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The Emergence of Third-Century

Equestrian Military Commanders (*)

In the mid-third century equestrians assumed a powerful military office.

the position of legionary commander. Since the founding of the Principate
by Augustus, it had been a long venerated tradition that only senators com-
manded the legions. It was important to the Emperors that senatorial privi-
leges be recognized; they were for nearly three hundred years. But in the
reign of Gallienus these legati legionum were replaced by equestrian prae-
fecti legionum. It is the purpose of this article to examine why this step was
taken.

Although Gallienus alteration was radical, it is important to recognize

that his reform had historical precedents. Gallienus could look to the long
established practice whereby equestrian praefecti were temporarily military
governors in recently conquered areas, and acted as intermediaries to pacify
a region before civil government was installed. These praefecti differed from
those of Gallienus in that they were governors, and not legionary com-
manders. Nonetheless, they were a legal precedent. In Gallienus' reign
nearly all provinces were either overrun or threatened. Many of his praefecti
were intermediaries who restored order until civil rule could be firmly esta-
blished.

Gallienus, however, could look to a far better prototype. For example, as

successor to the Ptolemies Augustus treated Egypt as his own personal
realm ('). He assigned its administration to equites jealously excluding
senators (2). The position of legionary commander for Egypt was held by a

(*) This article, with some minor alterations, was Chapter II of my Doctoral thesis, ac-
cepted at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor). August 18, 1974.
(1) Cf. J. LESQUIER. L'armée romaine d'Egypte d'Auguste à Diocletien in Mémoires de
l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire, fasc. 141. Le Caire, 1918, p. 115-120;
A. VON DOMASZEWSKI. Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres. Bonn, 1908, reissued. with
introduction by B. DOBSON, Cologne, 1967, p. 121.
(2) Cf. O. W. REINMUTH. The Prefect of Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian, Berlin,
1935, p. v R. SYME. The Roman Revolution, Oxford, 1939 (reprint ed., Oxford, 1960),
p. 300.
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knight, with the title praefectus legionis. Gallienus would extend this prin-
ciple to the rest of the empire.
It was, however, Septimius Severus who took the first real step in ex-
tending the Egyptian military system to other provinces. In 197 he formed
three new legions, I and III Parthica, camped at the Alban mount, quite
near Rome. Instead of the traditional legati Septimius placed praefecti in
charge of these legions (3). This alteration was a logical outgrowth of
previous equestrian bureaucratization, but Septimius was not the first to
have attempted this change. The praetorian prefect Perennis replaced legati
with praefecti during the uprising of 184 (*). The story, as related in the
Historia Augusta claims that Perennis was executed by Commodus for
initiating such a radical policy (³). Clearly the Historia Augusta was
exaggerating Commodus' concern that only Senators command the legions;
it is far more likely that Perennis was executed because of his rising power.
That the troops were angry with Perennis' innovation suggests that the
equestrian legionary commanders he appointed had been efficient disci-
plinarians. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the reigns of Septimius and
especially of Gallienus, ages of rampant legionary mutiny, such equestrians
would be appointed military officers to restore obedience to the emperor.
The evidence for Gallienus' changes is found in Aurelius Victor, who
roundly condemns their motives:

Et patres quidem commune Romani malum orbis stimulabat, proprii ordinis

contumelia, quia primus ipse, metu socordiae suae, ne imperium ad optimos
nobilium transferretur, senatum militia uetuit et adire exercitum (*).

Because this change is attested only by Aurelius Victor, writing nearly four
generations later, scholarly caution is in order. But he is generally reliable

in his facts, as far as he goes; moreover, he would have had a greater in-
terest in measures which directly affected the senatorial class than many of

