PPUE BOOK

Compact Textbooks in Mathematics
Sherif El-Helaly
The
Mathematics
of Voting and
Apportionment
An Introduction
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11225
Sherif El-Helaly
The Mathematics
of Voting and
Apportionment
An Introduction
Sherif El-Helaly
Department of Mathematics
The Catholic University of America
Washington, DC, USA
ISSN 2296-4568 ISSN 2296-455X (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-030-14767-9 ISBN 978-3-030-14768-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019935503
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91-01, 91B12, 91F10
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

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registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To my wife Afaf;
my late mother, Safeyya; and my late father,
Taha
vii
Preface
Until recently, the mathematical content of the social sciences undergraduate

curriculum was mostly limited to computations and routine manipulation
of symbols. The undergraduate social sciences student was left with little
or no exposure to the more sophisticated and elegant conceptual side of
mathematics that involves the logical deduction of results from axioms and
hypotheses. In the 1990s, mathematical applications involving deductive
reasoning started to find their way into the social sciences undergraduate
curriculum. The main topics introduced included social choice, yes-no
voting, apportionment, game theory, and fair division. Most of the textbooks
that covered this new material targeted the freshman and sophomore levels,
while junior and senior students received the attention of only a few authors.
Audience Based on two decades of teaching the above-mentioned topics at
the Catholic University of America, I wrote this book to serve the upper-level
audience as follows:
1. The book can be used as a textbook for a rigorous one-semester
course in the mathematics of voting and apportionment for upper-level
undergraduate and beginning graduate students majoring in economics,
political science, and philosophy.
2. It can be used for self-study, especially by graduate students in eco-
nomics and political science who need a straightforward and self-
contained introduction to the topics therein before they get started on
their dissertations.
3. It can also be used in an elective course for mathematics majors in the
applications of mathematics in the social sciences.
4. The book is also a suitable read for any curious mathematician who
wishes to get acquainted with these unpublicized applications of
mathematics.
Developed by economists and political scientists with contributions by

mathematicians, the theories of voting and apportionment (social choice and
social welfare theory in particular) are genuine branches of advanced mathe-
matics. For example, Arrow’s theorem on dictatorships (considered by many
to be the cornerstone of social welfare theory) and the subsequent theorem
by Gibbard on oligarchies are deep and original mathematical results whose
only prerequisite is an elementary knowledge of the mathematical concept
of “ranking” (or “order relation”) which I introduce in Chap. 1 along with
complete and detailed proofs of these two theorems.
Prerequisites No political science prerequisites are needed to use this
book. The mathematical prerequisites are minimal, and they do not include
elementary algebra, calculus, statistics, or geometry. There is no need for
viii Preface
computer skills; a simple calculator that can perform the basic arithmetical
operations and compute square roots and includes a memory function will
suffice.
The only mathematical requirement (included in the book in order to
make it self-contained) is some acquaintance with elementary concepts in
combinatorics, graph theory, and order relations, in addition to the geometric
and harmonic means. A more important requirement is the level of maturity
that enables the student to think logically, derive results from axioms and
hypotheses, and intuitively grasp logical notions such as “contrapositive”
and “counterexample.” This level of maturity can be expected of junior and
senior undergraduate students in economics, political sciences, philosophy,
and mathematics.
Book Contents The book consists of three mutually independent chapters
which can be covered in any of the six possible orders, with one caveat: An
instructor who wishes to start with Chap. 1 should cover Sect. 2.3 (on
combinatorics) before starting Sects. 1.5 (on social welfare functions) and
1.7 (on the manipulation of social choice functions). I included a detailed
Table of Contents that should give the reader a good idea about the topics
covered in each chapter. The following are some highlights:
Chapter 1, on social choice, starts with a discussion of the short-
comings of the widely used plurality procedure of elections in Sect. 1.1.
Elimination procedures are introduced in Sect. 1.2 as attempts to avert the
shortcomings of the plurality procedure. The Condorcet tournament (com-
monly known as the round-robin tournament) with its graph representation
and related concepts are introduced in Sect. 1.3; and special attention is
given to the Condorcet paradox and how it can be used in a parliamentary
procedure to manipulate the voting outcome by creating a killer amendment
(aka poison pill amendment). I end Sect. 3 with the mathematically elegant
but often overlooked theorem proved in 1953 by David McGarvey. This
theorem is useful in the construction of examples and counterexamples as
it guarantees the existence of a scenario of voting that can be represented
by any given complete directed graph. In Sect. 1.4, the vulnerability of
Borda count to the influence of irrelevant alternatives and its frequent failure
to elect an existing Condorcet winner are demonstrated. It is interesting
that bringing an elimination principle to the Borda count (similar to that of
Hare’s procedure) results in a procedure that satisfies the Condorcet winner
criterion (the Hare-Borda procedure). Section 1.5 is a brief introduction
to social welfare theory, including the theorems of Duncan Black, Kenneth
May, Kenneth Arrow, and Allen Gibbard. In Sect. 1.6, I provide natural
generalizations of some standard social choice procedures and Condorcet’s
concepts to the case where indifference in the voter’s rankings and ties are
allowed. The focus in Sect. 1.7 is on the manipulability of social choice
functions that satisfy the conditions of anonymity and neutrality and allow
indifference and ties. I also present the 1976 theorem of Peter Gärdenfors
ix
Preface
on the manipulability of social choice functions that satisfy the Condorcet

winner criterion, in addition to the aforementioned conditions.
Chapter 2, on yes-no voting, starts with an elementary view of the
Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices of power in Sects. 2.1 and 2.2,
including a comparison between the concepts and the computations of the
two indices. Section 2.3 includes the combinatorics needed to understand
the self-checking method of computing both indices in the same setting in
Sect. 2.4. The focus in Sect. 2.5 is on the question of when a given yes-
no voting system can be represented by weights and a quota. The theorem of
Taylor and Zwicker is partially proven, and their novel example of the magic
square voting system is presented.
Chapter 3, on apportionment, starts with two introductory sec-
tions that demonstrate the complexity of the apportionment problem. In
Sect. 3.3, I present quota procedures with a focus on the procedures of
Hamilton and Lowndes, the Alabama paradox, the population paradox, and
the Balinski-Young theorem. Divisor procedures are then discussed in detail
in Sect. 3.4, together with the process of using the threshold divisors to
find the interval of proper divisors for each of the procedures of Jefferson,
Adams, Webster, and Hill-Huntington. The equity criteria and the measures
of inequity associated with the procedures of Webster and Hill-Huntington
are discussed in Sect. 3.5. Motivated by a different measure of inequity,
Dean’s procedure and the associated harmonic mean are introduced, and
then the biases of the different divisor procedures are heuristically discussed.
Section 3.6 compares the quota procedures and the divisor procedures with
regard to the apportionment paradoxes. Section 3.7 is devoted to the quota-
divisor procedures introduced by Balinski and Young, which reconcile house
monotonicity with the quota rule.
Pedagogy The pedagogical approach can be highlighted in the following
points:
1. Each chapter begins with an elementary introduction and several
examples, gradually leading to the more advanced material. (This is
particularly useful to readers with no earlier exposure to the material at
the freshman level.)
2. New concepts and definitions are motivated by examples before being
formally defined.
3. The topics treated in this book are plagued by highly complicated and
nonstandard notations. To help overcome this problem, I tried to make
notations as simple and intuitive as possible, and, in some cases, I opted
to use words (instead of subscripts and superscripts) in order to keep
symbols simple and uncluttered. I also avoided using acronyms and
abbreviations to denote mathematical objects and concepts. (The use
of the standard acronym IIA instead of “Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives” is one of the few exceptions.)
x Preface
4. Landmark theorems are presented in this book, with fully detailed,

rigorous, and streamlined proofs. Complex proofs, such as those of
Arrow’s theorems, Gibbard’s theorem, and Gärdenfors’ theorem, are
broken down into propositions and lemmas in order to make them easier
to grasp.
5. Definitions of the form: “A scenario of voting for a set V of voters and
a set A of alternatives is a member the set RV where R is the set of
all order relations on A” and “A social welfare function is a function
λ : RV → R” would be too alien to most of the audience of this
book. Nevertheless, it is possible to convey the exact meanings of such
definitions, in a workable manner that can be used in rigorous proofs, in
a more lucid and less formal manner; this is what I opted to do.
6. Computations are kept as simple as possible in order to help the student
focus on the concepts.
7. Each chapter ends with a set of exercises that vary from routine exercises
(to help the student master concepts and techniques) to exercises in which
the student is asked to prove or disprove a given statement.
8. Answers to most exercises are given at the end of the book.
Washington, DC, USA Sherif El-Helaly

xi
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my gratitude to:

• Christopher Tominich at Birkhäuser for his guidance throughout the
preparation of the manuscript
• The anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for their valuable feedback
• My students at the Catholic University of America over the past two
decades whose questions and comments have contributed to the devel-
opment of this book
I am also grateful to my wife Afaf for her patience and support.

xiii
Contents
1 Social Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sherif El-Helaly
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Plurality vs Majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 The Plurality Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.3 The 2000 US Presidential Election and the Shortcomings of the
Plurality Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Elimination Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Plurality with Run-Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 The Hare Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.3 The Coombs Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.4 Monotonicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.5 Dealing with Non-monotonicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3 Condorcet Ideas and Related Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.1 The Condorcet Tournament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.2 Condorcet Winner and Condorcet Loser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3.3 Condorcet Winner vs Majority Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3.4 The Condorcet Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3.5 Agenda Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3.6 Weak Pareto Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.3.7 Killer Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3.8 The Copeland Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.3.9 Monotonicity Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.3.10 McGarvey’s Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4 Scoring Procedures: Borda Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.4.1 Borda Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.4.2 Shortcomings of the Borda Count Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.4.3 More on Borda Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.4.4 Hare-Scoring Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.4.5 Borda Meets Condorcet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.5 A Glimpse Into Social Welfare Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.5.1 Rankings and Semi Rankings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.5.2 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.5.3 Transitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.5.4 Black’s Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.5.5 May’s Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1.5.6 Dictatorship and Arrow’s Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.5.7 Oligarchy and Gibbard’s Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1.6 Social Choice Procedures: Indifference and Ties Allowed . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1.6.1 Standard Social Choice Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1.6.2 More Condorcet-Type Classifications of the Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
xiv Contents
1.6.3 The Social Choice Set of the Hare–Borda Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

1.7 Manipulability of Social Choice Procedures: Indifference and
Ties Allowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
1.7.1 Comparing Sets of Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
1.7.2 Anonymity and Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
1.7.3 Gärdenfors’ Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
1.7.4 Manipulability of Social Choice Functions Not Covered by
Gärdenfors’ Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2 Yes-No Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Sherif El-Helaly
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.1.1 The Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2.1.2 The +/− Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
2.1.3 Parity of Banzhaf Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.2 Quantification of Power in a Yes-No Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
2.2.1 The Banzhaf Index of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
2.2.2 The Felsenthal–Machover Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
2.2.3 The Shapley–Shubik Index of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
2.2.4 Banzhaf vs Shapley–Shubik Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
2.3 Some Combinatorics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.3.1 Permutations and Combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.3.2 Cartesian Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
2.4 Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik Indices in One View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
2.4.1 Computing the Shapley–Shubik Indices from Winning Coalitions . . . . . 138
2.4.2 Veto-Powered Voters, Dominant Voters and Dictators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
2.5 Weightable Yes-No Voting Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
2.5.1 Trades Among Coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
2.5.2 Trade-Robustness and the Taylor–Zwicker Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
2.5.3 The Magic Square Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3 Apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Sherif El-Helaly
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.2 Axioms of Apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.3 Quota Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.3.1 Hamilton’s Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.3.2 Lowndes’ Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
3.3.3 The Alabama Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.3.4 The Population Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
3.3.5 The Balinski-Young Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
3.4 Divisor Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
3.4.1 The General Framework of Divisor Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
xv
Contents
3.4.2 Jefferson’s Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

3.4.3 Adams’ Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
3.4.4 Webster’s Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
3.4.5 The Hill–Huntington Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
3.5 Equity Criteria of Divisor Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
3.5.1 Measures of Inequity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
3.5.2 Postulates of a Measure of Inequity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
3.5.3 Webster’s Procedure and the δ-Inequity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
3.5.4 The Hill–Huntington Procedure and the ρ-Inequity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
3.5.5 The ϕ-Inequity Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
3.5.6 The Harmonic Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
3.5.7 Dean’s Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
3.5.8 A Collective View of Divisor Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
3.5.9 The Threshold Divisors of Dean’s Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
3.6 Apportionment Paradoxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
3.6.1 Monotonicity and the Divisor Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
3.6.2 Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
3.7 Applications of Priority Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
3.7.1 One-By-One Seat Apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
3.7.2 The Quota-Divisor Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Answers to Selected Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
1 1
Social Choice
Sherif El-Helaly

Sherif El-Helaly, The Mathematics of Voting and Apportionment,
Compact Textbooks in Mathematics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6_1
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study situations in which a society needs to choose from two or more
alternatives available. Different members of the society may have different choices; and
the problem is how to aggregate the different choices of all members of the society
to make a choice for the entire society. The choice of the society will be called the
social choice set (or the social choice) and may consist of one alternative or more. An
alternative will be called a winner if it is a member of the social choice set; and will be
called a loser if it is not. When the social choice set consists of more than one alternative,
we shall say that its members are tied winners. The case of a social choice set consisting
of more then one alternative will be mostly avoided in the first four sections of this
chapter. The procedure used to produce the social choice set will be called a social
choice procedure or a social choice function.
A Note on the Use of the Terms “Function” and “Procedure” Many authors use the
term “function” only when the alternatives and the voters are specified. This is to stay
close to the standard mathematical concept of a function that specifies the domain in
addition to the rule (or the “procedure”) that describes the “action” of the function. We
find it more convenient to use the two terms interchangeably.
The most important instance of a social choice situation is when the voters in a
society need to elect a candidate for political office. Another example is that of a hiring
committee in a company or a university trying to pick one out of several applicants for a
vacant position. If necessary, a tie may be broken by some rule to be agreed upon before
voting starts.
Each of the social choice procedures in Sects. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 (except Sects. 1.3.5
and 1.3.7), 1.4, 1.6, and 1.7 is
1. anonymous, i.e., treats all voters equally.
2. neutral, i.e., treats all alternatives equally.
Precise definitions of these two concepts will be given in Sect. 1.7.

2 Chapter 1 • Social Choice
1
1.1.1 Plurality vs Majority
To motivate the discussion, assume that a hiring committee of 19 voters is trying to pick
one of the three candidates a, b, and c to fill a position in a certain company. Consider
the following two possible scenarios:
Scenario 1: a receives 9 votes, b receives 7 votes, and c receives 3 votes.
Scenario 2: a receives 10 votes, b receives 6 votes, and c receives 3 votes.
The above two scenarios do not look very different but, in fact, they are:
• In both scenarios a has more votes than each individual opponent.
• In Scenario 2, a goes one big step farther: He has more votes than all his opponents
combined. Of course, this means that a has more than half of the total vote. This
difference between the above two scenarios is of great importance, as we shall see.
Definition 1.1.1
Suppose the entire set of voters is partitioned into subsets A1 , A2 , · · · , An such that
each voter is included in one, and only one, of these subsets.
1. A subset Ai is said to be a plurality of the vote if the number of voters in Ai is
greater than or equal to the number of voters in each Aj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n. A
candidate who is voted for by a plurality set of voters is said to be a plurality
candidate.

2. A subset Ai is said to be a majority of the vote if any of the following two
equivalent conditions holds:
The number of voters in Ai is greater than half of the total vote.

The number of voters in Ai is greater than the total number of voters in all of
the other subsets.
A candidate who is voted for by a majority set of voters is said to be a majority

candidate.

In Scenario 1 above, a is a plurality candidate but not a majority candidate. In

Scenario 2, a is both a plurality candidate and a majority candidate. (In general, a
majority candidate is necessarily a plurality candidate but a plurality candidate need
not be a majority candidate.) Note that in every social choice problem:
• There is at least one plurality candidate.
• There is at most one majority candidate. (It is possible to have no majority candidate,
as in Scenario 1 above.)
• If there are only two candidates and the number of voters is odd, then one of the two
candidates must be a majority candidate.
1.1 · Introduction
3 1
Example 1.1.2
Identify the plurality candidates and the majority candidates in the following examples:
1. a has 29 votes, b has 26 votes, c has 9 votes, and d has 7 votes.
3. a has 17 votes, b has 17 votes, c has 14 votes, d has 12 votes, and e has 5 votes.
Solution
1. a is a plurality candidate. The total number of voters is 29 + 26 + 9 + 7 = 71. Since
2 = 35.5, one needs at least 36 votes to qualify as a majority candidate. Therefore, there
71
is no majority candidate.

2 = 22, one needs at least 23 votes to qualify as a majority candidate. Therefore, there
44

3. a and b are plurality candidates. The total number of voters is 17+17+14+12+5 = 65.
Since 652 = 32.5, one needs at least 33 votes to qualify as a majority candidate. Therefore,
there is no majority candidate.

2 = 24.5, one needs at least 25 votes to qualify as a majority candidate. Therefore, a is,
49
in fact, a majority candidate.

1.1.2 The Plurality Procedure

Definition 1.1.3
The social choice procedure which declares the plurality candidate (or candidates)
as winner(s) is called the plurality procedure.

Why can’t we replace the word “plurality” with the word “majority” in the above
definition to define what we might call “the majority procedure?” The reason, which can
be seen from the examples in Example 1.1.2 above, is that a majority candidate is not
guaranteed to exist in every case.
The plurality procedure has long been challenged by many political scientists. The
trouble lies in electing a plurality candidate a who is not a majority candidate. In fact,
• The number of voters who did not vote for a is greater than the number of voters
who voted for a.
• The victory of a depends, in part, on the way the rest of the vote was distributed
among her opponents, which has nothing to do with the merits of a or the strength of
her support among voters.
1
• As we shall see in Sect. 1.3, the plurality procedure can pick a winner who happens
to be the weakest candidate, in some “very reasonable” sense.
In the first of the Examples 1.1.2, candidate a is the plurality procedure winner without
having a majority of the total vote. Candidates c and d in this example could be regarded
as minor candidates with no realistic chance of winning. Had these two candidates not
been in the race, their combined vote of 9 + 7 = 16 votes would have been up for grabs
by the two main candidates, namely a and b. In one possible scenario, 10 or more of the
16 votes of c and d could have gone to b and 6 or less would have gone to a. This way, a
would have ended up with 35 or less votes and b would have ended up with 36 or more
votes and won the election.
Assume that, in this example, a is a left of center candidate, b is a right of center
candidate while c and d are to the right of b. It can be argued that had c and d not been in
the race, b would have picked up enough of their vote to win the election. The following
is a real-life example.
1.1.3 The 2000 US Presidential Election and the Shortcomings

of the Plurality Procedure
In the 2000 presidential election, the Florida results were delayed due to a dispute
between the two main contenders, George W. Bush and Al Gore, caused by a razor thin
vote margin. Based on the election returns from all states and the District Of Columbia
(with the exception of the delayed Florida returns), no candidate was able to secure the
270 electoral votes needed to win, and it was up to Florida with its 25 electoral votes
to decide who would be the next occupant of the White House. In Florida, as in the
vast majority of the states, the plurality procedure is used to pick one winner, who takes
all the electoral votes of the state. That said, the new president was, for all practical
purposes, being elected by the Florida voters using the plurality procedure; and the
complicating factor of the Electoral College was neutralized.
After a lengthy process of counting and recounting (and intervention by the Supreme
Court), the final Florida election returns were as shown in the following table. George
W. Bush won Florida with a plurality (but not a majority) of the vote and the difference
between Bush and his nearest opponent, Al Gore, was only 537 votes. The rest of the
candidates combined received 138,067 votes, enough to change the election outcome
had those minor candidates (or some of them) been out of the race.
1.1 · Introduction
5 1
Candidate Total vote % Party

George W. Bush (W) 2,912,790 48.847 Republican
Al Gore 2,912,253 48.838 Democratic
Ralph Nader 97,488 1.635 Green
Patrick J. Buchanan 17,484 0.293 Reform
Harry Browne 16,415 0.275 Libertarian
John Hagelin 2281 0.038 Natural law/reform
Howard Phillips 1371 0.023 Constitution
Other 3028 0.051
Total 5,963,110 100
The two main candidates who had realistic chances of winning the Florida vote were,
of course, George W. Bush (R) and Al Gore (D). Nader’s vote came, in the most part,
from Democratic voters while the rest of the vote received by the minor candidates came
from conservative Republican voters. Had the election been between George W. Bush
and Al Gore only, and assuming that Al Gore received only 71.1% of Nader’s votes
while the rest of Nader’s votes combined with the votes of the other minor candidates
went to George W. Bush, Al Gore would have won the 25 electoral votes of Florida and
the presidency of the United States.
Some Computations Half of the total vote is 2,981,555 and therefore, had the election
been between George W. Bush and Al Gore only, the number of votes needed to win
would have been 2,981,556. To reach this number, Al Gore would have needed
2, 981, 556 − 2, 912, 253 = 69, 303
more votes to win Florida. It would have been easy for Al Gore to get this number of
votes which is only 71.1% of Nader’s supporters who numbered 97,488. (It is assumed
in these computations that, in the absence of all minor candidates, all of the 5,963,110
voters would still cast their votes.)
In cases where the plurality procedure winner is also a majority candidate, we have a
very stable outcome that does not depend on the distribution of the opposing vote among
the opponents, nor does it depend on who might have dropped out of the race or stayed
in it.
For over two centuries, political scientists have been proposing ideas to reform
the plurality procedure (and some offered entirely new approaches) to avoid the
shortcomings of the plurality procedure discussed above. However, due to its simplicity,
the plurality procedure has persisted and continued to be by far the most widely used
election procedure in the United States.
The plurality procedure is also believed to be one of the main reasons behind the
perpetuation of the two-party system in the United States, as it discourages voters from
voting for minor (third party) candidates. In the 2000 presidential election, for example,
many voters who voted for Al Gore would have voted for Ralph Nader but voted for
Al Gore instead because they knew that Nader had no realistic chance of winning. The
wise thing to do, in their opinion, was to vote for their second choice, Al Gore, in
1
order to prevent their most undesirable candidate, George W. Bush, from winning. A
similar strategy was followed by many conservative republican voters who voted for
their second choice (George W. Bush) instead of their first choice (Patrick Buchanan).
Another vivid example of this phenomenon was in the presidential election of 1992 in
which the two main candidates were Bill Clinton (D) and George H. W. Bush (R) with
Ross Perot as a third party candidate, but the analysis is more complicated because of
the electoral college.
1.2 Elimination Procedures
Next, we study some of the attempts to reform the plurality procedure (commonly
known as elimination procedures). These reforms are based on one central idea: If a
majority candidate exists, she is declared the sole winner. If not, we eliminate one (or
more) of the weaker candidate(s) and take a second vote. (Elimination procedures differ
in the way they define the term “weaker candidates”.) If a “majority” candidate emerges
as a result of the second vote, he is the sole winner. If not, we eliminate one (or more)
of the weaker candidate(s) and take a third vote. The process is continued until one of
the following two mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities materializes:
1. A “majority” candidate emerges. This candidate is declared the sole winner.
2. The rule of elimination of weaker candidate(s) equally applies to all of the remaining
candidates. In this case, we declare all of the remaining candidates as tied winners.
The reason for enclosing the word “majority” above between quotation marks is that
the candidate who emerges with a majority after the second (or later) vote is not a true
majority candidate. A true majority candidate is a candidate who has a majority as a
result of the first vote, without any elimination. We shall, however, drop those quotation
marks from now on.
The idea behind the elimination procedures is that elimination helps concentrate the
vote in fewer hands, thus helping a majority to emerge.
Next, we present three of the better known elimination procedure: Plurality with
run-off, Hare’s procedure and Coombs’ procedure. A general illustration of elimination
procedures is given in ⊡ Fig. 1.1 below.
Winner(s) Yes
Data End
Found?
Eliminate No
Weaker
Candidate(s)
⊡ Fig. 1.1 Elimination procedures

1.2 · Elimination Procedures
7 1
1.2.1 Plurality with Run-Off
Definition 1.2.1
The plurality with run-off procedure:
Step 1. Look for a majority candidate. If one exists, declare her the winner. If not,
go to Step 2.
Step 2. Two candidates with the highest vote counts compete in a second run-off
round of voting. (The rest of the candidates are eliminated.) In the run-off
round, one of those two candidates wins by a majority of the vote or they
are tied.

A technical difficulty may arise and will be addressed in the third of the following
examples.
Example 1.2.2
Assuming that the plurality with run-off procedure is used, which two candidates qualify for
the run-off round, if needed, in the following examples?
Solution
1. No majority candidate exists. a and b qualify for the run-off round.

2. No majority candidate exists. a and b qualify for the run-off round.

3. No majority candidate exists. a qualifies for the run-off round, joined with one of b and
c. The tie between b and c is to be broken by some process (to be agreed upon before
the voting begins) to determine which of b and c should join a in the run-off round.
Difficulties of this kind are extremely unlikely in mass elections such as city-wide or
state-wide elections, but they are not so rare in small committees.

4. There is no run-off round in this case. a is a majority candidate and is declared an
“immediate” winner.

Instant Run-Off In the case of no majority candidate, the voters are invited to come
back after a reasonable period of time (usually 2 or 3 weeks) for the run-off round of
voting. This is how the plurality with run-off procedure is usually carried out. The whole
process can be completed in just one trip to the polling stations if the instant run-off idea
is implemented. In this trip, each voter is asked to fill out a preference ballot (a complete
preference list) showing a first choice, second choice, third choice, etc. If no majority
candidate exists, two candidates with the highest first choice votes are kept and all others
are eliminated from the preference ballots.
1
Note that
1. When preference ballots are used, the term “majority candidate” refers to a candidate
who is the first choice of a majority of voters. Preference ballots will be used in the
rest of this chapter.
2. In Sects. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, indifference will not be allowed in the preference
ballots, that is, given two alternatives x and y, a voter must either prefer x to y or y
to x but cannot be indifferent. Indifference will be allowed in Sects. 1.6 and 1.7.
The following example makes the instant run-off procedure very clear.
Example 1.2.3
Fifty three voters are to choose from the set of five candidates a, b, c, d and e. Identical
preference ballots are grouped together and the number of voters in each group is indicated
on the top. Process the ballots using
1. The plurality procedure.
2. The plurality with run-off procedure.
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
a a b b c c d e
e d c d b d c a
d e e c d e b d
c c d e e a a c
b b a a a b e b
(This may be considered the same as the first of Example 1.2.2 after the voters have been
instructed to submit complete preference ballots instead of “single pick” ballots.)
Solution
1. a is the first choice of 10 + 7 = 17 voters, b is the first choice of 8 + 6 = 14 voters, c
is the first choice of 6 + 5 = 11 voters, d is the first choice of 7 voters, and e is the first
choice of 4 voters. Candidate a is the sole plurality procedure winner.

2. Since 53 2 = 26.5, one needs at least 27 first choice votes to qualify as a majority
candidate. There is no majority candidate; and a, b qualify for the run-off round.
Eliminating c, d, and e and updating the ballots we get:
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
a a b b b a b a
b b a a a b a b
Now b has 8 + 6 + 6 + 7 = 27 votes (a majority) and wins the plurality with run-off
procedure.

9 1
Example 1.2.4
Twenty five voters are to choose from the set of four candidates a, b, c, and d. The grouped
ballots are given below. Process the ballots using
8 6 4 2 5
a a b b c
c b c d d
b d a a a
d c d c b
Solution
1. a is the first choice of 14 voters, b is the first choice of 6 voters, c is the first choice of
5 voters, and d is the first choice of 0 voters. Candidate a is the sole plurality procedure
winner.

2. Since 252 = 12.5, one needs at least 13 first choice votes to qualify as a majority
candidate; therefore a is a majority candidate. Candidate a wins the plurality with run-
off. No run-off round in this case.

1.2.2 The Hare Procedure
Introduced in 1861 by Thomas Hare (a British law scholar), this procedure is a

refinement of the instant run-off procedure. The version presented here is intended for
electing a single winner. A multiple-winner version of it is used in The Republic of
Ireland, Australia and in some local jurisdictions in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
Definition 1.2.5
Hare Procedure:
Step 1. If a majority candidate exists, he is the sole winner. If all candidates have
equal numbers of top choice votes, they are all tied for winning. If neither
of these two events occurs, go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate the candidate(s) with the lowest first choice vote, update the
ballots and go back to Step 1.

Example 1.2.6
Process the data in Example 1.2.3 using the Hare procedure.
1
Solution The 53 preference ballots are:
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
a a b b c c d e
e d c d b d c a
d e e c d e b d
c c d e e a a c
b b a a a b e b
Step 1. Since 532 = 26.5, a candidate needs at least 27 first choice votes to qualify as a
majority candidate. a is the first choice of 10 + 7 = 17 voters, b is the first choice
of 8 + 6 = 14 voters, c is the first choice of 6 + 5 = 11 voters, d is the first choice
of 7 voters, and e is the first choice of 4 voters. We must go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate e since he has the lowest first choice vote. Here are the updated preference
ballots:
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
a a b b c c d a
d d c d b d c d
c c d c d a b c
b b a a a b a b
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. a is the first choice of 10 + 7 + 4 = 21 voters, b is the first choice of 8 + 6 = 14
voters, c is the first choice of 6 + 5 = 11 voters, and d is the first choice of 7 voters.
We must go to step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate d since he has the lowest first choice vote. Here are the updated
preference ballots:
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
a a b b c c c a
c c c c b a b c
b b a a a b a b
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. a is the first choice of 10 + 7 + 4 = 21 voters, b is the first choice of 8 + 6 = 14
voters, and c is the first choice of 6 + 5 + 7 = 18 voters. We must go to step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate b since he has the lowest first choice vote. Here are the updated preference
ballots:
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
a a c c c c c a
c c a a a a a c
11 1
Step 1. a is the first choice of 10 + 7 + 4 = 21 voters and c is the first choice of 8 + 6 +
6 + 5 + 7 = 32 voters. Now c emerges with a majority and qualifies as the Hare
procedure sole winner.

Example 1.2.7
Process the following data for 24 voters and 4 candidates using the Hare procedure.
7 5 5 3 4
a a b b c
c b c d d
b d a a b
d c d c a
Solution
Step 1. Since 24 2 = 12, one needs at least 13 first choice votes to qualify as a majority
candidate. a is the first choice of 12 voters, b is the first choice of 8 voters, c is the
first choice of 4 voters, and d is the first choice of zero voters. We must go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate d. Here are the updates ballots.
7 5 5 3 4
a a b b c
c b c a b
b c a c a
Step 1. a is the first choice of 12 voters, b is the first choice of 8 voters, and c is the first
choice of 4 voters. We must go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate c. Here are the updated ballots.
7 5 5 3 4
a a b b b
b b a a a
Step 1. Each of a and b is the first choice of 12 voters. We have two tied winners: a
and b.

1.2.3 The Coombs Procedure
This procedure was introduced by Clyde Coombs (a twentieth century American scholar
in the field of mathematical psychology). It is based on a principle similar to that of
Hare’s procedure, as we shall soon see.
1
Definition 1.2.8
Coombs Procedure:
Step 1. If a majority candidate exists, she is the sole winner. If no majority
candidate exists and all candidates have equal numbers of last choice vote,
all candidates are tied for winning. If neither of these two events occurs,
we go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate the candidate(s) with the highest last choice vote, update the
ballots and go back to Step 1.

Example 1.2.9
Use Coombs’ procedure to process the data in Example 1.2.3.
Solution The 53 preference ballots are:
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
a a b b c c d e
e d c d b d c a
d e e c d e b d
c c d e e a a c
b b a a a b e b
Step 1. 27 first choice votes are necessary to qualify as majority candidate. No majority
candidate exists, as seen in Example 1.2.6. Further, a is the last choice of 8+6+6 =
20 voters, b is the last choice of 10 + 7 + 5 + 4 = 26 voters, c is the last choice
of 0 voters, d is the last choice of 0 voters, and e is the last choice of 7 voters. Last
choice vote is not equally distributed among all candidates. We go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate b since he has the highest number of last choice votes. Here are the
updated preference ballots:
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
a a c d c c d e
e d e c d d c a
d e d e e e a d
c c a a a a e c
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. There is no majority candidate since a is the first choice of 10 + 7 = 17 voters, c is
the first choice of 8 + 6 + 5 = 19 voters, d is the first choice of 6 + 7 = 13 voters,
and e is the first choice of 4 voters. Also, a is the last choice of 8 + 6 + 6 + 5 = 25
voters, c is the last choice of 10 + 7 + 4 = 21 voters, d is the last choice of 0 voters,
and e is the last choice of 7 voters. Last choice vote is not equally distributed among
all candidates, so we go to step 2.
13 1
Step 2. Eliminate a since he has the highest number of last choice votes. Here are the
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
e d c d c c d e
d e e c d d c d
c c d e e e e c
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. There is no majority candidate since c is the first choice of 8 + 6 + 5 = 19 voters, d
is the first choice of 7 + 6 + 7 = 20 voters, and e is the first choice of 10 + 4 = 14
voters. Further, c is the last choice of 10 + 7 + 4 = 21, d is the last choice of 8
voters, and e is the last choice of 6 + 6 + 5 + 7 = 24 voters. Last choice vote is not
equally distributed among all voters. We go to step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate e since he has the highest number of last choice votes. Here are the
10 7 8 6 6 5 7 4
d d c d c c d d
c c d c d d c c
Step 1. c is the first choice of 8 + 6 + 5 = 19 voters and d is the first choice of 10 + 7 +

6 + 7 + 4 = 34 voters. Now d qualifies as majority candidate and is declared the
sole winner of Coombs’ procedure.

Example 1.2.10
Process the following data for 27 voters and 5 candidates using
3. Hare’s procedure.
4. Coombs’ procedure.
8 7 6 5 1
a b c d e
c e d c c
b c b e d
e d e b b
d a a a a
Solution
1. Plurality procedure: a is the first choice of 8 voters, b is the first choice of 7 voters, c is
the first choice of 6 voters, d is the first choice of 5 voters, and e is the first choice of one
1
voter. Candidate a is the plurality procedure winner. Note that a, who won according to
the plurality procedure because he has the highest number of first choice votes, is ranked
as last choice by a majority of 19 out of the 27 voters! We shall have more to say about
this in Sect. 1.3.

2. Plurality with run-off : Since 27
2 = 13.5, one needs at least 14 first choice votes to qualify
as a majority candidate. There is no majority candidate. The top two candidates are a and
b. Eliminating c, d, and e and updating the ballots we get:
8 7 6 5 1
a b b b b
b a a a a
Now b has 7 + 6 + 5 + 1 = 19 votes (a majority) and wins the plurality with run-off
procedure.

3. Hare:
Step 1. There is no majority candidate. Go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate e since he has the lowest first choice vote. Here are the updated
preference ballots:
8 7 6 5 1
a b c d c
c c d c d
b d b b b
d a a a a
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. a is the first choice of 8 voters, b is the first choice of 7 voters, c is the first
choice of 6 + 1 = 7 voters, and d is the first choice of 5 voters. There is no
majority candidate. We go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate d since he has the lowest first choice votes. Here are the updated
preference ballots:
8 7 6 5 1
a b c c c
c c b b b
b a a a a
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. a is the first choice of 8 voters, b is the first choice of 7 voters, and c is the first
choice of 6 + 5 + 1 = 12 voters. There is no majority candidate. We go to Step
2.
15 1
Step 2. Eliminate b since he has the lowest first choice votes. Here are the updated
preference ballots:
8 7 6 5 1
a c c c c
c a a a a
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. a is the first choice of 8 voters and c is the first choice of 7 + 6 + 5 + 1 = 19
voters. Now c emerges as the sole winner of Hare’s procedure.

4. Coombs:
Step 1. There is no majority candidate. Further, a is the last choice of 19 voters, b is
the last choice of 0 voters, c is the last choice of 0 voters, d is the last choice of
8 voters, and e is the last choice of 0 voters. The last choice vote is not equally
distributed among the voters. We go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate a since she has the highest number of last choice votes. Here are the
8 7 6 5 1
c b c d e
b e d c c
e c b e d
d d e b b
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. b is the first choice of 7 voters, c is the first choice of 14 voters, d is the
first choice of 5 voters, and e is the first choice of one voter. c emerges with
a majority and is declared the sole winner of Coombs’ procedure.

Example 1.2.11
Process the following data for 27 voters and 5 candidate using
1. Hare’s procedure
2. Coombs’ procedure
8 7 6 5 1
a e c d b
b d b b d
d b d c e
c c e a c
e a a e a

1
Solution
1. Hare:
Step 1. a is the first choice of 8 voters, b is the first choice of 1 voter, c is the first choice
of 6 voters, d is the first choice of 5 voters, and e is the first choice of 7 voters.
One needs at least 14 first choice votes to qualify as a majority candidate. There
Step 2. Eliminate b since he has the lowest first choice voter. Here are the updated
ballots:
8 7 6 5 1
a e c d d
d d d c e
c c e a c
e a a e a
Step 1. a is the first choice of 8 voters, c is the first choice of 6 voters, d is the first
choice of 6 voters, and e is the first choice of 7 voters. There is no majority
candidate.
Step 2. Eliminate c and d since they have the lowest first choice vote. Here are the
8 7 6 5 1
a e e a e
e a a e a
Step 1. a is the first choice of 13 voters and e is the first choice of 14 voters. Now e
emerges with a majority and is declared the sole winner of Hare’s procedure.

2. Coombs:
Step 1. There is no majority candidate. Further, a is the last choice of 14 voters, e
is the last choice of 13 voters, while each of b, c, and d is the last choice of
0 voters.
Step 2. Eliminate a since he has the highest number of last choice votes. Here are
the updated preference ballots:
8 7 6 5 1
b e c d b
d d b b d
c b d c e
e c e e c
Step 1. b is the first choice of 9 voters, c is the first choice of 6 voters, d is the first
choice of 5 voters, and e is the first choice of 7 voters. There is no majority
17 1
candidate. Further, c is the last choice of 8 voters, e is the last choice of 19
voters, b is the last choice of 0 voters, and d is the last choice of 0 voters.
We go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate e since he has the highest number of last choice votes. Here are
the updated ballots:
8 7 6 5 1
b d c d b
d b b b d
c c d c c
Step 1. b is the first choice of 9 voters, c is the first choice of 6 voters, and d is the
first choice of 12 voters. No candidate has a majority yet. Further, b is the
last choice of 0 voters, c is the last choice of 21 voters, and d is the last
choice of 6 voters. We go to Step 2.
Step 2. Eliminate c since he has the highest number of last choice votes. Here are
the updated ballots:
8 7 6 5 1
b d b d b
d b d b d
Step 1. b is the first choice of 15 voters and d is the first choice of 12 voters. b is
the sole winner of Coombs’ procedure.

Note 1.2.12 In elimination procedures, it is important to stop the process as soon as a winner
emerges (or winners emerge). If we do not realize that candidate a has already acquired a
majority and should be declared the Coombs procedure winner in the following example,
we will have to eliminate a because he has the largest number of last choice votes; this
would lead to a wrong result. (The point here is that it is possible for a candidate to have,
simultaneously, a majority of the first choice vote and a plurality of the last choice vote. It is
impossible to have a majority of both, of course.)
3 2 2 2
a a b c
c b c b
b c a a
Note that the Hare procedure is not affected by mistakenly continuing the process. Can
you verify this?

Note 1.2.13 All of the four social choice procedures discussed so far are reasonable and
are founded on sensible ideas, yet they may produce different results as you have noticed.
(In Examples 1.2.3, 1.2.6, and 1.2.9 the four procedures delivered four different winners for
the same data.) Do some of these procedures pick the “right” winner and others do not?
1
This question presumes that we already have a correct way of identifying the “right” winner.
If this were the case, then there would be no need for those procedures. The point we are
making here is that social choice (made by several individual voters) is far more complex than
individual choice, and is plagued with anomalies and paradoxes to be studied in this chapter.
In fact, all social choice procedures (including those presented above) are mere imperfect
attempts to capture that elusive concept of “the choice of the society.” We shall study more
social choice procedures in the rest of this chapter, after we take a critical look into the
procedures presented above.

1.2.4 Monotonicity
In general, we say that a process is monotone if an increase in the input makes the
output increase or stay the same. Studying ought to be a monotone process because
studying harder should not lead to a lower grade. A healthy car engine is also monotone
because the car does not slow down when you apply more gas. If your grades drop
when you study harder, then there is something wrong with the way you study. If your
car slows down when you apply more gas, you should take it to the shop because it
is obviously malfunctioning. The following two examples show that the above three
elimination procedures are all non-monotone in the sense that (albeit rarely) improving
your positions in the preference ballots can turn you from a winner into a loser when
those elimination procedures are used.
Example 1.2.14
Twenty one voters are using the Hare procedure to choose from the available three candidates
a, b, and c. Process the following two possible voting scenarios and comment on the results.
8 5 2 6 8 5 2 6 10 5 6
a b b c a b a c a b c
Scenario 1: Scenario 2: =
b c a a b c b a b c a
c a c b c a c b c a b
Solution In Scenario 1, a is the first choice of 8 voters, b is the first choice is 7 voters, and
c is the first choice of 6 voters. To qualify as a majority candidate, one needs at least 11 first
choice votes. Eliminate c. The updated ballots are
8 5 2 6
a b b a
b a a b
and a emerges as the winner.

Before we process Scenario 2, we note that the only difference between the two scenarios
is in the way the two voters in the third column rank a and b. In Scenario 1, b is the first
choice of these two voters and a is their second choice. In Scenario 2, a is the first choice of
these two voters and b is their second choice. This slight difference makes Scenario 2 more
favorable to a than Scenario 1. (Think of the improvement of a’s position in Scenario 2 as
19 1
being the result of working harder on his campaign.) Since a is the winner in Scenario 1, one
would expect a to win in “the more favorable” Scenario 2.
Let us now process Scenario 2: a is the first choice of 10 voters, b is the first choice of 5
voters, and c is the first choice of 6 voters. Since there is no majority candidate, we eliminate
b. The updated ballots are
8 5 2 6
a c a c
c a c a
and c (not the expected a) emerges as the winner. This is certainly quite ironic and
paradoxical. (Think of a car that slows down when the gas pedal is pushed harder!)

Note The plurality with run-off procedure coincides with the Hare procedure in this
example. Therefore, the above comment would still apply had we used the plurality
with run-off procedure instead.
Example 1.2.15
Twenty one voters are using Coombs’ procedure to choose from the available three
candidates a, b, and c. Process the following two possible voting scenarios and comment on
the results.
8 7 2 4 8 7 2 4 8 9 4
a c c b a c c b a c b
b a b c b a a c b a c
c b a a c b b a c b a
Solution In Scenario 1, a is the first choice of 8 voters, b is the first choice is 4 voters, and c
is the first choice of 9 voters. To qualify as a majority voter, one needs at least 11 first choice
votes. a is the last choice of 6 voters, b is the last choice of 7 voters, and c is the last choice
of 8 voters. We eliminate c. The updated ballots are
8 7 2 4
a a b b
b b a a
and a emerges as the winner.

In Scenario 2, a is the first choice of 8 voters, b is the first choice of 4 voters, and c is the
first choice of 9 voters. There is no majority candidate. a is the last choice of 4 voters, b is
the last choice of 9 voters, and c is the last choice of 8 voters. We eliminate b. The updated
ballots are
8 7 2 4
a c c c
c a a a
1
and c emerges as the winner.
The only difference between the two scenarios is in the way the two voters in the third
column rank a and b. In Scenario 1, b is the second choice of these two voters and a is
their third choice. In Scenario 2, a is the second choice of these two voters and b is their
third choice. This slight difference makes Scenario 2 more favorable to a than Scenario
1, yet a loses in Scenario 2 and wins in Scenario 1. This is similar to what happened in
Example 1.2.14.

The paradoxical and flawed behavior exhibited by some of the social choice
procedures in Examples 1.2.14 and 1.2.15 deserves further consideration. In the next
definition we give a special name to the social choice procedures that do not suffer from
this flaw.
Definition 1.2.16
A social choice procedure is said to be monotone if a winner (i.e., a member of the
social choice set) x always maintains his membership in the social choice set when
some voters change their preference ballots in his favor by switching him with a
specific candidate y who was originally placed immediately above x in their
preference ballots, and all else stays the same. If the definition is modified so that
the change is made by only one voter, we say that the social choice procedure is
singly monotone.

Examples 1.2.14 and 1.2.15 show that none of the procedures of plurality with run-
off, Hare and Coombs is monotone. (They are non-monotone.) The student should not
conclude from this that those elimination procedures should be abandoned. In fact, in
most cases, a change of the kind described in the above definition will not turn a winner
into a loser. Further, as we shall see, every social choice procedure has its own flaws.
This will be studied in more detail in the course of the present chapter.
We stated in the beginning of this chapter that the elimination procedures were
introduced as reforms to the plurality procedures. Ironically, the plurality procedure
outperforms the elimination procedures when it comes to monotonicity: The plurality
procedure is, in fact, monotone. (You will be asked to prove this fact in Exercise 14
below.) This irony may be explained if we think of monotonicity as a sign of consistency
and so the plurality procedure is monotone in the sense of being consistent, regardless
of the quality of its choices.
1.2.5 Dealing with Non-monotonicity
A lesson to be learned from the above discussion is that, if you are a candidate for office
in a situation where an elimination procedure is used, you need to make some difficult
calculations. For example, if the Hare procedure is used and you are not sure of receiving
a majority at some round, you need to reconcile the following two events:
1.3 · Condorcet Ideas and Related Procedures
21 1
1. Receiving enough first choice votes to proceed to the next round.
2. Getting rid of “dangerous” opponents who can can beat you even if this requires
conceding some first choice votes to another opponent.
For example, it would be wise for a in Example 1.2.14 to concede to b those two top
choice votes to allow b to proceed to the next round instead of the “dangerous” c, as in
Scenario 1.
We shall revisit this issue in the next section.
1.3 Condorcet Ideas and Related Procedures
Consider the case of only two alternatives x and y. There are exactly two possible
events:
1. One of the two alternatives, say x, receives a majority of the vote.
2. The two alternates receive equal numbers of votes.
The two-alternative majority rule is the social choice procedure for two alternatives
that declares x the winner in the first event and declares a tie in the second. (For
simplicity, we may say, in the first case, that x beats y in the one-on-one vote or x
beats y one-on-one.) The following principle is basic to all social choice procedures:
When applied to the case of only two alternatives, all of the social choice procedures
that are designed for the several-alternative case must agree with the two-alternative
majority rule. It is therefore possible to view those procedures as attempts to extend the
majority rule from the two-alternative case to the general case of several alternatives.
Before considering any proposed procedure for social choice, one must first verify
that it satisfies this basic principle. The student can easily verify this for the social choice
procedures studied here such as plurality, plurality with run off, Hare, Coombs, and
Borda count ( Sect. 1.4).
1.3.1 The Condorcet Tournament
Marquis de Condorcet, an eighteenth century French philosopher, mathematician, and

political scientist (and a close friend of Thomas Jefferson when the latter was the United
States ambassador to France) sought to extend the majority rule from the two-alternative
case to the case of several alternatives in a different direction. His approach was to take
the one-on-one vote for each pair of alternatives and use the two-alternative majority rule
to determine the result of each vote. We shall call this process the Condorcet tournament
(instead of its more common name: the Round-Robin tournament). To motivate the
discussion, we present the following example.
Example 1.3.1
The following are four different scenarios for the voting data of nine voters and four
candidates a, b, c, and d.
1
4 3 2 4 3 2
a b d d a b
Scenario 1: c c c Scenario 2: b d a
b d a c c c
d a b a b d
4 3 2 4 3 2
a b d b c a
Scenario 3: c c c Scenario 4: a b d
b d b d d c
d a a c a b
Let us run the Condorcet tournament for each of the above scenarios. Since each vote
involves only two candidates and the number of voters in our example is odd, there will be a
sole winner in each of the one-on-one votes (no ties). We have six one-on-one votes to take in
each scenario: a vs b, a vs c, a vs d, b vs c, b vs d, and c vs d. We conduct these one-on-one
votes in Scenario 1 and leave the rest to the student.
Scenario 1:
• a beats b 6 to 3 since 6 voters rank a higher than b while 3 voters rank b higher than
a.
• c beats a 5 to 4 since 5 voters rank c higher than a while 4 voters rank a higher than
c.
• d beats a 5 to 4 since 5 voters rank d higher than a while 4 voters rank a higher than
d.
• c beats b 6 to 3 since 6 voters rank c higher than b while 3 voters rank b higher than
c.
• b beats d 7 to 2 since 7 voters rank b higher than d while 2 voters rank d higher than
b.
• c beats d 7 to 2 since 7 voters rank c higher than d while 2 voters rank d higher than
c.
In Graph theory (a branch of mathematics), a finite set of vertices some or all of its
pairs are joined by unidirectional or bidirectional arrows is called a directed graph. A
directed graph is said to be complete if each pair of its vertices is joined by an arrow
(unidirectional or bidirectional). It will be useful to represent the Condorcet tournament
of a given voting scenario by a complete directed graph in which each candidate is
represented by a vertex and the result of a two-alternative majority vote is indicated
by an arrow directed from the winner to the loser or, in case of a tie, a bidirectional
arrow. This representation of a Condorcet tournament will be referred to as the graph
representation of the Condorcet tournament or simply the graph representation of the
given voting scenario.
23 1
x beats y: x −→ y.
x and y are tied: x ←→ y.
Before we continue the discussion of Example 1.3.1 we define two important
concepts.
1.3.2 Condorcet Winner and Condorcet Loser

Definition 1.3.2
A winner of the Condorcet tournament, called a Condorcet winner, is a candidate
who beats all her opponents in the Condorcet tournament. A Condorcet loser is a
candidate who loses to all her opponents in the Condorcet tournament.

The graph representations for the four scenarios above are shown in ⊡ Fig. 1.2
below.
In the graph representation of a Condorcet tournament, a Condorcet winner “shoots”
arrows toward all his opponents and a Condorcet loser “receives” arrows from all his
opponents. In any particular scenario of voting, one and only one of the following four
cases is possible:
• A Condorcet winner exists but a Condorcet loser does not. (Scenario 1 in Exam-
ple 1.3.1.)
a a
d b d b
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Condorcet winner: c Condorcet winner: None
Condorcet loser: None c Condorcet loser: c c
a a
d b d b
Condorcet loser: a c Condorcet loser: None c
⊡ Fig. 1.2 Graph representations for Example 1.3.1

1
• A Condorcet loser exists but a Condorcet winner does not. (Scenario 2 in Exam-
ple 1.3.1.)
• A Condorcet winner and a Condorcet loser both exist. (Scenario 3 in Example 1.3.1.)
• Neither a Condorcet winner nor a Condorcet loser exists. (Scenario 4 in Exam-
ple 1.3.1.)

The above example shows that the Condorcet approach to extend the two-alternative
majority rule to the more general case of several candidates does not always succeed in
finding a winner (which would be the Condorcet winner defined above).
1.3.3 Condorcet Winner vs Majority Candidate
ⓘ Remark 1.3.3 It is important to note that

1. There is at most one Condorcet winner in any voting scenario. (The same holds for a
majority candidate as noted earlier.)

2. There is at most one Condorcet loser in any voting scenario.

3. The election of a Condorcet winner would be a very stable and desirable outcome
in any social choice situation because she cannot be challenged by any individual
opponent. Since the existence of a Condorcet winner is not guaranteed, we cannot
regard the Condorcet tournament as a social choice procedure and we have to resort
to procedures that are guaranteed to deliver a winner (or tied winners) such as plurality,
Hare, Coombs, etc. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that those procedures
do not necessarily pick the Condorcet winner when it exists!

4. The election of a Condorcet loser would be the worst possible outcome since he loses
one-on-one to each of his opponents.

5. A majority candidate is necessarily a Condorcet winner. In fact, being the first choice of
a majority of voters enables a majority candidate to beat each opponent in a majority of
the ballots. However, a Condorcet winner need not be a majority candidate. (In Scenarios
1 and 3 (Example 1.3.1), c is a Condorcet winner without being a majority candidate.)
To explain the difference between a majority candidate and a Condorcet winner, let
a be a majority candidate and let b be a Condorcet winner (in two different scenarios, of
course).
• There is one and the same majority set of voters, call it S, who prefer a over all his
opponents. The set of voters who place a on the top of their preference ballots is such
a set.
• For each opponent x of b there exists a majority set Sx of voters who prefer b over x.
The sets Sx can be different and the set of all voters who prefer b over all opponents
(which is the set of all voters who place b on the top of their ballots) need not be a
majority set and may even be empty.
25 1
⊡ Fig. 1.3 The condorcet a
paradox
c b
Consider, for example, the following preference ballots submitted by five individual
voters.
aa c bb
b caa c
c bb ca
Clearly a is a Condorcet winner who is not a majority candidate. If we name the voters
v, w, x, y, z from left to right, then the majority set {v, w, x} prefers a over b and the
majority set {v, w, y} prefers a over c but the set of voters who prefer a over all of his
opponents is {v, w} which is not a majority set.

6. Note that in Scenario 1 (Example 1.3.1), a beats b and b beats d, but instead of a beating
d (as intuition would have lead us to conclude), d does beat a! This is indicated in the
graph by the 3-cycle formed by the three arrows from a to b, from b to d, and from d
to a. There are no 3-cycles in Scenario 3. Scenarios 2 & 4 have 3-cycles that should be
identified by the student. The simplest form of these cycles was discovered by Condorcet
in his example with three voters and three candidates a, b, and c, known as the Condorcet
Paradox (⊡ Fig. 1.3).
ab c
b ca
cab
Note that a beats b, b beats c, and c beats a. This will be studied further in
Sect. 1.5.

The student should find the plurality procedure winner, the Hare winner, and
the Coombs winner in each of the four scenarios in Example 1.3.1 and verify the
information in the following table.
Scenario Condorcet W Condorcet L Plurality W Hare W Coombs W

1 c None a a c
2 None c d a d
3 c a a b c
4 None None d a d
1
Again, it is highly undesirable for any social choice procedure to
1. Fail to pick a Condorcet winner when one exists (e.g., plurality and Hare in Scenario
1 and Scenario 3).
2. Pick a Condorcet loser (e.g, plurality in Scenario 3).
This motivates the following definitions.
1.3.4 The Condorcet Criteria

Definition 1.3.4
1. A social choice procedure is said to satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion if it
always makes the Condorcet winner, when one exists, the sole member of its
social choice set.

2. A social choice procedure is said to satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion if it
never makes a Condorcet loser a member of its social choice set.

The plurality and Hare procedures both failed to elect an existing Condorcet winner
in Scenarios 1 and 3 of Example 1.3.1. Therefore, neither satisfies the Condorcet winner
criterion. The plurality procedure does not satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion since it
elected a Condorcet loser in Scenario 3.
The following example shows that the Coombs procedure does not satisfy the
Condorcet winner criterion.
Example 1.3.5
The following are the grouped preference ballots for 21 voters and 5 candidates a, b, c, d,
and e.
3 3 4 5 6
b c d e b
e e e b a
c d b a c
d a a c d
a b c d e
Show that
1. e is a Condorcet winner.
2. e does not win the Coombs procedure.

27 1
Solution
1. e beats a 15 to 6; e beats b 12 to 9; e beats c 12 to 9, and e beats d 11 to 10. Therefore, e
is a Condorcet winner.
2. A quick examination of the preference ballots shows that no majority candidate exists
and that the last choice votes are not equally distributed among the candidates, therefore
e must be eliminated since he has the highest number of last choice votes.

The following two examples show that neither Hare nor Coombs satisfies the Condorcet
loser criterion.
Example 1.3.6
Consider the following data for 7 voters and 3 candidates a, b, and c.
3 2 2
a b c
b c b
c a a
There is no majority candidate. The Condorcet loser a wins the Hare procedure after
eliminating b and c simultaneously because they both have the lowest first choice vote.
Example 1.3.7
Consider the following data for 11 voters and 3 candidates a, b, and c.
1 1 2 3 4
a b c c b
c c b a a
b a a b c
There is no majority candidate. The Condorcet loser a wins the Coombs procedure after
eliminating b and c simultaneously because they both have the highest last choice vote.
Note 1.3.8 In Examples 1.3.6 and 1.3.7, Hare and Coombs elected a Condorcet loser, as a
sole winner, after eliminating more than one opponent simultaneously. This is the only way
a Condorcet loser can be the sole winner in either of these two procedures. If we modify the
Hare and Coombs procedures so that only one candidate is eliminated at each elimination
step, a Condorcet loser could never be the sole winner (but could still be a member of the
social choice set). What do we do if two or more candidates “qualify” for elimination at one
step? A rule to determine the eliminated candidate should be decided upon prior to voting.
This will be addressed in Exercise 15 below.

1
1.3.5 Agenda Voting
This social choice procedure is not neutral (i.e., does not treat the available alternatives
equally) and, therefore, cannot be used when the alternatives are candidates for office. It
is mainly used by parliaments and committees when the alternatives to choose from are
two or more policies. This is how it works:
First, the available alternatives are listed in a certain order called the agenda. This
may be done by the committee chair or imposed by the bylaws of the voting body. If the
alternatives are a, b, c, d, and e, then bcead (in this specific order) is a possible agenda.
Vote is taken, using a modified version of the two-alternative majority rule (that rules
out ties), in the following sequence:
1. The first vote is taken on the pair b and c.
2. The winner in the first vote goes against e in the second vote.
3. The winner in the second vote goes against a in the third vote.
4. In the fourth vote, the winner in the third vote goes against d to determine the final
winner.
Should the two-alternative majority rule produce a tie in any of the above votes, between
the ith alternative and the j th alternative in the agenda, where i < j , it will be broken
in favor of the j th alternative. For example, if c beats b in the first vote above and beats
e in the second vote then ties with a in the third vote, a will be considered the winner
of the third vote and will proceed to face d in the fourth and final vote. Consequently,
agenda voting is always won by a single alternative.
In the case of only two alternatives a and b, the agenda ba, for example, means
that b wins if and only if supporters of b > supporters of a; and a wins if and only if
supporters of a ≥ supporters of b. This is typical of a situation in which b is a motion
and a is the status quo. Of course, this added tie breaker sets the agenda voting for two
alternatives apart from the two-alternative majority rule.
Example 1.3.9
A committee of nine voters is voting on the alternatives a, b, c, and d. The grouped
preference ballots are:
4 3 2
a c b
d b a
c d d
b a c
Find the winning alternative if the agenda is:

1. cbad 2. cabd 3. dabc 4. abcd.

