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Chapter 09 Test Bank
Student: _______________________________________________________________________________________
1. While everyone wants a clean environment, it can be very hard to achieve. An approach governments
could take to promote that outcome is to:
A. create social norms.
B. create and enforce strict laws and heavy fines.
C. influence individual's incentives.
D. All of these are ways governments can get the "green" behavior they want.
2. The prisoner's dilemma is a game of strategy:

A. in which people make rational choices that lead to a less-than-ideal result for all.
B. in which people make rational choices that lead to the ideal result for all.
C. that leads everyone to be as well off as possible without making another worse off.
D. that leads people to make irrational choices that lead to the ideal result for all.
3. To economists, games are:

A. just recreational pursuits like chess, Monopoly, or poker.
B. any situation in which players pursue strategies designed to achieve their goals.
C. situations in which individuals act against their own interest for fun.
D. None of these statements are true.
4. To economists, a game is:

A. any situation in which players pursue strategies designed to achieve their goals.
B. a trivial pursuit that should not be used to analyze the economy or its actors.
C. a way to simplify and minimize the true importance of situations like war.
D. All of these statements are true.
5. Economic games can be used to analyze decisions around which of the following situations?
A. War
B. Business
C. Environmental protection
D. All of these situations.
6. The study of how people behave strategically under different circumstances is called:
A. game theory.
B. game strategy.
C. strategy optimization.
D. strategy theory.
7. Game theory is:

A. the study of how people behave strategically under different circumstances.
B. used by economists to evaluate behavior in a variety of settings.
C. a useful tool in predicting strategic behavior.
8. Game theory is:

B. used to predict the winners of only certain types of strategic games.
C. used to evaluate the microeconomic choices that involve probabilities of different outcomes.
D. the study of games of chance like solitaire or betting on horse races.
9-1
Copyright © 2017 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent
of McGraw-Hill Education.
9. When the trade-offs you face are determined by the choices someone else will make, behaving
rationally involves:
A. behaving strategically.
B. ignoring the behavior of other actors.
C. acting in a way to help others.
10. Behaving strategically:

A. means recognizing that the actions of others will affect the trade-offs you face, and acting accordingly.
B. is an essential part of game theory.
C. involves rational decision making.
11. Behaving strategically means:

A. evaluating decisions in which players act in their own self-interest, but the interplay of those decisions
does not exist.
B. acting to achieve a goal by withholding key information from the person with whom an exchange is
being made.
C. acting to achieve a goal by anticipating the interplay between your own and others' decisions.
D. evaluating the impact of your choices on an uninvolved third party.
12. When your outcomes depend on another's choices, asking __________________ is the key to good
decision making.
A. how will others respond
B. what the wants and constraints are of those involved
C. what the trade-offs are
D. why everyone isn't already doing it
13. All games involve which of the following?

A. Multiple players
B. Strategies
C. Payoffs
D. All games involve all of these things.

A. Rules
B. Chance events
C. Dice
D. Cards

A. Strategies
B. Someone to enforce the rules
C. Cards or dice
D. Full information

A. A predictable outcome
B. Payoffs
C. Full information
D. A game master
17. In games, rules:

A. define the actions that are allowed in a game.
B. need to be loosely adhered to in order to predict an outcome.
C. define the winners of a game.
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D. outline the wrong choices that could be made in a game.
18. In real life, people's behavior is constrained by:

A. laws of nature.
B. legislated rules of society.
C. costs of various actions.
D. All of these are rules that constrain people's behavior.
19. An example of a real-life rule that might constrain people's behavior is:
A. minimum wage legislation.
B. having 24 hours in a day.
C. the earth's limited supply of oil.
D. All of these are examples of real-life rules.
20. In games, strategies are:

A. the outcomes players want to achieve.
B. the same for everyone to achieve the same goal.
C. the plans of action that players follow to achieve their goals.
21. In games, the strategy to reach a particular goal:

A. is the same for everyone.
B. can be different for different players and still achieve the same goal.
C. should be similar to what others have chosen to reach the same goal.
D. has begun to be documented by economists.
22. In games:
A. there is only one strategy associated with each outcome.
B. there are several strategies that can achieve a single goal.
C. all strategies followed in one particular game should all be similar in order to be successful.
D. if one person's strategy is wildly different from those of others, he will typically come in first or last.
23. Payoffs are:

A. the rewards that come from particular actions.
B. always monetary.
C. things that are only enjoyed by the winner.
D. bribes made to gain some advantage unfairly during a game.
24. An example of a payoff in a game would be:

A. a salary.
B. winning an election.
C. having clean drinking water.
D. All of these are examples of payoffs.
25. In game theory, an example of a payoff could be:

A. being the first mover in a game.
B. sharing information with a select few that others aren't privy to.
C. monetary gains made by a player.
D. giving an advantage to only one player.
26. The prisoner's dilemma game can involve:

A. only two players.
B. more than two players.
C. multiple organizations.
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27. The prisoner's dilemma:
A. can be summarized in a payoff matrix.
B. can involve two players.
C. leads to a less-than-ideal outcome for all players.
28. The prisoner's dilemma can be summarized in:

A. a strategy matrix.
B. a strategy tree.
C. a decision matrix.
D. a flowchart.
29. A decision matrix:

A. summarizes the players, strategies, and payoffs associated with a game.
B. outlines the clear outcome of any strategy-based game.
C. shows only the decisions of one player.
D. is not useful in evaluating the strategic choices.
30. When a strategy is the best one to follow no matter what strategy other players choose, it is called a:
A. golden decision.
B. dominated strategy.
C. dominant strategy.
D. zero-sum strategy.
31. A dominant strategy is one:

A. that is the best one to follow, no matter what strategy other players choose.
B. in which a player is forced to choose given the rules of the game.
C. in which a player must choose, even though it does not optimize his outcome.
D. provides a player with the highest payoff in the game.
32. A dominant strategy:

A. exists in every game.
B. is the best one to follow no matter what strategy other players choose.
C. is always the same for all players of a game.
D. awards the highest achievable payoff in a game.
33. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

A. there is a dominant strategy for both players.
B. there is a dominant strategy for only one player.
C. there is no dominant strategy for either player.
D. there is a dominant strategy for a player depending on what the other player does.
34. In the prisoner's dilemma:

A. a dominant strategy exists for only one player.
B. a non-cooperative outcome is predicted.
C. a cooperative win-win outcome can be predicted.

A. a stable outcome is impossible.
B. only one player has a dominant strategy.
C. a stable outcome is possible.
D. a commitment strategy is needed to reach a stable outcome.

A. a cooperative strategy can lead to a more beneficial outcome for both players.
9-4
B. a noncooperative strategy will lead to a positive-positive outcome.
C. a stable outcome is impossible.
D. neither player has a dominant strategy.

A. neither player has a dominant strategy.
B. both players have a dominant strategy.
C. only one player will ever have a dominant strategy.
D. All of these may be true in a prisoner's dilemma game.
38. The prisoner's dilemma game can be used to describe

A. the game Rock Paper Scissors
B. why candidates in elections go negative.
C. how individuals acting in their self-interest leads to the best outcome overall.
D. a zero sum game.
39. The prisoner's dilemma game:

A. is a zero sum game.
B. is a game of chance.
C. is a game with no dominant strategies.
D. is a game with a stable equilibrium.

A. if players can communicate in advance, they will always cooperate.
B. if players can communicate in advance, they may still not cooperate.
C. will always choose to cooperate.
D. will only cooperate if they are trustworthy.
41. The players of prisoner's dilemma-type games:

A. would be much better off if they could cooperate.
B. have an incentive to never cooperate.
C. have a dominant strategy to never cooperate.
42.
The figure shown portrays a game using a:
9-5
A. decision tree.
B. decision matrix.
C. flowchart.
D. graph.
43.
The game in the figure shown is a version of:
A. the prisoner's dilemma.

B. the first-mover advantage.
C. a sequential game.
D. a repeated game.
44.
A. a sequential game.
9-6
B. a simultaneous game.
C. a cooperative game.
D. an ultimatum.
45.
According to the figure shown, if Nike charges a high price, then Adidas should:
A. charge a high price.

B. charge a low price.
C. leave the market.
D. give an ultimatum.
46.
According to the figure shown, if Adidas charges a low price, then Nike should:

B. leave the market.
C. charge a low price.
9-7
47.
According to the figure shown, Nike:
A. has a dominant strategy to charge a high price.

B. does not have a dominant strategy.
C. will reach an optimum outcome by acting in its own self-interest.
D. has a dominant strategy to charge a low price.
48.
According to the figure shown, Adidas:
A. should charge a low price, regardless of what Nike chooses to do.

B. should charge a high price, regardless of what Nike chooses to do.
C. does not have a dominant strategy.
D. should take the first-mover advantage and charge a low price.
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49.
According to the figure shown:
A. there is no stable equilibrium to the game.

B. both players will act in their own self-interest and get a stable, but less than optimum, equilibrium.
C. both players will act in their own self-interest and get an optimum equilibrium that is stable.
D. both players have an incentive to charge a low price and undercut the competition.
50.
The stable outcome of the game in the figure shown will be:
A. Nike charges a high price, and Adidas charges a low price.

B. Nike charges a low price, and Adidas charges a high price.
C. Nike and Adidas both charge a low price.
D. Nike and Adidas both charge a high price.
9-9
51.
The outcome of the game in the figure show predicts that Nike will earn profits of:
A. $2 million.
B. $4 million.
C. $10 million.
D. $15 million.
52.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Adidas will earn:
A. $2 million.
B. $8 million.
C. $6 million.
D. $10 million.
9-10
53.
If Nike and Adidas are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can predict:
A. an outcome that is good for society and less than ideal for the companies.
B. an outcome that is less than ideal for society, but optimal for the companies.
C. that both will follow their dominant strategy and society will lose.
D. None of these is likely to happen.
54.
If Nike and Adidas are faced with the game in the figure, we can see that:
A. Nike has a dominant strategy, but Adidas does not.

B. Adidas has a dominant strategy, but Nike does not.
C. Neither company has a dominant strategy.
D. Both companies have a dominant strategy.
9-11
55.
This figure shows the payoffs involved when Sarah and Joe work on a school project together for a single
grade. They both will enjoy a higher grade when more effort is put into the project, but they also get
pleasure from goofing off and not working on the project. The payoffs can be thought of as the utility each
would get from the effort they individually put forth and the grade they jointly receive.
If Sarah and Joe are working on a project together and faced with the choices outlined in the figure
shown, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. both Joe and Sarah put forth low effort.

B. Joe will put forth high effort, and Sarah will put forth low effort.
C. Joe will put forth low effort, and Sarah will put forth high effort.
D. both Joe and Sarah put forth high effort.
56.
9-12

D. a repeated game.
57.
D. an ultimatum.
58.
9-13
According to the figure shown, if Joe puts forth high effort, then Sarah should:
A. put forth high effort.

B. put forth low effort.
C. leave school.
59.
According to the figure shown, if Sarah puts forth low effort, then Joe should:

9-14
60.
According to the figure shown, Joe:
A. has a dominant strategy to put forth high effort.

C. has a dominant strategy to put forth low effort.
D. will reach an optimum outcome by acting in his own self-interest.
61.
9-15
According to the figure shown, Sarah:
A. should put forth low effort, regardless of what Joe chooses to do.
B. should put forth high effort, regardless of what Joe choose to do.
D. should take the first-mover advantage and put forth low effort.
62.

B. both will act in their own self-interest and get a stable, but less than optimum, equilibrium.
C. both will act in their own self-interest and get an optimum equilibrium that is stable.
D. both have incentive to put forth high effort.
63.
9-16
The outcome of the game in the figure shown will be:
A. Joe puts forth high effort and Sarah puts forth low effort.
B. Joe puts forth low effort and Sarah puts forth high effort.
C. Joe and Sarah both put forth low effort.
D. Joe and Sarah both put forth high effort.
64.
The outcome of the game in the figure shown predicts that Joe will earn utility of:
A. 5.
B. 7.
C. 9.
D. 13.
9-17
65.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Sarah will earn utility of:
A. 6.
B. 10.
C. 7.
D. 15.
66.
9-18
If Joe and Sarah are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can see that:
A. Joe has a dominant strategy, but Sarah does not.