(3) Cf. Dio, LV, 24, 4; CIL, III, 99; VIII, 20996; XII, 1856. For discussions ofthis
Severan innovation and its significance, see L. HOMO, Les privilèges administratifs du Sénat
romain sous l'Empire et leur disparition graduelle au cours du IIIe siècle in RHist., 137.
1921. p. 161-203; 138, 1921, p. 1-52; 139, 1921, p. 23-24; W. ENSSLIN in RE, 2.
Reihe, XXII, 2, 1954, s.v. Praefectus legionis, col. 1324-1327.
(4) Cf. SHA. Commodus, 6. 2. For the date of the uprising of these tribes, cf. Dio,
LXXII, 9.
(5) Cf. SHA, Commodus. 6. 2-4.
(6) Cf. Caes., 33, 34. A later reference to this change is found at 37, 5, where Aurelius
Victor discusses Tacitus' reign.
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676 J. OSIER

the other historians of his period (7). Further, a banishment of Senators

from military service best explains the irrational hostility of the sources
toward Gallienus, and is also confirmed by some inscriptions, whose num-
ber is considerable by third century standards (*). Beginning in Gallienus'
reign they attest that equestrian praefecti legionum agens uices legatorum
replaced legati legionum (9). Though this replacement is only attested for
two legions, it can be extended to the others as well. Senatorial legati and
tribuni militum are not found at all after Gallienus' death (1º).
But the Romani malum orbis mentioned by Aurelius Victor is not
decisive in dating the implementation of this policy since disasters followed
one another in rapid succession from A.D.253 onward. First, the Germanic
peoples overran positions on the northern frontiers and penetrated as far as
Gaul (1). Sending Gallienus to restore that province, Valerian himself led
an army to the east to reconquer areas which Shapur I of Persia oc-
cupied (12). After initial successes, Valerian's situation worsened when
Goths swarmed into the province of Asia, wreaking havoc and inciting
terror wherever they advanced ("). Caught in the vise of Goths and Per-
sians, Valerian could expect no help from his son. The coinage suggests
that Gallienus was occupied in Gaul until 259 (14). Consequently,
Valerian's army was not only decisively defeated, but he himself was taken

(7) Cf. B. MALCUS, Notes sur la révolution du système administratif romain au IIIe siècle
in Opuscula Romana, 7, 1969, p. 216. See also C. E. V. NIXON, An Historiographical Study
of the Caesares ofSextus Aurelius Victor, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1971,
p. 415-416, who attests the historicity of these changes and relates them to Victor's interest
in the senatorial order, but who does not give a commentary on 33, 34. Nixon's suggestion
ofa common pool of historical knowledge used subjectively by fourth century historians (p.
330-331), could explain why only Aurelius Victor records Gallienus' banishment of
senators from the military. But M. T. W. ARNHEIM, The Senatorial Aristocracy ofthe Later
Roman Empire, Oxford, 1972, p. 37, rejects these modifications as inventions of Victor,
since they cannot be reconciled with the existence of senatorial governors.
(8) Cf. B. MALCUS, op. cit., p. 216.
(9) Cf. CIL, 3424 (II Adiutrix, reign of Gallienus), 3426 (undated), 3469 (284, /
Adiutrix), 4289 (II Adiutrix, 269); VIII, 2665 (reign of Aurelian), 2685 (undated).
(10) Cf. R. GROSSE, Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der byzan-
tinischen Themenverfassung, Berlin, 1920, p. 4; C. W. KEYES, The Rise of the Equites in
the Third Century of the Roman Empire, Princeton, 1915, p. 33, argues ex silentio that this
factual evidence is so, based on the inscriptional evidence.
(11) Cf. ZoSIMUS. I. 29. 2.
(12) Cf. ZOSIMUS, I, 29, 2-3.
(13) Ibid.

(14) Cf. C. OMAN, On the Coins of Severus and Gallienus Commemorating the Roman
Legions in NumChron., 4th ser., 18, 1918, p. 93.
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THIRD-CENTURY EQUESTRIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS 677

captive by the Persians sometime between 258 and 260 (15). Persian rock
reliefs show that Shapur I considered this a tremendous personal
triumph (16). Simultaneous with his capture, whole regions revolted from
imperial authority and set up their own emperors. In rapid succession
Postumus, Regalianus, Valens, and Calpurnius Piso, as well as
Trebellianus, assumed the purple and led entire provinces away from
Roman rule (1). These secessionist movements, coupled with enemy oc-
cupations of Roman territory, left little for Gallienus to rule when he
became sole emperor around 260.
An exact dating of Gallienus "edict" is hypothetical. Homo, however,
dates Gallienus removal of senators from the military to the spring of
261 (1). Nevertheless, it is logical to assume that he instituted this change
within the first three years of his reign when the conditions of anarchy and
strife were at their height. The fragmented empire was weakened further by
the Alamanni's penetration as far as Milan in 261 (19). The panic in Rome
must have been great before Gallienus repulsed these invaders (20). More-
over, the cost of maintaining the military operations needed to defend the
empire was becoming increasingly prohibitive; the coinage, which had been
unstable throughout the third century, was debased even more, so that the
troops could be paid (21). The resultant inflation compelled the government
to levy goods and services in lieu of coined money in either partial or full
payment of taxes (22). Thus, the state could increasingly tax the less privi-
leged, who had never possessed much currency. Since the officials of the
civil service continued to be paid in currency, the purchasing power of their
salaries was reduced (23). The disruption of agriculture caused by the enemy

