IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (C) NO.: 16247 OF 2023
IN THE MATTER OF:
Dr. Narinder Kaur Seera …Petitioner

Versus
Bharati Vidyapeeth …Respondent

Brief Synopsis
Challenging the Impugned Order dated 12.10.2023 passed by respondent on the
representation dated 23.09.2023 denying the gratuity and salary for the period of LWP
without any cogent reason.

S. No. Grounds Judgments

Maintainability Janet Jeyapaul v. S.R.M. University & Ors., (2015) 16
SCC 530 has held that:
“29. Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the facts
of the case in hand, we are of the considered view that
the Division Bench of the High Court erred in holding
that respondent No. 1 is not subjected to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In other words, it should have been held
that respondent No.1 is subjected to the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
30. This we say for the reasons that firstly, respondent
No. 1 is engaged in imparting education in higher studies
to students at large. Secondly, it is discharging "public
function" by way of imparting education. Thirdly, it is
notified as a "Deemed University" by the Central
Government under Section 3 of the UGC Act. Fourthly,
being a “Deemed University”, all the provisions of the
UGC Act are made applicable to respondent No. 1, which
inter alia provides for effective discharge of the public
function - namely education for the benefit of public.
Fifthly, once respondent No. 1 is declared as “Deemed
University" whose all functions and activities are
governed by the UGC Act, alike other universities then it
is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution. Lastly, once it is held to be an "authority"
as provided in Article 12 then as a necessary
consequence, it becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction of
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

Hence, the Respondent is an authority under Article 12 of

 the Constitution and amenable to writ jurisdiction of this
Hon’ble Court.
Alternate Relief Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf
Bhai Chawla and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1653 it
was held:
“215. Now, we may resume our discussion of the facts in
greater focus. We notice that the High Court has
interfered under Article 226. In keeping with what is laid
down in the judgment we have referred to, perhaps it
could be said that the High Court would have been better
advised to relegate the parties to the Tribunal. There are
however, certain aspects to it. Firstly, we may notice that
this is not a case where the challenge was laid only to the
lists or the survey. Rather we have noticed that the
challenge was laid to the very incorporation of the Board
and its constitution. A challenge was also laid to the
proceedings of the Charity Commissioner. These
decisions which were impugned could not have been
adjudicated by the Tribunal under Section 6 of the Act.
The second aspect which we cannot ignore is that as
held by this Court, Article 226 confers a jurisdiction or
a power on the High Courts. It is a power under the
Constitution. While it may be true that a statute may
provide for an alternate forum to which the High Court
may relegate the party in an appropriate case, the
existence of an alternate remedy by itself cannot
exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under the
Constitution. No doubt, it has been a self-imposed
restraint which is fairly faithfully adhered to by the
High Courts and it is largely a matter of discretion. We
find that there are dicta which has held that on the basis
of an alternate remedy, a writ petition is not
maintainable. We would understand that the position to
be that a constitutional remedy cannot be barred or
excluded as when the High Court exercises its power
under Article 226, it cannot be a case of lack of
inherent jurisdiction. No doubt, when High Courts stray
outside the limits with reference to certain principles as
have been laid down in the decision which we have
referred to, it can be corrected. Another factor which is
to be borne in mind is that in a case where the High
Court has entertained a matter and the matter comes for
hearing in this Court in the jurisdiction under Article
136, our woes are compounded by the long passage of
time as is demonstrated by the facts of this case. The
judgment of the
 High Court was rendered in the year 2011. This
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8
SCC 1 has held that:
“14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article
226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not
limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This
power can be exercised by the High Court not only for
issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained
in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other
purpose”.
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High
Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a
discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition.
But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain
restrictions one of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would
not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative
remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to
operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely,
where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement
of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has
been a violation of the principle of natural justice or
where the order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
(emphasis supplied)

Hence, availability of alternate ground of relief is no bar

to the Writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court as principle
of natural justice has not been followed in present case by
the respondent.
Contract of “Jyotirmay Ray v. The Field General Manager,
Service/Statutory Punjab National Bank & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2023
Duty INSC 979) it was held that:
“16. Further if we look at Section 4 of the Gratuity Act, it
elucidates the conditions pf payment of gratuity to an
employee on termination of his services.
17. the provisions of Gratuity Act make it clear that
forfeiture of gratuity may be directed to the extent of
damage or loss so caused or destruction of property
belonging to employer. In twin situations where the
termination is due to riotous or disorderly conduct or
involvement of the employee in a criminal case involving
moral turpitude, the gratuity shall be wholly forfeited.”
 Hence, statutory duty is cast upon the employer to pay
gratuity to an employee. It is not governed by contract of
service. Gratuity cannot be denied without reason as
provided u/s 4 of the Gratuity Act.
Leave Without Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C.
Pay Salary Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SCC 689 has held that:
“34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence
of statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”.
In appropriate cases, however, may, nay must, take into
account all the facts in their entirety and pass an
appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a
given case, may hold that the person was willing to work
but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so.
The Court may in the circumstances, direct the authority
to grant him all benefits considering “as if he had
worked”. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an
absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment
of consequential benefits can be granted by a court of law
and if such directions are issued by a court, the authority
can ignore them even if they had finally confirmed by the
Apex Court of the country. The bald contention of the
appellant board, therefore, has no substance and must be
rejected.
Shobha Ram Raturi v. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran
Nigam Limited, (2016) 16 SCC 663 it was held that:
“4. where an employer has restrained the employee from
working, the employer cannot plead ‘no work no pay’.”
ON MERITS a. The offer of appointment issued to petitioner and
offer of appointment kept by respondent are
different. Annexure-P-1 @ Page-30 received by
petitioner only with reply to notice dated
29.09.2021. shows illegal conduct of the
respondent.
b. There is no document on record filed by
respondent to show that the petitioner has denied
doing the assigned work.
c. No notice served before sending the petitioner on
leave without pay.
d. Petitioner approached the respondent for work but
was not allotted any work WhatsApp message
dated 31.07.2020. (Annexure-P-3 @ Page-39) &
Annexure-P-4 @ Page-42.
e. Mr. M.N. Hoda was part of the committee
deciding the representation filed by petitioner
despite grievance raised against him (Bias in
passing the impugned order).
 The impugned Order dated 12.10.2023 is in violation of
principle of natural justice as no cogent reason has been
provided by respondent for withholding the gratuity and
sending the petitioner on leave without pay.

Hence, the impugned Order dated 12.10.2023 is liable to be set-aside and respondent
are liable to pay the gratuity and salary for the period of LWP i.e.,01.07.2020 to
31.12.2020.