B. Sarah has a dominant strategy, but Joe does not.
C. neither student has a dominant strategy.
D. both students have a dominant strategy.
67.
Assume that Joe and Sarah, from the figure shown, are also dating, in addition to working together on the
joint school project. Further assume that Joe is madly in love with Sarah, who is an excellent student.
Sarah tells Joe that she will break up with him if he does not put forth high effort on this project. This
future punishment by Sarah is an example of:
A. a commitment strategy.
B. an effort optimization strategy.
C. an ultimatum.
D. a bargaining strategy.
68. Games that don't have a dominant strategy:

A. do not have stable equilibrium outcomes.
B. may have stable equilibrium outcomes.
C. always have stable equilibrium outcomes.
D. don't exist; all games have at least one dominant strategy.
69. If there is no single strategy that is best regardless of other players’ behavior:
A. there is no dominant strategy.
B. the dominant strategy will be to defect.
C. a noncooperative equilibrium is the only possible outcome.
D. the game is called a Prisoners’ dilemma.
9-19
70.
This figure displays the choices and payoffs (company profits) of two music shops-MiiTunes and The
Rock Shop. MiiTunes is an established business in the area deciding whether to charge its usual high
prices or to charge very low prices, in the hopes that a new business will not be able to make a profit at
such low prices. The Rock Shop is trying to decide whether or not it should enter the market and compete
with MiiTunes.
If MiiTunes and The Rock Shop are both in the music business and faced with the choices outlined in the
figure shown, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. MiiTunes charges low prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
B. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop enters.
C. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
D. MiiTunes charges low prices and The Rock Shop enters.
71.
with MiiTunes.
9-20
figure, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
B. there is more than one stable outcome to this game.
C. there is no stable outcome to this game.
D. None of these statements is true.
72.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, if MiiTunes charges low prices, The Rock Shop should:
A. enter the market and earn $4 million.

B. enter the market and lose $2 million.
C. not enter the market and earn $0.
D. It cannot be determined what The Rock Shop will do.
9-21
73.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, if The Rock Shop enters the market, MiiTunes should:

D. give an ultimatum to The Rock Shop.
74.
with MiiTunes.
9-22
According to the figure, MiiTunes:
A. has a dominant strategy to charge low prices.

C. has a dominant strategy to charge high prices.
D. has more than one dominant strategy.
75.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, The Rock Shop:
A. should enter the market, regardless of what MiiTunes chooses to do.

B. should not enter the market, regardless of what MiiTunes chooses to do.
9-23
76.
with MiiTunes.
Given the dominant strategy of MiiTunes according to the figure, we can predict that The Rock Shop:
A. will enter and enjoy profits of $4 million.

B. will enter and lose $2 million.
C. will not enter and earn $0.
D. Their actions cannot be predicted because they do not have a dominant strategy.
77.
with MiiTunes.
9-24
The game between music stores in the figure shows us that:
A. only The Rock Shop has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
B. only MiiTunes has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
C. neither store has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
78.
with MiiTunes.
If the two music stores are faced with the game in the figure, we can see that:
A. The Rock Shop has a dominant strategy, but MiiTunes does not.
B. MiiTunes has a dominant strategy, but The Rock Shop does not.
C. neither store has a dominant strategy.
D. both stores have a dominant strategy.
79. A noncooperative equilibrium is one in which:

A. the participants act independently, pursuing only their individual interests.
B. always results in a negative-negative outcome.
C. a dominant strategy exists for both players.
D. each player ignores the actions of the other players.
80. Games:
A. only have one outcome possible.
B. with noncooperative equilibriums are always negative-negative outcomes.
C. may have several stable outcomes.
D. must have a dominant strategy present to reach a stable equilibrium.
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81. Games:
A. will always have a dominant strategy.
B. are always zero sum.
C. will always have several stable outcomes.
D. None of the above are true.
82. Games:
A. only have one possible stable outcome.
B. may have noncooperative equilibriums that are positive-positive outcomes.
C. must have a dominant strategy present in order to reach an equilibrium.
83. Games with a noncooperative equilibrium:

A. always result in a negative-negative outcome.
B. always result in a positive-positive outcome.
C. can result in either a positive-positive or negative-negative outcome.
D. always result in a positive-negative outcome (zero-sum).
84. Games with a negative-negative outcome:

A. must have a noncooperative equilibrium.
B. are not necessarily the best outcome for the players involved.
C. result from players acting in their own self-interest.
85. Cooperative equilibriums:

A. are impossible to reach in real life.
B. never occur unless players act in their own self-interest.
C. never result in positive-positive outcomes.
D. can arise if a game is repeated.
86. A Nash equilibrium:

A. is reached when all players choose the best strategy they can, given the choices of all other players.
B. is a point in a game when no player has an incentive to change his or her strategy, given what the
other players are doing.
C. is a stable outcome of a game.
87. When all players in a game choose the best strategy they can, given the choices of all other players, it
is always a:
A. Nash equilibrium.
B. positive-positive outcome.
C. cooperative equilibrium.
D. negative-negative equilibrium.
88. Reaching a Nash equilibrium means that:

A. the outcome will be positive-positive.
B. a cooperative equilibrium has been reached.
C. the players have reached a stable outcome where neither would wish to change his strategy once he
finds out what the other player is doing.
D. the players have failed to reach a stable outcome because one player will always wish to change his
strategy once he finds out what the other player is doing.

A. a stable outcome has been reached.
B. there is no stable outcome to the game.
C. the players will never reach a positive-positive outcome.
9-26
D. each player has achieved their highest payoff in the game.
90. Once a Nash equilibrium has been found in a game:

B. the players have no incentive to change their choice.
C. the players always have an incentive to change their choice.
D. no one in the game can be made better off.
91. A commitment strategy is an agreement in which players agree to:

A. submit to a penalty in the future if they defect from a given strategy.
B. cooperate before the game begins.
C. cooperate in repeated games until someone defects.
D. None of these is a definition of a commitment strategy.
92. A commitment strategy can:

A. be used to change people's payoffs to gain cooperation.
B. allow players to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium that would otherwise be difficult to maintain.
C. result in a positive-positive outcome.
93. For a commitment strategy to work:

A. the punishment must be so bad that it outweighs the incentive to defect in the game.
B. the punishment must occur immediately after the game is played.
C. both players must agree to a punishment.
D. no player may have a dominant strategy.
94. Cooperation in prisoner's dilemma-type games:

A. always benefits the players and the public.
B. always benefits the players, but does not always benefit the public.
C. doesn't always benefit the players, but always benefits the public.
D. doesn't always benefit the players or the public.
95. Reaching a positive-positive outcome through a commitment strategy:

A. will only benefit the players and will not serve public interest.
B. will not benefit anyone.
C. can benefit everyone.
D. will always benefit everyone.
96. When competing firms have a commitment strategy, it is called:

A. collusion.
B. competitive cooperation.
C. predatory pricing.
D. competition.
97. Collusion is a situation where businesses:

A. agree to cooperate, and the U.S. government works hard to encourage this behavior.
B. have noncooperative outcomes, because they compete outside the public eye.
C. agree to cooperate, and their behavior does not serve the public interest.
D. act in their own self-interest and ignore what the other businesses are doing.
98. Collusion:
A. occurs only when no dominant strategy is present.
B. is a cooperative outcome between competitors.
C. is observed, but economists cannot theoretically model it.
D. is a theoretical concept that is rarely observed.
9-27
99. When businesses cooperate and agree to hold prices high, it is called ____________, and when they
reach a noncooperative equilibrium it is called _______________.
A. collusion; competition
B. competition; collusion
C. commitment strategy; collusion
D. collusion; commitment strategy
100. Collusion:
A. rarely occurs in reality.
B. never occurs in reality.
C. has not occurred in the last hundred years or so, due to government policy outlawing it.
D. is a common problem in reality.
101. Economists call a game that is played more than once:

A. a repeated game.
B. collusion.
C. a commitment strategy.
D. cooperative price play.
102. Strategies and incentives:

A. work the same whether games are played once or repeated.
B. often work quite differently when games are repeated.
C. do not change when the game is repeated.
103. In repeated games:

A. players no longer need commitment strategies to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
B. players will never reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
C. there are no dominant strategies.
D. negative-negative outcomes are the only outcomes possible.

A. a noncooperative outcome is more likely than in a single-round game.
B. cooperation never happens.
C. a cooperative outcome is more likely than in a single-round game.
D. players always cooperate and enjoy a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
105. Commitment strategies:

A. are not necessary to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium in repeated games.
B. are always needed to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium in single-round games.
C. usually fail to work.
D. are not observed in reality.
106. The tit-for-tat strategy is:

A. one in which a player in a repeated game takes the same action that his or her opponent did in the
preceding round.
B. one in which both players explicitly agree to compete in the first round of a repeated game, and if one
of them cooperates, the other will defect.
C. not effective in prisoner's dilemma type games.
107. The tit-for-tat strategy:

A. is not effective in repeated games.
B. is not possible in single-round games.
C. makes cooperation unlikely.
9-28
108. If each player responds by imitating the action of his opponent in the previous round of a repeating
game, the players are following a:
A. repeated cooperation agreement.
B. collusion plan.
C. commitment strategy.
D. tit-for-tat strategy.
109. If one player defects in a repeated game, and his opponent is following a tit-for-tat strategy, we can
predict the opponent will:
A. defect in the next round.
B. renegotiate.
C. cooperate and try to get his opponent to follow.
D. collude.
110. If you are following a tit-for-tat strategy in a repeated game, and your opponent makes a cooperative
move, you will:
A. collude.
B. make a cooperative move in the next round.
C. price compete.
D. defect.
111. Two players who are both playing tit-for-tat can quickly find their way toward:
A. lasting cooperation.
B. noncooperative outcomes for the remaining rounds.
C. a cycle of cooperation and noncooperation, similar to a business cycle.
112. For players in a repeated-play game to achieve cooperation:

A. the players must reach an explicit agreement to cooperate.
B. the players need not explicitly state an agreement to cooperate, but must publicly display a
commitment strategy.
C. there is no need to enter into public commitment strategies or explicit agreements.
D. there is no need for players to collude.
113. Explicit agreements between businesses to keep prices high:

A. are illegal.
B. are called collusion.
C. are not in the public's best interests.
114. Which of the following is a subtle way for a company to reassure their competitors that it is
committed to a tit-for-tat strategy?
A. Setting prices below cost
B. Price-matching guarantees
C. Collusion
D. Offering a commitment strategy
115. A key to gaining cooperative behavior in a repeated game is:

A. that the game must be repeated indefinitely.
B. there must be a definitive end to the game.
C. the players must commit to always acting in their own self-interest.
D. at least one player must have a dominant strategy.
116. When one player has to make a decision before the other player, the situation is called a:
A. commitment game.
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B. simultaneous game.
C. sequential game.
D. prisoner's dilemma.
117. In sequential games, an especially important part of strategic behavior is to:

A. "think backward, work forward."
B. "think forward, work backward."
C. "think forward, act backward."
D. "think backward, act forward."
118. The process of analyzing a problem in reverse-starting with the last choice, then the second-to-last
choice, and so on, to determine the optimal strategy-is called:
A. backward induction.
B. backward thinking.
C. forward thinking.
D. backward working.
119. Backward induction involves:

A. a process of analyzing a problem in reverse.
B. thinking forward and working backward.
C. starting with the last choice and working backward to determine an optimal strategy.
120. Backward induction is a useful tool for:

A. finding an optimal strategy in a sequential game.
B. analyzing the decisions in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
C. finding an optimal strategy in a simultaneous game.
D. Backward induction is useful in any of these games.
121. A way to summarize the actions and payoffs of a sequential game is to use a:
A. decision matrix.
B. decision tree.
C. payoff tree.
D. flowchart.
122. Using a decision tree:

A. allows a player to see his optimal strategy in a simultaneous game.
B. can help identify the dominant strategies in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
C. allows a player to see his optimal strategy in a sequential game.
D. can help define a binding commitment strategy.
123.
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This figure displays the choices being made by two coffee shops: Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts. Both
companies are trying to decide whether or not to expand in an area. The area can handle only one of
them expanding, and whoever expands will cause the other to lose some business. If they both expand,
the market will be saturated, and neither company will do well. The payoffs are the additional profits (or
losses) they will earn.
The game in the figure is shown using a:
A. decision tree.
B. decision matrix.
C. flowchart.
D. graph.
124.
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D. a repeated game.
125.
According to the figure shown, if Starbucks expands in the market, then Dunkin Donuts should:
A. also expand their business.

B. not expand.
C. give an ultimatum.
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126.
According to the figure shown, if Dunkin Donuts expands, then Starbucks should:

B. not expand.
127.
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According to the figure shown, Starbucks:
A. has a dominant strategy to expand.

