of ot her fact s.

It s principal exponent was t he Brit ish philosopher Bert rand Russell. It is also widely held t hat t he
early works[a] of his Aust rian-born pupil and colleague, Ludwig Wit t genst ein, defend a version of
logical at omism, t hough he went on t o reject it in his lat er Philosophical Investigations.[b] Some
philosophers in t he Vienna Circle were also influenced by logical at omism (part icularly Rudolf
Carnap, who was deeply sympat het ic t o some of it s philosophical aims, especially in his earlier
works).[2] Gust av Bergmann also developed a form of logical at omism t hat focused on an ideal
phenomenalist ic language, part icularly in his discussions of J.O. Urmson's work on analysis.[3]

The name for t his kind of t heory was coined in March 1911 by Russell, in a work published in
French t it led "Le Réalisme analyt ique" (published in t ranslat ion as "Analyt ic Realism" in Volume 6
of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell).[4] Russell was developing and responding t o what he
called "logical holism"—i.e., t he belief t hat t he world operat es in such a way t hat no part can be
known wit hout t he whole being known first .[5] This belief is relat ed t o monism, and is associat ed
wit h t he absolut e idealism which was dominant in Brit ain at t he t ime. The crit icism of monism
seen in t he works of Russell and his colleague G. E. Moore can t herefore be seen as an ext ension
of t heir crit icism of absolut e idealism, part icularly as it appeared in t he works of F. H. Bradley and
J. M. E. McTaggart .[5] Logical at omism can t hus be underst ood as a developed alt ernat ive t o
logical holism, or t he "monist ic logic" of t he absolut e idealist s.
Wit h t he operat ions of t he calculus of relat ions as at oms or indefinables (primit ive not ions),
Russell described logicism, or mat hemat ics as logic, in The Principles of Mathematics (1903).
Russell t hought t he revolut ionary mat hemat ical work could, t hrough t he development of
relat ions, produce a similar revolut ion in philosophy. This ambit ion overlays t he charact er of
Russell's work from 1900 onward. Russell believes in fact t hat logical at omism, fully carried out
and implement ed t hroughout philosophy, is t he realizat ion of his 1901 ambit ion. As he says in t he
1911 piece where he coins t he phrase "logical at omism":

The true method, in philosophy as in science, should be inductive,

meticulous, respectful of detail, and should reject the belief that it is
the duty of each philosophy to solve all problems by himself. It is this
method which has inspired analytic realism [a.k.a. logical atomism],
and it is the only method, if I am not mistaken, with which philosophy
will succeed in obtaining results as solid as those obtained in science.
(pg. 139)[4]

Logical at omism right ly makes logic cent ral t o philosophy. In doing so, it makes philosophy
scient ific, at least in Russell's view. As he says in his 1924 "Logical At omism":[8]

The technical methods of mathematical logic, as developed in this

book [Principia Mathematica], seem to me very powerful, and capable
of providing a new instrument for the discussion of many problems
that have hitherto remained subject to philosophical vagueness.

In summary, Russell t hought t hat a moral of t he revolut ionary work in mat hemat ics was t his:
equally revolut ionary work in philosophy could occur, if we only make logic t he essence of
philosophizing.[9] This aspirat ion lies at t he origin, and mot ivat es and runs t hrough, logical at omism.
Principles
Russell referred t o his at omist ic doct rine as cont rary t o t he t ier "of t he people who more or less
follow Hegel" (PLA 178).

The first principle of logical at omism is t hat t he World cont ains "fact s". The fact s are complex
st ruct ures consist ing of object s ("part iculars"). A fact may be t hat an object has a propert y or
t hat it st ands in some relat ion t o ot her object s. In addit ion, t here are judgment s ("beliefs"), which
are in a relat ionship t o t he fact s, and by t his relat ionship eit her t rue or false.

According t o t his t heory, even ordinary object s of daily life "are apparent ly complex ent it ies".
According t o Russell, words like "t his" and "t hat " are used t o denot e part iculars. In cont rast ,
ordinary names such as "Socrat es" act ually are definit ive descript ions. In t he analysis of "Plat o
t alks wit h his pupils", "Plat o" needs t o be replaced wit h somet hing like "t he man who was t he
t eacher of Arist ot le".

In 1905, Russell had already crit icized Alexius Meinong, whose t heories led t o t he paradox of t he
simult aneous exist ence and non-exist ence of fict ional object s. This t heory of descript ions was
crucial t o logical at omism, as Russell believed t hat language mirrored realit y.

