"Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All"

"Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All"
Author(s): Judith Butler

Source: Yale French Studies, No. 88, Depositions: Althusser, Balibar, Macherey, and the Labor of
Reading (1995), pp. 6-26
Published by: Yale University Press
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JUDITH BUTLER
"Conscience Doth Make Subjects

ofUs All"'
Althusser'sdoctrineofinterpellation continuesto structure contem-

porarydebateon subjectformation, offeringa wayto accountforhowa
subjectcomes intobeingafterlanguage,but alwayswithinits terms.
The theoryofinterpellation appearsto stagea social scenein whicha
subjectis hailed,thesubjectturnsaround,and thenacceptstheterms
bywhichhe or she is hailed.This is, no doubt,a scenebothpunitive
and reduced,forthe call is made by an officer of "the Law" and this
officeris cast as singularand speaking.Clearlywe mightobjectthat
the"call" arrivesseverallyandin implicitandunspokenways,thatthe
sceneis neverquiteas dyadicas Althusserclaims,buttheseobjections
have been rehearsed,and "interpellation" as a doctrinecontinuesto
surviveits critique.Ifwe acceptthatthesceneis exemplaryand alle-
gorical,thenitneverneedstohappenforitseffectivity tobe presumed.
Indeed,ifit is allegoricalin Benjamin'ssense,thentheprocessliter-
alizedbytheallegoryis preciselythatwhichresistsnarration, thatis,
that exceeds the narrativizability of events.2Interpellation,in this
account,is notan event,buta certainwayofstagingthecall,wherethe
call,as staged,becomesdeliteralizedin thecourseofits expositionor
Darstellung.The call itselfis also figuredas a demandto alignoneself
withthe law,a turningaround(to facethe law,to finda faceforthe
law?),and an entranceinto the languageof self-ascription-"HereI
am"-through theappropriation ofguilt.
Whyis itthatsubjectformation appearstotakeplaceonlyuponthe
Hamlet,act3, scene 1.
1. Shakespeare,
2. See WalterBenjamin,On the Originsof GermanTragicDrama, trans.Peter
Osborne(Cambridge: MIT Press,1987).
YFS 88,Depositions,ed. Lezra,? 1995byYale University.
JUDITH BUTLER 7
acceptanceofguilt,thatthereis no "I" who mightascribea place to
itself,who might be announced in speech, without firsta self-
attribution ofguilt,a submissionto thelaw throughan acceptanceof
its demandforconformity? The one who turnsaroundin responseto
the call does not respondto a demandto turnaround.The turning
aroundis an act thatis, as it were,conditionedbothbythe"voice" of
the law and by the responsiveness ofthe one hailed by the law. The
"turningaround"is a strangesortofmiddle-ground (takingplace,per-
haps,in a strangesortof"middle-voice"3) thatis determined bothby
thelaw and theaddressee,butbyneitherunilaterally orexhaustively.
Althoughtherewouldbe no turningaroundwithoutfirsthavingbeen
hailed,neitherwouldtherebe a turningaroundwithoutsome readi-
ness to turn.Butwhereand whendoes thecallingofthename solicit
theturningaround,theanticipatory movetowardidentity?How and
why does the subject turn,anticipatingthe conferralof identity
throughthe self-ascription of guilt?What kind of relationalready
bindsthesetwosuchthatthesubjectknowstoturn,knowsthatsome-
thingis to be gainedfromsuch a turn?How mightwe thinkofthis
"turn"as priorto subjectformation, a priorcomplicitywiththe law
withoutwhichno subjectemerges?The turntowardthelaw is thusat
once a turnagainstoneself,the turningback on oneselfthatconsti-
tutes the movementof conscience.But how is it that the reflexof
conscienceis preciselywhatparalyzesthecriticalinterrogation ofthe
law at thesame timethatit figuresthesubject'suncriticalrelationto
the law as a conditionof subjectivation? The one addressedis com-
pelledto turntowardthelaw priorto anypossibilityofaskinga set of
criticalquestions:Who is speaking?WhyshouldI turnaround?Why
shouldI acceptthetermsbywhichI am hailed?This meansthat,prior
to any possibilityof a criticalunderstanding of the law, thereis an
opennessorvulnerability tothelaw,exemplified in theturntowardthe
law,in theanticipationofcullingan identitythrough identifyingwith
theone who has brokenthelaw.Indeed,thelaw is brokenpriorto any
possibilityofhavingaccess to it,and so, "guilt"is priorto knowledge
ofthelaw and is, in thissense,alwaysstrangely innocent.The possi-
bilityof a criticalview ofthe law is thuslimitedby what mightbe
understoodas a priordesireforthelaw,a passionatecomplicitywith
law, withoutwhich no subjectcan exist.For the "I" to launch its
critique,it mustfirstunderstand thatthe"I" itselfis dependentupon
3. I thankHaydenWhiteforthissuggestion.
8 Yale FrenchStudies
its complicitousdesireforthelaw forthepossibilityofits own exis-
tence.A criticalreviewofthelaw will not,therefore, undotheforceof
conscienceunlesstheonewhooffers thatcritiqueis willing,as itwere,
to be undonebythecritiquethathe or she performs.
It is importantto rememberthatthe turntowardthe law is not
necessitatedby the hailing;it is compelling,in a less than logical
sense,becauseit promisesidentity. Ifthelaw speaksin thename ofa
self-identicalsubject (Althussercites the utteranceof the Hebrew
God: "I am thatI am"), how is it thatconsciencemightdeliveror
restorea selfto onenesswithitself,to thepostulationofself-identity
thatbecomestheprecondition ofthatlinguisticconsolidation:"Here
I am"?
On theotherhand,howmightwe sitethevulnerability ofsubjecti-
vationpreciselyin thatturn(towardthe law,againstthe self)which
precedesandanticipatestheacceptanceofguilt,a turnthateludessub-
jectivationevenas it conditionsit?How is it thatthis"turn"figuresa
consciencethatmightbe renderedless conscientiousthanAlthusser
wouldrenderit? And how is it thatAlthusser'ssanctification ofthe
sceneofinterpellation makesthepossibilityofbecominga "bad" sub-
ject moreremoteand less incendiary thanit mightverywell be?
The doctrineof interpellation appearsto presupposea priorand
unelaborateddoctrineof conscience,a turningback upon oneselfin
the sense thatNietzschedescribedin On the GenealogyofMorals.4
And this readinessto acceptguiltto gain a purchaseon identityis
linkedto a highlyreligiousscenarioofa nominatingcall thatcomes
fromGod andthatconstitutesthesubjectthroughappealingto a need
forthelaw,an originalguiltthatthelaw promisesto assuagethrough
the conferralof identity.How is it thatthis religiousfigurationof
interpellationrestrainsin advanceanypossibilityof a criticalinter-
4. Nietzschedistinguished betweenconscienceandbad consciencein On theGe-