B. has a dominant strategy not to expand.
C. has first-mover advantage.
D. should wait to see what Dunkin Donuts is going to do.
128.
According to the figure shown, Dunkin Donuts:
A. should expand, regardless of what Starbucks chooses to do.

B. should not expand, regardless of what Starbucks chooses to do.
D. does not have a dominant strategy.
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129.
A. Starbucks will expand and Dunkin Donuts will not.

B. Starbucks will not expand and Dunkin Donuts will.
C. Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts will both expand.
D. neither Starbucks nor Dunkin Donuts will expand.
130.
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The outcome of the game in the figure shown predicts that Starbucks will earn profits of:
A. $2 million.
B. $1 million.
C. $0 million.
D. $2 million.
131.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Dunkin Donuts will earn:
A. $2 million.
B. $1 million.
C. $2 million.
D. $0 million.
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132.
If Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can see that:
A. Starbucks has a dominant strategy, but Dunkin Donuts does not.

B. Dunkin Donuts has a dominant strategy, but Starbucks does not.
C. neither company has a dominant strategy.
D. both companies have a dominant strategy.
133. A game with a first-mover advantage is one in which:

A. the player who chooses first gets a higher payoff than those who follow.
B. the player who chooses first gets to decide if a repeated game will start with cooperation from the
beginning.
C. the first player to move determines the payoffs for the rest of the game.
134. First-mover advantage is:

A. most advantageous in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
B. very important in one-round sequential games.
C. likely to lead to a positive-positive outcome.
135. An ultimatum game is:

A. one in which one player makes an offer and the other player has the simple choice of whether to
accept or reject.
B. one in which one player makes an offer and the other player has the choice of whether to accept or
offer a counteroffer.
C. a repeated sequential game.
D. the only game played by unions in reality.
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136. An ultimatum game:
A. is a repeated game.
B. is a simultaneous move game.
C. is when one player makes an offer and the other has to accept or reject.
D. is a realistic way of modeling union negotiations.

A. more important in a repeated game than in a sequential game.
B. more important in a repeated sequential game than in a one-round sequential game.
C. more important to those who have less to bargain with.
D. more important in an ultimatum game than in a repeated game.
138. Repeated play can change the outcome in sequential games by:
A. reducing the first-mover advantage.
B. removing the incentive to cooperate.
C. making collusion more probable.
D. increasing the incentive to defect.
139. The ability to make counteroffers transforms bargaining from a game in which ___________ trumps
everything to a game in which ____________ is the winning strategy.
A. patience; first-mover advantage
B. commitment strategy; self-interested behavior
C. first-mover advantage; patience
D. first-mover advantage; cooperation
140. ___________ is a winning strategy in a game of bargaining.

A. First-mover advantage
B. Patience
C. Cooperation
D. Self-interested behavior
141. In a game of bargaining, those who _______________ will likely get the highest payoff.
A. are patient
B. are cooperative
C. have a commitment strategy
D. collude
142. In a game of bargaining, the player who is willing to:

A. be cooperative has more bargaining power and so receives a worse payoff.
B. hold out longer has more bargaining power and so receives a worse payoff.
C. hold out longer has more bargaining power and so receives a better payoff.
D. make the first move has more bargaining power and so receives a better payoff.
143. In the real world, it is likely that wage negotiations:

A. drag on for years to see which side is more patient.
B. often end with the company enjoying a larger payoff, since they can afford to be more patient.
C. often end with the worker's enjoying a larger payoff, since they are not losing as much in profit as the
company.
D. do not drag on for years.
144. In the real world, wage negotiations typically do not drag on for years:
A. because the company can simply offer the split that would eventually occur if the two sides played all
the rounds.
B. because neither a company nor employees can afford to not work for that long.
C. unless the employees play an ultimatum game using a union to negotiate.
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145. Using a commitment strategy in:
A. a simultaneous game can alter payoffs, but has no effect in sequential games.
B. a simultaneous game has no effect, but can alter the payoffs and outcome of sequential games.
C. either a simultaneous or sequential game has little impact on payoffs or outcome.
D. either a simultaneous or sequential game can greatly alter the payoffs and outcome of the game.
146. By committing to reduce one's options during a sequential game, a player can force a change in his
opponents' strategy, and that commitment strategy results in a:
A. payoff that he likely would have gotten anyway.
B. cooperative equilibrium.
C. payoff that would otherwise be out of reach.
D. negative-negative outcome.
147. The famous historical example of the commitment strategy used by Cortes against the Aztecs is
sometimes referred to as:
A. "burning your boats."
B. "burning your bridges."
C. "friendly fire."
D. "putting all your eggs in one basket."
Chapter 09 Test Bank KEY

1. While everyone wants a clean environment, it can be very hard to achieve. An approach governments
could take to promote that outcome is to:
A. create social norms.
B. create and enforce strict laws and heavy fines.
C. influence individual's incentives.
D. All of these are ways governments can get the "green" behavior they want.
AACSB: Reflective Thinking
Accessibility: Keyboard Navigation
Blooms: Understand
Difficulty: 02 Medium
Learning Objective: 09-01 Understand strategic behavior and describe the components of a strategic game.
Topic: Game Theory
2. The prisoner's dilemma is a game of strategy:

A. in which people make rational choices that lead to a less-than-ideal result for all.
B. in which people make rational choices that lead to the ideal result for all.
C. that leads everyone to be as well off as possible without making another worse off.
D. that leads people to make irrational choices that lead to the ideal result for all.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
Topic: Prisoners Dilemma
3. To economists, games are:

A. just recreational pursuits like chess, Monopoly, or poker.
B. any situation in which players pursue strategies designed to achieve their goals.
C. situations in which individuals act against their own interest for fun.
D. None of these statements are true.
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Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
4. To economists, a game is:

A. any situation in which players pursue strategies designed to achieve their goals.
B. a trivial pursuit that should not be used to analyze the economy or its actors.
C. a way to simplify and minimize the true importance of situations like war.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
5. Economic games can be used to analyze decisions around which of the following situations?
A. War
B. Business
C. Environmental protection
D. All of these situations.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
6. The study of how people behave strategically under different circumstances is called:
A. game theory.
B. game strategy.
C. strategy optimization.
D. strategy theory.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
7. Game theory is:

B. used by economists to evaluate behavior in a variety of settings.
C. a useful tool in predicting strategic behavior.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
8. Game theory is:

B. used to predict the winners of only certain types of strategic games.
C. used to evaluate the microeconomic choices that involve probabilities of different outcomes.
D. the study of games of chance like solitaire or betting on horse races.
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Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
9. When the trade-offs you face are determined by the choices someone else will make, behaving
rationally involves:
A. behaving strategically.
B. ignoring the behavior of other actors.
C. acting in a way to help others.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
10. Behaving strategically:

A. means recognizing that the actions of others will affect the trade-offs you face, and acting accordingly.
B. is an essential part of game theory.
C. involves rational decision making.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
11. Behaving strategically means:

A. evaluating decisions in which players act in their own self-interest, but the interplay of those decisions
does not exist.
B. acting to achieve a goal by withholding key information from the person with whom an exchange is
being made.
C. acting to achieve a goal by anticipating the interplay between your own and others' decisions.
D. evaluating the impact of your choices on an uninvolved third party.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
12. When your outcomes depend on another's choices, asking __________________ is the key to good
decision making.
A. how will others respond
B. what the wants and constraints are of those involved
C. what the trade-offs are
D. why everyone isn't already doing it
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory

A. Multiple players
B. Strategies
C. Payoffs
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D. All games involve all of these things.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory

A. Rules
B. Chance events
C. Dice
D. Cards
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory

A. Strategies
B. Someone to enforce the rules
C. Cards or dice
D. Full information
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory

A. A predictable outcome
B. Payoffs
C. Full information
D. A game master
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
17. In games, rules:

A. define the actions that are allowed in a game.
B. need to be loosely adhered to in order to predict an outcome.
C. define the winners of a game.
D. outline the wrong choices that could be made in a game.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
18. In real life, people's behavior is constrained by:

A. laws of nature.
B. legislated rules of society.
C. costs of various actions.
D. All of these are rules that constrain people's behavior.
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Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
19. An example of a real-life rule that might constrain people's behavior is:
A. minimum wage legislation.
B. having 24 hours in a day.
C. the earth's limited supply of oil.
D. All of these are examples of real-life rules.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
20. In games, strategies are:

A. the outcomes players want to achieve.
B. the same for everyone to achieve the same goal.
C. the plans of action that players follow to achieve their goals.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
21. In games, the strategy to reach a particular goal:

A. is the same for everyone.
B. can be different for different players and still achieve the same goal.
C. should be similar to what others have chosen to reach the same goal.
D. has begun to be documented by economists.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
22. In games:
A. there is only one strategy associated with each outcome.
B. there are several strategies that can achieve a single goal.
C. all strategies followed in one particular game should all be similar in order to be successful.
D. if one person's strategy is wildly different from those of others, he will typically come in first or last.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
23. Payoffs are:

A. the rewards that come from particular actions.
B. always monetary.
C. things that are only enjoyed by the winner.
D. bribes made to gain some advantage unfairly during a game.
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Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
24. An example of a payoff in a game would be:

A. a salary.
B. winning an election.
C. having clean drinking water.
D. All of these are examples of payoffs.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
25. In game theory, an example of a payoff could be:

A. being the first mover in a game.
B. sharing information with a select few that others aren't privy to.
C. monetary gains made by a player.
D. giving an advantage to only one player.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
26. The prisoner's dilemma game can involve:

A. only two players.
B. more than two players.
C. multiple organizations.
Blooms: Understand
Learning Objective: 09-02 Explain why noncooperation is a dominant strategy in the prisoners' dilemma.
27. The prisoner's dilemma:

A. can be summarized in a payoff matrix.
B. can involve two players.
C. leads to a less-than-ideal outcome for all players.
Blooms: Understand
28. The prisoner's dilemma can be summarized in:

A. a strategy matrix.
B. a strategy tree.
C. a decision matrix.
D. a flowchart.
Blooms: Understand
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29. A decision matrix:

A. summarizes the players, strategies, and payoffs associated with a game.
B. outlines the clear outcome of any strategy-based game.
C. shows only the decisions of one player.
D. is not useful in evaluating the strategic choices.
Blooms: Understand
30. When a strategy is the best one to follow no matter what strategy other players choose, it is called a:
A. golden decision.
B. dominated strategy.
C. dominant strategy.
D. zero-sum strategy.
Blooms: Understand
31. A dominant strategy is one:

A. that is the best one to follow, no matter what strategy other players choose.
B. in which a player is forced to choose given the rules of the game.
C. in which a player must choose, even though it does not optimize his outcome.
D. provides a player with the highest payoff in the game.
Blooms: Understand
32. A dominant strategy:

A. exists in every game.
B. is the best one to follow no matter what strategy other players choose.
C. is always the same for all players of a game.
D. awards the highest achievable payoff in a game.
Blooms: Understand

A. there is a dominant strategy for both players.
B. there is a dominant strategy for only one player.
C. there is no dominant strategy for either player.
D. there is a dominant strategy for a player depending on what the other player does.
Blooms: Understand
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34. In the prisoner's dilemma:

A. a dominant strategy exists for only one player.
B. a non-cooperative outcome is predicted.
C. a cooperative win-win outcome can be predicted.
Blooms: Understand

B. only one player has a dominant strategy.
C. a stable outcome is possible.
D. a commitment strategy is needed to reach a stable outcome.
Blooms: Understand

A. a cooperative strategy can lead to a more beneficial outcome for both players.
B. a noncooperative strategy will lead to a positive-positive outcome.
C. a stable outcome is impossible.
D. neither player has a dominant strategy.
Blooms: Understand

A. neither player has a dominant strategy.
B. both players have a dominant strategy.
C. only one player will ever have a dominant strategy.
D. All of these may be true in a prisoner's dilemma game.
Blooms: Understand
38. The prisoner's dilemma game can be used to describe

A. the game Rock Paper Scissors
B. why candidates in elections go negative.
C. how individuals acting in their self-interest leads to the best outcome overall.
D. a zero sum game.
Blooms: Understand
9-46
39. The prisoner's dilemma game:
A. is a zero sum game.
B. is a game of chance.
C. is a game with no dominant strategies.
D. is a game with a stable equilibrium.
Blooms: Understand

A. if players can communicate in advance, they will always cooperate.
B. if players can communicate in advance, they may still not cooperate.
C. will always choose to cooperate.
D. will only cooperate if they are trustworthy.
Blooms: Understand
41. The players of prisoner's dilemma-type games:

A. would be much better off if they could cooperate.
B. have an incentive to never cooperate.
C. have a dominant strategy to never cooperate.
Blooms: Understand
42.
The figure shown portrays a game using a:
A. decision tree.
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B. decision matrix.
C. flowchart.
D. graph.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Decision Matrix
43.