29 1
⊡ Fig. 1.4 Agenda cbad c b a d
a
c a
d b
a d
c a
Winner
Solution It is very helpful to draw the graph representation of the Condorcet tournament
first. We may then get the results of the one-on-one votes from the graph representation.
1. c beats b in the first vote then loses to a in the second vote. a beats d in the third and final
vote. a is the winner. The voting process according to this agenda is shown to the right
of the graph representation.

2. a beats c in the first vote then loses to b in the second vote. b beats d in the third and final
vote. b is the winner.

3. a beats d in the first vote then loses to b in the second vote. c beats b in the third and final
vote. c is the winner.

4. b beats a in the first vote then loses to c in the second vote. d beats c in the third and final
vote. d is the winner.

ⓘ Remark 1.3.10 It is clear from Example 1.3.9 that the agenda can play a very
important role in picking the winner when agenda voting is implemented. You should
also be able to verify the following facts about agenda voting.
1. The left-most alternative in an agenda wins if and only if it is a Condorcet winner.

2. A Condorcet winner wins agenda voting regardless of the specific agenda used.
Therefore, agenda voting satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion. It is also true that an
alternative x that always wins agenda voting regardless of the agenda used must be a
Condorcet winner. (Consider an agenda that places x in the left-most position.)

3. A Condorcet loser loses agenda voting regardless of the specific agenda. Therefore,
agenda voting satisfies the Condorcet loser criterion.

4. An alternative that always loses agenda voting irrespective of the agenda need not be
a Condorcet loser. An obvious example is when a Condorcet winner exists because the
Condorcet winner will win regardless of the agenda, leaving no saving agenda for any of
the competing alternatives. The following scenario for three voters and five alternatives
demonstrates the validity of this claim even in the absence of a Condorcet winner.
a b c
b c e
d d a
e a d
c e b
1
⊡ Fig. 1.5 Graph a
representation for
Example 1.3.11
d b
The student should be able to see from the graph representation of this scenario that
no Condorcet winner exists and that d is not a Condorcet loser, but no agenda can make
d win.

5. Agenda voting is monotone. You will be asked to prove this fact in Exercise 21 below.

Example 1.3.11
A committee of fifteen voters is using agenda voting to pick one out of the four alternatives
a, b, c, and d. Find an agenda for each of the alternatives to win, whenever possible.
5 4 3 2 1
a c d d c
c b a c d
d d b b a
b a c a b
Solution One simple way, thought not the only way, to construct an agenda for a specific
alternative to win (if this is at all possible) is to place this alternative at the end of the
agenda and proceed backward, following the arrows on the graph representation, until each
alternative has been visited exactly once. See ⊡ Fig. 1.5 below.
Alternative a wins if the agenda is bdca.

No agenda can make alternative b win, since it is a Condorcet loser.
Alternative c wins if the agenda is badc.
Alternative d wins if the agenda is bcad.

1.3.6 Weak Pareto Efficiency
One criterion that agenda voting fails to satisfy is the Weak Pareto efficiency, named
after the nineteenth to twentieth century Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto.
31 1
Definition 1.3.12
1. An alternative x is said to be Pareto superior to an alternative y (and y is
Pareto inferior to x) if x is ranked higher than y by each voter, i.e., if x is
unanimously preferred over y.

2. An alternative is said to be Pareto dominated if it is Pareto inferior to some
other alternative.

3. A social choice procedure is said to be Weakly Pareto efficient if it never admits
a Pareto dominated alternative into its social choice set.

The following example shows that agenda voting is not Weakly Pareto efficient.
Example 1.3.13
Three voters are picking one out of the four alternatives a, b, c, and d. Show that d is a Pareto
dominated alternative and find an agenda that makes d win.
a b c
d c a
b a d
c d b
Solution Alternative d is Pareto dominated since it is Pareto inferior to a. We indicate this

on the graph representation of the Condorcet tournament by a double-headed arrow from a
to d instead of the usual single-headed arrow.
You can easily verify that alternative d wins if the agenda is acbd (⊡ Fig. 1.6).

ⓘ Remark 1.3.14 It is important to note the difference between a Condorcet loser

alternative and a Pareto dominated one.
• To be a Condorcet loser, an alternative must lose, by a majority, to each opponent.
• To be Pareto dominated, an alternative needs to lose, unanimously, to just one opponent.
• Alternative d in Example 1.3.13 is Pareto dominated without being a Condorcet loser.
• Alternative c in Example 1.3.1 (Scenario 2) is a Condorcet loser without being Pareto
dominated.
• We saw in Remarks 1.3.10 that agenda voting satisfies the Condorcet loser criterion.
Example 1.3.13, on the other hand, shows that agenda voting is not Weakly Pareto
efficient.

• The plurality procedure is Weakly Pareto efficient but does not satisfy the Condorcet loser
criterion. These two facts will be addressed in Exercises 16 and 17 below.

1
representation of Example 1.3.13
d b
1.3.7 Killer Amendment
When a motion is made in a voting body, such as a committee or a parliament, the voting
body finds itself in a position of having to choose between two alternatives: the motion
b and the status quo a. Unless an amendment to the motion is made, an agenda vote is
taken according to the agenda ba to choose one of the two alternatives a and b. If an
amendment to the motion is proposed, a new situation arises in which the voting body
has to use agenda voting, with agenda cba, to choose one of the three alternatives a, b,
and c, where c is the amended motion. If the amended motion c is further amended to get
a twice-amended motion d, an agenda vote is taken to choose one of the four alternatives
a, b, c, and d according to the agenda dcba. In general, if several amendments are made,
an agenda vote is taken according to an agenda in which a later amendment comes before
an earlier one. In other words, the agenda in this case is a listing of all alternatives in
a chronological order in which the latest amendment is placed in the left-most position
and the status quo is placed in the right-most position. This agenda is usually included
in the parliamentary bylaws.
The Condorcet paradox is sometimes utilized to manipulate the agenda voting
processes for the purpose of defeating (or killing) a motion that would have otherwise
been successful. Consider, for example, a situation in which a committee of eleven
voters is to vote on a motion b versus the status quo a. Two of the eleven voters are
in favor of the status quo while the remaining nine voters are in favor of the motion.
Therefore, the grouped preference ballots are:
2 9
a b
b a
Clearly, if a vote is immediately taken, the status quo a will be defeated. The two
pro status quo voters can prevail if they introduce a killer amendment (aka poison pill
amendment) to the motion b so that the amended motion c would defeat b in the first
vote, then lose to the status quo a in the second vote; thus forming a 3-cycle, or a
Condorcet paradox. (See ⊡ Fig. 1.7 below.) To successfully create a killer amendment,
the pro status quo voters should design it so that it divides the pro motion voters into two
equal (or close to equal) groups. Members of one group like the amended motion c to the
33 1
⊡ Fig. 1.7 Killer Amendment a
Status quo: a
Motion: b
Killer Amendment: c
c b
point of preferring it over the motion b, while members of the other group dislike c to the
point of placing it below the status quo a. The pro status quo voters themselves should
place the amended motion c in the middle, between a and b. The grouped preference
ballots (with the amended motion c included), are:
2 4 5
a c b
c b a
b a c
According to the standard parliamentary procedure, the agenda is cba. In the first
vote, c defeats b by a 6 to 5 vote. In the second vote, a defeats c by a 7 to 4 vote and wins
the entire voting procedure. The status quo a survives against the wishes of a majority
of the voters!
Example 1.3.15
Five students meet in the study lounge in the dorms every evening to study and they order a
vegetarian pizza to eat during the break. One evening, while they were studying, a member
of the group made a motion to add pepperoni to the pizza. Discussions revealed that only one
member of the group wanted to keep the status quo (vegetarian pizza) while the remaining
four members were in favor of the motion (adding pepperoni). Knowing that two of the four
pro motion members loved hot pepper while the other two strongly disliked it, the pro status
quo member amended the motion so as to add hot pepper with the pepperoni. The following
three alternatives ended up being on the table:
The status quo a: Vegetarian pizza.

The motion b: Vegetarian pizza with pepperoni.
The amended motion c: Vegetarian pizza with pepperoni and hot pepper.
The five students agreed to apply the standard parliamentary procedure of agenda voting with
the agenda cba as they learned in class.
The grouped preference ballots are:
1 2 2
a c b
c b a
b a c
1
In the first vote of c vs b, c defeats b by a 3 to 2 vote. In the second vote of c vs a, a
defeats c by a 3 to 2 vote. The voting process is now complete with the status quo a being
the winner, despite the fact that four out of the five voters were in favor of the motion!
It is important to note that the killer amendment trick does not work by convincing
any of the pro-motion voters that the status quo is better. In fact, the relative ranking
by each voter of the status quo a and the motion b is the same before and after the
introduction of the killer amendment c.
Killer amendments are not easy to design and, in fact, many of them fail.
Example 1.3.16
In a committee of 23 voters, 17 voters support a motion b and 6 voters want to maintain the
status quo a. The pro status quo voters propose an amended motion c to kill the motion and
keep the status quo. Assuming that all the pro status quo voters will rank c between a and b,
will the amended motion c succeed in keeping the status quo if:
1. 6 of the 17 pro motion voters rank c as their top choice and 11 of them rank it as their
last choice.
last choice.
last choice.
last choice.
(Of course, the relative ranking of a and b by each voter will remain unchanged.)
Solution The preferences in the four cases above are as follows:
6 6 11 6 11 6 6 5 12 6 12 5
a c b a c b a c b a c b
1. 2. 3. 4.
c b a c b a c b a c b a
b a c b a c b a c b a c
The graph representations of the Condorcet tournaments are as follows:
a a a a
c b c b c bc b
1 2 3 4
As you can easily see, the killer amendment succeeds in saving the status quo in the
first and second scenarios. In the third and fourth scenarios, the amended motion c fails to
35 1
accomplish the goal of saving the status quo. In the third scenario, too many of the pro motion
voters ranked c as their last choice and the motion b ended up being a Condorcet winner
while, in the fourth scenario, too many of the pro motion voters ranked c as their top choice
which made c a Condorcet winner. (In the fourth scenario, the killer turned “monster!”)
Example 1.3.17 (1.3.16 Generalized)

Let us generalize the results of Example 1.3.16. Assume m voters are in support of the status
quo a while n voters are in support of the motion b, with m < n. Assume also that
• The pro status quo voters all rank their amended motion c between a and b.
• n1 of the pro motion voters rank c as their top choice.
• n2 of the pro motion voters rank c as their last choice. (n1 + n2 = n.)
The preferences are now as follows.
m n1 n2
a c b
c b a
b a c
For the killer amendment to accomplish the goal of saving the status quo a, the amended
motion c must beat the motion b in the first vote then lose to a in the second vote, that is,
m + n1 > n2 and m + n2 > n1 .
It follows that, under the stated conditions, the killer amendment succeeds in keeping the
status quo if and only if
|n1 − n2 | < m.
The student should be able to see how this result agrees with the intuition that larger support
for the status quo makes it easier for the killer amendment to succeed, and vice versa.
1.3.8 The Copeland Procedure
This procedure is based on the Condorcet tournament. We simply run all the one-on-
one votes and get the results from the two-alternative majority rule. In each of these
votes, the winner receives 1 point, the loser receives 0 points and, in case of a tie, each
of the two alternatives receives half a point. The alternative(s) with the highest point
sum wins (win). You can easily see that this procedure never fails to elect an existing
Condorcet winner and never elects a Condorcet loser. In other words, it satisfies both
the Condorcet winner criterion and the Condorcet loser criterion. The main problem
with this procedure is indecisiveness. Ties are quite likely in the absence of a Condorcet
winner.
1
Example 1.3.18
Process each of the four scenarios in Example 1.3.1 using the Copeland procedure.
Solution We use the graph representations in ⊡ Fig. 1.2.

In Scenario 1: The Condorcet winner c has 3 points; and each of a, b, and d has one point.
Therefore, c is the sole Copeland winner.

In Scenario 2: Each of a, b, and d has 2 points; and the Condorcet loser c has zero points.
We therefore have a three-way tie involving a, b, and d.

In Scenario 3: The Condorcet winner c has 3 points, b has 2 points, d has 1 point, and the
Condorcet loser a has zero points. Therefore, c is the sole Copeland winner.

In Scenario 4: Each of a and b has 2 points; and each of c and d has one point. We have a
two-way tie involving a and b.

Example 1.3.19
Seventeen voters are using the Copeland procedure to pick a candidate for a position in a
company.
5 7 3 2
a c b e
b d d b
c e e c
d b a a
e a c d
Draw the graph representation and find the winner(s) (⊡ Fig. 1.8).
Solution a has zero points (Condorcet loser), b has 3 points, c has 3 points, d has 2 points,
and e has 2 points. Candidates b and c are tied for winning. Can you suggest a tie breaker?

1.3.9 Monotonicity Revisited
ⓘ Remark 1.3.20 Let us view Example 1.2.14 from a different angle.
8 5 2 6 8 5 2 6 10 5 6
a b b c a b a c a b c
b c a a b c b a b c a
c a c b c a c b c a b
Of these two scenarios, we assume Scenario 2 to be the representation of the true

and sincere opinions of the voters.
Both scenarios have the same graph representation (⊡ Fig. 1.9) which is a
Condorcet paradox.
37 1
e
⊡ Fig. 1.9 Remark 1.3.20 a
c b
As we saw in Example 1.2.14, a would not win the Hare (or plurality with run-off)
procedure in scenario 2 (the sincere scenario). The reason, as seen from the graph
representation of the Condorcet tournament, is that b (whom a can beat one-on one) is
eliminated by Hare’s procedure and a has to face c (who defeats a one-on-one). This is
obviously an undesirable outcome for the voters who rank a as their top choice. Can
those voters get a better outcome for themselves by a manipulative trick? Yes they can.
If two of a’s supporters change their preferences from a first and b second to b first and
a second (which appears to hurt a’s chances), the graph representation remains the same
but the preference ballots change to Scenario 1. Now c is eliminated in the first round;
and a defeats b in the second round.
As you can see, the voters whose top choice is a get a better outcome for themselves
by seemingly acting against their own interest!
1.3.10 McGarvey’s Theorem
The representation of a Condorcet tournament of a given voting scenario by a complete

directed graph is quite useful and intuitive. It is natural to ask if any given complete
directed graph represents the Condorcet tournament of some voting scenario. The
answer, in the affirmative, was given [14] by David McGarvey. (See also [13].)
Theorem 1.3.21 (McGarvey 1953)

Every complete directed graph represents a Condorcet tournament for some voting
scenario.

1
The idea of the proof is quite original and simple at the same time but the notations
may be complicated. To simplify matters, we illustrate the proof in the following two
examples of complete directed graphs with 5 vertices. The general case of n vertices
follows exactly the same path.
Example 1.3.22
In Example 1.3.19 above we constructed a complete directed graph (⊡ Fig. 1.8) for the given
voting scenario of 17 voters and 5 candidates. Making the graph in ⊡ Fig. 1.8 our starting
point, we construct a voting scenario whose Condorcet tournament is representable by this
graph.
The candidates and the voters in our scenario are introduced as follows:
• For each vertex in the given complete directed graph we introduce a candidate with
the same name as the vertex, and so we have the five candidates a, b, c, d, and e.
• For each unidirectional arrow in the given graph we introduce two voters (with two
preference ballots) in the manner we explain next.
Let us start with the arrow pointing from b to a in ⊡ Fig. 1.8. On account of this arrow,
we introduce two voters with preferences
b e
a d
c and c
d b
e a
Note that in these two preference ballots (combined) b beats a while all of the
remaining nine pairs are tied. How did we accomplish this?
• We placed b first and a second in the first preference ballot and we placed b
second to last and a last in the second preference ballot.
• We placed c, d, and e in an arbitrary order in the remaining spots in the first ballot
and in the reverse order in the remaining spots in the second preference ballot.
Similarly, we account for the arrow pointing from e to b, for example, by introducing
two new voters with the following preference ballots:
e d
b c
a and a
c e
d b
39 1
Graph representation a
for Example 1.3.23
e
In these two preference ballots (combined) e beats b while all of the remaining
nine pairs are tied. Continuing with this process of introducing two new voters for each
unidirectional arrow we get the following voting scenario for five candidates and twenty
voters, which is representable by the given complete directed graph.
b→a c→a d→a e→a b→c b→d e→b c→d c→e d→e
b e c e d e e d b e b e e d c e c d d c
a d a d a c a c c d d c b c d b e b e b
c c b b b b b b a a a a a a a a a a a a
d b d c c d c e d b c b c e b c b c b d
e a e a e a d a e c e d d b e d d e c e
As explained above, the result of the vote on a certain pair of candidates is enforced
only by the two preference ballots associated with that pair (the result of the remaining
eighteen preference ballots is a tie for that particular pair).

Example 1.3.23
Construct a voting scenario whose Condorcet tournament is representable by the following
complete directed graph.
Solution The only difference between the present graph and the one in Example 1.3.22 is
that the arrow between c and d, the arrow between c and e, and the arrow between d and e
are all bidirectional in the present graph. For a bidirectional arrow we need not introduce any
voters or, if we wish, we may introduce two voters whose two preference ballots are exact
opposite of one another. Choosing the first option we get the scenario
b→a c→a d→a e→a b→c b→d e→b c↔d c↔e d↔e
b e c e d e e d b e b e e d
a d a d a c a c c d d c b c
c c b b b b b b a a a a a a
d b d c c d c e d b c b c e
e a e a e a d a e c e d d b
1
or
b→a c→a d→a e→a b→c b→d e→b

b e c e d e e d b e b e e d
a d a d a c a c c d d c b c
c c b b b b b b a a a a a a
d b d c c d c e d b c b c e
e a e a e a d a e c e d d b
McGarvey’s original proof treats the case of a complete directed graph with n vertices
whose all arrows are unidirectional. The proof uses the construction explained in Exam-
ple 1.3.22 but, as expected, the notations are considerably more complicated in the general
case. Since (by Proposition 2.3.1 in the next chapter) the number of pairs of vertices, which is

the same as the number of arrows, is n2 and two voters are introduced for each unidirectional
arrow we see that there are

n n(n − 1)
2· =2· = n(n − 1)
2 2·1
voters in the original proof of McGarvey’s theorem.

ⓘ Remark 1.3.24 1. The voting scenario constructed by McGarvey’s theorem for the com-
plete directed graph in ⊡ Fig. 1.8 is obviously different from the voting scenario from
which this graph originated in Example 1.3.19. This should not come as a surprise
because any given complete directed graph represents an infinitude of voting scenarios
but each given voting scenario is represented by only one complete directed graph.

2. The McGarvey voting scenario created in Example 1.3.22 is obviously not the most
compact one as it involves a large number of voters whose preference ballots are all
distinct. (Just compare McGarvey’s voting scenario with the voting scenario
5 7 3 2
a c b e
b d d b
c e e c
d b a a
e a c d
in Example 1.3.19.) This is typical of “existence theorems” in mathematics, whose only

purpose is to prove existence, leaving the refinements for future efforts.

3. McGarvey’s theorem can be quite useful in proving the existence of a voting scenario
with certain features that depend only on its graph representation. In such case, one can
proceed directly with the construction of the graph, without having to worry about the
more difficult construction of the voting scenario since its existence is guaranteed by the
theorem.

1.4 · Scoring Procedures: Borda Count
41 1
1.4 Scoring Procedures: Borda Count
In this section, we study a different family of social choice procedure with main
emphasis on the most important procedure in this family: the Borda count.
A scoring procedure assigns to each candidate a score from each preference ballot,
depending on her position in that ballot. This score is a real number such that
1. The higher the position in the preference ballot, the higher the score. Precisely, if the
j th position is higher than the ith position, then the score received by the occupant
of the j th position ≥ the score received by the occupant of the ith position.
2. For each i, the ith positions in all preference ballots are assigned the same score.
3. The score assigned to the top position must be greater than the score assigned to the
bottom position. This condition guarantees that a scoring procedure agrees with the
two-alternative majority rule in the case of only two alternatives.
The total score of each candidate, from all ballots, is tallied up and the candidate(s)
with the highest score wins (win).
1.4.1 Borda Count
This procedure was proposed by Jean-Charles de Borda, a French mathematician and

political scientist who was contemporary with Marquis de Condorcet. Here is how it
works:
The number of points a candidate receives from each preference ballot is equal to
the number of opponents who are placed lower than him in that ballot.
In other words, a candidate receives zero points from a preference ballot in which he
is placed as last choice, one point from a preference ballot in which he is placed second
to last choice, two points from a ballot in which he is placed third to last choice, and
so on. This description of Borda count rules out indifference in the voters’ individual
preference ballots; in Sect. 1.6, we shall generalize it to the case where indifference
is allowed.
Example 1.4.1
Process the following scenario for seventeen voters and five alternatives using the Borda
count.
5 7 3 2
4 a c b e
3 b d d b
2 c e e c
1 d b a a
0 e a c d
(This is the same as the data in Example 1.3.19.)

1
Solution We added a column on the left indicating the Borda scores of different positions.
Let us compute the total score of the candidates one candidate at a time.
Total score of a = 5(4) + 7(0) + 3(1) + 2(1) = 25 points.

Total score of b = 5(3) + 7(1) + 3(4) + 2(3) = 40 points.
Total score of c = 5(2) + 7(4) + 3(0) + 2(2) = 42 points.
Total score of d = 5(1) + 7(3) + 3(3) + 2(0) = 35 points.
Total score of e = 5(0) + 7(2) + 3(2) + 2(4) = 28 points.
It follows that c is the sole Borda count winner.

You may, if you wish, do the above calculations in the following table.
5 7 3 2 Total
a × 4 = 20 × 0 = 00 × 1 = 03 × 1 = 02 = 25
b × 3 = 15 × 1 = 07 × 4 = 12 × 3 = 06 = 40
c × 2 = 10 × 4 = 28 × 0 = 00 × 2 = 04 = 42
d × 1 = 05 × 3 = 21 × 3 = 09 × 0 = 00 = 35
e × 0 = 00 × 2 = 14 × 2 = 06 × 4 = 08 = 28
Note The correct sum of all scores should be known to us ahead of time and can be used to
check on our computations. In fact, each of the 17 voters contributes 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10
to the “pool” of points. The total scores should therefore be 17 × 10 = 170 points. The sum
of the scores calculated above is 25 + 40 + 42 + 35 + 28 = 170 which is the correct sum.
This is a strong indication that our calculations are all correct unless we have made two (or
more) mistakes that balanced one another! This is quite unlikely, of course.
Our next scoring procedure is one that you are very familiar with.
Plurality Procedure The plurality procedure itself is a scoring procedure in which the
first choice in a preference ballot receives one point and the rest of the candidates receive
zero points each. The total score of a candidate will therefore be the number of voters
who place her as first choice. It follows that the candidate(s) with the highest score is
(are) the same as the plurality winner(s).
Having found the plurality procedure to be a scoring procedure, it is natural to ask if
any of the other procedures we studied is (or can be viewed as) a scoring procedure too.
We shall have the answers shortly.
Proposition 1.4.2 Scoring procedures are monotone.
Proof
Assume that candidate a is a winner in some given scenario when an arbitrary scoring
procedure is used. If, in some ballots, a is switched with the candidate just above him (say b),
then a’s score will increase or stay the same, while b’s score will decrease or stay the same;
43 1
and the scores of the rest of the candidates will stay the same. Therefore, a will continue to
be a winner in the new scenario that resulted from the switch.

Being a scoring procedure, the Borda count is monotone.
ⓘ Corollary 1.4.3 None of the procedures of Hare, Coombs, and plurality with run-off is
a scoring procedure.
Proof
Examples 1.2.14 and 1.2.15 demonstrate the non-monotonicity of the procedures named in
the Corollary statement. We also see from Proposition 1.4.2 that scoring procedures are all
monotone. From these two results, together, we see that none of the named procedures is a
scoring procedure.

Theorem 1.4.4
The Borda count satisfies the Condorcet loser criterion but fails the Condorcet winner
criterion.
Proof
The first assertion is proved in Theorem 1.4.11 below. As for the second assertion, we present
the following example for seven voters and three alternatives:
4 3
2 c b
1 b a
0 a c
Candidate c is clearly a Condorcet winner. (In fact, c is more than just a Condorcet
winner; it is a majority candidate.)
a receives 3 points.
b receives 10 points.
c receives 8 points.
The above scores indicate that the Condorcet winner c is not a Borda count winner. (Note
that the sum of scores is 21, which is the correct sum since each of the 7 preference ballots
contributes 0 + 1 + 2 = 3 points.)

1
1.4.2 Shortcomings of the Borda Count Procedure
In addition to its failure to satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion (Theorem 1.4.4 above),
the Borda count suffers from more serious issues, as shown by the following two
examples.
Example 1.4.5
A committee of seven voters is using Borda count to pick one out of the four candidates
a, b, c, and d to fill a position in a company. The grouped preference ballots are as follows:
2 2 2 1
3 a b c d
2 b c d a
1 c d a b
0 d a b c
a receives 2(3) + 2(0) + 2(1) + 1(2) = 10 points.

b receives 2(2) + 2(3) + 2(0) + 1(1) = 11 points.
c receives 2(1) + 2(2) + 2(3) + 1(0) = 12 points.
d receives 2(0) + 2(1) + 2(2) + 1(3) = 09 points.
Minutes before declaring c the winner and sending him the job offer, the committee
received news that candidate d, who finished last, had included forged documents in his
application file and should have therefore been disqualified. Two opinions arose:
Opinion 1. The disqualification of d should have no effect on the above result and c should
still be the winner.
Opinion 2. A fresh Borda count procedure for the three candidates a, b, and c should be
conducted after excluding d. The preference ballots and the scores, after the
exclusion of d, would be as follows:
2 2 2 1
2 a b c a
1 b c a b
0 c a b c
a receives 2(2) + 2(0) + 2(1) + 1(2) = 8 points.

b receives 2(1) + 2(2) + 2(0) + 1(1) = 7 points.
c receives 2(0) + 2(1) + 2(2) + 1(0) = 6 points.
This would lead to declaring a as the winner, not c.

Opinion 2 is the more sound one as it prevents the undue influence of the
irrelevant alternative d on the selection of a winner.
If you look more thoroughly into the above results you would notice that
• In the presence of d, Borda count would place c first, b second, and a third.
45 1
• In the absence of d, Borda count would place a first, b second, and c third,
which is the exact reverse of the order of these three alternatives in the
presence of d.
We advise the student to eliminate the candidates in Example 1.4.5, one at a time, and
compare the Borda count ranking of the remaining three candidates to their Borda count
ranking obtained above when all of the four candidates are present.
Example 1.4.6
Five voters are using Borda count to elect one candidate out of a, b, c, and d. The main
contenders are a and b. The “honest” preference ballots are as follows:
2 3
3 a b
2 b a
1 c c
0 d d
a receives 12 points, b receives 13 points, c receives 5 point, and d receives 0 points and so b
is the sole winner. This is the best possible outcome for the voters in the right column since
b is their first choice, but it is not the best outcome for the voters in the left column since b
is their second choice. The voters in the left column can get a better outcome for themselves
if they vote strategically by placing c and d between their favorite candidate a and their less
favored b so that the preference ballots become as follows:
2 3
3 a b
2 c a
1 d c
0 b d
The new scores are as follows: a receives 12 points, b receives 9 points, c receives 7
points, and d receives 2 points. Now a is the sole winner; and the two voters in the left
column manage to get their favorite candidate elected by voting dishonestly! Next, suppose
that the three voters in the right column also vote strategically and place c and d between
their favorite candidate b and their less favored a. The preference ballots become
2 3
3 a b
2 c c
1 d d
0 b a
1
In this case, a receives 6 points, b receives 9 points, c receives 10 points, and d receives
5 points. Now c emerges as the sole winner and the two main contenders lose due to the
“mutual destruction” by their supporters!
For a possible real-life situation in which the scenarios described in the above
example can happen, think of the five voters here as the voters in a miniature
predominantly Republican district, candidates a, b as two Republican candidates and
candidates c, d as Democrats. Naturally, a and b will be the top two choices of all voters,
but some voters might have slight preference for a over b (the two voters in the left
column) and others (the three voters in the right column) might have a slight preference
for b over a. If each voter ranks the candidates according to his/her honest opinion, the
Republican b wins. By misrepresenting their preferences as described above, the two
voters who slightly prefer a over b can make a win, which is a better outcome for them.
If all voters follow this insincere strategy, they end up with a Democrat representing
their Republican district, which is a highly undesirable outcome for all voters.
The above examples highlight the biggest flaw with Borda count, namely, its
vulnerability to the effect of irrelevant alternatives. In Example 1.4.5, the presence of
the irrelevant alternative d affected the societal ranking of the three other candidates.
Example 1.4.6 goes further to show how irrelevant alternatives (c, d in this case) can be
used to manipulate the Borda count procedure. A detailed study of this topic will follow
in Sect. 1.5.
1.4.3 More on Borda Count
Theorem 1.4.4 above states that the Borda count procedure satisfies the Condorcet loser
criterion. This simply means that a Condorcet loser cannot receive the highest score in
the Borda count. The following includes a proof of this fact, together with a proof of
the analogous fact that a Condorcet winner cannot obtain the lowest score in the Borda
count. First we need to adopt some notations.
Notation 1.4.7 In the sequel, we shall be dealing with n preference ballots numbered
1, 2, · · · , n; and k candidates named x, y, · · · , a, b, · · · . For ballot number i and candidates
a, x we use #(a ↓ x, i) to denote the number of times a is placed higher than x in ballot
number i which is, obviously, 0 or 1. More precisely,
#(a ↓ x, i) = 1 if and only if a is placed higher than x in ballot number i and,

#(a ↓ x, i) = 0 if and only if a is placed lower than x in ballot number i or x = a.

It is clear that for a fixed a, the sum x #(a ↓ x, i) is the Borda score a receives
from ballot number i and therefore the total Borda score of a (from all ballots) is given
by the equation

The Borda score of a = #(a ↓ x, i) = #(a ↓ x, i).
i x x i
47 1

But, for a specific x, the sum i #(a ↓ x, i) is the number of ballots in which a is
placed higher than x (the number of voters who prefer a to x). We denote this sum by
#(a ↓ x) and we call it the score of a against x. We now have

The Borda score of a = #(a ↓ x, i) = #(a ↓ x, i) = #(a ↓ x).
i x x i x
(Note that by our notation, #(a ↓ a) = 0 so we do not have to rule out x = a in the
above sum.) The last equation provides an alternative way to compute the Borda score
of a candidate, say a:
Simply add the scores of a against all of his opponents in the one-on-one votes. The
sum of all these scores is the Borda score of a.
(Compare this to Copeland procedure where we ignore the actual scores and give a
one point for each win in the one-on-one votes, zero for each loss and half a point for
each draw.)
Proposition 1.4.8 In a society of n voters, if a one-on-one vote is taken on two candidates

x and y then, in the two-alternative majority tule, x beats y if and only if #(x ↓ y) > n2 and
x loses to y if and only if #(x ↓ y) < n2
Proof
This follows easily since in a one-on-one vote, x beats y if and only if more than half of the
voters place x higher than y and loses to it if less than half of the voters place x higher than
y.

ⓘ Corollary 1.4.9 In the case of n voters and k candidates:

If c is a Condorcet winner, then
n (k − 1)n
The Borda score of c = #(c ↓ x) > = .
x x
2 2
On the other hand, if c is a Condorcet loser, then
n (k − 1)n
The Borda score of c = #(c ↓ x) < = .

x x
2 2
ⓘ Lemma 1.4.10 In the case of n voters and k candidates,
k(k − 1)n
The sum of the Borda scores of all candidates = ·
2
Proof
Each voter has 0 + 1 + 2 + · · · + (k − 1) = k(k−1)
2 points to contribute to the “pool” of points.
Since we have n voters, the total number of points shared by the candidates, which is the sum
of scores of all candidates is k(k−1)n
2 .

1
Theorem 1.4.11
In Borda count:
1. A Condorcet winner cannot obtain the lowest score. More precisely, if c is a
Condorcet winner, then some opponent a of c scores lower than c.
2. A Condorcet loser cannot obtain the highest score. More precisely, if c is a
Condorcet loser, then some opponent a of c scores higher than c.
Proof
1. Assume we have n voters and k candidates and let c be a Condorcet winner. From
Corollary 1.4.9 we have
(k − 1)n
The Borda score of c > ·
2
If, further, x has the lowest Borda score, then (in contradiction to Lemma 1.4.10) we get
k(k − 1)n
Sum of the Borda scores of all candidates > ·
2
2. The proof of this part is similar to the proof of Part 1.

1.4.4 Hare-Scoring Procedures
The Hare-scoring procedure derived from a given scoring procedure consists of a finite
sequence of applications (or rounds) of the given scoring procedure where, at each
round, we eliminate the candidate(s) with the lowest score. We stop the process when all
remaining candidates have the same score, and we declare those candidates to be tied
winners.
Viewing the plurality procedure as a scoring procedure as in Sect. 1.4.1 above (a
candidate receives one point from a ballot if he occupies its top and receives zero points
otherwise), the student should be able to verify that
The Hare-plurality procedure is simply the Hare procedure studied in earlier
sections of the present chapter.
(Hence the term “Hare-scoring procedures.”)
The Hare–Borda count procedure will simply be called the Hare–Borda procedure.
Example 1.4.12
Process the following voting scenario for 21 voters and 5 candidates a, b, c, d, e using
49 1
3 3 4 5 6
4 b c d e b
3 e e e b a
2 c d b a c
1 d a a c d
0 a b c d e
1. The Borda count procedure.

2. The Hare–Borda procedure.
Solution
1. Borda count:
Score of a = 3(0) + 3(1) + 4(1) + 5(2) + 6(3) = 35 points.

Score of b = 3(4) + 3(0) + 4(2) + 5(3) + 6(4) = 59 points.
Score of c = 3(2) + 3(4) + 4(0) + 5(1) + 6(2) = 35 points.
Score of d = 3(1) + 3(2) + 4(4) + 5(0) + 6(1) = 31 points.
Score of e = 3(3) + 3(3) + 4(3) + 5(4) + 6(0) = 50 points.
The winner of Borda count is b.

2. Hare–Borda procedure:
We eliminate d since he has the lowest Borda count in the first round and we update
the ballots.
Second round:
3 3 4 5 6
3 b c e e b
2 e e b b a
1 c a a a c
0 a b c c e
Score of a = 3(0) + 3(1) + 4(1) + 5(1) + 6(2) = 24 points.

Score of b = 3(3) + 3(0) + 4(2) + 5(2) + 6(3) = 45 points.
Score of c = 3(1) + 3(3) + 4(0) + 5(0) + 6(1) = 18 points.
Score of e = 3(2) + 3(2) + 4(3) + 5(3) + 6(0) = 39 points.
We eliminate c since he has the lowest Borda count in the second round and we
update the ballots.
1
Third round:
3 3 4 5 6
2 b e e e b
1 e a b b a
0 a b a a e
Score of a = 3(0) + 3(1) + 4(0) + 5(0) + 6(1) = 9 points.

Score of b = 3(2) + 3(0) + 4(1) + 5(1) + 6(2) = 27 points.
Score of e = 3(1) + 3(2) + 4(2) + 5(2) + 6(0) = 27 points.
We eliminate a since he has the lowest Borda count in the third round and we update
the ballots.
Fourth round:
3 3 4 5 6
1 b e e e b
0 e b b b e
Score of b = 3(1) + 3(0) + 4(0) + 5(0) + 6(1) = 9 points.

Score of e = 3(0) + 3(1) + 4(1) + 5(1) + 6(0) = 12 points.
We eliminate b since he has the lowest Borda count in the fourth round and we are left
with e as winner of the Hare–Borda procedure.

1.4.5 Borda Meets Condorcet
In the above example, e is a Condorcet winner that was overlooked by the Borda
count procedure. However, the Hare–Borda procedure was able to detect and elect this
Condorcet winner. This is no coincidence, as established by the following theorem.
Theorem 1.4.13
The Hare–Borda procedure satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion.
Proof
If x is a Condorcet winner in the preference ballots submitted by the voters, she will continue
to be a Condorcet winner at all rounds of the Hare–Borda procedure since the elimination of
some candidates does not affect the relative rankings of any pair of the remaining candidates.
From Theorem 1.4.11 we then see that x will not be eliminated at any round of the process
and will be the sole winner of the Hare–Borda procedure.

51 1
representation for
Example 1.4.14 e
The above discussion of the procedures of Copeland, Borda count, and Hare–Borda
gives rise to the following two inquiries:
1. We proved in Theorem 1.4.11 that a Condorcet winner, which is also the sole
Copeland procedure winner, cannot obtain the lowest score in Borda count. In the
absence of a Condorcet winner, can a Copeland winner obtain the lowest score in
Borda Count?
2. Since both of the Copeland and the Hare–Borda procedures pick the Condorcet
winner (if it exists), it is natural to ask: Do these two procedures continue to pick
the same winner(s) in the absence of a Condorcet winner?
The following example addresses these two inquiries.
Example 1.4.14
Thirteen voters are to pick one of the five candidates a, b, c, d, and e. Show that
1. There is no Condorcet winner (⊡ Fig. 1.10).
2. b is the Copeland procedure winner.
3. b has the lowest Borda count score.
4. The winners of the Hare–Borda procedure and the Copeland procedure are different.
2 5 6
4 b c e
3 a b a
2 d d d
1 e e c
0 c a b
Solution
1 and 2. From the graph we see that there is no Condorcet winner and the Copeland scores
are
a b c d e
2 3 1 2 2
1
and so b is the sole Copeland procedure winner.

3. The Borda scores are:
a: 2(3) + 5(0) + 6(3) = 24

b: 2(4) + 5(3) + 6(0) = 23
c: 2(0) + 5(4) + 6(1) = 26
d: 2(2) + 5(2) + 6(2) = 26
e: 2(1) + 5(1) + 6(4) = 31
and so, the Copeland procedure winner, b, has the lowest Borda count score.

4. The Copeland procedure winner, b, is the first candidate to be eliminated in the
Hare–Borda procedure, and therefore cannot win it. This is sufficient for our
purposes, but if you wish to continue with the Hare–Borda procedure, you will
find d to be the sole winner.

1.5 A Glimpse Into Social Welfare Theory
In the earlier sections of this chapter we used social choice functions to aggregate
the preference ballots provided by all voters in a given voting scenario and produce a
non-empty set of winning alternatives (commonly known as the social choice set) that,
presumably, is the collective choice of the society of voters. Examples include plurality,
plurality with run-off, Hare, Coombs, Borda count, Copeland, and Hare–Borda.
A procedure that aggregates the preference ballots provided by all voters in a given
scenario and delivers a semi ranking (i.e., pairwise rankings of the alternatives) will
be called a semi social welfare function. Given any two alternatives x and y, a semi
social welfare function is able, after aggregating the preference ballots of the voters,
to tell us whether the society prefers one over the other or is indifferent. A procedure
that assigns a numerical value to each alternative can naturally compare x to y based on
the numerical values assigned to them. Examples include the Copeland procedure and
scoring procedures (such as plurality and Borda count). The Condorcet tournament is
another example as it compares x to y using the two-alternative majority rule.
If the pairwise rankings provided by a semi social welfare function fit together properly
(in a sense that will be made clear soon), we obtain a ranking of the alternatives into
first tier, second tier, third tier, and so on; and we speak of a social welfare function
instead of a semi social welfare function. Examples include all procedures that assign
a numerical value to each voter such as Copeland, Borda count, and plurality. (Those
procedures can naturally list the alternatives in the decreasing order of their numerical
values.)
Every social welfare function is a semi social welfare function but the converse is
not true.
1.5 · A Glimpse Into Social Welfare Theory
53 1
1.5.1 Rankings and Semi Rankings
The following is a more precise definition of a ranking:
Definition 1.5.1
Let A be a set of at least two alternatives. A ranking on A by a certain entity (which
may be an individual voter or a society) is a partition of A into subsets
A1 , A2 , · · · , An so that each alternative is in one and only one of these sets; and for
each pair x, y of alternatives in A,
• The entity thinks that each of these two alternatives is as good as the other if and
only if x and y are in the same Ai .
• The entity prefers y to x if and only if x is in some Ai and y is in some Aj with
i < j.
An
An−1
.
A ranking may be presented in a column: .
.
A2
A1
An is called the first tier (or top tier), An−1 is called the second tier, ..., and A1 is
called the bottom tier.

For example, if A = {q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z} is the set of alternatives, then
{s, v}
{q, u}
{x}
{r, w}
{t, y, z}
is a ranking with the first (or top) tier A5 = {s, v}, the second tier A4 = {q, u}, the third
tier A3 = {x}, the fourth tier A2 = {r, w}, and the fifth (or bottom) tier A1 = {t, y, z}.
To explain what it means for the pairwise rankings of a semi ranking to fit
together properly (see the underlined phrase above), we examine the four scenarios in
Example 1.3.1. We present the graph representations of their Condorcet tournaments
one more time here for easy reference (⊡ Fig. 1.11).
In Scenario 3, we can place the Condorcet winner c above all of its opponents (in
the first tier) because it beats each one of them one-on-one. Next, b beats each of a and
d one-one-one which entitles it be placed in the second tier. We then place d in the third
tier and a in the fourth tier since d beats a one-on-one. Thus the Condorcet tournament
1
a a
d b d b
Condorcet loser: None c Condorcet loser: c c
a a
d b d b
Condorcet loser: a c Condorcet loser: None c
⊡ Fig. 1.11 Rankings and semi rankings
c
b
works as a social welfare function and provides the collective ranking , in which the
d
a
first tier consists of c only, the second tier consists of b only, the third tier consists of d
only, and the fourth tier consists of a only.
Looking at Scenario 1, we can place the Condorcet winner c in the first tier as in
Scenario 3 but then we are left with three alternatives (a, b, and d) with no possible way
of sorting them into tiers since a beats b, b beats d, and d beats a (a Condorcet paradox).
This makes it impossible to proceed any further; and the semi ranking obtained from the
Condorcet tournament falls short of being a ranking.
c
a→b→d→a
In Scenario 2 we can place c in the bottom tier but then, as in Scenario 1, it is

impossible to proceed because a, b, and d are involved in a Condorcet paradox. Again,
the semi ranking obtained from the Condorcet tournament falls short of being a ranking.
a→d→b→a
c
55 1
The situation is even worse in Scenario 4 as you can see: a → d → c → b → a.
Only in Scenario 3 did the pairwise rankings provided by the Condorcet tournament
fit together properly and the semi ranking became a ranking!
For another example where the Condorcet tournament succeeds in providing a
ranking consider the following simple profile with two voters and four alternatives:
a a
b c
c b
d d
You can easily see that the Condorcet tournament places a in the first tier, b and c in
the second tier, and d in the bottom tier:
a
bc
d
Why are we interested in generating a ranking out of the Condorcet tournament

when Borda count is readily available to secure one for us with very little effort?
1.5.2 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
The relative ranking of two alternatives x and y by Borda count can be altered while
keeping the relative ranking of x and y by each voter unchanged. To illustrate, consider
the following (first) scenario for three voters and two alternatives a and b:
a a b
b b a
a is ranked higher than b by Borda count since a and b receive 2 points and 1 point,
respectively. If we add a third alternative c as in the following (second) scenario,
a a b
b b c
c c a
the relative ranking of a and b by Borda count becomes a tie with 4 points for each of
these two alternatives. Adding a fourth alternative d as in the following (third) scenario,
the relative ranking by Borda count changes again as b is now ranked higher than a with
7 points for b and 6 points for a. Obviously, withdrawing d and c will bring back the
original Borda count ranking when the contest involved only a and b. If, in the third
1
a a b
b b c
c c d
d d a
scenario with four alternatives, the second voter switches b and c and the third voter
switches a and d, we get the (fourth) scenario
a a b
b c c
c b a
d d d
in which the Borda count relative ranking of a and b changes in favor of a with 7 points
for a and 6 points for b.
What is significant here is that all these changes in the Borda count relative ranking
of a and b occurred while none of the three voters changed his/her opinion as to whether
a is better than b or b is better than a. This phenomenon, known as the dependence on
irrelevant alternatives, is a serious issue with Borda count and social welfare functions
in general, that has generated considerable interest and debate in the literature. Why is
dependence on irrelevant alternative seen as a problem?
In the first scenario above (involving a and b only), a is 1 point higher than b in
each of the first and the second ballots and is 1 point lower than b in the third ballot
and so a scores 1 point higher than b in Borda count. In the third scenario (involving
a, b, c, and d) a continues to be 1 point higher than b in the first and the second ballots
but is 3 points lower than b in the third ballot and so a scores 1 point lower than b in
Borda count. No voter changed his/her relative ranking of a and b but the wider gap in
the third ballot in the third scenario, created by the presence of c and d, is what changed
the outcome in favor of b.
Presumably, the Borda score difference between two alternatives in a certain ballot
is a measure of the intensity of preference for one over the other, but this is questionable
as we briefly explain in the following two points:
1. It is not clear how to quantify and compare the intensities of preference of different
voters, not to mention combining them. In fact, it is doubtful that this makes any
sense at all.
2. Even if this were possible, why should the presence of c and d in the third scenario
increase the third voter’s intensity of preference for b over a? What if c and d were
purposely brought in to manipulate the result in favor of b? For a concrete example,
why should the intensity of your preference for coke b over seven up a increase if
we make available to you a can of pepsi c and a can of ginger ale d as in the third
scenario?
For further investigation of social welfare theory, we need some definitions and
notations.
57 1
Notation 1.5.2 We shall denote voting scenarios by capital Greek letters , , , · · · .
Social welfare functions and semi social welfare functions shall be denoted by small Greek
letters λ, μ, ν, · · · . The ranking (or semi ranking) of the alternatives obtained from a scenario
by a social welfare function (or a semi social welfare function) λ will be denoted λ. The
voters will be labelled 1st, 2nd, 3rd, . . . . The restriction of a scenario or a ranking (or a semi
ranking) to a subset B of the set of A of all alternatives will be indicated by the suffix /B.
These notation and definitions are made clear in the following example.
Example 1.5.3
The restriction of the scenario
1st 2nd 3rd

c d b
= a c d
b a c
d b a
to the two alternatives a and b is
1st 2nd 3rd

/{a, b} = a a b
b b a
in which the voters are asked to choose between a and b only. If the social welfare function
λ is the Borda count, then
c
d
λ =
b
a
as you can easily verify. (Borda points: 3 points for a, 4 points for b, 6 points for c, and 5
points for d.)
We therefore have
b
(λ)/{a, b} =
a
Note also that
a
λ(/{a, b}) =
b
with 2 Borda points for a and 1 Borda point for b.

1
Definition 1.5.4
A semi social welfare function λ is said to satisfy the independence of irrelevant
alternative (IIA) if, for any given scenario and any two alternatives x and y,
(λ)/{x, y} = λ(/{x, y}).

In other words, the relative ranking of any two alternative by λ depends only on their
relative rankings by the voters without any interference from the rest of the alternatives.
This leads to the following formulation of the same definition:
Definition 1.5.4
A semi social welfare function λ is said to satisfy the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) if for every two given scenarios and and two alternatives x
and y with /{x, y} = /{x, y} we have
(λ)/{x, y} = (λ)/{x, y}.

Example 1.5.5
As a social welfare function, the Borda count does not satisfy IIA. This is clear form
Example 1.5.3 since (λ)/{a, b} = λ(/{a, b}) for the given scenario with λ being the
Borda count.
Theorem 1.5.6
As a semi social welfare function, the Condorcet tournament satisfies IIA.

Theorem 1.5.6 needs no proof since the IIA property is built into the definition of
the Condorcet tournament.
Example 1.5.7
As a social welfare function, the Copeland procedure does not satisfy the IIA. This is shown
by the following voting scenario.
1st 2nd 3rd

d e c
c a b
=
b d e
e c a
a b d

59 1
Graph representation for a
Example 1.5.7
e
The Copeland point distribution is
a b c d e
1 2 3 2 2
Let μ be the Copeland social welfare function then
c
c
μ = b d e and therefore (μ)/{c, d} =
d
a
while
1st 2nd 3rd

d
/{c, d} = d d c and therefore μ(/{c, d}) =
c
c c d
and so (μ)/{c, d} = μ(/{c, d}).

The failure of Copeland social welfare function to inherit the IIA from the Condorcet
tournament is worth noticing since the first is directly derived from the second!
1.5.3 Transitivity
Next, we investigate how the pairwise rankings can “fit together properly” so that a
semi ranking becomes a ranking and a semi social welfare function (in particular, the
Condorcet tournament) becomes a social welfare function.
Notation 1.5.8 Let A be a set of at least two alternatives on which a certain semi ranking is
defined. Let x and y be two alternatives in A.
• We write x → y (or y ← x) if x is preferred over y.

• We write x ↔ y or y ↔ x if each of x and y is as good as the other.

• We write x y if x is at least as as good as y, that is, x → y or x ↔ y. Clearly, x y
and y x together mean that x ↔ y.

1
(→ denotes preference, ↔ denotes indifference and denotes weak preference.)

• If x → y we say that x is superior to y; if x ← y we say that x is inferior to y; and if
x ↔ y we say that x is a match for y (and y is a match for x).

• When several rankings are involved, we shall use a subscript to represent the particular
voter (or the semi social welfare function) making the ranking. For example, we shall
write
x →v y to indicate that voter v prefers x over y.

x →λ y to indicate that the society of voters with voting scenario prefer x over y
when the semi social welfare function λ is used to aggregate the voters’ rankings.

Definition 1.5.9
A semi ranking on a set A of alternatives is said to be transitive if for every x, y and
z in A with x y and y z we have x z.

Clearly, a semi ranking is transitive if and only if its restriction to every set of three
alternatives is transitive.
The following corollary is clear.
ⓘ Corollary 1.5.10 A semi ranking is transitive if and only if the following four
conditions are all satisfied for every set of three alternatives x, y, and z.
Condition 1. If x ↔ y and y ↔ z then x z.
Condition 2. If x ↔ y and y → z then x z.
Condition 3. If x → y and y ↔ z then x z.
Condition 4. If x → y and y → z then x z.

The above four conditions can be made more precise as in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.5.11 A semi ranking is transitive if and only if the following four conditions
are all satisfied for every set of three alternatives x, y, and z.
Condition 1. If x ↔ y and y ↔ z then x ↔ z.
Condition 2. If x ↔ y and y → z then x → z.
Condition 3. If x → y and y ↔ z then x → z.
Condition 4. If x → y and y → z then x → z.
Proof
Condition 1: Assume x ↔ y and y ↔ z then by Condition 1 in Corollary 1.5.10 we have
x z. Similarly, from z ↔ y and y ↔ x we get z x. From x z and
z x we then get x ↔ z.

Condition 2: Assume x ↔ y and y → z. If it were not true that x → z then (from Condi-
tion 2 in Corollary 1.5.10) we have x ↔ z. From z ↔ x and x ↔ y we con-
clude by Condition 1 (in this proposition) that z ↔ y, a contradiction. There-
fore, x → z.

61 1
Condition 3. Similar to Condition 2.

Condition 4. Assume x → y and y → z. If it were not true that x → z then (from
Condition 4 in Corollary 1.5.10) we have x ↔ z. From z ↔ x and x → y
we conclude by Condition 2 (in this proposition) that z → y, a contradiction.
Therefore, x → z.

We see from Condition 1 of Proposition 1.5.11 that the indifference ↔ of a transitive

semi ranking on a set A of alternatives partitions A into subsets (tiers) A1 , A2 , · · · , An
such that all alternatives in the same tier are equally favored and if the alternatives x, y
are in two different tiers then one of them is preferred over the other. Further, Conditions
2,3,4 of Proposition 1.5.11 make it possible to list those tiers in a column such that (after
renumbering if necessary), y → x if and only if x is in some Ai and y is in some Aj
with i < j . This proves the “if” part of the following theorem. The “only if” part is
clear.
Theorem 1.5.12
A semi ranking on a set of alternatives is a ranking if and only if it is transitive.

1.5.4 Black’s Theorem
The lack of transitivity of the pairwise ranking created by the Condorcet tournament
is the reason behind its failure to be a social welfare function. This is what we learn
from Theorem 1.5.12. In Theorem 1.5.16 below we provide a sufficient condition on
the voting scenarios that brings about this missing transitivity. It is a special case of
both of the theorems of Black [3] and Sen [21]. Those theorems bring transitivity to
the Condorcet tournament semi ranking by restricting the domain, i.e, restricting the
allowed scenarios to certain types. (More on this topic can be found in [5, 16, 19, 20,
24].)
Proposition 1.5.13 Assume we have a semi ranking on a set A of alternatives such that for
every set of three alternatives:
one of the three is superior to each of the other two

or
one of the three is inferior to each of the other two,
Then the semi ranking is transitive.
Proof
Let a, b, and c be three alternatives. If, say, b → a and b → c, then the restriction of our
semi ranking to a, b, and c is one of the following three rankings:
1
b b
b
a , c or
ac
c a
and therefore the semi ranking is transitive. The other case is similar.

ⓘ Remark 1.5.14
1. In the sequel, we shall consider scenarios where indifference in the voters’ rankings
(preference ballots) occurs. This will require a slight adaptation of the two-alternative
majority rule as follows: Given two alternatives x and y, let m be the number of voters
who prefer x over y and let n be the number of voters who prefer y over x.
• x beats y in the two-alternative majority rule if and only if m > n. (Note that x
may or may not have a majority of the total vote, but must have a majority of the
non-indifferent vote, in order to beat y.)
• x and y are tied in the two-alternative majority rule if and only if m = n.
2. To conform with the principle that the winner in the two-alternative majority rule should
receive a majority of the total vote, we add half of the indifferent vote to each of m and n
above.
3. In the case where voters are allowed to express indifference, ties in the two-alternative
majority rule may occur regardless of whether the number of voters is even or odd. In the
case where indifference is not allowed, ties may occur only when the number of voters is
even.
ⓘ Remark 1.5.15 In some applications, the alternatives and the voters can naturally be
positioned on a straight line and each voter ranks the alternatives based on their
distances from his/her position: the nearer the better. For example, consider the case of
several candidates running for political office and let a, b, and c be three of these
candidates whose positions on the political spectrum are as follows:
a x b y c
b is a centrist, a is a leftist, and c is a rightist. x and y are not candidates: x is the

midpoint between a and b, and y is the midpoint between b and c on the political
spectrum. Under ideal circumstances:
a
• A voter to the left of x should rank the candidates as b .
c
ab
• A voter exactly at x should rank the candidates as .
c
63 1
b b
b
• A voter between x and y should rank the candidates as a , or c .
ac
c a
bc
• A voter exactly at y should rank the candidates as .
a
c
• A voter to the right of y should rank the candidates as b .
a
Therefore, the general form of a voting scenario (restricted to three alternatives) is
h i j k l m n
a b b c
ab b bc
b a c b
c ac a
c c a a
where h, i, j, k, l, m, and n are the corresponding numbers of voters. For example, the
bc
number of voters who ranked the candidates as is m. Note that some rankings such
a
a
as c will not occur in the present situation. (A voter whose most preferred of the three
b
candidates is the leftist a is not expected to prefer the rightist c to the centrist b.)

Theorem 1.5.16
If the alternatives and the voters are as in Remark 1.5.15 and the number of voters is
odd, then the Condorcet tournament is a social welfare function.
1
Proof
Assume that the alternatives and voters are as in Remark 1.5.15 and let μ be the Condorcet
tournament semi social welfare function. Let be a scenario of voting whose restriction to
arbitrary three alternatives a, b, and c is as in Remark 1.5.15. By Theorem 1.5.12, all we
need to prove is that μ is transitive.
h i j k l m n
a b b c
ab b bc
/{a, b, c} =
b a c b
c ac a
c c a a
We have three cases to consider:

Case 1. a →μ c:
In this case we have
h + i + j > l + m + n and therefore h + i + j + k + l > n
which proves that b →μ c. The transitivity of μ now follows from Proposi-
tion 1.5.13 in this case.
Case 2. a ↔μ c:
In this case we have h + i + j = l + m + n. The total number of voters is then
(h + i + j ) + k + (l + m + n) = 2(h + i + j ) + k
which is assumed to be an odd number and so k is a positive odd integer. In

particular, k > 0. It follows that
h + i + j + k > l + m + n and therefore h+i+j +k+l >n
which proves that b →μ c. We also get
k + l + m + n > h + i + j and therefore j +k+l+m+n>h
which proves that b →μ a. The transitivity of μ follows from Proposition 1.5.13
in this case too.
Case 3. c →μ a:
By symmetry, this case is similar to Case 1.