nealogyofMorals,linkingthefirstwiththecapacityto promiseand thesecondto the
problemofinternalization andofdebt.The distinction appearsnottobe sustainedas it
becomesapparentthatthepromising beingcan onlystandforhis/herfuturethrough
firstbecomingregular,thatis, throughtheprocessofinternalizing the law or,to be
precise,"burning it intothewill." Internalization,
introducedin thesecondessay,sec-
tion 16,involvestheturningofthewill (orinstincts)againstitself.In section15,he
introduces freedom as thatwhichturnsagainstitselfin themakingofbad conscience:
"Thisinstinctforfreedom madelatent.. . thisinstinctforfreedom
forcibly pushedback
and repressed,incarcerated withinandfinallyable to dischargeandventitselfonlyon
itself:that,and thatalone,is whatthebad conscienceis in its beginnings" (Friedrich
Nietzsche,On theGenealogyofMorals,trans.WalterKaufmann[NewYork:Vintage,
1969],87).
JUDITH BUTLER 9
ventionin theworkingsofthelaw,theundoingofthesubjectwithout
whichthelaw cannotproceed?
The mentionofconsciencein Althusser's"Ideologyand Ideologi-
cal State Apparatuses"5has receivedlittle criticalattention,even
thoughtheterm,takentogether withtheexampleofreligiousauthor-
ityto illustratetheforceofideology, suggeststhatthetheoryofideol-
ogy is supportedby a complicatedset of theologicalmetaphors.
AlthoughAlthusserexplicitlyintroduces"the Church"merelyas an
exampleofideologicalinterpellation, it appearsthatideologyin his
termscannotbe thoughtexceptthroughthemetaphoricsofreligious
authority. The finalsectionof"Ideology.. . " is entitled"An Example:
The ChristianReligiousIdeology"and makesexplicitthe exemplary
statusthatreligiousinstitutionshave occupiedin theprecedingsec-
tion ofthe essay.Those examplesinclude:theputative"eternity"of
ideology;theexplicitanalogybetweenthe "obviousnessofideology"
andSt Paul'snotionofthe"Logos"in whichwe aresaid to "live,move
and have ourbeing";Pascal'sprayeras an instanceofritualin which
assumingthepostureofkneelinggivesriseovertimeto belief;belief
itselfas theinstitutionallyreproduced conditionofideology;and the
deifying "
capitalizationof Family,""Church,""School,"and " State."
Althoughthelastsectionoftheessayseeksto explicateandexpose
the exampleof religiousauthority, this is not an exposurewith the
powerto defusethe forceof ideology.Althusser'sown writing,he
concedes,invariably enactswhatit thematizes,6 andthuspromisesno
enlightenedescape fromideologythroughthisarticulation.To illus-
tratethe powerof ideologyto constitutesubjects,Althusserseeks
recourseto theexampleofthedivinevoicethatnames,andin naming,
bringsits subjectsintobeing.In claimingthatsocialideologyoperates
in an analogousway,Althusserinadvertently assimilatessocial inter-
pellationto the divineperformative. The exampleof ideologythus
5. LouisAlthusser, "Ideologieet appareilsideologiquesd'etat,"in Positions(Paris:
EditionsSociales,1976),67-126; orin English,"IdeologyandIdeologicalStateAppara-
tuses (Notes Towardan Investigation)," in Lenin and Philosophyand OtherEssays,
trans.BenBrewster (New York:MonthlyReviewPress,1971),127-88.
6. Althusserimplicateshis ownwriting in theversionofideologicalinterpellation
thathe explains:"Itis essentialtorealizethatbothhewhois writing theselinesandthe
readerwho readsthemare themselvessubjects,and therefore ideologicalsubjects(a
tautologicalproposition), i.e. thatthe authorand the readerof theselines bothlive
'spontaneously'or 'naturally'in ideology"("Ideologyand IdeologicalState Appara-
tuses,"171).This remarkis especiallynoteworthy insofaras Althusserpresumesthe
authoritativecapacitiesofthevoice,andinsiststhathis writing, to theextentthatit is
ideological,addressesits readeras woulda voice.
assumes the status of a paradigmforthinkingideologyas such,
wherebytheinevitablestructures ofideologyareestablishedtextually
throughreligiousmetaphor:theauthority ofthe "voice" ofideology,
the"voice" ofinterpellation, is figured as a voicealmostimpossibleto
refuse.The forceof interpellation in Althusseris derivedfromthe
examplesby which it is ostensiblyillustrated,most notably,God's
voice in thenamingofPeter(andMoses) and its secularizationin the
postulatedvoice of the representative of state authority:the police-
man's voice in the hailingofthewaywardpedestrianwith "Hey you
there!"
In otherwords,thedivinepowerofnamingstructures thetheoryof
interpellationthat accountsforthe ideologicalconstitutionof the
subject.Baptismexemplifiesthe linguisticmeans bywhichthe sub-
ject is compelledinto social being.God names "Peter,"and this ad-
dressestablishesGod as theoriginofPeter("Ideology,"177);thename
remainsattachedto Peterpermanently by virtueof the impliedand
continuouspresencein thename oftheone who nameshim.Within
the termsof Althusser'sexamples,however,this namingcannotbe
accomplishedwithouta certainreadinessoranticipatory desireon the
part of theone addressed. To the extent that thenaming an address,
is
thereis alreadyan addressee,priorto the address;but giventhatthe
addressis a name thatcreateswhatit names,thereappearsto be no
"Peter"withoutthe name, "Peter."Indeed,"Peter"does not exist
withoutthenamethatsuppliesthatlinguisticguaranteeofexistence.
In thissense,as a priorand essentialconditionoftheformation ofthe
subject,thereis a certainreadinessto be compelledbythe authorita-
tive interpellation,a readinessthatsuggeststhatone is, as it were,
alreadyin relationto thevoicebeforetheresponse,alreadyimplicated
in thetermsoftheanimatingmisrecognition byan authoritytowhich
one subsequently yields.Orperhapsonehas alreadyyieldedbeforeone
turnsaround,andthatturning is nothingotherthana signofan inevi-
tablesubmissionbywhichoneis establishedas a subjectpositionedin
languageas a possible addressee.In this sense, the scene with the
police is a belatedand redoubledscene, one thatrendersexplicita
foundingsubmissionforwhichno such scenewouldproveadequate.
Forifthatsubmissionis whatbringsthe subjectintobeing,thenthe
narrativethatseeks to tell the storyofthatsubmissioncan proceed
onlythrough exploiting grammar foritsfictionaleffects.
The narrative
thatseeks to accountforhow thesubjectcomesintobeingpresumes
thegrammatical"subject"priorto theaccountofitsgenesis.Andyet,
JUDITH BUTLER 11
the foundingsubmissionthathas not yetresolvedinto the subject
would be preciselythatnonnarrativizable prehistory of the subject,
a paradoxthatcalls theverynarrativeofsubjectformation intoques-
tion.Ifthereis no subjectexceptas a consequenceofthissubjection,
thenarrative thatwouldexplainthisrequiresthatthetemporality not
be true,forthegrammar ofthatnarrativepresupposesthatthereis no
subjectionwithouta subjectwho undergoesit.
Is thisfounding submissiona kindofyieldingpriorto anyquestion
ofpsychologicalmotivation?How are we to understandthe psychic
dispositionatworkat themomentin whichthepedestrian respondsto
thelaw-what conditionsandinforms thatresponse?Whywoulditbe
that the personon the streetrespondsto the "Hey you there!"by
turningaround?Whatis the significance in turningto facethevoice
thatcalls frombehind?This turningtowardthevoice ofthe law is a
signofa certaindesireto be beheldbyand perhapsalso to beholdthe
face of authority,a visual renderingof an auditoryscene-a mirror
stageor,perhapsmoreappropriately, an "acousticmirror"7-thatal-
lows thatmisrecognition withoutwhichthe socialityofthe subject
cannotbe achieved.This subjectivationis, accordingto Althusser,a
misrecognition, a falseandprovisionaltotalization.Whatprecipitates
thisdesireforthelaw,thislureofmisrecognition offeredin therepri-
mand that establishessubordinationas the priceof subjectivation?
This accountappearsto implythat social existence,existenceas a
subject,can be purchasedonlythrougha guiltyembraceof the law,
whereguiltguaranteesthe intervention of the law and, hence, the
continuationofthesubject'sexistence.Ifthesubjectcan onlyassure
his/herexistencein termsofthelaw,and thelaw requiressubjection
forsubjectivation, thenitmaybe,perversely, thatone (alwaysalready)
yieldsto the law in orderto continueto assureone's own existence.
The yieldingto the law mightthenbe readas the compelledconse-
quence ofa narcissisticattachment to one's continuingexistence.
Althussertakes up guiltexplicitlyin the narrative, howeverreli-
7. See Kaja Silverman,TheAcousticMirror:TheFemale Voicein Psychoanalysis