D. a repeated game.
Blooms: Understand
44.
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D. an ultimatum.
Blooms: Understand
45.
According to the figure shown, if Nike charges a high price, then Adidas should:

Blooms: Understand
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46.
According to the figure shown, if Adidas charges a low price, then Nike should:

B. leave the market.
C. charge a low price.
Blooms: Understand
47.
According to the figure shown, Nike:
A. has a dominant strategy to charge a high price.

C. will reach an optimum outcome by acting in its own self-interest.
D. has a dominant strategy to charge a low price.
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Blooms: Understand
48.
According to the figure shown, Adidas:
A. should charge a low price, regardless of what Nike chooses to do.

B. should charge a high price, regardless of what Nike chooses to do.
D. should take the first-mover advantage and charge a low price.
Blooms: Understand
49.
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B. both players will act in their own self-interest and get a stable, but less than optimum, equilibrium.
C. both players will act in their own self-interest and get an optimum equilibrium that is stable.
D. both players have an incentive to charge a low price and undercut the competition.
Blooms: Understand
50.
The stable outcome of the game in the figure shown will be:
A. Nike charges a high price, and Adidas charges a low price.

B. Nike charges a low price, and Adidas charges a high price.
C. Nike and Adidas both charge a low price.
D. Nike and Adidas both charge a high price.
Blooms: Understand
51.
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The outcome of the game in the figure show predicts that Nike will earn profits of:
A. $2 million.
B. $4 million.
C. $10 million.
D. $15 million.
Blooms: Understand
52.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Adidas will earn:
A. $2 million.
B. $8 million.
C. $6 million.
D. $10 million.
Blooms: Understand
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53.
If Nike and Adidas are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can predict:
A. an outcome that is good for society and less than ideal for the companies.
B. an outcome that is less than ideal for society, but optimal for the companies.
C. that both will follow their dominant strategy and society will lose.
D. None of these is likely to happen.
Blooms: Understand
54.
If Nike and Adidas are faced with the game in the figure, we can see that:
A. Nike has a dominant strategy, but Adidas does not.

B. Adidas has a dominant strategy, but Nike does not.
C. Neither company has a dominant strategy.
D. Both companies have a dominant strategy.
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Blooms: Understand
55.
If Sarah and Joe are working on a project together and faced with the choices outlined in the figure
shown, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. both Joe and Sarah put forth low effort.

B. Joe will put forth high effort, and Sarah will put forth low effort.
C. Joe will put forth low effort, and Sarah will put forth high effort.
D. both Joe and Sarah put forth high effort.
Blooms: Understand
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56.

D. a repeated game.
Blooms: Understand
57.
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D. an ultimatum.
Blooms: Understand
58.
According to the figure shown, if Joe puts forth high effort, then Sarah should:

C. leave school.
Blooms: Understand
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59.
According to the figure shown, if Sarah puts forth low effort, then Joe should:

Blooms: Understand
60.
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According to the figure shown, Joe:
A. has a dominant strategy to put forth high effort.

C. has a dominant strategy to put forth low effort.
D. will reach an optimum outcome by acting in his own self-interest.
Blooms: Understand
61.
According to the figure shown, Sarah:
A. should put forth low effort, regardless of what Joe chooses to do.
B. should put forth high effort, regardless of what Joe choose to do.
D. should take the first-mover advantage and put forth low effort.
Blooms: Understand
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62.

B. both will act in their own self-interest and get a stable, but less than optimum, equilibrium.
C. both will act in their own self-interest and get an optimum equilibrium that is stable.
D. both have incentive to put forth high effort.
Blooms: Understand
63.
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A. Joe puts forth high effort and Sarah puts forth low effort.
B. Joe puts forth low effort and Sarah puts forth high effort.
C. Joe and Sarah both put forth low effort.
D. Joe and Sarah both put forth high effort.
Blooms: Understand
64.
The outcome of the game in the figure shown predicts that Joe will earn utility of:
A. 5.
B. 7.
C. 9.
D. 13.
Blooms: Understand
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65.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Sarah will earn utility of:
A. 6.
B. 10.
C. 7.
D. 15.
Blooms: Understand
66.
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If Joe and Sarah are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can see that:
A. Joe has a dominant strategy, but Sarah does not.

B. Sarah has a dominant strategy, but Joe does not.
C. neither student has a dominant strategy.
D. both students have a dominant strategy.
Blooms: Understand
67.
Assume that Joe and Sarah, from the figure shown, are also dating, in addition to working together on the
joint school project. Further assume that Joe is madly in love with Sarah, who is an excellent student.
Sarah tells Joe that she will break up with him if he does not put forth high effort on this project. This
future punishment by Sarah is an example of:
A. a commitment strategy.
B. an effort optimization strategy.
C. an ultimatum.
D. a bargaining strategy.
Blooms: Understand
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68. Games that don't have a dominant strategy:

A. do not have stable equilibrium outcomes.
B. may have stable equilibrium outcomes.
C. always have stable equilibrium outcomes.
D. don't exist; all games have at least one dominant strategy.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Learning Objective: 09-03 Identify whether or not a player has a dominant strategy in a one-time game.
Topic: Dominant Strategy
69. If there is no single strategy that is best regardless of other players’ behavior:
A. there is no dominant strategy.
B. the dominant strategy will be to defect.
C. a noncooperative equilibrium is the only possible outcome.
D. the game is called a Prisoners’ dilemma.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
70.
with MiiTunes.
figure shown, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. MiiTunes charges low prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
B. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop enters.
C. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
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D. MiiTunes charges low prices and The Rock Shop enters.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
71.
with MiiTunes.
figure, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
B. there is more than one stable outcome to this game.
C. there is no stable outcome to this game.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
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72.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, if MiiTunes charges low prices, The Rock Shop should:
A. enter the market and earn $4 million.

B. enter the market and lose $2 million.
C. not enter the market and earn $0.
D. It cannot be determined what The Rock Shop will do.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
73.
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with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, if The Rock Shop enters the market, MiiTunes should:

D. give an ultimatum to The Rock Shop.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
74.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, MiiTunes:
A. has a dominant strategy to charge low prices.

C. has a dominant strategy to charge high prices.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
9-67
75.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, The Rock Shop:
A. should enter the market, regardless of what MiiTunes chooses to do.

B. should not enter the market, regardless of what MiiTunes chooses to do.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
76.
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with MiiTunes.
Given the dominant strategy of MiiTunes according to the figure, we can predict that The Rock Shop:
A. will enter and enjoy profits of $4 million.

B. will enter and lose $2 million.
C. will not enter and earn $0.
D. Their actions cannot be predicted because they do not have a dominant strategy.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
77.
with MiiTunes.
The game between music stores in the figure shows us that:
A. only The Rock Shop has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
B. only MiiTunes has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
C. neither store has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
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78.
with MiiTunes.
If the two music stores are faced with the game in the figure, we can see that:
A. The Rock Shop has a dominant strategy, but MiiTunes does not.
B. MiiTunes has a dominant strategy, but The Rock Shop does not.
C. neither store has a dominant strategy.
D. both stores have a dominant strategy.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
79. A noncooperative equilibrium is one in which:

A. the participants act independently, pursuing only their individual interests.
B. always results in a negative-negative outcome.
C. a dominant strategy exists for both players.
D. each player ignores the actions of the other players.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Learning Objective: 09-04 Identify whether or not a Nash equilibrium will be reached in a one-time game.
80. Games:
A. only have one outcome possible.
B. with noncooperative equilibriums are always negative-negative outcomes.
C. may have several stable outcomes.
D. must have a dominant strategy present to reach a stable equilibrium.
Blooms: Remember
9-70
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Topic: Game Theory
81. Games:
A. will always have a dominant strategy.
B. are always zero sum.
C. will always have several stable outcomes.
D. None of the above are true.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Topic: Game Theory
82. Games:
A. only have one possible stable outcome.
B. may have noncooperative equilibriums that are positive-positive outcomes.
C. must have a dominant strategy present in order to reach an equilibrium.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Topic: Game Theory
83. Games with a noncooperative equilibrium:

A. always result in a negative-negative outcome.
B. always result in a positive-positive outcome.
C. can result in either a positive-positive or negative-negative outcome.
D. always result in a positive-negative outcome (zero-sum).
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Topic: Game Theory
84. Games with a negative-negative outcome:

A. must have a noncooperative equilibrium.
B. are not necessarily the best outcome for the players involved.
C. result from players acting in their own self-interest.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Topic: Game Theory
85. Cooperative equilibriums:

A. are impossible to reach in real life.
B. never occur unless players act in their own self-interest.
C. never result in positive-positive outcomes.
D. can arise if a game is repeated.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
9-71
Topic: Game Theory
86. A Nash equilibrium:

A. is reached when all players choose the best strategy they can, given the choices of all other players.
B. is a point in a game when no player has an incentive to change his or her strategy, given what the
other players are doing.
C. is a stable outcome of a game.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Topic: Nash Equilibrium
87. When all players in a game choose the best strategy they can, given the choices of all other players, it
is always a:
A. Nash equilibrium.
B. positive-positive outcome.
C. cooperative equilibrium.
D. negative-negative equilibrium.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy

A. the outcome will be positive-positive.
B. a cooperative equilibrium has been reached.
C. the players have reached a stable outcome where neither would wish to change his strategy once he
finds out what the other player is doing.
D. the players have failed to reach a stable outcome because one player will always wish to change his
strategy once he finds out what the other player is doing.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy

A. a stable outcome has been reached.
B. there is no stable outcome to the game.
C. the players will never reach a positive-positive outcome.
D. each player has achieved their highest payoff in the game.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
90. Once a Nash equilibrium has been found in a game:

B. the players have no incentive to change their choice.
C. the players always have an incentive to change their choice.
D. no one in the game can be made better off.
9-72
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
91. A commitment strategy is an agreement in which players agree to:

A. submit to a penalty in the future if they defect from a given strategy.
B. cooperate before the game begins.
C. cooperate in repeated games until someone defects.
D. None of these is a definition of a commitment strategy.
Blooms: Understand
Learning Objective: 09-05 Explain how a commitment strategy can be used to achieve cooperation in a one-time game.
Topic: Commitment Strategies
92. A commitment strategy can:

A. be used to change people's payoffs to gain cooperation.
B. allow players to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium that would otherwise be difficult to maintain.
C. result in a positive-positive outcome.
Blooms: Understand
93. For a commitment strategy to work:

A. the punishment must be so bad that it outweighs the incentive to defect in the game.
B. the punishment must occur immediately after the game is played.
C. both players must agree to a punishment.
D. no player may have a dominant strategy.
Blooms: Understand
94. Cooperation in prisoner's dilemma-type games:

A. always benefits the players and the public.
B. always benefits the players, but does not always benefit the public.
C. doesn't always benefit the players, but always benefits the public.
D. doesn't always benefit the players or the public.
Blooms: Understand
95. Reaching a positive-positive outcome through a commitment strategy:

A. will only benefit the players and will not serve public interest.
B. will not benefit anyone.
C. can benefit everyone.
D. will always benefit everyone.
9-73
Blooms: Understand
96. When competing firms have a commitment strategy, it is called:

A. collusion.
B. competitive cooperation.
C. predatory pricing.
D. competition.
Blooms: Understand
97. Collusion is a situation where businesses:

A. agree to cooperate, and the U.S. government works hard to encourage this behavior.
B. have noncooperative outcomes, because they compete outside the public eye.
C. agree to cooperate, and their behavior does not serve the public interest.
D. act in their own self-interest and ignore what the other businesses are doing.
Blooms: Understand
98. Collusion:
A. occurs only when no dominant strategy is present.
B. is a cooperative outcome between competitors.
C. is observed, but economists cannot theoretically model it.
D. is a theoretical concept that is rarely observed.
Blooms: Understand
99. When businesses cooperate and agree to hold prices high, it is called ____________, and when they
reach a noncooperative equilibrium it is called _______________.
A. collusion; competition
B. competition; collusion
C. commitment strategy; collusion
D. collusion; commitment strategy
Blooms: Understand
100. Collusion:
A. rarely occurs in reality.
B. never occurs in reality.
C. has not occurred in the last hundred years or so, due to government policy outlawing it.
D. is a common problem in reality.
Blooms: Understand
9-74
101. Economists call a game that is played more than once:

A. a repeated game.
B. collusion.
C. a commitment strategy.
D. cooperative price play.
Blooms: Understand
Learning Objective: 09-06 Explain how repeated play can enable cooperation.
Topic: Repeated Games
102. Strategies and incentives:

A. work the same whether games are played once or repeated.
B. often work quite differently when games are repeated.
C. do not change when the game is repeated.
Blooms: Understand

A. players no longer need commitment strategies to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
B. players will never reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
C. there are no dominant strategies.
D. negative-negative outcomes are the only outcomes possible.
Blooms: Understand

A. a noncooperative outcome is more likely than in a single-round game.
B. cooperation never happens.
C. a cooperative outcome is more likely than in a single-round game.
D. players always cooperate and enjoy a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
Blooms: Understand
105. Commitment strategies:

A. are not necessary to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium in repeated games.
B. are always needed to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium in single-round games.
C. usually fail to work.
D. are not observed in reality.
Blooms: Understand
9-75
106. The tit-for-tat strategy is:

A. one in which a player in a repeated game takes the same action that his or her opponent did in the
preceding round.
B. one in which both players explicitly agree to compete in the first round of a repeated game, and if one
of them cooperates, the other will defect.
C. not effective in prisoner's dilemma type games.
Blooms: Understand
107. The tit-for-tat strategy:

A. is not effective in repeated games.
B. is not possible in single-round games.
C. makes cooperation unlikely.
Blooms: Understand
108. If each player responds by imitating the action of his opponent in the previous round of a repeating
game, the players are following a:
A. repeated cooperation agreement.
B. collusion plan.
C. commitment strategy.
D. tit-for-tat strategy.
Blooms: Understand
109. If one player defects in a repeated game, and his opponent is following a tit-for-tat strategy, we can
predict the opponent will:
A. defect in the next round.
B. renegotiate.
C. cooperate and try to get his opponent to follow.
D. collude.
Blooms: Understand
110. If you are following a tit-for-tat strategy in a repeated game, and your opponent makes a cooperative
move, you will:
A. collude.
B. make a cooperative move in the next round.
C. price compete.
D. defect.
9-76
Blooms: Understand
111. Two players who are both playing tit-for-tat can quickly find their way toward:
A. lasting cooperation.
B. noncooperative outcomes for the remaining rounds.
C. a cycle of cooperation and noncooperation, similar to a business cycle.
Blooms: Understand
112. For players in a repeated-play game to achieve cooperation:

A. the players must reach an explicit agreement to cooperate.
B. the players need not explicitly state an agreement to cooperate, but must publicly display a
commitment strategy.
C. there is no need to enter into public commitment strategies or explicit agreements.
D. there is no need for players to collude.
Blooms: Understand
113. Explicit agreements between businesses to keep prices high:

A. are illegal.
B. are called collusion.
C. are not in the public's best interests.
Blooms: Understand
114. Which of the following is a subtle way for a company to reassure their competitors that it is
committed to a tit-for-tat strategy?
A. Setting prices below cost
B. Price-matching guarantees
C. Collusion
D. Offering a commitment strategy
Blooms: Understand
115. A key to gaining cooperative behavior in a repeated game is:

A. that the game must be repeated indefinitely.
B. there must be a definitive end to the game.
C. the players must commit to always acting in their own self-interest.
D. at least one player must have a dominant strategy.
9-77
Blooms: Understand
116. When one player has to make a decision before the other player, the situation is called a:
A. commitment game.
B. simultaneous game.
C. sequential game.
D. prisoner's dilemma.
Blooms: Understand
Learning Objective: 09-07 Explain how backward induction can be used to make decisions.
Topic: Sequential Games
117. In sequential games, an especially important part of strategic behavior is to:

A. "think backward, work forward."
B. "think forward, work backward."
C. "think forward, act backward."
D. "think backward, act forward."
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Backward Induction
118. The process of analyzing a problem in reverse-starting with the last choice, then the second-to-last
choice, and so on, to determine the optimal strategy-is called:
A. backward induction.
B. backward thinking.
C. forward thinking.
D. backward working.
Blooms: Understand
119. Backward induction involves:

A. a process of analyzing a problem in reverse.
B. thinking forward and working backward.
C. starting with the last choice and working backward to determine an optimal strategy.
Blooms: Understand
120. Backward induction is a useful tool for:

A. finding an optimal strategy in a sequential game.
B. analyzing the decisions in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
C. finding an optimal strategy in a simultaneous game.
D. Backward induction is useful in any of these games.
9-78
Blooms: Understand
121. A way to summarize the actions and payoffs of a sequential game is to use a:
A. decision matrix.
B. decision tree.
C. payoff tree.
D. flowchart.
AACSB: Knowledge Application
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
Learning Objective: 09-08 Use a decision tree to solve a sequential game.
Topic: Decision Trees
122. Using a decision tree:

A. allows a player to see his optimal strategy in a simultaneous game.
B. can help identify the dominant strategies in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
C. allows a player to see his optimal strategy in a sequential game.
D. can help define a binding commitment strategy.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
123.
The game in the figure is shown using a:
9-79
A. decision tree.
B. decision matrix.
C. flowchart.
D. graph.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
124.

D. a repeated game.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
Topic: Sequential Games
9-80
125.
According to the figure shown, if Starbucks expands in the market, then Dunkin Donuts should:

B. not expand.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
126.
9-81
According to the figure shown, if Dunkin Donuts expands, then Starbucks should:

B. not expand.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
127.
According to the figure shown, Starbucks:
A. has a dominant strategy to expand.

B. has a dominant strategy not to expand.
D. should wait to see what Dunkin Donuts is going to do.
9-82
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
Topic: First Mover Advantage
128.
According to the figure shown, Dunkin Donuts:
A. should expand, regardless of what Starbucks chooses to do.

B. should not expand, regardless of what Starbucks chooses to do.
D. does not have a dominant strategy.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
9-83
129.
A. Starbucks will expand and Dunkin Donuts will not.

B. Starbucks will not expand and Dunkin Donuts will.
C. Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts will both expand.
D. neither Starbucks nor Dunkin Donuts will expand.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
130.
9-84
The outcome of the game in the figure shown predicts that Starbucks will earn profits of:
A. $2 million.
B. $1 million.
C. $0 million.
D. $2 million.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
131.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Dunkin Donuts will earn:
A. $2 million.
B. $1 million.
C. $2 million.
D. $0 million.
9-85
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
132.
If Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can see that:
A. Starbucks has a dominant strategy, but Dunkin Donuts does not.

B. Dunkin Donuts has a dominant strategy, but Starbucks does not.
C. neither company has a dominant strategy.
D. both companies have a dominant strategy.
Blooms: Apply
Difficulty: 03 Hard
133. A game with a first-mover advantage is one in which:

A. the player who chooses first gets a higher payoff than those who follow.
B. the player who chooses first gets to decide if a repeated game will start with cooperation from the
beginning.
C. the first player to move determines the payoffs for the rest of the game.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
Learning Objective: 09-09 Define first-mover advantage and identify it in practice.
9-86
A. most advantageous in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
B. very important in one-round sequential games.
C. likely to lead to a positive-positive outcome.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
135. An ultimatum game is:

A. one in which one player makes an offer and the other player has the simple choice of whether to
accept or reject.
B. one in which one player makes an offer and the other player has the choice of whether to accept or
offer a counteroffer.
C. a repeated sequential game.
D. the only game played by unions in reality.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
136. An ultimatum game:

A. is a repeated game.
B. is a simultaneous move game.
C. is when one player makes an offer and the other has to accept or reject.
D. is a realistic way of modeling union negotiations.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy

A. more important in a repeated game than in a sequential game.
B. more important in a repeated sequential game than in a one-round sequential game.
C. more important to those who have less to bargain with.
D. more important in an ultimatum game than in a repeated game.
Blooms: Remember
Difficulty: 01 Easy
138. Repeated play can change the outcome in sequential games by:
A. reducing the first-mover advantage.
B. removing the incentive to cooperate.
C. making collusion more probable.
D. increasing the incentive to defect.
Blooms: Understand
Learning Objective: 09-10 Explain why patient players have more bargaining power in repeated games.
Topic: Repeated Sequential Games
9-87
139. The ability to make counteroffers transforms bargaining from a game in which ___________ trumps
everything to a game in which ____________ is the winning strategy.
A. patience; first-mover advantage
B. commitment strategy; self-interested behavior
C. first-mover advantage; patience
D. first-mover advantage; cooperation
Blooms: Understand
140. ___________ is a winning strategy in a game of bargaining.

A. First-mover advantage
B. Patience
C. Cooperation
D. Self-interested behavior
Blooms: Understand
141. In a game of bargaining, those who _______________ will likely get the highest payoff.
A. are patient
B. are cooperative
C. have a commitment strategy
D. collude
Blooms: Understand
142. In a game of bargaining, the player who is willing to:

A. be cooperative has more bargaining power and so receives a worse payoff.
B. hold out longer has more bargaining power and so receives a worse payoff.
C. hold out longer has more bargaining power and so receives a better payoff.
D. make the first move has more bargaining power and so receives a better payoff.
Blooms: Understand
143. In the real world, it is likely that wage negotiations:

A. drag on for years to see which side is more patient.
B. often end with the company enjoying a larger payoff, since they can afford to be more patient.
C. often end with the worker's enjoying a larger payoff, since they are not losing as much in profit as the
company.
D. do not drag on for years.
Blooms: Understand
9-88
144. In the real world, wage negotiations typically do not drag on for years:
A. because the company can simply offer the split that would eventually occur if the two sides played all
the rounds.
B. because neither a company nor employees can afford to not work for that long.
C. unless the employees play an ultimatum game using a union to negotiate.
Blooms: Understand
145. Using a commitment strategy in:

A. a simultaneous game can alter payoffs, but has no effect in sequential games.
B. a simultaneous game has no effect, but can alter the payoffs and outcome of sequential games.
C. either a simultaneous or sequential game has little impact on payoffs or outcome.
D. either a simultaneous or sequential game can greatly alter the payoffs and outcome of the game.
Blooms: Understand
Learning Objective: 09-11 Explain how a commitment strategy can allow players to achieve their goals by limiting their options.
Topic: Commitment Strategies in Sequential Games
146. By committing to reduce one's options during a sequential game, a player can force a change in his
opponents' strategy, and that commitment strategy results in a:
A. payoff that he likely would have gotten anyway.
B. cooperative equilibrium.
C. payoff that would otherwise be out of reach.
D. negative-negative outcome.
Blooms: Understand
147. The famous historical example of the commitment strategy used by Cortes against the Aztecs is
sometimes referred to as:
A. "burning your boats."
B. "burning your bridges."
C. "friendly fire."
D. "putting all your eggs in one basket."
Blooms: Understand
Chapter 09 Test Bank Summary