Russell's principles
Bert rand Russell's t heory of logical at omism consist s of t hree int erworking part s: t he at omic
proposit ion, t he at omic fact , and t he at omic complex. An at omic proposit ion, also known as an
element al judgement , is a fundament al st at ement describing a single ent it y. Russell refers t o
t his ent it y as an at omic fact , and recognizes a range of element s wit hin each fact t hat he refers
t o as part iculars and universals. A part icular denot es a signifier such as a name, many of which
may apply t o a single at omic fact , while a universal lends qualit y t o t hese part iculars, e.g. color,
shape, disposit ion. In Russell's Theory of Acquaint ance, awareness and t hereby knowledge of
t hese part iculars and universals comes t hrough sense dat a. Every syst em consist s of many
at omic proposit ions and t heir corresponding at omic fact s, known t oget her as an at omic
complex. In respect t o t he nomenclat ure t hat Russell used for his t heory, t hese complexes are
also known as molecular fact s in t hat t hey possess mult iple at oms. Rat her t han decoding t he
complex in a t op-down manner, logical at omism analyzes it s proposit ions individually before
considering t heir collect ive effect . According t o Russell, t he at omic complex is a product of
human t hought and ideat ion t hat combines t he various at omic fact s in a logical manner.

Russell's perspect ive on belief proved a point of cont ent ion bet ween him and Wit t genst ein,
causing it t o shift t hroughout his career. In logical at omism, belief is a complex t hat possesses
bot h t rue and unt rue proposit ions. Init ially, Russell plot t ed belief as t he special relat ionship
bet ween a subject and a complex proposit ion. Lat er, he amended t his t o say t hat belief lacks a
proposit ion, and inst ead associat es wit h universals and part iculars direct ly. Here, t he link
bet ween psychological experience – sense dat a – and component s of logical at omism –
universals and part iculars – causes a breach in t he t ypical logic of t he t heory; Russell's logical
at omism is in some respect s defined by t he crossover of met aphysics and analyt ical philosophy,
which charact erizes t he field of nat uralized epist emology.[10]

In his t heory of Logical At omism, Russell posit ed t he highly cont roversial idea t hat for every
posit ive fact exist s a parallel negat ive fact : a fact t hat is unt rue. The correspondence t heory
maint ains t hat every at omic proposit ion coordinat es wit h exact ly one at omic fact , and t hat all
at omic fact s exist . The Theory of Acquaint ance says t hat for any given st at ement t aking t he
form of an at omic proposit ion, we must be familiar wit h t he assert ion it makes. For example, in
t he posit ive st at ement , "t he leaf is green," we must be acquaint ed wit h t he at omic fact t hat t he
leaf is green, and we know t hat t his st at ement corresponds t o exact ly t his one fact . Along t his
same line, t he complement ary negat ive st at ement , "t he leaf is not green," is clearly false given
what we know about t he color of t he leaf, but our abilit y t o form a st at ement of t his nat ure
means t hat a corresponding fact must exist . Regardless of whet her t he second st at ement is or
isn't t rue, t he connect ion bet ween it s proposit ion and a fact must it self be t rue. One cent ral
doct rine of Logical At omism, known as t he Logically Perfect Language Principle, enables t his
conclusion. This principle est ablishes t hat everyt hing exist s as at omic proposit ion and fact , and
t hat all language signifies realit y. In Russell's viewpoint , t his necessit at es t he negat ive fact ,
whereas Wit t genst ein maint ained t he more convent ional Principle of Bivalence, in which t he
st at es "P" and "Not (P)" cannot coexist .
Wittgenstein's principles
In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wit t genst ein explains his version of logical
at omism as t he relat ionship bet ween proposit ion, st at e of affairs, object , and complex, oft en
referred t o as "Pict ure t heory".[11] In view of Russell's version, t he proposit ions are congruent in
t hat t hey are bot h clear st at ement s about an at omic ent it y. Every at omic proposit ion is
const ruct ed from "names" t hat correspond t o "object s", and t he int eract ion of t hese object s
generat es "st at es of affairs," which are analogous t o what Russell called at omic fact s. Where
Russell ident ifies bot h part iculars and universals, Wit t genst ein amalgamat es t hese int o object s
for t he sake of prot ect ing t he t rut h-independence of his proposit ions; a self-cont ained st at e of
affairs defines each proposit ion, and t he t rut h of a proposit ion cannot be proven by t he sharing or
exclusion of object s bet ween proposit ions. In Russell's work, his concept of universals and
part iculars denies t rut h-independence, as each universal account s for a specific set of
part iculars, and t he exact mat ching of any t wo set s implies equalit y, difference implies
inequalit y, and t his act s as a qualifier of t rut h. In Wit t genst ein's t heory, an at omic complex is a
layered proposit ion subsuming many at omic proposit ions, each represent ing it s own st at e of
affairs.

