Scots Philosophical Association

University of St. Andrews

Review: Williams on Truthfulness

Reviewed Work(s): Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy by Bernard Williams
Review by: Catherine Z. Elgin
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 55, No. 219 (Apr., 2005), pp. 343-352
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and
the University of St. Andrews
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The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 219 April 2oo5
ISSN oo3i-8o94

CRITICAL STUDY

WILLIAMS ON TRUTHFULNESS

BY CATHERINE Z. ELGIN

Truth and Truthfuidness: an Essay in Genealogy. BY BERNARD WIUIAMS. (Princeton UP,

2002. Pp. 322. Price ?26.95 h/b, ?Di.95 p/b.)

Thick concepts, such as criminal, sleazy and friend, 'seem to express a union of fact and
value', Bernard Williams maintains.' Adherents of the fact/value distinction might
be tempted to construe his term 'union' in set-theoretical terms. Then thick concepts
comprise two identifiably distinct components, one factual, the other evaluative.
Thus 'X is a criminal' is to be analysed, roughly, as 'X broke the law [f] & Breaking
the law is wrong [v]'. I shall call this a skeletal analysis. On this view, a thick concept
is just a convenient shorthand for a conjunction of a factual claim and an evaluation.
Williams is convinced that such an analysis is inadequate. The union of the factual
and evaluative components in a thick concept is no mere set-theoretical union, but a
more intimate, unbreakable bond. The question thus arises: what more is there to
a thick concept than a skeletal analysis provides? What makes thick concepts thick?
Because of the nature of the concepts, they are unlikely to admit of an informa-
tive uniform analysis. What puts meat on the bones of a particular thick concept is
the role it plays in the moral life of a community; and this depends both on features
of the concept which can be characterized abstractly and on contingent features of
the community which cannot. For the contingent features at issue vary from case to
case. Evidently, such concepts have to be explicated one by one.
Truth and Truthfulness, Williams' last book, can be read as a case study of a thick
concept. It develops a genealogy of truthfulness out of practical concern for truth,
and shows how what starts out as a purely instrumental good is modulated and
refined into something of independent value. Besides providing an understanding of
a particular virtue, Truth and Truthfulness thus affords an understanding of the com-
plex, partly contingent factors that fix the contours of thick concepts. Since Williams
is not a linear thinker, his discussion is rather circuitous. In what follows, I attempt
to give a more structured argument than is easily found in his text. To that end, I
reorder some of his points and omit discussion of some fascinating detours.
I Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard UP, 1985), p. 129.

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 344 CATHERINE Z. ELGIN

The title, Truth and Truthfulness, is ironically misle

sustained investigation into the nature, scope and signi
fulness. It concerns truth only to the extent that truthf
book thus offers no analysis of the concept of truth, no
truth over another, no advice on how to evade the Liar
adamant that truth is important, he is remarkably non-c
His position accords with a correspondence theory
minimalist theory, and perhaps other theories of truth a
- Rortyan pragmatists and postmodernists who den
rebuttal of their position can be put succinctly. Truth
Truthfulness is anchored in truth. Therefore truth exist
Williams attempts to account for the virtue of truth
he understands as a story of how a concept might ha
the contours it actually has. Unlike Foucault and Nie
phasize that his genealogy is grounded in a fiction, and
includes and omits, and why it does so.
Williams' genealogy begins with a fictional State of
certain basic relations in which people stand to one
hostile natural environment, and to show that peopl
have reason to value truthfulness. The denizens of t
They are capable of reflection. They have a language,
truths. Given that they can speak the truth, what makes
Williams' answer, roughly, is that even in a fairly aus
be a division of cognitive labour. Simply because partie
is in a position to know things that another cannot
potentially beneficial. If, for example, you can see a p
be good for me if you could warn me. Were our sit
good for you if I could warn you. Thus we both wo
mechanism for communicating the relevant facts. L
enough. Speakers need not just the capacity to trans
desire to do so. Correspondingly, hearers need both
the information imparted and the disposition to believ
The two core virtues of truthfulness, Williams belie
Accuracy and Sincerity. (He capitalizes the words to in
terms, which diverge somewhat from their lower-cas
is of value to me only if it is (at least likely to be) true
likely to be) Accurate and Sincere. The connection wi
just is Accuracy of propositions. Sincerity is required
to be Accurate if it is not Sincere. Moreover, for the w
need to think that it is (at least likely to be) Accurate
butterfly was as likely to elicit your warning as a tige
take your warnings seriously. If I thought you were
exaggerating or speaking ironically as speaking Sincer
take your report, and hence would not know what
information-pooling to be effective, we need not ju