# of Questi
Category
ons
AACSB: Knowledge Application 12
9-89
AACSB: Reflective Thinking 135
Accessibility: Keyboard Navigation 102
Blooms: Apply 12
Blooms: Remember 28
Blooms: Understand 107
Difficulty: 01 Easy 28
Difficulty: 02 Medium 108
Difficulty: 03 Hard 12
Learning Objective: 09-
25
01 Understand strategic behavior and describe the components of a strategic game.
43
02 Explain why noncooperation is a dominant strategy in the prisoners' dilemma.
11
03 Identify whether or not a player has a dominant strategy in a one-time game.
12
04 Identify whether or not a Nash equilibrium will be reached in a one-time game.
05 Explain how a commitment strategy can be used to achieve cooperation in a one- 10
time game.
Learning Objective: 09-06 Explain how repeated play can enable cooperation. 15
5
07 Explain how backward induction can be used to make decisions.
Learning Objective: 09-08 Use a decision tree to solve a sequential game. 12
Learning Objective: 09-09 Define first-mover advantage and identify it in practice. 5
7
10 Explain why patient players have more bargaining power in repeated games.
11 Explain how a commitment strategy can allow players to achieve their goals by limi 3
ting their options.
Topic: Backward Induction 9
Topic: Commitment Strategies 10
Topic: Commitment Strategies in Sequential Games 3
Topic: Decision Matrix 1
Topic: Decision Trees 3
Topic: Dominant Strategy 13
Topic: First Mover Advantage 6
Topic: Game Theory 31
Topic: Nash Equilibrium 5
Topic: Prisoners Dilemma 43
Topic: Repeated Games 15
9-90
Topic: Repeated Sequential Games 7
Topic: Sequential Games 2
9-91
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were on each other, not on the broad mirror over the back bar, which
showed Rock their faces.
One was Buck Walters; the other was Dave Wells, the Texan boss
of the Wagon Wheel on Old Man River, north of the Canada line.
Rock drew back, unseen, sought a chair in the lobby, and sat
down, with some food for thought. Here were two men, each of
whom knew him quite well—one as Doc Martin, a Parke
cowpuncher; while the other had employed him for nine months in
his real identity. Fort Benton was small. He could not remain in that
town over the night without meeting both, face to face. Which identity
should he choose?
It did not take Rock long to decide. He rose and made for the bar.
This time he put his foot on the rail and made an inclusive sign to the
bartender, after the custom of the country.
There were other men in the bar now. Walters and Wells looked up
to see who was buying. A shadow, very faint, flitted across Buck
Walters’ face. He nodded, with a grunt. Wells grinned recognition
and stuck out his hand.
“You got the best of me,” Rock drawled. “But shake, anyway.”
“I’d know your hide on a fence in hell,” Wells declared. He was
jovial, and his eyes were bright. He had been hoisting quite a few,
Rock decided. Walters seemed coldly sober.
“Gosh, who do you think I am?” Rock asked. “Your long-lost
brother or something?”
“Why, you’re Rock Holloway, darn you!” Wells said bluntly. “I’d
ought to know you. I paid you off less’n a month ago. Course, if
you’re layin’ low for somethin’——” He paused significantly. Over his
shoulder Rock marked the surprised attention of Buck Walters.
“If that is so, I sure must have a double,” Rock said. “I been
drawin’ wages from the TL on the Marias River for goin’ on two
years, without a break. Does this Holloway fellow you speak of look
so much like me, stranger?”
Wells looked him up and down in silence.
“If you ain’t Rock Holloway, I’ll eat my hat,” he said deliberately.
“Let’s see a man eat a Stetson for once,” Rock said to the
manager of the Maltese Cross. “Tell him who I am.”
“Eat the hat, Dave,” Walters said. “This feller never rode for you—
not in this country. His name is Doc Martin. He rides for a lady
rancher on my range. I know him as well as I know you.”
Wells scratched his head.
“I need my sky piece to shed the rain,” he said mildly. “Maybe the
drinks are on me. If you ain’t the feller I think you are, you certainly
got a twin.”
“I never had no brothers,” Rock declared lightly and reached for
his glass. “Never heard of anybody that looked like me. Well, here’s
luck.”
That was that. He got away from the barroom in a few minutes.
Wells kept eying him. So did Walters. He felt that they were
discussing him in discreet undertones. They did not include him in
their conversation after that drink. Once out of there, Rock set about
his business. He had no desire to paint the town. He went seeking
casual labor. Luck rode with him. Within an hour he had located and
hired two men—the only two souls in Fort Benton, he discovered,
who needed jobs. He went back to the Grand Union for supper. In
the dining room he saw Wells and Walters still together, seated at a
table by themselves. He observed them later in the lobby, deep in
cushioned chairs, cigars jutting rakishly from their lips.
Early in the evening Rock went up to his room. He had left the
Marias at sunrise, and had jolted forty miles in a dead-axle wagon.
He would hit the trail early in the morning, with the hay diggers,
before they changed their mind and hired themselves to some one
else. He needed sleep.
But he couldn’t sleep. The imps of unrest propped his eyelids
open. An hour of wakefulness made him fretful. His mind questioned
ceaselessly. Could a man like Buck Walters deliberately set out to
destroy another man merely because he was a rival for a girl’s
capricious affection? It didn’t seem incentive enough. A man with as
much on his hands as Walters, could scarcely afford petty feuds like
that. Still——
Rock dressed again, drew on his boots, and tucked his gun inside
the waistband of his trousers. He would stroll around Fort Benton for
an hour or so. By that time he would be able to sleep.
A battery of lighted windows faced the Missouri. Saloons with quaint