(15) Most scholars agree with that range of dates for his capture. For full citations of
sources, cf. G. LOPUSZANSKI, La date de la capture de Valérien et la chronologie des Em-
pereurs gaulois in Cahiers de l'Institut d'études polonaises en Belgique. 9, 1951, p. 3-5, who
dates the capture to between September 259 and September 260.
(16) Cf. B. C. MACDERMOTT, Roman Emperors in the Sassanian Reliefs in JRS. 44.
1954. p. 78-80, who reinterpreted the figures on the relief.
(17) Cf. SHA. Gallieni, 1, 2-5 Tyranni. 3: 9; 10; 12: 19: 21.
(18) See note 3 supra: L. HOMO, p. 19-20.
(19) Cf. ZoSIMUS, 1, 37 and ZONARAS. XII, 24.
(20) Ibid.

(21) For a table showing the debasement throughout the third century see P. OLIVA, Pan-
nonia at the Onset of the Crisis in the Roman Empire. trans. I. URWIN, Prague. 1962.
p. 102; cf. S. BOLIN. State and Currency in the Roman Empire. Stockholm. 1958. p. 248-
290.

(22) Cf. A. H. M. JONES, Inflation under the Roman Empire in Economic Historical
Review. 5, 1953, p. 317.
(23) Ibid.
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678 J. OSIER

invasions also contributed to a lowering of Roman morale (24). The pinnacle

of these mounting disasters was reached in 262 when the worst plague in
Roman history erupted, spread by Valerian's troops returning from the
east (25). The ancient sources agree that the plague produced enormous
casualties (26). Such crises demanded radical solution if the empire was to
survive.

These emergencies forced Gallienus to attempt reform in that sphere

most vital to the survival of the empire, the military. Aurelius Victor im-
plies that Gallienus' reorganization of legionary commands was an overt at-
tack on the Senate, but his interpretation was biased by his own conception
of history, that good and bad emperors were so measured by what they did
for the Senate (27). This tendency was common among imperial historians,
but it was particularly sharpened in Aurelius Victor's case since the fourth
century witnessed a direct confrontation between Emperor and Senate over
the place of Christianity in the State (28). Gallienus' policy clearly resulted
in a weakening of senatorial military power, but evidence points to other
motives for it.

During this critical period military incompetency became an intolerable

luxery. The Roman military system, as established by Augustus, always had
a pre-eminent weakness; as Parker observes:

"The remarkable feature of the legatus legionis is that it was filled by men of
comparatively little military experience, who retained their appointment for
three or four years. In itself this was necessarily a weakness, and the ill effects
of it are seen in the mutiny on the Rhine and in Pannonia in 14 A.D., and in

(24) On disruption of agriculture, cf. A. E. R. BOAK, Manpower Shortage and the Fall of
the Roman Empire in the West. Ann Arbor. 1955. p. 24.
(25) Cf. ZOSIMUS, I, 36-37 :SHA. Gallieni, 5, 5; EUSEBIUS. HE. VII. 22, 1: CYPRIAN.
De Mortalitate. 14. 16 In Demetriano, 10, 11 PONTIUS, Vita Cypriani. 9: OROSIUS. VII.
21. 4 ZONARAS. XII. 21.
(26) Cf. ZOSIMUS, 1, 26-37, who records five thousand deaths per diem SHA. Gallieni.
5. 5. relates that the plague decimated the population. These sources are not, however, con-
temporary.
(27) Cf. L. DE REGIBUS. La monarchia militare di Gallieno, Recco, 1939, p. 97; cf..
however, the cautions of W. DEN BOER, Some Minor Roman Historians. Leiden. 1972.
p. 25-27. that Aurelius Victor was critical of the third century Senate. But such criticism
need not be incompatible with a pro-senatorial stance, as the writings of Tacitus show. cf.
R. SYME. Ten Studies in Tacitus. Oxford. 1970, p. 1-10.
(28) On this conflict, cf. A. H. M. JONES. The Social Background ofthe Struggle between
Paganism and Christianity in The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth
Century, ed. A. MOMIGLIANO, Oxford, 1963. p. 226-235.
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THIRD-CENTURY EQUESTRIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS 679

the incompetency of generals like Paetus. To some extent also the selection of
senators for the highest command stifled the enterprise of the junior officers,
who could never be promoted to the command of their unit" (").