and Cinema(Bloomington: IndianaUniversity notesthe"theo-
Press,1988).Silverman
logical"dimensionofthe"voice-over" infilmthatalwaysescapestheviewer'sgaze(49).
Silvermanalso makesclearthatthevoicerecognized in thecinematicpresentationof
voice is not only the maternalvoice,but a repudiateddimensionof the masculine
subject'sownvoice(80-81).Silverman's analysisshedslighton the"voice"ofideology
insofaras thesubjectwho turnsaroundalreadyknowsthevoiceto whichhe responds,
suggesting an irreducible
ambiguity betweenthe"voice"ofconscienceandthe"voice"
ofthelaw.
able,ofhismurderofhiswifeHelene,inwhichhe recounts,in a telling
reversalofthepolicescenein "Ideology," howhe rushedintothestreet
callingforthepolice in orderto deliverhimselfup to the law.8This
callingforthepolice is a peculiarinversionofhailing,which"Ideol-
ogy"presupposeswithoutexplicitlythematizing. Withoutexploiting
the biographical,I wantto pursuethe theoreticalimportanceofthis
reversalofthe scene withthepolice in whichthe man on the street
calls forthepoliceratherthanresponding tothepolice'scall.In "Ideol-
ogy," guiltandconscienceoperateimplicitly in relationto an ideologi-
cal demand,an animatingreprimand, in theaccountofsubjectforma-
tion.Whatfollowshereis an attemptto rereadthatessayin orderto
understand how interpellation
is essentiallyfiguredthroughthereli-
gious example.The exemplarystatus of religiousauthorityunder-
scoresthe paradoxof how the verypossibilityof subjectformation
dependsupona passionatepursuitofa recognition which,withinthe
termsofthereligiousexample,is inseparablefroma condemnation.
Anotherwayofposingthisquestionis as follows:How is Althus-
ser'stextimplicatedin the"conscience"thatit seeksto explain?And
to whatextentis thepersistenceofthetheologicalmodela symptom,
one thatcompelsa symptomatic reading?In his introductory essayto
Lirele Capital,Althussersuggeststhateverytextmustbe readforthe
"invisible"thatappearswithintheworldthattheoryrendersvisible.9
In a recentconsiderationofAlthusser'snotionof"symptomatic read-
ing,"Jean-Marie Vincentremarksthat"a textis not onlyinteresting
becauseitorganizeslogically,bythearguments itdevelopsin an appar-
entlyrigorousfashion,butalso becauseofeverything thatdisorganizes
its order,becauseofeverything thatweakensit."1O NeitherAlthusser
norVincentconsidersthepossibilitythattheexemplary statusofcer-
tainmetaphorsmaybecomeoccasionsfora symptomatic readingthat
"weakens" rigorousargument.But it seems thatin relationto Al-
thusser'sowntext,a reconsideration ofthecentralreligioustropesof
thevoice ofthe law and conscienceprovidesa wayto questionwhat
has become,withinrecentliterarystudies,an unnecessarytension
betweenthe readingofmetaphorand thereadingofideology.To the
8. See sectionone in Althusser,L'avenirdurelongtemps, suivide les faits(Paris:

EditionsSTOCK/IMEC,1992).
9. AlthusserandEtienneBalibar, LireleCapital(Paris:FrancoisMaspero, 1968),vol.
1,26; orin English,Reading"Capital,"trans.BenBrewster (London:Verso,1970),26.
10. Jean-Marie Vincent,"La lecturesymptomrale chezAlthusser,"in SurAlthusser:
Passages(Paris:EditionsL'Harmattan, collectionFuturAnterieur, 1993),97.
JUDITH BUTLER 13
extentthatAlthusser'sreligiousanalogiesare understoodas merely
illustrative,theyareset apartfromtherigorousargumentation ofthe
textitself,offered in pedagogicalparaphrasis.And yet,theperforma-
tiveforceofthevoiceofreligiousauthority becomesexemplary forthe
theoryofinterpellation, thusextending through exampletheputative
forceofdivinenamingto thosesocialauthorities bywhichthesubject
is hailed into social being.This argumentdoes not mean to suggest
thatthe "truth"ofAlthusser'stextcan be discoveredin the disrup-
tiveeffects ofthefiguralon its "rigorous"conceptualization. Such an
approachromanticizesthe figuralas essentiallydisruptive, whereit
maywell be thecase thatfigurescompoundandintensify conceptual
claims.The concernherehas a morespecifictextualaim,namely,to
showhow thefigures-theexamplesand the analogies-informand
extendthe conceptualizations, implicatingthe textin an ideological
sanctification ofreligiousauthority whichit can exposeonlythrough
its reenactment.
ForAlthusser, theefficacyofideologyconsistsin partin theforma-
tion of conscience,wherethe notionofconscienceis understoodto
place restrictions on whatis speakableor,moregenerally, represent-
able. Consciencecannotbe conceptualizedas a self-restriction, ifthat
relationis construedas a pregivenreflexivity, a turningback upon
itselfperformed bya ready-made subject,butdesignatesa kindofturn-
ing back-a reflexivity-whichconstitutesthe conditionsforthe
possibilityofthesubject'sformation. In thissense,reflexivityis con-
stitutedthroughthismomentofconscience,thisturningback upon
oneself,onewhichis simultaneouswitha turning towardthelaw.This
self-restrictionis something otherthantheinternalization ofan exter-
nal law: themodelofinternalization takesforgrantedthe "internal"
and the "external"as alreadyformed.This self-restriction is priorto
thesubject,constituting theinaugurating reflexive
turnofthesubject,
enactedin anticipationofthelaw and,hence,determined inrelationto
thatlaw,witha prejudicative foreknowledge ofthelaw.Conscienceis
fundamental to theproductionand regulationofthe citizen-subject,
forit is consciencethatturnsthe individualaroundto make itself
availableto thatsubjectivating reprimand, butthelaw will represent
theredoublingofthereprimand: a turning backand a turningtoward.
How aretheseturnsto be thoughttogether, withoutreducingtheone
to theother?
Beforethe police or the churchauthoritiesarriveon the Althus-
serianscene, thereis a referenceto prohibitionwhich,in a Lacan-
ian vein,is linkedwiththeverypossibilityofspeech.Althusserlinks
theemergenceofa consciousness-and a conscience-[la conscience
civique et professionelle]-withthe problemof speakingproperly
[bienparler]("Ideology,"132). "Speakingproperly"appearsto be an
instanceoftheideologicalworkofskillacquisition,a processcentral
to the formationof the subject.The "diverseskills" of laborpower
have to be reproduced. This reproduction ofthe skillsoflaborpower
happensmoreandmoreoften"outsidethefirm"andin school,thatis,
outsideproductionand in educationalinstitutions.The skills to be
learnedare,in thefirstinstance,theskillsofspeech.The firstmention
of"conscience,"whichwill turnout to be quitecentralto thesuccess
or efficacy is linkedto the acquisitionof mastery,
of interpellation,
learninghow to "speak properly."The reproductionof the subject
takesplace through thereproduction oflinguisticskills,constituting,
as it were,the rules and attitudesobserved"by everyagentin the
divisionoflabour." In thissensetherulesofproperspeecharealso the
rulesbywhichrespectis proferred orwithheld.Workersaretaughtto
speak properlyand managerslearnto speak to workers"in the right
way" [biencommander](131-32).
Languageskillsaresaidtobe masteredandmasterable, andyet,this
masteryis figured byAlthusserquite clearlyas a kindofsubmission:
". . . thereproductionoflabourpowerrequiresnotonlya reproduction
of(thelabourer's)skills,butalso, at thesame time,a reproduction of
its submissionto the rules of the establishedorder[soumissiona'
l'ideologiedominante]"(132).This submissionto the rulesofdomi-
nantideologyleadsin thenextparagraph to theproblematicofsubjec-
tion,whichcarriesthedoublemeaningofhavingsubmittedto these
rules,andbecomingconstituted withinsocialitybyvirtueofthissub-
mission.
He writesthat"theschoolteaches'know-how'(skills)[des 'savoir-
faire']... in formswhichensuresubjectiontotherulingideology[l'as-
sujetissementa l'ideologie dominante]or the masteryof its 'prac-
tice.""' Considerthelogicaleffect ofthisdisjunctive"or" [ou]in the
middleofthisformulation: "subjectiontotherulingideologyor-put
in different, yetequivalentterms-the masteryofits 'practice"'(my
emphases).The morea practiceis mastered,themorefullysubjection
is achieved.Submissionandmasterytakeplacesimultaneously, andit
is thisparadoxicalsimultaneity thatconstitutesthe ambivalenceof
11. Althusser,
Positions, 73; Lenin and Philosophy, 133.
JUDITH BUTLER 15
subjection.Whereone mightexpectsubmissionto consistin a yield-
ing to an externally imposeddominantorder,and to be markedby a
loss of controland mastery,it is paradoxicallymarkedby mastery
itself.The binaryframeof mastery/submission is forfeitedby Al-
thusseras he recastssubmissionpreciselyandparadoxicallyas a kind
ofmastery. In thisview,neithersubmissionnormasteryis performed
by a subject; the lived simultaneityof submissionas mastery,and
masteryas submission,is the conditionofpossibilityforthe emer-
genceofthesubjectitself.
The conceptualproblemhereis underscored bya grammaticalone
in whichtherecan be no subjectpriorto a submission,andyetthereis
a grammatically induced"needto know"whoundergoesthissubmis-
sionin ordertobecomea subject.Althusserintroducestheterm"indi-
vidual" as a place-holderto satisfyprovisionallythis grammatical
need,butwhatmightultimatelyfitthegrammatical requirement will
not be a static grammaticalsubject. The grammarof the subject
emergesonly as a consequenceof the veryprocesswe are tryingto
describe.Because we are,as it were,trappedwithinthegrammatical
timeofthesubject[e.g.,"we aretrying to describe,""we aretrapped"],
it is almostimpossibleto ask aboutthegenealogyofits construction
withoutpresupposing thatconstruction fortheaskingofthequestion
itself.
Whatis there,then,priorto thesubjectthataccountsforitsforma-
tion? Althusserbeginsthe "Ideologyand IdeologicalState Appara-
tuses" essay by referring to the reproduction of social relations;he
thenspecifiesthisreproduction ofsocialrelationsas thereproduction
of social skills and distinguishesbetweenthoseskillsreproducedin
the firm,and those reproducedin education.Withrespectto these
latter,thesubjectis formed. In a sense,thisreproduction ofrelationsis
priorto thesubjectwho is formedin the courseofthisreproduction.
And yet,the two cannot,strictlyspeaking,be thoughtwithouteach
other.
The reproduction ofsocial relations,thereproduction ofskills,is
thereproduction ofsubjection,buthereit is not thereproduction of
labor that is central,but a reproduction properto the subject,one
thattakesplace in relationto languageand to theformationofcon-
science. ForAlthusser,to perform tasks "conscientiously"is to per-
formthem,as itwere,againandagain,toreproduce thoseskillsand,in
reproducing them,acquiremastery."Conscientiously"is placed in
quotationmarksbyAlthusser("pours'acquitter'consciencieusement'
de leur tache"),thus bringinginto reliefthe way in which labor is
moralized.Significant here,however,is themoralsense of "s'acquit-
in
ter"lost its translationas "to perform": ifthe masteryofa set of
skillsis to be construedas an acquittingofoneself,thenthismastery
of"savoir-faire" will constitutea defenseofoneselfagainstan accusa-
tion or, quite literally,a declaringof innocenceon the partof the
accused.To acquitoneself"conscientiously"ofone's taskis, then,to
construelaboras a confessionofinnocence,a displayorproofofguilt-
lessnessin thefaceofthedemandforconfessionimpliedbyan insis-
tentaccusation.
The "submission"to therulesofdominantideologymightthenbe
understoodas a submissionto thenecessityto proveinnocencein the
faceofaccusation,a submissionto thedemandforproof,an execution
ofthatproof,and the acquisitionof the statusof the subjectin and
througha compliancewiththetermsoftheinterrogative law. To be-
comea "subject"is,thus,tohavebeenpresumedguilty, thentriedand
declaredinnocent.Andbecausethisdeclarationis nota singleact,but
a statusincessantly reproduced, tobecomea "subject"is to be contin-
uouslyin theprocessofacquittingoneselfoftheaccusationofguilt.It
is tohavebecomean emblemoflawfulness, a citizenin goodstanding,
butoneforwhomthatstatusis tenuous,indeed,onewhohas known-
somehow,somewhere-what it is not to have that standingand,
hence, to have been cast out as guilty.And yet,because this guilt
conditionsthesubject,it constitutestheprehistory ofthatsubjection
to thelaw bywhichthesubjectis produced.Here one mightusefully
conjecturethatthereasonthereareso fewreferences to "bad subjects"
in Althusseris thatthetermtendstowardtheoxymoronic withinthe
termsofhis text.To be "bad" is notyetto be a subject,notyetto have
acquittedoneselfoftheallegationofguilt.'2
Andyetthisperformance is notsimplyin accordwiththeseskills,
forthereis no subjectpriorto theperforming ofthoseskills;it is the
performing of the skills thatlaboriouslyworksthe subjectinto its
statusas a socialbeing,a guilt,andthena repetitive practicebywhich
skills are acquired,and then and only then the assumptionof the
grammaticalplace withinthesocial as a subject.
Yetthe subjectmaybe said to perform accordingto a set ofskills,
thatis, as it were,to takegrammarat its word:firstthereis a subject
12. One mightusefullycompareWeber'sThe Protestant EthicwithAlthusseron
thispointin whichlaboris effectively
guaranteed through
a Protestant
ethic,although
appearsto be moreCatholic.
in Althusserthereligiousinflection
JUDITH BUTLER 17
whoencounters a setofskillstobe learned,learnsthemorfailstolearn
them,andthenandonlythencanbe saideithertohavemasteredthose
skillsor not. To mastera set ofskillsis not simplyto accepta set of
skills,but to reproducethemin and as one's own activity;thisis not
simplyan actingaccordingto a setofrules,buttheembodying ofrules
in thecourseofaction,andthereproduction ofthoserulesin embodied
ritualsofaction.13
Whatleads to thisreproduction? Clearly,it is notmerelya mecha-
nisticappropriation ofnorms,and neitheris it a voluntaristic appro-
priation.Itwouldbe as wrongtoaccountforthisreproduction in terms
of a simplebehaviorismas it would to accountforit in termsof a
deliberateproject.To theextentthatit precedestheformation ofthe
of of
subject,itis notyet theorder consciousness,andyetthisinvolun-
tarycompulsionis not the same as a mechanistically inducedeffect.
The notion of ritualsuggeststhat it is performed, and that in the
repetitionofperformance a beliefis spawned,whichis thenincorpo-
ratedintotheperformance in its subsequentoperations.Butinherent
to anyperformance is a compulsionto "acquitoneself,"andso priorto
anyperformance is an anxietyanda knowingness thatbecomesarticu-
late and animatingonlyon theoccasionofthereprimand.
Is itpossiblehereto separatethepsychicdimensionofthisritualis-
ticrepetition fromthe"acts"bywhichitis animatedandreanimated?
The verynotionofritualis meanttorenderbeliefandpracticeinsepar-
13. PierreBourdieuelaboratestheconceptionofthehabitusin The LogicofPrac-