From Definition 1.5.4 we see that a semi social welfare function can satisfy the
IIA if it uses, as building blocks, the pairwise rankings resulting from some two-
alternative rule (which need not be the two-alternative majority rule. (As a social
65 1
welfare function, the Borda count is not built in this manner since it creates a
ranking for the available alternative all at once.) If the consequent semi ranking turns
out to be transitive, we obtain a social welfare function that satisfies the IIA. The
Condorcet tournament satisfies the IIA simply because it is built in this manner (with
the pairwise rankings obtained from the two-alternative majority rule). The problem
with the Condorcet tournament is that it does not, in general, produce a transitive
semi ranking. Theorem 1.5.16 presents a way to bring transitivity to the Condorcet
tournament by limiting our consideration to certain types of scenarios. A simple but
obviously unattractive way to secure both transitivity and IIA together, without limiting
the scenarios considered, is to endow one specific voter with the sole authority to rank
the alternatives on behalf of the entire society of voters. The precise definition is as
follows:
Definition 1.5.17
A social welfare function δ is said to be a strong dictatorship if a specific voter v
(called the strong dictator) is designated such that for every scenario , δ is the
ranking provided by v, that is, given any two alternatives x and y,
x →δ y if and only if x →v y

and
x ↔δ y if and only if x ↔v y.

1.5.5 May’s Theorem
In 1952 Kenneth May proved a landmark theorem about the two-alternative majority
rule which we discuss next. We first explain the notations to be used throughout this
subsection (Sect. 1.5.5) then give formal definitions of some of the desirable properties
satisfied by the two-alternative majority rule.
Notation 1.5.18
1. The two alternatives being compared are a and b.

2. We have n voters labeled vi , i = 1, 2, · · · , n; and the ranking of a and b provided by
voter vi is labeled with the subscript i. For example, a →i b means that voter vi prefers
a over b. Scenarios will involve only those n voters and the two alternatives a, b.

3. The number of voters who prefer a over b is n(a → b), the number of voters who prefer
b over a is n(b → a), and the number of voters who are indifferent is n(a ↔ b) so that
n(a → b) + n(b → a) + n(a ↔ b) = n.

4. The two-alternative rule used to aggregate the rankings of a and b in a scenario for the
n voters and the two alternatives is denoted by μ and, as usual, the ranking that results
from this aggregation is denoted by μ.

1
5. For any given scenario , one and only one of a →μ b, b →μ a and a ↔μ b is
true.

6. A scenario obtained by redistributing the same rankings in among the voters (i.e.,
permuting them as discussed in Sect. 2.3 according to a certain permutation p) will be
denoted by p .

7. The inverse of a scenario , denoted by is the scenario obtained from by replacing
every a →i b with b →i a and every b →i a with a →i b while leaving every
a ↔i b unchanged. Likewise, the inverse of μ, denoted by μ is obtained from μ
by replacing a preference of a over b with a preference of b over a and vice versa, while
leaving an indifference unchanged.

8. If, in scenario , a single voter, say vi , changes her ranking
from a ←i b to a ↔i b or a →i b
OR
from a ↔i b to a →i b,
the new scenario, which is obviously more favorable to a than , will be denoted + .

Definition 1.5.19
A two-alternative rule μ is said to satisfy
1. Anonymity if μp = μ for every scenario and every permutation p of the
voters’ rankings.

2. Neutrality if μ = μ for every scenario .

3. Monotonicity if a →μ + b whenever a ↔μ b or a →μ b.

(Anonymity means that the outcome depends only on the numbers n(a → b),
n(b → a) and n(a ↔ b) regardless of the identities of the voters who provided
each of the three types of rankings.)
Neutrality means that if a and b exchange votes then the outcome is reversed (if it
was in favor of either one) and stays the same if they were originally tied.
Monotonicity means that an alternative that is already tied or winning will be
winning if it receives additional support.
The two-alternative majority rule obviously satisfies all of the three properties
in Definitions 1.5.19. The significance of May’s theorem is that it singles out the
two-alternative majority rule as the only two-alternative rule that satisfies those three
properties. In other words, if we start building a two-alternative rule with those three
properties in mind, we shall find ourselves face-to-face with the two-alternative majority
rule and no other!
Proposition 1.5.20 If the scenario is such that n(a → b) = n(b → a) and the two-
alternative rule μ satisfies anonymity and neutrality, then a ↔μ b.
67 1
Proof
Assuming that n(a → b) = n(b → a) we see that = p for some permutation p of the
voters’ rankings in in which the voters who prefer a over b exchange their rankings with
those who prefer b over a. By anonymity of μ we have μp = μ and by neutrality of μ
we have μ = μ. It follows that
μ = μ = μp = μ.
From Notations 1.5.18 we see that the only way that μ and μ could be equal is that μ is
an indifference, that is a ↔μ b.

Proposition 1.5.21 If the scenario is such that n(a → b) > n(b → a) and the two-
alternative rule μ satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity, then a →μ b.
Proof
Assume n(a → b) > n(b → a) and let k = n(a → b) − n(b → a), then k > 0. Let us
construct a scenario from by “convincing” k of the voters who prefer a over b to change
their rankings to indifference. Clearly the conditions of Proposition 1.5.20 apply to and
so a ↔μ b. Now let us recover from by making those k voters switch their rankings
back from indifference to preference for a over b, one at a time. By monotonicity of μ we
get a →μ b.

Theorem 1.5.22 (Kenneth May, 1952)

The two-alternative majority rule is the only two-alternative rule that satisfies
anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity.
Proof
The theorem follows immediately from Propositions 1.5.20 and 1.5.21.

1.5.6 Dictatorship and Arrow’s Theorem
Perhaps the most important result in social welfare theory is the theorem known as
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem proven by the 1972 Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow
in his monograph Social Choice and Individual Values published in 1951. We present
here a stronger version of the theorem, proven by Arrow in the second edition [1] of the
same monograph in 1963. Arrow puts forward a seemingly innocuous set of axioms that
a social welfare function should satisfy and proves that the only social welfare function
that satisfies those reasonable axioms is a form of dictatorship somewhat similar to
(though slightly weaker than) the strong dictatorship in Definition 1.5.17.
1
Arrow’s Axioms 1.5.23 A semi social welfare function λ needs to satisfy the following
axioms:
1. Unrestricted Domain. This means that all scenarios are allowed, in contrast to Black’s
theorem (Theorem 1.5.16). which limits the allowable scenarios.
2. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).
3. Weak Pareto Condition: If, in a scenario , every voter prefers alternative x to alternative
y then x →λ y.
4. Collective Rationality. This axiom means that for every scenario , λ is transitive. (This
axiom is already included in our definition of a social welfare function.)

Before we state and prove Arrow’s theorem, we need the following definition.
Definition 1.5.24
A semi social welfare function δ is said to be dictatorial (or a dictatorship) if a
specific voter v (called the dictator) is designated such that for every scenario and
every pair of alternatives x, y,
x →v y implies x →δ y.

A strong dictator (as in Definition 1.5.17) fully enforces her ranking (both prefer-
ences and indifferences) of the alternatives on the society of voters, while a dictator (as
in Definition 1.5.24) enforces only his preferences. For example, if the ranking of voter
a
a a a
b
v is b c , then the societal ranking δ is b c if v is a strong dictator; but can be b c ,
c
d d d
d
a
c
or if v is only a dictator.
b
d
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 1.5.25 (Arrow [1]) For a set A of at least three alternatives
and a set V of at least two voters, a semi social welfare function satisfies Arrow’s axioms if
and only if it is a dictatorship.

If we add to Arrow’s axioms a fifth axiom that rules out dictatorship, it would be
impossible to find a semi social welfare function (or a social welfare function) that
satisfies all the five axioms together, hence the “impossibility” part in the theorem’s
title.
The proof of Arrow’s theorem will follow as a culmination of several partial results.
It is a truly original, deep, and pioneering mathematical work.
69 1
Notation 1.5.26
1. In the sequel, V will denote a set of at least two voters, A will denote a set of at least three
alternatives, and λ will denote a semi social welfare function. Further, D will denote a
nonempty subset of V .

2. The set of voters not in D will be denoted by V \D.

3. If all the voters in D prefer alternative x over alternative y we shall write x →D y.
Similarly, x →V \D y will denote a concerted vote by voters in V \D for x over y.

4. If is a scenario in which x →D y and y →V \D x, we may write
D V \D
/{x, y} = x y ·
y x

Definition 1.5.27
D is said to be
1. nearly λ-decisive if for every x, y in A and every scenario such that x →D y
and y →V \D x we have x →λ y.

2. λ-decisive if for every x, y in A and every scenario such that x →D y we
have x →λ y.

ⓘ Remark 1.5.28
1. Members of a nearly λ-decisive set D of voters are able to force their concerted
preference for x over y against the concerted opposite preference (y over x) by the voters
not in D. Members of a λ-decisive set E of voters, on the other hand, are able to force
their concerted preference for x over y against any configuration of rankings by the voters
not in E, including their concerted opposite preference (y over x).

2. It may seem intuitive that a nearly λ-decisive set should also be λ-decisive since it
is able to prevail against the most challenging opposition possible, but we work with
axioms, not with intuition, and we have nothing available in our axioms to lend an
immediate support to this intuition. It will take some elaborate arguments involving a
very interesting interplay among Arrow’s axioms to prove the validity of this intuition,
which constitutes a significant part of the proof of Arrow’s theorem.

The following corollary follows immediately from the definitions, with no need to
invoke any of Arrow’s axioms. (See the first Remark in 1.5.28.)
ⓘ Corollary 1.5.29 A λ-decisive set is nearly λ-decisive.

1
Proposition 1.5.30 Assume we have two specific alternatives a, b in A and a specific
scenario that satisfies
D V \D
Condition I: /{a, b} = a b
b a
and
a
Condition II: (λ)/{a, b} =
b
where λ is a semi social welfare function that satisfies IIA. Then every scenario that
satisfies Condition I must also satisfy Condition II, that is
D V \D
a
/{a, b} = a b implies (λ)/{a, b} = .
b
b a
Proof
This is an immediate consequence of the IIA (Definition 1.5.4 ).

The student should note the relation between Proposition 1.5.30 and the definition of
near λ-decisiveness in 1.5.27. Informally speaking, Proposition 1.5.30 assumes just one
single occurrence of the defining condition of near λ-decisiveness for D (involving a
specific pair of alternatives a and b, and a specific scenario ) and, using only the IIA,
the proposition extends this single occurrence to all scenarios that satisfy Condition I
for these two specific alternatives. Using the axioms of Arrow, combined, the following
lemma will further extend this to all pairs of alternatives x and y, thus proving the near
λ-decisiveness of D.
ⓘ Lemma 1.5.31 Assume we have two specific alternatives a, b in A, and a specific

scenario with
D V \D
a
Condition I: /{a, b} = a b and Condition II: (λ)/{a, b} =
b
b a
and assume further that λ satisfies Arrow’s axioms. Then D is nearly λ-decisive.
Proof
By Proposition 1.5.30, every scenario that satisfies Condition I will necessarily satisfy
Condition II.
71 1
Step 1: Pick an arbitrary alternative y that is different from each of a and b. (This is possible
since there are at least three alternatives in A.) By the axiom of unrestricted domain,
there is a scenario such that
D V \D
a b
/{a, b, y} = .
b y
y a
It follows from Proposition 1.5.30 that a →λ b and from the weak Pareto axiom
that b →λ y. Collective rationality now implies
a
Condition II: (λ )/{a, y} = ·
y
Since we also have
D V \D
Condition I: /{a, y} = a y ,
y a
it follows from Proposition 1.5.30 and the arbitrariness of y that
D V \D
a
/{a, y} = a y implies (λ)/{a, y} =
y
y a
for every scenario and every alternative y that is different from a. (Notice how the
arbitrary y has replaced the specific b we started with. In the next step, an arbitrary
x will replace the specific a.)
Step 2: Pick an arbitrary alternative x that is different from each of a and y. (This is possible
since there are at least three alternatives in A.) By the axiom of unrestricted domain,
there is a scenario such that
D V \D
x y
/{a, x, y} = .
a x
y a
It follows from Proposition 1.5.30 that a →λ y and from the weak Pareto axiom
that x →λ a. Collective rationality now implies
x
Condition II: (λ )/{x, y} = ·
y
Since we also have
D V \D
Condition I: /{x, y} = x y ,
y x
it follows from Proposition 1.5.30 and the arbitrariness of x and y that
D V \D
x
/{x, y} = x y implies (λ)/{x, y} =
y
y x
1
for every scenario and every pair of different alternatives x and y. This
completes the proof of our lemma.

ⓘ Lemma 1.5.32 Assume that λ satisfies Arrow’s axioms. Then D is λ-decisive if and
only if it is nearly λ-decisive.
Proof
We only need to prove that near λ-decisiveness implies λ-decisiveness, since the converse
has already been established in Corollary 1.5.29.
Let x and y be two different arbitrary alternatives. Let be a scenario in which every
voter in D prefers x over y. Partition V \D into three sets E, F, G such that
DEF G
/{x, y} = x x y x y .
y y x
Pick an arbitrary alternative z that is different from each of x and y. (This is possible
since we have at least three alternatives.) By the axiom of unrestricted domain, we can find a
scenario such that
D E F G
x x y xy
/{x, y, z} =
z y x z
y z z
It follows from the near λ-decisiveness of D that z →λ y and from the weak Pareto axiom
that x →λ z. Collective rationality now implies x →λ y. Since /{x, y} = /{x, y} (as
you can easily verify), it follows from the axiom of IIA that
x
(λ)/{x, y} = (λ )/{x, y} = ·
y
Since is an arbitrary scenario with the only restriction that all voters in D prefer x over
y (with no restrictions as to how the individual voters in V \D rank x and y relative to one
another), and since x and y are arbitrary alternatives, it follows that D is λ-decisive. This
completes the proof of the lemma.

ⓘ Corollary 1.5.33 Assume we have two specific alternatives a, b in A, and a specific

scenario such that
D V \D
a
b
b a
are both satisfied, and assume further that λ satisfies Arrow’s axioms. Then D is
λ-decisive.
73 1
Proof
This follows immediately from Proposition 1.5.30, Lemma 1.5.31, and Lemma 1.5.32.

ⓘ Lemma 1.5.34 Assume that λ satisfies Arrow’s axioms and that D is a λ-decisive set of
at least two voters. Partition D into two non-empty subsets D1 and D2 . Then one (and
only one) of D1 and D2 is λ-decisive.
Proof
Let x, y, and z be three different alternatives. (Again, this is possible since we have at least
three alternatives.) By the axiom of unrestricted domain, we can find a scenario such that
D1 D2 V \D
x z y
/{x, y, z} = .
y x z
z y x
z
If (λ)/{y, z} = then, D2 is λ-decisive (by Corollary 1.5.33) and D1 is not. If
y
z
(λ)/{y, z} = , then λ ranks y at least as high as z that is,
y
y λ z.
But from the λ-decisiveness of D we have
x →λ y.
It then follows from Collective rationality that
x →λ z
and therefore D1 is λ-decisive (by Corollary 1.5.33) and D2 is not. The proof is now
complete.

Proof 1.5.35 (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem) Starting off with the set V of all voters
(which is evidently λ-decisive by the weak Pareto axiom) we shall reach, after a finite
sequence of applications of Lemma 1.5.34, a λ-decisive set with only one voter. This voter is
a dictator as easily seen from Definitions 1.5.24 and 1.5.27. This will complete the proof. In
detail:
1. Partition V into two nonempty sets (this is possible since there are at least two voters in
V ). One and only one of those two sets is λ-decisive by Lemma 1.5.34. Denote this set
by D1 .
1
2. If D1 contains two or more voters, we can partition it into two nonempty subsets, one
and only one of which is λ-decisive. Denote this set by D11 . Obviously, D11 has fewer
members than D1 .
Continuing in this fashion, we must reach, after finitely many applications of

Lemma 1.5.34, a λ-decisive set with just one voter. This voter is our dictator or, more
precisely, λ-dictator.

1.5.7 Oligarchy and Gibbard’s Theorem
In Sect. 1.5.4 above, we saw how restricting the allowable scenarios can bring transitiv-
ity to the Condorcet tournament (Black’s theorem), thus making it into a social welfare
function. It can be easily verified that the social welfare function so obtained satisfies
the Weak Pareto axiom in addition to the inbuilt IIA and the Collective rationality that
has been brought into it. This is a good example of how relaxing one or more of Arrow’s
axioms (the axiom of unrestricted domain in this case) can replace Arrow’s dictatorship
with a more appealing outcome.
In an unpublished manuscript [8, 23], Allen Gibbard replaced the collective ratio-
nality (included here in our definition of a social welfare functions) with the weaker
property in the following definitions. (Compare to Definition 1.5.9, Corollary 1.5.10,
Proposition 1.5.11, and Theorem 1.5.12 above.)
Definition 1.5.36
1. A semi ranking on a set A of alternatives is said to be quasi transitive if for
every x, y, and z in A with x → y and y → z we have x → z.

2. A quasi transitive semi ranking is said to be a quasi ranking.

3. A semi social welfare function λ is said to be a quasi social welfare function if
for every scenario , λ is quasi transitive. We also say, in this case that λ
satisfies the axiom of collective quasi-rationality.

ⓘ Corollary 1.5.37 A semi ranking on a set A of alternatives is quasi transitive if and

only if it satisfies the following two conditions for every x, y, z in A:
1. If x → y and y z then x z.
2. If x y and y → z then x z.
Proof
First, assume that the semi ranking at hand is quasi transitive. If Condition 1 is not satisfied,
then there are x, y, z in A such that x → y, y z and z → x. From z → x and x → y and
the assumed quasi transitivity we get z → y, a contradiction. This proves condition 1. The
proof of Condition 2 is similar.
Next, assume the above two conditions and let x, y, z be alternatives in A such that
x → y and y → z then, from Condition 1 we see that x z (i.e., x ↔ z or x → z). If
75 1
z ↔ x then, this together with x → y and Condition 2 yields z y, a contradiction. Hence
x → z which proves quasi transitivity.

It is clear from Proposition 1.5.11 that transitivity implies quasi transitivity. The converse
is not true: Consider, for example, the case where A consists of three alternatives x, y, z with
x → y, y ↔ z and x ↔ z.

Following the notations in 1.5.26 we have
Definition 1.5.38
A non-empty subset D of the set V of voters is said to be
1. nearly λ-blocking if for every x, y in A and every scenario such that x →D y
and y →V \D x we have x λ y.

2. λ-blocking if for every x, y in A and every scenario such that x →D y we
have x λ y.

The use of the adjective “blocking” can be explained by noting that D is λ-blocking
if and only if the members of D can block the collective preference of y over x by
their concerted preference for x over y (but may allow a tie between x and y). If {v}
is a nearly λ-blocking (or λ-blocking) set, we say that v is a nearly λ-blocking (or a
λ-blocking) voter.
Definition 1.5.39
A semi social welfare function λ is said to be oligarchic if there exists a non-empty
set D of voters, called oligarchy (or λ-oligarchy, to be more precise) such that D is
λ-decisive and each member of D is λ-blocking.

A λ-dictator is automatically λ-blocking, as you can easily verify. It is therefore

possible to think of a dictatorship as an oligarchy consisting of only one member.
Gibbard’s Theorem 1.5.40 If λ is a semi social welfare function that satisfies the following
axioms (henceforth called Gibbard’s axioms):
1. Unrestricted Domain,
2. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives,
3. Weak Pareto,
4. Collective quasi-rationality
then λ is oligarchic.

The proof of Gibbard’s theorem will come as a culmination of the following partial
result (Corollary 1.5.41 through Proposition 1.5.43). First, we note that Corollary 1.5.33
above was arrived at with the help of collective quasi-rationality, not the full strength
of collective rationality. This establishes Part 1 of the following corollary. We ask the
1
student to prove Part 2 by revising the statements and proofs of Proposition 1.5.30,
Lemmas 1.5.31, and 1.5.32.
ⓘ Corollary 1.5.41 Assume that the semi social welfare function λ satisfies Gibbard’s
axioms and let D be a nonempty subset of the set V of voters.
1. If two specific alternatives a, b in A, and a specific scenario exist such that
D V \D
a
b
b a
are both satisfied, then D is λ-decisive.

2. If two specific alternatives a, b in A, and a specific scenario exist such that
D V \D
a
Condition I: /{a, b} = a b and Condition II: (λ)/{a, b} = or ab
b
b a
are both satisfied, then D is λ-blocking.

A student who is not familiar with the set-theoretic notations used below can refer
to 1.7.A for an explanation of these notations.
ⓘ Lemma 1.5.42 Assume that the semi social welfare function λ satisfies Gibbard’s
axioms and let D and E be two λ-decisive subsets of the set V of voters. Then
1. D ∩ E is nonempty.
2. D ∩ E is λ-decisive.
Proof
1. Assume to the contrary that D ∩ E = ∅ and let a and b be two different alternatives. By
the axiom of unrestricted domain, we can find a scenario such that
a →D b and b →E a·
The λ-decisiveness of both D and E now yields the two contradictory conclusions
a →λ b and b →λ a. Hence D ∩ E = ∅.
2. Let x, y, z be three different alternatives. By the axiom of unrestricted domain we can
find a scenario such that
D ∩ E D\E E\D V \(D ∪ E)

x z y z
/{x, y, z} =
y x z y
z y x x
Since D is λ-decisive, we have x →λ y; and since E is also λ-decisive, we have y →λ
z. By the axiom of collective quasi-rationality we then have x →λ z. It follows from
Corollary 1.5.41 that D ∩ E is λ-decisive.

77 1
Proposition 1.5.43 Assume that the semi social welfare function λ satisfies Gibbard’s
axioms. Then there exists a unique subset D of V such that
1. D is a nonempty λ-decisive subset of V .
2. If E is a λ-decisive subset of V , then D is a subset of E. (D is termed the smallest
λ-decisive subset of V .)
3. If D is a singleton, that is D = {v} for some voter v, then v is a dictator (more precisely,
a λ-dictator).
Proof
1. The weak Pareto axiom guarantees the existence of at least one λ-decisive subset of the
set V of all voters, namely V itself.
Let D be the intersection of all λ-decisive subsets of V . Finitely many applications
of Lemma 1.5.42 prove that D is a nonempty λ-decisive subset of V .
2. This follows since E is one of the sets whose intersection is D.
3. This is clear since D is λ-decisive.
The uniqueness of D is evident because if G is another smallest λ-decisive subset of V ,
then D ⊆ G and G ⊆ D and so G = D.

Proof 1.5.44 (Gibbard’s Theorem) We show that the nonempty subset D of V , obtained in
Proposition 1.5.43, is an oligarchy. If D is a singleton, then λ is both oligarchic and dictatorial
as pointed out above. It remains to consider the case when D consists of more than one voter,
which we do next.
Since D is already known to be λ-decisive, we only need to show that each voter v in D
is λ-blocking.
Let x, y, z be three different alternatives and let v be an arbitrary voter in D. By the
axiom of unrestricted domain we can find a scenario such that
D\{v} {v} V \D
z x y
/{x, y, z} =
x y z
y z x
If z →λ y, then D\{v} is λ-decisive by Part 1 of Corollary 1.5.41, contrary to the

assumption that D is the smallest λ-decisive subset of V . We must therefore have y λ z;
but since D is λ-decisive we must also have x →λ y. Using Corollary 1.5.37, it now follows
from x →λ y and y λ z that x λ z. Finally, it follows from Part 2 of Corollary 1.5.37
that voter v is λ-blocking.

1
A Note on the Proofs of Arrow’s Theorem and Gibbard’s Theorem In the proof of
Lemma 1.5.34, the stronger property of transitivity enabled us to partition a given λ-
decisive set D of at least two voters into two nonempty subsets D1 and D2 , one of
which is λ-decisive. Finitely many applications of this result led to a λ-decisive set with
just one voter: Arrow’s Dictator.
The weaker property of quasi transitivity (if used in the proof of Lemma 1.5.34
instead of transitivity) will fall short of establishing that one of D1 and D2 is λ-decisive.
It will, instead, establish that either D2 is λ-decisive or D1 is λ-blocking (Verify!). If
D2 is not λ-decisive, we stop. If D2 is λ-decisive, it must contain all members of the
oligarchy. We partition D2 into D21 and D22 . We can continue with the partitioning
process till further partitioning results in two parts none of which is λ-decisive. The
last λ-decisive set so obtained must contain Gibbard’s Oligarchy. It will be exactly that
oligarchy if we are so lucky that all our partitions leave the entire oligarchy in one of the
two parts. Of course, if the oligarchy happens to consist of only one voter (a dictator), it
will always fall into one of the two parts and will be found at the end of the partitioning
process.
Example 1.5.45
Assume that λ satisfies Arrow’s axioms and consider the following scenario
s t u
a a b
=
c b ac
b c
for the set V = {s, t, u} of voters and the set A = {a, b, c} of alternatives, and assume that
a →λ b.
1. How does λ rank a and c?
2. Find all the possibilities for λ and identify the dictator associated with each possibility.
Solution
1. Let D = {s, t}. Since a →D b, b →V \D a and a →λ b, it follows from
Corollary 1.5.33 that D is λ-decisive and so a →λ c since we also have a →D c.

a
2. From Lemma 1.5.34 we see that either s is the dictator and therefore λ = c , or t is the
b
a
dictator and therefore λ = b .

c
1.6 · Social Choice Procedures: Indifference and Ties Allowed
79 1
1.6 Social Choice Procedures: Indifference and Ties Allowed
In our study of social choice procedures in the first four sections of this chapter, we
did not allow indifference in the voters’ ballots and, with few exception including
Example 1.3.23 on McGarvey’s theorem, we avoided ties in the outcome. In this section,
we generalize the standard social choice procedures so that voters can submit rankings
of the kind introduced in Definition 1.5.1 instead of mandating them to submit strict
preferences. The crucial point here is that when no indifference occurs in the voters’
ballots, the proposed generalization of a certain social choice procedure should agree
with the original version of the procedure. Recall that when two or more alternatives
are tied for winning, we speak of a winning set or a social choice set. For example, if
a, b, and c are tied for winning, the social choice set will be {a, b, c} and, if a is the sole
winner, the social choice set will be {a}.
1.6.1 Standard Social Choice Procedures
In Sect. 1.4 we viewed the plurality procedure as a scoring procedure in which every
voter is in possession of exactly one point to be given, undivided, to the one candidate he
prefers most. The most natural generalization, if we are to allow indifference in voters’
rankings, is to equally divide each voter’s point among the candidates in his first tier. For
example, if a voter picks 3 candidates as her top choice, each of those candidates receives
one third of a point from her. (A voter whose ranking consists of only one tier equally
distributes his point among all candidates, or we may just drop that voter’s ballot from
our calculations.) The total number of points received by all candidates remains equal to
the number of voters (as it should). As usual, a majority candidate is a candidate who
receives more than half of the total number of points.
The generalizations of the plurality with run-off and the Hare procedures use
the present manner of point calculation in implementing Definitions 1.2.1 and 1.2.5
of the original versions of these two procedures. As for the Coombs procedure, we
only need to mention that in Definition 1.2.8, the last choice votes are calculated in the
same way as the top choice votes: If a voter’s last tier consists of 3 candidates, each
of those candidates get one third of a last choice vote from him. In the procedures of
plurality, plurality with run-of, Hare and Coombs, one-tier ballots are to be dropped
from our calculations. If all ballots are one-tier ballots, the social choice set consists of
all candidates.
To explain our generalization of Borda count to the case where a tier may include
more than one alternative, consider the following example of two rankings of seven
alternatives: The first ranking does not include indifference and the second ranking does.
1
a 6
b 5 Tiers Points in a tier Total point in a tier Points per alternative
c 4 a, b 5,6 11 11/2 = 5.5
d 3 c 4 4 4/1 = 4
e 2 d, e, f 1,2,3 6 6/3=2
f 1 g 0 0 0/1 =0
g 0
In the second ranking, alternatives in the same tier equally share the sum of points
that they would have earned if they were in different tiers (as in the first ranking). As
shown, g earns 0 points, each of d, e, f earns 2 points, c earns 4 points, and each of
a, b earns 5.5 points. Following the same pattern, the student should be able to verify
the point-worth of being in each tier in the following ranking of 10 alternatives:
Tier Points per alternative

a, b 8.5
c, d, e 6
f 4
g, h 2.5
i, j 0.5
Here is a unified definition of the generalized Borda count and the standard Borda
count:
An alternative x receives from a ranking ballot one point per each alternative in
lower tiers, half a point per each alternative (other than x itself) in the same tier, and
zero points per each alternative in higher tiers.
To justify the above definition, assume that alternative x is in a tier that has p
alternatives (including x) and the total number of alternatives in the tiers lower than
x’s tier is q. Then the total score of the alternatives in x’s tier is
p(p − 1)
q+(q+1)+(q+2)+· · ·+(q+p−1) = pq+(1+2+· · ·+(p−1)) = pq+ .
2
Since this total is equally shared by p alternatives (including x), we see that x receives

1 p(p − 1) 1
pq + = q + (p − 1),
p 2 2
in agreement with the above generalized Borda count definition.

As in Lemma 1.4.10, each voter has
k(k − 1)
2
81 1
points to contribute to the pool of points; and the sum of the Borda scores of all
alternatives is
k(k − 1)n
points.
2
The two-alternative majority rule was defined in the second remark in 1.5.14
in a generalized form that allows indifference. Based on this generalization of the
two-alternative majority rule, the generalizations of the following concepts follow
immediately: Copeland procedure, Condorcet tournament, Condorcet winner, and
Condorcet loser.
Example 1.6.1
The following scenario shows the rankings of five alternatives a, b, c, d, and e by five voters.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

ab c cd e a bd
c d a bc ac
de abe b d e
e
The corresponding graph representation is shown in ⊡ Fig. 1.12.

1. There is no Condorcet winner and e is a Condorcet loser.
2. The plurality procedure scores are as follows:
a: 12 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 0 = 96
b: 12 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 12 = 66
c: 0 + 1 + 13 + 0 + 0 = 86
d: 0 + 0 + 13 + 0 + 12 = 56
e: 0 + 0 + 13 + 0 + 0 = 26
The sum of plurality scores is equal to the number of voters, as it should. The plurality
procedure choice set is {a}.

e
c
1
3. If indifference was not allowed, a majority would have meant ≥ 3 votes since we have
5 voters. With indifference allowed, votes are not necessarily integers so we must follow
the formal definition of a majority as greater than half of the number of voters ( 52 in the
present example).
There is no majority alternative to win the Hare procedure in the first round. We
eliminate e since it has the lowest top choice score. The updated scenario is
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

ab c cd a bd
c d a bc ac
d ab b d
and the top choice scores are

a: 12 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 0 = 96
b: 12 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 12 = 66
c: 0 + 1 + 12 + 0 + 0 = 96
d: 0 + 0 + 12 + 0 + 12 = 66
The sum checks correctly. No majority. b and d are eliminated and we are left with a
and c which are tied as seen from the graph representation. The Hare procedure choice
set is therefore {a, c}.

4. There is no majority candidate to win the Coombs procedure in the first round. The
bottom choice distribution is
a: 0 + 13 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 26
b: 0 + 13 + 1 + 0 + 0 = 86
c: 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
d: 12 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 36
e: 12 + 13 + 0 + 1 + 1 = 17
6
We eliminate e since it has the highest last choice score. The updated scenario is
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

ab c cd a bd
c d a bc ac
d ab b d
There is no majority candidate in this scenario. The bottom choice scores are
a: 0 + 12 + 0 + 0 + 12 = 66
b: 0 + 12 + 1 + 0 + 0 = 96
c: 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 12 = 36
d: 1 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 0 = 12 6
83 1
Here is the updated scenario after the elimination of d:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

ab c c a b
c a bc ac
ab b
The top choice scores are

a: 12 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 0 = 96
b: 12 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 = 96
c: 0 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 0 = 126
Again, no majority candidate exists. The last choice scores are

a: 0 + 12 + 0 + 0 + 12 = 66
b: 0 + 12 + 1 + 12 + 0 = 12
6
c: 1 + 0 + 0 + 12 + 12 = 12
6
b and c are eliminated and the Coombs social choice set is {a}.

5. The Borda count scores are:
a: 72 + 1 + 1 + 4 + 32 = 222
b: 72 + 1 + 0 + 52 + 72 = 21
2
c: 2 + 4 + 3 + 52 + 32 = 26
2
d: 12 + 3 + 3 + 1 + 72 = 222
e: 12 + 1 + 3 + 0 + 0 = 92
The total sum of scores of all candidates is 50, which is the correct sum. The Borda
count social choice set is {c}.

6. To proceed with the Hare–Borda procedure, we eliminate e. The updated scenario is
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

ab c cd a bd
c d a bc ac
d ab b d
and the new Borda scores scores are

a: 52 + 12 + 1 + 3 + 12 = 15
2
b: 52 + 12 + 0 + 32 + 52 = 14
2
c: 1 + 3 + 52 + 32 + 12 = 17
2
d: 0 + 2 + 52 + 0 + 52 = 142
We eliminate b and d, and the Hare–Borda social choice set is {a, c} as can be seen
from the graph representation.

1
1.6.2 More Condorcet-Type Classifications of the Alternatives
Example 1.6.2
The following are the rankings of five alternatives a, b, c, d, and e by four voters, and the
corresponding graph representation.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th

a e d abe
b c c cd
cd ab ab
e d e
There is no Condorcet winner or loser in this scenario. With close examination, you can
see that in the Condorcet tournament:
1. a beats each of b, d, and e; and ties with c.
2. b beats each of d and e; ties with c; and loses to a.
3. c ties with all of its opponents.
4. d ties with each of c and e; and loses to each of a and b.
5. e ties with each of c and d; and loses to each of a and b.
Motivated by the above five observations, we make the following definitions that lie between
the two extremes of a Condorcet winner and a Condorcet loser (⊡ Fig. 1.13).
Definition 1.6.3
An alternative is said to be
1. a weak Condorcet winner if it loses to no opponent in the Condorcet
tournament, beats at least one and ties with at least one.

(a in Example 1.6.2.)
2. a Condorcet neutralizer if it ties with all its opponents in the Condorcet
tournament.

(c in Example 1.6.2.)
(continued )

e
c
85 1
Definition 1.6.3 (continued)

3. a strong Condorcet loser if it beats no opponent in the Condorcet tournament,
loses to at least one and ties with at least one.

(d and e in Example 1.6.2.)
(b in Example 1.6.2 is “none of the above.”)
Proposition 1.6.4 No weak Condorcet winner or Condorcet neutralizer can exist in the
presence of a Condorcet winner.
Proof
This is clear since a Condorcet winner must beat each of his opponents, leaving no possibility
for a weak Condorcet winner or a Condorcet neutralizer to exist.

Proposition 1.6.5
1. Let j be the number of weak Condorcet winners in a scenario with k ≥ 3 alternatives.
Then the only possible values for j are 0, 1, 2, · · · , k − 1.
2. A weak Condorcet winner cannot exist in the case of exactly two alternatives.
Proof
1. The requirement that a weak Condorcet winner must beat at least one opponent rules out
the possibility of j = k. A complete directed graph with k vertices all of its arrows are
bidirectional proves the case j = 0.
For the case of exactly one weak Condorcet winner, construct a graph with 3 of the k
vertices, say a, b, c, are such that a → b, b → c, and c ↔ a, then draw a unidirectional
arrow from each of a, b, and c to each of the remaining k − 3 vertices. This makes a the
only weak Condorcet winner.
For 2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, construct a complete directed graph with j vertices all of its
arrows are bidirectional, then augment this graph with k − j vertices and unidirectional
arrows from each of the j vertices to each of the k − j vertices. Each of the graphs
constructed in this proof can be realized by a scenario of voting, thanks to McGarvey’s
theorem (Theorem 1.3.21).

2. This is clear.

Proposition 1.6.6 Let a and b be two weak Condorcet winners in a given scenario, then
a ↔ b in the Condorcet tournament.
Proof
Neither one can lose to the other and therefore we must have a ↔ b.

Next, we shall adapt the results in Sects. 1.4.3, 1.4.4, and 1.4.5 to accommodate the
case of indifference by voters and cover the Condorcet-type concepts of Definition 1.6.3.
1
ⓘ Remark 1.6.7 Given two alternatives a and x we introduced the notation #(a ↓ x, i) in
1.4.C to represent the number of times a beats x in the ith voter’s ballot. To
accommodate the above generalization of Borda count that allows indifference, we need
to modify the meaning of this notation as follows:
#(a ↓ x, i) = 0 if the ith voter prefers x to a or x = a.
#(a ↓ x, i) = 12 if the ith voter ranks a and x in the same tier.
#(a ↓ x, i) = 1 if the ith voter prefers a to x.
You can verify that, as in Notations 1.4.7, we still have

The Borda score of a = #(a ↓ x, i) = #(a ↓ x, i) = #(a ↓ x).
i x x i x

where #(a ↓ x) = i #(a ↓ x, i) is the score of a against x in the two-alternative
majority rule (as in the second Remark in 1.5.14).

As noted in Proposition 1.4.8, x beats y in the Condorcet tournament if and only if

#(x ↓ y) > n2 where n is the number of voters. For this to happen, #(x ↓ y) must be
at least 12 more than n2 . Similarly, x loses to y in the Condorcet tournament if and only
if #(x ↓ y) is at least 12 less than n2 . This leads to the following (sharper) version of
Proposition 1.4.8.
Proposition 1.6.8 Given two alternatives x and y in an n-voter scenario,

1. x beats y in the Condorcet tournament if and only if #(x ↓ y) ≥ n+1
2 ·
2 ·
2. x loses to y in the Condorcet tournament if and only if #(x ↓ y) ≤ n−1
3. x and y are tied in the Condorcet tournament if and only if #(x ↓ y) = n2 ·
ⓘ Corollary 1.6.9 In a scenario with k alternatives and n voters,

1. If c is a Condorcet winner, then
(k − 1)n k − 1
The Borda score of c ≥ + ·
2 2
2. If c is a weak Condorcet winner, then
(k − 1)n 1
The Borda score of c ≥ + ·
2 2
3. If c is a Condorcet neutralizer, then
(k − 1)n
The Borda score of c = ·
2
4. If c is a strong Condorcet loser, then
(k − 1)n 1
The Borda score of c ≤ − ·
2 2
87 1
5. If c is a Condorcet loser, then
(k − 1)n k − 1
The Borda score of c ≤ − ·
2 2
Proof
1. If c is a Condorcet winner, it follows from Proposition 1.6.8 that c must score at least
2 points against each of its k − 1 opponents in the Condorcet tournament. Now from
n+1
Remark 1.6.7 we have
(k − 1)(n + 1) (k − 1)n k − 1
The Borda score of c ≥ = + ·
2 2 2

2. To be a weak Condorcet winner, c must beat at least one opponent in the Condorcet
tournament and tie with the rest. Therefore, from Proposition 1.6.8 and Remark 1.6.7 we
have
(k − 2)n n + 1 (k − 1)n 1
The Borda score of c = #(c ↓ x) ≥ + = + ·
x
2 2 2 2

3. To be a Condorcet neutralizer, c must tie with each of its k−1 opponents in the Condorcet
tournament. The result follows from Proposition 1.6.8 and Remark 1.6.7.

4. To be a strong Condorcet loser, c must lose to at least one opponent in the Condorcet
tournament and tie with the rest. Therefore, from Proposition 1.6.8 and Remark 1.6.7 we
have
(k − 2)n n − 1 (k − 1)n 1
The Borda score of c = #(c ↓ x) ≤ + = − ·
x
2 2 2 2

5. If c is a Condorcet loser, it follows from Proposition 1.6.8 that c must score at most
2 points against each of its k − 1 opponents in the Condorcet tournament. Now from
n−1
Remark 1.6.7 we have
(k − 1)(n − 1) (k − 1)n k − 1
The Borda score of c ≤ = − ·
2 2 2

Theorem 1.6.10
In a scenario with k alternatives and n voters
1. Neither a Condorcet winner nor a weak Condorcet winner can obtain the lowest
score in the Borda count. (There will always be an opponent with a lower score.)
(continued )
1
Theorem 1.6.10 (continued)

2. If a Condorcet neutralizer c obtains the lowest score in Borda count, then each
alternative obtains the same score as c, which is (k − 1) n2 points.
3. If a Condorcet neutralizer c obtains the highest score in Borda count, then each
alternative obtains the same score as c, which is (k − 1) n2 points.
4. Neither a Condorcet loser nor a strong Condorcet loser can obtain the highest
score in the Borda count. (There will always be an opponent with a higher score.)
Proof
1. This follows from a similar argument to the one used in Theorem 1.4.11.

2. Let c be a Condorcet neutralizer. By Corollary 1.6.9, the Borda score of c is (k − 1) n2 .
If each of the k − 1 opponents of c scores at least as high as c and at least one opponent
scores strictly higher than c, the sum of scores of all alternatives will be greater than
k(k − 1) n2 , in contradiction to Lemma 1.4.10.

3. This is analogous to Part 2.
4. This follows from a similar argument to the one used in Theorem 1.4.11.

1.6.3 The Social Choice Set of the Hare–Borda Procedure
The following remark is an immediate consequence of the independence of irrelevant

alternatives, satisfied by the Condorcet tournament.
ⓘ Remark 1.6.11 In the course of eliminations in the Hare–Borda procedure

1. A Condorcet winner maintains its Condorcet winner status.
2. A Condorcet neutralizer maintains its Condorcet neutralizer status.
3. A Condorcet loser maintains its Condorcet loser status.
4. A weak Condorcet winner will turn into a Condorcet neutralizer if the opponents
it defeats in the Condorcet tournament are eliminated, otherwise, it remains a weak
Condorcet winner, or becomes a Condorcet winner.
5. A strong Condorcet loser will turn into a Condorcet neutralizer if the opponents it loses
to in the Condorcet tournament are eliminated, otherwise, it remains a strong Condorcet
loser, or becomes a Condorcet loser.
Theorem 1.6.12
In the Hare–Borda procedure
1. If a Condorcet winner exists, it is the sole member of the choice set.
(continued )
89 1
Theorem 1.6.12 (continued)

2. The social choice set includes all Condorcet neutralizers and weak Condorcet
winners that may exist.
3. A strong Condorcet loser may or may not be included in the social choice set.
4. A Condorcet loser cannot be included in the social choice set.
Proof
1. This is a restatement of Theorem 1.4.13.

2. This is a consequence of Parts 2 and 4 of Remark 1.6.11 and Parts 1 and 2 of
Theorem 1.6.10.

3. This will be demonstrated by Examples 1.6.13 and 1.6.14 below.

4. This is a consequence of Part 3 of Remark 1.6.11 and Part 3 of Theorem 1.6.10.

Example 1.6.13
The following scenario shows the rankings of three alternatives a, b, and c by five voters.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

a c b a ac
b a c b b
c b a c
(The corresponding graph representation is shown in ⊡ Fig. 1.14.) Find the Hare–Borda
social choice set.
It is clear that a is a weak Condorcet winner and c is a strong Condorcet loser.
The Borda count scores are:
a: 2 + 1 + 0 + 2 + 32 = 132
b: 1 + 0 + 2 + 1 + 0 = 82
c: 0 + 2 + 1 + 0 + 32 = 92

c b
1
e
The elimination of b will turn both a and c into Condorcet neutralizers; and the Hare–Borda
social choice set is {a, c}. Note how the strong Condorcet loser c ended up in the social choice
set of the Hare–Borda procedure after turning into a Condorcet neutralizer (⊡ Fig. 1.15).
Example 1.6.14
The following scenario shows the rankings of five alternatives a, b, c, d, and e by four voters,
and the corresponding graph representation.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th

a e d abe
b c c cd
cd d a
e ab be
You can see that
a is a weak Condorcet winner.

b is a strong Condorcet loser.
c is a Condorcet neutralizer.
d is a Condorcet neutralizer.
e is a strong Condorcet loser.
We find the Hare–Borda social choice set.

1. The Borda count scores are
Alternative a b c d e
Borda score 9.5 7 8 8 7.5
91 1
2. The updated scenario after the elimination of b is
1st 2nd 3rd 4th

a e d ae
c c cd
cd d a
e a e
and the new Borda scores are
Alternative a c d e
Borda score 6.5 6 6 5.5
The graph representation is in ⊡ Fig. 1.16(1).
a is a weak Condorcet winner.

e is a strong Condorcet loser.
3. The updated scenario after the elimination of e is
1st 2nd 3rd 4th

a c d a
d c cd
cd a a
and the new Borda scores are
Alternative a c d
Borda score 4 4 4
The graph representation is in ⊡ Fig. 1.16(2).
a turns from a weak Condorcet winner into a Condorcet neutralizer.

The Hare–Borda procedure social choice set is {a, d, c}. Note that the strong
Condorcet losers b and e did not make it to the Hare–Borda social choice set in this
example.

1
representations of the a
elimination steps in
Example 1.6.14
e c
d c
d
(1) (2)
Example 1.6.15
We leave it to the student to verify that the Hare–Borda social choice set for the following
scenario is {a, b, c, d} and that a is a Condorcet neutralizer, while none of b, c, d falls under
any of our Condorcet-type classifications in Definition 1.6.3.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th

b ad c ab d ac
c b d c b d
ad c ab d ac b
1.7 Manipulability of Social Choice Procedures: Indifference

and Ties Allowed
It is often possible for a voter to get a more favorable outcome for herself by
misrepresenting her preference. For example, we saw in the course of our discussion of
the Florida 2000 presidential election (in Sect. 1.1.3). that, when the plurality procedure
is used, a voter whose top choice is a minor candidate with a slim chance of winning
may very well get a better outcome for herself if she bypasses her top choice and votes
for her most preferred candidate among those with a realistic chance of winning.
In Example 1.2.14 and Remark 1.3.20 we saw an instance of how the Hare procedure
can be manipulated by voters through insincere reporting of preferences to bring a better
outcome. Example 1.2.15 can also be transformed as in Remark 1.3.20 to illustrate the
possibility of manipulating the Coombs procedure. The manipulability of Borda count
is illustrated in Example 1.4.6.
A social choice procedure is said to be resolute if its social choice set is always
a singleton, i.e., includes only one alternative. Most of the study of manipulability
deals with resolute social choice procedures, with only one manipulator among the
voters. The best known result in this regard is the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, which
was independently proven by Gibbard in 1973 and Sattarthwaite in 1975. Different
1.7 · Manipulability of Social Choice Procedures: Indifference and Ties. . .
93 1
versions of this theorem, with different proofs, are abundantly available in the literature
and we shall therefore bypass it for the less known theorem proven [7] by Peter
Gärdenfors in 1976, which deals with non-resolute social choice procedures and only
one manipulator. (See [17] for more on Gärdenfors’ theorem; and [6, 10, 16] for the
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem.)
Notation 1.7.1
1. We shall follow Notations 1.5.2 with some changes. The small Greek letters λ, μ, ν, · · ·
will denote social choice functions (procedures) instead of social welfare and semi social
welfare functions. Given a scenario and a social choice function λ, λ will denote the
social choice set that results from applying the social choice function λ to the scenario
.
2. Given two alternatives x and y we shall write
• x →t y if voter t prefers x to y.
• x ↔t y if the voter t places x and y in the same tier.
(To avoid complicating the notations, the scenario in which this occurs will be verbally
specified instead of adding it to the notations.)
3. Given a scenario and a specific voter t, t will denote any scenario such that
• The ranking of the alternatives by voter t in t is different from his ranking of the
alternatives in .
• For s = t, the rankings by voter s in and t are the same.
4. When the rankings by voter t in different scenarios are considered, we shall speak of the
voter t -ranking, the voter t -ranking, and so on.
Definition 1.7.2
A social choice function μ is said to be
1. manipulable by voter t at scenario if there exists a scenario t (as in
Notations 1.7.1) such that voter t prefers μ t to μ, based on his “initial”
-ranking.

2. manipulable if there exists a scenario at which μ is manipulable by some
voter.

3. stable or Strategy-proof if it is not manipulable.

If a stable social choice function is used, a voter has no incentive to submit an

insincere ranking of the alternatives since the ranking he reveals will get him the best
possible outcome according to that ranking, under the circumstances imposed by the
other voters’ rankings.
1
1.7.1 Comparing Sets of Alternatives
The definition of manipulability in Sect. 1.7.2 can be directly applied to resolute social
choice functions without any ambiguity involved. This is because each of the outcomes
μ i and μ is a single alternative; and the comparison of alternatives by the ith voter is
readily available. The case of non-resolute social choice functions is different because
μ and μ i are not necessarily singletons and we do not have a concept of comparing
sets of alternatives that are not singletons.
Gärdenfors [7] used an existing ranking on a set of alternatives to induce a compar-
ison of subsets of alternatives which we present next. We shall find it convenient to use
some standard set-theoretic notations. Let A and B be sets of objects (elements).
1. x ∈ A means that x is a member of A. (∈ stands for “in” or “is in.”)
2. A ⊂ B (A is a proper subset of B) means that every member of A is also a member
of B but there is at least one member of B that is not in A.
3. A ∩ B (the intersection of A and B) is the set of all x such that x ∈ A and x ∈ B.
4. Given a finite collection of sets Ai , i = 1, 2, · · · , k, the set of all x such that x ∈ Ai
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , k is denoted ∩ki=1 Ai .
5. A ∪ B (the union of A and B) is the set of all x such that x ∈ A or x ∈ B (or both).
6. Given a finite collection of sets Ai , i = 1, 2, · · · , k, the set of all x such that x ∈ Ai
for at least one i, i = 1, 2, · · · , k, is denoted ∪ki=1 Ai .
7. A\B is the set of all x in A but not in B.
8. A = B means that every x in A is also in B and every x in B is also in A.
9. A ⊆ B (A is a subset of B) means that A ⊂ B or A = B.
10. The set that does not have any member, called the empty set, will be denoted ∅.
11. We say that A and B are disjoint if A ∩ B = ∅.
Definition 1.7.3
Let A, B be two subsets of a set S of alternatives on which a ranking is defined, and
assume that A = B. We say that A is preferred over B, and we write A B, in any
of the three following cases:
Case 1. A ⊂ B and for every x ∈ A and y ∈ B\A we have x y, with x → y
for at least one such x and one such y.
Case 2. B ⊂ A and for every x ∈ A\B and y ∈ B we have x y, with x → y
for at least one such x and one such y.
Case 3. Neither A\B nor B\A is empty and for every x ∈ A\B and y ∈ B\A we
have x y, with x → y for at least one such x and one such y.

95 1
B A
A B
A B c
c f c f f
a b
g
g e
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
⊡ Fig. 1.17 Example 1.7.4
Example 1.7.4
We start with the following ranking
ab
cd e
fg
h
According to Definition 1.7.3, A B in each of the following three cases (⊡ Fig. 1.17):
Case 1. A = {c, f } and B = {c, f, g}.
Case 2. A = {c, f, e} and B = {c, f }.
Case 3. A = {a, c, f } and B = {b, c, f, g}.
The intuition behind Definition 1.7.3 is that A B when, on “average,” a member of A

is preferred over a member of B.
Note that not every A and B are comparable by the concept introduced in Definition 1.7.3.
Consider, for example, A = {b, c, f, g} and B = {a, c, f, e}. We only need to check Case 3
since none of the two sets is a subset of the other. We have
• b ∈ A\B, e ∈ B\A and b → e.
• a ∈ B\A, g ∈ A\B and a → g.
and therefore neither set is preferred over the other (⊡ Fig. 1.17).
1.7.2 Anonymity and Neutrality
In Notations 1.5.18 we used p to denote a scenario after the rankings of the voters
have been permuted. We find it more convenient here to replace the notation p with
p; and we shall also use q to denote after a certain permutation q has been applied
to the alternatives. If, in a certain scenario, alternatives a, b, c, d are permuted so that,
in all rankings, c replaces a, a replaces b, d replaces c, and b replaces d, we write
q(a) = c, q(b) = a, q(c) = d and q(d) = b. Given a set of alternatives such as
1
A = {a, b} we shall write
q(A) = q({a, b}) = {q(a), q(b)} = {c, a} (or {a, c}).
We can also represent q as follows:
a → c
b → a
q=
c → d
d → b
We shall always use p to denote a permutation of the voters and q to denote a

permutation of the alternatives.
Definition 1.7.5
A social choice function μ is said to be
1. anonymous if μ(p) = μ for every scenario and every permutation p of
the voters’ rankings. (See Notations 1.5.18 and Definitions 1.5.19.)

2. neutral if μ(q) = q(μ) for every scenario and every permutation q of the
alternatives.
In the sequel, all social choice functions are non-resolute and voters are allowed to
express indifference in their rankings. Further, in Proposition 1.7.6 through 1.7.11, we
shall have only three alternatives (named a, b, c) and three voters (named s, t, u).
Proposition 1.7.6 Consider the following scenario for the voters s, t, u and the alternatives
a, b, c
s t u
b ab a
=
c c c
a b
and assume that the social choice function μ is anonymous and neutral.
1. If one of a and b is in μ, then so is the other.
2. μ is {c}, {a, b, c} or {a, b}.
97 1
Proof
1. Let p be the permutation of the voters’ rankings and q be the permutation of the
alternatives given by
s →
u a→ b
p= t → t and q = b → a ·
u→ s c→ c
It is easy to check that = pq and therefore,
μ = μ(pq) = μ(q) = q(μ)
where the second and the third equalities follow from the anonymity and neutrality of
μ, respectively. If a ∈ μ, then by the above equality we see that both a and b are in
μ.

2. From Part 1, μ includes both a and b or neither of the two.

ⓘ Lemma 1.7.7 The social choice set from a Condorcet paradox scenario by a neutral
and anonymous social choice function consists of all the three alternatives involved.
Proof
Consider the Condorcet paradox scenario
s t u
a b c
= ·
b c a
c a b
Let μ be a neutral and anonymous social choice function and let p be the permutation of the
voters’ rankings and q be the permutation of the alternatives given by
s → u a → b
p = t → s and q = b → c ·
u → t c → a
It is easy to check that = pq and therefore,
μ = μ(pq) = μ(q) = q(μ)
where the second and the third equalities follow from the anonymity and neutrality of μ,
respectively. If a ∈ μ, then by the above “triple” equality we see that b ∈ μ as well. Next,
starting with b ∈ μ and applying the above argument a second time we get c ∈ μ. We
have thus shown that the presence of a in μ implies the presence of both b and c in μ. In
a similar fashion, we can start with b ∈ μ or c ∈ μ and conclude that μ = {a, b, c}.
1
1.7.3 Gärdenfors’ Theorem
The following sequence of four propositions constitute Gärdenfors’ proof of his 1976
theorem on the manipulability of social choice functions [7]. The central idea of the
proof is to consider a certain scenario (denoted below by ) for three voters and three
alternatives, and examine all possible choice sets μ where μ is a social choice function
that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and the Condorcet winner criterion. For each of those
μ possibilities, the manipulability of μ is demonstrated.
Proposition 1.7.8 Assume that the social choice function μ satisfies the Condorcet winner
criterion and assume that c ∈ μ where
s t u
c ab a
= ·
b c c
a b
Then μ is manipulable.
Proof
t
t
a
If voter t changes his -ranking from a b to , we get the new scenario
b
c
c
s t u
c a a
=
t
b b c
a c b
whose choice set by μ is μt = {a} since μ satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion. Clearly,
t
in the -ranking of t, namely a b , {a} is preferred to any set containing c (Definition 1.7.3),
c
and therefore μ is manipulable by t at scenario .

Proposition 1.7.9 Assume that the social choice function μ is neutral and anonymous. Let
be as in Proposition 1.7.8, that is,
s t u
c ab a
= ·
b c c
a b
99 1
If μ = {a, b}, then μ is manipulable.
Proof
Consider the Condorcet paradox scenario
s t u
c b a
= ·
b a c
a c b
t
t
b
By Lemma 1.7.7, we have μ = {a, b, c}. If voter t changes his -ranking from to a b ,
a
c
c
the resulting t scenario will be identical with scenario whose choice set by μ is {a, b}.
Clearly, in the -ranking of t, {a, b} {a, b, c} and therefore μ is manipulable by voter t at
scenario .

Proposition 1.7.10 Assume that the social choice function μ satisfies anonymity, neutrality,
and the Condorcet winner criterion. Let be as in Proposition 1.7.8, that is,
s t u
c ab a
= ·
b c c
a b
If μ = {b}, then μ is manipulable.
Proof
u u
a c
If voter u changes her -ranking from to , we get the new scenario
c a
b b
s t u
c ab c
=u
b c a
a b
whose choice set by μ is μu = {c} since μ satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion. It
follows that μ is manipulable by voter u at scenario since {c} {b} in the -ranking of
voter u.

1
Proposition 1.7.11 Assume that the social choice function μ is anonymous and neutral. Let
be as in Proposition 1.7.8, that is,
s t u
c ab a
= ·
b c c
a b
If μ = {a}, then μ is manipulable.
Proof
s s
c b
If voter s changes her -ranking from to , the resulting s scenario will be identical
b c
a a
with scenario of Proposition 1.7.6. By Part 2 of Proposition 1.7.6 we then have μs = {c},
μs = {a, b, c} or μs = {a, b}, each of which is preferred to {a} in the -ranking of voter
s. Therefore, μ is manipulable by voter s at scenario .

Theorem 1.7.12 (Gärdenfors [7])

A neutral, anonymous social choice function that satisfies the Condorcet winner
criterion and is defined for at least three voters and at least three alternatives is
manipulable.
Proof
In Propositions 1.7.8 through 1.7.11 we considered all possible social choice sets for a certain
scenario of three alternatives and three voters, denoted , by an arbitrary social choice
function μ that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and the Condorcet winner criterion. In each
case of a possible social choice set, we demonstrated the manipulability of μ. This proves
the theorem for three alternatives and three voters.
The following table shows all possibilities for the social choice set μ and the
Proposition that demonstrates the manipulability of μ for each possibility.
μ Proposition
{a} 1.7.11
{b} 1.7.10
{c} 1.7.08
{a, b} 1.7.09
{a, c} 1.7.08
{b, c} 1.7.08
{a, b, c} 1.7.08
101 1
The case of m alternatives and n voters with m > 3 or n > 3 (or both) can be established
by augmenting the scenarios in Propositions 1.7.6 through 1.7.11 as in the following two
steps:
Step 1: If m > 3, we add m − 3 dummy alternatives, x4 , x5 , · · · , xm , all tied (i.e., in one
tier), below a, b, c in the rankings of voters s, t, u. If m = 3, no dummy alternatives
will be added.
Step 2: If n > 3, we add n − 3 dummy voters, v4 , v5 , · · · , vm , such that each of these
dummy voters places a, b, c, x4 , x5 , · · · , xm (a, b, c if no dummy alternatives are
added in Step 1) all in one tier. If n = 3, no dummy voters are added.
We leave it to the student to verify that the changes in Steps 1 and 2 do not affect the
validity of the proofs of Propositions 1.7.6 through 1.7.11. This completes the proof.