The desire to recognize senatorial dignitas had been inherent in Augustus

arrangements only if some offices became the prerogative of birth could
the monarchy be accepted (30). But appointing such men legati legionum by
right of birth instead of the result of competition was militarily unwise. For
nearly three hundred years the defect remained virtually undetected, but the
crisis of the mid-third century brought it out in bold relief.
Equestrians, by contrast, were better suited for legionary com-
manderships. They had none of the ancient Republican pretension of

Senators, and enthusiastically embraced the imperial system; the lesser am-
bitions of their order were attractive to emperors who were coming to
demand complete loyalty ("). Advancement in an equestrian cursus was
much more dependent on past performance and fidelity than was the case
with the cursus honorum. For equestrians a career was not so clearly
delineated nor was promotion by any means automatic (32). Beginning with
Hadrian, who instituted an exclusively civilian cursus for knights, military
and civil careers were separated and specialization resulted. Septimius gave
this trend added impetus by elevating many soldiers to equestrian rank. It
was thus possible, if the legionary commander were a knight, to appoint one
who had a long,. distinguished and exclusively military career.
When this possibility of greater equestrian military experience is con-
sidered, Gallienus rationale for breaking with tradition is transparent. Of-
ficers with solid military proficiency would have a better chance of restoring
discipline than senatorial time-servers, who were legionary commanders as
an carly step in a career that comprised major governmental magis-
tracies ("). Senatorial legati legionum had failed utterly in their duty of
keeping the legions loyal. The employment of equestrians in their stead to
enforce military discipline might advance the cause of making the legions
trustworthy. Concern with such a problem must be supposed in a century in

(29) Cf. H. M. D. PARKER. The Roman Legions, rev. ed.. New York, 1961. p. 188.
(30) See note 27 supra: R. SYME, op. cit., p. 121.
(31) Cf. H.-G. PFLAUM. Les procurateurs équestres sous le haut-empire romain, Paris,
1950, p. 214, who gave a good discussion.
(32) Cf. A. STEIN. Der römische Ritterstand. München, 1927, p. 270, who stressed that
advancement was at the pleasure of the emperor.
(33) Cf. B. MALCUS, op. cit., p. 234, who argues that by the third century the troops had
come to ignore the auctoritas of senatorial legati legionum.
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680 J. OSIER

which twenty-two of twenty-six Emperors were murdered as a direct result

of military disorder. Obedience to command also had to be reinstated in or-
der to successfully turn back the foreign invaders.
For an earlier period, Eric Birley notes that equestrians were particularly
competent military officers (3). Although some equestrian officers were
quite young, they were counterbalanced by many who received their initial

appointment as equestrian officers in their fifties; such men were tried

warriors who could promote the smooth running of a legion (3). In the
third century there was an increase of such men entering the ordo equester,
and some of them held the post of praefectus castrorum.
The office of praefectus castrorum had ranked high in the early empire.
Two or more legions were frequently quartered in one camp, and the camp
commandant, the praefectus castrorum, must have enjoyed considerable
power (36). Moreover, the prefect of the camp was sometimes in charge of
other barracks which quartered auxiliary troops on the borders of the em-
pire (37). This office, in fact, ranked higher than the other posts of the
militia equestris and was often held by men who had risen through the
ranks (38). Evidence by analogy with Egypt suggests that the office ofprae-
fectus castrorum increased in rank from the second half of the first century.
By that date this office, in Egypt, had grown to such an extent that it was
mentioned immediately after the praefectus Aegypti in inscriptions (39).
These same inscriptions prove that the praefectus castrorum commanded
auxiliaries (40). After Marcus Aurelius' reign, an officer with this title is no
longer found in Egypt; evidently his title became praefectus legionis, and
he assumed the role of legionary commander (41). Outside of Egypt, begin-
ning with Domitian and culminating with Septimius, the title praefectus
castrorum is dropped for the title praefectus legionis (42). However, unlike
their Egyptian counterparts, these praefecti legionum still remained second
in command to the legati legionum and tribuni militum laticlauii. On ex-