tice(Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress,1990),66-79. He analyzestheembodiedrituals
ofeverydayness bywhicha givencultureproducesandsustainsbeliefin its own"obvi-
ousness." In thisway,Bourdieuunderscores theplaceofthebody,itsgestures, itsstylis-
tics,itsunconscious"knowingness" as thesiteforthereconstitutionofa practicalsense
withoutwhichsocialrealitywouldnotbe constituted as such.
Bourdieu'snotionofthehabitusmightwellbereadas a reformulation ofAlthusser's
notionofideology. WhereasAlthusser willwritethatideologyconstitutes the"obvious-
ness"ofthesubject,butthatthisobviousnessis theeffect ofa dispositif,
thatsameterm
reemerges in Bourdieuto describethewayin whicha habitusgenerates certainbeliefs.
ForBourdieu,dispositionsaregenerative and transposable.Note in Althusser's"Ideol-
ogyandIdeologicalStateApparatuses" theinceptionofthislatterreappropriation: "An
individualbelievesin God,orDuty,orJustice, etc.This beliefderives(foreveryone,i.e.
forall thosewho livein an ideologicalrepresentation ofideology, whichreducesideol-
ogyto ideas endowedby definition witha spiritualexistence)fromthe ideas of the
individualconcerned, i.e.fromhimas a subjectwitha consciousness whichcontainsthe
ideas ofhis belief.In thisway,i.e. bymeansoftheabsolutelyideological'conceptual'
device(dispositif)thussetup (a subjectendowedwitha consciousness inwhichhefreely
formsor freelyrecognizesideas in whichhe believes),the (material)attitudeof the
subject concerned naturallyfollows" ("Ideology," 167).
able. And yet,hereis wherethe SloveniancriticMladen Dolar will
arguethatAlthusserfailsto accountforthe psycheas a separatedi-
mension.Dolar counselsa returnto Lacan,muchin thesamewaythat
SlavojZizek suggestsa necessarycomplementarity betweenAlthusser
and Lacan.14To insiston the separabilityof the psychefromsocial
practiceis to intensify thereligiousmetaphorics in Althusser, thatis,
to figurethe psycheas a pureideality,not unlike the idealityofthe
soul. I turn,then,to Dolar's readingofAlthusserin orderto consider
thetensionbetweentheputativeidealityofsubjectivity andtheclaim
thatideology, is partoftheexpandeddomain
includingpsychicreality,
ofmateriality in theAlthusseriansense.
MladenDolar's essay,"BeyondInterpellation,"''5 suggeststhatAl-
of of
thusser,despitehis occasionaluse Lacan'stheory theimaginary,
failedto appreciatethedisruptive potentialofpsychoanalysis, in par-
ticular,thenotionoftheRealas designating thatwhichneverbecomes
availableto subjectivation. Dolar writes,"To putit thesimplestway,
thereis a partoftheindividualthatcannotsuccessfully pass intothe
subject,an elementof 'pre-ideological'and 'presubjective'materia
primathatcomestohauntsubjectivity onceit is constitutedas such"
(75). The use of "materiaprima" here is significant, forwith this
phraseDolar explicitlyconteststhesocial accountofmateriality that
Althusserprovides.In fact,this"materiaprima"nevermaterializesin
theAlthusserian sense,neveremergesas a practice,a ritual,ora social
relation;fromthepointofview ofthe social,the "materiaprima"is
radicallyimmaterial.Dolar thuscriticizesAlthusserforelidingthat
dimensionof subjectivitythatremainsradicallyimmaterial,barred
froman appearancewithinmateriality. AccordingtoDolar,interpella-
tioncan onlyexplaintheformation ofthesubjectin a partialway:"For
Althusser,the subject is what makes ideologywork; forpsycho-
analysis, the subject emergeswhere ideology fails.... The remainder
producedbysubjectivationis also invisiblefromthepointofview of
interpellation." he writes,"is a wayofavoiding[that
"Interpellation,"
remainder]"(76).At stakeforDolar is theneed to strengthenthedis-
tinctionbetweenthedomainof'thesymbolic,understoodas commu-
nicable speech and social bonds,and that of the psychic,which is
14. See Slavoj?izek, The SublimeObject ofIdeology(London:Verso,1989),1-2.