Wit t genst ein's handling of belief was dismissive and reflect s his abst ent ion from t he
epist emology t hat concerned Russell. Because his t heory dealt wit h underst anding t he nat ure of
realit y, and because any it em or process of t he mind barring posit ive fact , i.e. somet hing absolut e
and wit hout int erpret at ion, may become alt ered and t hus divorced from realit y, belief exist s as a
sign of realit y but not realit y it self. Wit t genst ein was decidedly skept ical of epist emology, which
t ends t o value unifying met aphysical ideas while depreciat ing t he casewise and met hodological
inspect ion of philosophy t hat dominat es his Tract at us Logico-Philosophicus.[12] Furt hermore,
Wit t genst ein concerned himself wit h defining t he exact correspondence bet ween language and
realit y wherein any explanat ion of realit y t hat defies or overburdens t hese semant ic st ruct ures,
namely met aphysics, becomes unhinged. Wit t genst ein's work bears t he exact philosophical
det erminant s t hat he openly dismissed, hence his lat er abandonment of t his t heory alt oget her.
Differences between Russell's and
Wittgenstein's atomism
At t he t ime Russell delivered his lect ures on logical at omism, he had lost cont act wit h
Wit t genst ein. Aft er World War I, Russell met wit h Wit t genst ein again and helped him publish t he
Tract at us Logico Philosophicus, Wit t genst ein's own version of Logical At omism.

Alt hough Wit t genst ein did not use t he expression Logical Atomism, t he book espouses most of
Russell's logical at omism except for Russell's Theory of Knowledge (T 5.4 and 5.5541). By 1918
Russell had moved away from t his posit ion. Nevert heless, t he Tractatus differed so
fundament ally from t he philosophy of Russell t hat Wit t genst ein always believed t hat Russell
misunderst ood t he work.

The differences relat e t o many det ails, but t he crucial difference is in a fundament ally different
underst anding of t he t ask of philosophy. Wit t genst ein believed t hat t he t ask of philosophy was
t o clean up linguist ic mist akes. Russell was ult imat ely concerned wit h est ablishing sound
epist emological foundat ions. Epist emological quest ions such as how pract ical knowledge is
possible did not int erest Wit t genst ein. Wit t genst ein invest igat ed t he "limit s of t he world" and
lat er on meaning. For Wit t genst ein, met aphysics and et hics were nonsensical - as t hey did not
"speak of fact s" - t hough he did not mean t o devalue t heir import ance in life by describing t hem
in t his way.[13] Russell, on t he ot her hand, believed t hat t hese subject s, part icularly et hics, t hough
belonging not t o philosophy nor science and possessing an inferior epist emological foundat ion,
were not only of cert ain int erest , but also meaningful.

Influence and decline

The immediat e effect of t he Tractatus was enormous, part icularly by t he recept ion it received
by t he Vienna Circle. However, it is now claimed by many cont emporary analyt ic philosophers,
t hat t he Vienna Circle misunderst ood cert ain sect ions of t he Tractatus. The indirect effect of
t he met hod, however, was perhaps even great er long-t erm, especially on logical posit ivism.
Wit t genst ein event ually reject ed t he "at omism" of logical at omism in his post humously published
book, Philosophical Investigations, and it is st ill debat ed whet her or not he ever held t he wide-
ranging version t hat Russell expounded in his 1918 logical at omism lect ures.[1] Russell, on t he
ot her hand, never abandoned logical at omism. In his 1959 My Philosophical Development, Russell
said t hat his philosophy evolved and changed many t imes in his life, but he described all t hese
changes as an "evolut ion" st emming from his original "revolut ion" int o logical at omism in 1899-
1900:[14]

There is one major division in my philosophical work: in the years

1899-1900, I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism and the
technique of Peano in mathematical logic. This was so great a
revolution as to make my previous work, except such as was purely
mathematical, irrelevant to everything that I did later. The change in
these years was a revolution; subsequent changes have been of the
nature of an evolution. (Chapter 1: "Introductory Outline")

Even int o t he 1960s, Russell claimed t hat he "rat her avoided labels" in describing his views—wit h
t he except ion of "logical at omism."[15]

Philosophers such as Willard Van Orman Quine, Hubert Dreyfus and Richard Rort y went on t o
adopt logical holism.