(34) Cf. E. BIRLEY. Roman Britain and the Roman Army: Collected Papers, Kendal,
1961. p. 133-134.
(35) Cf. PLINIUS. Epist., VII, 31: FRONTINUS, Stratagemata, IV, 1. 28.
(36) Cf. SUETONIUS. Domitian, 7.
(37) Cf. TACITUS. Annales, 1, 33; VELLEIUS PATERCULUS. II. 120; Dio. LV. 33.
(38) Cf. CIL. III, 381 IX. 798, 3672: X. 1262 XI, 1056; XII. 4230.
(39) Cf. CIL, III, 13580 (A.D. 90); 11, 6025 (A.D. 140), 14147 (around A.D. 150).
14147 (around A.D. 175).
(40) Cf. CIL. 14147 supra.
(41) See note 10 supra.
(42) See note 1 supra; J. LESQUIER, op. cit., p. 125.
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THIRD-CENTURY EQUESTRIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS 681

traordinary occasions praefecti (castrorum) legionum assumed command of

a legion for legati (4). In the third century Gallienus simply elevated these
praefecti to the commandership of the legions in all parts of the empire.
Keyes, however, argues that the office of praefectus castrorum was much
too low for such advancement and that, in fact, this office continued to

exist, but with the title praefectus legionis. First, he contends that the high
rank of praefectus castrorum was lowered by Claudius' institution of the
militia equestris. His argument runs that the primipili, who normally
became praefecti castrorum after holding the offices of praefectus cohortis.
tribunus legionis, or praefectus alae, now became tribunes of the city forces
instead (44). In their places younger equestrians, who now exclusively filled
the offices of the militia equestris, became praefecti castrorum (45). How-
ever, there is no evidence that Claudius intended to advance those who

completed the militia equestris to the office of praefectus castrorum, nor

does epigraphy attest that less experienced men began to hold the office (46).
Keyes' contention that praefecti castrorum are no longer found com-
manding auxiliary troops on the frontiers demands additional positive
evidence if his thesis is to be accepted (47). Moreover, Domitian introduced
changes permitting no more than one legion to a camp, thus subordinating
the praefectus castrorum to a legion, not a camp ("). But far from lowering
the rank of this prefect, as Keyes contends, he was still the ranking eques-
trian officer (49).

Another, even weaker argument is adduced by Keyes to show that the of

fice of praefectus (castrorum) legionis continued to be low in rank after
Gallienus ouster of senators from the military. He cites a long inscription
restored by Domaszewski which, to his mind, contains two praefecti
legionum, one lower in rank than the other (50). But the occurrence of the

higher ranking praefectura is not necessarily proven by the inscription, as

(43) Cf. TACITUS. Annales. XIV, 37; Historiae, II, 19.

(44) Cf. KEYES. op. cit., p. 202-205. Full citation is given above; cf. H. MATTINGLY.
The Imperial Civil Service of Rome. Cambridge, 1910, p. 66-68.
(45) See note 39 above for citation of classical evidence.
(46) Cf. SUETONIUS. Claudius. 25. does not support this contention.
(47) Cf. CIL. III. 381; IX. 789, 3672; X, 1262; XI. 1056; XII. 4230 for his evidence.
(48) Cf. SUETONIUS, Domitian. 7.
(49) Cf. L. DE REGIBUS. Le riforme militari dell' Imperatore Gallieno in Historia, 9,
1935. p. 452, and R. CAGNAT. L'armée romaine d'Afrique et l'occupation militaire de
l'Afrique sous les Empereurs. Paris, 1892, p. 182, give contrary arguments.
(50) CIL. XI. 1836. to my mind. however. vindicates Keyes thesis.
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682 J. OSIER

Keyes himself reluctantly admitted, for the restoration reads douxnvap(Lov)