15. Publishedin Englishin Qui Parle6/2(Spring/Summer, 1993):73-96. The En-
glishversionis a revisionof the original,publishedin Germanas "JenseitsderAn-
rufung," in GestaltenderAutoritiit,
ed. Slavoj?izek (Vienna:HoraVerlag,1991).
JUDITH BUTLER 19
ontologicallydistinctfromthe social, definedas thatremainderof
whichthenotionofthesocial cannottakeaccount.
Dolar offersa distinctionbetween materialityand interiority
whichhe looselyalignswiththe Althusseriandivisionbetweenthe
materiality ofthe stateapparatusand theputativeidealityofsubjec-
tivity.In a formulation withstrongCartesianresonance,Dolar defines
subjectivity throughthenotionofinteriority, and identifiesas mate-
rialthedomainofexteriority (exterior tothesubject).Presupposed here
is thenotionthatsubjectivity consistsin bothinteriorityandideality,
whereasmateriality belongsto its opposite,the countervailing exte-
riorworld.
This mannerof distinguishing interiorfromexteriormay well
seemstrangeas a characterization orextrapolation ofAlthusser'sposi-
tion. It was, afterall, Althusser'sdistinctivecontribution to under-
minetheontologicaldualismpresupposedbytheconventionalMarx-
ist distinctionbetweena materialbase and an ideal or ideological
superstructure. This undermining took place by assertingthe mate-
rialityoftheideological:"An ideologyalwaysexistsin an apparatus,
and its practice,or practices.This existenceis material"("Ideology,'
166).
The constitutionofthe subjectis materialto the extentthatthis
constitutiontakesplace through rituals,and theseritualsmaterialize
"the ideas ofthe subject"(169).Whatis called "subjectivity," under-
stood as the lived and imaginaryexperienceof the subject,is itself
derivedfromthe materialritualsby whichsubjectsare constituted.
Pascal'sbelieverkneelsmorethanonce,necessarilyrepeatingtheges-
tureby which beliefis conjured.To understand, morebroadly,"the
ritualsofideologicalrecognition"(173)bywhichthesubjectis consti-
tutedis centralto theverynotionofideology.Butifbelieffollowsfrom
the postureofprayer, ifthatpostureconditionsand reiteratesbelief,
thenhow are we to separatethe ideationalspherefromthoseritual
practicesbywhichit is incessantlyreinstituted?
Althoughthequestionofthesubjectis notthesameas thequestion
of subjectivity, in Dolar's essayit nevertheless remainsunclearhow
preciselythosetwonotionsare to be thoughttogether. The notionof
"subjectivity" doesnothavemuchplayinAlthusser, exceptperhapsin
thecritiqueofsubjectivism, and it is unclearhow thattermmightbe
transposedonto the termshe does use. This may well be precisely
Dolar's criticalpoint,namely,thatthereis not enoughofa place for
subjectivityin Althusser'stext.Dolar's primarycriticalconcernis
thatAlthussercannotfullytake into accountthe "remainder"pro-
duced by subjectivation(76),the nonphenomenal"kernelof interi-
ority."In fact,Dolar will arguethatthedistinctionbetweentheinte-
riorand the exterioris producedthrough"the introjectionof the
object"(79).Hence,a primaryobjectis introjected, and thatintrojec-
tion becomes the conditionof possibilityforthe subject.The irre-
coverabilityofthatobjectis,thus,notonlythesupporting conditionof
the subjectbut the persistentthreatto its coherence.The Lacanian
notionoftheReal is cast as thefirstact ofintrojectionas well as the
subject'sradicallimit.
In Dolar,the idealityofthiskernelofinteriority sets thelimitto
it
bothmaterializationand subjectivation; constitutesthe constitu-
tive lack or the nonsymbolizableReal. As foreclosedor introjected,
theprimaryobjectis lost and idealizedat once; the idealityacquired
by thisobjectthroughintrojectionconstitutesthe foundingideality
ofsubjectivity.This insightis theone thatAlthusserappearsto miss,
and yetDolar seemsto attributeto himtheverydistinctionbetween
materialityand idealitythatis insufficientlyrealizedin Althusser's
theory:
Thereis a stepintheemergenceofboththesubject andtheOtherthat

Althusser leavesoutandthatcanperhaps be bestillustrated
byAl-
thusser'sownexample. To elucidate
thetransition betweentheexter-
nal materialityofstateapparatuses(institutions, practices,
rituals,
ofideological
etc.)andtheinteriority subjectivity,Althusserborrowsa
famous suggestionfromPascal,namely hisscandalous pieceofadvice
thatthebestwayto becomea believer is to followthereligious
rit-
uals.[881
Dolar refersto this as a "senselessritual,"and thenreversesthe