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 WILLIAMS ON TRUTHFULNESS 345

Accurate and Sincere, but reporters who have, and are belie
dispositions of Accuracy and Sincerity. The manifest utility of t
the denizens' capacity to develop them shows, Williams believe
emerge in the State of Nature.
The State of Nature affords resources for a relatively thin conc
Accuracy is the disposition to believe truths. Sincerity is the dis
one believes. So, in skeletal form once more, 'X is truthful' migh
disposed to believe truths and assert what she believes [f] & B
lieve truths and assert what one believes is good [v]'.
Williams recognizes that this is too thin. He appreciates that n
or even all assertion, involves information transfer. It is someti
state the obvious. Expressions of commiseration, congratulation,
like, often involve stating facts that are well known to all parties
one thinks that only those whose reactions might otherwise
express condolences to the bereaved.) Listing points of agreemen
fixing the locus of disagreement. Children learn a language be
describe features of the environment that are, and are recogn
both teacher and learner. Although Williams does not mention it
scored by the fact that much language learning occurs without e
This indicates that there must be a fair measure of stating the o
discourse as well. An account that locates the value of truthfuln
information transfer will not do justice to its value for language
A second limitation of the State of Nature story is this: it ma
valuable that there is effective information transfer. Each of us ma
fact that others are Accurate and Sincere. But it does not follow th
us an incentive to be Accurate and Sincere in her own reports.
power. So it may be to my advantage to be less than Accurate
assertions to you. If the escape route is narrow, my chances of e
may be considerably greater if I lie to you about our peril. The Stat
then faces a free-rider problem. Not surprisingly, this is because
account shows truthfulness to be an instrumental good. If one can
of truthfulness without sharing the cost, it appears prudent to do s
show how truthfulness, initially justified as an instrumental good,
than a merely instrumental good.
As a merely instrumental good, Williams argues, truthfulnes
reflection. Recognition of our vulnerability to free-riders undermin
of us has to trust our informants. But as trust diminishes, the v
wanes as well. Cassandra was truthful. Her prophecies were Accur
their value was nil, because no one believed her. Truthfulness is i
able only if we have reason to believe truthful pronouncements. An
believe them only if truthfulness is not merely instrumentally valu
Through an examination of Accuracy and Sincerity, and an e
roles in our lives, Williams purports to show them to be intrin
explains what qualifies a good as intrinsic, so it is not clear whet
as discussion proceeds, the concepts thicken. The values of Sinc