Exaloxov deyiwvos...] (1). Further, this inscription, definitely dated to
Gallienus reign (52), does not contain the Greek equivalent phrase agens
uices legati. In other inscriptions this phrase does not drop out until
Aurelian's reign (5). Perhaps the reference is not to a praefectus legionis at
all the earlier reference to agens uices legati (54), which also has no
qualifying phrase may allude to another type of praefectura. Other
restorations are certainly possible; in any event, such tenuous argumen-
tation from a single, largely restored inscription, is no serious obstacle to
the argument that the praefectus legionis was of high rank. By Aurelian's
reign, nonetheless, the title praefectus legionis was firmly established, thus
proving that an equestrian cursus leading to a legionary commandership
had been established ("). Debasement of the coinage is certainly the key to
understanding such elevation (56). However, he did not adduce enough
evidence.

Keyes cites Vegetius, a fourth to fifth century military historian, to show

that the praefectus legionis and the praefectus castrorum existed simul-
taneously. But this is not the conclusive evidence that prima facie it may
appear. Vegetius clearly distinguished the praefectus legionis from the prae-
fectus castrorum, which title had dropped out of inscriptions by Septimius'
reign, and maintains that the praefectus legionis commanded the legion
whenever the legatus legionis was incapacitated (57). However, it is difficult
to determine to what period Vegetius is referring. He uses the past tense,
but his mention of legati as first in command dates the passage pre-
Gallienus. Before that date there is no evidence that each legion had both a
praefectus legionis as well as a praefectus castrorum. Therefore Vegetius,
not a military man himself, is confounding the development; this is not
surprising when it is realized that in describing the legion of his own day he

(51) Cf. KEYES' comments on p. 40: "But even if this is not true, we can be fairly cer-
tain from the silence of the inscriptions that the honor was not granted very widely, and was
not extended outside Italy before Gallienus' reign as sole Emperor". Recent archaeological
evidence certainly proves a nearly equal distribution of Latin and Greek inscriptions
throughout the empire.
(52) See note 38 above.
(53) See note 9 above.
(54) E.g. praefectus legionis II Parthicae.
(55) The first inscription without the phrase agens uices legati is CIL. VIII. 2665
(A.D. 270-275).
(56) Cf. S. BOLIN, loc. cit.

(57) Cf. VEGETIUS, II, 9-11.

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THIRD-CENTURY EQUESTRIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS 683

makes the blatant error of having it contain 6,000, rather than 1,500 (").
Vegetius is hardly proof that the praefectus castrorum continued to exist af-
ter Gallienus reign.

Moreover, Keyes' argument for the existence of two essentially different

offices with the exact title in every legion is an anomaly that cannot easily
be explained away. His feeble attempt is to contend that the qualifying
phrase agens uices legati distinguishes the office of praefectus legionis from
that of camp commandant (59). Even if this fact were granted, why would
the same phrase be used to qualify a prefect of Legio II Parthica, an exam-
ple that is found but once for the Parthian legions (60)? The use of this
phrase has other purposes. It indicates a reluctance to break totally with
tradition. The myth is created that the position is still rightfully that of a
Senator, suggesting that the change was introduced gradually and
cautiously, by analogy with similar alterations a propos governorships ("").
As Augustus initiation of the Principate showed, Romans only accepted
changes which in appearance did not violate the mos maiorum. Gallienus
made it appear that the ordo senatorius was not really ousted from the
military by using this phrase.
Another change instituted by Gallienus suggests his concern with
military efficiency. He established the independent unit equites Dal-
matae (62). From this fact it appears likely that he began detaching other
cavalry units from legionary organization; a later line of development can
be seen in Aurelian's promoti and Constantine's comitatenses, which
separated mobile units from frontier troops (63). The frontiers were so ex-
tensive and the Roman army so small, by modern standars, that the entire
area could not be guarded. A force of troops which could be rapidly
mobilized to any part of the empire was essential in a period of enemy in-
vasions. A mounted detachment of soldiers such as the equites Dalmatae
served this purpose admirably. The importance that Gallienus gave this
detachment is shown by the fact that Aureolus, its commander, became