Althusserian accountin orderto establishthatthecreedandtheritual
aretheeffectsof"a supposition, " thatritualfollowsbelief,butis not-
in thefirstinstance-its conditionofproduction.Dolar underscores
theinabilityofAlthusser'stheoryofritualpracticeto accountforthe
motivationtopray:"Whatmadehimfollowtheritual?Whydidhe/she
consentto repeata seriesofsenselessgestures?"(89).
Dolar's questionsare impossibleto satisfyin Althusser'sterms,
but the very presuppositionsof Dolar',Fquestions are countered
throughan Althusserian explanation.ThatDolar presumesa consent-
ingsubjectpriorto theperformance ofa ritualsuggeststhathe already
presumesthata volitionalsubjectmust firstbe in place to give an
JUDITH BUTLER 21
accountofmotivation.Buthow does thisconsentingsubjectcome to
be? This subjectappearsto be a supposingand consentingone who
precedesand conditionsthe"entrance"intothesymbolicand,hence,
thebecomingofa subject.The circularity is clear,buthow is it to be
understood?Is it a failingofAlthusser'sthathe did not providethe
subjectpriorto the formationof the subject,or does his "failure"
indicateonlythatthegrammatical requirements ofthenarrative work
againsttheaccountofsubjectformation thatthenarrative attemptsto
provide?To literalizeor to ascribean ontologicalstatusto thegram-
maticalrequirement of"thesubject"is topresumea mimeticrelation
betweengrammarand ontologythatmisses the point,bothAlthus-
serianandLacanian,thattheanticipationsofgrammar arealwaysand
onlyretroactively installed.The grammar thatgovernsthenarration of
subjectformation is one thatpresumesthatthegrammatical placefor
thesubjecthas alreadybeenestablished.In an important sense,then,
the grammarthatthe narrativerequiresis a resultof the narrative
itself.The accountof subjectformationis thus a double fictionat
cross-purposes with itself,symptomatizing repeatedlywhat resists
narration.
If,as Wittgenstein has remarked,"we speak,we utterwords,and
onlylaterget a sense of theirlife,"thenthe sense of that "empty"
ritualwhichis speechis anticipated, andthatanticipationgovernsits
iterability.
In thissense,then,we mustneitherfirstbelievebeforewe
kneelnorknowthe sense ofwordsbeforewe speak.On the contrary,
both are performed "on faith"that sense will arrivein and by the
articulationitself-an anticipationthatis notforthatreasongoverned
by a guaranteeofnoematicsatisfaction. Ifsupposingand consenting
areunthinkableoutsideofthelanguageofsupposingand consenting,
and thislanguageis itselfa sedimentation ofritualforms-therituals
ofCartesianism-thentheactbywhichwe might"consent"to kneel
is no moreand no less ritualisticthanthekneelingitself.
Dolar makeshis objectionexplicitly theologicalbysuggesting that
Althusser'sreformulation ofthenotionofmateriality to includethe
domainofideologyis too inclusive,thatit makesno roomfora non-
materializable ideality:thelostandintrojected objectthatinaugurates
the formationof the subject.It remainsunclear,however,how pre-
ciselyDolar reads"materiality" in Althusser, and whethertheritual
and,hence,temporaldimensionofmateriality in Althusseris effaced
in favorof a reductionof materialityto the empiricallyor socially
given:
This is also whyAlthusser'sardentinsistenceon materiality is insuffi-
cient:theOtherthatemergeshere,theOtherofthesymbolicorder,is
notmaterial,and Althussercoversup thisnon-materiality bytalking
aboutthemateriality ofinstitutions and practices.Ifsubjectivity can
springup frommaterially followingcertainrituals,it is onlyinsofaras
thoseritualsfunctionas a symbolicautomatism, thatis,insofaras they
are governedby an "immaterial"logic supportedby the Other.That
Othercannotbe discovered byscrutinizingmateriality. . . whatcounts
is ultimatelynot thattheyare material,but thattheyare ruledby a
code and bya repetition.[89]
This last remarkformulatesan opposition between materialityand

repetition that appears in a directtension with Althusser's own argu-
mentation. Ifideology is material to the extentthat it consists in a set
of practices, and practices are governedby rituals, then materialityis
defined as much by ritual and repetition as it is by more narrowly
empiricistconceptions. Moreover,the rituals of ideology are material
to the extent that they acquire a productive capacity and, in Althus-
ser's text,what rituals produce are subjects.
Dolar explains that rituals can produce not subjects, but subjec-
tivityonly to the extent that theyare themselves governedby a sym-
bolic or reiterativelogic, a logic that is immaterial. Subjectivity for
Dolar is said to "springup frommateriallyfollowingcertain rituals,"
where the "springingup" is not itselfmaterial, but where the notion
of "following" a ritual does have a material dimension. Subjectivity
arises immaterially froma material ritual performance,but this can
happen only on the condition that a logic precedes and supports this
ritualperformance,an immateriallogic, one that encodes and reenacts
the idealizing effectsofintrojection.But how are we to distinguishthe
repetitionproperto ritual and the repetitionproperto the "symbolic
autonomatism"2?
Consider the inseparabilityof those two repetitionsin Althusser's
descriptionof the materialityof ideas and the ideal in ideology:
Ideas have disappearedas such (insofaras theyare endowedwith an

ideal or spiritualexistence),to thepreciseextentthatit has emerged
thattheirexistenceis inscribedin theactionsofpracticesgoverned by
ritualsdefinedin thelastinstancebyan ideologicalapparatus.It there-
foreappearsthatthesubjectactsinsofaras he is actedbythefollowing
system(setoutin theorderofitsrealdetermination): ideologyexisting
in a materialideologicalapparatus, materialpracticesgov-
prescribing
ernedbya materialritual,whichpracticesexistin thematerialactions
JUDITH BUTLER 23
ofa subjectactinginall consciousness tohisbelief.["Ideol-
according
ogy,"169-701
It appearsthatideas have theirexistenceas whatis "inscribed"in

