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international
social science
journal
Published quarterly
by Unesco
Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981
Technology and cultural values

Andrew Robertson Introduction: technological innovations and their
social impacts 431
Werner Ackermann Cultural values and social choice of technology 447
Dieter Ernst Technology policy for self-reliance: some major

issues 466
Kazimierz Kopecki The case for nuclear energy 481
Ken Newcombe Technology assessment and policy: examples

from Papua N e w Guinea 495
A. Rahman The interaction between science, technology and

society: historical and comparative perspectives 508
Continuing debate
David Schweitzer Alienation theory and research: trends, issues

and priorities 523
The social science sphere
Gyõrgy Rózsa European co-operation in social science

information and documentation: a process of
maturation 559
Professional and documentary services
Approaching international conferences 569
Books received 573
Recent Unesco publications 577
ISSN 0020-8701
Technology and
cultural values
Introduction:
technological innovations
and their social impacts*
Andrew Robertson
Technological progress has for some time been thought of as essential to economic
growth, as a key element in addition to the factors of capital and labour. With
this widely accepted belief in mind, governments in both developed and developing
countries have allocated resources to research and development with resultant
innovations, which have brought both benefits, in the short term and sometimes
the long term, and unforeseen disadvantages, usually in the longer term.
In the words of François H e t m á n writing in this Journal in 1973 (Vol. X X V ,
N o . 3, p. 265) 'a process of forecasting, analysis and assessment of technological
futures socially desirable and politically acceptable' seems to have become a
matter for urgent international consideration.1
Fears for the future of h u m a n society under the pressure of technological
progress have often been expressed since the end of the Second World W a r . A
Ford Motor C o m p a n y executive is said to have coined the word 'automation'
(by automatic out of mechanization) in the early 1950s, and there was a lengthy
debate in the United States Congress in 1955 in which anxiety was expressed at the
possibility of mass unemployment arising from the advent of the so-called 'auto-
matic factory'. Seven years later the Kennedy administration was told that, of
the 6.5 million unemployed in the United States, 2 million were the victims of
'automation'. President Kennedy set up a special advisory committee to study the
problem. In its dedicatory address appeared the following objective:
[The] achievement of technological progress without sacrifice of human values requires
a combination of private and government action, consonant with the principles of a free
society.
Andrew Robertson is Reader in Management Studies at the Polytechnic of Central London, 35 Mary-
lebone Road, London N W 1 5LS. Formerly associated with the Science Policy Research Unit of
Sussex University, he has published extensively on problems of management, industrial organization
and technological innovation.
* This text partially reflects the proceedings of a
Symposium on Technological Innovations
and their Social Impacts convened in Bonn
(Federal Republic of Germany) jointly by
Unesco and the National Commission of the
Federal Republic of Germany for Unesco on
10-14 November 1980. Thefinalreport has
been issued as Unesco document SS-80/
C O N F . 8 0 4 / 1 1 , dated 16 February 1981 (in
English only).
Int. Soc. Sei. / . , Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981
432 Andrew Robertson
The references to privacy and freedom cannot obscure the fact that it requires
legislation and public enforcement to counterbalance the adverse effects of tech-
nological change, a m o n g which industrial society has experienced injury and
disablement of workers with machinery, diseases caused by the use of toxic
substances (the harmful effects of blue asbestos have only recently been realized),
as well as the 'de-skilling' of jobs and in the post-war years the extinction of whole
sectors of industry with attendant regional employment problems. In addition,
there is the continuing conflict of interest between 'labour-saving' efficiency and
profitability in the economy and the resistance to technical change put u p by
organized labour in an effort to diminish or at least slow d o w n its rate in order
to preserve jobs and protect the skilled from redundancy.
The world recession, which has created unemployment in all the industrial
countries to differing extents, has tended to m a s k the unemployment brought
about technologically, but trade-union officials are acutely aware of the erosion
of their members'jobs in certain sectors of industry, such as printing and publishing
in the United K i n g d o m . The struggle to establish the 'new technology' in Fleet
Street has been going on for years, to the extent that the proposed technology
is n o w far from 'new'. The setting and printing of British newspapers is carried
on using equipment nearly a century old in design terms. Printing metal is melted
and then cast into lines of type-matter, or 'slugs', on Linotype machines. The
type is in one solid piece, and any corrections therefore demand the resetting
of the whole line. These lines are assembled into vertical columns or galleys,
which are then locked together into a metal frame, or 'forme'. A 'flong' or papier-
mâché sheet is soaked and pressed on to the type, baked hard and then used
as a mould with which to cast the half-cylinders of type that are fixed on the
rotary printing machines. It is a long, arduous and occasionally dangerous process.
The new technology using computer typesetting, photography and offset
printing is a shorter process altogether, with less r o o m for error with easily corrected
matter, silent (except for web-offset presses) and safe, but could when perfected
m e a n that there would be no need for compositors (Linotype and Monotype
operators) at all because the advertising and editorial matter could be keyboarded
by office and staff journalists directly, using visual display screens by which to
check their setting. Already some regional newspapers have proved the cost-
cutting advantages of the new techniques but the well-entrenched printing unions
seem to prefer the risk of complete closure to negotiating the introduction of
'single keystroking'. Indeed, the Times group of papers was closed for nearly a
year in 1979-80 to bring pressure to bear on the unions. This desperate measure
failed, and recently the parent company, T h o m s o n Newspapers, sold the group
to Rupert Murdoch, the Australian press millionaire.
It was expected that The Times and the Sunday Times and the three weekly
supplements would close putting about 5,000 skilled m e n and w o m e n out of work,
with little prospect of another job in a declining industry, a fate that has n o w
Technological innovations and their social impacts 433
overtaken hundreds of thousands of others in the United K i n g d o m and other