(58) Cf. C. OMAN, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, A.D. 378-1515, rev. by J. H.
BEELER. Ithaca. 1968, p. 7-9, who cited this example and had a generally low opinion of
Vegetius accuracy as a historian.
(59) Cf. C. W. KEYES, op. cit., p. 35.
(60) Cf. CIL, III, 99 XIII, 1856, where uice legati are not mentioned.
(61) Cf. L. DE REGIBUS. La monarchia militare di Gallieno, p. 73.
(62) Cf. ZOSIMUS, 1. 40, 2: SHA. Gallieni, 14, 4, 9.
(63) Cf. L. DE REGIBUS, op. cit., p. 100.
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684 J. OSIER

powerful enough to challenge him (64). It was symptomatic of the rising

power of the equestrian order that only knights could be generals of the
Dalmatian cavalry.
Equites also came to control other detachments of troops. These were
called uexillationes, or units temporarily forming an independent command.
In the early Empire the uexillatio contained an indefinite number of men,
but its size naturally designated the rank of its commander; for example.
small divisions were put under the command of mere legionary cen-
turions (6). During Hadrian's reign a force of tres uexillationes milliariae is
found commanded by only a primipilus (66). But in the late second and early
third centuries uexillationes were used much more frequently in war because
of their particular utility. An army of considerable size could be raised
without greatly weakening the garrison of any part of the empire (67). These
uexillationes were unified under a commander of higher rank than
previously inscriptional evidence attests that this commander, called dux
or praepositus uexillationum, was usually a senator, holding the post right
after that of legatus legionis (68). Later in the third century the epigraphic
evidence suggests that equestrians replaced these senatorial com-
manders (69). This policy would be in keeping with Gallienus so-called
edict barring senators from military service.
These praepositi and duces gradually became more powerful as they com-
mand larger numbers of troops. Not only might a dux command several
uexillationes but a number of legions as well. For example, the dux ripae of
Dura Europus held such an extraordinary command in the joint reign of
Valerian and Gallienus, although he did not have increased military juris-
diction (70). From Gallienus' reign onward other extraordinary commands
like dux Illyrici and dux totius Orientis appear ("). The growth of these
commands no doubt encouraged Diocletian to establish independent duces
with absolute military jurisdiction in order to destroy the old concept of im-

(64) Cf. SHA. Gallieni. 2. 6. 3. 1; 14, 6-7 Tyranni, 11. 1. 12. 2.

(65) Cf. CIL, III, 1890, 14370, 14433.
(66) Cf. CIL, X. 5829.
(67) Cf. C. W. KEYES, op. cit., p. 44-45.
(68) Cf. CIL. IX. 2459; VI. 1408, 1409; III, 10471 VIII, 7978, 3387, 905, 3745.
5349.
(69) Cf. CIL, XII, 2228.
(70) Cf. J. F. GILLIAM. The Dux Ripae at Dura in TAPA, 72. 1941. p. 163. for this
assertion.

(71) Cf. CIL. VI. 31856, 1638; III, 3228; XII, 2228.
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THIRD-CENTURY EQUESTRIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS 685

perium, to his mind the prime source of fifty years of military anarchy (72).
Surely Gallienus desired that his military reorganization would prevent
revolts. In making the legions more efficient by advancing experienced
equestrians to legionary commanderships, he made concessions to the very
body which might overthrow him. But his dilemma was not entirely ofhis
own making. The growing localism of the legions greatly contributed to the
military anarchy of the period. This tendency began as early as Hadrian,
with his introduction of local recruitment ("). Septimius intensified this
trend by allowing soldiers to marry legally; later, Severus Alexander gran-
ted soldiers land near their posts (74). These acts attached the troops to their
regions rather than to the empire. A. R. Hands observed:

"It was ... in part the multiplicity of the military threat from outside in con-
junction with the local interests of the armies which in large measure gave rise
to the growing practice (not just a game) of Emperor-making within the Em-
pire" (75).

In other words, the attachment of soldiers to their castella and uici con-

tributed to a breakdown of imperial unity. Gallienus realized that it must be

preserved for the elitist power structure to endure.
To effectively deal with the problem of anarchy, this regional attachment
of the military would have to be destroyed. Gallienus never successfully
came to grips with this problem. Instead he placed his faith in his legionary
commanders, as evidenced by enrolling them in his newly instituted body-
guard, the protectores diuini lateris (76). He intended to establish a close
bond between the military commanders and the Emperor, but this desired

loyalty was not achieved. He died fighting an usurper. Military anarchy

continued throughout the period, as unabated as ever.
At such a time of crisis, Gallienus needed to appeal to an interest group

(72) See J. F. GILLIAM, loc. cit.