those acts whichare partofpracticesregulatedby rituals.Can they
appearany otherway,and can theyhave an "existence"outsideof
ritual?And whatmightit mean to rethinkthematerialnot onlyas a
regulatedrepetition, butas one whichproducesa subjectactingin full
consciousnessaccordingto his belief?The subject'sbeliefis no differ-
entfromPascal's;theyareboththeresultofthatrepetitiousconjuring
thatAlthussercalls "materiality."
Dolar arguesthatAlthusserfailsto takeintoaccountthe distinc-
tionbetweenmateriality andthesymbolic,butwherewouldwe place
"interpellation" on thismappingofthe divide?Is it the voice of the
symbolicor is it the ritualizedvoice of the state,or is the problem
preciselythatthe two have become indissoluble?If,to use Dolar's
term,thesymbolicacquiresits "existence"onlyin ritual,thenwhatis
toestablishtheidealityofthatsymbolicdomainapartfromthevarious
modes of its appearanceand iterability? Ritual takes place through
repetition,and repetitionimpliesthe discontinuity of the material,
andtheirreducibility ofmaterialitytophenomenality. The intervalby
whichanyrepetitiontakesplacedoesnot,strictly speaking,appear;it
is,as itwere,theabsencebywhichthephenomenalis articulated.But,
thisnonappearance orabsenceis notforthatreasonan "ideality," forit
is boundto the articulationas its constitutiveand absentnecessity.
If the theologicalresistanceto materialismis exemplifiedin
Dolar's explicitdefenseofLacan'sCartesianinheritance (78),insisting
upon thepureidealityofthesoul,thetheologicalimpulsestructures
Althusser'sworkin thefigure ofthepunitiveLaw.Overandagainstthe
law thatsuccessfully regulatesitssubjects,Dolar suggeststhatthelaw
cannottoucha certaininteriorregister oflove: "Thereis a remainder
involvedin themechanismofinterpellation, theleft-over
oftheclean
cut, and. . . this remaindercan be pinpointedin the experienceof
love" (85).A bitfurther on,he asks,"Could one saythatloveis whatwe
findbeyondinterpellation?"
Herelove is, in his words,a "forcedchoice,"suggesting thatwhat
Dolar expectedfromthenotionofa subjectwho "consents"to kneel
and prayis an accountof a "forcedconsent"of some kind.Love is
beyondinterpellation preciselybecause it is understoodto be com-
pelledby an immaterial law-the symbolic-overand abovetheritu-
alisticLaws thatgovernthevariouspracticesoflove: "The Otherthat
emergeshere,the Otherof the symbolicorder,is not material,and
Althussercoversup this nonmateriality by talkingabout the mate-
rialityofinstitutions andpractices"(89).The Otherwho is lost,intro-
jected,who is said to becometheimmaterialconditionofthesubject,
inaugurates,as it were,the repetitionspecificto the symbolic,the
punctuatedfantasyofa returnthatis nevercompletedorcompletable.
Let us provisionally acceptthispsychoanalytic accountofsubject
formation, and concedethatthesubjectcannotformexceptthrougha
barredrelationto theOther,and evenconsiderthatthisbarredOther
reappearsas the introjectedconditionofsubjectformation, splitting
that subjectat its inception.Are thereotherformsof "losing" the
Otherthatarenotintrojection, andaretherevariouswaysofintroject-
ingthatOther?Arethesetermsnotculturally elaborated,
indeed,ritu-
alized, to such a degreethatno metaschemeof the symboliclogic
escapesthehermeneutics ofsocial description?
Significantly,wheresocialinterpellations aredescribedbyDolar as
always "failing"fullyto constitutesubjects,it seems thatno such
"failure"is at workin thecompulsory characteroflove.To theextent
thatprimary introjection is an actoflove,it is,I wouldsuggest,notan
actperformed onlyonce,buta reiterated and,indeed,ritualaffair.But
whatis tokeepus frommakingtheanalogythatwe fallinloveinmuch
thesamewaywe kneelandprayorthatwe maywellbe doingonewhen
we thinkwe are doingtheother?
And yet,Dolar's suggestionthatlove mightbe whatis "beyond"
interpellation is an important one. Andit seems thatAlthusserhim-
selfwouldhavebenefited froma betterunderstanding ofhow thelaw
itselfbecomes the objectof passionateattachment,a strangescene
of love. Forthe consciencethatcompelsthe waywardpedestrianto
turnaroundupon hearingthe policeman'saddress,or the one that
ushersthemurderer intothestreetsin searchofthepolice,appearsto
be drivenby a love of the law that can be satisfiedonly by ritual
punishment.To the extentthatAlthussergesturestowardthis anal-
ysis,he beginsto explainhowa subjectis formedthrough thepassion-
ate pursuitofthereprimanding recognition ofthestate.That thesub-
jectturnsroundorrushestowardthelaw suggeststhatthesubjectlives
in passionateexpectationofthelaw.This wouldbe a kindoflove not
beyondinterpellation, but,rather, one thatformsthepassionatecircle
bywhichthesubjectbecomesensnaredbyits own state.
The failureofinterpellation is clearlyto be valued,but to figure
JUDITH BUTLER 25
thatfailurein termsthatrehabilitatea structure oflove outsidethe
domainofthesocial is to riskthereification ofparticularsocial forms
of love as eternalpsychicfacts.It is also to leave unexplainedthe
passionthatprecedesand formsconscience,thatprecedesand forms
thepossibilityoflove,one thataccountsforthefailureofinterpella-
tionfullyto constitutethesubjectitnames.Interpellation is "barred"
fromsuccessnot bya structurally permanentformofprohibition(or
foreclosure), butbyits inabilityto determinetheconstitutive fieldof
thehuman.Ifconscienceis oneformthatthepassionateattachment to
existencetakes,then the failureof interpellation is to be foundin
preciselythepassionateattachmentthatalso lets it work.According
to thelogicofconscience,one in whichAlthusserappearedfullycon-
strained,thatpassionateattachment to thelaw is thatwithoutwhich
thelinguisticguaranteeofexistenceforthesubjectprovesimpossible.
This complicity at onceconditionsandlimitstheviabilityofa critical
interrogation ofthelaw.One cannotcriticizetoofartheverytermsby
whichone's existenceis secured.
But what if the discursivepossibilitiesforexistenceexceed the
reprimand voicedbythelaw,wouldthatnotlessentheneedto confirm
one'sguiltandembarkon a pathofconscientiousness as a waytogaina
purchaseon identity?Whatare the conditionsunderwhichourvery
senseoflinguisticsurvivaldependsuponourwillingnessto turnback
uponourselves,thatis, in whichattainingrecognizablebeingrequires
self-negation, requiresexistingas a self-negatingbeingin orderto at-
tainto and preservea statusas "being"at all?
It may be, in a Nietzscheanvein,that such a slave moralityis
predicated uponthatsobercalculationthatitis betterto "be" enslaved
in such a waythannot "to be" at all. Butthetermsthatconstrainthe
optionto "being"and "not being"are preciselythosethat"call for"
anotherkindofresponse.Underwhatconditionsdoes a law monopo-
lize the termsof existencein quite so thorougha way?Or is this a
theologicalfantasyofthelaw? Perhapsthereis a possibilityofbeing
elsewhereor otherwise,withoutdenyingour complicityin the law
thatwe oppose.Suchknowledgewillonlybe answeredthrough a differ-
entkindofturn,one that,enabledbythelaw,turnsawayfromthelaw,
resistingits lureofidentity;an agencythatoutrunsand countersthe
conditionsofitsexistence.Sucha turndemandsa willingnessnot "to
be"-a criticaldesubjectivation-inorderto exposethe law as less
powerful thanit seems.Whatformsmightlinguisticsurvivaltakein
thisdesubjectivizeddomain?How wouldone knowone's existence?
Throughwhat termswould it be recognizedand recognizable?Such
questionscannotbe answeredhere,buttheydo indicatea directionfor
thinkingthatis perhapspriorto the questionofconscience,namely,
thequestionthatpreoccupiedSpinoza,Nietzsche,and mostrecently,
GiorgioAgamben:how are we to understandthe desireto be as a
constitutivedesire?Resituatingconscienceand interpellation
within
such an account,we mightthenadd to thisquestionanother:how is
sucha desireexploitednotonlybya law in thesingular,butbylaws of
variouskinds?
In conclusion,Agambenoffersus one directionforrethinking
ethicsalongthelinesofthedesireto be and,hence,at a distancefrom
anyparticularformation ofconscience:
Ifhumanbeingswereorhadtobe thisorthatsubstance, thisorthat
destiny, wouldbe possible.... Thisdoesnot
no ethicalexperience
mean,however, thathumans arenot,anddonothavetobe,something,
thattheyaresimply consignedtonothingnessandtherefore canfreely
decidewhether tobe ornottobe,toadoptornottoadoptthisorthat
destiny(nihilismanddecisionismcoincideat thispoint).Thereis in
effect
something thathumansareandhaveto be,butthisis notan
essencenorproperly a thing:Itis thesimplefactofone'sownexistence
as possibilityorpotentiality. . .16
Agambenmightbe readas claimingthatthisis a possibilitythat
must resolveitselfinto something,but that cannot undo its own
statusas possibilitythroughsuch a resolution.Or,rather,we might
reread"being"as preciselythatpotentiality
thatremainsunexhausted
byanyparticularinterpellation.Sucha failureofinterpellationmight
well underminethe capacityofthe subjectto "be" in a self-identical
sense,but it maywell markthepathtowarda moreopen,evenmore
ethical,kindofbeing,one oforforthefuture.
16. GiorgioAgamben,The Coming Community,trans.Michael Hardt (Min-

neapolis:University
ofMinnesotaPress,1993),section11 (nopaginationin text).

"Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All"

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Author(s): Judith Butler