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 346 CATHERINE Z. ELGIN

show themselves to be more textured and more deeply enmeshe

of our lives. Whether or not we conclude that they should be v
sakes, it is plain that they are valuable because they are integra
conducive to, a valuable way of life. Perhaps this is all that intri
This might seem to be much ado about very little: truth,
internally related to assertion and belief. Belief aims at truth in
is defective if it is not true. An assertion purports to express a tr
if it is not true. The claim about belief is, Williams thinks, cor
assertion is more complicated.
A speaker S's assertion that p gives the hearer to understand
lieves that p. A Sincere assertion is, Williams suggests, a direct e
The hearer can straightaway take it that S believes that p, and
acquire a true belief about S. And if S is Accurate in matters of
can also acquire the warranted belief that p. Sincere and Accu
extend our epistemic range. They provide us with additional wi
They do so, Williams believes, because such assertions are tran
interposition of the speaker's will. She simply transmits what sh
It might therefore seem that the Sincerity that figures in tr
simply in telling the truth - that is, saying what you believe. The
- saying what you do not believe. But this is too simple. For
although the speaker expresses one belief, the hearer acqui
giving me to believe that p, S also gives me to believe p's impli
ploiting implicatures, a speaker who asserts only truths can
Intentionally misleading is, like lying, a violation of trust. My
take me at my word (or at any rate, no reason not to). Thro
intentionally lead her to believe that q when I do not in fact
the world in its impact on her by my will, I put her, to that exte
so take away or limit her freedom' (p. 118). Misleading, like lying,
This explains why people who are taken in by liars or mi
ashamed, dishonoured or humiliated. They feel not just chagr
gullible, or anger at having been treated disrespectfully. They
having been put into a position of being less than autonomous a
that by being used or patronized, they were treated as less tha
but also that by being misled about the state of things, they
nomously. One of the merits of Williams' discussion is that it
occur even if the lies have been told for benevolent reasons.
This suggests that the disposition of Sincerity that figures in the virtue of
truthfulness is a disposition to refrain from lying or misleading. Again Williams con-
siders this too simple. Not all lies, evasions, obfuscations and omissions are morally
objectionable. One aspect of the virtue of truthfulness is sensitivity to when truth-
fulness is called for. Some information is private. Your interlocutor may have no
right to know the details of your love life or your trade secrets or your developing
election strategy. If refusing to answer an unduly intrusive question is not feasible,
and 'It's none of your business!' is too blunt, Williams believes, some sort of evasion
may be permissible. Your interlocutor should recognize that in relentlessly pursuing

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 WILLIAMS ON TRUTHFULNESS 347

such questions, she may transgress the boundaries of the spa

truthfulness is required. Similarly, in adversarial exchanges, ther
tion to tell the truth, but no obligation to be entirely open. Pa
exchanges know this, so they are not apt to be misled by omi
crafted assertions. As these examples show, the obligation to be tr
to cultural circumstances. Where and when lies and evasions
depends on aspects of the culture, including what is considere
deserves to know. Because the parties involved in the exchanges a
culture in question, they can be expected to understand what
truthfulness govern the exchanges. Moreover, Williams argu
deserves the truth. Like many, he thinks Kant got it wrong when
one should not lie to the assassin at the door. Someone who demands information
for manifestly evil purposes simply does not deserve the truth.
The virtue of Sincerity, then, although grounded in asserting what one believes
be true, is not simply a matter of asserting what one believes to be true. It turns o
to require both more and less than that. Since misleading is a violation of Sincerity
the virtue requires refraining from assertions of belief which are likely to mislea
Since not everyone is entitled to every truth, it requires sensitivity to contextu
factors, such as the expectations and intentions of the parties to the exchange,
determine whether and to what extent truth-telling is called for.
Belief aims at truth. But to aim at something is not always to hit the mark
Because the world is independent of the will, Sincerity does not ensure Accurac
But the connection between belief and truth is not random either. Some belief-
forming strategies are better than others at generating true beliefs. Being reflective,
we monitor our truth-seeking efforts. As we learn more about things, we learn more
about what methods of enquiry yield reliable results. We devise and refine our
methodologies and control our belief-formation accordingly. We continue our re-
finements, ultimately developing the scientific method, which hedges against such
threats as wishful thinking, misleading evidence and jumping to conclusions, by
grounding acceptability in intersubjective agreement, repeatable results, controlled
experiments, rigorous measures of statistical significance, and so forth. Other disci-
plines, such as history and journalism, develop their own methods for securing the
Accuracy of their findings. What hedges we require depend on what obstacles we
are likely to encounter. We need to worry about undetected red shift in astronomy,
gaps in the fossil record in biology, lying informants in journalism. The underlying
concern in all cases is to secure the Accuracy of our findings.
The methodologies are public and are institutionally grounded. But they are not
just an additional layer of assessment for antecedently formulated beliefs. For
investigators who belong to an intellectual community, committed to the values that
its methodologies embody, internalize those values and form their own beliefs
accordingly. To some extent, this is because of the education they receive. They
come to understand that the methodologies are effective means of forming beliefs
that are and will be recognized as Accurate.
The contention that scientists, for example, internalize the values embedded
in the scientific method, and live their professional lives accordingly, may seem