To illustrate Steps 1 and 2 in the proof of Theorem 1.7.12, we present the augmented
version of scenario in the case of five voters (s, t, u, v, w) and six alternatives
(a, b, c, x, y, z):
s t u v w
c ab a abcxyz abcxyz
= b c c
a b
xyz xyz xyz
To better understand the proof of Gärdenfors’ theorem, we show in the next example
how it works in the case of the Copeland social choice procedure, which obviously
satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
Example 1.7.13
Part 2 of Proposition 1.7.6 presents all possibilities for μ for the given scenario by an
arbitrary anonymous and neutral social choice function μ. You can easily verify that the
actual possibility for μ is {a, b} when μ is the Copeland social welfare function.
You can also verify that for scenario considered in Propositions 1.7.8, 1.7.9, 1.7.10,
and 1.7.11, μ = {a} as in Proposition 1.7.11. The suggested change of the -ranking of
s s
c b
voter s from the sincere to the insincere results in scenario above, whose Copeland
b c
a a
choice set is {a, b}. Clearly, {a, b} is better than {a} from the point of view of someone whose
c
sincere and true ranking is b .
a
1
ⓘ Remark 1.7.14
1. In the case of a Condorcet paradox scenario for three alternatives, Lemma 1.7.7 formally
delivers the intuitive and natural choice by a neutral and anonymous social choice
function, which is the set of all three alternatives. Similarly, Proposition 1.7.6 implies that
a neutral and anonymous social choice function cannot pick one of a or b without picking
the other too. The indispensability of anonymity and neutrality in most social choice
problems thus weighs in favor of Gärdenfors’ theorem as it deals with social choice
functions that are neutral, anonymous, and non-resolute. On the other hand, the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem deals only with resolute social choice functions and therefore does
not postulate anonymity or neutrality. A common version of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
theorem reads as follows:
» Assume that indifference is not allowed in the voters’ rankings and that there
are at least three alternatives and three voters. Then, the only resolute, weakly
Pareto efficient and Strategy-proof social choice functions are dictatorships.
Note When indifference is not allowed, a social choice function δ is said to be dictatorial
or a dictatorship if there exists a voter v, called the dictator, such that for every scenario
, δ = {a} where a the unique alternative on the top of the dictator’s ranking.
2. The scenario whose manipulability is established in the proof of Gärdenfors’ theorem
includes voters’ indifference. Therefore, the theorem does not cover the case where
indifference is not permitted. In the same paper [7] of 1976, Gärdenfors includes the
following theorem which we state without proof.
Theorem 1.7.15
Assume that
1. There are at least three alternatives and three voters.
2. Scenarios are restricted to those that prohibit indifference in the voters’ rankings.
We define the social choice function κ as follows: κ = {c} if a majority alternative c

exists in , and κ is the entire set of alternatives otherwise. Then κ is a strategy-proof
social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and the Condorcet winner
criterion.

1.7.4 Manipulability of Social Choice Functions Not Covered by

Gärdenfors’ Theorem
Two of the social choice functions studied in this chapter, namely the Copeland and the
Hare–Borda social choice functions, satisfy all of the conditions of Gärdenfors’ theorem
and their manipulability is thus established. The following examples demonstrate the
103 1
manipulability of some standard social choice functions that do not meet all of the
postulates of the theorem.
Example 1.7.16
Let λ be the plurality social choice function and consider the following “sincere” scenario
for the 5 voters s, t, u, v, w and the three alternatives a, b, c.
s t u v w
a b b c c
=
b a a a a
c c c b b
s
a
Clearly, λ = {b, c}, but if voter s changes his ranking from the sincere to the insincere
b
c
s
b
we get the scenario
a
c
s t u v w
b b b c c
s =
a a a a a
c c c b b
with λ s = {b}. Voter s thus benefits from voting insincerely since {b} is preferred to {b, c}
according to the sincere ranking of voter s.
Example 1.7.17
Let λ be the Hare social choice function and consider the following “sincere” scenario for
three alternatives a, b, c and 21 voters.
9 5 6 s
a b c a
=
b c a b
c a b c
The last column represents the sincere ranking by voter s which will be our manipulator. You
s
a
can easily verify that λ = {c}, but if voter s changes his ranking from the sincere to the
b
c
1
s
b
insincere we get the scenario
a
c
9 5 6 s
a b c b
s =
b c a a
c a b c
with social choice set λ s = {a} which is preferred to {c} according to the sincere ranking
of s.
Note that Example 1.7.17 is actually a modification that conforms with Defini-
tions 1.7.2 (which involves only one manipulator) of the example with two manipulators
discussed in Remark 1.3.20.
Example 1.7.18
Consider the following sincere Condorcet paradox scenario for 3 alternatives a, b, c and 3
voters s, t, u. Let λ be the agenda voting with agenda abc.
s t u
a b c
=
b c a
c a b
Clearly λ = {c}, but if voter s switches a and b in his ranking we get the manipulated
scenario
s t u
b b c
s
=
a c a
c a b
with λ s = {b}. As you can easily see, voter s prefers {b} to {c}.
Note that both plurality and Hare are neutral and anonymous but fail the Condorcet
winner criterion; while agenda voting (with a fixed agenda) satisfies anonymity and the
Condorcet winner criterion but does not meet the neutrality condition.
Exercises
105 1
Exercises
In each of Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6,
1. Draw the graph representation of the Condorcet tournament and identify the Condorcet
winner and the Condorcet loser that may exist.
2. Process the given scenario using the plurality procedure.
3. Process the given scenario using the plurality with run-off procedure.
4. Process the given scenario using Hare’s procedure
5. Process the given scenario using Coombs’ procedure
6. Identify the procedures that elected a Condorcet loser or failed to elect an existing
Condorcet winner.
Scenario 1
3 2 2 2
a c c d
b b d a
c d a b
d a b c
Scenario 2
5 4 3 2 1
a b c d a
b c d a b
c d a b c
d a b c d
Scenario 3
2 2 1 2 2
a a b b c
d d d d d
c b a c b
b c c a a
1
Scenario 4
3 3 2 1
a b c d
c d a c
d a d b
b c b a
Scenario 5
6 4 2 2 1
a b c d e
c c b c c
e d a b b
b e e a a
d a d e d
Scenario 6
8 5 4 2
a b d c
b c c a
c d a b
d a b d
7. Show that in the following incomplete scenario (for 13 voters and 5 candidates
a, b, c, d, e) there is a Condorcet winner that loses in all of the standard procedures of
plurality, plurality with run off, Hare, Coombs, and Borda count.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th
a a a a b b b b c c d d e
e e . . a a e e e e e e a
. . . . . . . . . . . a .
. . . . . . . . . . . c .
b c e e e e c c a a a b d
Exercises
107 1
8. In the following incomplete scenario for 11 voters and 4 candidates a, b, c, and d,
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th
b b b b b a a d d c .
. . . . . . b . . b .
. . . . . . c . . d c
a a c c d b d b b a b
1. Identify a Condorcet winner.

2. Identify a plurality procedure winner.
3. Identify a Hare procedure winner.
4. Identify a Coombs procedure loser.
9. The following is a voting scenario for 59 voters and 5 candidates a, b, c, d, and e.
14 13 12 11 9
a b c d e
c e b a d
e d e e c
d a a b a
b c d c b
1. Draw the graph representation of the Condorcet tournament and search for a Condorcet
winner and a Condorcet loser.
2. Rather than using any of the standard social choice procedures, they invented their own
procedure, call it the top-averaging procedure, which we now explain. Since there are
59 voters and five candidates, the average number of top choice votes for each candidate
is 59/5 = 11.8. Each candidate with less than the threshold of 11.8 top choice votes
is eliminated and the process is repeated with the threshold adjusted for the remaining
number of candidates. Continue until all the remaining candidates have equal numbers
of top choice votes. These candidates constitute the social choice set of the top-averaging
procedure. Process the given scenario using this procedure.
3. Show that the top-averaging procedure coincides with the two-alternative majority rule
in the case of only two alternatives.
4. Does the top-averaging procedure satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion?
10. Use Hare’s procedure to process the voting scenario in Exercise 9.
11. Use the Coombs’ procedure to process the voting scenario in Exercise 9.
12. The following two voting scenarios for 21 voters and 3 candidates are given. Note that
the only difference between the two scenarios is that, in scenario II, the last two voters
improved the position of candidate a by switching his position with candidate c. This makes
1
scenario II more favorable to candidate a. Find the Hare winner in each scenario and
compare the results. Do you notice a violation of monotonicity by Hare in this example?
8 6 5 2 8 6 5 2
a b c c a b c a
Scenario I: Scenario II:
. a b a . a b c
. c a b . c a b
13. The following two voting scenarios for 21 voters and 3 candidates are given. Note that
the only difference between the two scenarios is that, in scenario II, the last two voters
improved the position of candidate a by switching his position with candidate c. This makes
scenario II more favorable to candidate a. Find the Coombs winner in each scenario and
compare the results. Do you notice a violation of monotonicity by Coombs in this example?
8 7 4 2 8 7 4 2
a b c b a b c b
Scenario I: Scenario II:
c a b c c a b a
b c a a b c a c
14. Prove that the plurality procedure is monotone.
15. Prove that the procedures of Hare and Coombs cannot make a Condorcet loser the sole
winner if they are modified so that only one candidate is eliminated at each elimination step,
but can still include a Condorcet loser in the social choice set.
16. Prove that the plurality procedure is Weakly Pareto efficient.
17. Prove that the plurality procedure does not satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion.
18. Draw the graph representation of the Condorcet tournament for the following 15 ballots
and 4 alternatives, and (whenever possible) find an agenda for each alternative to win. If this
is not possible for one or more alternatives, explain the reason.
4 4 3 2 1 1
d c d a b a
a b b b d d
c a a c a b
b d c d c c
Exercises
109 1
4 4 3 2 1 1
d c b a b a
c b d b d d
a a a c a b
b d c d c c
4 4 3 2 1 1
d c b a b a
c a d b d d
a b a c a b
b d c d c c
21. Prove that agenda voting is monotone.
22.
1. Which of the 5 alternatives in the following scenario can win agenda voting by a suitable
choice of the agenda?
a b c
b c e
d d a
e a d
c e b
2. As stated in Remarks 1.3.10, a Condorcet loser loses agenda voting regardless of the
agenda adopted. Is the converse of this fact true? More precisely, is it always possible to
find a winning agenda for a given non-Condorcet loser.
23. Suppose that an alternative x wins all agendas in which it is placed in the last position
and the preceding alternatives are permuted in all possible ways. Is x necessarily a Condorcet
winner?
24.
1. A committee of 21 members is to vote on a motion b vs the status quo a. Discussions
reveal that b would win with ballots being as follows:
1
5 16
a b
b a
Where should a killer amendment c be placed in the ballots in order to save the status
quo a?
2. Show that the pro b voters can amend c so that the new motion d succeeds in making b
win.
3. Show that the pro a voters can amend d so that the new motion e succeeds in making a
win.
25. Can a Pareto dominated alternative occupy the top of any preference ballot? Explain.
26. Identify all Pareto dominated alternatives in the following ballots and, whenever
possible, find an agenda for each one of these alternatives to win.
4 3 2
d a b
c d a
e c c
b e e
a b d
27. Identify all Pareto dominated alternatives in the following ballots and, whenever
possible, find an agenda for each one of these alternatives to win.
4 3 2
d a c
c d e
e c a
a e b
b b d
28. Show that once an agenda is adopted and fixed, agenda voting is not neutral (as in
Definitions 1.7.5).
29. Use the Borda count to process the ballots in each of Exercises 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
30. Use the Hare–Borda procedure to process the ballots in each of Exercises 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6.
Exercises
111 1
31. Theorem 1.4.11 states that, in Borda count, a Condorcet winner cannot obtain the lowest
score and a Condorcet loser cannot obtain the highest score. The two scenarios in this exercise
demonstrate the “limits” of these two statements.
7 1 5 7 1 5
a b d e a a
b c c d e e
Scenario 1 : Scenario 2 :
c d b c d b
d e e b c c
e a a a b d
1. In Scenario 1, show that there is a Condorcet winner which ranks second to last in Borda
count.
2. In Scenario 2, show that there is a Condorcet loser which ranks second in Borda count.
3. Process Scenario 1 using the Hare–Borda procedure and confirm Theorem 1.4.13.
32. Use the Borda count procedure to process the voting scenario in Exercise 09 above. Can
you predict the outcome of the Hare–Borda procedure in advance?
33.
1. Draw the graph representation of the Condorcet tournament for the following scenario.
2 2 3 2
a a d c
d d b d
c b a b
b c c a
2. Show that the semi ranking of the Condorcet tournament is actually a ranking in this
example. Does this ranking agree with the Borda count ranking?
34.
1. Prove that the Copeland social welfare function satisfies the weak Pareto axiom.
2. We showed by example (Example 1.5.7 above) that the Copeland social welfare function
does not satisfy IIA. Can you obtain this result from Arrow’s theorem?
35. Allowing indifference in voters’ rankings, we introduce a new scoring social choice
procedure in this exercise, call it the top-bottom procedure, as follows: From each voter’s
ranking, alternatives in the top tier equally share 1 point, and alternatives in the bottom
tier equally share −1 points. (One-tier ballots are dropped out.) All voters in the tiers in
between receive 0 points each. The points are tallied and the social choice set consists of the
alternatives with the highest score.
1. Show that the top-bottom social choice procedure coincides with the two-alternative
majority rule in the case of only two alternatives.
1
2. Process the following voting scenario for 7 voters and 4 alternatives using the top-bottom
procedure, Hare’s procedure and Coombs’ procedure.
2 2 2 1
b c d b
a a a c
d b c d
c d b a
3. Does the top-bottom social choice procedure satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion?
36. Let μ be the Hare–Borda social choice function. Demonstrate the manipulability of μ
by comparing μ and μs in Proposition 1.7.11.
37. Show that a social choice function that is not singly monotone (as in Definition 1.2.16)
is manipulable.
38. Let s and t be two specific members of the set V of voters. Let λ be a semi social welfare
function such that:
Given a scenario and two alternatives x, y we have x →λ y if and only if one of the
following three events occurs in :
x →s y and x ↔t y,
x ↔s y and x →t y
or,
x →s y and x →t y.
Otherwise, x ↔λ y.
Show that λ satisfies Collective quasi-rationality and that the set {s, t} is an oligarchy.
39. Consider the following voting scenario for 3 alternatives a, b, c and 3 voters s, t, u.
s t u
= a bc ab
bc a c
and let λ be a social welfare function that satisfies Arrow’s axioms. Is it possible to have
c
λ = ?
ab
Exercises
113 1
40. Let {a, b, c, d} be the set of alternatives and {s, t, u} be the set of voters. Consider the
following two scenarios:
s t u s t u
a b cd a abd c
= and =
b ad ab c c bd
cd c bd a
1. Find all pairs of alternatives x, y such that /{x, y} = /{x, y}.

2. Assuming that λ is the Borda count, find λ and λ.
3. Detect all violations of IIA
41. Assuming that μ is the Condorcet tournament,

1. Find μ and μ where and are as in Exercise 40.
2. Detect all violations of Collective rationality.
In each of Exercises 42 and 43 you are asked to do the following:

1. Draw the graph representation of the Condorcet tournament of the given voting scenario
and find any existing Condorcet winner, weak Condorcet winners, Condorcet neutraliz-
ers, strong Condorcet losers or Condorcet loser.
2. Using Theorem 1.6.12, determine the alternatives that have a place “reserved in advance”
in the Hare–Borda social choice set.
3. Process the given voting scenario using Hare–Borda social choice procedure and find the
actual Hare–Borda social choice set.
42.
a cde a bde b ade b ace d abe

b a c a c b d b c d
cde b bde c ade c ace d abe c
43.
1 1 1 1 1 5
a c b a ac d
b a c b b
c b a c d abc
d d d d
1
44. Let us define the Hare–Copeland procedure following the same iteration steps as in
the Hare–Borda procedure. At each step we eliminate the alternative(s) with the lowest
point sum; and we continue till we have a set of alternatives with equal point sums. Show
that Theorem 1.6.12 holds with the Hare–Copeland procedure replacing the Hare–Borda
procedure.
45. Replace the Hare–Borda procedure with the Hare–Copeland procedure in Exer-
cises 42, 43; and compare the social choice sets of the two procedures.
115 2
Yes-No Voting
Sherif El-Helaly

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6_2
2.1 Introduction
This kind of voting is quite different from the voting studied in Social Choice. The main
differences are summarized in the following points:
1. The number of alternatives to choose from: While the voter in the topic of social
choice has several (usually more than two) alternatives to choose from, the voter
in the context of yes-no voting has only two available alternatives: YES and NO.
Examples of yes-no voting systems include committees and all instances in which
a body of voters has to vote YES or NO on a motion, such as referendums.
(For simplicity, abstention is ruled out in our study.)
2. The most important application of social choice theory is the election of a candidate
to occupy a political office or to fill a position in a company. The alternatives in
this case are the candidates who should be treated in a neutral fashion. In yes-no
voting, the two alternatives (YES and NO) need not be treated with neutrality. For
example, voting to amend the constitution of a nation is usually biased in favor of
NO by requiring two thirds or three quarters of the voters to vote YES before the
constitutional amendment can be adopted. On the other hand, to discuss a motion in
a committee, only two YES votes are needed: one from the member who submits
the motion and another from a member who seconds it. The committee, of course
may consist of any number of members.
3. When applied to elections, social choice procedures need to be anonymous. This
means that they treat the voters equally: one person one vote. In contrast, a yes-
no voting system may discriminate among the voters. The United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), for example, is a yes-no voting system with fifteen member
nations five of which (China, France, Russia, UK and USA) are endowed with the
veto power which enables any of those five nations to block a motion by casting a
NO vote on it. Another form of discrimination (which is not of concern to us here)
in favor of those five nations is that their membership in the UNSC is permanent,
while each of the remaining ten members serves for a 2-year term.
116 Chapter 2 • Yes-No Voting
2.1.1 The Basics

2
Definition 2.1.1
A set consisting of some (or all) of the voters in a yes-no voting system is called a
coalition. Voters are usually denoted by lowercase letters a, b, c, . . . , x, y, . . . and
a coalition whose members are the voters a, b, c is denoted {a, b, c}. Notice that the
order in which voters are listed in a coalition has no significance, for example,
{a, b, c}, {a, c, b}, {b, a, c}, {b, c, a}, {c, a, b}, and {c, b, a} denote the same
coalition. (Please note that using the term “coalition” here does not necessarily
mean that its members have actually joined forces to support or oppose a certain
motion. In our study, a coalition is simply a subset of the set of all voters, whether
or not they agreed to vote in a certain manner. We may also denote a coalition by an
uppercase letter. For instance, we may write A = {a, b, c}.)
If each voter in A is also in B, we say that A is a subcoalition of B and B is a
supercoalition of A. If, in addition, there is a voter in B that is not in A, we say that
A is a proper subcoalition of B and B is a proper supercoalition of A.
A coalition is said to be winning if a YES vote by all its members is sufficient to
pass a motion, and is said to be losing if it is not winning.

Our yes-no voting systems will be monotone: All supercoalitions of a winning

coalition are winning. (Consequently, all subcoalitions of a losing coalition are losing.)
The coalition of all voters in the system will always be winning.
Example 2.1.2
Four people, a, b, c, and d established a new business. Their contributions to the capital of
the business were as follows: a contributed 4 million dollars, b contributed 3 million dollars,
c contributed 2 million dollars, and d contributed 1 million dollars. (The total is 10 million
dollars.) They decided to run their business based on a weighted yes-no voting system in
which every 1 million dollars of capital is equivalent to one point of weight. This means that
a’s vote is worth four points of weight, b’s vote is worth three points of weight, c’s vote is
worth two points of weight, and d’s vote is worth one point of weight. They decided to set
the quota (the minimum weight required to pass a motion) at six points of weight. List all the
winning coalitions.
Solution The one-voter coalitions are {a} with a weight of four points, {b} with a weight of
three points, {c} with a weight of two points, and {d} with a weight of one point. None of
these meets the quota of six.
Two-voter coalitions: How can we go through all of these coalitions without missing
any of them? We can start by fixing a and pairing each of b, c, d with it one at a time.
Next, we fix b and pair each of c, d with it one at a time. We then fix c and pair d with it.
Results are:
2.1 · Introduction
117 2
Coalition Weight Status

{a, b} 7 W
{a, c} 6 W
{a, d} 5 L
{b, c} 5 L
{b, d} 4 L
{c, d} 3 L
Three-voter coalitions: We can list those by leaving out one voter at a time. Results are:
Coalition Weight Status

{a, b, c} 9 W
{a, b, d} 8 W
{a, c, d} 7 W
{b, c, d} 6 W
Finally, the coalition {a, b, c, d} of all voters is certainly winning with a weight of 10.
We may now list all the winning coalitions as follows:
{a, b}
{a, c}
{a, b, c}
{a, b, d}
{a, c, d}
{b, c, d}
{a, b, c, d}
Definition 2.1.3
A member in a winning coalition is said to be critical in that coalition if its
withdrawal causes the coalition to become losing. The number of winning
coalitions in which a voter is critical is called the Banzhaf score of the voter.

The Banzhaf score and the Banzhaf index (to be discussed in detail later) were
introduced by attorney John F. Banzhaf III in connection with a lawsuit involving the
board of Nassau county, New York in the 1960s.
Being critical in a winning coalition is a source of power since a critical voter in
a winning coalition can turn the coalition into a losing one by withdrawing from it. A
non-critical voter in a winning coalition does not have this power since his withdrawal
does not turn the winning coalition into a losing one.
Example 2.1.4
2 Identify all critical voters in each of the winning coalitions in Example 2.1.2 and find the
Banzhaf score of each voter.
Solution Examine, for instance, the winning coalition {a, b, c}. Voter c is a member of this
coalition but is not critical since its withdrawal results in the coalition {a, b} which also
appears in the same list of all winning coalitions. Likewise, b is not critical in {a, b, c} since
its withdrawal results in the coalition {a, c} which is also winning, being in the same list of
all winning coalitions. On the other hand, a is critical in {a, b, c} since its withdrawal results
in the coalition {b, c} which is losing since it is not in the list of all winning coalitions. The
following table shows the critical voters in each of the winning coalitions:
Winning coalition Critical voters

{a, b} a, b
{a, c} a, c
{a, b, c} a
{a, b, d} a, b
{a, c, d} a, c
{b, c, d} b, c, d
{a, b, c, d} None
The following table shows the Banzhaf score of each voter:
Voter a b c d
Banzhaf score 5 3 3 1
2.1.2 The +/− Table
If we are not interested in knowing which voter is critical in which coalition, but only
in the Banzhaf score of each voter, we can use the following table (Taylor [24].) Each
time a voter is present in a coalition, we enter a plus sign, otherwise, we enter a minus
sign. (We do not check whether or not the voter is critical in the coalition.) The net of
the plus and minus signs in the column of a voter yields the Banzhaf score of that voter.
Winning coalition a b c d
{a, b} + + − −
{a, c} + − + −
{a, b, c} + + + −
{a, b, d} + + − +
{a, c, d} + − + +
{b, c, d} − + + +
{a, b, c, d} + + + +
Net 5 3 3 1
2.1 · Introduction
119 2
How does this table work? Let us think of the plus sign a voter gets for being present
(but not critical) in a winning coalition as “unmerited.” Let us also think of the plus sign
a voter gets for being present (and critical) in a winning coalition as “merited.”
• To see how the +/− table handles a voter that is present (but not critical) in a
winning coalition, consider the case of voter c in the winning coalition {a, b, c}.
Since c is not critical in {a, b, c}, the withdrawal of c from {a, b, c} leaves us with
another winning coalition, namely {a, b}. Voter c gets a minus sign in the line of the
winning coalition {a, b} which cancels the “unmerited” plus sign c gets in the line
of the winning coalition {a, b, c}.
• To see how the +/− table handles a voter that is present (and is critical) in a winning
coalition, consider the case of voter c in the winning coalition {a, c, d}. Since c
is critical in {a, c, d} the withdrawal of c from {a, c, d} leaves us with a losing
coalition, namely {a, d}. Since {a, d} is losing, it does not have a line in the +/−
table to enter a minus sign in. Therefore, the “merited” plus sign c gets in the line of
the winning coalition {a, c, d} persists.
Consequently, the net of plus signs and minus signs in the column of a voter (obtained
by subtracting the number of minus signs from the number of plus signs) yields the
Banzhaf score of the voter.
Example 2.1.2 is an example of a kind of yes-no voting system which we now define:
Definition 2.1.5
A yes-no voting system is said to be weighted if each voter is assigned a positive
number called weight so that a coalition is winning if and only if the total weight of
its members (called the weight of the coalition) is greater than or equal to a specific
given number called the quota.

Example 2.1.6
Find the Banzhaf score of each voter in the weighted system consisting of the four voters
a, b, c, d with weights 6,4,2,1, respectively, if
1. The quota is 7.
2. The quota is 8.
3. The quota is 9.
Solution
1. Quota q = 7. There are eight winning coalitions.
Winning coalition Weight a b c d

2
{a, b} 10 + + − −
{a, c} 8 + − + −
{a, d} 7 + − − +
{a, b, c} 12 + + + −
{a, b, d} 11 + + − +
{a, c, d} 9 + − + +
{b, c, d} 7 − + + +
{a, b, c, d} 13 + + + +
Banzhaf score N/A 6 2 2 2
2. Quota q = 8. The table for this part is the same as in Part 1 except that the two lines for
coalitions {a, d} and {b, c, d} are eliminated since these two coalitions will no longer be
winning when q = 8. There are six winning coalitions.

{a, b} 10 + + − −
{a, c} 8 + − + −
{a, b, c} 12 + + + −
{a, b, d} 11 + + − +
{a, c, d} 9 + − + +
{a, b, c, d} 13 + + + +
3. Quota q = 9. The table for this part is the same as in Part 2 except that the line for
coalition {a, c} is eliminated since this coalition will no longer be winning when q = 9.
There are five winning coalitions.

{a, b} 10 + + − −
{a, b, c} 12 + + + −
{a, b, d} 11 + + − +
{a, c, d} 9 + − + +
{a, b, c, d} 13 + + + +
In Part 2 of the Example 2.1.6 we notice that

• Voter a has no minus signs in his/her column. This means that no coalition can be
winning without a.
• Voter d has a Banzhaf score of zero. This means that d is never critical in any winning
condition.
This motivates the following definitions.

2.1 · Introduction
121 2
Definition 2.1.7
1. A voter who is critical in every winning coalition is said to have veto power.

(Note that the word “critical” can be replaced with the word “present” in this
definition. Can you see the reason?)
2. A voter who is never critical in any winning coalition (i.e., with a Banzhaf
score of zero) is said to be a dummy.

ⓘ Remark 2.1.8
1. A yes-no voting system need not be defined by weights and quota. All we need is to
determine whether any given coalition is winning or losing. This can be done in various
ways including
• weights and quota as in weighted systems,
• a verbal definition of winning coalitions,
• an explicit and complete list of all winning coalitions.
2. In the axiomatic approach of the yes-no voting theory, a list of coalitions in a yes-no
voting system for a set V of voters is regarded as a complete list of winning coalitions, if
and only if it satisfies the following three axioms:
Axiom 1: V is in the list.
Axiom 2: A coalition in the list must include at least one voter.
Axiom 3: Monotonicity: If coalition A is in the list and B is a supercoalition of A, then
B is also in the list.
The reader should always verify for himself that all the yes-no voting systems presented
here satisfy the above three axioms.
3. Axiom 3 implies that if a yes-no voting system is modified by removing a coalition from
the list of all winning coalitions, all subcoalitions of the removed coalition must also be
removed. On the other hand, if a coalition is added to the list, all its supercoalitions must
also be added too.
Example 2.1.9
A yes-no voting system consists of four voters a, b, c, and d. A coalition in this system is
winning if and only if it contains at least two voters including a or b (or both.) Find the
Banzhaf score of each voter and identify the dummies and the voters with veto power.
Solution We construct the +/− table.

There are no dummies since no voter has a Banzhaf score of zero; and there are no voters
with veto power since minuses exist in every voter’s column.

Winning coalition a b c d
2
{a, b} + + − −
{a, c} + − + −
{a, d} + − − +
{b, c} − + + −
{b, d} − + − +
{a, b, c} + + + −
{a, b, d} + + − +
{a, c, d} + − + +
{b, c, d} − + + +
{a, b, c, d} + + + +
Banzhaf score 4 4 2 2
2.1.3 Parity of Banzhaf Scores
If you closely examine the above examples you will notice that:
• The Banzhaf scores are non-negative integers.
• In all cases where the number of winning coalitions was odd, all the Banzhaf scores
were odd.
• In all cases where the number of winning coalitions was even, all the Banzhaf scores
were even.
The above remarks are true in general and can be put together in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1.10
In a yes-no voting system
1. The Banzhaf scores of all voters are non-negative integers.
2. The Banzhaf scores of all voters have the same parity, which is the parity of the
number of winning coalition.
3. No dummies can exist in cases where the number of winning coalitions is odd.
Proof
Let x be a voter and let m be the number of minuses and n be the number of pluses that
x receives in the +/− table, then the Banzhaf score of x is n − m and the total number of
winning coalitions is m + n.
1. Each minus earned by x in the +/− table corresponds to a certain winning coalition A
that does not include x. Adding x to A, we get a winning coalition Ax that includes x,
from which x earns a plus. If B is a winning coalition (different from A) that does not
include x, then Bx is a winning coalition (Different from Ax ) that includes x, from which
2.2 · Quantification of Power in a Yes-No Voting System
123 2
x earns a plus. This shows that for each minus earned by x there corresponds a plus also
earned by x; and different minuses correspond to different pluses. It follows that n ≥ m
and therefore n − m ≥ 0.

2. If m + n is even, then m and n have the same parity (both even or both odd) and therefore
n − m is even. If m + n is odd, then m and n have different parities and therefore n − m
is odd.

3. To have n − m = 0 we must have m = n and therefore m + n is even.

2.2 Quantification of Power in a Yes-No Voting System
We now focus on the way “power” is distributed in a yes-no voting system. More
precisely, we would like to quantify the power of each voter by a non-negative integer.
It may seem that in a weighted system, the weight of the voters can be used for this
purpose. For a simple example that dramatizes the inadequacy of weights as measures
of power in a weighted system, consider a weighted system with three voters a, b, and
c with weights 49, 48, and 3, respectively; and a quota of 51. As you can easily verify,
the winning coalitions in this system are {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, and {a, b, c}. Simply
stated: All we need, to pass a motion, is to get any two of the three voters to vote
YES on it. Intuitively, this means that “power” in this system is equally distributed
among the three voters despite the large difference in weight between c and each of a
and b.
2.2.1 The Banzhaf Index of Power
The Banzhaf scores developed above can give an idea about the distribution of power
within the same yes-no voting systems, but cannot be used to compare the distributions
of power of two systems for the same voters. For example, it may seem that voter a in
Example 2.2.6 (below) has more power in Part 1 than he has in Part 2 since his Banzhaf
score in Part 1 is 9 and his Banzhaf score in Part 2 is only 8. This, however, ignores the
contexts in which those scores are obtained.
Definition 2.2.1
The Banzhaf index of a voter in a yes-no voting system is defined as the Banzhaf
score of this voter divided by the sum of the Banzhaf scores of all voters in the
system. The Banzhaf distribution of power in a yes-no voting system is a statement
of the Banzhaf indices of all voters.

If we denote the Banzhaf score of voter x by b(x) and the Banzhaf index by bi(x),
and if the voters in a yes-no voting system are a, b, c, d, then
b(a)
bi(a) = .
b(a) + b(b) + b(c) + b(d)
Note that the Banzhaf index of a voter is always non-negative (by Theorem 2.1.10) and
2 the sum of the Banzhaf indices of all voters in a yes-no voting system is one.
The intuition behind the concept of Banzhaf index is that the power of a voter resides
in being critical in winning coalitions. Therefore, it makes sense to say that in a system
with four voters a, b, c, d, power is distributed according to the ratio
b(a) : b(b) : b(c) : b(d)
If we think of the total power in a system as a “pie,” then the portion voter a gets out of
it is bi(a) defined above.
Example 2.2.2
Find the Banzhaf distribution of power for the yes-no voting system in Example 2.1.4.
Solution We have
b(a) = 5, b(b) = 3, b(c) = 3, b(d) = 1.
Therefore
5 5
bi(a) = = ,
5+3+3+1 12
3 3
bi(b) = = ,
5+3+3+1 12
3 3
bi(c) = = ,
5+3+3+1 12
1 1
bi(d) = = .
5+3+3+1 12

Example 2.2.3
Find the Banzhaf distribution of power for Example 2.1.6.
Solution
1. When the quota is 7, b(a) = 6, b(b) = 2, b(c) = 2, and b(d) = 2. The common
denominator for the Banzhaf indices is therefore 6 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 12 and
6 3 2 1 2 1 2 1
bi(a) = = , bi(b) = = , bi(c) = = , bi(d) = = .
12 6 12 6 12 6 12 6
6 3 2 1 2 1 0
bi(a) = = , bi(b) = = , bi(c) = = , bi(d) = = 0.
10 5 10 5 10 5 10
125 2
5 3 1 1
bi(a) = , bi(b) = , bi(c) = =, bi(d) = .
10 10 10 10
Example 2.2.4
Compute the Banzhaf distribution of power for the yes-no voting system in Example 2.1.9.

Solution b(a) = 4, b(b) = 4, b(c) = 2, and b(d) = 2. The common denominator for the
Banzhaf indices is therefore 4 + 4 + 2 + 2 = 12 and
4 2 4 2 2 1 2 1
bi(a) = = , bi(b) = = , bi(c) = = , bi(d) = = .
12 6 12 6 12 6 12 6
Example 2.2.5
A yes-no voting system consists of five voters a, b, c, d, and e with the following defining
rule for the winning coalitions: A coalition is winning if and only if it consists of at least three
voters including a. Compute the Banzhaf distribution of power and identify the dummies and
the voters with veto power.
Solution We have not dealt with a system with five voters before, but the presence of a in
every winning coalition will help identify all winning coalitions. Since a winning coalition
must contain at least three voters including a, we can list all winning coalitions as follows:
Three-voter winning coalitions: Following the argument used earlier in the solution of the
Example 2.1.2 to find all possible ways of picking two out of b, c, d, e to join a, the three-
voter winning coalitions are {a, b, c}, {a, b, d}, {a, b, e}, {a, c, d}, {a, c, e}, {a, d, e}.
Four-voter winning coalitions: We can list those by leaving out one of b, c, d, e at a time.
This yields {a, b, c, d}, {a, b, c, e}, {a, b, d, e}, {a, c, d, e}.
Of course, we should not forget the coalition of all voters: {a, b, c, d, e}.
There are exactly 11 winning coalitions, an odd number. Therefore, all Banzhaf scores
must be odd (by Theorem 2.1.10.) Next, we set up the +/− table.
Winning coalition a b c d e
{a, b, c} + + + − −
{a, b, d} + + − + −
{a, b, e} + + − − +
{a, c, d} + − + + −
{a, c, e} + − + − +
{a, d, e} + − − + +
{a, b, c, d} + + + + −
{a, b, c, e} + + + − +
{a, b, d, e} + + − + +
{a, c, d, e} + − + + +
{a, b, c, d, e} + + + + +
Net 11 3 3 3 3
2 The sum of the Banzhaf scores is 11 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 23 and therefore
11 3
bi(a) = , bi(b) = bi(c) = bi(d) = bi(e) = .
23 23
There are no dummies and voter a has veto power.

It can be difficult to identify all the winning coalitions in a yes-no voting system with
more than four voters. The following is a list of all coalitions in a five-voter yes-no
voting system with voters a, b, c, d, and e. Given any particular yes-no voting system
with five voters, the student can examine each coalition in the list to determine whether
it is winning or not. Systems with more than five voters shall be treated later, after we
present some needed combinatorial concepts.
One-member coalitions:
{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {e}
Two-member coalitions:
{a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}, {a, e},
{b, c}, {b, d}, {b, e},
{c, d}, {c, e},
{d, e}
Three-member coalitions:
{c, d, e}, {b, d, e}, {b, c, e}, {b, c, d},
{a, d, e}, {a, c, e}, {a, c, d},
{a, b, e}, {a, b, d},
{a, b, c}
Four-member coalitions:
{b, c, d, e}, {a, c, d, e}, {a, b, d, e}, {a, b, c, e}, {a, b, c, d}
Five-member coalitions:
{a, b, c, d, e}
2.2.2 The Felsenthal–Machover Example
Example 2.2.6
This example was discovered by Felsenthal and Machover in 1994.
1. The weights of voters in a five-voter weighted yes-no voting system are given in the
following table. The quota is 8.
Voter a b c d e
Weight 5 3 1 1 1
127 2
Compute the Banzhaf distribution of power and identify the dummies and the voters
with veto power.
2. Voter a ceded one point of weight to voter b. The quota remained the same as in Part 1.
The new weights are:
Voter a b c d e
Weight 4 4 1 1 1
Compute the Banzhaf distribution of power and identify the dummies and the voters
with veto power.
3. Comment on the results in Parts 1 and 2.
Solution
1. The +/− table for Part 1 is
Coalition a b c d e
{a, b} + + − − −
{a, b, c} + + + − −
{a, b, d} + + − + −
{a, b, e} + + − − +
{a, b, c, d} + + + + −
{a, b, c, e} + + + − +
{a, b, d, e} + + − + +
{a, c, d, e} + − + + +
{a, b, c, d, e} + + + + +
Banzhaf score 9 7 1 1 1
There are no dummies and a has veto power. The sum of Banzhaf scores is 9 + 7 +
1 + 1 + 1 = 19 and so the Banzhaf indices are as in the following table.
Voter a b c d e
Banzhaf index 9/19 7/19 1/19 1/19 1/19
2. The +/− table for Part 2 is
Coalition a b c d e
{a, b} + + − − −
{a, b, c} + + + − −
{a, b, d} + + − + −
{a, b, e} + + − − +
{a, b, c, d} + + + + −
{a, b, c, e} + + + − +
{a, b, d, e} + + − + +
{a, b, c, d, e} + + + + +
Banzhaf score 8 8 0 0 0
c, d, and e are dummies; a and b have veto power. The sum of Banzhaf scores is
2 8 + 8 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 16 and so the Banzhaf indices are as in the following table.
Voter a b c d e
Banzhaf index 8/16 = 1/2 8/16 = 1/2 0 0 0
3. Comments:
• Voter b gained veto power and her Banzhaf index increased (from 19 7
= 0.368 to
0.5) as a result of receiving an additional point of weight from voter a. This seems
reasonable.
• It is ironic that a’s Banzhaf index increased (from 199
= 0.473 to 0.5) after ceding
one point of weight to b.
How did this happen? A careful comparison of the lists of winning coalitions in
Part 1 and Part 2 shows that the only difference between the two lists is that coalition
{a, c, d, e} (which was winning in Part 1) is losing in Part 2. The removal of this
coalition from the list of winning coalitions in Part 2 made each of a, c, d, e drop
a plus and b drop a minus. The drop of the Banzhaf score of a from 9 to 8 was
outweighed by the drop of the denominator of the Banzhaf indices from 19 to 16. The
result was an increase in the Banzhaf index of a from 199
= 0.473 to 16 8
= 0.500.
This paradoxical behavior may not sound as dramatic if we observe that coalition
{a, c, d, e} is the only winning coalition in Part 1 where b is not present and,
therefore, removing it from the list of winning coalitions (as in Part 2) is equivalent
to endowing b with veto power. (Note that by the third remark in Remark 2.1.8, the
removal of {a, c, d, e} from the list of winning coalitions necessitates the removal
of all of its subcoalitions but, in fact, none of those subcoalition is in that list to
begin with.) Rephrasing the change as “endowing b with veto power” instead of “a
ceding one point of weight to b” makes the increase of a’s Banzhaf index seem less
paradoxical.
• Voters c, d, and e, who were bystanders in the deal between a and b, lost the little
power they had and became dummies!
2.2.3 The Shapley–Shubik Index of Power
This power index is an application of an important game theoretic notion known as the
Shapley value which is beyond the scope of this book. We shall therefore take a direct
path to the Shapley–Shubik power index and refer the interested reader to [4] and [9]
for information on the more general and basic notion of Shapley value.
Consider the yes-no voting system in Example 2.2.2 with four voters a, b, c, d with
weights 4, 3, 2, 1, respectively, and a quota of 6. Let us examine, for example, the
arrangement or permutation adcb of the voters in which a comes first, d comes second,
c comes third, and b comes fourth in this specific chronological order. Voter c possesses
special power in this permutation because it is the first voter to form a winning coalition
129 2
together with the preceding voters. (Note that both {a} and {a, d} are losing but {a, d, c}
is winning.) This leads to the following concept, which is central to the development of
the Shapley–Shubik index.
Definition 2.2.7
The first voter to form a winning coalition together with the preceding ones in a
permutation of all voters is said to be the pivotal voter in this particular
permutation.

Example 2.2.8
In Example 2.2.2, identify the pivotal voter in each of the permutations abcd, dcba, and
bcda.
Solution The pivotal voter in abcd is b since coalition {a} is losing but coalition {a, b} is
winning. Similarly, b is the pivotal voter in dcba and d is the pivotal voter in bcda.

Let us count the permutations of four voters a, b, c, and d. The first position in a
permutation can be filled by any of the four voters. Once the occupant of the first
position has been chosen, we have three possible occupants for the second position.
Therefore we have 4 × 3 possible ways to fill both the first and the second positions in a
permutation. For each one of these 4 × 3 possible ways there are two possible occupants
for the third position then only one choice left for the fourth position. Therefore, there
are 4 × 3 × 2 × 1 = 24 permutations for any system with four voters. Similarly, in a
system with five voters we have 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1 = 120. In general, the number of
permutations of n voters is n(n − 1)(n − 2) · · · 2 · 1. Here is a complete list of the 24
permutations of four voters a, b, c, and d:
a b c d b a c d c a b d d a b c
a b d c b a d c c a d b d a c b
a c b d b c a d c b a d d b a c
a c d b b c d a c b d a d b c a
a d b c b d a c c d a b d c a b
a d c b b d c a c d b a d c b a
This is how we composed the list:

1. It seems plausible that the first place should be equally shared among the four voters,
we therefore created four columns, each contains six permutations: the first column
is for the permutations that start with a, the second column is for the permutations
that start with b, and so on.
2. In the first column, in which a occupies the first place, the second place will be
2 equally shared by the b, c, and d. We therefore fill the second place in this column
twice with b, twice with c, and twice with d. We fill the second spot in each of the
permutation in the other columns in a similar fashion.
3. The first and second permutations in the first column are now filled with a in the
first spot and b in the second spot. We complete one of these two permutations by
placing c third and d fourth, and the other by placing d third and c fourth. We follow
the same pattern in filling the third and fourth spots in the remaining 22 permutation.
Definition 2.2.9
The Shapley–Shubik score of a voter in a yes-no voting system is the number of
permutations in which this voter is pivotal. The Shapley–Shubik index of a voter is
its Shapley–Shubik score divided by the total number of permutations. The
Shapley–Shubik distribution of power in a yes-no voting system is a statement of
the Shapley–Shubik indices of all voters.

The Shapley–Shubik score and the Shapley–Shubik index of voter x will be denoted
by s(x) and si(x), respectively.
Example 2.2.10
Compute the Shapley–Shubik distribution of power for the yes-no voting system in Exam-
ple 2.2.2.
Solution We list all the 24 permutations of the voters a, b, c, d. The pivotal voter in each
permutation is in boldface.
s(a) = 10, s(b) = 6, s(c) = 6, and s(d) = 2. The total number of permutations is
s(a) + s(b) + s(c) + s(d) = 10 + 6 + 6 + 2 = 24.
The above sum of 24 should have been known to us in advance since the total number of
permutations for four voters is 4×3×2×1 = 24 as shown above. However, it is recommended
that you compute this sum for double checking. The Shapley–Shubik distribution of power
now follows:
10 5 6 3 6 3 2 1
si(a) = = , si(b) = = , si(c) = = , si(d) = = .
24 12 24 12 24 12 24 12
131 2
ⓘ Remark 2.2.11
1. A dummy in a yes-no voting system must have zero Banzhaf index and zero Shapley–
Shubik index. Conversely, a voter with zero Banzhaf index or a zero Shapley–Shubik
index must be a dummy. Verify!

2. As noted earlier, a voter has veto power if and only if her column in the +/- table has no
minus signs. It is also clear that a voter has veto power if and only if she is pivotal in all
permutations in which she is placed in the last position.

3. Comparing the results in Example 2.2.2 and Example 2.2.10 we see that the Banzhaf
distribution of power and the Shapley–Shubik distribution of power (for the same yes-
no voting system) coincided. This is not always the case as we shall see in some of the
examples below. In fact, the processes of computing the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik
distributions of power are not two different methods to arrive at the same result. Rather,
they are two different attempts to interpret and quantify the vague concept of power in a
yes-no voting system.

Example 2.2.12
Find the Shapley–Shubik distribution of power for the weighted system consisting of the four
voters a, b, c, d with weights 6,4,2,1, respectively, if
1. The quota is 7.
2. The quota is 8.
3. The quota is 9.
This is the same voting system in Example 2.2.3.
Solution
1. Quota=7.
s(a) = 12, s(b) = 4, s(c) = 4, s(d) = 4. Therefore,
12 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
si(a) = = , si(b) = = , si(c) = = , si(a) = = ·
24 6 24 6 24 6 24 6
This is the same as the Banzhaf Distribution of power, obtained in Example 2.2.3.
2. Quota=8.
2

16 4 4 1 4 1 0
si(a) = = , si(b) = = , si(c) = = , si(d) = = 0·
24 6 24 6 24 6 24
This is different from the Banzhaf Distribution of power, obtained in Example 2.2.3.
3. Quota=9.

14 7 6 3 2 1 2 1
si(a) = = , si(b) = = , si(c) = = , si(d) = = ·
24 12 24 12 24 12 24 12
This is different from the Banzhaf distribution of power, obtained in Example 2.2.3.

ⓘ Remark 2.2.13 Suppose you are voter b in the yes-no voting system in Part 2 of
Examples 2.2.3 and 2.2.12. You have a Banzhaf index of 15 which is higher than your
Shapley–Shubik index of 16 . Does this mean that you get more power if the Banzhaf
index is adopted? Not so. In fact, neither of the two indices gives you any power. They
only try to quantify and estimate the power you have. You should be able to think of
situations where the lower of the two indices better serves your interest and other
situations where the higher index is more preferable to you. Exercise 5 at the end of this
chapter is related to this remark.
2.2.4 Banzhaf vs Shapley–Shubik Computations
ⓘ Remark 2.2.14
1. While the Banzhaf computations identify critical voters in an already formed winning
coalition, the Shapley–Shubik computations observe voters as they join a coalition in the
process of formation, one at a time, and identifies the voter who turns the coalition from
a losing to a winning one.

2.3 · Some Combinatorics
133 2
2. As we saw, permutations and pivotal voters play a role in the development of the
Shapley–Shubik index analogous to the role played by winning coalitions and critical
voters in the development of the Banzhaf index. There are, however, some differences
that make the Shapley–Shubik approach more appealing (at least mathematically) than
the Banzhaf approach:
• A permutation has one and only one pivotal voter (this is clear from the definition)
and, as a consequence, the sum of the Shapley–Shubik scores in a given yes-no voting
system is equal to the pre-known number of permutations of the voters. On the other
hand, a winning coalition of m voters can have any number of critical voters from 0
to m. (In Example 2.1.4, both a and c are critical in {a, c, d} but d is not, all voters in
{b, c, d} are critical, and no voter is critical in {a, b, c, d}.) We can therefore think of
the Shapley–Shubik index of a voter as the ratio of her Shapley–Shubik score to the
total available score (just as we do to evaluate a student’s performance in a test.) No
analogous observation holds in the Banzhaf computations since the sum of scores of
all voters is, in general, different from the number of winning coalitions.

• We do not have an obvious relationship between the number of winning coalitions
and the number of voters in a yes-no voting system. In fact, the number of winning
coalitions depends on the defining condition of the winning coalitions in addition
to the number of voters. For example, the different quotas in Example 2.1.6 lead to
different numbers of winning coalitions. Permutations are much more orderly than
this. In fact, the number of permutations depends only on the number of voters in
the yes-no voting system at hand. (For n voters, there are n(n − 1)(n − 2) · · · 2 · 1
permutations.)

2.3 Some Combinatorics
In this section, we present some combinatorial concepts and tools that will help us study
the linkage between the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik indices of power and deal
with yes-no voting systems with larger numbers of voters.
2.3.1 Permutations and Combinations
Suppose we want to pick a committee of three out of the five people a, b, c, d, and e.
We study the following two different types of committees:
1. Committees in which the members serve in equal, indistinguishable, capacities:
To denote a committee of this type, we list the members, (in any order)
separated by commas and enclosed between two curly brackets. For instance, the
committee whose members are a, b, and c may be denoted by any of the expressions
{a, b, c}, {a, c, b}, {b, a, c}, {b, c, a}, {c, a, b}, {c, b, a}. We shall call a committee
of this type a combination of 3 objects out of 5.
2. Committees in which the members are assigned different roles (whether or not
some of these roles are superior to others.):
A committee of this type is denoted by listing the members, separated by
commas and enclosed between two round brackets. The order of listing the members
is now significant: The expressions (a, b, c), (a, c, b), (b, a, c), (b, c, a), (c, a, b),
2 (c, b, a) denote the various committees whose members are a, b, and c. The
difference between any two of these committees is similar to the difference between
the presidential ticket (Trump, Pence) in which Trump is president and Pence is vice
president, and the ticket (Pence, Trump) in which Pence is president and Trump is
vice president. We shall call each one of these committees a permutation of 3 objects
out of 5.
We have two questions to answer:

Question 1. How many permutations of 3 objects out of 5 are there?
Question 2. How many combinations of 3 objects out of 5 are there?
Despite being apparently more complex, permutations are easier to count. There are
five different choices of a first member (the president, say): It could be a, b, c, d, or e.
Each of these five people may be paired with any of the remaining four (who would
serve as vice president, say). We now have 5 × 4 possibilities for a (president, vice
president) pair. Next, each of these 5 × 4 choices can be complemented with any of the
remaining three people (who would serve, say, as secretary.) We now have the answer
to Question 1: There are
5 × 4 × 3 = 60
permutations of 3 objects out of 5.

To answer Question 2, we notice that fixing three out of the given five objects
(a, b, and c for example) exactly one combination can be composed, but how many
permutations? With the same argument used in answering Question 1, we can conclude
that exactly 3 × 2 × 1 = 6 permutations can be composed from those three fixed
objects. Therefore, each 3 × 2 × 1 permutations of 3 objects out of 5 correspond to
one combination. Therefore, there are
5×4×3
3×2×1
combinations of 3 out of 5 objects.

The above correspondence is shown in the following array.
(a, b, c) (a, b, d) (a, c, d) (b, c, d) (a, b, e) (a, c, e) (b, c, e) (a, d, e) (b, d, e) (c, d, e)
(a, c, b) (a, d, b) (a, d, c) (b, d, c) (a, e, b) (a, e, c) (b, e, c) (a, e, d) (b, e, d) (c, e, d)
(b, a, c) (b, a, d) (c, a, d) (d, b, c) (b, a, e) (c, a, e) (c, b, e) (d, a, e) (d, b, e) (d, c, e)
(b, c, a) (b, d, a) (c, d, a) (d, c, b) (b, e, a) (c, e, a) (c, e, b) (d, e, a) (d, e, b) (d, e, c)
(c, a, b) (d, a, b) (d, a, c) (c, b, d) (e, a, b) (e, a, c) (e, c, b) (e, a, d) (e, b, d) (e, c, d)
(c, b, a) (d, b, a) (d, c, a) (c, d, b) (e, b, a) (e, c, a) (e, b, c) (e, d, a) (e, d, b) (e, d, c)
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
{a, b, c} {a, b, d} {a, c, d} {b, c, d} {a, b, e} {a, c, e} {b, c, e} {a, d, e} {b, d, e} {c, d, e}
The general case can be handled in the same way.

2.3 · Some Combinatorics
135 2
Proposition 2.3.1 For integers k, n with 0 < k ≤ n, the number of permutations of k objects
out of n objects is
n(n − 1)(n − 2) · · · (n − k + 1)
and the number of combinations of k objects out of n objects is
n(n − 1)(n − 2) · · · (n − k + 1)
·
k(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · 2 · 1
Note that in the case k = n, the above formula yields the intuitive result that the number of
combinations of n objects out of n objects is 1.
Notation 2.3.2 For integers n, k with 0 < k ≤ n we denote the number of combinations of

k objects out of n by nk (read n choose k.)
Definition 2.3.3
Given a positive integer n we define factorial n, denoted n!, by
n! = n(n − 1)(n − 2) · · · 2 · 1
and we define factorial 0 by 0! = 1.
Proposition 2.3.4 For integers n, k with 0 < k ≤ n we have

n n!
= ·
k (n − k)! k!
Proof
For 0 < k < n, this follows from

n n(n − 1)(n − 2) · · · (n − k + 1) n(n − 1)(n − 2) · · · (n − k + 1) (n − k)!
= =
k k(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · 2 · 1 k(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · 2 · 1 (n − k)!
and for k = n this follows from our convenient definition 0! = 1.

ⓘ Corollary 2.3.5 For integers n, k with 0 < k < n we have

n n
= ·
k n−k
Proof
2 From Proposition 2.3.4 we have

n n! n! n
= = = ·
k (n − k)! k! k! (n − k)! n−k

The above result is intuitively clear since picking k out of n given objects is the same as
unpicking (n − k) out of those n objects. By entering k = n, we can also use this result
to define the number of combinations of 0 objects out of n objects as follows:

n n
= = 1·
0 n
2.3.2 Cartesian Products
Next, suppose we have two sets: A with m ≥ 1 objects and B with n ≥ 1 objects. In how
many ways can we pair an object from A with an object from B?
The set of all such pairs is called the cartesian product of A and B and is denoted
A × B. More precisely, A × B is the set of all ordered pairs (a, b) where a is from A
and b is from B. In general, suppose we have nonempty sets A1 with m1 members, A2
with m2 members, · · · and Ak with mk members. The set of all k-tuples (a1 , a2 , · · · , ak )
where a1 is from A1 , a2 is from A2 , · · · and ak is from Ak is called the cartesian product
of A1 , A2 , · · · Ak (in this order) and is denoted A1 × A2 × · · · × Ak . The proof of the
following theorem is clear.
Theorem 2.3.6
If A and B are nonempty sets with m and n members, respectively, then A×B has m×n
members (pairs (a, b) where a is from A and b is from B.) In general, with the same
notations as above, the cartesian product A1 × A2 × · · · × Ak has m1 × m2 × · · · × mk
members (k-tuples (a1 , a2 , · · · , ak ) as above.)
Finally, suppose we have a set A = {a1 , a2 , · · · , am } of m objects. How many

subsets (or combinations) of all possible sizes can we pick from A? An effective way
of answering this question is to try to construct a subset of A and count our choices as
we pause at each member of A and choose whether to include it in our set or not. Let
{y1 , n1 } denote the set of choices for a1 where y1 means “include a1 in our set” and n1
means “do not include a1 in our set.” In general, for each ai , i = 1, 2, · · · m let {yi , ni }
be the set of choices for ai where yi means “include ai in our set” and ni means “do
not include ai in our set.” Each subset of A corresponds to a member of the cartesian
product
{y1 , n1 } × {y2 , n2 } × · · · × {ym , nm }

2.4 · Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik Indices in One View
137 2
which, by Theorem 2.3.6, contains 2 × 2 × · · · × 2 = 2m members, i.e., possible choices
for a subset of A. Note that the empty set is included in this count as it corresponds to
the m-tuple (n1 , n2 , · · · nm ). This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.7
A set of m ≥ 0 members has 2m subsets, including the empty set. (Note that the empty
set has exactly one subset and so the theorem holds true for m = 0.)

