Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198338 November 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN, PO2 ANTHONY D. ABULENCIA, and SPO1 WILFREDO L.
RAMOS, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Court hereby resolves the Motions for Reconsideration filed by accused-appellants SPO 1
1

Wilfredo L. Ramos and PO2 Anthony D. Abulencia and the Motion for New Trial Due to. Newly
Discovered Evidence and for Reconsideration of the February 20, 2013 Resolution filed by accused-
2

appellant P/Supt. Artemio E. Lamsen (Motions). The foregoing Motions assail the Court's
Resolution dated February 20, 2013, which upheld the conviction of accused-appellants of the crime
3

of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion. perpetua and to
jointly .and severally pay: [a] the heirs of victim Fernando Sy the amount of Pl 00,000.00 as actual
damages, ₱4,968,320.l 0 as loss of earning capacity, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and 1 50,000.00
as moral damages; [b] the heirs of victim Arturo Mariado the amount of ₱150,000.00 as stipulated
damages; [c] Equitable PCI Bank the amount of ₱2,707,400.77 as the amount taken during the
robbery; and [d] costs of suit.4

In their respective Motions, accused-appellants state, inter alia that they obtained affidavits from
prosecution witnesses Amel F. Reyes (Reyes) and Domingo Marcelo (Marcelo) whose testimonies
5 6

implicated accused-appellants of the crime of robbery with homicide. In their affidavits, the aforesaid
prosecution witnesses claim that they made their testimonies under duress as they were forced by
elements of the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the former
mayor of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Julian Resuello, to point at accused-appellants as
perpetrators of the aforesaid crime. They equally claim that they did not actually see who committed
the crime and that they only testified against accused-appellants out of fear of their own lives. 7

The Court is not convinced.

Reyes’ and Marcelo’s affidavits partake of a recantation which is aimed to renounce their earlier
testimonies and withdraw them formally and publicly. Verily, recantations are viewed with suspicion
8

and reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is
not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it
9 10

will later be repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when
11

coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can
retractions be considered and upheld. As aptly pointed out by the Court in Firaza v. People, viz:
12 13
Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court
of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and forestall
falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given the testimony later on changed his
mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.

x x x.

This Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously given in court.
The asserted motives for the repudiation are commonly held suspect, and the veracity of the
statements made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently and deservedly subject to serious
doubt.

x x x. Especially when the affidavit of retraction is executed by a prosecution witness after the
judgment of conviction has already been rendered, "it is too late in the day for his recantation without
portraying himself as a liar." At most, the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given
probative value.

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if
credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent
1âwphi1

different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony
to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A
testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this
can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared
and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized,
and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. The unreliable character of the
affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact
that after going through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested
by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and
testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that all the
foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation.
And in situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently
executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit
is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are
generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. (Emphases and underscoring
14

supplied)

After a careful scrutiny of the records, the Court sees no sufficient reason to disturb its Resolution
dated February 20, 2013. In the case at bar, the trial court gave great weight and credence to the
collective statements of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, including those of Reyes and Marcelo, as
their testimonies were candid, straightforward, and categorical. It is likewise worthy to mention that
their respective testimonies were deemed credible as they withstood extensive cross-examination,
and possibly, even re-direct and re-cross examinations. Absent any special circumstances attendant
to this case, Reyes’ and Marcelo’s recantations fail to cast doubt to the truth and veracity of their
earlier testimonies, and to the collective statements of all of the prosecution witnesses as a whole.

Moreover, it should be noted that Reyes and Marcelo only executed their respective affidavits of
recantation after the Court issued its Resolution dated February 20, 2013 upholding accused-
appellants’ conviction of the crime of robbery with homicide, or more than a decade after they gave
their testimonies in open court. These affidavits should be seen as nothing but a last-minute attempt
to save accused-appellants from punishment. 15
Finally, the Court need not discuss the other issues raised in the accused-appellants Motions as
they were already exhaustively passed upon in its Resolution dated February 20, 2013.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES with FINALITY the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
accused-appellants SPO1 Wilfredo L. Ramos and PO2 Anthony D. Abulencia and the Motion for
New Trial Due to Newly Discovered Evidence and for Reconsideration of the February 20, 2013
Resolution filed by accused-appellant P/Supt. Artemio E. Lamsen. Accordingly, the Court’s
Resolution dated February 20, 2013 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 135-139 (dated April 1 2013) and pp. 166-178 (dated April 5 2013), respectively.
 2
Id. at 141-152 (dated April 8 2013).