(73) Cf. SHA, Aurelianus. 18. 1. for Aurelian's cavalry command: Claudius. 15. 2. for
Claudius' title of dux Illyrici; ZONARAS, XII, 23-24, for the personage Odenathus, who
had, however, achieved senatorial rank: ZoSIMUS, 1, 66, I and SHA. Firmus. 7. for Satur
ninus, a knight, who held the office ducatus totius Orientis. For other duces, see CIL. II.
4114 VI. 1450. 1408. 1409, 1645; V, 3229. On Gallienus praetorian prefect Hera-
clianus, who had been a dux. cf. G. M. BERSANETTI. Eracliano, prefetto di pretorio di
Gallieno in Epigraphica. 4. 1942. p. 172. for ancient evidence.
(74) Cf. HERODIANUS, III, 8, 5: SHA. Alexander. 78. 3-5.
(75) Cf. A. R. HANDS. The Fall of the Roman Empire in the West: a Case ofSuicide or
Force Majeure in Greece and Rome, 10, 1963, p. 161.
(76) Cf. B. MALCUS, op. cit., p. 216.
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686 J. OSIER

which could support him. The Balkan area contained the only large forces
left to him at his accession. While this region increased in importance with
the third century invasions, few of its natives were senators ("). Instead,
many of the Illyrian élite became knights ("). One reason Gallienus made
military commanderships exclusively equestrian was to appeal to this
group (79). Consequently, Gallienus' changes gave impetus to the rise of
successful equestrian general from this area, like Aurelian, Claudius
Gothicus and Probus. But a soldier from any part of the empire could hope
to rise to a military command under Gallienus (80). Such men saved the em-
pire from falling in the third century, they did not ruin it ($1). For all the
obvious bias of the sources against Gallienus, his new organization brought
steady military victories, though hardly spectacular ones (32). In 262-263
he returned to Gaul and enjoyed moderate success against Postumus (83).
Going east, he restored order at Byzantium in 263 (4). He raised
Odenathus of Palmyra to the position of dux orientis with powerful, albeit
circumscribed, authority to combat the Sassanians and put down the
secessionist movement (85). By 262 Odenathus had reconquered most of the
east, though Palmyra later created an imperium orientis (86). Gallienus him-
self went to Thrace in 267 to campaign against the Goths but died a year
later fighting Aureolus at Milan ("). His Illyrian successors restored the
splintered empire by Aurelian's death in 275.
Gallienus' system was successful because it promoted men of proven
ability, talent, and loyalty to the highest military posts. The spectre of civil
war was never totally diminished by Gallienus, or any of his successors, for

(77) Cf. P. OLIVA, op. cit., p. 102.

(78) Cf. A. STEIN. Der römische Ritterstand. München. 1927, p. 416.
(79) Cf. G. BARBIERI, L'Albo senatorio da Settimio Severo a Carino (193-284). Roma.
1952. p. 458.
(80) See note 61 above.
(81) Cf. L. DE REGIBUS, op. cit., p. 74; contra. G. FERRERO. The Ruin of Ancient
Civilization and the Triumph of Christianity, transl. by Lady WHITEHEAD. New York and
London. 1921, p. 33-34.
(82) Modern scholarship is rehabilitating the reputation of Gallienus. Cf. the works cited
in the bibliography of A. ALFÖLDI's Studien zur Geschichte der Weltkrise des 3. Jahr-
hunderts nach Christus, Darmstadt. 1967.
(83) Cf. SHA. Tyranni. 4. 6. 6. 2; 7. 1.
(84) Cf. SHA. Gallieni, 7. 2.
(85) Cf. ZONARAS. XII. 23.

(86) Cf. SHA. Gallieni, 3, 1-5; Tyranni. 14, 1-2, 15. 3; 18, 13: ZONARAS, XII. 25.
(87) Cf. G. BARBIERI, Morte e consacrazione di Gallieno in Studi italiani di filologia
classica, 11, 1934, p. 4-8, for a good discussion and citation of sources.
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THIRD-CENTURY EQUESTRIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS 687

the military had become too powerful. For his own survival as well as that
of the empire, Gallienus had to rely heavily on the troops. By raising eques-
trians to the highest military commands, he assured the restoration of the
empire, even at the expense of his own and future emperors' security.

John OSIER.