The set of all subsets of a set A is called the power set of A and is denoted P (A).
2.4 Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik Indices in One View
To motivate the discussion, assume that

1. V = {a, b, c, d, e, f } is the set of voters in a yes-no voting system.
2. The coalition C = {a, b, c} is winning.
3. c is a critical voter in C.
Since c is critical in the coalition C = {a, b, c}, c is pivotal in all permutations in which
it is preceded by a and b in any of the 2! possible orders (a, b) and (b, a), and succeeded
by d, e, and f in any of the 3! possible orders (d, e, f ), (d, f, e), (e, d, f ), (e, f, d),
(f, d, e), and (f, e, d). There are exactly 2! · 3! = 12 such permutations:
(a, b, c, d, e, f )
(a, b, c, d, f, e)
(a, b, c, e, d, f )
(a, b, c, e, f, d)
(a, b, c, f, d, e)
(a, b, c, f, e, d)
(b, a, c, d, e, f )
(b, a, c, d, f, e)
(b, a, c, e, d, f )
(b, a, c, e, f, d)
(b, a, c, f, d, e)
(b, a, c, f, e, d)
Likewise, if c is critical in a winning coalition of five voters, say D = {a, b, c, e, f }, c
will be pivotal in all of the 4! · 1! = 24 permutations in which it is preceded by a, b, e,
and f (in all of the 4! possible orders) and succeeded by d (in 1! = 1 order.)
The generalization of the above argument is straightforward. The number of
members in a set S will be called the size of S and will be denoted |S|.
Proposition 2.4.1 Let V be the set of voters in a yes-no voting system. Given a pair x, C,
where C is a winning coalition and x is a critical voter in C, let P(x, C) be the set of
all permutations (of the voters in V ) in which x is preceded by all of its “partners” in C.
2 Then,
1. Every permutation in which x is pivotal belongs to P(x, C) for exactly one winning
coalition C that includes x.

2. |P(x, C)| = (|C| − 1)! · (|V | − |C|)!.

2.4.1 Computing the Shapley–Shubik Indices

from Winning Coalitions
The following theorem is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.4.1.
Theorem 2.4.2
Let V be the set of voters in a yes-no voting system and let x be a member of V . Then
the Shapley–Shubik score s(x) and the Shapley–Shubik index si(x) of x are given by

s(x) = |P(x, C)| = (|C| − 1)! · (|V | − |C|)!
C C
and

|P(x, C)| C (|C| − 1)! · (|V | − |C|)!
si(x) = C
= ·
|V |! |V |!
where C runs through all winning coalitions in which x is critical.

We may now abandon the cumbersome process of counting the permutations in

which a voter is pivotal, and compute the Shapley–Shubik score and the Shapley–Shubik
index of a voter from his critical membership in winning coalitions, as we do with the
Banzhaf score and the Banzhaf index. Unfortunately, the +/− table will not be useful
in the Shapley–Shubik computation.
Definition 2.4.3
Let V be the set of voters in a yes-no system and let C be a winning coalition. We
define the Banzhaf weight and the Shapley–Shubik weight of C (not to be confused
with the weight of a voter or a coalition in a weighted system) as follows:
The Banzhaf weight of C = 1.

The Shapley–Shubik weight of C = (|C| − 1)! · (|V | − |C|)!.

(If a voter is critical in a winning coalition C, the Banzhaf weight of C counts

toward the Banzhaf score of the voter and its Shapley–Shubik weight counts toward
the voter’s Shapley–Shubik score. Neither weight counts for the voter if he is not
present in C or is present but not critical in it.
The Banzhaf weights of all winning coalitions are equal but the Shapley–Shubik
weights are obviously not.)
139 2
2.4.2 Veto-Powered Voters, Dominant Voters and Dictators
The following diagram shows the Shapley–Shubik weight of a winning coalition C in a

yes-no voting system with eight voters (⊡ Fig. 2.1).
|C| = 1, 2, · · · , 8 is represented on the horizontal axis and the Shapley–Shubik
weight of C is represented on the vertical axis. The shape of the diagram can be
explained by taking the ratio of the Shapley–Shubik weight of some coalition C to the
Shapley–Shubik weight of another coalition of size |C| + 1.
(|C| − 1)! · (|V | − |C|)! |V | − |C|

=
(|C| + 1 − 1)! · (|V | − |C| − 1))! |C|
which is greater than 1 if |C| < |V2 | and is less than 1 if |C| > |V2 | .
It follows that the Shapley–Shubik weight of a coalition assumes its highest value of
(|V | − 1)! when |C| = 1 (a one-voter coalition) and when |C| = |V | (the coalition of
all voters) and takes the shape of a symmetric open-up bell between these two extremes.
This is intuitively and logically appealing since
1. A voter x who is critical in the coalition V of all voters is particularly strong because
her YES vote is necessary for a motion to pass.
2. A voter y such that {y} is a winning coalition is particularly strong because his YES
vote is sufficient for a motion to pass.
Clearly, x is a veto-powered voter as in Definition 2.1.7(1). What about y?
⊡ Fig. 2.1 Shapley-Shubik 5040 5040

weight of a coalition in a yes-no
voting system with 8 voters
720 720
240
144 144 240
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Definition 2.4.4
2 Let x be a voter in a yes-no voting system with V as the set of all voters.
1. x is said to be a veto-powered voter if her membership is necessary for a
coalition to be winning.

(This is a restatement of Definition 2.1.7(1).)
2. x is said to be a dominant voter if her membership is sufficient for a coalition to
be winning.

3. x is said to be a dictator if it is dominant and veto-powered.

You can easily see that a yes-no voting system may have more than one veto-
powered voter or more than one dominant voter but cannot simultaneously have a
veto-powered voter and a dominant voter unless they are the same voter (which would
then be a dictator) since the sufficiency of some voter and the necessity of another voter
for a coalition to win will contradict one another.
Both of the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik concepts have probabilistic roots. The
Banzhaf concept is based on the assumption that all winning coalitions are equally likely
to form and, therefore, the power of a voter is proportional to the number of winning
coalitions this voter is critical in. The Shapley–Shubik concept, on the other hand, is
based on the assumption that the permutations of the set of voters (or the sequences in
which the voters line up to support a motion) are equally likely. Therefore, the power
of a voter is proportional to the number of permutations this voter is pivotal in. The
probabilistic basis of the Shapley–Shubik index seems more sound than that of the
Banzhaf index since permutations are exactly similar in size and construction while
winning coalitions are not.
In our first application of the above results, we redo Example 2.2.6 (due to Felsenthal
and Machover) in a setting that enables us to compute both of the Banzhaf and Shapley–
Shubik distributions of power together. We shall be able to determine whether or not the
unexpected behavior of the Banzhaf index in this example is shared by the Shapley–
Shubik index.
Example 2.4.5
1. The weights of voters in a five-voter weighted yes-no voting system are given in the
following table. The quota is 8.
Voter a b c d e
Weight 5 3 1 1 1
Compute the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik distributions of power and identify
the dummies and the voters with veto power.
2. Voter a ceded one point of weight to voter b. The quota remained the same as in Part 1.
The new weights are:
Voter a b c d e
Weight 4 4 1 1 1
141 2
Compute the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik distributions of power and identify
the dummies and the voters with veto power.
3. Is the paradoxical behavior of the Banzhaf index discussed in Example 2.2.6 shared by
the Shapley–Shubik index?

Solution Computations are done in the following table. The check mark in the column
of a voter x and the row of a winning coalition C is an indication that x is critical in C and
therefore receives both its Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik weights. The absence of means
that x is not critical in C (or is not in C to begin with) and therefore receives neither weight.
1.
Winning coalition SS weight Banzhaf weight a b c d e
{a, b} 1! · 3! = 6 1
{a, b, c} 2! · 2! = 4 1
{a, b, d} 2! · 2! = 4 1
{a, b, e} 2! · 2! = 4 1
{a, b, c, d} 3! · 1! = 6 1
{a, b, c, e} 3! · 1! = 6 1
{a, b, d, e} 3! · 1! = 6 1
{a, c, d, e} 3! · 1! = 6 1
{a, b, c, d, e} 4! · 0! = 24 1
Shapley–Shubik computations:
s(a) = 6 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 24 = 66.
s(b) = 6 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 6 + 6 + 6 = 36.
s(c) = 6.
s(d) = 6.
s(e) = 6.
Banzhaf computations
b(a) = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 9.
b(b) = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 7.
b(c) = 1.
b(d) = 1.
b(e) = 1.
Note that the sum of the Shapley–Shubik scores of all voters is 66 + 36 + 6 + 6 + 6 = 120
which is the correct number of permutations of the five voters (5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1).
This verifies both of our Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf computations. The Banzhaf and
Shapley–Shubik distributions of power are shown in the following table:
Index a b c d e
si 66/120 = 0.550 36/120 = 0.300 6/120 = 0.050 6/120 = 0.050 6/120 = 0.050
bi 9/19 ≈ 0.473 7/19 ≈ 0.368 1/19 ≈ 0.053 1/19 ≈ 0.053 1/19 ≈ 0.053
2.
2
Winning coalition SS weight Banzhaf weight a b c d e
{a, b} 1! · 3! = 6 1
{a, b, c} 2! · 2! = 4 1
{a, b, d} 2! · 2! = 4 1
{a, b, e} 2! · 2! = 4 1
{a, b, c, d} 3! · 1! = 6 1
{a, b, c, e} 3! · 1! = 6 1
{a, b, d, e} 3! · 1! = 6 1
{a, b, c, d, e} 4! · 0! = 24 1
Shapley–Shubik computations:
s(a) = 6 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 24 = 60.
s(b) = 6 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 24 = 60.
s(c) = 0.
s(d) = 0.
s(e) = 0.
Banzhaf computations
b(a) = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 8.
b(b) = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 8.
b(c) = 0.
b(d) = 0.
b(e) = 0.
The sum of the Shapley–Shubik scores of all voters is 60 + 60 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 120 which

is the correct number of permutations of the five voters. This, again, verifies both of
our Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf computations as in Part 1. The Banzhaf and Shapley–
Shubik distributions of power are shown in the following table:
Index a b c d e
si 60/120 = 0.500 60/120 = 0.500 0/120 = 0.000 0/120 = 0.000 0/120 = 0.000
bi 8/16 = 0.500 8/16 = 0.500 0/16 = 0.000 1/16 = 0.000 0/16 = 0.000
3. Comments: Interestingly, the unexpected increase in the Banzhaf index of voter a upon
ceding one point of weight to b was not paralleled by a similar increase in the Shapley–
Shubik index of a. As shown from Parts 1 and 2, the Shapley–Shubik index of a
decreased from 0.55 to 0.50. (See the comments in Example 2.2.6.)

Example 2.4.6
The set of voters in an eight-voter yes-no voting system is V = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h} and a
coalition is winning if and only if it consists of four or more voters including a and b (both
a and b have veto power.) Compute the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik distributions of power.

143 2
Solution From Theorem 2.3.7 we can see that there are 28 − 1 = 255 coalitions in
this case; and if we restrict our consideration to coalitions of four or more voters then by
Proposition 2.3.4 we have to examine

8 8 8 8 8
+ + + + = 70 + 56 + 28 + 8 + 1 = 163
4 5 6 7 8
coalitions to find the winning ones. We can avoid this formidable task by utilizing the
combinatorial tools presented in the last section.
Obviously, a and b play interchangeable roles in the system, and the same can be said
about c, d, e, f, g, and h. Therefore, it is enough to compute the Banzhaf and Shapley–
Shubik indices for one from each group, say a and c.
Let us sort out the winning coalitions in which a is critical by size (number of voters.)
• Coalitions of size 4 in which a is critical: A coalition of this size must include

a, b and any two of the remaining six voters which can be chosen in 62 = 15
ways. Therefore, there are 15 such coalitions each has a Banzhaf weight of 1 and
a Shapley–Shubik weight of 3! · 4! = 144. In conclusion, a receives 15 × 1 = 15
Banzhaf points and 15 × 144 = 2160 Shapley–Shubik points from those coalitions.
a, b and any three of the remaining six voters which can be chosen in 63 = 20
a, b and any four of the remaining six voters which can be chosen in 64 = 15
a, b and any five of the remaining six voters which can be chosen in 65 = 6 ways.
Therefore, there are 6 such coalitions each has a Banzhaf weight of 1 and a Shapley–
Shubik weight of 6! · 1! = 720. In conclusion, a receives 6 × 1 = 6 Banzhaf points
and 6 × 720 = 4320 Shapley–Shubik points from those coalitions.
• Coalitions of size 8 in which a is critical: A coalition of this
size must include a, b
and all of the remaining six voters which can be chosen in 66 = 1 way. Therefore,
there is 1 such coalition that has a Banzhaf weight of 1 and a Shapley–Shubik weight
of 7! · 0! = 5040. In conclusion, a receives 1 × 1 = 1 Banzhaf point and 1 × 5040 =
5040 Shapley–Shubik points from this coalition.
It follows that
b(b) = b(a) = 15 + 20 + 15 + 6 + 1 = 57, and
s(b) = s(a) = 2160 + 2880 + 3600 + 4320 + 5040 = 18,000.
Next, let us sort out the winning coalitions in which c is critical by size
2 (number of voters.)
Only in winning coalitions of size 4 can c be critical. (This should be clear.) In a
coalition of this size, a, b, and c must be
included together with any one of the remaining
five voters, which can be chosen in 51 = 5 ways. Therefore, there are 5 such coalitions
each has a Banzhaf weight of 1 and a Shapley–Shubik weight of 3! · 4! = 144. In
conclusion, a receives 5 × 1 = 5 Banzhaf points and 5 × 144 = 720 Shapley–Shubik
points from those coalitions.
It follows that
b(h) = b(g) = b(f ) = b(e) = b(d) = b(c) = 5, and
s(h) = s(g) = s(f ) = s(e) = s(d) = s(c) = 720.
We may now verify our computations by adding the Shapley–Shubik scores of all voters:
2(18000) + 6(720) = 40320 = 8!
which is the correct number of permutations of the eight voters. Therefore, the Shapley–
Shubik indices of the voters are
si(b) = si(a) = 18000
40320
= 25
56
≈ 0.4464285.
si(h) = si(g) = si(f ) = si(e) = si(d) = si(c) = 720
40320
= 1
56
≈ 0.0178571.
The common denominator of the Banzhaf indices is 2(57)+6(5) = 144 and the Banzhaf
indices are
bi(b) = bi(a) = 144
57
=≈ 0.3958333.
bi(h) = bi(g) = bi(f ) = bi(e) = bi(d) = bi(c) = 5
144
≈ 0.0347222.

2.5 Weightable Yes-No Voting Systems
We close this chapter with a brief investigation of the possibility of describing a yes-no
voting system by means of weights and a quota. For a deeper presentation we refer the
reader to Taylor [24]. An advanced treatment of this topic is available in Taylor and
Zwicker [25].
To motivate the discussion, we consider the following two examples.
Example 2.5.1
A yes-no voting system has four voters a, b, c, and d. A coalition is this system is winning
if and only if it contains two or more voters including a. The following is the list of winning
coalitions:
{a, b}
{a, c}
{a, d}
{a, b, c}
{a, b, d}
{a, c, d}
{a, b, c, d}
2.5 · Weightable Yes-No Voting Systems
145 2
Can we find weights for the voters, and a quota, so that the complete list of winning coalitions
of the new weighted system is exactly as above? It makes sense to assign the same weight,
say λ, to each of b, c, and d; and a different weight, say μ, to a. If the quota is q then, since
{b, c, d} is losing and {a, b} is winning we have
3λ < q ≤ μ + λ·
We have infinitely many solutions: Assign a value to λ, then choose a value for μ such that
μ > 2λ and a value for q so that the above inequality holds. For example, λ = 1, μ = 3,
q = 4 is a solution, and λ = 1, μ = 6, q = 5 is another.
Example 2.5.2
A yes-no voting system has four voters: two women a, b and two men c, d. A coalition is
winning if and only if it contains two or more voters with both genders represented. The
following is the list of winning coalitions.
{a, c}
{a, d}
{b, c}
{b, d}
{a, b, c}
{a, b, d}
{a, c, d}
{b, c, d}
{a, b, c, d}
It is impossible to find weights for the voters and a quota so that the new weighted system
has the above list as a complete list of winning coalitions. To see this, assume to the contrary
that such weights: w(a), w(b), w(c), w(d) and a quota q were found. Since {a, c} and {b, d}
are both winning we have
w(a) + w(c) ≥ q, w(b) + w(d) ≥ q and therefore w(a) + w(b) + w(c) + w(d) ≥ 2q.
If these two winning coalitions trade b for c, we get the two coalitions {a, b} and {c, d} which
are both losing. It follows that
w(a) + w(b) < q, w(c) + w(d) < q and therefore w(a) + w(b) + w(c) + w(d) < 2q·
The above two inequalities (w(a) + w(b) + w(c) + w(d) ≥ 2q and w(a) + w(b) + w(c) +
w(d) < 2q) are contradictory, and this proves the non-existence of a weighted yes-no voting
system with the same list of winning coalitions as the given system.
Definition 2.5.3
2
1. Two yes-no voting systems (for the same set of voters) are said to be equivalent
if they have the same list of winning coalitions. (We may also say that each of
the two systems is equivalent to the other.)

2. A yes-no voting system is said to be weightable if it is equivalent to a weighted
system. A weighted system that is equivalent to a given system is said to be a
weighted representation for it.

(According to Definition 2.5.3, the voting system in Example 2.5.1 is weightable
while the system in Example 2.5.2 is not.)
2.5.1 Trades Among Coalitions
Example 2.5.4
Let V = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h} be the set of voters in a yes-no voting system and consider the
following four coalitions:
A1 = {a, d, f, h}, A2 = {d, g}, A3 = {a, c, e} and A4 = {d, g, h}
V a b c d e f g h V a b c d e f g h
A1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 B1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
A2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 B2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
(A) (B)
A3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 B3 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
A4 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 B4 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
2 0 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 3 1 1 2 2
In Table (A), the top row represents the set V of all voters in the system. The
second, third, fourth, and fifth rows represent coalitions A1 , A2 , A3 , and A4 , respectively.
(The membership in a coalition is indicated by placing 1 in the columns of the voters who
are in that coalition, and placing 0 in the columns of the voters who are not.) The bottom row
sums up the entries in each column to find the number of occurrences of each voter in all of
the coalitions.
Table (B) is derived from Table (A) by moving some of the 1’s and the 0’s vertically
(thus keeping the numbers of 1’s and 0’s in each column unchanged.) This results in the new
coalitions:
B1 = {d, h}, B2 = {c, d, g}, B3 = {a, d, e, f, h} and B4 = {a, g}.
Definition 2.5.5
Let V be the set of voters in a yes-no voting system.
1. Given a coalition A in the system and a voter x in V , we define the membership
index of x in A, denoted [x; A], by [x; A] = 1 if x is in A and [x; A] = 0 if x is
not in A.

(continued )
147 2
Definition 2.5.5 (continued)

2. Given a set of coalitions {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} and a voter x in V , we define the
membership index of x in the given set of coalitions, denoted
[x; {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k}] by

k
[x; {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k}] = [x; Ai ].

i=1
3. For k ≥ 2, a set of coalitions {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} is said to be

trade-equivalent to another set of coalitions {Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} (some Ai ’s
or Bi ’s may be empty) if for every voter x in V ,
[x; {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k}] = [x; {Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k}] ·

The membership index of a voter in a set of coalitions is simply the number of

occurrences of that voter in the coalitions of the set.
ⓘ Remark 2.5.6
1. Clearly, if the set {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} is trade-equivalent to the set {Bi : i =
1, 2, · · · , k}, then {Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} is trade-equivalent to {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k}
and we may therefore say that the two sets are trade-equivalent. It is also clear that if
{Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} is trade-equivalent to the set {Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} and the set
{Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} is trade-equivalent to the set {Ci : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} then the set
{Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} is trade-equivalent to the set {Ci : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} (In fact, trade-
equivalence is an “equivalence relation.”) All sets of coalitions that are trade-equivalent
to one another form a trade-equivalence class.

2. In Example 2.5.4, the two given sets of coalitions are trade-equivalent. All trade-
equivalent sets to a given set of coalitions can be obtained by representing the given set
by a table as in Example 2.5.4 then redistributing the 1’s and 0’s among the cells in each
column in all possible ways. This redistribution of the 1’s and 0’s amounts to allowing the
voters to move freely among the coalitions in the set {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k}. This gives
a more intuitive understanding of the formal definition of trade equivalence in 2.5.05(3).
The movement of the voters (in this manner) is called a trade and we may say that the
set {Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} of coalitions is derived from the set {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} by
a trade among the Ai ’s.

2.5.2 Trade-Robustness and the Taylor–Zwicker Theorem
ⓘ Remark 2.5.7 Assuming that the yes-no voting system in Example 2.5.4 is weighted,
let us replace each of the 1s in Table (A) and Table (B) with the weight of the voter in its
column and keep the 0s. Note that
1. The weight of a coalition can be obtained by adding up the entries in its row.

2. The sum of all entries in either table yields the sum of weights of the coalitions in the
table.

3. Since the entries in Table (B) are the same as the entries in Table (A) (albeit in different
2 cells), the sum of all entries in Table (B) is equal to the sum of all entries in Table (A).

4. It follows from 2 &3 that the sum of weights of the coalitions in Table (B) is the same as
the sum of weights of the coalitions in Table (A).

5. The above remarks hold in general in any weighted yes-no voting system. More precisely,
Proposition 2.5.8 If {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} and {Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} are two-trade

equivalent sets of coalitions in a weighted yes-no voting system, then

k
k
w(Ai ) = w(Bi )
i=1 i=1
where w(X) denotes the weight of coalition X.

Definition 2.5.9
A (not necessarily weighted) yes-no voting system is said to be
1. n-trade-robust for a certain positive integer n ≥ 2 provided that given two
arbitrary trade-equivalent sets of coalitions {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} and
{Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} (with 2 ≤ k ≤ n) such that the coalitions
Ai , i = 1, 2, · · · , k are all winning, at least one of the coalitions
Bi , i = 1, 2, · · · , k is winning.

2. trade-robust if it is n-trade-robust for all positive integer n ≥ 2.

Trade-robustness is an expression of the fact that weight does not dissipate. More
precisely, if an open exchange of voters takes place among coalitions, the weight lost
by a coalition due to the departure of a voter is gained, in the exact same amount, by
the coalition this voter joins. We may compare this to the exchange of players among
football teams in the open season, but the analogy is not exact since the value a player
adds to his new team is not necessarily equal to the value he takes away from his old
team, due to issues of compatibility and ability to work with other players.
Theorem 2.5.10 (Taylor & Zwicker, 1992)

A yes-no voting system is weightable if and only if it is trade-robust.
Proof
Let V be the set of voters in a yes-no voting system.
Assuming that the system is weightable, each voter x in V can be assigned a weight w(x),
and a quota q can be found so that the resulting weighted system have the same list of winning
coalitions as the given system. For an arbitrary integer k ≥ 2, let {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} and
{Bi : i = 1, 2, · · · , k} be two trade-equivalent sets of coalitions such that each Ai is winning,
149 2
i = 1, 2, · · · , k. It follows that

k
k
w(Bi ) = w(Ai ) ≥ kq·
i=1 i=1
From this we conclude that w(Bi ) ≥ q for at least one i, for otherwise we would have
k
i=1 w(Bi ) < kq. This proves that every weightable yes-no voting system is trade-robust.
The proof that every trade-robust yes-no voting system is weightable is too involved to
be presented here. We refer the interested reader to Taylor and Zwicker [25] for a proof.

Using the “if” part of Theorem 2.5.10 to prove that a given yes-no voting system is
weightable by demonstrating its trade-robustness is often impractical because one will
have to examine all pairs of trade-equivalent sets of coalitions. In fact, it is much easier
to try to find weights and a quota that generate the list of winning coalitions of the given
system.
The “only if” part, on the other hand, comes in handy when we embark on proving
that a given system is not weightable. To this end, we only need to find a set of all-
winning coalitions and a trade among its members that results in another set of all-losing
coalitions.
Example 2.5.11
A yes-no voting system has the set of voters V = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g}. A coalition
in this system is winning if and only if it consists of three or more voters including
at least one of a and b. Show that this system is not weightable.
Solution Consider the set {A1 , A2 } where A1 = {a, c, d} and A2 = {b, e, f, g}; and the set
{B1 , B2 } where B1 = {a, b} and B2 = {c, d, e, f, g}. The two sets are trade-equivalent as
shown in the following two tables.
V a b c d e f g V a b c d e f g
A1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 B1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Table (A) Table (B)
A2 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 B2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(You can see that {B1 , B2 } was derived from {A1 , A2 } by a trade between A1 and A2 in
which c and d moved from A1 to A2 and b moved from A2 to A1 .)
Note that A1 and A2 are both winning while B1 and B2 are both losing and so the
system is not trade-robust. It follows from Theorem 2.5.10 that it is not weightable.
Example 2.5.12
Let us keep the same set of voters as in Example 2.5.11 but modify the defining condition of
a winning coalition by requiring both a and b to be present. The new defining condition for
winning coalitions is: A coalition is winning if and only if consists of three or more voters
including both a and b.
Given a set {A1 , A2 , · · · , Ak } of winning coalitions, we can see that each Ai , i =

2 1, 2, · · · , k includes both a and b in addition to one or more of c, d, e, f , and g. If a
set {B1 , B2 , · · · , Bk } is derived from the given set by a trade then, obviously, each Bi
must include both a and b. If all of the Bi ’s are losing, then none of them can include
any of c, d, e, f, g which is impossible. Therefore our system is trade-robust and, by
Theorem 2.5.10, is weightable. This is one of the rare occasions where Theorem 2.5.10 can
be used to show that a given yes-no system is weightable.
To find weights and a quota for this system, let us assign a weight of 1 to each of
c, d, e, f , and g, a weight of μ to each of a and b and set the quota at q. Since {a, b, c}
is winning and {b, c, d, e, f, g} is losing we have
μ + 5 < q ≤ 2μ + 1·
We obviously have infinitely many possibilities to choose a pair q, μ. One of those choices
is q = 11 and μ = 5. Another choice is q = 16 and μ = 10.
We close with the following ingenious example by Taylor and Zwicker [24, 26] of a
yes-no voting system that is 2-trade-robust but not 3-trade-robust and, therefore, not
trade-robust.
2.5.3 The Magic Square Voting System
For an integer n ≥ 3, a magic square of order n is an array with n rows and n columns
filled with the numbers 1, 2, · · · , n2 so that the sum of each row, columns or diagonal is
the same. Since
1 2 2
1 + 2 + · · · + n2 = n (n + 1)
2
we can see that this common sum (called the magic sum) is 12 n(n2 + 1). Magic squares
exist for all n ≥ 3 (but not for n = 2) and have been a subject of interest since antiquity.
The following is an example of a magic square of order 3. The magic sum for a magic
square of order 3 is 12 × 3(32 + 1) = 15.
4 3 8
9 5 1
2 7 6
The set of voters in the magic square voting system of order 3 consists of 9 voters
a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, each occupies one of the cells of the above magic square. Let us
think of the number in each cell as a dollar amount owned by the voter in that cell. The
dollar amount owned by a coalition X, denoted $(X), is the sum of the dollar amounts
owned by its members; and the number of voters in X is denoted #(X).
a|$4 b|$3 c|$8
d|$9 e|$5 f |$1
g|$2 h|$7 i|$6
151 2
Winning coalitions: Let X be a coalition in the above magic square yes-no voting
system. By definition, the winning/losing status of X is determined as follows:
1. X is winning if #(X) ≥ 4 and is losing if #(X) ≤ 2.
2. Let #(X) = 3. X is winning if $(X) ≥ 16 and is losing if $(X) ≤ 14.
3. If #(X) = 3 and $(X) = 15, then the members of X occupy a row, a column, or
a diagonal in the magic square. (This will be shown in Proposition 2.5.13 below.)
Rows are declared winning, while columns and diagonals are declared losing.
Proposition 2.5.13 Let S be a coalition in the magic square voting system of order 3, with
#(S) = 3 and $(S) = 15, then the members of S occupy a row, a column, or a diagonal in
the magic square.
Proof
If a is in S and if the other two members of S are x and y then, since $(a) = 4, we have
$(x) + $(y) = 11. The only possible values for $(x) and $(y) are 9&2, 8&3 and 6&5; and
therefore X = {a, d, g} (a column) or X = {a, b, c} (a row) or X = {a, e, i} (a diagonal.)
Similarly, if e is in S and the other two members of S are x and y then, since $(e) = 5,
we have $(x) + $(y) = 10. The only possible values for $(x) and $(y) are 9&1, 8&2, 7&3
and 6&4; and therefore X = {d, e, f } (a row), X = {c, e, g} (a diagonal), X = {b, e, h} (a
column), or X = {a, e, i} (a diagonal.)
We leave it to the student to consider the membership of each of the remaining seven
voters in S and show that, in each case, S is a row, a column, or a diagonal.

Proposition 2.5.14 The magic square voting system of order 3 is 2-trade-robust.
Proof
Let {A1 , A2 } be a set of winning coalitions and assume that the set {B1 , B2 } was derived from
{A1 , A2 } by a trade between A1 and A2 involving unequal numbers of voters (the number of
voters moving from A1 to A2 is different from the number of voters moving from A2 to A1 .)
Since #(A1 ) ≥ 3 and #(A2 ) ≥ 3, we must have #(B1 ) > 3 or #(B2 ) > 3 and therefore at
least one of B1 and B2 is winning.
To complete the proof, we consider trades between A1 and A2 that involve equal numbers
of voters (the number of voters moving from A1 to A2 is the same as the number of voters
moving from A2 to A1 .) We have three possibilities:
1. One of A1 and A2 , say A1 , is such that #(A1 ) ≥ 4. In this case, we have #(B1 ) ≥ 4 and
therefore B1 is winning.
2. #(A1 ) = 3 and #(A2 ) = 3; and one of A1 and A2 , say A1 , is such that $(A1 ) ≥ 16. In this
case, we have #(B1 ) = 3 and #(B2 ) = 3. Further, since $(A1 ) ≥ 16 and $(A2 ) ≥ 15, at
least one of B1 and B2 , say B1 , will be such that $(B1 ) ≥ 16 and therefore B1 is winning.
3. #(A1 ) = 3, #(A2 ) = 3, $(A1 ) = 15 and $(A2 ) = 15. (Both A1 and A2 must be
rows.) In this case, we have #(B1 ) = 3 and #(B2 ) = 3. If one of B1 and B2 , say B1 ,
is such that $(B1 ) > 15, then it is winning. If $(B1 ) = 15 and $(B2 ) = 15 then, by
Proposition 2.5.13, each of B1 and B2 is a row, a column, or a diagonal. But a column or
diagonal must include members from all three rows, which is not the case with B1 or B2
2 whose members come only from the two rows of A1 and A2 . It follows that B1 and B2
are rows ({B1 , B2 } is the same as {A1 , A2 }) and therefore both B1 and B2 are winning.

Proposition 2.5.15 The magic square voting system of order 3 is not 3-trade-robust.
Proof
Each of the three following coalitions is winning since its members occupy a row of the
magic square
A1 = {a, b, c}, A2 = {d, e, f }, A3 = {g, h, i},
while each of the three following coalitions is losing since its members occupy a column
of the magic square
B1 = {a, d, g}, B2 = {b, e, h}, B3 = {c, f, i}.
It can be easily verified that the two sets {A1 , A2 , A3 } and {B1 , B2 , B3 } are trade-
equivalent and so the magic square voting system is not 3-trade-robust.

Propositions 2.5.14 and 2.5.15 amount to the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5.16
The magic square voting system of order 3 is 2-trade-robust but not 3-trade-robust.

The following more general theorem, also by Taylor and Zwicker, can be found in
their paper [26].
Theorem 2.5.17
For each integer k ≥ 3, there exists a yes-no voting system that is (k − 1)-trade-robust
but not k-trade-robust.

We close the present chapter with a brief note on a different direction of the
study of the structure of a yes-no voting system. Weighted (or weightable) systems
have the simplest structure, in the sense that an arbitrary yes-no voting system can
be reconstructed from a set of weighted systems. To explain, consider the system in
Example 2.5.2. One can think of this system as an “intersection” of two weighted
systems:
• In the first system, each of a and b has a weight of 1, each of c and d has a weight
of zero, and the quota is 1.
• In the second system, each of a and b has a weight of zero, each of c and d has a
weight of 1, and the quota is 1.
You can easily see that a coalition in Example 2.5.2 is winning if and only if it is
winning in both of the above two weighted systems. In other words, the system in
Exercises
153 2
Example 2.5.2 is the intersection of the above two weighted systems, and can be
represented as follows:
a b c d q
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1
It turns out that every yes-no voting system is representable as an intersection of

finitely many weighted yes-no voting system. The dimension of a given yes-no voting
system is the smallest number of weighted systems whose intersection yields that given
system [24]. (see also Exercise 28 below.)
Exercises
1. In a weighted yes-no voting system, voter a has weight of 6, voter b has weight of 3 and
b(a) = 8. What are the possible values of b(b)?
2. In a weighted yes-no voting system, voter a has weight of 7, voter b has weight of 4 and
b(a) = 7. What are the possible values of b(b)?
3. In a weighted yes-no voting system, b(a) = 8. Which of the following is a possible value
for the total number of winning coalition: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10?
4. In a weighted yes-no voting system, b(a) = 9. Which of the following is a possible value
for the total number of winning coalition: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11?
5. Suppose you are a voter in a yes-no voting system and your Banzhaf index is different
from your Shapley–Shubik index.
• Can you think of a situation where the lower index better serves your interest?
• Can you think of a situation where the higher index better serves your interest?
6. Show that the following three Yes-No systems for voters a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h are
equivalent.
1. A coalition is winning if and only if it contains at least four voters including a, b.
2. Each of a and b is assigned a weight of 5, each of c, d, e, f, g, and h is assigned a weight
of 1, and a quota of 12 is adopted.
3. Each of a and b is assigned a weight of 100, each of c, d, e, f, g, and h is assigned a
weight of 1, and a quota of 202 is adopted.
7. A yes-No voting system assigns weights of 5,4,3,2,1 to the voters a, b, c, d, e, respec-

tively. Compute the Banzhaf distribution of power and identify the dummies and the voters
with veto power in each of the following three cases:
1. Quota is 8.
2. Quota is 9.
3. Quota is 10.
8. A Yes-No voting system consists of six voters named a, b, c, d, e, f together with the
2 following rule: A coalition is winning if and only if it contains at least four voters whose
names are four consecutive letters. List all winning coalitions and compute the Banzhaf
distribution of power. Identify the dummies and the voters with veto power that may exist.
9. A hypothetical country consists of five states a, b, c, d, e whose populations, in millions,

are given in the following table:
State a b c d e
Population 5 5 1 1 1
In the National Supreme Council that runs the country, a coalition of states is winning
if and only if the total population of the states in the coalition is at least 8 million citizens.
List all the winning coalitions and compute the Banzhaf distribution of power. Identify the
dummies and the voters with veto power.
10. In Exercise 9, the three smaller states c, d, and e demanded that a winning coalition
of states must contain at least three states, in addition to the condition of at least 8 million
citizens. List all the winning coalitions and compute the Banzhaf distribution of power. Show
how this additional condition shifts some Banzhaf power from the larger states to the smaller
ones.
11. The following are the weights of the voters in a yes-no voting system:
a b c d e
6 4 2 2 1
Find the Banzhaf distribution of power if the quota is 10 and identify the dummies and
the voters with veto power if they exist.
12. It was suggested that increasing the quota from 10 to 11 in Exercise 11 might be helpful
to voter e. Find the Banzhaf distribution of power and identify the dummies and the voters
with veto power if this change is implemented. Did voter e actually gain from this change?
13. Instead of increasing the quota as in Exercise 12, let us bring the quota back to 10
and add the condition that a winning coalition must include three or more voters. Find the
Banzhaf distribution of power and identify the dummies and the voters with veto power if
they exist. Did this help voter e? Which of the two modifications is better for e: the one in
Exercise 12 or this one?
14. In a yes-no voting system for seven voters a, b, c, d, e, f , and g, a coalition is winning
if and only if it includes four or more voters including both a and b. Mark the pivotal voter
in each of the following permutations:
acbf d eg acgf deb gcaf bed ecgf dba
Exercises
155 2
15. In a yes-no voting system for seven voters a, b, c, d, e, f , and g, a coalition is winning
if and only if it includes four or more voters including at least one of a and b. Mark the
pivotal voter in each of the permutations in Exercise 14.
acbf d eg acgf deb gcaf bed ecgf dba
16. Is the yes-no voting system in Exercise 14 weightable?
18. A yes-No voting system assigns weights of 5,4,1,1 to the voters a, b, c, d, respectively.
Compute the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik distributions of power and identify the dummies
and the voters with veto power in the following three cases:
1. Quota is 6.
2. Quota is 7.
3. Quota is 8.
19. A Yes-No voting system consists of four voters named a, b, c, d together with the
following rule: A coalition is winning if and only if it includes two voters whose names
are consecutive letters. Compute the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik distributions of power.
Identify the dummies and the voters with veto power, if they exist.
21. A Yes-No voting system for five voters a, b, c, d, and e has the following defining rule
for the winning coalitions: A coalition is winning if and only if it contains three or more
voters including both a and b.
1. Find a weighted representation for the system.
2. Find the Banzhaf distribution of power.
3. Find the Shapley–Shubik distribution of power.
22. A Yes-No voting system for five voters a, b, c, d, and e has the following defining rule
for the winning coalitions: A coalition is winning if and only if it contains three or more
voters including at least one of a and b.
1. Find a weighted representation for the system.
2. Find the Banzhaf distribution of power.
3. Find the Shapley–Shubik distribution of power.
23. Consider a weighted yes-no voting system in which all voters have positive even integer
weights except for one voter, say x, whose weight is 1; and assume that the quota is an even
positive integer. Show that x is a dummy.
24. The European Union (EU) started in 1957 under the name The European Common
Market which consisted of six members: France, West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg. The decision making body was a weighted yes-no voting system
2 with weights and quota as follows:
Member France Germany Italy Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg

Weight 4 4 4 2 2 1
and the quota was set at 12.
Without listing all winning coalitions, show that Luxembourg was a dummy in the
European Common Market yes-no voting system.
25. Find the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik distributions of power for the European
Common Market in Exercise 24. (Hint: Instead of sorting coalitions in which a voter is critical
by the size, sort them by the weight.)
26. Without listing all winning coalitions, show that voters d, e, f are all dummies in the
following weighted system if the quota is 16.
Member a b c d e f
Weight 9 9 7 3 1 1
27. Let D be a coalition in a yes-no voting system.

• D is said to be minimal winning if it is winning but every proper subcoalition of D is
losing. (This is equivalent to the condition that every voter in D is critical.)
• D is said to be maximal losing if it is losing but every proper supercoalition of D is
winning.
Prove or disprove
1. Every minimal winning coalition contains a maximal losing one.
2. Every maximal losing coalition is contained in a minimal winning one.
3. Every winning coalition contains a minimal winning one.
4. Every losing coalition is contained in a maximal losing one.
28. The following table shows the population data (in millions) of a federated nation of
eight states with a total population of 22 million citizens.
State a b c d e f g h
Population 8 8 1 1 1 1 1 1
The nation is governed by a yes-no voting system in which a coalition is winning if and
only if it includes at least five states with a total population of at least 12 million people.
Show that this system is not 2-trade robust, and is therefore not weightable.
Note The yes-no voting system in Exercise 28 can be presented as a double-weighted system
as follows:
State a b c d e f g h Quota
w1 8 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
w2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5
Exercises
157 2
Such system can be viewed as a blend of two weighted systems. It is often used in
federated nations in order to protect the smaller states from being dominated by the larger
ones. The system in Exercise 10 is another example of a double weighted system; it can be
presented as:
State a b c d e Quota
w1 5 5 1 1 1 8
w2 1 1 1 1 1 3
The two weight assignments involved are denoted w1 and w2 . Note that the system
in Exercise 10 is weightable (as we shall see next, in Exercise 29) while the system in
Exercise 28 is not.
29. Show that the yes-no voting system in Exercise 10 is weightable.
30. How many sets {X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 } are there in the trade-equivalence class of the set
{A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 } in Example 2.5.4?
31. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) comprises 15 members, 5 of which are
endowed with veto power. The following is a simplified version of the yes-no voting system
used by the UNSC that precludes abstentions: A coalition is winning if and only if it includes
four or more voters in addition to the five veto-powered members.
1. Show that the UNSC system is weightable.
2. Compute the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik distributions of power for the UNSC
system.
159 3
Apportionment
Sherif El-Helaly

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6_3
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the problem of apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives every 10 years after the census.
Article I Sect. 2.3 of the constitution states that “Representatives and direct taxes
shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union,
according to their respective numbers . . . .”
In other words, the representation of each state should be commensurate with its
population size. To get started, consider the following two examples.
Example 3.1.1
Suppose we have a federated nation of three states A, B, and C and a total population of
1000 people: 500 in state A, 300 in state B, and 200 in state C. The house size (which is the
total number of seats in the house) is 10 seats. Intuitively, A should be represented by 5 seats,
B should be represented by 3 seats, and C should be represented by 2 seats. The underlying
computations are as follows.
Start by computing the number of people to be represented by one seat (nationwide),

called the natural divisor and denoted by d:
Total Population of the Nation 1000

Natural Divisor = = = 100 person/seat.
House Size 10
To find the number of seats that should represent a state (called the exact quota or natural
quota of the state), we divide the natural divisor into its population. The results are
shown in the following table:
160 Chapter 3 • Apportionment
State Population Natural quota

A 500 500/100 = 5
B 300 300/100 = 3
3 C 200 200/100 = 2
Total 1000 10
The exact apportionment of the house is the apportionment in which each state is
represented by its natural quota. It is called exact because it guarantees that the number
of people to be represented by one seat is same regardless of the state they live in. In
other words, the ratio
Population of a state
number of seats apportioned to that state
(called the district size in the state) is same for all states. The exact apportionment is the
ideal that we should aim at despite its virtual impossibility. The study of apportionment
is all about trying to get as close as possible to this ideal. In the present (unrealistically
simple) example, the exact apportionment is 5 seats for A, 3 seats for B, and 2 seats for
C with a district size of 100 people in each state.
Example 3.1.2
In the above example, let us change the population data as in the following table and keep
the house size at 10 seats.
State A B C Total
Population 378 346 276 1000
The natural divisor is 1000

10 = 100 person/seat. Calculations are shown in the following
table.
State Population Natural quota

A 378 378/100 = 3.78
B 346 346/100 = 3.46
C 276 276/100 = 2.76
Total 1000 10
Therefore, the exact apportionment is 3.78 seats for A, 3.46 seats for B, and 2.78 seats
for C.
3.1 · Introduction
161 3
In contrast with the exact apportionment in Example 3.1.1 which assigned integer
values of seats to each state, the exact apportionment in Example 3.1.2 involves non-
integer values and is therefore impossible to implement in the real world since seats
come in whole numbers. This is what makes apportionment a problematic, but rich and
interesting field of study.
We still have a practical problem waiting for a solution, namely, apportioning the
house seats among the states in the last example. Obviously, a practical solution must
replace the non-integer values with integer ones which means that we have to deviate
from the exact apportionment. A state that receives a whole number of seats higher than
its natural quota will be over-represented and a state that receives a whole number of
seats lower than its natural quota will be under-represented.
Perhaps the first thing that comes to mind is to round each non-integer natural quota
to the nearest integer value. In other words, we use 0.5 as the cut-off point of rounding
so that a fraction that is lower than 0.5 is rounded down, a fraction that is higher than 0.5
is rounded up and we agree to always round a fraction of exactly 0.5 either up (which
we shall do) or down. This rounding is called the conventional rounding. Let us try
conventional rounding in Example 3.1.2: State A’s natural quota of 3.78 rounds up to 4,
state B’s natural quota of 3.46 rounds down to 3, and state C’s quota of 2.76 rounds up
to 3. The total is 10 seats. Obviously, A is over-represented, B is under-represented, and
C is over-represented. The following table summarizes the work done in this problem.
State Population Natural quota Rounded

A 378 378/100 = 3.78 4
B 346 346/100 = 3.46 3
C 276 276/100 = 2.76 3
Total 1000 10 10
Let us try the following two examples using the conventional rounding.
Example 3.1.3
The population data of a certain country is shown in the following table. The house size is 10
seats.
State A B C Total
Population 418 346 236 1000

table:
3
A 418 418/100 = 4.18 4
B 346 346/100 = 3.46 3
C 236 236/100 = 2.36 2
Total 1000 10 9
Example 3.1.4
The population data of a certain country is shown in the following table. The house size is 10
seats.
State A B C Total
Population 378 356 266 1000

table:

A 378 378/100 = 3.78 4
B 356 356/100 = 3.56 4
C 266 266/100 = 2.66 3
Total 1000 10 11
It is clear from the above two examples that conventional rounding does not always help.
(The rounded natural quotas did not add up to the correct house size of 10 seats.)
There are two main approaches to the apportionment problem, neither is perfect. Each of
these two approaches has its own shortcomings which we shall discuss in detail. These two
approaches result in quota procedures and divisor procedures.
3.2 Axioms of Apportionment
Now that exact apportionments have been seen to be virtually impossible, we should
settle for lesser requirements (or axioms) that we should expect an apportionment to
satisfy.
We shall implicitly assume that the house size ≥ the number of states.
3.2 · Axioms of Apportionment
163 3
Axioms of Apportionment 3.2.1
Axiom 1. The number of seats apportioned to a state must be a non-negative integer.
Axiom 2. The total number of seats apportioned to all states must equal the house size;
and if all the natural quotas are integers, then the apportionment obtained from a
procedure must coincide with the exact apportionment.
Axiom 3. Any two states with equal populations must be apportioned the same number of
seats; and if the population of state X is larger than the population of state Y ,
then the number of seats apportioned to Y must not exceed the number of seats
apportioned to X.
All apportionment procedures must satisfy the above three axioms. Quota
procedures must also satisfy the following (fourth) axiom:
Axiom 4. A solution to the apportionment problem must satisfy the quota rule.
What does the quota rule mean? Let q be the natural quota of a state. If q is not an integer,
the integer that is lower than q and is nearest to it is called the lower natural quota of the
state, and the integer that is higher than q and is nearest to it is called the upper natural quota
of the state. In other words, the lower natural quota and the upper natural quota are derived
from the natural quota by rounding it to the nearest lower integer, or to the nearest higher
integer, respectively. In the extremely rare case that q itself is an integer then, by definition,
the lower natural quota and the upper natural quota are both equal to q.
A state that receives less seats than its lower natural quota is said to violate lower
quota (otherwise it is said to satisfy lower quota), and a state that receives more seats
than its upper natural quota is said to violate upper quota (otherwise it is said to satisfy
upper quota). A state that satisfies both lower and upper quotas is said to satisfy quota
or stay within quota.
A solution to an apportionment problem in which all states stay within quota is said
to satisfy the quota rule or stay within quota; it is also called a quota solution or a quota
apportionment.
The rationale behind the quota rule is that if the natural quota is unusable because
it is not an integer, we should replace it with one of the two integers nearest to it: the
lower natural quota or the upper natural quota.
Note that the above axioms allow a state to receive zero seats. This goes against the
constitutional requirement that each state must be represented by at least one seat in the
House of Representatives. The law should provide a provision to deal with this issue if
it materializes (increasing the house size is one possible solution).
There are, however, other applications of apportionment where zero is allowed and
even desirable as we shall see. Proportional Representation (common in European
countries) is a good example of those applications. In a country that applies the pro-
portional representation system, the entire country is one electoral district. Candidates
for parliamentary seats do not run as individuals. Instead, each political party submits an
ordered list of candidates. When a voter goes to the balloting station, she does not cast
her vote for an individual candidate, but for a party list. The votes are then tallied and
the parliament seats are apportioned among the political parties in accordance with their
respective numbers of votes. If, for example, the Social Democratic Party is apportioned
37 seats, the top 37 candidates in that party list occupy those seats.
Typically, the parties in the parliament form two main blocs which balance one
3 another. A minor political party with only a small number of seats can have an undue
influence by holding the balance between the two main blocs. For this reason, it is
undesirable to have minor parties represented in the parliament. In fact, countries that
use the proportional representation system often set a threshold that a party must meet
in order to participate in the seat apportionment process. For example, if that threshold
is set at 5% of the total vote, then parties that receive below 5% of the total vote are
denied access to the parliament and the seats will be apportioned only among parties
that meet that threshold. The downside of this, of course, is that supporters of minor
pairs are denied representation in the parliament and may be discouraged from voting
according to their own opinions. We remind the student of the way the Plurality voting
procedure (studied in Chap. 1) discourages voters from voting to minor candidates.
Example 3.2.2
Find all quota solutions for Example 3.1.3.
State A B C Total
Population 418 346 236 1000
Solution In the initial allocation (IA) we give each state its lower natural quota.
State Population NQ IA (A) (B) (C)

A 418 418/100 = 4.18 4 5 4 4
B 346 346/100 = 3.46 3 3 4 3
C 236 236/100 = 2.36 2 2 2 3
Total 1000 10 9
There is one surplus seat left after the initial allocation. In the columns headed (A), (B),
and (C) we try giving the surplus seat to each of A, B, and C, respectively. The check mark
in the bottom of a column indicates that the solution contained in the column conforms
with the four axioms in Axiom 3.2.1 and is, therefore, acceptable. There are exactly three
quota apportionments.
3.2 · Axioms of Apportionment
165 3
Example 3.2.3
Find all quota solutions for Example 3.1.4.
State A B C Total
Population 378 356 266 1000
Solution In the initial allocation we give each state its lower natural quota.
State Population NQ IA (A, B) (A, C) (B, C)

A 378 378/100 = 3.78 3 4 4 3
B 356 356/100 = 3.56 3 4 3 4
C 266 266/100 = 2.66 2 2 3 3
Total 1000 10 8 X
There are two surplus seats left after the initial allocation. In the columns headed
(A, B), (A, C), and (B, C) we try giving the two surplus seats to the pair appearing in the
heading of the column. As above, the check mark in the bottom of a column indicates
that the solution contained in the column is acceptable because it conforms with the four
axioms in Axiom 3.2.1, while “X” marks a solution that violates Axiom 3 and is, therefore,
unacceptable. There are exactly two quota apportionments.
Example 3.2.4
Find all quota solutions of the following problem in which 10 seats are to be apportioned
among the four states A, B, C, and D.
State A B C D Total
Population 4432 2537 1617 1414 10,000
Solution The natural divisor is 10,000/10 = 1000. Work is shown in the following table.
State Population NQ IA (A, B) (A, C) (A, D) (B, C) (B, D) (C, D)

A 4432 4.432 4 5 5 5 4 4 4
B 2537 2.537 2 3 2 2 3 3 2
C 1617 1.617 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
D 1414 1.414 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
Total 10,000 10 8 X X
There are exactly four quota solutions to this apportionment problem.

Solutions to the above three examples can be outlined in the following two steps:
3 Step 1: In the initial allocation, each state is awarded the whole number part of its natural
quota (which is same as the lower natural quota). The number of seats assigned at
this point will be less than or equal to the house size.
The seats that remain unassigned after the initial allocation are called the surplus
seats; and the number of surplus seats is denoted by s. Since s is the sum of the
“dropped” fractional parts of the natural quotas, we see that s is always a non-
negative integer, smaller than the number of states.
Step 2: Now to the surplus seats. How should they be allocated? Since s is always less
than the number of states as pointed out above, some states will receive surplus
seats and others will not. We try all possible allocations of the surplus seats that
allow no state to receive more than one surplus seat and choose, as valid solutions,
those that satisfy Axiom 3 above. (Axioms 1, 2, 4 are automatically satisfied.)
3.3 Quota Procedures
In this section we present two commonly used quota procedures: the first was proposed
by Alexander Hamilton to apportion the seats of the House of Representatives after the
census of 1790. The second was proposed in 1822 by Representative William Lowndes
of South Carolina.
Step 1 above is exactly the same in all quota procedures. As for Step 2, the states are
listed according to some priority rule that conforms with the above axioms and the top
s states receive one surplus seat each. Quota procedures differ in the priority rules they
use.
3.3.1 Hamilton’s Procedure

Definition 3.3.1 (Hamilton’s Procedure)
The states are listed according to the decreasing order of the fractional part of the
natural quota and the top s states receive one seat each, in addition to its initial
allocation.

The rationale behind this rule is obvious: The larger the fractional part in the natural
quota of a state, the more eligible it is for a surplus seat. The student should find it easy
to verify that the quota solution picked by Hamilton’s procedure always satisfies Axiom
3 above.
Example 3.3.2
Conventional rounding failed to apportion the 10 seats in Example 3.1.3 above. Let us try the
procedure of Hamilton. In the initial allocation, A receives 4 seats, B receives 3 seats, and C
receives 2 seats for a total of 9 seats. Therefore, s = 10 − 9 = 1. The priority list for surplus
3.3 · Quota Procedures
167 3
seats is BCA since 0.46 > 0.36 > 0.18. Since we have only one surplus seat (s = 1), we
draw a vertical line between the first and second states in the list: B|CA to demonstrate the
fact that only the top state will add a surplus seat to its initial allocation. The final Hamilton
apportionment is therefore as follows: A receives 4 seats, B receives 4 seats, and C receives
2 seats. The complete solution of this problem is presented in the following table.
State Population Natural quota Initial allocation Surplus seats Apportionment

A 418 418/100 = 4.18 4 0 4
B 346 346/100 = 3.46 3 1 4
C 236 236/100 = 2.36 2 0 2
Total 1000 10.00 9 1 10
Example 3.3.3
Conventional rounding also failed to apportion the 10 seats in Example 3.1.4 above. Let us
try the procedure of Hamilton. In the initial allocation, A receives 3 seats, B receives 3 seats,
and C receives 2 seats for a total of 8 seats. Therefore, s = 10 − 8 = 2. The priority list for
surplus seats is ACB since 0.78 > 0.66 > 0.56. Since we have two surplus seats (s = 2),
the vertical line is drawn between the second and third states in the list: AC|B. The final
Hamilton apportionment is therefore as follows: A receives 4 seats, B receives 3 seats, and
C receives 3 seats. Solution of this problem is presented in the following table.

A 378 378/100 = 3.78 3 1 4
B 356 356/100 = 3.56 3 0 3
C 266 266/100 = 2.66 2 1 3
Total 1000 10.00 8 2 10
Note 3.3.4 Hamilton’s procedure is really a variant of conventional rounding in which the
cut-off point of rounding is floating, instead of being fixed at 0.5. In Example 3.3.2, any
cut-off point between the first and the second largest fractional parts (0.46 and 0.36), such
as 0.40 will allow only B to receive a surplus seat. Likewise, in Example 3.3.3 any cut-off
point between the second and the third largest fractional parts (0.66 and 0.56) such as 0.61
will allow only A and C to receive surplus seats.

3.3.2 Lowndes’ Procedure

Definition 3.3.5 (Lowndes’ Procedure)
3 The states are listed according to the decreasing order of the district size based on
the initial allocation. The top s states in the list receive one seat each. The district
size of a state with zero initial allocation is set at ∞.

The rationale behind this rule is that if state X has a larger district size than state
Y after the initial allocation, then X is poorly represented compared to Y and therefore
has a stronger claim than Y to the next available seat. It is easy to verify that the quota
solution picked by the procedure of Lowndes satisfies Axiom 3.
Example 3.3.6
In Example 3.3.2 the district sizes after the initial allocation are 418/4 = 104.5 for A,
346/3 = 115.3 for B, and 236/2 = 118 for C. Therefore the Lowndes priority list is CBA.
Since we have only one surplus seat, we draw the line between the first and the second states
in the list: C|BA and the Lowndes apportionment is 4 seats for A, 3 seats for B, and 3 seats
for C. (Compare to Hamilton’s solution of the same problem.)
Example 3.3.7
In Example 3.3.3, the district sizes after the initial allocation are 378/3 = 126 for A, 356/3 =
118.6 for B and 266/2 = 133 for C. Therefore the Lowndes priority list is CA|B and the
Lowndes apportionment is 4 seats for A, 3 seats for B, and 3 seats for C which coincides
with Hamilton’s solution of the same problem.
ⓘ Remark 3.3.8 The following is an equivalent statement of the Lowndes priority rule
presented in Definition 3.3.5:
The states are listed according to the decreasing order of the ratio:
fractional part of the natural quota

entire natural quota
and the top s states in the list receive one seat each.
The equivalence of this statement to Definition 3.3.5 follows from the equality
i δ i+δ
+ = = 1.
q q q
where q is the natural quota, i is the integer part of the natural quota (which is also the
initial allocation), and δ is the fractional part of the natural quota. You will be asked to
provide the details in the exercises.

ⓘ Remark 3.3.9 The above alternative statement of the Lowndes priority rule highlights
the difference between the priority rules of Hamilton and Lowndes. While Hamilton
bases priority only on the absolute size of the fractional part of the natural quota,
169 3
Lowndes puts the size of the fractional part in perspective by taking its ratio to the entire
natural quota. Consider, for example, state X with a natural quota of 5.76 and state Y
with a natural quota of 1.28. In the initial allocation, X receives 5 seats, and Y receives 1
seat. In Hamilton’s procedure, X’s claim to a surplus seat would be stronger than Y ’s
claim since 0.76 > 0.28 while in Lowndes’ procedure Y ’s claim would be stronger than
X’s claim since 0.28 0.76
1.28 > 5.76 . Lowndes’ rationale here is that 0.28 is a more significant
portion of Y ’s natural quota than 0.76 as a portion of X’s natural quota. Lowndes’
procedure is therefore more sympathetic to smaller states than Hamilton’s.