names, “Last Chance,” “The Eldorado,” “Cowboy’s Retreat,” the
“Bucket of Blood.” They never closed. They were the day-and-night
clubs of frontier citizens. Business did not thrive in all at once. It
ebbed and flowed, as the tides of convivial fancy dictated. In one or
two the bartender polished glasses industriously, while house
dealers sat patiently playing solitaire on their idle gambling layouts.
But in others there were happy gatherings, with faro and poker and
crap games in full swing. Rock visited them all and chanced a dollar
or two here and there. Eventually he retraced his steps toward the
hotel.
In the glow of lamplight from the last saloon on the western end of
the row, just where he had to cross the street to the Grand Union,
sitting in its patch of grass and flanked by a few gnarly cottonwoods,
Rock met Buck Walters and Dave Wells.
He nodded and passed them. A little prickly sensation troubled the
back of his neck. It startled Rock, that involuntary sensation.
Nervous about showing his back to a potential enemy? Nothing less.
The realization almost amused Rock. Absurd! Nobody would shoot
him down on a lighted street. Yet it was a curious feeling.
Expectancy, a sense of danger, a conscious irritation at these
psychological absurdities. He was not surprised when a voice behind
him peremptorily called:
“Hey, Martin!”
He turned to see Buck Walters stalking toward him. Wells’ long,
thin figure showed plain in the glimmer of light. He stood on the edge
of the plank walk, staring at the river.
“Got somethin’ to say to you,” Walters announced curtly.
“Shoot,” Rock answered in the same tone.
Walters faced him, six feet away. His face, so far as Rock could
see, told nothing. It was cold and impassive, like the face of a
gambler who has learned how to make his feature a serviceable
mask to hide what is in his mind. Buck’s face was unreadable, but
his words were plain.
“This country ain’t healthy for you no more, Martin.”
“Why?”
“Because I tell you it ain’t.”
“You’re telling me doesn’t make it so, does it?”
“I know. Talk’s cheap. But this talk will be made good. You need a
change of scenery. I’d go South if I was you—quick. You’ve been on
the Marias too long.”
“Why should I go South, if I don’t happen to want to?” Rock asked.
“Because I tell you to.”
Rock laughed. For the moment he was himself, Doc Martin
forgotten, and he had never stepped aside an inch for any man in his
life.
“You go plumb to hell,” he said. “I’ll be on the Marias when you are
going down the road talking to yourself.”
“All right,” Buck told him very slowly. “This is the second time I’ve
warned you. You know what I mean. You’re huntin’ trouble. You’ll get
it.”
“I don’t know what you mean,” Rock retorted. “Say it in plain
English. What’s eating you?”
“I’ve said all I aimed to say,” Walters declared. “You know what I
mean, well enough.”
“If I had never laid eyes on you before,” Rock answered quietly,
“you have said enough right now to justify me in going after you. Is
that what you want? Do you want to lock horns with me? The light’s
good. Pop your whip, you skunk!”
Rock spat the epithet at him in a cold, collected fury. He meant
precisely what he said. There was such an arrogant note in that cool
intimidation. It filled him with a contemptuous anger for Buck Walters
and all his ways and works and his veiled threats.
“You are just a little faster with a gun than I am,” Walters replied,
unruffled, the tempo of his voice unchanged. “I take no chances with
you. I am not afraid of you, but I have too much at stake to risk it on
gun play—by myself. If you do not leave this country, I will have you
put away. You can gamble on that.”
Rock took a single step toward him. Walters held both hands away
from his sides. He smiled.
“If you so much as make a motion for that gun in your pants,” he
said in an undertone, “my friend Dave Wells will kill you before you
get it out.”
Now Rock had made that step with the deliberate intention of
slapping Walters’ face. No Texan would take a blow and not retaliate.
He couldn’t live with himself if he did. But, “my friend, Dave Wells,”
made him hesitate. Rock’s glance marked Wells, twenty feet away, a
silent watchful figure. And it was more than a mere personal matter.
Down in Fort Worth, Uncle Bill Sayre had joint responsibility with this
man for the safeguarding of a fortune, and a medley of queer
conclusions were leaping into Rock’s agile brain. Reason, logic,
evidence—all are excellent tools. Sometimes instinct or intuition,
something more subtle than conscious intellectual processes, short-
circuits and illuminates the truth with a mysterious flash of light. This
man before him was afraid of Doc Martin. He was afraid of Doc, over
and above any desire for possession of a woman—any passion of
jealousy. There was too much at stake, he had said. Rock would
have given much to know just what Buck Walters meant by the
phrase. Doc Martin would have known. Rock didn’t regret the surge
of his own temper—the insult and challenge he had flung in this
man’s teeth. But he fell back on craft.
“Yes,” he said. “I’d expect you to take no chance on an even
break, with anybody or about anything. You’ll play safe. You’ll pass
the word that I’m to be put away. You tried it already.”
“Next time there will be no slip-up,” Walters answered with cold
determination. “You have said things you shouldn’t have said. You
have shot off your mouth at me. You have made a play at a fool of a
girl that I aim to have for myself. I have a cinch, Martin, and I am
goin’ to play it for all it is worth.”
“A cinch on me—or on the Maltese Cross?” Rock taunted.
“Both,” Walters muttered, in a whisper like a hiss, the first emotion
that had crept into his cold, malevolent voice.
“That’s a damaging admission to make,” Rock sneered.
“Not to you,” Walters said flatly. “You’ll never have a chance to use
it. You are goin’ to be snuffed out, if you don’t pull out. I don’t like
you, for one thing; you are interferin’ with my plans, for another.”
“Those are pretty strong words, Buck,” Rock told him soberly. “I’m
not an easy man to get away with.” He tried a new tack. “If you are
so dead anxious to get rid of me, why don’t you try making it worth
my while to remove myself?”
Walters stared at him.
“I ain’t buyin’ you,” he said at last. “There’s a cheaper way.”
“All right, turn your wolf loose on me.” Rock laughed. “See what’ll
happen. Now you run along, Mister Buck Walters, before I shoot an
eye out of you for luck, you dirty scoundrel!”
Rock’s anger burned anew, but he did not on that account lose his
head. He abused Walters in a penetrating undertone, with malice,
with intent, with venom that was partly real, partly simulated. But he
might as well have offered abuse and insult to a stone. He could not
stir Walters to any declaration, any admission that would have been
a key to what Rock sought.
“Talk is cheap. I don’t care what you say. It don’t hurt me,” the
Maltese Cross boss told him stiffly. “I will shut your mouth for good,
inside of forty-eight hours.”
And with that he turned his back squarely on Rock and walked to
rejoin his friend, Dave Wells, who stood there, ready to shoot in the
name of friendship.
Rock stood staring at their twin backs sauntering past lighted
saloons. He wouldn’t have turned his back on Walters, after that.
Which was a measure of his appraisal of the man’s intent. Buck
would make that threat good!
Rock shrugged his shoulders and strolled across the dusty street
into the Grand Union. He was little the wiser for that encounter,
except that he could look for reprisal, swift and deadly. He wondered
calmly what form it would take.
Certainly he had stepped into a hornet’s nest when he stepped
into the dead cowpuncher’s boots. Rock lay down on his bed with his
clothes still on and stared up at the dusky ceiling. He was trying to
put one and one together, to make a logical sum. It made no
difference now, whether he was Doc Martin or Rock Holloway. After
to-night Buck Walters was an enemy. And Rock reflected
contemptuously that he would rather have him as an enemy than a
friend.
He recalled again Uncle Bill Sayre’s distrust of his fellow executor.
Uncle Bill’s instinct was sound, Rock felt sure in his own soul, now.
“I expect I am in for some exciting times,” Rock murmured to
himself. “Yes, sir, I shouldn’t be surprised.”
Ten minutes later he was sound asleep.
CHAPTER X—THIRTY ANGRY MEN
He had been given forty-eight hours! When twenty-four of them had
elapsed, Rock lay in his bunk at the TL, staring at roof beams dim
above his head. The small noises of the night, insect voices, and the
river’s eternal whisper drifted through an open window. In an
opposite corner the two hired men snored. Perhaps to-morrow
something would happen. Perhaps not. Yet Rock could not take easy
refuge behind the idea that Buck Walters’ talk had been a bluff. Fire
burned under that smoke. To-morrow would tell the tale.
Sunrise came and breakfast. Rock set the men at work in a
meadow. The whir of the mower blades droned in the quiet valley.
There were odds and ends of work that kept him busy until ten
o’clock. While he attended to these jobs, he debated with himself
whether to tell Nona Parke about his encounter with Buck. He
concluded to keep it to himself. He wished that he had taken
advantage of Dave Wells’ presence to establish his own identity. Yet
who the devil, he asked himself fretfully, would have expected Buck
Walters to declare open war?
At the next opportunity, he decided, he would be himself and be
done with a dead man’s troubles. It had been altogether too easy to
let people go on thinking he was Doc Martin. But there was no use
worrying Nona Parke with that just now. She wasn’t concerned. If
anything happened to him, she could get other riders. And she was
quite helpless to prevent anything happening. Rock didn’t intend that
anything should happen to him. He would be wary, watchful, his
weapons always handy.
Something took him to the house.
Nona sat on the porch, darning stockings for Betty. She stopped
Rock to mention the need of getting in more work horses, and while
they talked, her eyes, looking past Rock, began to twinkle.
“Well,” she said, “we are about to have a distinguished visitor.
There’s Alice Snell, and she’s certainly burning the earth.”
Rock turned. That range phrase for speed was apt. Alice came
across the flat on a high gallop, her skirt flapping, bareheaded, and
the gold of her hair like a halo in the sun. Her bay horse, when she
jerked him to a stop, was lathered with sweat, his breast spotted with
foam flecks. The girl’s face struck Rock as being stricken with a
terrible fear. She swung down. To Nona Parke she gave no greeting
whatever. Her eyes never left Rock, except for one furtive, backward
glance. And she cried with a hysterical tremble in her voice:
“Buck Walters and Elmer Duffy, with all the boys, are coming to
hang you! For God’s sake, Doc, get away from here before they
come! I heard them talking it over, and I sneaked away from the
ranch. They can’t be far behind me.”
So that was it. Rock’s lip curled. But a vigilance committee from
two big outfits didn’t function without some excuse.
“What are they going to hang me for?” he asked.
Alice Snell put her hands on his arms, her white face turned up to
his in a fever of anxiety.
“They say—they say,” she gulped, “you’re stealing cattle. They
mean to hang you.”
Rock laughed.
“They won’t hang me,” he said lightly. “Thank you, just the same,
for coming to tell me of their kind intentions.”
“Doc, please! There’s a lot of them. Elmer Duffy and his crew as
well as the Maltese Cross riders. You can’t fight that bunch. Get a
horse and ride fast.”
Rock smiled and put Alice Snell’s trembling, clutching hands off his
own. But there was no mirth in that smile, for a squad of horsemen, a
long line of them abreast, had swung around the point of brush, a
quarter of a mile away. Nona Parke stared at the two of them in
blank amazement. Alice didn’t seem to know that she was there. She
had no thought for anything but this man she took for Doc Martin.
But out of one corner of her eye she marked the approaching riders
and began to babble incoherently.
“Take her into the kitchen,” Rock commanded Nona. “Stay in
there. If she’s right, there’ll be a fuss. I can’t run. And neither Buck
Walters nor anybody else is going to hang me.”
He darted into the bunk room. His rifle hung above his bed, and he
took it down. Out of his war bag he snatched two boxes of cartridges
and stuffed them in his trousers pocket. He had on his belt gun. Both
six-shooter and carbine were the same caliber. Then he went back to
the door. The line of riders drew close, bobbing in unison, a long row.
The sun made their silver ornaments gleam—white hats and black,
red horses, blacks, bays, dun, and spotted—on they came, a brave
sight. Thirty riders to confront a single miscreant. Rock wondered if
Charlie Shaw rode with them, and if he would stand by, unprotesting.
But he had brief time to speculate. The two girls were still on the
porch. Nona had her arms about Alice, steadying her, encouraging
her, and Alice was sobbing in a panic of grief and fear.
“For Heaven’s sake get her and yourself inside,” Rock snapped.
“This is not going to be a Sunday-school picnic. Buck Walters
warned me in Fort Benton that he’d get me inside of forty-eight
hours. He’s going to make it good, if he can. This is nothing for you
to be mixed up in.”
“This is as good a place as any for her and me,” Nona declared.
“This is my ranch. They won’t dare!”
“Dare!” Rock grinned. “The man leading that bunch will dare
anything. But I aim to fool him, if I get a chance to declare myself.”
“And if you don’t, they won’t stop to listen to anything,” she
declared. Her eyes were full of questions.
“From the bunk room,” Rock said softly. “I will give them a good
run for their money. The walls are thick, and I have plenty of
ammunition.”
The eyeballs of horses and men were visible now, faces staring
from under hat brims. Rock could see Seventy Seven riders he had
worked with on trail. Charlie Shaw rode beside Buck Walters and
Elmer Duffy. They slowed to a trot, then to a walk and drew up
before the house. Rock moved back a little in the doorway, his rifle in
the crook of his arm. He stood in plain sight; but if a hand moved
toward a weapon he would be under cover before it could be drawn,
or fired, at least.
Walters, Duffy and Charlie Shaw dismounted. Buck Walters looked
at Alice Snell, her face hidden yet against Nona’s shoulder. His own
face remained impassive, but his eyes burned. And Rock got in the
first word.
“Miss Snell, not liking the idea of coldblooded murder to satisfy a
personal grudge, rode up a little ahead of you-all to tell us you aimed
to hang Doc Martin. If——”
“If that is true,” Nona Parke’s voice cut like a knife across his
sentence, “you are a pack of dirty cowards—and you are too late.”
She thrust the weeping girl away from her and faced them, with
her head up, her gray eyes wide with scorn.
“Is it true?” she demanded. “What do you want here, all of you with
rifles, as if you were going to war?”
“We want him,” Buck Walters pointed at Rock. “And we will take
him, dead or alive. He is a thief.”
“That,” said Nona without a moment’s hesitation, “is a lie.”
Duffy, Walters, and Charlie Shaw had stepped up on the porch. They
stood within eight feet of Rock, apparently secure in the belief that
under thirty pairs of watchful eyes he could neither escape nor
menace them.
“You two girls better go inside,” Duffy said. “Leave us men handle
this thing. They ain’t no room for argument, I guess.”
“Guess again, Elmer,” Rock said quietly. “There is lots of room for
argument. In the first place, I am not Doc Martin. I can prove that by
you, Duffy, and by Buck Walters himself.”
“What the hell are you givin’ us?” Walters growled.
“It is quite true,” Nona declared. “Doc Martin is dead. He was shot
from ambush ten days ago. This man, no matter how much he may
look like Doc, is not Doc.”
“I told you that, but you wouldn’t listen, you were so hell-bent to
hang somebody,” declared Charlie Shaw, opening his mouth for the
first time and addressing Buck Walters. “Now it can be proved right
here, unless you got to hang somebody for your own personal
satisfaction.”
“Listen, all of you!” Rock put in. “I have told you, and Miss Parke
has told you, I am not Doc Martin. Do you want to listen to proof, or
do you want it proved to you after a bunch of men have gone to hell
in a fog of powder smoke? Because, if you don’t want to listen to
reason, there will be a lot of shooting before there is any hanging.
And I will get you, Mr. Buck Walters, first crack, in spite of all your
men. Just think that over.”
Charlie Shaw winked at Rock, then took two quick steps to the
doorway and slid through. Walters’ right hand moved ever so little,
suggestively and involuntarily, and the muzzle of Rock’s carbine
pointed straight at his breast.
“Just one move,” said Rock, “one more little move like that, Buck,
and the Maltese Cross will be shy your services for good. I will give
you leave to hang me or shoot me, if you can, but this crowd is going
to hear who I am before the ball opens. I am going to keep this gun
right on your middle. If I feel anything or hear anything, I pull trigger.
If one of your men should pot me, I can still kill you, even if I were
dead on my feet. Now, I tell you again I am not Doc Martin. I came to
this ranch the day he was killed—murdered, as a matter of fact. I
helped to bury him. His riding gear and all his stuff is here in the
house.”
The riders edged their horses nearer and craned their necks. At
best, destroying a thief was an unpleasant task even for honest men
who despised stock thieves with the contempt such a thief inspired
on the range. Every word uttered on that porch carried distinctly to
their ears. They were not fools. They knew, and Rock banked on that
knowledge, that, whether the man in the doorway was Doc Martin or
not, he had the drop on Buck Walters, and the chances were a
hundred to one he would kill not only Walters but several of them
before they got him. Perhaps too late they realized the tactical error
of letting Charlie Shaw get inside. He was a TL man. Right or wrong,
if there was a fight, Shaw would fight against them. They would have
been confirmed in that supposition if they could have looked behind
Rock. That young man’s heart warmed at the boy’s quick wit and
unhesitating loyalty. A little behind him Charlie whispered:
“Stand pat. I’ll back any play you make. I got two guns on me.”
Elmer Duffy stared at Rock. He glanced sidewise at Buck Walters,
then back to the man in the door.
“If you ain’t Doc Martin,” he said at last, “there’s only one other
man you could be.”
“Hell and damnation!” Walters burst out. “Who else could he be?
Are we goin’ to be old women and let him bluff us out with a fairy
story?”
“We got plenty of time, Buck,” Elmer Duffy reminded him. “He can’t
get away. We don’t want to get off on the wrong foot. Young Shaw
did tell us this before we started.”
“Rats!” Rock laughed. “You sure don’t want to be convinced, do
you, Buck? You surely want to see Doc Martin dance on a rope end.
Maybe you’d just as soon hang me, even if I’m not Doc. You recollect
what Dave Wells named me in Fort Benton, night before last, don’t
you? Well, you have Elmer Duffy say who he thinks I might be if I’m
not Doc.”
“If Doc Martin is dead an’ buried,” Duffy said, “there’s only one
man you can be.”
“You are right,” Rock said. “I will bet you a new hat, Walters, that
Elmer Duffy names me what Dave Wells called me in Benton. I can
see half a dozen riders in this crowd I worked on trail with, until we
came to Clark’s Ford in Nebraska. If you want to be dead sure,
Elmer, there is a sorrel horse with two white hind feet and a big star
on his forehead, branded JB, and a black, branded a Bleeding Heart,
grazing in the pasture back of the barn. And I could tell you more
that only one man could know, Elmer. Tell Buck Walters who I am.”
“You’re Rock Holloway,” Duffy muttered.
“Bull’s-eye!” Rock said. “I have been in Montana less than three
weeks. It seems a plumb exciting place. Are you satisfied, Buck? Are
you still eager to hang me under the impression that I’m Doc Martin?
Do you want to see his saddle, with bloodstains on it, where
somebody—who also wanted to see him dead—shot him, while he
rode along the river bottoms? Maybe you’d like to dig up his body,
where he’s buried over by those poplars?”
“What is the use of carrying this on any longer?” Nona demanded.
“I don’t believe Doc did what Alice says you claim he did. I don’t
believe he was a thief. But, whether he was or was not, he is dead.
This man is what he says he is. He came here the day Doc was
killed. He told me his name was Rock Holloway. I hired him. That is
all there is to it.”
“Isn’t that what Dave Wells called me?” Rock said to Walters. “Are
you satisfied?”
“You denied it,” Walters said. “When he spoke to you, you used
me to prove you were Doc Martin.”
“A man can have a joke with his friends, if he likes. It isn’t against
any law that I know of. He probably told you I joined his outfit on the
Yellowstone last summer and worked for him all winter.”
“I don’t recollect him mentionin’ it,” Walters replied. “Why have you
passed yourself off for Doc Martin, anyway?”
“Shucks!” Rock said. “Everybody just naturally insisted on taking
me for Doc. Miss Parke knew my name. I explained myself to Charlie
Shaw as soon as I had a chance. I didn’t care much, one way or the
other. I didn’t know anybody in this neck of the woods, barring the
Seventy Seven. I fooled Elmer Duffy purposely, the first time I saw
him, because I was kinda interested in trying to find out who killed
Doc Martin, seeing I looked so much like him and was taking his
place as a TL rider. Are you satisfied, or is there still something you’d
like to know about?”
“Yes, I can see there’s been a mistake,” Walters said in a different
tone. “You can’t blame us. We got it straight that Martin was standing
in with some pretty bald-faced stealing. We’ve cleaned out his
partners. I guess this settles it as far as you’re concerned. I’ll have to
take Elmer’s word for it. He ought to know you, seein’ you killed his
brother.”
It seemed to Rock that Walters raised his voice a trifle, and that he
managed to impart a sneer into those words. Every man could hear.
It seemed to Rock like a deliberate taunt, a barb purposely planted to
rankle in Duffy’s skin. For a second there was silence. Elmer Duffy’s
Adam’s apple slid nervously up and down his lean throat. His face
flushed. Rock read the signs for himself. A few spiteful reminders like
that, and Duffy would feel that he had to go gunning for his brother’s
slayer. Buck Walters broke that strained hush. He lifted his hat to
Nona.
“I’m sorry if this has been disagreeable,” he said politely. “But
those Burris thieves incriminated your man Martin. He has been in
with them on their rustling. We’ve lost a lot of stock. Maybe they
didn’t overlook you. It’s as well Doc Martin has cashed in. We would
certainly have hung him to the nearest cottonwood. We don’t reckon
there’ll be any more trouble. I hope you don’t hold grudges,” he said,
turning to Rock. “In our place you’d do the same. Nobody told us
what happened to Martin. You passed for him. We got to protect our
range. There’s only one way to deal with rustlers.”
He turned to his men with a wave of his hand.
“All right, boys,” he said. “You’ve heard the whole show, and we’re
saved a nasty job. Ride on. We’ll catch up with you.”
Elmer Duffy muttered something, stepped down off the porch, and
swung into his saddle, without a word or a look at Rock. Buck
Walters stepped over beside Alice. She had listened, wide-eyed and
open-mouthed. Now she shrank away from Buck.
“Come on home with us, Al,” he said coaxingly.
“Go home with you!” Alice Snell shrilled. “I’ll never go on that ranch
again till you’re off it for good, you blackhearted beast! If Doc Martin
was murdered, I know who did it and why. I hate you—I hate you!”
“You’re all worked up,” Walters said diffidently. “You’ll be sorry for
saying such a thing about me when you cool off. I didn’t kill Doc
Martin, although he had it coming. A man who steals can’t flourish on
any range I have charge of.”
“Doc Martin never stole anything in his life,” the girl cried. “He was
a better man than you, any day. You were afraid of him,” she raved.
“I know. You hated him because I loved him, and he loved me. Get
away from me, you—you toad!”
Walters’ face flamed. He shot a quick sidewise look at Nona and
Rock Holloway. But he was cool and patient.
“Hysterics,” he said to Nona. “I guess I’ll have to leave her to you,
Miss Parke. See she gets home, will you? Sorry about all this fuss.
Couldn’t be helped, the way things stood.”
Rock said nothing. He had declared himself. This was a matter
between these others, interesting, dramatic, and with hints of
passionate conflict. Rock knew Nona Parke’s side of it. What she
had told him about Doc Martin was fresh in his mind. And there was
Martin’s attitude and actions toward Elmer Duffy. She, like himself,
stood silent, while Alice leaned against the log wall and lashed at her
foreman, her breast heaving, a fury blazing in her pansy-blue eyes.
Walters stepped off the porch and mounted his horse. The riders
were crossing the flat at a walk. Buck lifted his hat to Nona, flung “So
long, boys!” over his shoulder to Rock and Charlie Shaw, and loped
away after his men.
A very cool hand, Rock reflected. Smooth and dangerous. He had
denied that Dave Wells mentioned anything. Rock felt that to be a
lie. It was simpler now that he had established his real identity. But
he wasn’t done with Buck Walters yet. No! Rock couldn’t quite say
why he had that conviction; but he had it very clear in his mind.
CHAPTER XI—RIDERS ON A RISE
“Is the excitement all over?” Charlie Shaw asked, grinning. “Guess
I’ll go put my caballo in the barn. I’ll go back an’ cut my string this
afternoon.”
“Round-up over?” Nona asked.
She had put one arm protectingly about Alice Snell. That disturbed
young woman, her tawny hair in a tangle, her cheeks tear stained,
stared at Rock. Her eyes expressed complete incredulity, surprise
and a strange blend of grief and wonder.
Charlie nodded. “Glad, too,” he said. “Hope you don’t send me
with that outfit this fall.”
“Some one will have to go,” Nona said dispiritedly.
“Oh, well!” Charlie shrugged his shoulders and took his horse
away to the stable. Nona led Alice inside. Rock stood his rifle against
the wall and sat down on the porch steps to roll a smoke. He found
the fingers that sifted tobacco into the paper somewhat tremulous.
Odd that a man could face a situation like that with cold
determination and find himself shaky when it was all over. Rock
smiled and blew smoke into the still air. He could see the teams
plodding in the hayfield. The whir of the mower blades mingled with
the watery murmur of the river. A foraging bee hummed in a bluster
of flowers by his feet. Except for these small sounds, the hush of the
plains lay like a blanket, a void in which men and the passions of
men were inconsequential, little worrying organisms agitated briefly
over small matters, like flies on the Great Wall of China.
He sat there a long time. Charlie came back and went into the
bunk room. Rock saw him stretch out on a bed. Good kid—loyal to
his friends and his outfit. What a mess there would have been if a
fight had started. Like the Alamo. Two of them intrenched behind log
walls, and thirty angry men in the open, spitting lead. Alice Snell
must certainly have thought a lot of Doc Martin. Rock could see the
look on Buck Walters’ face when she flung her scornful epithets in
his face. Funny about Doc and Nona Parke and Elmer Duffy. Not so
funny, either. Hearts were caught on the rebound. Alice Snell was
worth a second look. Passionate, willful, beautiful. Her fingers had
clutched his arms with a frenzy of possession, when she pleaded
with him to get away from danger. She was certainly capable of
loving.
Nona came out. She, too, sat down on the edge of the porch near
him. She stared at the haymakers, off down the river, where that
hanging squad had departed, up at the banks where the plains
pitched sharp to the valley floor.
“Isn’t it peaceful?” she said absently.
“Yes, by comparison. Sweet Alice calm her troubled soul?”
“How can you joke about it? I made her lie down. She’s in a
terrible state—all on edge. I didn’t think she was like that.”
“Like what?” Rock inquired.
“I didn’t think she had it in her to feel so much about anything.
She’s heartbroken,” Nona said. “Doc, it appears, meant a lot to her.
She just babbles about him.”
“Everybody seems to know that but you,” Rock told her.
“I don’t understand it,” Nona said slowly. “Doc—oh, well, I guess
he made love to her, same as he did to me.”
“You blame him?” Rock inquired. “She’s attractive. Offhand, I’d say
she loved this rider of yours a heap. You didn’t have any use for him
except in his capacity as a cowpuncher. Sometimes, I’ve noticed, a
man craves affection. If he can’t find it one place he’ll look
elsewhere. Maybe he was in love with you both. You’re funny,
anyhow. You didn’t want him, yourself. But it seems to jar you
because he consoled himself with another girl.”
“It isn’t that,” she replied in a bewildered sort of fashion. “Why
should he lie to me? Why should he quarrel with Elmer Duffy about
me—make an issue of me—if—if—”
“I don’t know. I do know that I may have a man-size quarrel with
Elmer, myself, now, if Buck Walters makes a few more public cracks
about my run-in with Mark. Elmer’s apt to brood over that, and I’m
handy if he concludes it’s up to him to get action over a grievance.
And it’s likely he will.”
“What’ll you do, if he does?” she said anxiously.
“Oh, take it as it comes. There’s something fishy to me about all
this upheaval. Of course I can savvy why Buck Walters wanted to get
your man, Doc. Alice would be reason enough. Buck’s face gave him
away. But I somehow don’t believe that’s the whole answer. Perhaps
both Elmer and Buck are such honest, God-fearing cattlemen that
the very idea of rustling would make them froth at the mouth
simultaneously. But I don’t know.”
“I don’t believe for a single instant that Doc Martin had anything to
do with any rustling whatever,” Nona declared. “I don’t care what
these Burrises said, or anybody.”
“I’m not an awful lot interested in that, now,” Rock remarked
thoughtfully. “It would appear from the way these fellows were ready
to act that there has been rustling. Duffy wouldn’t back a play like
that just to satisfy either his own or Buck Walters’ grudge. Between
the Seventy Seven and the Maltese Cross, ranging around forty
thousand cattle, a few rustled calves by the Goosebill don’t cut so
much figure, except as an excuse for action. No; ‘there’s more in this
than meets the eye,’ as Shakespeare or some other wise gazabo
said once. You have lost calves, yourself.”
“Yes, I know I have, and I can’t afford to. I certainly hate a thief.”
“So do I,” Rock murmured. “Still, I don’t hate you.”
“Me?” she uttered in astonishment. Her head went up imperiously.
“What do you mean?”
“You steal hearts.” Rock said calmly. “You admitted it. You told me
you did, only, of course, you said you didn’t mean to.”
The blood leaped to her cheeks. It was the first time he saw her
momentarily at a loss for words, embarrassed by an imputation.
“It worries me a little,” Rock continued meditatively. “You may steal
mine. Of course, you don’t intend to. You hate to do it, as the fellow
said when he took the town marshal’s gun away from him. But, on
the other hand, you don’t care a boot if you find you’ve got the
darned thing. You’re immune. And mine is an innocent,
inexperienced sort of a heart. It’s useful to me. I’d be mighty
uncomfortable without it. Maybe I’d better pull out while the going is
good.”
“You want to quit now?” she asked. “There won’t be any more
trouble, I think,” she said stiffly. “And I’m just getting used to you. I
hate strange men around. Can’t you think of me as your boss
instead of as a woman? Oh, dear, it’s always like this!”
Her distress was so comical, yet so genuine, that Rock laughed
out loud.
“Good Lord, Nona—everybody calls you Nona, so it comes natural
—I’m the world’s crudest josher, I guess,” he declared. “Say, you
couldn’t drive me off this range now. I promised you, didn’t I, that if
my admiration for you did get powerful strong I wouldn’t annoy you
with it? Don’t you give me credit for fully intending to keep my word?”
Nona smiled frankly at him and with him.
“You like to tease, don’t you?” she said simply. “You aren’t half so
serious as you look and act.”
“Sometimes I’m even more so,” he drawled lightly.
“You were serious enough a while ago,” she said. Her next words
startled Rock, they were so closely akin to what had been running in
his mind not long before. “If Elmer hadn’t known you, there would
have been a grand battle here. You and Charlie in the bunk house. I
would probably have bought into it from one of the kitchen windows.
I have dad’s old rifle, and I can shoot with it probably as straight as
most men. They wouldn’t have won much from us. Buck Walters and
his cowboys, I don’t think.”
“What makes you think Charlie would have backed me up?” he
asked curiously.
“He did, didn’t he?” she asked. “I know that boy.”
“Weren’t you scared?”
“Of course I was scared,” she admitted. “But that didn’t paralyze
me. It never does. Do you think I’d stand and wring my hands, while
a man was fighting for his life?”
“I see,” Rock nodded. “Sort of united we stand, eh?”
“Well, neither Buck Walters nor anybody else will ever take a man
out of my house and hang him to a cottonwood tree if I can stop it,”
she said hotly. “There is law in this Territory, if it is not very much in