3
Id. at 126-134. See People v. Lumsen G.R. No. 198338, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA
498.

4
Id. at 133. See People v. Lamsen id. at 509.

5
Id. at 154-157.

6
Id. at 158-163.

7
Id. at 155-156 and 158-159.

8
See People v. Ballabare, 332 Phil. 384, 396 (1996).

9
Regidor, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 166086-92, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 244, 268,
citing

Balderama v. People, G.R. Nos. 147578-85 and G.R. Nos. 147598-605, January 28,
2008, 542 SCRA 423, 432-433.

10
Id.

11
Id.

12
Id.

13
547 Phil. 573 (2007).

14
Id. at 584-586. (Citation omitted)

15
See id. at 586. (Citation omitted)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 147578-85 January 28, 2008

ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA, petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, respondents.

x------------------------------------------x

G.R. Nos. 147598-605 January 28, 2008

ROLANDO D. NAGAL, petitioner,

vs.

JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, private respondent

and

THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, public respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Joint Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan dated November
17, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20669, 20670, 20672, 20674, 20675, 20676, 20677, and 20678; and its
Resolution dated March 20, 2001.

Rolando L. Balderama, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 147578-85, and Rolando D. Nagal, petitioner in G.R. Nos.
147598-605, were employed with the Land Transportation Commission (LTO) assigned to the Field
Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento, respondent in both cases,
operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units.

Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport discriminate against
passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on a "contract" basis, the LTO created a
team to look into the veracity of the complaints. Petitioners in these cases were members of the team,
popularly known as "Flying Squad," together with Cipriano L. Lubrica and Cresencio de Jesus.
On July 14, 1992, the team flagged down for inspection an "SJ Taxi" owned by respondent. The team
impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon inspection and testing
by the LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the meter
waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was functioning normally. The vehicle was
released to respondent.

On December 2, 1992, respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, as amended,2 against herein petitioners as well as Lubrica and de Jesus. He alleged that
prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting "protection money" from
him. On February 15, 1992, they went to his office and proposed they would not apprehend his drivers
and impound his vehicles for violations of LTO rules, provided he gives them the amount of P400.00
every 15th and 30th day of the month. They agreed to the reduced amount of P300.00. On the same
day, he started giving them P300.00 and from then on, every 15th and 30th day of the month until June
15, 1992. Thereafter, he failed to give them the agreed amount because his business was not doing well.

Eventually, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan nine (9) Informations for
violations of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code3 against petitioners and the other members of the
team, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 20669-20677. All the Informations were identically worded,
except the date of the commission of the crimes. For brevity, we reproduce the Information in Criminal
Case No. 20669 as sample, thus:

Criminal Case No. 20669

That on or about February 15, 1992 or for sometime prior thereto in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused all public officers, being all
employees of the Land transportation Office assigned with the Field Enforcement Division, Law
Enforcement Services, committing the offense in relation to their office and taking advantage of their
position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously solicit, demand and receive from Juan
Armamento, a taxicab operator, the amount of P300.00 in consideration for the said accused refraining
from performing their official duty of conducting inspections on the taxicab units being operated by said
Juan Armamento to determine any possible violation of LTO rules and regulations, thereby causing Juan
Armamento and the public service damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
They were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 20678, reads:

That on or about July 14, 1992 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, all accused public officers, being
employees of the Land transportation Office, assigned with the Field Enforcement Division, Law
Enforcement Services, while in the discharge of their official administrative functions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to Juan Armamento, a taxicab operator, through
evident bad faith by apprehending and impounding one (1) unit of his taxicab with Plate No. PKD-726 for
alleged violation of LTO rules and regulations, in that, its meter is defective (waiting time not
functioning), which was later on established to be not true, thereby depriving said Juan Armamento of
the use of his taxicab unit for about three (3) days and to realize income thereon for the same period, as
well as incur unnecessary expenses in effecting the release of his impounded unit from the impounding
area of the LTO.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment on June 30, 1994, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. The cases
were consolidated and tried jointly. Prior thereto, they were suspended pendente lite from the service
for a period of ninety (90) days.

On March 5, 1999, accused de Jesus died. The cases against him were dismissed. The hearing proceeded
against petitioners and Lubrica.

In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan found petitioners and Lubrica guilty of direct
bribery in seven (7) of the nine (9) Informations filed against them and were sentenced in each count "to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 years and 2 months, as minimum, to 5 years, 4
months and 20 days, as maximum, within the range of prision correccional, and to suffer the penalty of
special temporary disqualification." They were further ordered to pay a fine of P300.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and "to restitute the amount of P300.00 as alleged in the
Informations." They were acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 20671 and 20673 for failure of the
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioners and Lubrica were also convicted in Criminal Case No. 20678 for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as maximum. They were also disqualified
perpetually from holding public office and were ordered to indemnify the respondent the amount of
P1,500.00, representing his lost income for the 3-day period that the taxi cab remained in the LTO
impounding unit.