3.3.3 The Alabama Paradox
After the 1880 census, C.W. Seaton, the chief clerk of the U.S. Census Bureau,
computed the Hamilton’s apportionments of all house sizes from 275 to 350 seats. (The
house size was not fixed then since the population of the country and the number of states
were both rapidly growing.) To his astonishment, Seaton found that Alabama receives 8
seats in a 299-seat house but receives only 7 seats in the larger house of 300 seats! This
paradox became known in the literature as the Alabama Paradox. To help understand
how this paradoxical behavior can occur, we present the following simple example.
Example 3.3.10
Use Hamilton’s procedure to apportion
1. 10 seats
2. 11 seats
among the following three states.
State A B C Total
Population 135 333 532 1000
Solution
1. The natural divisor is 1000/10 = 100 person/seat. Calculations are presented in the
following table:

A 135 135/100 = 1.35 1 1 2
B 333 333/100 = 3.33 3 0 3
C 532 532/100 = 5.32 5 0 5
Total 1000 10.00 9 1 10
Only one surplus seat remains after the initial allocation and is taken by A since its
natural quota has the largest fractional part.
2. The natural divisor is 1000/11 = 90.90 person/seat. Calculations are presented in the
3 following table:

A 135 135/90.90 = 1.485 1 0 1
B 333 333/90.90 = 3.663 3 1 4
C 532 532/90.90 = 5.852 5 1 6
Total 1000 11.00 9 2 11
Two surplus seats remain after the initial allocation. They are taken by C and B since
there natural quotas have the largest two fractional parts.
State A is the “Alabama” in this example. It received 2 seats in a 10-seat house but
only 1 seat in an 11-seat house.
Let us try to understand how the calculations led to this anomaly.

If p is the population of one of the three states, then its natural quota is p
1000/10
= 10 p
1000
p
in a 10-seat house and is 1000/11 = 1000
11 p
in an 11-seat house. Therefore, increasing the
house size from 10 seats to 11 seats had the effect of enlarging the natural quota of each
state by a factor of
11 p 10 p 11
÷ = = 1.1
1000 1000 10
and therefore,
Increase in the natural quota of A = (0.1)(1.35) = 0.135
Increase in the natural quota of B = (0.1)(3.33) = 0.333
Increase in the natural quota of C = (0.1)(5.32) = 0.532
Note 1 The increments added to the natural quotas all went to the fractional parts,
leaving the initial allocations unchanged.
Note 2 State A (which originally had the largest fractional part) had the smallest natural
quota and therefore received the smallest increase in its natural quota. States B and C
received larger increases in their natural quotas and the result (due to Note 1) was a
reversal in priority for surplus seats from A|BC in a 10-seat house to CB|A in an 11-
seat house. Next, we present the formal definition.
Definition of the Alabama Paradox 3.3.11 We say that the Alabama paradox has occurred
when an increase in the house size causes the number of seats apportioned to a state to
decrease. An apportionment procedure that never exhibits the Alabama paradox is said to be
house-monotone.

171 3
The above discussion indicates that Hamilton’s procedure is not house-monotone.
Lowndes’ procedure is not house-monotone either but this fact is not highlighted in
the literature possibly because Lowndes’ procedure was never implemented in the
House apportionment and is not widely used in other apportionment applications. The
following example presents an occurrence of the Alabama paradox with the Lowndes
procedure.
Example 3.3.12
Use the Lowndes’ procedure to apportion
1. 10 seats
2. 11 seats
among the following four states.
State A B C D Total
Population 1262 1264 3736 3738 10,000
Solution
1. The natural divisor is 10000/10 = 1000 person/seat. Calculations are shown in the
following table:

A 1262 1262/1000 = 1.262 1 1 2
B 1264 1264/1000 = 1.264 1 1 2
C 3736 3736/1000 = 3.736 3 0 3
D 3738 3738/1000 = 3.738 3 0 3
Total 10,000 10.000 8 2 10
1 = 1262 for A, 1 = 1264

The district sizes based on the initial allocation are 1262 1264
for B, 3736
3 = 1245.3 for C, and 3738
3 = 1246 for D. The two surplus seats go to A and
B since they have the two highest district sizes based on the initial allocation.
2. The natural divisor is 10000/11 = 909.09 person/seat. Calculations are shown in the
following table.

A 1262 1262/909.09 = 1.3882 1 0 1
B 1264 1264/909.09 = 1.3904 1 1 2
3 C 3736 3736/909.09 = 4.1096 4 0 4
D 3738 3738/909.09 = 4.1118 4 0 4
Total 10,000 11.0000 10 1 11
1 = 1262 for A, 1 = 1264

The district sizes based on the initial allocation are 1262 1264
for B, 3736
4 = 934 for C, and 3738
4 = 934.5 for D. We have only one surplus seat in
this case and it is picked up by B since it has the largest district size based on the initial
allocation. The Alabama paradox has obviously occurred in this example since state A
(the Alabama) lost a seat (going down from two seats to one) when one seat was added
to the house.
3.3.4 The Population Paradox
We alert the reader to the fact that this paradox has various definitions in the literature.
We use the definition adopted by Balinski and Young in their monograph [2].
Definition of the Population Paradox 3.3.13 We say that the population paradox has
occurred when a state that gained population loses one seat or more and a state that lost
population gains one seat or more, while the house size is kept unchanged. An apportionment
procedure that never exhibits the population paradox is said to be population-monotone.
ⓘ Remark 3.3.14 Two events need to simultaneously take place for the population
paradox to occur:
1. A state that gained population loses one seat or more.
2. Another state that lost population gains one seat or more.
The occurrence of one of these two events without the other is not paradoxical or
counter-intuitive.

ⓘ Remark 3.3.15
1. To examine house-monotonicity, we need to fix the population data and allow the house
size to change.

2. To examine population-monotonicity, we need to fix the house size and allow the
population data to change.

3.3.5 The Balinski-Young Theorem
The following two examples, given by Young in [29] establish a very important fact
about quota procedures in general.
173 3
Example 3.3.16
The following is the 1990 census data of a nation. Find all quota apportionments of 7 seats
among the states A, B, C, and D.
State A B C D Total
Population 752 101 99 98 1050
Solution The natural divisor is 1050/7 = 150 person/seat. There are exactly 2 surplus seats.
Work is shown in the following table.
State Population NQ IA (A, B) (A, C) (A, D) (B, C) (B, D) (C, D)

A 752 5.0133 5 6 6 6 5 5 5
B 101 0.6733 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
C 099 0.6600 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
D 098 0.6533 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Total 1050 7 5 X X X X
There are exactly two quota solutions to this apportionment problem: 6, 1, 0, 0 and 5,
1, 1, 0 for A, B, C, and D, respectively. (Both Hamilton and Lowndes pick the 5, 1 ,1, 0
solution.)
Example 3.3.17
The following is the 2000 census data of the nation in Example 3.3.16. Find all quota
apportionments of 7 seats among the states A, B, C, and D.
State A B C D Total
Population 753 377 96 97 1323
Solution The natural divisor is 1323/7 = 189 person/seat. There are exactly 3 surplus seats.
Work is shown in the following table.
State Population NQ IA (A, B, C) (A, B, D) (A, C, D) (B, C, D)

A 753 3.9841 3 4 4 4 3
B 377 1.9947 1 2 2 1 2
3 C 096 0.5079 0 1 0 1 1
D 097 0.5132 0 0 1 1 1
Total 1323 7 4 X
There are exactly three quota solutions to this apportionment problem. (Hamilton picks
the 4, 2, 0, 1 solution while Lowndes picks the 3, 2, 1, 1 solution.)
The above two examples show that regardless of the particular quota procedure used:
1. State A whose population increased from 752 to 753 suffered a drop in representa-
tion from at least 5 seats to at most 4 seats.
2. State D whose population decreased from 98 to 97 gained in representation from 0
seats to 1 seat.
This proves the following 1983 result due to Balinski and Young [28].
Theorem 3.3.18
No quota procedure is population-monotone.

In other words, a population-monotone procedure must allow the allotment of a state

to go above the upper natural quota or below the lower natural quota. For example, a
state with a natural quota of 7.3654 should be allowed to receive more than 8 seats or
less than 7 seats. This happens to be the case with the divisor procedures which we study
in the next section.
Note 3.3.19 It can be problematic to use quota procedures to apportion a certain house size.
This can happen in the case where two or more states have exactly the same priority for a
surplus seat. For example, if we try to use Hamilton’s procedure to apportion ten seats among
the three states in the following table,
State A B C Total
Population 522 339 139 1000
A gets 5 seats, B gets 3 seats, and C gets one seat in the initial allocation. Which state
gets the remaining surplus seat? B or C?
3.4 · Divisor Procedures
175 3
We run into the same difficulty if we try to use Lowndes’ procedure to apportion ten
seats among the three states in the following table:
State A B C Total
Population 616 256 128 1000
Nine seats are apportioned in the initial allocation but which state gets the surplus
seat? B or C?
Mathematically, we can say that an apportionment of ten seats in the above two
examples either does not exist or is not unique. Problems of this kind are extremely rare
and can be resolved by provisions in the apportionment law that would break the ties
for eligibility for surplus seats (thus choosing one out of available different solutions) or
by changing the house size (in the grounds that a solution for this particular house size
does not exist).

3.4 Divisor Procedures
The earliest of these procedures was introduced in 1790 by Thomas Jefferson (pres-
ident of the United States from 1801 to 1809). President George Washington vetoed
Hamilton’s apportionment bill and Jefferson’s procedure was passed and was used to
apportion the U.S. House of Representatives from 1790 to 1840. Later on, several other
divisor procedures were introduced but they were all based on the principle originated
by Thomas Jefferson in 1790. We shall study four different divisor procedures in this
section and one more procedure will be developed in the next section. The four divisor
procedures to be studied in this section are:
1. Jefferson’s procedure.
2. Adams’ procedure: Introduced by John Quincy Adams (president of the United
States from 1825 to 1829) in 1832 when he was a representative from Massachusetts.
It was never implemented.
3. Webster’s procedure: Introduced in 1840 by Senator Daniel Webster of New York.
It was used on-and-off to apportion the U.S. House of Representatives from 1840 to
1940.
4. The Hill–Huntington: Introduced by Joseph Hill (Head of the Federal Bureau of
Statistics) and E.V. Huntington (professor of mathematics at Harvard University). It
was adopted in 1940 and has been in use ever since to apportion the U.S. House of
Representatives.
3.4.1 The General Framework of Divisor Procedures
The quotas of the states are computed by dividing their populations by one and the same
divisor d > 0. Each divisor procedure adopts a certain rule for rounding the quotas to
non-negative integers. More precisely, a quota whose value is q is rounded to one of
the two nearest non-negative integers, according to the rounding rule specified by the
procedure. Each state is then apportioned a number of seats equal to its rounded quota.
Each divisor procedure is characterized by its rounding rule.
3 If the house size h is pre-specified, which is often the case, we adjust the divisor so
that the apportioned seats add up to h.
Note A rounding rule must be monotone in the sense that if α and β are quotas that are
rounded to the integers m and n, respectively, and if α > β, then m ≥ n.
The student should be able to verify that Axioms 1, 2, and 3 in 3.2.1 are all satisfied
by these procedures.
Preliminary Definitions and Notations 3.4.1 If a divisor d is used, a state with population
p will have a quota of q = pd which is rounded, say, to n seats. As we gradually decrease
the divisor, we will reach a value for the divisor called the critical or threshold divisor to
add 1 seat, and denoted Th(+1), so that divisors just higher than Th(+1) apportion n seats
and divisors just lower than Th(+1) apportion n + 1 seats to the state in question. If we
continue to decrease the divisor we will reach, for every positive integer i, a divisor value
Th(+i) (called the critical or threshold divisor to add i seats) so that divisors just higher
than Th(+i) apportion n + i − 1 seats and divisors just lower than Th(+i) apportion n + i
seats to the state in question.
On the other hand, if we gradually increase the divisor, we will reach a value for
the divisor called the critical or threshold divisor to drop 1 seat, denoted Th(−1), so
that divisors just higher than Th(−1) apportion n − 1 seats and divisors just lower
than Th(−1) apportion n seats to the state in question. If we continue to increase the
divisor we will reach, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, a divisor value Th(−i) (called the critical
or threshold divisor to drop i seats) so that divisors just higher than Th(−i) apportion
n − i seats and divisors just lower than Th(−i) apportion n − i + 1 seats to the state in
question.
In an apportionment problem with a pre-specified house size h, a good strategy
would be to make a first attempt using the natural divisor. If the rounded natural quotas
add up to the pre-specified house size, we are done! If not, we replace the natural divisor
with a modified divisor and the populations of the states are all divided by this modified
divisor to produce the corresponding modified quotas. If the modified quotas add up
to the pre-specified house size, the modified divisor used is said to be a proper divisor
and the process is completed by giving each state its rounded modified quota. In general
(barring some extremely rare situations) there is an interval (called the interval of proper
divisors) that contains, exclusively, all proper divisors for a particular problem and
they all deliver the same solution to the apportionment problem at hand. The threshold
divisors defined above will play a crucial role in finding that interval.
Lower modified quotas and upper modified quotas are the modified quotas rounded
down and up, respectively.

177 3
3.4.2 Jefferson’s Procedure
In the light of the framework explained in Sect. 3.4.1, all we need to do in order to define
a divisor procedure is to present its rounding rule.
The Rounding Rule of Jefferson’s Procedure 3.4.2 All quotas are rounded down. More
precisely, a state whose quota is q > 0 receives k seats where k is the unique non-negative
integer such that
k ≤ q < k + 1.
Example 3.4.3
Use Jefferson’s procedure to apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, C, and D based on
the following population data.
State A B C D Total
Population 6514 2608 611 267 10,000
Solution Let us first try the natural divisor d = 10000

10 = 1000 person/seat. Calculations are
shown in the following table.
State Population NQ Apportionment

A 6514 6.514 6
B 2608 2.608 2
C 0611 0.611 0
D 0267 0.267 0
Total 10,000 10 8
Obviously, the natural divisor of 1000 person/seat is not a proper divisor: it apportions
only 8 seats, not 10. We need to replace the natural divisor with a smaller (modified) divisor
d to produce new (modified) quotas, larger than the natural quotas. Hopefully, the resulting
lower modified quotas will add up to the pre-specified house size of 10 seats. The choice
of modified divisor is a delicate process because if it is too small, the resulting modified
quotas will be too large and the sum of the lower modified quotas will be larger than the
pre-specified house size. On the other hand, if the modified divisor is too large, the modified
quotas will not be large enough and the sum of the lower modified quotas will be less than
the pre-specified house size.
Let us try a modified divisor of 800 persons/seat.
3 State Population MQ Apportionment

A 6514 6514/800 = 8.14 · · · 8
B 2608 2608/800 = 3.26 · · · 3
C 0611 0611/800 = 0.76 · · · 0
D 0267 0267/800 = 0.33 · · · 0
Total 10,000 12.5 11
Obviously, a modified divisor of 800 person/seat is not a proper divisor. It is too

small since it apportions 11 seats while the pre-specified house size is 10 seats only.
We need a divisor larger than 800 person/seat. Let us try a modified divisor of 900
person/seat.
State Population MQ Apportionment

A 6514 6514/900 = 7.23 · · · 7
B 2608 2608/900 = 2.89 · · · 2
C 0611 0611/900 = 0.67 · · · 0
D 0267 0267/900 = 0.29 · · · 0
Total 10,000 11.11 · · · 9
A modified divisor of 900 person/seat is not a proper divisor either. It is too large
since it apportioned 9 seats only. Therefore, we should confine our search to the interval
800 < d < 900. We won’t keep you waiting any longer: a divisor of 840 person/seat is
a proper divisor, as shown in the following table.

A 6514 6514/840 = 7.75 · · · 7
B 2608 2608/840 = 3.10 · · · 3
C 0611 0611/840 = 0.72 · · · 0
D 0267 0267/840 = 0.31 · · · 0
Total 10,000 11.90 · · · 10
The solution to the above problem by Jefferson’s procedure stays within the quota. In
fact,
State A whose natural quota is 6.514 ended up with its upper natural quota of 7 seats.
State B whose natural quota is 2.608 ended up with its upper natural quota of 3 seats.
State C whose natural quota is 0.611 ended up with its lower natural quota of 0 seats.
State D whose natural quota is 0.267 ended up with its lower natural quota of 0 seats.

179 3
In the following example Jefferson’s solution violates the quota rule.
Example 3.4.4
Use Jefferson’s procedure to apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, C, and D based on
State A B C D Total
Population 5942 1684 1527 847 10,000
Solution We may use trial and error to find a divisor that apportions the exact house size
of 10 seats as we did in the previous example but this will not be easy in this example and
may take several attempts because the interval of proper divisors is the very narrow interval
842 < d < 847, as we shall see later. Let us use the proper divisor d = 845.

A 5942 5942/845 = 7.031 · · · 7
B 1684 1684/845 = 1.992 · · · 1
C 1527 1527/845 = 1.807 · · · 1
D 0847 0847/845 = 1.002 · · · 1
Total 10,000 11.834 · · · 10
Jefferson’s solution to this problem violates quota rule. To see this, note that the natural
10 = 1000 person/seat and therefore state A’s natural quota is 1000 = 5.942.
divisor is 10000 5942
Jefferson’s procedure apportions 7 seats to state A which exceeds its upper natural quota of
6. You can verify that the apportionments of B, C, and D are within the quota.

Example 3.4.5
In Example 3.4.3, each of C and D was assigned zero seats by Jefferson’s procedure in a
house of 10 seats.
1. Find the smallest house size that satisfies the constitutional requirement that each state
should receive at least one seat and the corresponding number of seats apportioned to
each state.
2. Detect all violations of the quota rule.

Solution
1. We need to use a modified divisor d so that the modified quota of the smallest state
rounds down to an integer ≥ 1, that is,
3
267
≥ 1 and so d ≤ 267
d
To make the house as small as possible, we choose the largest possible value for d allowed
by the above inequality, that is, d = 267. Computations are shown in the following table.

A 6514 6514/267 = 24.39 · · · 24
B 2608 2608/267 = 9.76 · · · 9
C 0611 0611/267 = 2.28 · · · 2
D 0267 0267/267 = 1 1
Total 10,000 37.45 · · · 36
From the table we see that the smallest house size that enables each state to have at
least one seat is 36 seats and the apportionment is shown in the last column of the table.
36 = 277.7 and the natural quotas are
2. The natural divisor is 10000
6514/277.7 = 23.45 · · · for A,

2608/277.7 = 9.38 · · · for B,
611/277.7 = 2.19 · · · for C and,
267/277.7 = 0.96 · · · for D.
The following table shows the lower and upper natural quota of each state based on a
house size of 36 seats and the quota rule violations.
State Pop NQ LNQ UNQ Apportionment Within quota?

A 6514 23.450 23 24 24 YES
B 2608 9.388 9 10 9 YES
C 0611 2.199 2 3 2 YES
D 0267 0.961 0 1 1 YES
Total 10,000 36 36
Jefferson’s apportionment for this problem is within quota.

Next, we proceed to determine the interval of proper divisors for Jefferson’s procedure.
181 3
Proposition 3.4.6 A state with population p receives n seats (n = 1, 2, 3, · · · ) by
Jefferson’s procedure if and only if the divisor d satisfies the inequality
p p
<d≤
n+1 n
and receives 0 seats if and only if d > p.
Proof
The state in question receives n seats by Jefferson’s procedure if and only if its quota q
satisfies the inequality n ≤ q < n + 1, that is, n ≤ pd < n + 1 which is equivalent to d > p
p
when n = 0 and can be transformed with simple algebraic manipulations to n+1 < d ≤ pn
for n = 0.

ⓘ Corollary 3.4.7 If n seats are apportioned to a state with population p by Jefferson’s

procedure, then
p
Th(+i) = , i = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
n+i
p
Th(−i) = , i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , n ·

n − (i − 1)
Example 3.4.8
Consider a state with a population of 7648 persons.
The interval of divisors that allow the state to have exactly 5 seats is
7648 7648
<d≤ , that is, 1274.667 < d ≤ 1529.6
6 5
7648 7648
<d≤ , that is, 1092.572 < d ≤ 1274.666
7 6
7648 7648
<d≤ , that is, 956 < d ≤ 1092.571
8 7
One should always exercise great care when using the threshold divisors to solve an
apportionment problem. We can use them only to determine the interval of proper divisors but
6 = 1274.6
should never use any of them as a divisor for the problem at hand. A divisor of 7648
is supposed to give the state in question 6 seats since it is in the interval 7648
7 < d ≤ 7648
6 ,
but a tiny computational error can make it fall into the interval 6 < d ≤ 7648
7648
5 , thus
7 < d ≤ 6 above we
giving only 5 seats to this state. Note also that in the inequality 7648 7648
used the approximation 1092.572 for the quotient 7648 7 = 1092.5714 · · · but, for the same
quotient, we used the approximation 1092.571 in the inequality 956 < d ≤ 1092.571. For
the same reason, we rounded 1274.6 to 1274.667 when it occupied the left end of an interval;
and we rounded it to 1274.666 when it occupied the right end. This is to make sure that
our calculation errors are on the side of caution. In general, the left endpoint of a divisor
3 interval should be approximated up, and the right endpoint should be approximated down.
This should always be on our mind when we calculate divisor intervals not just in Jefferson’s
procedure, but in all the divisor procedures.
In the following diagram, the interval between each pair of successive threshold divisors
is marked by the number of seats assigned to our state by divisors in that interval.
956 ←−
7 ←− 1092.5714 · · · ←−
6 ←− 1276.6 ←−
5 ←− 1529.6
The arrows are pointing in the direction of increasing number of seats apportioned. The
number of seats corresponding to each interval is circled.
Example 3.4.9
We pointed out above that it is possible to determine an interval of proper divisors for the
Jefferson procedure. Let us try to find it in Example 3.4.4. The natural divisor of 1000
person/seat is a good place to start, so let us see how it works.

A 5942 5942/1000 = 5.942 5
B 1684 1684/1000 = 1.684 1
C 1527 1527/1000 = 1.527 1
D 0847 0847/1000 = 0.847 0
Total 10,000 10 7
The natural divisor apportions only 7 seats and so there are 3 surplus seats and we need
to reduce the divisor. As we gradually reduce the divisor starting from the natural divisor of
1000 person/seat, each time we reach a threshold divisor of a state, one of the 3 surplus seats
is taken. As we saw from Jefferson’s apportionment in Example 3.4.4, a state can acquire
more than one surplus seat in Jefferson’s procedure (state A acquired two of the three surplus
seats in this case), so let us compute the threshold divisors for each state to add 1, 2, 3, and 4
seats. (It will be clear from the next example why we compute the threshold divisors to add
s + 1 seats when we have s surplus seats only.) Calculations are shown in the following table.
State Pop d = 10 Th(+1) Th(+2) Th(+3) Th(+4)

6 = 990.333 (1) 7 = 848.857 8 = 742.750 9 = 660.222
5942 5942 5942 5942
A 5942 5 (2)
2 = 842.000 (4) 3 = 561.333 4 = 421.000 5 = 336.800
1684 1684 1684 1684
B 1684 1
2 = 763.500 3 = 509.000 4 = 381.750 5 = 305.400
1527 1527 1527 1527
C 1527 1
1 = 847.000 (3) 2 = 423.500 3 = 282.333 4 = 211.750
847 847 847 847
D 0847 0
183 3
The following diagram describes the gradual reduction of the divisor (going through the
threshold divisors) and the interval of proper divisors.
1000 Natural divisor

↓
990.333 · · · A gets the first surplus seat
↓
848.857 · · · A gets the second surplus seat
↓
847 D gets the third surplus seat

842 Stop before you reach this point. We do not have a fourth surplus seat.
Therefore, the interval of proper divisors for Jefferson’s procedure in this example is 842 <
d < 847. A adds 2 surplus seats for a total of 7 seats, B stays at 1 seat, C stays at 1 seat,
and D adds 1 surplus seat for a total of 1 seat. We may choose any number in the interval
842 < d < 847 as our modified divisor. Let us use the modified divisor d = 845. The
modified quotas and the final apportionment are shown in the following table:
State Pop d = 845 Final apportionment

845 = 7.031
5942
A 5942 7
845 = 1.992
1684
B 1684 1
845 = 1.807
1527
C 1527 1
845 = 1.002
847
D 0847 1
Total 10,000 10
It is important to note that the interval of all proper divisors for this example does include
847 as can be verified by the student, but we shall always exclude any endpoints from our
interval of divisors since any inaccuracy in the calculation of an endpoint can produce a
wrong result if used as a divisor, as explained in the discussion of Example 3.4.8 above. Note
also that when the decimal representations of the threshold divisors are truncated, the last
digit after the decimal point should stay as it is if the threshold divisor occupies the right end
of the interval of critical divisors and should be rounded up if the threshold divisor occupies
the left end of that interval.
Example 3.4.10
Using Jefferson’s procedure, apportion 10 seats among the four states in the following table:
State A B C D Total
Population 6478 1426 1384 0712 10,000

10 = 1000 person/seat. Jefferson’s apportionment using

Solution The natural divisor is 10000
the natural divisor is shown in the following table:
3
A 6478 6478/1000 = 6.478 6
B 1426 1426/1000 = 1.426 1
C 1384 1384/1000 = 1.384 1
D 0712 0712/1000 = 0.712 0
Total 10,000 10 8
The natural divisor apportions only 8 seats. We need to reduce the divisor to apportion
the 10 seats available. Since we have 2 surplus seats, we need to compute, for each state, the
threshold divisors to add up to 3 seats.
State Pop d = 10 Th(+1) Th(+2) Th(+3)

7 = 925.428 8 = 809.750 9 = 719.777
6478 6478 6478
A 6478 6 (1) (2) (3)
2 = 713.000 3 = 475.333 4 = 356.500
1426 1426 1426
B 1426 1
2 = 692.000 3 = 461.333 4 = 346.000
1384 1384 1384
C 1384 1
1 = 712.000 2 = 356.000 3 = 237.333
712 712 712
D 0712 0
The following diagram describes the gradual reduction of the divisor (going through the
threshold divisors) and the interval of proper divisors.

↓
925.428 · · · A adds the first seat
↓
809.75 A adds the second seat

719.777 · · · Stop before you reach this point. We do not have a third surplus seat.
Therefore, the interval of proper divisors for Jefferson’s procedure in this example is
719.777 · · · < d ≤ 809.750. A adds 2 surplus seats for a total of 8 seats, B stays at 1
seat, C stays at 1 seat, and D stays at 0 seats. We may choose any number in the interval
719.778 < d < 809.750 as our modified divisor. Let us use the modified divisor d = 750.
It is now clear why we needed to compute the threshold divisor to add s +1 seats when we
only have s surplus seats. (In this example, we had only two surplus seats but the threshold
divisor for state A to add 3 seats was needed to provide the left end of the interval of proper
divisors.)
185 3
The modified quotas and the final apportionment are shown in the following table:
State Pop d = 845 Final apportionment

750 = 8.637
6478
A 6478 8
750 = 1.901
1426
B 1426 1
750 = 1.845
1384
C 1384 1
750 = 0.949
712
D 0712 0
Total 10,000 10
Has the quota rule been violated in this example? To answer this question, we need to
compare the final Jefferson’s apportionment with the lower and upper natural quotas:
State Pop NQ LNQ UNQ Apport Within quota?

A 6478 6.478 6 7 8 NO
B 1426 1.426 1 2 1 YES
C 1384 1.384 1 2 1 YES
D 0712 0.712 0 1 0 YES
Total 10,000 10 10
The only apportionments allowed for A by the quota rule are 6 or 7 seats, but it ended up
with 8 seats. Therefore, the quota rule is violated.

3.4.3 Adams’ Procedure
The rounding rule adopted by Adams’ procedure is antithetical to the one adopted by
the procedure of Jefferson. As we shall see, this results in sharp differences between the
results of the two procedures.
The Rounding Rule of Adams’ Procedure 3.4.11 All quotas are rounded up. More pre-
cisely, a state whose quota is q > 0 receives k seats where k is the unique non-negative
integer such that
k − 1 < q ≤ k.
ⓘ Remark 3.4.12 Adams’ procedure gives each state its upper modified quota and this
can never be zero unless the modified quota and, consequently, the population of the
state in question is zero. Therefore
Adams’ procedure never gives a state zero seats except for the trivial (ruled out)
case that the state has zero population.

Example 3.4.13
Use Adams’ procedure to apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, C, and D based on the
following population data. (This is the same data as in Example 3.4.3.)
3
State A B C D Total
Population 6514 2608 611 267 10,000


A 6514 6.514 7
B 2608 2.608 3
C 0611 0.611 1
D 0267 0.267 1
Total 10,000 10 12
In contrast to Jefferson’s procedure, the natural divisor here apportions too many seats
(more than the pre-specified house size). Therefore, we need a higher modified divisor. How
high? Just as in Jefferson’s procedure, there is an interval of proper divisors that we can find.
A proper divisor for this Example is 1303.4 which we are going to verify now and determine
the interval of proper divisors a little later.
State Population MQ Apportionment Within quota?

A 6514 6514/1303.4 = 4.9976 · · · 5 NO
B 2608 2608/1303.4 = 2.0009 · · · 3 YES
C 0611 0611/1303.4 = 0.4687 · · · 1 YES
D 0267 0267/1303.4 = 0.2048 · · · 1 YES
Total 10,000 7.672 · · · 10
The quota rule is violated by Adams’ procedure in this example since A ended up with 5
seats which is below its lower natural quota of 6 seats. The apportionments of B, C, and D
are within quota.

187 3
Proposition 3.4.14 A state with population p receives n seats (n = 1, 2, 3, · · · ) by Adams’
procedure if and only if the divisor d satisfies the inequality
p p
≤d< ·
n n−1
p
(The case n = 0 is ruled out by Remark 3.4.12; and for n = 1 we conveniently set 0 = ∞)
Proof
The state in question receives n seats by Adams’ procedure if and only if its quota q satisfies
the inequality n − 1 < q ≤ n, that is, n − 1 < pd ≤ n which can be transformed with simple
algebraic manipulations to pn ≤ d < n−1 p
.

ⓘ Corollary 3.4.15 If n seats are apportioned to a state with population p by Adams’

procedure, then
p
Th(+i) = ,
n+i−1
p
Th(−i) = , i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , n − 1 ·
n−i
Note 3.4.16 If a state has n seats by Adams’ procedure, then the threshold divisor for the
p
state to drop all the n seats would be n−n = p0 which we agree to write as ∞. This expresses
the fact that no divisor is high enough to render a state seatless in Adams’ procedure.

Example 3.4.17
Consider a state with a population of 7648 persons.
7648 7648
≤d< , that is, 1529.6 ≤ d < 1912
5 4
7648 7648
≤d< , that is, 1912 ≤ d < 2549.3
4 3
7648 7648
≤d< , that is, 2549.3 ≤ d < 3824
3 2
7648 7648
≤d< , that is, 3824 ≤ d < 7648
2 1
The interval of divisors that allow the state to have exactly 1 seat is
7648 7648
≤d< , that is, 7648 ≤ d < ∞
3 1 0
As in Jefferson’s procedure and for the same reason, we should avoid using the threshold
divisors to apportion seats in Adams’ procedure.
In the following diagram, the interval between each pair of successive threshold divisors
is marked by the number of seats assigned to our state by divisors in that interval.
1529 −→
5 −→ 1912 −→
4 −→ 2549.3 −→
3 −→ 3824 −→
2 −→ 7648 −→
1 −→ ∞
The arrows are pointing in the direction of decreasing number of seats apportioned. The
number of seats corresponding to each interval is circled.
Example 3.4.18
We go back to Example 3.4.13 to determine the interval of proper divisors for Adams’
procedure. We use the natural divisor as a place to start.
State Population NQ Apportionment (d = 10)

A 6514 6.514 7
B 2608 2.608 3
C 0611 0.611 1
D 0267 0.267 1
Total 10,000 10 12
The natural divisor of 1000 person/seat apportions 12 seats and so there are 2 excess seats
and we need to increase the divisor. As we gradually increase the divisor starting from the
natural divisor of 1000 person/seat, each time we reach a threshold divisor of a state, one
of the 2 excess seats is dropped. We need to compute the threshold divisors to drop up to 3
seats. (For the same reason as in Example 3.4.10 above, if we have s excess seats we should
compute, for each state, the threshold divisors to drop up to s + 1 seats.) Calculations are
State Pop d = 10 Th(−1) Th(−2) Th(−3)

6 = 1085.666 · · · = 1302.8 (2) = 1628.5
6514 6514 6514
A 6514 7 (1) 5 4
2 = 1304.00 (3) = 2608.00 =∞

2608 2608 2608
B 2608 3 1 0
0 =∞ ··· ···
611
C 0611 1
0 =∞ ··· ···
267
D 0267 1
189 3
The following diagram describes the gradual increase of the divisor and the interval of
proper divisors.
1304 Do not go this far. We do not want to drop a third seat.

1302.8 A drops the second seat
↑
1085.666 · · · A drops the first seat
↑
The interval of proper divisors for Adams’ procedure in this example is 1302.8 < d < 1304.
A drops 2 excess seats and ends up with 5 seats, B stays at 3 seat, C stays at 1 seat, and
D stays at 1 seat. We may choose any number in the interval 1302.8 < d < 1304 as our
modified divisor. We used the modified divisor of d = 1303.4 in our earlier consideration of
this data in Example 3.4.13.
Example 3.4.19
In this example we process the data in Example 3.4.4 and Example 3.4.9 using Adams’
procedure. The following is the apportionment provided by the natural divisor of 1000
person/seat.

A 5942 5942/1000 = 5.942 6
B 1684 1684/1000 = 1.684 2
C 1527 1527/1000 = 1.527 2
D 0847 0847/1000 = 0.847 1
Total 10,000 10 11
The natural divisor of 1000 person/seat apportions 11 seats and so we need to compute
the threshold divisors to drop up to 2 seats. Computations are shown in the following table.
State Pop d = 10 Th(−1) Th(−2)

5 = 1188.4 = 1485.5 (2)
5942 5942
A 5942 6 (1) 4
1 = 1684 =∞
1684 1684
B 1684 2 0
1 = 1527 =∞
1527 1527
C 1527 2 0
0 =∞ ···
847
D 0847 1
proper divisors.
1485.5 Do not go this far. We do not want to drop a second seat.

1188.4 A drops a seat
3 ↑
The interval of proper divisors for Adams’ procedure in this example is 1188.4 < d <
1485.5. A drops 1 excess seats and ends up with 5 seats, B stays at 2 seats, C stays at 2 seats,
and D stays at 1 seat. We may choose any number in the interval 1188.4 < d < 1485.5 as
our modified divisor. Let us use the modified divisor d = 1250.

A 5942 5942/1250 = 4.7536 5
B 1684 1684/1250 = 1.3472 2
C 1527 1527/1250 = 1.2216 2
D 0847 0847/1250 = 0.6776 1
Total 10,000 8 10
The student should verify that the solution provided by Adams’ procedure in this example
is within quota.
Example 3.4.20
In Example 3.4.5 we computed the smallest house size that allows the smallest state to have a
seat in Jefferson’s procedure. From Remak 3.4.12 we see that Adams’ procedures never gives
zero seats to a state, no matter how small. Therefore, the smallest house size that allows the
smallest state to have a seat can be trivially obtained by using a modified divisor higher than
the population of the largest state. This will make the modified quotas of all states less than
1 and each state will end up with one seat and the house size will equal the number of states.
This situation is of no interest, of course. The interesting question in Adams’ procedure case
would be to find the largest house size that allows the smallest state, namely D, to have just
one seat. From Proposition 3.4.14 we see that the interval of divisors that allow D to have
only one seat is
267 267
≤d< , that is, 267 ≤ d < ∞.
1 0
For the largest possible house we need to use the smallest possible divisor in the above
interval which is d = 267. The computations are shown in the following table.
191 3

A 6514 6514/267 = 24.397 25
B 2608 2608/267 = 9.767 10
C 0611 0611/267 = 2.288 3
D 0267 0267/26 = =1.000 1
Total 10,000 37.453 39
From the table we see that the largest house size that allows state D to have just one seat
is 39 seats and the apportionment is shown in the last column of the table.
The natural divisor corresponding to 10,000 persons and 39 seats is 10000/39 =
256.4102. The student should compute the natural quotas and verify that the above
apportionment is within quota.
Example 3.4.21
Let us use Adams’ procedure to process the same data that was processed in Example 3.4.10
using Jefferson’s procedure.
State A B C D Total
Population 6478 1426 1384 0712 10,000
10 = 1000 person/seat. Adams’ apportionment using the

Solution The natural divisor is 10000
natural divisor is shown in the following table:

A 6478 6478/1000 = 6.478 7
B 1426 1426/1000 = 1.426 2
C 1384 1384/1000 = 1.384 2
D 0712 0712/1000 = 0.712 1
Total 10,000 10 12
The natural divisor apportions 12 seats. To determine the interval of proper divisors, we
need to compute, for each state, the threshold divisors to drop up to 3 seats.

6 = 1079.666 · · · = 1295.6 (2) = 1619.5
6478 6478 6478
A 6478 7 (1) 5 4
1 = 1426 =∞ ···
1426 1426
B 1426 2
3 0
1 = 1384 (3) =∞ ···

1384 1384
C 1384 2 0
0 =∞ ··· ···
712
D 0712 1
proper divisors.
1384 Do not go this far. We do not want to drop a third seat.

1295.6 A drops the second seat
↑
1079.666 · · · A drops the first seat
↑
1000
The interval of proper divisors for Adams’ procedure in this example is 1295.6 < d < 1384.
A drops 2 excess seats and ends up with 5 seats, B stays at 2 seat, C stays at 2 seat, and
D stays at 1 seat. We may choose any number in the interval 1295.6 < d < 1384 as our
modified divisor. The following table shows the computation using a modified divisor of
d = 1330.
State Pop d = 1330 Apportionment

A 6478 6478
1330 = 4.87 5
B 1426 1426
1330 = 1.07 2
C 1384 1384
1330 = 1.04 2
D 0712 712
1330 = 0.53 1
Total 10,000 10
Each of B, C, and D received its upper natural quota, but the quota rule is violated since
A received only 5 seats, which is less than its lower natural quota.
3.4.4 Webster’s Procedure
To pass his apportionment bill through Congress, Representative J.Q. Adams of

Massachusetts (then former president of the Unites States) approached Senator Daniel
Webster of New York asking him to co-sponsor the bill in the U.S. Senate. Senator
Webster, however, found it more reasonable to round the quotas to whole numbers using
the conventional rounding rule: fractions greater than or equal to 0.5 are rounded up and
fractions less than 0.5 are rounded down. Why did it take four decades for someone
to suggest this approach which conforms with common sense more than “rounding
193 3
all down” as in Jefferson’s approach or “rounding all up” as in Adams’ approach? An
interesting question in need of an answer.
The Rounding Rule of Webster’s Procedure 3.4.22 Quotas are rounded up or down
according to the conventional rounding rule. More precisely, a state whose quota is q > 0
receives k seats where k is the unique non-negative integer such that
1 1
k− ≤q < k+ ·
2 2
ⓘ Remark 3.4.23 Since Webster’s procedure adopts the conventional rounding, some
natural quotas are rounded up and other natural quotas are rounded down. As a result,
assuming that the house size is pre-specified, three cases are possible:
Case 1: The sum of the rounded natural quotas is lower than the pre-specified house size
and we need a modified divisor (lower than the natural divisor) as is always the
case with Jefferson’s procedure.
Case 2: The sum of the rounded natural quotas is equal to the pre-specified house size. In
this case, there is no need to use a modified divisor. The natural divisor is a proper
divisor.
Case 3: The sum of the rounded natural quotas is higher than the pre-specified house size
and we need a modified divisor (higher than the natural divisor) as is always the
case with Adams’ procedure.

Example 3.4.24
In each of the following three examples, Webster’s procedure is to be used to apportion 10
seats among 4 states with a total population of 10,000 people. The natural divisor in each case
is therefore 10000/10 = 1000 person/seat. The first example represents Case 1, the second
example represents Case 2, and the third example represents Case 3.
State Pop NQ Rounded

A 6478 6478/1000 = 6.478 6
B 1426 1426/1000 = 1.426 1
Case 1:
C 1384 1384/1000 = 1.384 1
D 0712 712/1000 = 0.712 1
Total 10,000 10 9

A 6342 6342/1000 = 6.342 6
B 1684 1684/1000 = 1.684 2
Case 2:
C 1527 1527/1000 = 1.527 2
D 0447 447/1000 = 0.447 0
Total 10,000 10 10

A 5942 5942/1000 = 5.942 6
B 1684 1684/1000 = 1.684 2
3 Case 3:
C 1527 1527/1000 = 1.527 2
D 0847 847/1000 = 0.847 1
Total 10,000 10 11

Proposition 3.4.25 A state with population p receives n seats (n = 1, 2, 3, · · · ) by

Webster’s procedure if and only if the divisor d satisfies the inequality
p p
<d≤
n+ 1
2 n− 1
2
and receives 0 seats if and only if d > 2p.
Proof
The state in question receives n seats by Webster’s procedure if and only if its quota q satisfies
the inequality n − 12 ≤ q < n + 12 , that is, n − 12 ≤ pd < n + 12 which is equivalent
to d > 2p when n = 0, and can be transformed with simple algebraic manipulations to
p p
1 < d ≤ 1 for n > 0.

n+ 2 n− 2
ⓘ Corollary 3.4.26 If n seats are apportioned to a state with population p by Webster’s

procedure, then
p
Th(+i) = , i = 1, 2, · · ·
n + (i − 12 )
p
Th(−i) = , i = 1, 2, · · · , n ·

n − (i − 12 )
Example 3.4.27
Use Webster’s procedure to apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, C, and D in
Examples 3.4.3 and 3.4.13.
State A B C D Total
Population 6514 2608 611 267 10,000

195 3

A 6514 6.514 7
B 2608 2.608 3
C 0611 0.611 1
D 0267 0.267 0
Total 10,000 10 11
This is Case 3 in Examples 3.4.24 above. We need a modified divisor higher than the
natural divisor of 1000. Since there is one excess seat, we need to compute, for each state,
the threshold divisors to drop up to two seats. Calculations are shown in the following table:

6.5 = 1002.153 · · · = 1184.363 · · ·
6514 6514
A 6514 7 (1) 5.5
2.5 = 1043.2 (2) = 1738.666 · · ·

2608 2608
B 2608 3 1.5
0.5 = 1222 ···

611
C 0611 1
D 0267 0 ··· ···
proper divisors.
1043.2 Do not go this far. We do not want to drop a second seat.

1002.153 · · · A drops a seat
↑
The interval of proper divisors for Webster’s procedure in this example is 1002.153 · · · <
d < 1043.2. A drops 1 excess seat and ends up with 6 seats, B stays at 3 seats, C stays at
1 seat, and D stays at 0 seats. We may choose any number in the interval 1002.154 < d <
1043.2 as our modified divisor. Let us use the modified divisor d = 1030.

A 6514 6514/1030 = 6.32 · · · 6
B 2608 2608/1030 = 2.53 · · · 3
C 0611 0611/1030 = 0.59 · · · 1
D 0267 0267/1030 = 0.25 · · · 0
Total 10,000 9.69 · · · 10
The student should verify that the solution provided by Webster’s procedure in this
example is within quota.

Example 3.4.28
Use Webster’s procedure to apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, C, and D in
Examples 3.4.9 and 3.4.19.
3
State A B C D Total
Population 5942 1684 1527 0847 10,000


A 5942 5.942 6
B 1684 1.684 2
C 1527 1.527 2
D 0847 0.847 1
Total 10,000 10 11
This is Case 3 in Examples 3.4.24 above. We need a modified divisor higher than the
natural divisor of 1000. Since there is one excess seat, we need to compute, for each state,
the threshold divisors to drop up to two seats. Calculations are shown in the following table:

5.5 = 1080.363 · · · = 1320.444 · · ·
5942 5942
A 5942 6 (2) 4.5
1.5 = 1122.666 · · · = 3368

1684 1684
B 1684 2 0.5
1.5 = 1018 (1) = 3054

1527 1527
C 1527 2 0.5
0.5 = 1694 ···

847
D 0847 1
proper divisors.
1080.363 · · · Do not go this far. We do not want to drop a second seat.

1018 C drops a seat
↑
The interval of proper divisors for Webster’s procedure in this example is 1018 < d <
1080.363 · · · . A stays at 6 seats, B stays at 2 seats, C drops 1 excess seat and ends up with 1
seat, and D stays at 1 seat. We may choose any number in the interval 1018 < d < 1080.363
as our modified divisor. Let us use the modified divisor d = 1050.
197 3
State Population MQ, d = 1050 Apportionment

A 5942 5942/1050 = 5.65 · · · 6
B 1684 1684/1050 = 1.60 · · · 2
C 1527 1527/1050 = 1.45 · · · 1
D 0847 0847/1050 = 0.80 · · · 1
Total 10,000 9.5 · · · 10
Webster’s solution to this problem is within quota.

Webster’s procedure rarely violates the quota rule; the following is an example where it
does.
Example 3.4.29
Use Webster’s procedure to apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, C, and D whose
population data is shown in the following table:
State A B C D Total
Population 5942 1362 1351 1345 10,000
Solution As always, we start with the natural divisor d = 10000

10 = 1000 person/seat.
Calculations are shown in the following table.

A 5942 5.942 6
B 1362 1.362 1
C 1351 1.351 1
D 1345 1.345 1
Total 10,000 10 9
This is Case 1 in Examples 3.4.24 above. We need a modified divisor lower than the
natural divisor of 1000. Since there is one surplus seat, we need to compute, for each state,
the threshold divisors to add up to two seats. Computations are shown in the following table:
State Pop d = 10 Th(+1) Th(+2)

A 5942 6 5942
6.5 = 914.153 · · · (1) 5942
7.5 = 792.266 · · ·
B 1362 1 1362
= 908 (2) 1362
= 544.8
3 C 1351 1
1.5
1351
= 900.666 · · ·
2.5
1351
= 540.4
1.5 2.5
D 1345 1 1345
1.5 = 896.666 · · · 1345
2.5 = 538
The following diagram describes the gradual reduction of the divisor and the interval of
proper divisors.

↓
914.153 · · · A gets the first surplus seat

908 Stop before you reach this point. We do not have a second surplus seat.
The interval of proper divisors for Webster’s procedure in this example is 908 < d ≤
914.153. A adds the surplus seat and ends up with 7 seats, B stays at 1 seat, C stays at 1
seat, and D stays at 1 seat. We may choose any number in the interval 908 < d < 914.153
as our modified divisor. Let us use the modified divisor d = 911.
State Population MQ, d = 911 Apportionment

A 5942 5942/911 = 6.52 · · · 7
B 1362 1362/911 = 1.49 · · · 1
C 1351 1351/911 = 1.48 · · · 1
D 1345 1345/911 = 1.47 · · · 1
Total 10,000 10.97 · · · 10
Webster’s solution for this problem violates the quota rule since state A whose natural
quota is 5.942 ends up with 7 seats instead of 5 or 6.

Example 3.4.30
In Example 3.4.27, the smallest state, D, received 0 seats by Webster’s procedure.
State A B C D Total
Population 6514 2608 611 267 10,000
Let us try to compute the smallest and the largest houses that allow D to receive exactly
one seat. From Proposition 3.4.25 we see that D receives exactly one seat if and only if
267 267
<d≤
1+ 1
2 1− 1
2
199 3
that is, 178 < d ≤ 534. With d = 534 we get the apportionment 12, 5, 1, 1, and with d
slightly larger than 178 we get the apportionment 37, 15, 3, 1 for A, B, C, D, respectively.
Therefore, the smallest house size that allows D to receive exactly one seat is 19 seats and
the largest house size that allows D to receive exactly one seat is 56 seats.
Based on the house size of 19 seats, the natural divisor is 10000 19 = 526.315 · · · and
the natural quotas for A, B, C, D are approximately 12.37, 4.95, 1.16, 0.507, respectively,
56 = 178.571 · · · and the
while based on the house size of 56 seats the natural divisor is 10000
natural quotas for A, B, C, D are 36.47, 14.60, 3.42, 1.49, respectively. This shows that both
apportionments above are within quota.
3.4.5 The Hill–Huntington Procedure
Before we begin our discussion of the Hill–Huntington procedure, we need some

familiarity with the concept of geometric mean of two non-negative numbers.
Definition 3.4.31
Let x and y be two non-negative numbers.
1. The arithmetic mean of x and y, denoted m(x, y) is defined by m(x, y) = x+y 2 .
In other words, the arithmetic mean of x and y is the midpoint between x and y.

√
2. The geometric mean of x and y, denoted g(x, y) is defined by g(x, y) = xy.
In general, a mean of two given numbers x and y is a representation of them with

one number based on some arithmetic operation(s). The arithmetic mean is based on the
operation of addition as it represents x and y with a number that, when added to itself,
it yields the same result as adding x and y. On the other hand, the geometric mean is
based on the operation of multiplication: It represents x and y with a number that, when
multiplied with itself, it yields the same result as multiplying x and y.
Proposition 3.4.32
1. If 0 < x < y, then x < g(x, y) < m(x, y) < y.
2. If x or y is zero, then g(x, y) = 0.
Proof
1. For 0 < x < y we have
√ √ √ √ x y y y
x= x x < x y = g(x, y) and m(x, y) = + < + = y.
2 2 2 2
Further,
x y √ √ 1√ 2 √ √ √ 1 √ √ 2
m(x, y)−g(x, y) = + − x y= ( x) + ( y)2 − 2 x y = x− y >0
3 2 2 2 2
and so g(x, y) < m(x, y) which completes the proof of Part 1. Part 2 is clear.

The conventional rule of rounding, adopted by Webster’s procedure, uses the arithmetic
mean of two consecutive integers as the cut-off point of rounding for all quotas that
lie between those two consecutive integers. More precisely, given a quota q such that
n ≤ q < n + 1, we compare it to the arithmetic mean
n + (n + 1) 1
m(n, n + 1) = =n+ .
2 2
If q < m(n, n + 1), we round it down to n; and if q ≥ m(n, n + 1), we round it up

to n + 1. In the Hill–Huntington procedure, the geometric mean plays a rôle similar to
the one played by the arithmetic mean in Webster’s procedure. In other words, to round
a quota q, we find an integer n such that n ≤ q < n + 1 and we compare q to the
geometric mean
g(n, n + 1) = n(n + 1).
If q ≤ g(n, n + 1) we round it down to n; and if q > g(n, n + 1) we round it up to

n+1. We call this the geometric-mean rounding. (Note: q is—by definition—a “rational
number,” while for n = 1, 2, 3, · · · , g(n, n + 1) is always an “irrational number” and
therefore, the equality q = g(n, n + 1) is impossible.)
The Rounding Rule of the Hill–Huntington Procedure 3.4.33 A state whose quota is q >
0 receives k seats where k is the unique positive integer such that
(k − 1)k < q < k(k + 1)·
The following table shows the Webster cut-off point of rounding, m(n, n + 1), and Hill–
Huntington cut-off point of rounding, g(n, n + 1), for each of the intervals n ≤ q < n + 1,
n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 19, 99, 199, 499, 999.
201 3
Cut Oﬀ Point of Rounding

Interval
Webster Hill - Huntington
√
0 to 1 0.5 0×1=0
√
1 to 2 1.5 1 × 2 = 1.4142135
√
2 to 3 2.5 2 × 3 =2.4494897
√
3 to 4 3.5 3 × 4 = 3.4641016
√
4 to 5 4.5 4 × 5 = 4.4721359
√
5 to 6 5.5 5 × 6 = 5.4772255
√
6 to 7 6.5 6 × 7 = 6.4807406
√
7 to 8 7.5 7 × 8 = 7.4833147
√
8 to 9 8.5 8 × 9 = 8.4852813
√
9 to 10 9.5 9 × 10 = 9.4868329
√
10 to 11 10.5 10 × 11 = 10.488088
√
11 to 12 11.5 11 × 12 = 11.489125
√
12 to 13 12.5 12 × 13 = 12.489995
√
13 to 14 13.5 13 × 14 = 13.490737
√
14 to 15 14.5 14 × 15 = 14.491376
√
15 to 16 15.5 15 × 16 = 15.491933
√
16 to 17 16.5 16 × 17 = 16.492422
√
17 to 18 17.5 17 × 18 = 17.492855
√
18 to 19 18.5 18 × 19 = 18.493242
√
19 to 20 19.5 19 × 20 = 19.493588
√
99 to 100 99.5 99 × 100 = 99.498743
√
199 to 200 199.5 199 × 200 = 199.49937
√
499 to 500 499.5 499 × 500 = 499.49974
√
999 to 1000 999.5 999 × 1000 = 999.49987
Based on the above table, we can conjecture that for n = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,

1. The Hill–Huntington cut-off point of rounding is always to the left of Webster’s one, that
is, g(n, n+1) < m(n, n+1) = n+ 12 . This has already been proven in Proposition 3.4.32
above.
2. As n increases, g(n, n + 1) gets closer to m(n, n + 1). (See ⊡ Fig. 3.1.) This is to be
proven in Part 1 of Proposition 3.4.34 below.
3. Except for n = 0, the first digit to the right of the decimal point in g(n, n + 1) is 4. This
follows from Part 1 of Proposition 3.4.34 below and the fact that the first digit to the right
√
of the decimal point in 1 × 2 is 4.
4. The difference
m(n, n + 1) − g(n, n + 1)
between the arithmetic mean and the geometric mean tends to zero as n → ∞. This is to
be proven in Part 2 of Proposition 3.4.34.
⊡ Fig. 3.1 Positions of g

g(n, n + 1) relative to 0 m 1
m(n, n + 1)
3 1
g
2
m
g
2 m
3
g
3 4
m
g
9 10
m
g
14 15
m
Proposition 3.4.34
1. For n = 0, 1, 2, · · · we have
m(n, n + 1) − g(n, n + 1) > m(n + 1, n + 2) − g(n + 1, n + 2).
2. limn→∞ {m(n, n + 1) − g(n, n + 1)} = 0·
Proof
√
1. From Proposition 3.4.32 we have g(n, n + 1) < m(n, n + 1) and so 2 n(n + 1) < 2n + 1.
Adding 1 + n(n + 1) to both sides we get
(1 + n(n + 1))2 = 1 + 2 n(n + 1) + n(n + 1) < n2 + 3n + 2 = (n + 1)(n + 2)·

√ √
It follows that 1 + n(n + 1) < (n + 1)(n + 2), that is,
g(n + 1, n + 2) − g(n, n + 1) > 1 = m(n + 1, n + 2) − m(n, n + 1)
from which we get
m(n + 1, n + 2) − g(n + 1, n + 2) < m(n, n + 1) − g(n, n + 1)

203 3
which proves Part 1. To Prove Part 2 we note that m(n, n + 1) − g(n, n + 1) = n + 1

−
√ 2
n(n + 1). Rationalizing the numerator we get
1
m(n, n + 1) − g(n, n + 1) = 4
√ → 0 as n → ∞·
n+ 1
2 + n(n + 1)

Note 3.4.35 It is now clear that

1. Any quota that is rounded up in Webster’s procedure is also rounded up in the Hill–
Huntington procedure; and any quota that is rounded down in the Hill–Huntington
procedure is also rounded down in Webster’s procedure.

2. Quotas less than 1 are all rounded up to 1 by the Hill–Huntington procedure. Therefore,
the Hill–Huntington procedure (like Adams’ procedure) never gives zero seats to a state
with non-zero population.

3. For a quota q with integer part n ≥ 1, let δ be the first digit to the right of the decimal
point. If δ is 3 or lower, q is rounded down; if δ is 5 or higher, q is rounded up and if
√
δ = 4 then we have to check q carefully against the n(n + 1) cut-off point.

Since some quotas are rounded down and others are rounded up, Remark 3.4.23 applies to
the Hill–Huntington procedure as it does to Webster’s procedure.
Example 3.4.36
We use the Hill–Huntington procedure to apportion ten seats among the states A, B, C, and
D based on the following data.
State A B C D Total
Population 6514 2608 611 267 10,000
(This was done in Examples 3.4.3, 3.4.13, and 3.4.27 using the procedures of Jefferson,
10 = 1000 is not a proper divisor
Adams and Webster, respectively.) The natural divisor of 10000
but d = 1100 is. Computations are shown in the following table. (We shall determine the
interval of proper divisors later.)
State Pop NQ Rounded NQ MQ, d = 1100 Apportionment

A 6514 6.514 7 6514/1100 = 5.92 · · · 6
B 2608 2.608 3 2608/1100 = 2.37 · · · 2
C 0611 0.611 1 611/1100 = 0.55 · · · 1
D 0267 0.267 1 267/1100 = 0.24 · · · 1
Total 10,000 10 12 9.09 · · · 10
The Hill–Huntington solution to this problem is within quota.

Proposition 3.4.37 A state with population p receives n seats, (n = 1, 2, 3, · · · ) by the

Hill–Huntington procedure if and only if the divisor d satisfies the inequality
3 √
p
<d< √
p
·
n(n + 1) (n − 1)n
p
(The case n = 0 is ruled out by Notes 3.4.35 and for n = 1 we conveniently set 0 = ∞.)
Proof
The state in question receives n seats by the Hill–Huntington procedure if and only if its
√ √
quota q is such that (n − 1)n < q < n(n + 1), that is,
p
(n − 1)n < < n(n + 1)
d
which can be transformed to √ p <d< √ p .

n(n+1) (n−1)n
ⓘ Corollary 3.4.38 If n seats are apportioned to a state with population p by the

Hill–Huntington procedure, then
p
Th(+i) = √ , i = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
(n + i − 1)(n + i)
p
Th(−i) = √ , i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , n − 1 ·
(n − i)(n − i + 1)
Example 3.4.39
Find the Hill–Huntington interval of proper divisors for Example 3.4.36.
State A B C D Total
Population 6514 2608 611 267 10,000
Solution Computations are shown in the following table, starting with the natural divisor of
10000

A 6514 7 √6514
6×7
= 1005.132 · · · (1) 6514
√
5×6
= 1189.288 · · · (3) 6514
√
4×5
= 1456.574 · · ·
B 2608 3 √2608
2×3
= 1064.711 · · · (2) 2608
√
1×2
= 1844.134 · · · 2608
√
0×1
=∞
C 0611 1 √611
0×1
=∞ ··· ···
D 0267 1 √267
0×1
=∞ ··· ···
205 3
There are 2 excess seats in this case so we have to compute the threshold divisors, for
each state, to drop up to 3 seats. As we proceed upwards starting from the natural divisor of
1000 person/seat, we see that the interval of proper divisors is
2608 6514
√ <d< √ ·
2×3 5×6
We may use a divisor of 1100 as we did in Example 3.4.36.