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2. The prisoner's dilemma is a game of strategy:

3. To economists, games are:

4. To economists, a game is:

7. Game theory is:

8. Game theory is:

10. Behaving strategically:

11. Behaving strategically means:

13. All games involve which of the following?

14. All games involve which of the following?

15. All games involve which of the following?

16. All games involve which of the following?

17. In games, rules:

18. In real life, people's behavior is constrained by:

20. In games, strategies are:

21. In games, the strategy to reach a particular goal:

23. Payoffs are:

24. An example of a payoff in a game would be:

25. In game theory, an example of a payoff could be:

26. The prisoner's dilemma game can involve:

28. The prisoner's dilemma can be summarized in:

29. A decision matrix:

31. A dominant strategy is one:

32. A dominant strategy:

33. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

34. In the prisoner's dilemma:

35. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

36. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

37. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

38. The prisoner's dilemma game can be used to describe

39. The prisoner's dilemma game:

40. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

41. The players of prisoner's dilemma-type games:

The figure shown portrays a game using a:

The game in the figure shown is a version of:

A. the prisoner's dilemma.

The game in the figure shown is a version of:

A. charge a high price.

A. charge a high price.

According to the figure shown, Nike:

A. has a dominant strategy to charge a high price.

According to the figure shown, Adidas:

A. should charge a low price, regardless of what Nike chooses to do.

According to the figure shown:

A. there is no stable equilibrium to the game.

A. Nike charges a high price, and Adidas charges a low price.

A. Nike has a dominant strategy, but Adidas does not.

A. both Joe and Sarah put forth low effort.

A. the prisoner's dilemma.

The game in the figure shown is a version of:

A. put forth high effort.