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 348 CATHERINE Z. ELGIN

unrealistic. Like everyone else, scientists can be motivated by

envy and competitiveness. Williams is under no illusions a
think it undermines his point. In discussing Watson and Cr
terized in The Double Helix, he notes that even if they were mot
competitiveness, what they were competing for was to be
important scientific truth. They did not want merely to b
covered the structure of DNA or to be rewarded because they
discovered it. They wanted actually to discover it and to be d
done so. A commitment to truth remained at the heart of their motivation. Whatever
the other motivations of individual investigators, Williams maintains, the growth of
knowledge, and in particular, the growth of systematic, scientific knowledge, is a
manifestation of our accommodation of the resistance of the world to the will.
The brute independence of the world from the will means that we can never
guarantee that our beliefs are Accurate. Even a finely tuned, methodologically soph-
isticated disposition of Accuracy will not assure that our methods are fail-safe or that
our assertions are true. But besides the slings and arrows of epistemic misfortune,
there are internal obstacles to Accuracy that can, to some extent at least, be over-
come. This reduces our vulnerability.
So far, Sincerity has been characterized as a matter of expressing what one
believes. Its foils were identified as lying and intentionally misleading. But refraining
from lying and misleading only ensures that one expresses what one thinks one
believes. It is possible to be wrong about this. So the idea that when S Sincerely
asserts that p, her hearer acquires the true belief that S believes that p turns out to be
over-optimistic. If S is self-deceptive, she may in fact not believe what she takes her-
self to believe. In that case her Sincere assertion is not an expression of her belief.
Wishful thinking threatens Accuracy as well. S can mistake her grounds for a
belief, or, knowing her grounds, mistake their strength. In this way, S may believe
that p even though she has at her disposal ample resources for doubting that p or for
recognizing the insufficiency of her evidence for p. Wishful thinking often has its
roots in the content of a proposition. S wishes that p were so, and so wrongly
convinces herself that it is so. It figures in intellectual laziness too. If S thinks her
grounds for p are good enough, she can stop investigating whether p. So even where
the content is not a particularly likely candidate for wishful thinking, the desirability
of settling an issue may prompt one to jump to conclusions. Truthfulness thus
requires knowing, or having good reason to believe, that one's grounds are good.
A third obstacle is what we might call fickleness. We usually limit this notion to
matters of the heart, but endorsing every passing intellectual fad or idle thought
seems to be much the same thing. As I use the term, anyone given to capricious
changes of mind counts as fickle. Such a person may be disposed to assert Sincerely
what he believes at any given moment. But because he is apt to reverse his opinions
frequently and for no apparent reason, we have no reason to consider any belief he
expresses to be Accurate. His views simply blow with the prevailing winds.
Williams maintains that there are resources for resisting these internal obstacles
that derive from membership in communities that embed and reinforce certain
epistemic values. Wishful thinking involves believing that p on grounds you wrongly

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 WILLIAMS ON TRUTHFULNESS 349