See also

Logical positivism
Philosophy of language
Logic
 Ordinary language philosophy
Theory of descriptions
"On Denoting"
Definitions of philosophy

Notes

a. This includes both the Tractatus Logico-

Philosophicus and Wittgenstein's pre-
Tractarian writings.
b. See especially Philosophical Investigations
§§46–49, §81, §91).[1]

References

1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). G.E.M.

Anscombe; Rush Rhees (eds.).
 Philosophical Investigations. Oxford:
Blackwell.
2. Carnap, R. (1934), "On the Character of
Philosophic Problems (Über den Charakter
der philosophischen Probleme)," translation
by W. M. Malisoff, Philosophy of Science, 1,
pp. 5–19.
3. Bergmann, Gustav (1957). "The Revolt
Against Logical Atomism--I". The
Philosophical Quarterly. 7 (29): 323–339.
doi:10.2307/2217296 (https://doi.org/10.2
307%2F2217296) . JSTOR 2217296 (http
s://www.jstor.org/stable/2217296) .
4. Russell, Bertrand; Slater, John Greer;
Frohmann, Bernd (1992). Logical and
Philosophical Papers, 1909-13 (https://boo
ks.google.com/books?id=SSd9Iu1uXHoC&
q=logical+atomism) . Psychology Press.
ISBN 9780415084468.
5. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Russell's Logical
Atomism" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entrie
s/logical-atomism/) . Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
6. Russell, Bertrand (1918-10-01). THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM [with
Discussion] (https://archive.org/details/jsto
r-27900704) . JSTOR. The Monist.
7. Russell, Bertrand (1918). Mysticism and
logic, and other essays (https://archive.org/
details/cu31924059441125) . Cornell
University Library. New York, Longmans,
Green and co.
8. Russell, Bertrand; Slater, John Greer;
Frohmann, Bernd (1988). Essays on
language, mind, and matter, 1919-26 (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=KfsPAQA
AIAAJ&q=new+instrument+for+the+discus
sion) . Unwin Hyman.
ISBN 9780049200753.
9. BERTRAND RUSSELL. OUR KNOWLEDGE
OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD (https://archiv
e.org/details/ourknowledgeofth005200mb
p) . Universal Digital Library. GEORGE
ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
10. Kitchener, Richard F. (2004). "Bertrand
Russell's Flirtation with Behaviorism".
Behaviorism and Philosophy.
11. "Wittgenstein, Ludwig | Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy" (http://www.ie
p.utm.edu/wittgens/#H2) .
www.iep.utm.edu. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
12. Temelini, Michael (2015). "Wittgenstein's
Method of Perspicuous Representation".
Wittgenstein and The Study of Politics (htt
p://www.utppublishing.com/Wittgenstein-a
nd-the-Study-of-Politics.html) .
Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of
Toronto Press. pp. 68–94. ISBN 978-1-
4426-4633-9.
13. L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, proposition 6.52.
14. Russell, Bertrand (1995). My Philosophical
Development (https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=XjncL40ZIR0C&q=logical+atomis
m) . Psychology Press.
ISBN 9780415136013.
15. U.G. Krishnamurti (2013-12-24), Bertrand
Russell - Mankind's Future & Philosophy (htt
ps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvOcjzQ3
2Fw) , archived (https://ghostarchive.org/v
archive/youtube/20211221/gvOcjzQ32F
w) from the original on 2021-12-21,
retrieved 2018-09-27

External links

Logical atomism (https://philpapers.org/

browse/logical-atomism) at PhilPapers
Logical atomism (https://www.inphoproj
ect.org/idea/676) at the Indiana
Philosophy Ontology Project
"Russell's Metaphysics" (http://www.iep.
utm.edu/russ-met/) . Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peter Schulte: Bertrand Russell:
Philosophie des Logischen Atomismus
(https://web.archive.org/web/20090704
001107/http://wwwhomes.uni-bielefeld.
de/pschulte/pla-seminar.html)
Kevin Klement: Russell's Logical
Atomism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entri
es/logical-atomism/)
Ian Proops: Wittgenstein's Logical
Atomism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entri
es/wittgenstein-atomism/)
Jeff Speaks: Russell on logical
constructions and logical atomism (http
s://web.archive.org/web/200909042133
04/http://www.nd.edu/~jspeaks/mcgill/
370/winter2004/russell-atomism.htm) ,
McGill University 2004
Logical Atomism Overview: [1] (http://uni
versitypublishingonline.org/cambridge/h
istories/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO978113905
3563&cid=CBO9781139053563A043)
Lecture on Bertrand Russell at Wheaton
College: [2] (https://www.youtube.com/
 watch?v=bHkhzPVbeaQ)
Lecture on Ludwig Wittgenstein at
Wheaton College: [3] (https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=P28L0AyrimM)

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