Example 3.4.40
Apportion the seats in Example 3.4.29 using the Hill–Huntington procedure.
State A B C D Total
Population 5942 1362 1351 1345 10,000
Solution We do the computations in the following table, starting with the natural divisor of
10000
State Pop d = 10 Th(+1) Th(+2)

A 5942 6 5942
√
6×7
= 916.870 · · · 5942
√
7×8
= 794.033 · · ·
B 1362 1 1362
√
1×2
= 963.079 · · · (1) 1362
√
2×3
= 556.034 · · ·
C 1351 1 1351
√
1×2
= 955.301 · · · (2) 1351
√
2×3
= 551.543 · · ·
D 1345 1 1345
√
1×2
= 951.058 · · · 1345
√
2×3
= 549.093 · · ·
There is 1 surplus seat in this case so we have to compute the threshold divisors, for each
state, to add up to 2 seats. As we proceed downwards starting from the natural divisor of
1000 person/seat, we see that the interval of proper divisors is √1351
1×2
< d < √13621×2
. Let us
use 960 as a divisor.

A 5942 5.942 6 5942/960 = 6.189 · · · 6
B 1362 1.362 1 1362/960 = 1.418 · · · 2
C 1351 1.351 1 1351/960 = 1.407 · · · 1
D 1345 1.345 1 1345/960 = 1.401 · · · 1
Total 10,000 10 9 10.416 · · · 10
The Hill–Huntington solution to this problem is within quota.

Example 3.4.41
Apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, C, and D using the Hill–Huntington procedure.
3
State A B C D Total
Population 5123 1629 1625 1623 10,000
Solution We do the computations in the following table, starting with the natural divisor of
10000

A 5123 5 5123
√
4×5
= 1145.537 · · · (1) 5123
√
3×4
= 1478.882 · · ·
B 1629 2 1629
√
1×2
= 1151.876 · · · 1629
√
0×1
=∞
C 1625 2 1625
√
1×2
= 1149.048 · · · 1625
√
0×1
=∞
D 1623 2 1623
√
1×2
= 1147.634 · · · (2) 1623
√
0×1
=∞
There is 1 excess seat in this case so we have to compute the threshold divisors, for each
state, to drop up to 2 seats. As we proceed upwards starting from the natural divisor of 1000
person/seat, we see that the interval of proper divisor is 1145.538 · · · < d < 1147.634 · · · .
We use 1146.6 as our divisor for this problem.

A 5123 5.123 5 5123/1146.6 = 4.467 · · · 4
B 1629 1.629 2 1629/1146.6 = 1.420 · · · 2
C 1625 1.625 2 1625/1146.6 = 1.417 · · · 2
D 1623 1.623 2 1623/1146.6 = 1.415 · · · 2
Total 10,000 10 11 8.721 · · · 10
The Hill–Huntington solution to this problem violates the quota rule since A, whose
natural quota is 5.123 receives 4 seats only. Webster’s solution to this problem is 5 seats for
A, 2 seats for B, 2 seats for C, and 1 seat for D. This should be verified by the student.
Note 3.4.42 Problems similar to those discussed in Note 3.3.19 with quota procedures can
arise with divisor procedures and are dealt with in the same manner. Consider, for example,
the apportionment of ten seats among the four states in the following table by Webster’s
procedure.
3.5 · Equity Criteria of Divisor Procedures
207 3
State A B C D Total
Population 4113 3199 1350 1338 10,000
The rounded natural quotas add up to 9 seats. The interval of proper divisors in this
case collapses to just one point, namely, 914. Any divisor higher than 914 will apportion
fewer than 10 seats and any divisor lower than 914 will apportion more than 10 seats. With
a divisor of exactly 914 A and B will have equal claim to the surplus seat. As with quota
procedures, pathologies such as this are extremely rare and are assumed not to materialize in
our discussion.

3.5 Equity Criteria of Divisor Procedures
We start with the following definition:
Definition 3.5.1
Let X be a state with population p. If m seats are apportioned to X, then the per
capita representation of X, denoted pcr(X : m), is defined by
m
pcr(X : m) = ·

p
Of course, the higher the per capita representation, the better for the state in question.
In a situation where the per capita representations of two states are being compared, the
state with the higher per capita representation is said to be the rich state and the state
with the lower per capita representation is said to be the poor state.
As the reader would expect, per capita representations are typically very small
numbers with several zeroes following the decimal point, leaving only few decimal
places at the end for the non-zero digits that make the difference between the per capita
representations of two states; this will lead to a great loss in accuracy. Multiplying all
per capita representations in the problem at hand with a large constant, such as 1000,
will be helpful in this regard. Doing this, the result will be the representation per 1000
persons. Consider, for example, two states A (with 6 seats representing a population of
6001 citizens) and B (with 5 seats representing a population of 5001 citizens). On an
average calculator, the per capita representations of these two states appear to be equal
with the common value 0.0009998 but their representations per 1000 persons appear as
0.9998333 and 0.9998000 for A and B, respectively, showing the difference between
the two.
In this section, we shall be interested in measuring the inequity in representation
between two given states: A poor state A (with a smaller per capita representation) and
a rich state B (with larger per capita representation). The effect of transferring a seat
from one state to another will be of particular interest to us.
3.5.1 Measures of Inequity
3.5.2 We postulate that a measure of inequity should be

3 1. a non-negative number.
2. symmetric, that is, the measure of inequity between X and Y is same as the measure
of inequity between Y and X.
3. monotone, which means that it increases if the poor state cedes a seat to the rich
state.

What if the rich state cedes a seat to the poor state?
Proposition 3.5.3 Assume that the rich state B cedes a seat to the poor state A.
1. If A remains poor and B remains rich after the transaction, then the measure of inequity
must decrease. (This follows from monotonicity by reversing the transaction, forcing A
to give the seat back to B.)

2. If the measure of inequity increases, then A must have turned into rich and B must have
turned into poor. (This is simply the contrapositive of Part 1.)

Note 3.5.4 For the transfer of a seat from one state to another to be possible
1. The transfer should not result in a larger state having less seats than a smaller one (Axiom
3 in 3.2.1.)

2. If the seats are apportioned using a certain procedure, then the state that gives up the
seat should not be left with fewer seats than the minimum allowed by that procedure.
(For example, a minimum of zero seats is allowed by the procedures of Jefferson and
Webster; and a minimum of one seat is allowed by the procedures of Adams and Hill–
Huntington.)

The concepts in this section are somewhat more advanced than those presented in the
previous sections. Let us start our discussion with the following very simple example.
Example 3.5.5
Find the Webster and the Hill–Huntington apportionments of 10 seats between two states A
and B with populations 5501 and 4499, respectively.
10 = 1000 person/seat;
Solution The total population is 10,000 and the natural divisor is 10000
the natural quotas of A and B are 5.501 and 4.499, respectively. Therefore, the natural divisor
is a proper divisor for Webster’s procedure, giving 6 seats to A and 4 seats to B.
In the Hill–Huntington Procedure, A’s natural quota of 5.501 rounds up to 6 seats and
B’s natural quota of 4.499 rounds up to 5 seats for a total of 11 seats. The student should
verify that the interval of proper divisors is 1004.3407 < d < 1006.0069. With a modified
(proper) divisor of 1005, A’s modified quota is 5.4736, rounding down to 5 seats; and B’s
modified quota is 4.4766, rounding up to 5 seats, which is the Hill–Huntington solution to
this problem.

209 3
3.5.2 Postulates of a Measure of Inequity
Let us compute the representations per 1000 persons for A and B that occurred in
Example 3.5.5.
1000 × pcr(A : 6) = 1.0907107
1000 × pcr(A : 5) = 0.9089256
1000 × pcr(B : 5) = 1.111358
1000 × pcr(B : 4) = 0.8890864
Next, we introduce two different measures of inequity between two states in a given
apportionment problem. A third measure will be introduced later in this section.
Definition 3.5.6
If two states X and Y are apportioned m seats and n seats, respectively, we define
the δ-inequity (denoted δ(X : m, Y : n)) between the two states by
δ(X : m, Y : n) = |pcr(X : m) − pcr(Y : n)|
and the ρ-inequity (denoted ρ(X : m, Y : n)) between the two states by

pcr(X : m) pcr(Y : n)
ρ(X : m, Y : n) = max , if pcr(X : m) = 0 and pcr(Y : n) = 0·
pcr(Y : n) pcr(X : m)
If one (and only one) of pcr(X : m) and pcr(Y : n) is zero, we write

ρ(X : m, Y : n) = ∞. (If both pcr(X : m) and pcr(Y : n) are zero, we leave
ρ(X : m, Y : n) undefined.)

It will often be wise to use a multiple of δ(X : m, Y : n) as explained above.

It is left to the student to verify that the postulates in 3.5.2 are satisfied by both of the
δ-inequity and the ρ-inequity.
δ uses the difference between the two per capita representations as a measure of inequity,
while ρ uses the ratio instead. Either way, it is always desirable to have the inequity
between any two states as small as possible. Clearly, it is always the case that the δ-
inequity is ≥ 0 and the ρ-inequity is ≥ 1. In an ideal situation, the δ-inequity should be
0 and the ρ-inequity should be 1. (This happens in the highly unlikely event that the two
states have equal nonzero per capita representations.)
Note 3.5.7 From the above computations of per capita representations related to Exam-
ple 3.5.5 we see that the apportionment of 6 seats to A and 4 seats to B, provided by Webster’s
procedure, results in a δ-inequity of the magnitude
δ(A : 6, B : 4) = 1.0907107 − 0.8890864 = 0.2016243,
with A being the rich state and B being the poor one.
If we try to improve the situation by making rich A cede one seat to poor B, thus
switching to the apportionment of 5 seats to A and 5 seats to B we get
3 δ(A : 5, B : 5) = 1.111358 − 0.9089256 = 0.2024324,
with B being the rich state and A being the poor one. This is worse, not better, because the
δ-inequity increased (from 0.2016243 to 0.2024324). Therefore, tampering with Webster’s
solution, in an attempt to minimize the δ-inequity between the two states led to the opposite
and undesirable result of increasing it!
The ρ-inequity based on the Hill–Huntington solution for this problem is obtained by
dividing the larger pcr(B : 5) = 1.111358 by the smaller pcr(A : 5) = 0.9089256. We get
better accuracy if we compute it directly as follows:
5 5
ρ(A : 5, B : 5) = ÷ = 1.2227161
4499 5501
If we try to improve the situation by making rich B cede one seat to poor A, thus switching
to the apportionment of 6 seats to A and 4 seats to B we get
6 4
ρ(A : 6, B : 4) = ÷ = 1.2267769
5501 4499
with A becoming the rich state and B becoming the poor state. The situation gets worse
with this change since the ρ-inequity increases (from 1.2227161 to 1.2267769). Therefore,
tampering with the Hill–Huntington solution in an attempt to minimize the ρ-inequity
between the two states led to the opposite and undesirable result of increasing it.

Definition 3.5.8
We say that a given apportionment minimizes pairwise inequities according to a
certain measure of inequity if each transfer of a seat from one state to another
increases the inequity between the two states involved.

By the monotonicity postulate in 3.5.2, the transfer of a seat from a poor state to a
rich one always increases the measured inequity between the two states involved. We
therefore have the following corollary.
ⓘ Corollary 3.5.9 A given apportionment minimizes pairwise inequities according to a

certain measure of inequity if and only if each transfer of a seat from a rich state to a
poor state increases the measured inequity between the two states.

The ρ-inequity pairwise minimization property rules out the possibility of a seatless
state. We prove this in the next proposition.
211 3
Proposition 3.5.10 An apportionment that minimizes the pairwise ρ-inequities cannot
apportion zero seats to any state.
Proof
If some state A with population x is apportioned m = 0 seats, then (by our blanket
assumption in Sect. 3.2 that the house size ≥ the number of states) some other state B
with population y must receive n ≥ 2 seats. In this case we have
n m n 0
ρ(A : m, B : n) = ÷ = ÷ = ∞
y x y x
while ρ(A : m + 1, B : n − 1) = x1 ÷ n−1 y < ∞ since n − 1 > 0. The possibility of m = 0

is ruled out by Corollary 3.5.09 since the transfer of a seat from rich B to poor A reduced the
ρ-inequity between A and B.

ⓘ Corollary 3.5.11
1. A given apportionment minimizes the pairwise δ-inequities if and only if for every pair of
poor state A and rich state B whose respective populations are x and y and respective
numbers of seats are m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1 we have
n m m+1 n−1
δ(A : m, B : n) = − < − = δ(A : m + 1, B : n − 1)·
y x x y
2. A given apportionment minimizes the pairwise ρ-inequities if and only if for every pair
of poor state A and rich state B whose respective populations are x and y and respective
numbers of seats are m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 1 we have
n m m+1 n−1
ρ(A : m, B : n) = ÷ < ÷ = ρ(A : m + 1, B : n − 1) ·
y x x y
3.5.3 Webster’s Procedure and the δ-Inequity
The following theorem confirms and generalizes the observations about Webster’s
procedures in Note 3.5.7.
Theorem 3.5.12
1. Webster’s procedure minimizes the pairwise δ-inequities, in the sense that if

Webster’s procedure is used, the resulting apportionment must minimize the
pairwise δ-inequities.
2. Webster’s procedure is the only apportionment procedure with this property, that
is, an apportionment that minimizes the pairwise δ-inequities must coincide with
Webster’s apportionment.
Proof
1. Assume that Webster’s procedure apportioned m seats to state A and n seats to state B
3 whose populations are x persons and y persons, respectively, and let d be the divisor
used. Then
1 x 1 1 y 1
m− ≤ <m+ and n− ≤ < n + , m ≥ 0, n ≥ 0·
2 d 2 2 d 2
Therefore,
2m − 1 2 2m + 1 2n − 1 2 2n + 1
≤ < and ≤ < ·
x d x y d y
From this we get n−1y + y < x + x · Assuming pcr(B : n) > pcr(A : m) (i.e., B is
n m m+1
the rich state and A is the poor state) and rearranging the terms we get
n m m+1 n−1
δ(A : m, B : n) = − < − = δ(A : m + 1, B : n − 1)
y x x y
as in Part 1 of Corollary 3.5.11.

2. Denote the states among which the seats are apportioned by Ai , i = 1, 2, · · · , r and for
each i let xi be the population of Ai and mi be the number of seats apportioned to it. Let
m
Ai and Aj be two states with xjj > mxii (Aj is the rich state and Ai is the poor state).
Assuming that the pairwise δ-inequity minimization property holds we get
mj mi mi + 1 mj − 1
− < −
xj xi xi xj
mj − 12 mi + 12
and with simple algebraic manipulations we get xj < xi . Since the latter
mj mi
inequality trivially holds if xj < xi we now get
mj − 1
2 mi + 1
2
<
xj xi
for every pair of indices i, j = 1, 2, · · · , r. Taking the minimum in the right side and the
maximum in the left side over all values of the indices i, j from 1 to r, we get
mj − 1
mi + 1
max 2
< min 2
·
1≤j ≤r xj 1≤i≤r xi
mj − 12 mi + 12
Pick any number d > 0 such that max1≤j ≤r xj ≤ 1
d < min1≤i≤r xi then for each
mk − 12 mk + 12
k = 1, 2, · · · , r we get xk ≤ 1
d < xk and so
1 xk 1
mk − ≤ < mk +
2 d 2
213 3
which is the rounding rule for Webster’s procedure, with the divisor being d. The interval
of proper divisors is
xk xk
max ≤ d < min ·
1≤k≤r mk + 1
2
1≤k≤r mk − 1
2

Note 3.5.13 In the proof of Part 2 of the above theorem, it is a trivial matter to find, for each
i, a number di > 0 so that mi − 12 ≤ xdii < mi + 12 but the di ’s may have to be different.
Thanks to the δ-inequity pairwise minimization property we are able to find one common
value d so that di = d, i = 1, 2, · · · , r.

3.5.4 The Hill–Huntington Procedure and the ρ-Inequity
The ρ-inequity is related to the Hill–Huntington procedure in the same way the δ-
inequity is related to Webster’s procedure. This is to be established in the next theorem
whose proof follows similar arguments to those in the proof of Theorem 3.5.12, with
the algebra switching from addition and subtraction to multiplication and division.
Theorem 3.5.14
1. The Hill–Huntington procedure minimizes the pairwise ρ-inequities, in the sense

that if the Hill–Huntington procedure is used, the resulting apportionment must
minimize the pairwise ρ-inequities.
2. The Hill–Huntington procedure is the only apportionment procedure with this
property, that is, an apportionment that minimizes the pairwise ρ-inequities must
coincide with the Hill–Huntington apportionment.
Proof
1. Assume that the Hill–Huntington procedure apportioned m seats to state A and n seats
to state B whose populations are x persons and y persons, respectively (note that m ≥
1, n ≥ 1 by Notes 3.4.35). and let d be the divisor used. Then
x y
(m − 1)m < < m(m + 1) and (n − 1)n < < n(n + 1), m ≥ 1, n ≥ 1·
d d
Therefore,
(m − 1)m 1 m(m + 1) (n − 1)n 1 n(n + 1)

< 2 < and < 2 < ·
x2 d x2 y2 d y2
From this we get n−1y × y < x × x . Assuming pcr(B : n) ≥ pcr(A : m) (i.e., B is

n m m+1
the rich state and A is the poor state) and using some simple algebraic manipulations we
get
3
n m m+1 n−1
ρ(A : m, B : n) = ÷ < ÷ = ρ(A : m + 1, B : n − 1)
y x x y
as in Part 2 of Corollary 3.5.11. This completes the proof of Part 1.

2. Denote the states among which the seats are apportioned by Ai , i = 1, 2, · · · , r and for
each i let xi be the population of Ai and mi be the number of seats apportioned to it (none
m
of the mi ’s is zero, by Proposition 3.5.10). Let Ai and Aj be two states with xjj > mxii
(Aj is the rich state and Ai is the poor state). Assuming that the pairwise ρ-inequity
minimization property holds we get
mj mi m i + 1 mj − 1
÷ < ÷
xj xi xi xj
√
(mj −1)mj
which, with simple algebraic manipulation, can be transformed to xj <
√
mi (mi +1) mj mi
xi . Since the last inequality trivially holds if xj < xi we now get
√
(mj − 1)mj mi (mi + 1)
<
xj xi
for every pair of indices i, j = 1, 2, · · · , r. Pick any number d such that

√
(mj − 1)mj 1 mi (mi + 1)
max < < min
1≤j ≤r xj d 1≤i≤r xi
then for each k = 1, 2, · · · , r we get
xk
(mk − 1)mk < ≤ mk (mk + 1)
d
which is the rounding rule for the Hill–Huntington procedure, with the divisor being d.
The interval of proper divisors is
xk xk
max √ < d ≤ min √ ·
1≤k≤r mk (mk + 1) 1≤k≤r (mk − 1)mk

The following table shows the changes in δ(A : m, B : n) (multiplied by 1000) and
ρ(A : m, B : n) in Example 3.5.5 as m decreases from 10 to 0 seats and n increases
from 0 to 10 seats.
215 3
m 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
n 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
δ 1.817 1.413 1.009 0.605 0.2016 0.2024 0.606 1.010 1.414 1.818 2.222
ρ ∞ 7.360 3.271 1.908 1.2267 1.2227 1.834 2.853 4.890 11.004 ∞
2.5
0 1.817
12ρ-inequity
1 1.413 1 7.36
2 1.009 2 3.271
3 0.605 3 1.908
4 0.2016 4 1.2267
5 0.2024 10
5 1.2227
6 2 0.606 6 1.834
7 1.01 7 2.853
8 1.414 8 4.89
9 1.818 9 11.004
10 2.222
8
1.5
ρ-inequity
δ-inequity
1
4
0.5
2
min
min
0 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10
n n
Note that the δ-inequity is minimized when A receives 6 seats and B receives 4 seats
(Webster’s procedure) and the ρ-inequity is minimized when A receives 5 seats and B
receives 5 seats (the Hill–Huntington procedure). The minimum values of the δ-inequity
and ρ-inequity are in boldface. (The last five columns in the above table provide invalid
apportionments since they violate Axiom 3 in 3.2.1.)
The difference and the ratio of per capita representations are not the only ways to
measure inequity between two states. A third possible measure will be discussed next.
3.5.5 The ϕ-Inequity Measure
Recall that the district size in a state is the population of the state divided by the number
of seats apportioned to it, that is, if state A whose population is x people is apportioned
m seats, then its district size, denoted ds(A : m) is given by
x 1
ds(A : m) = = if m = 0, and ds(A : 0) = ∞·
m pcr(A : m)
Definition 3.5.15
If two states X and Y are apportioned m seats and n seats, respectively, we define
the ϕ-inequity (denoted ϕ(X : m, Y : n)) between the two states by
3
ϕ(X : m, Y : n)=|ds(X : m)−ds(Y : n)| if ds(X : m) = ∞ and ds(Y : n) = ∞·
If one (and only one) of ds(X : m) and ds(Y : n) is ∞, we write

ϕ(X : m, Y : n) = ∞. If both ds(X : m) and ds(Y : n) are ∞, we leave
ϕ(X : m, Y : n) undefined.

We leave it to the student to verify that the ϕ-inequity measure satisfies the postulates
in 3.5.2.
It is always desirable to have the ϕ-inequity between any two states as small as
possible and, in an ideal situation, the ϕ-inequity should be 0. This happens in the
highly unlikely case that the two states have equal non-zero per capita representations.
In contrast with the per capita representation, the larger the district size, the poorer the
representation. Therefore, when two states are compared, the state with the larger district
size is the poor one and the state with the smaller district size is the rich one; and the
ϕ-inequity is computed by subtracting the (smaller) district size of the rich state from
the (larger) district size of the poor state. As is the case with the ρ-inequity we have
the following proposition and corollary whose proofs are very similar to the proofs of
Proposition 3.5.10 and Corollary 3.5.11; and are left to the student.
Proposition 3.5.16 An apportionment that minimizes the pairwise ϕ-inequities cannot

apportion zero seats to any state.

ⓘ Corollary 3.5.17 A given apportionment minimizes the pairwise ϕ-inequities if and

only if for every pair of poor state A and rich state B whose respective populations are
x and y and respective numbers of seats are m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 1 we have
x y y x
ϕ(A : m, B : n) = − < − = ϕ(A : m + 1, B : n − 1) ·
m n n−1 m+1
3.5.6 The Harmonic Mean
In order to proceed with our discussion of the ϕ-inequity, we need to acquaint the student
with a third type of mean that is not as common as the arithmetic mean or the geometric
mean. Let x and y be two positive numbers.
Step 1. Take their reciprocals x1 and y1 .
Step 2. Compute the arithmetic mean 12 ( x1 + y1 ) of the reciprocals.
Step 3. Being a mean of the reciprocals of x and y, the result of Step 2 can be viewed
as the reciprocal of some kind of mean for x and y themselves. This leads to
the following definition.
217 3
Definition 3.5.18
Given two numbers x, y with 0 ≤ x < y, we define their harmonic mean, denoted
h(x, y), by
1
h(x, y) = if x = 0
1 1
2(x + y1 )
and we set h(x, y) = 0 if x = 0.

A simpler and more practical formula for the harmonic mean of x and y, which can
be easily verified by the student is
2xy
h(x, y) = , 0 ≤ x < y·
x+y
Proposition 3.5.19 Let x and y be two numbers with 0 ≤ x < y.
1. The geometric mean of x and y is the geometric mean of their harmonic and
arithmetic means, that is, g(x, y) = g(h(x, y), m(x, y)).
2. If 0 < x, then x < h(x, y) < g(x, y) < m(x, y) < y.
Proof
We have
2xy xy (g(x, y))2

h(x, y) = = =
x+y 1
2 (x + y) m(x, y)
which proves Part 1. Part 2 now follows from Proposition 3.4.32.

3.5.7 Dean’s Procedure
Following the steps of the proof of Part 2 of each of Theorems 3.5.12 and 3.5.14, we
now develop a divisor procedure, different from all the ones we have seen so far, that
minimizes the pairwise ϕ-inequities in the sense that moving a seat between any two
states will only increase the ϕ-inequity between them.
Assume that seats are apportioned among the states Ai , i = 1, 2, · · · , r and for
each i let xi be the population of Ai and mi be the number of seats apportioned to it.
Assume also that the pairwise ϕ-inequities are minimized by this apportionment then, by
x
Proposition 3.5.16, none of the mi ’s is zero. Let Ai and Aj be two states with mxii > mjj
(Aj and Ai are the rich state and the poor state, respectively). By Corollary 3.5.17,
forcing rich Aj to cede a seat to poor Ai leads to
xi xj xj xi
− < −
mi mj mj − 1 mi + 1
and so

1 1 1 1
xi + < xj + ·
3 mi mi + 1 mj − 1 mj
With simple algebraic manipulations in the case mj > 1 we get
h(mi , mi + 1) h(mj − 1, mj )
>
xi xj
which is also true if mj = 1.

xi xj
The above inequality was derived under the condition mi
> mj
using the ϕ-
xi xj
minimization property, but it is obviously true if < mi
(without the aforementioned
mj
property). Therefore, we can find a positive number d so that
h(mj − 1, mj ) 1 h(mi , mi + 1)
max < ≤ min ·
1≤j ≤r xj d 1≤i≤r xi
h(mk −1,mk ) h(mk ,mk +1)

For every k = 1, 2, · · · , r we then have xk
< 1
d
≤ xk
and so
xk
h(mk − 1, mk ) < ≤ h(mk , mk + 1)·
d
The last inequality resembles the rounding rules of Webster’s procedure and the Hill–
Huntington procedure, with the arithmetic and the geometric means replaced with the
harmonic mean. The use of the harmonic mean of two consecutive integers as the cut-
off point of rounding was suggested by James Dean (a professor of mathematics at the
University of Vermont) in his (never adopted) procedure of apportionment introduced in
1832.
The Rounding Rule of Dean’s Procedure 3.5.20 A state whose quota is q > 0 receives k
seats where k is the unique positive integer such that
h(k − 1, k) ≤ q ≤ h(k, k + 1),
that is
2(k − 1)k 2k(k + 1)

≤q < ·
2k − 1 2k + 1
We have thus proved, in the course of the above discussion, Part 2 of the following theorem.
We leave it to the student to prove Part 1 in a manner similar to the proofs of Part 1 of each
of Theorem 3.5.12 and Theorem 3.5.14.
219 3
Theorem 3.5.21
1. Dean’s procedure minimizes the pairwise ϕ-inequities, in the sense that if Dean’s
procedure is used, the resulting apportionment must minimize the pairwise ϕ-
inequities.

2. Dean’s procedure is the only apportionment procedure with this property, that
is, an apportionment that minimizes the pairwise ϕ-inequities must coincide with
Dean’s apportionment.

3.5.8 A Collective View of Divisor Procedures
For a broader perspective including Dean’s procedure together with the other divisor
procedures, we need some facts about the harmonic mean rounding.
Proposition 3.5.22
1. limn→∞ {m(n, n + 1) − h(n, n + 1)} = 0.
2. For n = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
m(n, n + 1) − h(n, n + 1) > m(n + 1, n + 2) − h(n + 1, n + 2)·
Proof
1. For n = 0, 1, 2, · · · we have
2n + 1 2n(n + 1) 1
m(n, n + 1) − h(n, n + 1) = − = → 0 as n → ∞·
2 2n + 1 2(2n + 1)
2. This follows from
1 1
m(n, n+1)−h(n, n+1) = > = m(n+1, n+2)−h(n+1, n+2)·
2(2n + 1) 2(2n + 3)

⊡ Figure 3.2 shows the cut-of points of rounding of the five divisor procedures
we presented, in three different intervals. Note that the left endpoint of an interval is
always the cut-off point of rounding for Adams’ procedure, the right endpoint of the
interval is the cut-off point of rounding for Jefferson’s procedure and the midpoint is
the cut-off point of Webster’s procedure. We also tried to demonstrate in the figure
the fact that as n → ∞, the difference between the cut-off point of Webster and the
cut-off point of each of Dean and Hill–Huntington tends to zero. Note also that since
h(0, 1) = 0, h(1, 2) = 1.333 · · · , and h(2, 3) = 2.4 · · · , it follows from Part 2 of
Proposition 3.5.22 that for n ≥ 2, the first digit to the right of the decimal point in
⊡ Fig. 3.2 Cut-off points of h

rounding for the standard 0 m 1
g
divisor procedures
3 g
1 2
h m
g
9 10
h m
h(n, n + 1) is always 4. This observation will be helpful in rounding quotas with less
computations. The following table shows the cut-off points of rounding for our five
divisor procedures in several intervals.
Interval Adams Dean H–H Webster Jefferson

0 to 1 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.5000000 1.0000000
1 to 2 1.0000000 1.3333333 1.4142135 1.5000000 2.0000000
2 to 3 2.0000000 2.4000000 2.4494897 2.5000000 3.0000000
3 to 4 3.0000000 3.4285714 3.4641016 3.5000000 4.0000000
4 to 5 4.0000000 4.4444444 4.4721359 4.5000000 5.0000000
5 to 6 5.0000000 5.4545454 5.4772255 5.5000000 6.0000000
6 to 7 6.0000000 6.4615384 6.4807406 6.5000000 7.0000000
7 to 8 7.0000000 7.4666666 7.4833147 7.6000000 8.0000000
8 to 9 8.0000000 8.4705882 8.4852813 8.5000000 9.0000000
9 to 10 9.0000000 9.4736842 9.4868329 9.5000000 10.000000
19 to 20 19.000000 19.487179 19.493588 19.500000 20.000000
99 to 100 99.000000 99.497487 99.498743 99.500000 100.00000
199 to 200 199.00000 199.49874 199.49937 199.50000 200.00000
999 to 1000 999.00000 999.49974 999.49987 999.50000 1000.0000
Since, in Dean’s procedure, some quotas are rounded up and others are rounded
down, the three cases in Remark 3.4.23 occur in Dean’s procedure as they did in the
Webster and Hill–Huntington procedures. Note also that, like the procedures of Adams
and Hill–Huntington, Dean’s procedures never apportions zero seats to any state.
Note 3.5.23 For n ≥ 1, the cut-off points of rounding of the five divisor procedures follow
the inequality
n < h(n, n + 1) < g(n, n + 1) < m(n, n + 1) < n + 1
and for n = 0 we have
1
0 = n = h(n, n + 1) = g(n, n + 1) < m(n, n + 1) = < n + 1 = 1·
2
221 3
(with n being the cut-off point of rounding for Adams’ procedure and n + 1 being the cut-off
point of rounding for Jefferson’s procedure).

Obviously, the smaller the quota of a state, the more significant its fractional part
to the state in question. This, together with Proposition 3.5.22 and ⊡ Fig. 3.2, explains
why procedures get more favorable to smaller states as we proceed from right to left in
the above inequality. The following is a list of the five standard divisor procedures with
arrows pointing in the direction of favorability to smaller states.
Adams ←− Dean ←− Hill–Huntington ←− Webster ←− Jefferson

Next, we discuss the relationships among the intervals of proper divisors for divisor
procedures. First, let us agree to say that an interval I1 is greater than or equal to an
interval I2 and write I1 ≥ I2 if for every x1 in I1 there is an x2 in I2 with x2 ≤ x1 and
for every y2 in I2 there is a y1 in I1 with y1 ≥ y2 . For example, if I1 is 5 < t < 8 and I2
is 1 < t < 7, then I1 ≥ I2 .
Proposition 3.5.24 Let Proc1 and Proc2 be two divisor procedures and in each interval
[k, k + 1] (where k is a non-negative integer) assume that the cut-off points of rounding are
such that
cut-off point of rounding for Proc1 ≤ cut-off point of rounding for Proc2·
If a house of h seats is to be apportioned, then I1 ≥ I2 where I1 and I2 are the intervals of

proper divisors for Proc1 and Proc2, respectively.
Proof
1. Due to the above relation between the cut-off points of rounding of the two procedures,
we see that a divisor α1 that apportions h seats for Proc1 will apportion ≤ h seats for
Proc2 and therefore α1 may have to be reduced to a value α2 ≤ α1 in order to apportion
the h seats for Proc2.
2. Again, due to the above relation between the cut-off points of rounding of the two
procedures, we see that a divisor β2 that apportions h seats for Proc2 will apportion
≥ h seats for Proc1 and therefore β2 may have to be increased to a value β1 ≥ β2 in
order to apportion the h seats for Proc1.

3.5.9 The Threshold Divisors of Dean’s Procedure
Proposition 3.5.25 A state with population p receives n seats, (n = 1, 2, 3, · · · ) by Dean’s

3 procedure if and only if the divisor d satisfies the inequality
p p
<d≤ ·
2n(n+1) 2(n−1)n
2n+1 2n−1
p
(The case n = 0 is ruled out as seen earlier, and for n = 1 we conveniently set 0 = ∞.)
Proof
The state in question receives n seats by Dean’s procedure if and only if its quota q is such
that h(n − 1, n) ≤ q < h(n, n + 1), that is,
2(n − 1)n p 2n(n + 1)

≤ <
2n − 1 d 2n + 1
p p
which can be transformed to
2n(n+1)
<d≤
2(n−1)n
.

2n+1 2n−1
ⓘ Corollary 3.5.26 If n seats are apportioned to a state with population p by Dean’s

procedure, then
p p
Th(+i) = = , i = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
h(n + i − 1, n + i) 2(n+i−1)(n+i)
2n+2i+1
p p
Th(−i) = = , i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , n − 1 ·
h(n − i, n − i + 1) 2(n−i)(n−i+1)
2n−2i+1
Example 3.5.27
Use Dean’s procedure to apportion ten seats among the states A, B, C, and D in the following
table.
State A B C D Total
Population 6514 2608 611 267 10,000
Solution As always, the natural divisor of 10000

10 = 1000 person/seat is a good place to start.
223 3
State Population NQ Apportionment (d = 10)

A 6514 6.514 7
B 2608 2.608 3
C 0611 0.611 1
D 0267 0.267 1
Total 10,000 10 12
The natural divisor apportions 12 seats, so we need to compute, for each state, the
threshold divisors to drop up to three seats in order to determine the interval of proper
divisors.

2×6×7 = 1008.119 · · · (1) 2×5×6 = 1194.233 · · · = 1465.65
6514×13 6514×11 6514×9
A 6514 7 (3) 2×4×5
2×2×3 = 1086.666 · · · (2) 2×1×2 = 1956 ∞

2608×5 2608×3
B 2608 3
C 0611 1 ∞ ··· ···
D 0267 1 ∞ ··· ···
The interval of proper divisors is 1086.666 · · · < d < 1194.233 · · · . With a modified
divisor d = 1100 we get
State Pop d = 1100 Apportionment

A 6514 6514
1100 = 5.92 · · · 6
B 2608 2608
1100 = 2.37 · · · 2
C 0611 611
1100 = 0.55 · · · 1
D 0267 267
1100 = 0.24 · · · 1
Total 10,000 10
The solution provided by Dean’s procedure for this example is within quota.

The procedures of Jefferson, Adams, Webster, and Hill–Huntington were used in

Examples 3.4.3, 3.4.13, 3.4.27 and 3.4.36, respectively, to do the apportionment in
Example 3.5.27. The results are shown in the following table. The student should
compare the results with Note 3.5.23 in mind.
State Population Adams Dean H–H Webster Jefferson

A 6514 5 6 6 6 7
B 2608 3 2 2 3 3
C 0611 1 1 1 1 0
D 0267 1 1 1 0 0
Example 3.5.28
Apportion ten seats among the states A, B, C, and D using Dean’s procedure.
3 State A B C D Total
Population 5123 1629 1625 1623 10,000
Solution Starting with the natural divisor of 10000

10 = 1000 person/seat we get

A 5123 5 5123×9
40 = 1152.675 (1) 5123×7
24 = 1494.208 · · ·
B 1629 2 1629×3
4 = 1221.750 ∞
C 1625 2 1625×3
4 = 1218.750 ∞
D 1623 2 1623×3
4 = 1217.250 (2) ∞
The natural divisor of 1000 person/seat apportions 11 seats, so there is 1 excess seat. We
have to compute the threshold divisors, for each state, to drop up to 2 seats. As we proceed
upwards starting from the natural divisor of 1000 person/seat, we see that the interval of
proper divisor is 1152.675 < d < 1217.250. We use 1200 as our divisor for this problem.

A 5123 5.123 5 5123/1200 = 4.269 · · · 4
B 1629 1.629 2 1629/1200 = 1.357 · · · 2
C 1625 1.625 2 1625/1200 = 1.354 · · · 2
D 1623 1.623 2 1623/1200 = 1.352 · · · 2
Total 10,000 10 11 8.333 · · · 10
This solution violates the quota rule since A, whose natural quota is 5.123 receives 4
seats only. This problem was done in Example 3.4.41 using the Hill–Huntington procedure
which delivered the same solution.

Example 3.5.29
Apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, C, and D with the following population data using
each of the five standard divisor procedures.
State A B C D Total
Population 6201 1284 1264 1251 10,000

3.6 · Apportionment Paradoxes
225 3
Solution The first of the following two tables shows the natural quota of each state and
the apportionment by each of the five divisor procedures based on the natural divisor of
10 = 1000 person/seat. The second table shows the natural quota of each state and the
10000
apportionment of 10 seats by each procedure. The interval of proper divisor is shown under
the name of each procedure. Computations and details are left to the student.
State Pop NQ Adams Dean H–H Webster Jefferson

A 6201 6.201 7 6 6 6 6
B 1284 1.284 2 1 1 1 1
C 1264 1.264 2 1 1 1 1
D 1251 1.251 2 1 1 1 1
Total 10,000 10 13 9 9 9 9
Adams Dean H–H Webster Jefferson

State NQ 1251–1264 959.7–963 907.93–956.83 856–954 775.13–885.85
A 6.201 5 6 7 7 7
B 1.284 2 2 1 1 1
C 1.264 2 1 1 1 1
D 1.251 1 1 1 1 1
Total 10 10 10 10 10 10
Note that the intervals of proper divisors decrease as we move from left to right,
Adams −→ Dean −→ Hill–Huntington −→ Webster −→ Jefferson
in accordance with the general result proven in Proposition 3.5.24.

Note 3.5.30 In Example 3.5.29, the intervals of proper divisors of the procedures of Hill–
Huntington and Webster overlap but the intervals of proper divisors of the procedures of
Dean and Hill–Huntington do not. In general, only the intervals of proper divisors for the
procedures of Adams and Jefferson “must” be disjoint. (There is only one highly unlikely
case in which the same divisor (the natural divisor) works for both of Adams’ procedure and
Jefferson’s procedure; it is the case where the natural quotas are all integers).

3.6 Apportionment Paradoxes
The student should have realized by now that apportionment procedures are not perfect
and that the only perfect solution to an apportionment problem is the one provided by
the natural quotas, which is almost always unworkable as it involves non-integer seat
apportionments. In this section we continue the study of the anomalies of apportionment
procedures, begun in Sect. 3.3 for quota procedures.
3.6.1 Monotonicity and the Divisor Procedures
We saw in Sect. 3.3 that none of the quota procedures is population-monotone and
3 that neither of the procedures of Hamilton and Lowndes is house-monotone. In the
following two theorems we prove that divisor procedures are both population-monotone
and house- monotone.
Theorem 3.6.1
Divisor procedures are house-monotone.
Proof
Assume that a divisor procedure is used to apportion the seats of the house in a certain nation.
If the proper divisor used to apportion h seats is d and the proper divisor used to apportion
h + 1 seats is d1 then, clearly, d1 < d. If the modified quotas of a state with population p in
an h-seat house and an (h + 1)-seat house are q and q1 , respectively, then
p p
q1 = > =q·
d1 d
Since rounding rules are monotone (see Sect. 3.4.1), it follows that the share of the state in
question in the (h + 1)-seat house is ≥ its share in the h-seat house.

Theorem 3.6.2
Divisor procedures are population-monotone.
Proof
Assume to the contrary that, with the same house size, and the same divisor procedure being
used, the following changes simultaneously occurred over some period of time.
1. The representation of state A decreased from m seats to m1 seats with an increase in its
population from x citizens to x1 citizens.
2. The representation of state B increased from n seats to n1 seats with a decrease in its
population from y citizens to y1 citizens.
Assume also that the divisor used in the earlier apportionment was d and the divisor used in
the latter one was d1 .
Since dx rounds to m and xd11 rounds to m1 ; and since m > m1 , we get from the
monotonicity of rounding rules that dx > xd11 and so
d1 x1
> > 1·
d x
227 3
With a similar argument we also get the contradictory statement
d1 y1
< < 1.
d y
The result follows from the contradiction obtained.

3.6.2 Consistency
The following example, from Young’s book [29] demonstrates one more imperfect
behavior by Hamilton’s procedure.
Example 3.6.3
1. Use Hamilton’s procedure to apportion 21 seats among the three states A, B, and C with
State A B C Total
Population 727 123 222 1072
2. Reapportion, between A and B, the combined seats apportioned to those two states in
Part 1.
Solution
21 = 51.047619 · · · person/seat. Calculations and solution are
1. The natural divisor is 1072
State Population NQ Initial Surplus seats Apportionment

A 727 14.2416 · · · 14 0 14
B 123 2.4095 · · · 2 1 3
C 222 4.3488 · · · 4 0 4
Total 1072 21 20 1 21
We now reapportion the 14 + 3 = 17 seats apportioned to A and B combined in Part

1 among those two states. The natural divisor is 727+123
State Population NQ Initial Surplus seats Apportionment

A 727 14.54 14 1 15
B 123 2.46 2 0 2
3 Total 850 21 16 1 17
Note that:
• In the presence of C, A receives 14 seats, and B receives 3 seats out of the 17 seats
allotted to these two states combined.
• If those 17 seats are reapportioned between A and B (with C removed), A receives
15 seats, and B receives 2 seats.
This is obviously a type of inconsistency that bares resemblance to the dependence on

irrelevant alternatives that afflicts many social welfare functions, studied in Chap. 1.
Definition 3.6.4
An apportionment procedure is said to be consistent if the reapportionment of the
combined shares of any set of states among the members of that set always agrees
with the original apportionment. Precisely, if A1 , A2 , · · · Ar are some of the states
in a nation and for each i, state Ai was apportioned ni seats, then the sum
n1 + n2 + · · · + nr , when reapportioned among A1 , A2 , · · · Ar , state Ai receives
again ni seats, i = 1, 2, · · · r. An apportionment procedure that is not consistent is
said to be inconsistent.

Example 3.6.5
1. Use Lowndes’ procedure to apportion 21 seats among the three states A, B, and C with
State A B C Total
Population 717 133 222 1072
2. Reapportion, between A and C, the combined seats apportioned to those two states in
Part 1.
Solution
1. The Lowndes apportionment for this problem is 14 seats for A, 3 seats for B, and 4 seats
for C.
2. The combined population of A and C is 939 citizens and their combined share of seats
in Part 1 is 18 seats. Reapportioning those 18 seats between A and C using the Lowndes
229 3
procedure, A receives 13 seats, and C receives 5 seats. Compare to their allotments in
the presence of B in Part 1.
Computations are left to the student.

ⓘ Corollary 3.6.6 The procedures of Hamilton and Lowndes are inconsistent. (This
follows from Example 3.6.3 and Example 3.6.5 above.)

Theorem 3.6.7
Divisor procedures are consistent.
Proof
Assume a divisor procedure was used to apportion the house seats in a certain nation (and
the proper divisor used was d). The seats apportioned to a certain set of states were then
combined and reapportioned among the states in this set (and the proper divisor used was
d1 ). Assume also that some member of that set, say state A (with population p) received m
seats in the original apportionment and m1 seats in the above- mentioned reapportionment.
If m > m1 , then
p p
> and so d1 > d·
d d1
Note that some other member of the set, say state B, must have gained a seat or more in
the reapportionment. A similar argument will show that d1 < d; a contradiction. Hence
m1 = m.

Note 3.6.8 Theorems 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.7 above establish some positive attributes of
divisor procedures. The only shortcoming in these procedures we have come across so far
is their possible quota violations.
Divisor procedures, however, differ in the manner and the frequency of their quota
violations:
1. Jefferson’s procedure can only violate upper quota, while Adams’ procedure can only
violate lower quota. The procedures of Webster, Hill–Huntington, and Dean can violate
both upper and lower quotas: Violations of upper quota can occur only when the divisor
used is lower than the natural divisor; and violations of lower quota can occur only when
the divisor used is higher than the natural divisor.
2. The procedures of Adams and Jefferson are the greatest quota violators, followed
by Dean’s procedure then the Hill–Huntington procedure. Webster’s procedure rarely
violates quota. The following data [2] was obtained using the Monte Carlo simulation
for a US-like nation of 50 states and 435-seat house. It shows the expected number of
quota violations per 1000 apportionment problems.
Procedure Adams Dean H–H Webster Jefferson

Expected number of quota violations 1000 15.40 2.86 0.61 1000
3
Another point in favor of Webster’s procedure is that it shows no tendency to favor larger
or smaller states. The three procedures to the left of Webster’s in Note 3.5.23 tend to favor
smaller states (increasingly from right to left). Jefferson’s procedure, on the opposite end,
have a strong tendency to favor larger states. (For statistics about bias estimates toward larger
or smaller states, see [2]).

We further the heuristic argument begun in Note 3.5.23, by trying to understand why
divisor procedures can violate the quota. The use of a divisor smaller than the natural divisor
scales up all the quotas by the same factor. Obviously the incremental increase in the larger
quotas will be larger than the incremental increase in the smaller ones. Therefore, the larger
states are likely to add more seats than the smaller ones do; and this could involve exceeding
the upper natural quota by the larger states. On the other hand, the use of a divisor larger than
the natural divisor scales down all the quotas by the same factor. Obviously, the incremental
decrease in the larger quotas will be larger than the incremental decrease in the smaller
quotas, causing the larger states to drop more seats than the smaller states do, which could
make the larger states go below the lower natural quotas.
The above observations are only statistical and do not always hold. In Example 3.4.29
we detected a violation of quota rule by Webster’s procedure. The student is asked to process
the same data in that example using the other standard procedures. The results are shown in
the following table:
Procedure Interval of proper divisors A B C D

Adams 1345 < d < 1351 5 2 2 1
Dean 1013.25 < d < 1021.5 6 2 1 1
H–H 955.302 < d < 963.07 6 2 1 1
Webster 908 < d < 914.15 (7) 1 1 1
Jefferson 742.75 < d < 848.85 (7) 1 1 1
Note that, in this example, the procedure of Webster violates the quota rule (along with
Jefferson’s procedure) while the procedures of Adams, Dean, and Hill–Huntington do not.
The following is another interesting example.
Example 3.6.9
Apportion 20 seats among the following eight states using the five standard divisor
procedures and detect all violations of the quota rule.
Solution The results are shown in the following table. Computations are left to the student.
231 3
State Population NQ Adams 1202 Dean 918 H–H 915 Webster 913 Jefferson 850
A 6846 6.846 6 7 7 7 (8)
B 5942 5.942 5 (7) (7) (7) 6
C 1205 1.205 2 1 1 1 1
D 1204 1.204 2 1 1 1 1
E 1203 1.203 2 1 1 1 1
F 1201 1.201 1 1 1 1 1
G 1200 1.200 1 1 1 1 1
H 1199 1.199 1 1 1 1 1
The total population is 20,000, the natural divisor is 20,000

20 = 1000 person/seat; and the
divisor used for each procedure is shown next to the procedure’s name. Notice the quota
violations (marked by parenthesis). The only procedure that conformed with the quota rule
in this example is Adams’ procedure!
Note 3.6.10 Now that we have found Webster’s procedure to be unbiased and to violate
quota with less frequency than the procedure of Hill–Huntington, it is natural to ask: Why
was Webster’s procedure replaced with the procedure of Hill–Huntington? Here are some
good reasons:
1. The Hill–Huntington procedure automatically satisfies the constitutional requirement
that each state should be represented by at least one seat. Webster’s procedure, on the
other hand, can give zero seats to a state which would require an intervention from outside
the procedure, or an increase in the house size, in order to satisfy the constitutional
requirement.
2. The difference in per capita representations and the difference in their reciprocals (the
district sizes) provide two different measures of inequity, minimized by two different
procedures, namely, Webster’s procedure and Dean’s procedure, respectively. On the
other hand, the ratio of per capita representations and the ratio of their reciprocals (the
larger district size divided by the smaller one) provide one and the same measure of
inequity, which is minimized by the Hill–Huntington procedure. The measure of inequity
that the Hill–Huntington procedure minimizes is therefore more “robust” in some sense.
Of course, this is a point in favor of the Hill–Huntington procedure.
3. Measuring inequity by a ratio makes more sense than measuring it by difference.
Consider, for example, three states: A with 41 seats per 100 citizens, B with 21 seats
per 100 citizens, and C with just one seat per 100 citizens. Measuring inequity by the
difference in per capita representation would lead to the conclusion that there is as much
inequity between A and B as there is between B and C:
41 21 21 1 20
− = − = ·
100 100 100 100 100
Measuring inequity, on the other hand, by the ratio of per capita representations, would
lead to the conclusion that the inequities between A, B and between B, C are
3 41
= 1.952 · · · and
21
= 21,
21 1
respectively, which is more expressive of the considerable difference in inequities.
For a more intuitive example, think of three people A, B, and C with bank account
balances of $2,000,001, $1,000,001 and $1, respectively. If we adopt the difference as a
measure of inequity, we are forced to say that the wealth gap between A and B is same as
the wealth gap between B and C. Ratio makes more sense as a measure of inequity because
it leads to the conclusion that A is approximately twice as rich as B while B is about one
million times as rich as C.

Apart from the standard paradoxes like the ones presented in this chapter, and others
that will be encountered in the exercises, one may come across some anomalies that are not
known with special names in the literature. The following is an example.
Example 3.6.11
The following two tables show the population data of a nation consisting of three states A, B,
and C based on the censuses of the years 2000 and 2010. The only change that occurred in
the 10-year period from 2000 to 2010 is that 20 people migrated from state B to state C. No
change in the population of A or the total population occurred.
State A B C Total
Year 2000 data
Population 1414 3465 5121 10,000
State A B C Total
Year 2010 data
Population 1414 3445 5141 10,000
The Hill–Huntington apportionment for the year 2000 is 1 seat for A, 4 seats for B, and
5 seats for C. In the year 2010, the same procedure apportions 2 seats to A, 3 seats to B,
and 5 seats to C. (We leave it to the student to do the computations.) Note that although the
population movement was from B to C, the seat movement was from B to A which did not
receive any additional population. The following diagram illustrates this rather unexpected
result.
A ← seat ← B → population → C
To understand why the Hill–Huntington computations led to this anomaly, notice that in
the year 2000, the natural quota of A was 1.414 which misses the cut-off point of rounding
√
( 1 × 2) by about 0.0002 only and rounds down to 1. B was very lucky to get 4 seats because
its natural quota of 3.465 was just about 0.001 higher than the cut-off point of rounding
3.7 · Applications of Priority Formulas
233 3
√
( 3 × 4). C’s natural quota of 5.121 comfortably rounds down to 5. The natural divisor
works with 1 seat for A, 4 seats for B and 5 seats for C.
The group of 20 people who left B for C after the 2000 census was large enough to bring
the natural quota of B below the cut-off point of rounding in its interval, but was too small to
qualify the natural quota of C for rounding up instead of down. The sum of rounded natural
quotas became only 9 and a lower divisor had to be used in order to absorb the surplus seat.
This enabled A to pick up that surplus seats since its natural quota was much closer to the
cut-off point in its interval than the natural quota of B was after the group of 20 people had
left it.
Similar behavior by the other standard divisor procedures will occur in the exercises.
3.7 Applications of Priority Formulas
The term priority formulas in this section’s title refers to the formulas proven in Proposi-
tions 3.4.6, 3.4.14, 3.4.25, 3.4.37, and 3.5.25. Our first application of those formulas is a
simple algorithm that apportions seats, using a divisor procedure, one seat at time. In this
section we shall drop the assumption that the number of seats ≥ the number of states.
3.7.1 One-By-One Seat Apportionment
Example 3.7.1
We use Webster’s procedure to apportion 10 seats among the states A, B, and C with
populations 135, 333, and 532 people, respectively. At any point of the process, let us
represent the present apportionment by the apportionment vector (i, j, k) where i, j , and
k are the numbers of seats apportioned to A, B and C, respectively.
We start with 0 seats for each of the three states, so the initial apportionment vector
is (0, 0, 0). By Axiom 3 in 3.2.1, the first seat should certainly go to C since it has the
largest population. The new vector is (0, 0, 1). Which of the three states gets the second
seat? With each seat added, the divisor goes down and from the priority formula proven in
Proposition 3.4.25 we see that the state with the highest value of p 1 gets that added seat.
n+ 2
p
At present, the values of for the three states are given by the priority vector
n+ 12
135 333 532

, , = 270, 666, 354.6 ·
0+ 1
2 0+ 1
2 1+ 1
2
Therefore, the second seat goes to B, leading to the apportionment vector (0, 1, 1) and the
corresponding priority vector
135 333 532

, , = 270, 222, 354.6 ·
0+ 1
2 1+ 1
2 1+ 1
2
Therefore, the third seat goes to C, leading the apportionment vector (0, 1, 2) and the priority
vector
3 135
,
333
,
532
= (270, 222, 212.8) ·
0+ 1
2 1+ 1
2 2+ 1
2
The fourth seat then goes to A, leading to the apportionment vector (1, 1, 2) and the priority
vector
135 333 532

, , = (90, 222, 212.8) ,
1+ 1
2 1+ 1
2 2+ 1
2
and the fifth seat goes to B. The following table shows all the steps necessary to apportion
10 seats.
Seats Apportionment vector Priority vector for next seat Next seat
1 (0, 0, 1) (270, 666, 354.666) B
2 (0, 1, 1) (270, 222, 354.666) C
3 (0, 1, 2) (270, 222, 212.8) A
4 (1, 1, 2) (90, 222, 212.8) B
5 (1, 2, 2) (90, 133.2, 212.8) C
6 (1, 2, 3) (90, 133.3, 152) C
7 (1, 2, 4) (90, 133.3, 118.222) B
8 (1, 3, 4) (90, 95.142, 118.222) C
9 (1, 3, 5) (90, 95.142, 96.727) C
10 (1, 3, 6) (90, 95.142, 81.846) B
Note that the state with the highest priority in each line gets the new seat in the next line.
For instance, the highest priority in the ninth line is that of state C and therefore state C goes
from 5 seats in a nine-seat house (ninth line) to 6 seats in a ten-seat house (tenth line).
A similar algorithm can be used with each divisor procedure.
3.7.2 The Quota-Divisor Procedures
In their landmark result of 1983 (Theorem 3.3.18), Balinski & Young proved that population-
monotonicity and the quota rule are incompatible. The same authors, however, were able to
reconcile house-monotonicity with the quota rule by means of a modified version of the
one-by-one seat apportionment [2], that creates a house-monotone quota procedure out of
each divisor procedure. We call these procedures, the quota-Jefferson procedure, the quota-
Webster procedure, and so on.
House-monotonicity is a built-in quality of the process of one-by-one seat apportionment
since the “next” seat goes to some state without taking any seat away from the “present” share
235 3
of any state. (Incidentally, this provides an immediate proof to Theorem 3.6.1 since divisor
procedures can be implemented using one-by-one seat apportionment as in Sect. 3.7.1). The
quota rule can then be enforced by checking whether or not assigning the next seat according
to the established priority rule of the underlying divisor procedure violates the quota rule. If
this violates the quota rule, we go downward on the priority list till we find a state that can
get that seat without causing a violation of the quota rule. The following example explains
the process.
Example 3.7.2
We use the quota-Jefferson procedure and the quota-Adams to apportion up to 21 seats among
the following three states
State A B C Total
Population 112 132 756 1000
p
According to Jefferson’s priority, the state with the highest n+1 gets the next seat
(Proposition 3.4.6.)
Step 1: We start with the initial apportionment vector (0, 0, 0). By Axiom 3 in 3.2.1, the
1st seat goes to C and we move to the apportionment vector (0, 0, 1) with the
corresponding priority vector ( 0+1 , 0+1 , 1+1 ) = (112, 132, 378).
112 132 756
Step 2: According to Jefferson’s priority, the 2nd seat should go to C (since it has the
highest priority in Step 1), but we must check on the quota rule before implement-
ing Jefferson’s “recommendation.” With two seats, The natural divisor is 1000 2 =
500 and the natural quotas vector is ( 112 , 132 756
,
500 500 500 ) = (0.224, 0.264, 1.512).
Therefore, the apportionment vector (0, 0, 2) satisfies quota and is adopted. The
corresponding priority vector is ( 0+1 , 0+1 , 2+1 ) = (112, 132, 252).
112 132 756
Step 3: Before giving the 3rd seat to C, as suggested by the priority vector in the Step
2, we must check the natural quota vector (0.336, 0.396, 2.268) in a 3-seat house
(calculations are left to the student). Clearly, the apportionment vector (0, 0, 3)
is within quota and is therefore adopted. The corresponding priority vector is
, 0+1 , 3+1 ) = (112, 132, 189).
112 132 756
( 0+1
Step 4: Before giving the 4th seat to C, as suggested by the priority vector in Step 3,
we must check the natural quota vector (0.448, 0.528, 3.024) in a 4-seat house.
Clearly, the apportionment vector (0, 0, 4) is within quota and is therefore adopted.
The corresponding priority vector is ( 0+1 , 0+1 , 4+1 ) = (112, 132, 151.2).
112 132 756
Step 5: Before giving the 5th seat to C, as suggested by the priority vector in Step 4, we
must check the natural quota vector (0.560, 0.660, 3.780) in a 5-seat house. The
apportionment vector (0, 0, 5) violates the quota rule since the natural quota of C is
only 3.780, so we must pass over C in favor of B who has the next highest Jefferson
priority and the apportionment vector (0, 1, 4) is within quota. The corresponding
, 1+1 , 4+1 ) = (112, 66, 151.2).
112 132 756
priority vector is ( 0+1
we must check the natural quota vector (0.672, 0.792, 4.536) in a 6-seat house.
, 1+1 , 5+1 ) = (112, 66, 126).
112 132 756
The corresponding priority vector is ( 0+1
3 we must check the natural quota vector (0.784, 0.924, 5.292) in a 7-seat house.
, 1+1 , 6+1 ) = (112, 66, 108).
112 132 756
Step 8: Before giving the 8th seat to A, as suggested by the priority vector in Step 7,
we must check the natural quota vector (0.896, 1.056, 6.048) in an 8-seat house.
, 1+1 , 7+1 ) = (56, 66, 108).
112 132 756
The following two tables show the apportionments of up to 21 seats using the quota-Jefferson
and the quota-Adams procedures. When the priority rule of the underlying divisor procedure
(Jefferson or Adams) has to be overridden in order to stay within quota, an ∗ is entered.
Quota-Jefferson Procedure
Seats Apportionment vector Priority vector for next seat Next NQ vector Next seat
1 (0, 0, 1) (112.00, 132.00, 378.00) (0.224, 0.264, 1.512) C
2 (0, 0, 2) (112.00, 132.00, 252.00) (0.336, 0.396, 2.268) C
3 (0, 0, 3) (112.00, 132.00, 189.00) (0.448, 0.528, 3.024) C
4 (0, 0, 4) (112.00, 132.00, 151.20) (0.560, 0.660, 3.780) B∗
5 (0, 1, 4) (112.00, 66.00, 151.20) (0.672, 0.792, 4.536) C
6 (0, 1, 5) (112.00, 66.00, 126.00) (0.784, 0.924, 5.292) C
7 (0, 1, 6) (112.00, 66.00, 108.00) (0.896, 1.056, 6.048) A
8 (1, 1, 6) (56.00, 66.00, 108.00) (1.008, 1.188, 6.804) C
9 (1, 1, 7) (56.00, 66.00, 94.50) (1.120, 1.320, 7.560) A
10 (1, 1, 8) (56.00, 66.00, 84.00) (1.232, 1.452, 8.316) C
11 (1, 1, 9) (56.00, 66.00, 75.60) (1.344, 1.584, 9.072) C
12 (1, 1, 10) (56.00, 66.00, 68.72) (1.456, 1.716, 9.828) B∗
13 (1, 2, 10) (56.00, 44.00, 68.72) (1.568, 1.848, 10.584) C
14 (1, 2, 11) (56.00, 44.00, 63.00) (1.680, 1.980, 11.340) C
15 (1, 2, 12) (56.00, 44.00, 58.15) (1.792, 2.112, 12.096) C
16 (1, 2, 13) (56.00, 44.00, 54.00) (1.904, 2.244, 12.852) A
17 (2, 2, 13) (37.33, 44.00, 54.00) (2.016, 2.376, 13.608) C
18 (2, 2, 14) (37.33, 44.00, 50.40) (2.128, 2.508, 14.364) C
19 (2, 2, 15) (37.33, 44.00, 47.25) (2.240, 2.640, 15.120) C
20 (2, 2, 16) (37.33, 44.00, 44.47) (2.352, 2.772, 15.876) B∗
21 (2, 3, 16) (37.33, 33.00, 44.47) (2.464, 2.904, 16.632) C
237 3
Quota-Adams Procedure
Seats Apportionment vector Priority vector for next seat Next NQ vector Next seat
1 (0, 0, 1) (∞ , ∞, 756.00) (0.224, 0.264, 1.512) B
2 (0, 1, 1) (∞, 132.00, 756.00) (0.336, 0.396, 2.268) C∗
3 (0, 1, 2) (∞, 132.00, 378.00) (0.448, 0.528, 3.024) C∗
4 (0, 1, 3) (∞, 132.00, 252.00) (0.560, 0.660, 3.780) A
5 (1, 1, 3) (112.00, 132.00, 252.00) (0.672, 0.792, 4.536) C
6 (1, 1, 4) (112.00, 132.00, 189.00) (0.784, 0.924, 5.292) C
7 (1, 1, 5) (112.00, 132.00, 151.20) (0.896, 1.056, 6.048) C
8 (1, 1, 6) (112.00, 132.00, 126.00) (1.008, 1.188, 6.804) B
9 (1, 2, 6) (112.00, 66.00, 126.00) (1.120, 1.320, 7.560) C
10 (1, 2, 7) (112.00, 66.00, 108.00) (1.232, 1.452, 8.316) C∗
11 (1, 2, 8) (112.00, 66.00, 94.50) (1.344, 1.584, 9.072) C∗
12 (1, 2, 9) (112.00, 66.00, 84.00) (1.456, 1.716, 9.828) A
13 (2, 2, 9) (56.00, 66.00, 84.00) (1.568, 1.848, 10.584) C
14 (2, 2, 10) (56.00, 66.00, 75.60) (1.680, 1.980, 11.340) C
15 (2, 2, 11) (56.00, 66.00, 68.72) (1.792, 2.112, 12.096) C
16 (2, 2, 12) (56.00, 66.00, 63.00) (1.904, 2.244, 12.852) B
17 (2, 3, 12) (56.00, 44.00, 63.00) (2.016, 2.376, 13.608) C
18 (2, 3, 13) (56.00, 44.00, 58.15) (2.128, 2.508, 14.364) C
19 (2, 3, 14) (56.00, 44.00, 54.00) (2.240, 2.640, 15.120) C∗
20 (2, 3, 15) (56.00, 44.00, 50.40) (2.352, 2.772, 15.876) A
21 (3, 3, 15) (37.33, 44.00, 50.40) (2.464, 2.904, 16.632) C
The following are the apportionments of 20 seats and 21 seats by the procedures of
Jefferson, quota-Jefferson, Adams, and quota-Adams. The ∗ indicates a quota violation.
State Jefferson q-Jefferson Adams q-Adams

A 2 2 3 2
20 seats:
B 2 2 3 3
C 16 16 14 ∗ 15
State Jefferson q-Jefferson Adams q-Adams

A 2 2 3 3
21 seats:
B 2 3 3 3
C 17 ∗ 16 15 15
We refer the interested reader to the monograph by Balinski and Young [2] for a proof
of the existence, at each step of the construction of the quota-divisor procedures, of a state
that can receive the next seat without causing a violation of the quota rule. In Theorem 3.7.7
below, we address the case of only three states. A few simple results are needed first.
Proposition 3.7.3 If the total population of all states in a nation is p citizens and the house
size is h seats, then a state Aj with pj citizens and aj seats satisfies upper quota if and only
if
3
pj
aj − 1 < h
p
and satisfies lower quota if and only if
pj
h < aj + 1 ·
p
Proof
pj
This is clear since p h is the natural quota of Aj .