believe are sufficient. Since you endorse your own grounds, it is u

scrutiny of those particular grounds will uncover their inadequacy.
community standards and subject your belief to peer review, y
error of your ways. You realize that whatever you may think of y
not pass muster in the relevant community of enquiry. This alone
show that you are wrong in the assessment of your grounds. But if
of that community and recognize that the belief in question is pr
standards, you see that your belief does not pass muster. The protec
thinking derives not from the mere fact that there is a commun
bear on the Accuracy of your views, but from your taking your
subject to the judgement of that community. You endorse the stand
belief is to be judged. There need, of course, be no actual public a
have internalized the standards, you can invoke them to assess yo
Presumably the standards of any community would provide
thinking. But for the avoidance of wishful thinking to be conduc
community must be of a certain kind. If the community standar
standards are, products of sustained, reflective efforts to discov
there is reason to think that their satisfaction promotes Accuracy.
Scientists care about scientific truth; historians care about
journalists care about journalistic truth. Through their training
the enterprises in question, they develop the virtues of attentive
and rigour appropriate to their fields. They internalize the val
investigations accordingly. Williams' point is that the values a
least in part from the existence, structure and activities of the
contingent communities. To understand the virtue of scientific
focus not on the lone scientist confronting nature, but on the s
tudes have been formed, informed and sustained by a sophisticat
historically contingent scientific community.
The standards of a reflective intellectual community also pro
resisting self-deception and fickleness. Mental states do not com
need to distinguish beliefs, wishes, fantasies and hunches. We
fixing the standards to which the different mental states are su
volves construing pretty much every passing thought (in a giv
Self-deception is a matter of mistaking some other sort of ment
fantasy, for example) for a belief. With the development and end
community standards, we come to recognize that beliefs are t
states that should be backed by reasons and should change only i
ence is introduced or reasoned assessment yields a reweighting
hand. Armed with this conception of belief, we can assess our var
to see if they are suitably related to reasons. Not everything
posed to endorse will then count as a belief. One might object th
pedestrian beliefs we have no such reasons. But if we tread lig
of reasons here, Williams' point still holds. I may have no par
believing I know my telephone number. Still, my belief is no
reasons that support it are general reasons for considering people

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350 CATHERINE Z. ELGIN

matters of the kind. These general reasons, and the

beliefs, are underwritten by communities that hav
typically competent about such matters, and perhaps w
Initially, Sincerity seemed to be a matter of blurt
mind. But what is on one's mind may or may not be a
component of truthfulness, it must connect more clos
tains that community standards figure critically in th
of beliefs, and that the standards of duly reflective com
connection to truthfulness.
There remains the question of how far a commitm
quest for understanding. Williams believes that the ans
is that we seek to understand. Science, he contends, se
absolute conception of reality. If they were discovered
acceptable (p. 258). Truth plays a pivotal role. History,
look to history for interpretations of events that mak
in one set of circumstances does not always make se
deny that truth matters to historical acceptability.
appear in works of history need to be true. But a histo
puts a construction on, or finds a pattern in, or other
focus, vocabulary, orientation and emphasis are crucia
The 'histories' of World War II that deny the Holocau
are false. Histories of World War II that merely neglec
defective because such an omission makes the works
commitment to truthfulness is required to see why
acceptable. The issue that concerns Williams is that truth
with one another. Both Daniel Goldhagen's Hitler's W
Dawidowicz's The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 are
They are, presumably, truthful. This is not, of cou
statement they contain is true. Like any extensive wo
contain minor errors. Nevertheless, we may suppose, th
discipline. They contain no glaring omissions, egregious
inferences. (I have chosen these works because my inf
works of history. But nothing hangs on the particular
with my choice can, no doubt, find other examples tha
The two works are in tension in that they offer co
Holocaust. Goldhagen explains it in terms of the att
Germans, Dawidowicz explains it in terms of two mill
disagree about what makes for an adequate explanation
need to be adduced to make sense of the events. Goldh
The facts he adduces and the pattern he finds in the
anyone can) how a specific group of people at a specific
passively, in the genocide of the Jews. Dawidowicz tak
She shows how the Holocaust belongs to a longer sequen
shocking anomaly but part of a long-standing, deeply
ories answer different questions. They also implicate th