Petitioners and Lubrica filed separate motions for reconsideration arguing that they were not yet
grouped as a team on February 15, 1992, hence, there could be no conspiracy. While the motion was
pending resolution, both petitioners filed separate motions for new trial based on an affidavit dated
December 22, 2000 executed by respondent recanting his previous testimony and pointing to Lubrica
and de Jesus as the only culprits.

On March 20, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration and the motions for new
trial. In denying the motions for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan ruled:

Anent the second argument, the Supreme Court has made these pronouncements:

Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, as it may be shown by acts and circumstances from
which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design, or may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetuated. (see People v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 785; People v.
Tingson, 47 SCRA 243; People v. Alonso, 73 SCRA 484).

Thus, for failure of the accused to controvert prosecution’s evidence that all four of them went to the
office of the private complainant on February 15, 1992 and offered him to refrain from subjecting his
taxi units to apprehension for notation of LTO rules, provided that he comes across with the amount of
P400.00 (later reduced to P300.00) to be delivered twice a month and it was accused Nagal who
received the P300.00 on April 30, 1992, Balderama on May 30, in the presence of de Jesus, Lubrica on
February 15, February 28 together with Nagal, March 30 and June 15, and that in fact, Manimtim
witnessed the incident which occurred on May 15 and February 15, 1992 and saw Balderama and de
Jesus waiting in the mobile car together with Nagal, this Court’s finding of conspiracy holds.

In denying the motions for new trial, the Sandiganbayan held:

Retraction of testimonies previously given in Court are viewed with disfavor. As a general rule, a motion
for new trial will not be granted if based on an affidavit of a witness where the effect is to free the
appellant from participation in the commission of the crime. The recantation made by the private
complainant after the conviction of the accused is unreliable and deserves scant consideration.
In the case of People v. Soria, 262 SCRA 739, the Supreme Court declared:

Indeed, it would be dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the Court of justice simply
because the witness later changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule will make a
solemn trial a mockery and will place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
It bears stressing that a testimony in court is made under conditions calculated to discourage and
forestall falsehood.

Both petitioners filed with this Court separate petitions for review on certiorari, both arguing that the
Sandiganbayan erred: (1) in finding that they are guilty of the offenses charged; (2) in holding that
petitioners and their co-accused acted in conspiracy; and (3) in disregarding the recantation made by
respondent.

On January 4, 2003, Lubrica likewise filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In our
Decision dated February 26, 2007, we denied his petition for being late. Our Decision became final and
was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on April 20, 2007.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the guilt of the accused, now petitioners, in these cases has
been proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the following
elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some
gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of
his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something
which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a
public officer.4

The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established that the
accused demanded and received P300.00 as "protection money" from respondent on several dates. As
against the prosecution’s evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest
of defenses.

Anent Criminal Case No. 20678, to hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former; (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any
party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.5 The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners
and Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of
respondent, causing him undue injury.6

Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding and
conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions, among them:
1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the
absence of evidence on record.7 We found none of these exceptions in the present cases.

Petitioners’ prayer for complete acquittal on the strength of respondent’s affidavit of recantation fails to
impress us.

A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation.8 The Court looks
with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of
desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant
attention.9 The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated.10 Only when
there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to
the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld.11 As found by
the Sandiganbayan, "(t)here is indubitably nothing in the affidavit which creates doubts on the guilt of
accused Balderama and Nagal."

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated November 17,
2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20669, 20670, 20672, 20674, 20675, 20676, 20677 and 20678 is AFFIRMED
in toto.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao and concurred in by Associate Justice Narciso S. Nario
and Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer (all retired).

2 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

3 Art. 210. Direct bribery.—Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or
present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of
the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been
committed.

If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the
preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such
gift.

If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from
doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not less than three times the
value of such gift.

In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of
special temporary disqualification.

The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators,
appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties.

4 Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 273, citing Maniego v.
People, 88 Phil. 494 (1951).

5 Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122166, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 382, 398, citing Ponce de Leon
v. Sandiganbayan, 186 SCRA 745, 754 (1990); Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116, 128 (1994);
Jacinto v. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 254, 259 (1989); and Medija, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 218 SCRA 219,
223 (1993).

6 Rollo, pp. 50-52.

7 Gil v. People, G.R. No. 73642, September 1, 1989, 177 SCRA 229, 236, citing Cesar v. Sandiganbayan,
134 SCRA 105 (1985).

8 People v. Ramirez, Jr., G.R. Nos. 150079-80, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 666, 676, citing People v.
Bertulfo, 381 SCRA 762 (2002); People v. Nardo, 353 SCRA 339 (2001); Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA
245 (1998); Reano v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525 (1988).

9 Santos v. People, G.R. No. 147615, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 507, 514.

10 Id., p. 515, citing Lopez v. CA, 239 SCRA 562 (1994).

11 Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., supra.