Proposition 3.7.4 Assume that state Aj in Proposition 3.7.3 satisfies quota; and assume
further that a new seat is added to the house then,
1. If the new seat is received by Aj , then Aj will continue to satisfy lower quota in the new
(h + 1)-seat house.
2. If the new seat is not received by Aj , then Aj will continue to satisfy upper quota in the
new (h + 1)-seat house.
Proof
pj
1. The new natural quota of Aj (after receiving the additional seat) is p (h + 1) and its new
pj
allotment is aj + 1 seats. Note that h < aj + 1 (by Proposition 3.7.3) since Aj , with
p
aj seats, satisfies lower quota in the h-seat house, and therefore
pj pj pj pj
(h + 1) = h+ < aj + 1 + < (aj + 1) + 1
p p p p
and the result follows from Proposition 3.7.3.

2. This follows from
pj pj
aj − 1 < h < (h + 1) ·
p p

Note Proposition 3.7.4 confirms the intuition that when all states are within quota and a new
seat is added, a state that receives the new seat will stay above its new lower quota, and a
state that does not receive the new seat will stay below its new upper quota. Therefore, we
only need to check the upper quota for a state that received the new seat and the lower quota
for a state that did not receive it.
Proposition 3.7.5 Consider a nation of n states A1 , A2 , · · · , An whose populations are

p1 , p2 , · · · , pn and seat allotments are a1 , a2 , · · · , an , respectively, and assume that all
239 3
allotments satisfy the quota rule. Then there exists j such that the seat allotment of Aj can
increase from aj to aj + 1 without violating its quota.
Proof
By Part 1 of Proposition 3.7.4, we only need to consider violations of upper quota. Assume
to the contrary that no state can receive an additional seat without violating its upper quota.
Then from Proposition 3.7.3 we get
pi
ai ≥ (h + 1), i = 1, 2, · · · , n
p
where h is the original house size and p is the total population of the nation. It follows that

n
h+1
n
h = ai ≥ pi = h + 1 ·
p
i=1 i=1
This contradiction completes the proof.

Proposition 3.7.6 Consider a nation of 3 states A1 , A2 , A3 whose populations are

p1 , p2 , p3 and their seat allotments are a1 , a2 , a3 , respectively (with p1 + p2 + p3 = p and
a1 + a2 + a3 = h), and assume that all allotments satisfy the quota rule. If a new seat is
added to the house, then at most one of the three states can violate the quota rule if it does
not receive it.
Proof
By Part 2 of Proposition 3.7.4, we only need to consider lower quota violations.
Assume to the contrary that for i = 1, 2, Ai will violate lower quota if it does not receive
the new seat, then for i = 1, 2,
pi pi pi
(h + 1) ≥ ai + 1 and so h − ai ≥ 1 − ·
p p p
p1 p2 p3
Since a1 + a2 + a3 = h = p h+ p h+ p h we get

p1 p2 p3
h − a1 + h − a2 + h − a3 = 0
p p p
and therefore,

p1 p2 p3
1− + 1− + h − a3 ≤ 0
p p p
but then

p1 + p 2 p3 p3
a3 − 1 ≥ 1− + h > h
p p p
which implies a violation of upper quota by A3 in the original h-seat house, in contradiction
to our assumptions. This completes the proof.

3 The seat allotments in Propositions 3.7.3 through 2.7.06 did not necessarily satisfy Axiom
3 in 3.2.1, this is why we stopped short of calling them apportionments. The next theorem
considers fully-fledged apportionments.
Theorem 3.7.7
Consider a nation of three states A1 , A2 , A3 with populations p1 , p2 , p3 , respectively
(with p1 + p2 + p3 = p and pi = pj for i = j ); and assume that the allotment ai
seats for Ai , i = 1, 2, 3, (a1 + a2 + a3 = h ), is an apportionment that satisfies the
quota rule. It is then possible to add a new seat to the house such that
1. Some state adds the new seat to its original allotment,
2. Two states keep their original allotments, and
3. The new seat allotments constitute an apportionment that satisfies the quota rule.
Proof
By virtue of Proposition 3.7.6, we have only two cases to consider:
Case 1: One state, say A1 , will violate lower quota if it does not receive the new seat
while each of A2 and A3 will continue to satisfy lower quota if it keeps its original
allotment. In this case, let us give the new seat to A1 , then by Proposition 3.7.4, A1
will continue to satisfy lower quota in the (h + 1)-seat house; and we only need to
show that it will continue to satisfy upper quota. Since A1 will violate lower quota
if it does not receive the new seat we get a1 + 1 ≤ pp1 (h + 1) by Proposition 3.7.3
and so
p1
(a1 + 1) − 1 < (h + 1) ·
p
Another appeal to Proposition 3.7.3 shows that A1 will satisfy upper quota in the
(h + 1)-seat house. To show that Axiom 3 will continue to be satisfied in the new
house, we first note that Axiom 3 will only be violated if for i = 2 or i = 3,
a1 = ai and p1 < pi . (Why?)
Since A1 will violate lower quota for not receiving the new seat and Ai will not,
we have
p1 pi
(h + 1) ≥ a1 + 1 and (h + 1) < ai + 1
p p
and therefore,
pi p p1
< ≤ ·
ai + 1 h+1 a1 + 1
If a1 = ai , then pi < p1 and so giving the new seat to A1 will not violate Axiom 3.
Exercises
241 3
Case 2: No state will violate lower quota if it does not receive the new seat. In this case
we give the new seat to one of the states (whose existence is guaranteed by
Proposition 3.7.5) that can receive it without violating upper quota. Of course,
if any two of those states have the same number of seats in the original h-seat
house, we should not give the seat to the state with the smaller population. To
complete the proof, we need to show that if some state, say A1 will violate upper
quota if it receives the new seat and some other state, say A2 will continue to
satisfy upper quota if it receives the new seat, and if a1 = a2 then p1 < p2 and so
giving the new seat to A2 (and not A1 ) will not violate Axiom 3. To this end, we
note that by Proposition 3.7.3 we have
p1 p2
a1 ≥ (h + 1) and a2 < (h + 1)
p p
and so
a1 h+1 a2
≥ > ·
p1 p p2
Since a1 = a2 we now have p1 < p2 .

Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 3.7.7 leaves us with only one choice of a state that should
receive the new seat: the state that will violate lower quota if it does not receive it. In Case 2,
however, we may have different choices that correspond to different priority rules, including
the priority rules of the standard divisor procedures. It is even possible not to follow any pre-
specified priority rule each time we have to assign a new seat; we only need to stay within
the constraints described in the proof.
The quota-divisor procedures discussed above provide a compromise between the desir-
able properties of the two main families of apportionment procedures: the quota procedures
and the divisor procedures, as they combine the quota rule with house-monotonicity.
Population-monotonicity is too strong a property to reconcile with the quota rule, as estab-
lished Balinski-Young (Theorem 2.3.18.) In fact, population-monotonicity is a stronger prop-
erty than house-monotonicity: every population-monotone procedure is house-monotone, but
the converse is not true [2].
Given that violations of the quota rule by the Hill–Huntington procedure are quite rare in
the case of the United States house of representatives, as shown in Notes 3.6.8, we wouldn’t
gain much if we replace it with some quota divisor procedure such as the quota-Hill–
Huntington procedure or the quota-Webster procedure. Any gain obtained by the complete
prevention of quota violation would be outweighed by the loss of population-monotonicity
and the highly desirable inequity minimization property of the Hill–Huntington procedure
(Theorem 3.5.14.)
Exercises
The data in each of the Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 will be processed using various
apportionment procedures in this exercise set.
3
Table 3.1 State A B C D Total
Population 5480 2450 1415 655 10,000
Table 3.2
State A B C D Total
Population 3580 2550 2515 1355 10,000
Table 3.3
State A B C D Total
Population 5382 1796 1791 1031 10,000
Table 3.4
State A B C D Total
Population 6389 1594 1590 427 10,000
Table 3.5 State A B C D Total

Population 7501 1257 1012 230 10,000
Table 3.6
State A B C D Total
Population 5732 1826 1457 985 10,000
Table 3.7
State A B C D Total
Population 7215 1551 711 523 10,000
Exercises
243 3
1. Find all quota apportionments of 10 seats for the data in each of the seven tables above.
2. Identify the Hamilton apportionments in Exercise 1.
3. Identify the Lowndes apportionments in Exercise 1.
4. Do the following apportionments of 20 and 21 seats among states A, B, C, and D exhibit

an Alabama paradox? Explain.
State A B C D Total State A B C D Total

Seats 11 4 3 2 20 Seats 12 5 3 1 21
5. Do the following apportionments of 20 and 21 seats among states A, B, C, and D exhibit

an Alabama paradox? Explain.
State A B C D Total State A B C D Total

Seats 11 4 3 2 20 Seats 12 4 3 2 21
6. The following table shows the population data of a nation that adopts Hamilton’s
procedure for apportioning its house of representatives.
State A B C D Total
Population 128 227 322 323 1000
1. Apportion a 10-seat house.

2. Apportion an 11-seat house.
3. Do the results above show an Alabama paradox? If so, identify the Alabama state.
7. The following table shows the population data of a nation that adopts Lowndes’ procedure
for apportioning its house of representatives.
State A B C D Total
Population 38 42 365 555 1000

2. Apportion an 11-seat house.
3. Do the results above show an Alabama paradox? If so, identify the Alabama state.
8. In this striking example, due to Jason and Linusson (see [18, page 121]), Hamilton’s
procedure is being used to apportion the house seats among the following five states:
3
State A B C D E Total
Population 280 275 270 90 85 1000

3. Do the results above show an Alabama paradox? If so, identify the Alabama state. (In
fact, there are two Alabama states in this example. Notice the drastic change caused by
the additional seat!)
9. The following are the election results in a hypothetical country that uses the proportional
representation system with a 6% threshold and adopts Hamilton’s procedure in apportioning
its 90-seat parliament.
Party A B C D E F Total
Votes received 3,417,819 2,451,278 2,349,645 781,258 572,151 427,849 10,000,000
1. Which parties will be excluded from the seat apportionment?

2. How many votes will be thrown away?
3. Apportion the parliament seats among the parties.
10. Lowndes’ procedure bases the priority of a state to receive a surplus seat on pa , where
p is the population of the state and a its initial allocation. As you can see, this resembles
Adams’ threshold divisor for adding a seat. Apportion the 10 seats in Table 3.4 by replacing
p
a with each of
p p √ p p(2a+1)
1. a+1 2. a+0.5 3. a(a+1)
4. 2a(a+1)
which, respectively, resemble the threshold divisor of Jefferson, Webster, Hill–Huntington

and Dean, to add a seat. Compare the results.
11. Prove the following equivalent statement to the Lowndes priority rule for surplus seats:
The states are listed in the decreasing order of the ratio
fractional part of the natural quota

entire natural quota
and the top s states in the list receive one seat each. (See Remark 3.3.8.)
12. Explain why the occurrence of only one of the two events in Remark 3.3.14 is not
necessarily paradoxical.
Exercises
245 3
13. Assume that the house size in a nation that uses a quota procedure has increased from h
to h + 1. Prove that the only way the Alabama paradox can occur is when a state that acquires
a surplus seat in the h-seat house drops that seat in the (h + 1)-seat house while keeping its
initial allocation the same in both houses. In other words, a state that receives only its initial
allocation in the h-seat house cannot become an “Alabama” in the (h + 1)-seat house.
14. For each of Tables 3.1 through 3.7 in the beginning of this exercise set, compute
Jefferson’s apportionment of 10 seats and detect all quota violations. You must determine
the interval of proper divisors in each case.
15. For each of Tables 3.1 through 3.7,

1. Find the largest house size that allows the smallest state to get just one seat and the
corresponding number of seats apportioned to each state, when Jefferson’s procedure is
used.
2. Find the smallest house size that allows the smallest state to get just one seat and the
corresponding number of seats apportioned to each state, when Jefferson’s procedure is
used.
16. Assuming that state A with population 7815 is apportioned 7 seats by Jefferson’s
procedure, how many seats can be apportioned to state B with population 4218, to state
C with population 16,532 and to D with population 970?
17. For each of Tables 3.1 through 3.7 in the beginning of this exercise set, compute Adam’s
apportionment of 10 seats and detect all quota violations. You must determine the interval of
proper divisor in each case.
18. For each of Tables 3.1 through 3.7, find the largest house size that allows the smallest
state to get just one seat and the corresponding number of seats apportioned to each state,
when Adams’ procedure is used.
19. Assuming that state A with population 7815 is apportioned 7 seats by Adams’
20. For each of Tables 3.1 through 3.7 in the beginning of this exercise set, compute
Webster’s apportionment of 10 seats and detect all quota violations. You must determine

1. Find the largest house size that allows the smallest state to get just one seat and the
corresponding number of seats apportioned to each state, when Webster’s procedure is
used.
2. Find the smallest house size that allows the smallest state to get just one seat and the
corresponding number of seats apportioned to each state, when Webster’s procedure is
used.
22. Assuming that state A with population 7815 is apportioned 7 seats by Webster’s
3
23. For each of Tables 3.1 through 3.7 in the beginning of this exercise set, compute the Hill–
Huntington apportionment of 10 seats and detect all quota violations. You must determine
when the Hill–Huntington apportionment procedure is used.
25. Assuming that state A with population 7815 is apportioned 7 seats by the Hill–
Huntington procedure, how many seats can be apportioned to state B with population 4218,
to state C with population 16,532 and to D with population 970?
26. For each of Tables 3.1 through 3.7 in the beginning of this exercise set, compute Dean’s
apportionment of 10 seats and detect all quota violations. You must determine the interval of
proper divisors in each case.
when Dean’s apportionment procedure is used.
28. Assuming that state A with population 7815 is apportioned 7 seats by Dean’s procedure,
how many seats can be apportioned to state B with population 4218, to state C with
population 16,532 and to D with population 970?
29. In Exercises 15 and 21 you were asked to compute, not only the largest, but also the
smallest house size that allows the smallest state get exactly one seat, but in Exercises 18, 24
and 27 you were only asked to compute the largest house size. The question about the
smallest house size is still valid but is rather trivial. Why?
Exercises 30 through 33 demonstrate an awkward behavior by the procedures of Jeffer-
son, Adams, Webster, and Dean similar to the behavior of the Hill–Huntington procedure
shown in Example 3.6.11.
30. The following two tables show the population data of a nation in two different census
years (2000 and 2010). Apportion a ten-seat house in both census years using Jefferson’s
procedure.
Exercises
247 3
State A B C Total
Year 2000 data
Population 1999 1986 6015 10,000
State A B C Total
Year 2010 data
Population 2399 1586 6015 10,000
Comment on the results.
years (2000 and 2010). Apportion a ten-seat house in both census years using Adams’
procedure.
State A B C Total
Year 2000 data
Population 1999 1986 6015 10,000
State A B C Total
Year 2010 data
Population 2499 1486 6015 10,000
years (2000 and 2010). Apportion a ten-seat house in both census years using Webster’s
procedure.
State A B C Total
Year 2000 data
Population 1490 3520 4990 10,000
State A B C Total
Year 2010 data
Population 1490 3420 5090 10,000
years (2000 and 2010). Apportion a ten-seat house in both census years using Dean’s
procedure.
State A B C Total
Year 2000 data
Population 1331 3448 5221 10,000
State A B C Total
Year 2010 data
Population 1331 3418 5251 10,000
34. Prove or disprove: Suppose that a divisor procedure is used, then doubling the house
size leads to the doubling of the apportionment of each state.
35. Prove or disprove: Suppose that Hamilton’s procedure is used, then doubling the house
3 36. Prove or disprove: Suppose that Lowndes’ procedure is used, then doubling the house
37. Show that multiplying the population of each state by the same positive integer leaves
the apportionment unchanged, regardless of the procedure used.
38. Apportion 10 seats among the states in Example 3.4.4 using the quota-Jefferson
procedure.
39. Apportion 10 seats among the states in Example 3.4.29 using the quota-Webster
procedure.
40. Apportion 10 seats among the states in Example 3.4.41 using the quota-Hill–Huntington
procedure.
41. Apportion 10 seats among the states in Example 3.4.13 using the quota-Adams
procedure.
42. Prove Proposition 3.5.16 and Corollary 3.5.17.
43. Lowndes’ procedure is to be used to apportion 10 seats among the following four states:
State A B C D Total
Population 901 34 33 32 1000
1. After the initial allocation, there will be only one surplus seat with three states having the
highest priority (∞ if you use Definition 3.3.5 or 1 if you use the equivalent definition in
Remark 3.3.8). How can you resolve this issue?
2. Find the Lowndes’ solution to this problem.
44. Let A and B be two of the states in a certain apportionment problem and assume that
1. The number of seats apportioned to A is higher than its upper natural quota.
2. The number of seats apportioned to B is lower than its lower natural quota.
Could this apportionment have been obtained from a divisor procedure? (Of course, it could
not have been obtained from a quota procedure.)
45. Show that the following apportionment of 20 seats could not have been obtained from a
quota procedure or a divisor procedure.
Exercises
249 3
State A B C D E Total
Population 4495 2506 1329 1055 615 10,000
Apportionment 10 4 3 2 1 20
46. In Definitions 3.4.31 and 3.5.18 we introduced three types of means, each was shown
to correspond to a certain divisor procedure. In this problem, we construct a fourth type of
mean for two numbers x, y with 0 ≤ x ≤ y as follows:
Step 1. Take the squares x 2 and y 2 of the given two numbers.
Compute the arithmetic mean x +y
2 2
Step 2. 2 of x 2 and y 2 .
Step 3. Being the mean of the squares of x and y, the outcome of Step 2 can be viewed
as the square of some kind of mean for x and y themselves. This leads to the
following definition:
Definition Given two numbers x and y with 0 ≤ x ≤ y, we define their mean square
denoted s(x, y), by
x2 + y2
s(x, y) = ·
2
1. Show that m(x, y) < s(x, y) < y for all x, y with 0 ≤ x < y. Note: It follows from
Proposition 3.5.19 that for 0 < x < y,
x < h(x, y) < g(x, y) < m(x, y) < s(x, y) < y.
2. Show that for 0 ≤ x < y,
s(g(x, y), s(x, y)) = m(x, y).
47. Definitions
1. The mean square apportionment procedure is the divisor procedure with the following
rounding rule: A state whose quota is q > 0 receives k seats where k is the unique
non-negative integer such that
s(k − 1, k) ≤ q < s(k, k + 1).
2. If two states X and Y are apportioned m seats and n seats, respectively, we define the
θ -inequity (denoted θ (X : m, Y : n)) between the two states by
θ (X : m, Y : n) = |(pcr(X : m))2 − (pcr(Y : n))2 |.
Prove that the mean square apportionment procedure minimizes the pairwise θ -inequities
and that it is the only divisor procedure with this minimization property.
48. For each of Tables 3.1 through 3.7 in the beginning of this exercise set, use the mean
square procedure to apportion 10 seats and detect all quota violations. You must determine
3
1. Find the largest house size that allows the smallest state to get just one seat and
the corresponding number of seats apportioned to each state, when the mean square
procedure is used.
2. Find the smallest house size that allows the smallest state to get just one seat and
the corresponding number of seats apportioned to each state, when the mean square
procedure is used.
50. Prove that

1. limn→∞ {s(n, n + 1) − m(n, n + 1)} = 0.
2. For n = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
s(n, n + 1) − m(n, n + 1) > s(n + 1, n + 2) − m(n + 1, n + 2)·
51. For the population data in Table 3.2 above, the following table shows Webster’s
apportionment of 10 seats.
State Population Seats Divisor interval

A 3580 4 795.555 < d < 1022.857
B 2550 3 728.571 < d < 1020.000
C 2515 2 1006.00 < d < 1676.666
D 1355 1 903.333 < d < 2710.000
In the fourth column of the above table we use Proposition 3.4.25 to compute the interval
of divisors that allow a state to receive the indicated number of seats.
Compared to the natural divisor of 1000 person per seat, the population difference of
only 35 between B and C does not justify the one seat difference between these two states.
Can you resolve this issue by changing the house size?
Exercises 52 and 53 you are asked to prove theorems for the procedures of Jefferson and
Adams similar to Theorems 3.5.12, 3.5.14 and 3.5.21 for the procedures of Webster, Hill–
Huntington, and Dean, respectively. It is assumed that state A (with m seats and a population
of x people) is the poor state; and state B (with n seats and a population of y people) is the
rich state.
52. Prove that the inequity measure associated with Jefferson’s procedure is n xy − m.
53. Prove that the inequity measure associated with Adams’ procedure is n − m yx .
251
Answers to Selected Exercises
Chapter 1
Answers to Exercises 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 29, 30 are presented in the following table.
Scenario CW CL Plurality P with RO Hare Coombs Borda Hare–Borda

1 – – c a a a a, c a
2 – – a a a a b a
3 d c a b b d d d
4 a b a, b a a, b, c a a a
5 c d a b c c c c
6 – d a a a a b a
07. e is a Condorcet winner that loses in all of the procedures named.

08. 1. b is a Condorcet winner. 2. b is the plurality winner. 3. b is the Hare winner.
4. b is a Coombs non-winner.
09. 1. e is a Condorcet winner, b is a Condorcet loser. 2. a is the winner. 4. No.
(From 1&2.)
10. d
11. e
12. Yes.
13. Yes.
18. d wins regardless of the agenda, since it is a Condorcet winner.
19. a loses regardless of the agenda since it is a Condorcet loser; b wins with agenda
acdb; c wins with agenda adbc; d wins with agenda abcd.
20. a wins with agenda cdba; b wins with agenda acdb; c wins with agenda dbac; d
wins with agenda bacd.
22. a, b, c can win with agendas edcba, edacb, edbac, respectively. d is a non-
Condorcet loser that loses regardless of the agenda.
26. e is the only Pareto dominated alternative. It wins with agenda cdabe.
27. b and e are Pareto dominated. No agenda can save b since it is also a Condorcet
loser, while e wins with agenda bcdae.
31. 1. a a Condorcet winner and is second to last in Borda count.
2. a a Condorcet loser and is second in Borda count.
32. e is the sole winner of Borda count. It is also the sole winner of the Hare–Borda
procedure since it is a Condorcet winner.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6
252 Answers to Selected Exercises
33. The Condorcet tournament ranking is d first, b second, a third, c fourth. Borda
count ranking is d first, a second, b third, c fourth. Note also that b (who is placed
second by the Condorcet tournament) is Pareto dominated.
35. 2. a is a Condorcet winner. b is the sole winner of the top-bottom procedure, c is the
sole winner of Hare’s procedure, and a is the sole winner of Coombs’ procedure.
The top-bottom procedure does not satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion.
36. μ = {a} while μs = {a, b}. Voter s prefers {a, b} to {a} since, in his sincere
ranking, he prefers b to a.
39. No, because none of the voters could be the Arrow’s dictator.
40. 1. {a, c} and {a, d}. 3. (λ)/{a, c} = (λ)/{a, c}; (λ)/{a, d} = (λ)/{a, d}.
41. 2. d ↔μ a and a ↔μ b but b →μ d;
c →μ b and b ↔μ a but a →μ c; d ↔μ a and a →μ c but c →μ d.
42. 1. This scenario was created from a complete directed graph as in Exam-
ple 1.3.23. The graph can be easily recovered from the scenario.
a is a weak Condorcet winner, c is a strong Condorcet loser, and e is a
Condorcet neutralizer.
2. a and e. 3. {a, e}.
43. 1. a is a weak Condorcet winner, d is a Condorcet neutralizer, and c is a strong
Condorcet loser.
2. a and d. 3. {a, c, d} (The strong Condorcet loser c made it to the Hare–Borda
social choice set.)
44. Assume we have n candidates. The total number of Copeland points is (n−1)n 2
;a
weak Condorcet winner receives ≥ n2 points and a Condorcet neutralizer receives
exactly n−12
points. To show that a strong Condorcet loser can join the social choice
set of the Hare–Copeland procedure, construct a complete directed graph in which
a loses to b and is tied with everyone else, and b loses to everyone except a.
McGarvey’s theorem guarantees the existence of a scenario representable by this
graph.
45. Exercise 42: Hare–Copeland social choice set is {a, e} (same as the Hare–Borda
social choice set.)
Exercise 43: Hare–Copeland social choice set is {a, d} (different from the Hare–
Borda social choice set.)
Chapter 2
01. 8, 6, 4, 2, 0
02. 7, 5, 3, 1
03. 8, 10
04. 9,11
06. In System 2, the most you get, if you miss a or b, is 11 points. Therefore, to meet
the quota of 12, you need to include both a and b; and you need to include at least
two more of c, d, e, f, g, and h.
07. 1. bi(a) = 10 26
, bi(b) = 26
6
, bi(c) = 26
6
, bi(d) = 26
2
, bi(e) = 26
2
. No dummies or
veto-powered voters.
253
2. bi(a) = 25 9
, bi(b) = 25 7
, bi(c) = 255
, bi(d) = 25 3
, bi(e) = 25 1
. No dummies or
3. bi(a) = 24 8
, bi(b) = 24 6
, bi(c) = 244
, bi(d) = 24 4
, bi(e) = 24 2
. No dummies or
08. bi(a) = bi(f ) = 14 1
, bi(b) = bi(e) = 14 2
, bi(c) = bi(d) = 14 4
. No dummies; each
of c and d has veto power.
09. bi(a) = 228
, bi(b) = 22 8
, bi(c) = 22 2
, bi(d) = 22 2
, bi(e) = 22 2
. No dummies or
10. bi(a) = 237
, bi(b) = 23 7
, bi(c) = 23 3
, bi(d) = 23 3
, bi(e) = 23 3
. No dummies or
11. bi(a) = 10
20
, bi(b) = 20 6
, bi(c) = 20 2
, bi(d) = 20 2
, bi(e) = 20 0
. e is a dummy and a
has veto power.
12. bi(a) = 20 8
, bi(b) = 20 6
, bi(c) = 20 2
, bi(d) = 20 2
, bi(e) = 20 2
. There are no
dummies and a has veto power.
13. bi(a) = 21 9
, bi(b) = 21 5
, bi(c) = 21 3
, bi(d) = 21 3
, bi(e) = 21 1
. There are
no dummies and a has veto power. Both changes benefit e but the change in
Exercise 12 benefits e more.
14. acbf d eg acgf deb gcaf bed ecgf dba
15. acbf d eg acgf deb gcaf bed ecgf dba
16. Yes
17. Yes
q a b c d Dummmies Veto-powered
6 6/12 2/12 2/12 2/12 None None
18.
7 5/10 3/10 1/10 1/10 None a
8 4/8 4/8 0/8 0/8 a, b c, d
Index a b c d
19. bi 2/12 4/12 4/12 2/12 No dummies or veto-powered voters.
si 4/24 8/24 8/24 4/24
20. No.
21. Weights: a:3, b:3, c:1, d:1, e:1; q=7.
Index a b c d e
bi 7/17 7/17 1/17 1/17 1/17
si 54/120 54/120 4/120 4/120 4/120
22. Weights: a:3, b:3, c:2, d:2, e:2; q=7.
Index a b c d e
bi 7/29 7/29 5/29 5/29 5/29
si 30/120 30/120 20/120 20/120 20/120
Index f g i b n l
25. bi 10/42 10/42 10/42 6/42 6/42 0/42 l is a
si 168/720 168/720 168/720 108/720 108/720 0/720
dummy. No veto-powered voters.
29. Weights: a:2, b:2, c:1, d:1, e:1; q=5
30. 6 × 1 × 4 × 4 × 4 × 4 × 6 × 6 = 55, 296
31. Each of the five permanent members has a weight of 7, each of the ten non-
permanent members has a weight of 1; and q = 39
Index Permanent members Non-permanent members

bi 212/1270 0.1669291 21/1270 0.0165354
si 421/2145 0.1962703 4/2145 0.0018648
Chapter 3
Answers to Exercises 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 48 are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and
7. Quota violations are circled.
Table 1
Dean H-H Webster Mean square Jeff

Adams 1020.84– 1000.51– 980– 926.31– 782.85–
State Pop 1225–1370 1061.25 1000.55 996.36 960.96 816.66
A 5480 5 5 5 6 6 6
B 2450 2 2 2 2 3 3
C 1415 2 2 2 1 1 1
D 0655 1 1 1 1 0 0
Table 2
Mean
Adams Dean H-H square
1257.5– 1044.17– 1026.75– Webster (natural Jeff
State Pop 1275 1047.91 1033.45 1006–1020 divisor) 838.34–850
A 3580 3 3 4 4 4 4
B 2550 3 3 3 3 3 3
C 2515 2 3 2 2 2 2
D 1355 2 1 1 1 1 1
255
Table 3
Dean Webster Mean square

Adams (natural H-H (natural (natural (natural Jeff
State Pop 1345.5–1797 divisor) divisor) divisor) divisor) 895.5–897
A 5382 5 5 5 5 5 6
B 1796 2 2 2 2 2 2
C 1791 2 2 2 2 2 1
D 1031 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4
Mean
Webster square
Adams Dean H-H (natural (natural Jeff
State Pop 1277.8–1594 1171.32–1192.5 1124.30–1127.12 divisor) divisor) 797–798.62
A 6389
5
5 6 6 6
8
B 1594 2 2 2 2 2 1
C 1590 2 2 1 2 2 1
D 0427 1 1 1 0 0 0
Table 5
Dean H-H Webster

Adams 1004.60– 1002.37– (natural Mean square Jeff
State Pop 1257–1500.2 1160.86 1157.42 divisor) 880.95–997.91 833.45–937.62
A 7501
6 7 7 8 8 8
B 1257 2 1 1 1 1 1
C 1012 1 1 1 1 1 1
D 0230 1 1 1 0 0 0
Table 6
Adams Dean H-H Webster

1146.4– 1050.87– 1030.26– (natural Mean square Jeff
State Pop 1433 1092.75 1046.51 divisor) (natural divisor) 818.86–857.91
A 5732 5 5 6 6 6 6
B 1826 2 2 2 2 2 2
C 1457 2 2 1 1 1 1
D 0985 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 7
Dean H-H Mean square

Adams 1116.61– 1096.73– Webster 959.87– Jeff
State Pop 1202.5–1443 1163.25 1113.29 1034–1046 980.93 775.5–801.6
A 7215
6
6 7 7 7
9
B 1551 2 2 1 1 2 1
C 0711 1 1 1 1 1 0
D 0523 1 1 1 1 0 0
01. Table 4: Four quota solutions exist:

A:7, B:2, C:1, D:0
A:7, B:1, C:1, D:1
A:6, B:2, C:2, D:0
A:6, B:2, C:1, D:1
02. A:6, B:2, C:2, D:0
03. A:6, B:2, C:1, D:1
06. 10 seats: A:2, B:2, C:3, D:3; 11 seats: A:1, B:2, C:4, D:4. A is the Alabama
state.
07. 10 seats: A:1, B:1, C:3, D:5; 11 seats: A:0, B:1, C:4, D:6. A is the Alabama
state.
08. 5 seats: A:1, B:1, C:1, D:1, E:1; 6 seats: A:2, B:2, C:2, D:0, E:0. There are two
Alabama states in this case: D and E.
09. 1. E and F are excluded. 2. Votes of E + Votes of F = 1,000,000 votes (thrown
away.) 3. A:34, B:25, C:23, D:8, E:0, F :0.
10. 1. A:7, B:2, C:1, D:0; 2. A:6, B:2, C:2, D:0; 3. A:6, B:2, C:1, D:1; 4. A:6,
B:2, C:1, D:1.
11. In Remark 3.3.8, the larger qδ the smaller qi the larger qi , which is equal to di
p
where
p is the population of the state and d is the natural divisor.
13. The initial allocation, which is the integer part of the natural quota can only
increase (or stay the same) when the house size increases from h to h + 1.
15. For the data in Table 4
1. Largest house size is 44. A:29, B:7, C:7, D:1; 2. Smallest house size is 21.
A:14, B:3, C:3, D:1
16. B: 3 or 4; C: 14, 15 or 16; D: 0
Largest house size is 24. A:15, B:4, C:4, D:1
19. B: 4; C: 13, 14 or 15; D: 1
A:7, B:2, C:2, D:1
22. B: 4; C: 14, 15 or 16; D: 1
257
25. B: 4; C: 14, 15 or 16; D: 1

28. B: 4; C: 14, 15 or 16; D: 1
33. A ← seat ← B → population → C
39. (0, 0, 0, 0) → (1, 0, 0, 0) → (2, 0, 0, 0) → (2, 1, 0, 0) → (2, 1, 1, 0) →
(2, 1, 1, 1) → (3, 1, 1, 1) → (4, 1, 1, 1) → (5, 1, 1, 1) → (6, 1, 1, 1) →
(6, 2, 1, 1). In the last step we had to override Webster’s priority in order to stay
within quota.
43. The one with the highest population among the three states gets that surplus seat.
44. See the first note in Notes 3.6.08.
45. No. Upper quota and lower quota are both violated. See the first note in
Notes 3.6.08.
A:11, B:3, C:3, D:1
259
References
1. Arrow, K.J.: Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edn. Yale University, New Haven (1963)
2. Balinski, M.L., Young, H.P.: Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man One Vote, 2nd
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3. Black, D.: Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1958)
4. Felsenthal, D.S., Machover, M.: The Measurement of Voting Power. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
(1998)
5. Fishburn, P.C.: The Theory of Social Choice. Princeton University, Princeton (1973)
6. Gaertner, W.: A Primer in Social Choice Theory. Oxford University, New York (2006)
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8. Gibbard, A.: Social Choice and the Arrow Conditions. Unpublished Manuscript (1969)
9. Gura, E.-Y., Maschler, M.B.: Insights into Game Theory. Cambridge University, New York (2008)
10. Heckelman, J.C., Miller, N.R. (ed.): Handbook of Social Choice and Voting. Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham (2015)
11. Kelly, J.S.: Social Choice Theory. Springer, Berlin (1988)
12. Laruelle, A., Valenciano, F.: Voting and Collective Decision-Making. Cambridge University, New
York (2008)
13. Laslier, J.-F.: Tournament Solutions and Majority Voting. Springer, Berlin (1997)
14. McGarvey, D.C.: A Theorem on the Construction of Voting Paradoxes. Econometrica 21 (4),
608–610 (1953)
15. Moon, J.W.: Topics on Tournaments in Graph Theory. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York
(1968)
16. Nitzan, S.: Collective Preference and Choice. Cambridge University, New York (2010)
17. Nurmi, H.: Comparing Voting Systems. D. Reidel, Boston (1987)
18. Pukelsheim, F.: Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and their Applications.
Springer, New York (2014)
19. Riker, W.H.: Liberalism Against Populism. Waveland, Long Grove (1982)
20. Schwartz, T.: The Logic of Collective Choice. Columbia University, New York (1986)
21. Sen, A.: A possibility theorem on majority decision. Econometrica 34, 491–496 (1966)
22. Straffin Jr., P.D.: Topics in the Theory of Voting. Birkhäuser, Boston (1980)
23. Suzumura, K.: Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare. Cambridge University,
London (1983)
24. Taylor, A.: Mathematics and Politics. Springer, New York (1995)
25. Taylor, A., Zwicker, W.: A Characterization of weighted voting. Proc. Am. Math. Soc. 115,
1089–1094 (1992)
26. Taylor, A., Zwicker, W.: Simple games and magic squares. J. Comb. Theory Series A 71, 67–88
(1995)
27. Taylor, A., Zwicker, W.: Simple Games. Princeton University, Princeton (1999)
28. Young, H.P.: Condorcet’s theory of voting. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 82, 1231–1244 (1988b)
29. Young, H.P.: Equality in Theory and Practice. Princeton University, Princeton (1994)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6
261
Index
A Condorcet paradox, 25, 32, 36, 54, 97, 99, 102,

Adams, J.Q., 175, 192 104
Adams’ procedure, 175, 185–193, 203, 219, 221, Condorcet tournament, 21–24, 29, 31, 34, 35,
225, 229, 231, 245, 250 37–39, 52–55, 58, 60, 61, 63–65, 74, 81,
– rounding rule of, 185 84–88, 105, 107–109, 111, 113, 252
– threshold divisors, 187–189, 191, 223, 244 Condorcet-type classifications of alternatives,
Agenda, 28–33, 104, 108–110, 251 84–88, 92
Agenda voting, 28–33, 104, 109, 110 Condorcet winner, 23–27, 29, 30, 35, 36, 43,
Alabama paradox, 169–172, 243–245 44, 46–48, 50, 51, 53, 81, 84–91, 98–102,
Anonymity (of a two-alternative rule), 65–67 104–107, 111–113, 251, 252
Anonymous social choice function, 97, 100, Condorcet winner criterion, 26, 29, 35, 43, 44, 50,
102 98–102, 104, 107, 112, 252
Arithmetic mean, 199–201, 216, 217, 249 Consistency of apportionment procedures,
Arrow, K., 67, 68 227–233
Arrow’s axioms, 68–70, 72–74, 78, 112 Conventional rounding, 161, 162, 166, 167, 192,
Arrow’s (impossibility) theorem, 67–74, 78, 111 193
Axioms of apportionment, 162–166
D
B Dean’s procedure, 217–220, 222–225, 229, 231,
Balinski, M., 172, 174, 234, 237 246
Balinski-Young theorem, 172–175, 241 – rounding rule of, 218
Banzhaf, J.F. III., 117 – threshold divisors, 222–225
Banzhaf distribution of power, 123–125, 127, Dictator, 65, 68, 73–75, 77, 78, 102, 139–144,
131, 132, 153–155 252
Banzhaf index, 117, 123–128, 131–133, 138, Directed graph, 22, 37–40, 85, 252
140–142, 153 District size, 160, 168, 171, 172, 215, 216, 231
Banzhaf score, 117–123, 125–128, 138 Divisor procedures, 162, 174–227, 229, 230,
Black’s theorem, 61–65, 74 233–237, 241, 247–249
Bush, G.W., 4–6 Dominant voter, 139–144
Dummy voter, 101
C
Cartesian product of sets, 136–137 E
Coalition, 116–129, 132, 133, 137–157 Elimination procedures, 6–21
Collective quasi-rationality, 74–76, 112 Equity criteria, 207–225
Collective rationality, 68, 71–75, 113 Equivalent relation, 147
Combination, 133–136 Equivalent yes-no voting system, 116, 128,
Complete graph, 22, 37–40, 85, 252 146–149, 152, 153, 156, 168, 181, 194, 244,
Condorcet loser, 23–24, 26, 27, 29–31, 35, 36, 43, 248
46–48, 81, 84–91, 105, 107–109, 111, 113, Exact apportionment, 160–163
251, 252
Condorcet loser criterion, 26, 29, 31, 35, 43, 108 F
Condorcet neutralizer, 84–92, 113, 252 Felsenthal–Machover example, 126–128

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6
262 Index
G K
Gärdenfors, P., 93, 94 Killer amendment, 32–35, 110
Gärdenfors preference on sets of alternatives, 92,
94–95 L
Gärdenfors theorem, 93, 98–102 λ-blocking set of voters, 75
Generalizations of standard social choice λ-decisive set of voters, 69, 73, 74, 78
procedures, 79–83, 107 Loser, 1, 18, 20, 22–24, 26, 27, 29–31, 35, 36, 43,
Geometric mean, 199–201, 217, 218 46–48, 81, 84–91, 105, 107–109, 111, 113,
Gibbard, A., 74, 92 201, 233, 251, 252
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, 92, 93, 102 Losing coalition, 116, 156
Gibbard’s axioms, 75–77 Lower natural quota, 163–166, 174, 178, 186,
Gibbard’s theorem (on oligarchy), 74–78 192, 230, 248
– proof, 74–778 Lowndes’ procedure, 168–169, 171, 175, 228,
Gore, A., 4, 5 243, 244, 248
Graph representation, 22, 23, 29–32, 34, 36, 37, Lowndes, W., 166, 168, 169, 173, 226
39, 40, 51, 53, 59, 81–84, 89–91, 105–109,
111, 113
M
Graph theory, 22
Magic square, 150–152
Magic square voting system, 150–157
H Magic sum, 150
Hamilton, A., 166, 168 Majority, 2–22, 24–28, 31, 33, 35, 41, 43, 47, 52,
Hamilton’s procedure, 166–167, 169, 171, 174, 62, 64–67, 81–83, 86, 102, 107, 111
227, 243, 244, 248 Manipulable social choice functions, 93, 98,
Harmonic mean, 217–219 102–114
Hill, J., 175 May’s theorem, 65–67
Hill–Huntington procedure, 199–208, 213–215, McGarvey’s theorem, 37–40, 79, 85, 252
220, 224, 229, 231, 241, 246 Mean (arithmetic), 199–201, 216, 217, 249
– rounding rule of, 200–202, 214 – geometric, 199–201, 216, 217
– threshold divisors, 205, 206, 223, 224, 244 – harmonic, 216–219
House-monotone, 170, 171, 226, 234, 241 Measures of inequity, 208–211, 231
Huntington, E.V., 175 – δ-inequity, 209–213
– ϕ-inequity, 215–217
– ρ-inequity, 209–211, 213–215
I Measures of inequity (monotone, symmetric), 208
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), Membership index of a voter, 147
55–59, 64, 65, 68, 70, 72, 74, 75, 111, 113 Modified quota, 176, 177, 180, 183, 185, 190,
Indifference, 8, 41, 52, 60–62, 65–68, 79–114 208, 226
Inferior, 31, 60, 61 Modified divisor, 176–178, 180, 183, 184, 186,
Initial allocation, 164–172, 174, 175, 244, 245, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195–198, 208, 223
248, 256 Monotone (rounding rule), 176, 226
Intensity of preference, 56 Monotonicity (of a two-alternative rule), 66, 67
Irrelevant alternative, 44, 46, 56, 75 Monotonicity social choice procedure, 20
J N
Jason–Linusson example, 244 Nader, R., 5
Jefferson, T., 21, 175 Natural divisor, 159, 160, 162, 165, 169–171,
Jefferson’s procedure, 175, 177–186, 188, 190, 173, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182–184, 186,
191, 193, 219, 221, 229, 230, 245, 250 188–191, 193–199, 203–206, 208, 222–227,
– rounding rule of, 177 229–231, 233, 235, 250, 254–256
– threshold divisors, 181–184, 188 Natural (exact) quota, 159
263
Index
Nearly λ-blocking set of voters, 75 – procedures, 162, 166–175, 206, 207, 225, 226,
Nearly λ-decisive set of voters, 69, 73, 74, 78 234, 241, 245, 248
Neutrality (of a two-alternative rule), 66, 67 – rule, 163, 179, 180, 185, 186, 192, 197, 198,
Neutral social choice function, 101 206, 224, 230, 231, 234, 235, 237, 239–241
n-trade-robust, 148 – solution, 163–166, 173, 174, 256
– upper natural, 163, 174, 178, 179, 185, 192,
O 230, 248
Oligarchy, 74–78, 112 – in yes-no voting, 116, 119–128, 131–133, 140,
One-by-one seat apportionment, 233–235 144, 145, 148–150, 153–157
Quota-divisor procedures, 234–250
P
Pareto dominated, 31, 110, 251, 252 R
Pareto inferior/superior, 31 Ranking, 34, 45, 46, 50, 52–69, 74, 79, 80, 84,
Pareto, V., 30 89, 90, 93–104, 111, 252
Parity of Banzhaf scores, 122–123 Restricting the domain, 61
Per capita representation, 207, 209, 215, 216,
231, 232 S
Permutation, 66, 67, 95–97, 128–131, 133–138, Satisfies lower quota, 238
140–142, 144, 154, 155 Satisfies upper quota, 238
Pivotal voter, 129, 130, 133, 140, 154, 155 Scoring procedure, 41–52, 79
Plurality, 2–4, 6–9, 13, 14, 17, 19–21, 24, 26, 37, Semi ranking, 52–55, 57, 59–62, 65, 74, 111
42, 52, 79, 81, 103, 104, 106, 164, 251 Semi social welfare function, 52, 57–60, 64,
Plurality procedure, 3–6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 20, 25, 26, 68–70, 74–77, 112
31, 42, 48, 79, 81, 92, 105, 107, 108 Sen, A., 61
+/− table, 118–122, 125, 127, 131, 138 Shapley–Shubik distribution of power, 130, 131,
Population monotone, 172, 174, 226, 241 155
Population paradox, 172 Shapley–Shubik index of power, 128–132
Proof of Arrow’s (impossibility) theorem, 68, 69 Shapley–Shubik score, 130, 133, 138, 141, 142,
Proper divisors, 176–184, 186, 188–192, 195, 144
196, 198, 203–208, 213, 214, 221, 223–230, Singly monotone, 20, 112
245, 246, 250 Social choice, 1–115, 252
Proper subcoalition, 116, 156 – procedure (function), 1, 3, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24,
Proper supercoalition, 116, 156 26, 28, 31, 41, 79–115
Proportional representation, 163, 164 – set, 1, 20, 26, 27, 31, 52, 79, 83, 88–93, 97,
100, 104, 107, 108, 111, 113, 114, 252
Q Stable social choice function, 93
Quasi ranking, 74 State (poor, rich), 207–212, 214, 216, 217, 250
Quasi social welfare function, 74 Stays within quota, 163
Quasi transitive, 74 Strategic voting, 45
Quota Strategy-proof social choice function, 93, 102
– apportionment, 164, 165, 173, 243 Strong Condorcet loser, 85, 86, 88–91, 113,
– lower natural, 163–166, 174, 178, 186, 192, 252
230, 248 Strong dictator, 65, 68
– modified, 176, 177, 180, 183, 185, 190, 208, Subcoalition, 116, 121, 128, 156
226 Supercoalition, 116, 121, 156
– natural, 160–172, 174, 176–180, 185, 186, Superior, 31, 60, 61, 133
191–193, 198, 199, 206–208, 224, 225, 230, Surplus seats, 164–175, 182–184, 197, 198, 205,
233, 235, 236, 238, 244, 248, 256 207, 227, 228, 233, 244, 245, 248, 257
264 Index
T W
Taylor, A.D., 118, 144, 148–150, 152 Washington, G., 175
Threshold (critical) divisors, 183 Weak Condorcet winner, 84–91, 113, 252
Tied winners, 1, 6, 11, 24 Weakly Pareto efficient social choice function,
Trade-equivalence class, 147, 157 31, 108
Trade-equivalent, 147–149 Weak Pareto condition, 68
Trade-robust, 147–152 Weak preference, 60
Trades among coalitions, 146–147 Webster, D., 175, 192, 223, 225, 229–231, 246,
Transitive, 60–62, 64, 65, 68, 74 250
Two-alternative majority rule, 21, 28, 35, 41, 52, Webster’s procedure, 175, 192–200, 203, 208,
62, 64–67, 81, 86, 107 211–213, 215, 218, 219, 229–231, 233, 245
Two-alternative rule, 65–67 – rounding rule of, 192, 193, 213, 218
– threshold divisors, 195–197, 244
U Weighted/weightable yes-no voting system, 116,
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 115, 126, 140, 144–157
157 Weight of a coalition, 139, 147
2000 Unites States Presidential Election, 4–6 Winner, 1, 3–30, 34–36, 42–54, 62, 67, 79, 81,
Unrestricted domain, 68, 71–77 84–91, 98–102, 104–109, 111–113, 251, 252
Upper natural quota, 163, 174, 178, 179, 185, Winning coalition, 116–126, 128, 129, 132,
192, 230, 248 137–146, 149–151, 153–156
Winning set of alternatives, 79
V
Veto power, 115, 121, 125–128, 131, 140–142, Y
153–155, 157, 253 Young, H.P., 172, 174, 227, 234, 237
Veto-powered voter, 139–144, 252–254
Violates lower quota, 163, 229, 240, 241, 2339 Z
Violates upper quota, 229 Zwicker, W.S., 144, 149, 150, 152

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Compact Textbooks in Mathematics

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/

ISSN 2296-4568 ISSN 2296-455X (electronic)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019935503

Mathematics Subject Classification: 91-01, 91B12, 91F10

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

This book is published under the imprint Birkhäuser, www.birkhauser-science.com by the

Until recently, the mathematical content of the social sciences undergraduate

Developed by economists and political scientists with contributions by

on the manipulability of social choice functions that satisfy the Condorcet

4. Landmark theorems are presented in this book, with fully detailed,

Washington, DC, USA Sherif El-Helaly

I would like to express my gratitude to:

I am also grateful to my wife Afaf for her patience and support.

1.6.3 The Social Choice Set of the Hare–Borda Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

2 Yes-No Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

3.4.2 Jefferson’s Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Answers to Selected Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Precise definitions of these two concepts will be given in Sect. 1.7.

The number of voters in Ai is greater than half of the total vote.

A candidate who is voted for by a majority set of voters is said to be a majority

In Scenario 1 above, a is a plurality candidate but not a majority candidate. In

in fact, a majority candidate.

1.1.2 The Plurality Procedure

1.1.3 The 2000 US Presidential Election and the Shortcomings

Candidate Total vote % Party

2, 981, 556 − 2, 912, 253 = 69, 303

1.2 Elimination Procedures

⊡ Fig. 1.1 Elimination procedures

1.2.2 The Hare Procedure

Introduced in 1861 by Thomas Hare (a British law scholar), this procedure is a

1.2.3 The Coombs Procedure

Solution The 53 preference ballots are:

Step 1. c is the first choice of 8 + 6 + 5 = 19 voters and d is the first choice of 10 + 7 +

and a emerges as the winner.

and a emerges as the winner.

1.2.5 Dealing with Non-monotonicity

1.3 Condorcet Ideas and Related Procedures

1.3.1 The Condorcet Tournament

Marquis de Condorcet, an eighteenth century French philosopher, mathematician, and

1.3.2 Condorcet Winner and Condorcet Loser

⊡ Fig. 1.2 Graph representations for Example 1.3.1

1.3.3 Condorcet Winner vs Majority Candidate

ⓘ Remark 1.3.3 It is important to note that

Scenario Condorcet W Condorcet L Plurality W Hare W Coombs W

This motivates the following definitions.

1.3.4 The Condorcet Criteria

Find the winning alternative if the agenda is:

Alternative a wins if the agenda is bdca.

1.3.6 Weak Pareto Efficiency

Solution Alternative d is Pareto dominated since it is Pareto inferior to a. We indicate this

ⓘ Remark 1.3.14 It is important to note the difference between a Condorcet loser

1.3.7 Killer Amendment

The status quo a: Vegetarian pizza.

Solution The preferences in the four cases above are as follows:

The graph representations of the Condorcet tournaments are as follows:

Example 1.3.17 (1.3.16 Generalized)

The preferences are now as follows.

(λ)/{x, y} = λ(/{x, y}).

(λ)/{x, y} = (λ)/{x, y}.

and so (μ)/{c, d} = μ(/{c, d}).

which proves that b →μ c. We also get