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 WILLIAMS ON TRUTHFULNESS 351

requires answering different questions. Whatever the tensions

views, it seems plain that we cannot say 'If one is right, the other
we account for the tensions, we cannot plausibly maintain tha
independent fact of the matter such that at most one of them is cor
Williams' point is this. History is shot through with choices. A
selection of facts, terminology, orientation, scope and grain. Tru
differ in their selections, yielding divergent understandings o
Historians thus find different patterns in the play of events, th
different aspects of the eras they study. Depending on current ci
will seek different sorts of insights from the past, will approach th
icle with different questions and concerns in mind, and will consi
of accounts to make sense. One can imagine a fixed and final
Williams believes. One cannot imagine a fixed and final history
tion confronts its past with new questions, demanding a reconside
previous historians have made of things. Truth and truthfulness,
for good history, are not sufficient.
The conviction that nothing similar holds in the natural scienc
Williams believes that science could conceivably deliver a Gran
which would explain everything that occurs in the natural worl
acknowledges, explain everything under every description. It
sequence of events as matter in motion, but not, for example, as
aggression. This is why we cannot expect a GUT to yield the sort
we seek from history. But to explain a sequence of events as matt
not to explain them as, for example, an adaptation or an immuno
an epidemic or an emerging cold front. To characterize events in
explain why they merit these characterizations requires interests
towards the phenomena that the GUT would not supply. Just as c
stances prompt us to ask new questions of the past, they also pro
questions of nature. We devise new taxonomies, adopt new ori
new instruments and take new measurements to discover new pat
answer to our evolving interests. Even if the absolute conception
aspirations of fundamental physics (which I am not at all sure th
not accommodate the diversity of interests and approaches that
branches of natural science. This suggests that the role of trut
science is closer to the role it plays in history than Williams believ
Williams presents a convincing case that truthfulness is a more
than the skeletal analysis supposes. Still, there are reasons to t
qualifications are needed. Williams contends that truthfulness is
of suitably nuanced dispositions of Accuracy and Sincerity and is
the assertion of literal sentences. The conjunction of these two co
out to be more problematic than it might originally appear.
Emotivists and expressivists about ethics deny that ethical pr
truth-evaluable. Nevertheless such pronouncements should be
cere. If 'Feeding the hungry is good' amounts to 'I approve of f
you should too', I should say 'Feeding the hungry is good' on

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 352 CATHERINE Z. ELGIN

feeding the hungry and recommend that you do

for feeding the hungry!' I should say it only if I a
feeding the hungry. Otherwise I am a hypocrite. Sin
'emote' only feelings that I have. Accuracy requires
Accuracy and Sincerity are required of ethical prono
in the offing. Even inarticulate expressions of emo
sighs, should be Accurate and Sincere. I should sigh o
table, and only at things that I genuinely regret. Th
Accuracy, the second a demand for Sincerity.2 Again
This suggests that the virtue of truthfulness may
Williams shows, it is anchored in a concern for tru
evidently extends to things that are not truth-evaluabl
Worries arise within the propositional realm as well
of literally stating what one genuinely believes, re
paradigmatic vehicles for information transfer. B
assume, as Williams does, that only literal assertion
ironic and hyperbolic sentences can also inform. A
aneurysm as a time-bomb effectively conveys to her
condition. Mark Antony's ironic claim 'Brutus is an
clear that he believed the opposite, and persuaded his
student who complains hyperbolically 'This assignmen
the professor that the assignment is too long. Evid
formation transfer is not that the speaker must rest
but that the speaker and hearer must be, as it wer
frequency. If the speaker is speaking ironically, or m
and the hearer takes her to be speaking literally, c
hearer interprets her words correctly, the fact that
interfere with their communicative function. This is
the case of metaphor, for often there is no literal way
says. Both cognitive science and immunology current
commitments in metaphorical terms. They lack t
Presumably, responsible cognitive scientists who convey
mind's peripheral processing units speak truthfully.
No doubt further quibbles could be raised. But th
enormous value of Truth and Truthfulness. Williams ma
of truthfulness, explaining why it has (at least rough
it contributes to our lives. He shows it to be an et
stemology, which links our knowledge of the worl
underwrite that knowledge. The wealth of insight in
much we have lost with the death of Bernard Williams.

Harvard University

2 Both the point about expressivism and the point about inarticulate expressions are found
in C. McGinn, 'Isn't It the Truth?', New York Review ofBooks, 50 (2003), P. 72.

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