industrial countries. A s w e have seen already the problem of 'enforced leisure'
or unemployment was foreseen thirty years ago in Europe and the United States,
but n o concerted national policy or programmes were introduced to cope with
the eventuality. Technical forecasting did not begin on any significant scale until
the 1960s, with the result that school-leavers were still being given training in
skills that would not be needed in ten or twenty years when they would have
families andfinancialcommitments. True, the welfare-state economic policy has
helped to cushion the worst material effects of redundancy, but for a skilled worker
to find that all his training and experience have become worthless is a tragedy in
itself, and conceivably avoidable.
Matching the numbers and levels of skills in the national work-force to the
needs of industry has been a part of British economic policy since the 1960s,
and the setting up of the Industrial Training Boards and the development of
manpower planning, but it has to be admitted that these efforts have not succeeded
in eliminating structural unemployment, partly because of lack of foresight on
the part of policy-makers, partly because of the rapid acceleration of technological
change: from mechanization to automatic control (automation and cybernetics)
via computer control to the microprocessor.
In an attempt to monitor change and its impact on jobs in industrial society,
the United K i n g d o m Engineering Industry Training Board sponsored nearly
ten years of research at the Science Policy Research Unit of the University of
Sussex. S o m e results have n o w been published.2 The general conclusions emphasize
the need for continuing and comprehensive surveys and forecasts of training needs
and future skill shortages in a wide range of industrial sectors, and not merely
in the United Kingdom.
In a parallel study,3 R . Rothwell and W . Zegfeld point out that whereas
automatic control had its main impact on the process and assembly line industries,
the so-called 'micro-chip' is m u c h more pervasive andflexible,and therefore
threatens to eliminate people and their jobs in all sectors of business. It threatens
to diffuse its applications rapidly, allowing little time in which to adjust redeploy-
ment of labour, training and retraining and to implement socially acceptable
redundancy schemes. For these reasons the European Economic Community
has set aside a great deal of money for research into the applications and social
impact of the microprocessor 'revolution'.
A 1976 report, sponsored by the Anglo-German Foundation for the Study
of Industrial Society, on technical innovation in the Federal Republic of Germany
states that there is a tendency in that country to treat innovation as primarily a
matter for managerial decision-making. Weltz and Schmidt, the authors, appear
to have found that under such circumstances the decision to apply n e w technology
is m a d e at board level, implemented by management, and only when the proposed
innovation is under way are the consequences communicated to staff in terms of
reductions in manning, reorganization, which brings with it actual demotion of

individuals and additional workloads for those remaining in the firm at their
previous level. N e w recruitment takes the form of acquiring skills and knowledge
previously lacking in the firm. There is often some retraining but those unfor-
tunate enough not to be selected for the appropriate course are likely to be laid
off eventually. Typically, such changes tend to c o m e about in times of severe
recession, w h e n organized labour is at its weakest, but in periods of economic
recovery the converse appears to be true.4
Senker and Swords-Isherwood assert that m a n p o w e r planning is undertaken
by far fewer British companies, even in its simplest forms, than by multinational
companies based in the United K i n g d o m . O n e result is that larger British
companies m a y well find themselves with an ageing force of skilled workers w h o
m a y be difficult to retrain with the concomitant problem of recruitment difficulties
in addition to expensive redundancy and early retirement. They add:
The significance of this neglect of manpower planning is both philosophical and practical.
It illustrates that manpower issues are regarded as peripheral to the main objectives of
the enterprise. This contrasts most markedly with the approach of Japanese companies
in particular, which integrate all aspects of the planning exercise. In large Japanese
companies, manpower is planned rigorously within the constraints of guarantees of
lifetime employment (albeit only for men). 5
N o r d o those same companies hand over training to a department. It is considered

of 'vital and central importance' to the firm: too important to be reduced to a
lower level of status and power than that enjoyed by the top management. T h e
similarity between the attitudes of enterprises in the United K i n g d o m and the
Federal Republic of G e r m a n y to the manpower question deserves closer consider-
ation and comparison with other European countries. In neglecting the long-
term problem of the impact of technological change on the working population,
c o m p a n y policy seems to run counter to national economic well-being, but what
alternatives are there which might reduce this conflict of interest?
A n American, Paul Dickson," has already pointed out some possible alterna-
tives, which have honourable historical antecedents. The shorter working week is,
after all, an issue still marginally in dispute but with a history of generations of
negotiation between employer and employed. T h e eight-hour day and the five-day
week are comparatively new, as are paid holidays of two or three weeks, and they
had to be fought for in the early years, before the realization that industrial fatigue
was counter-productive and that the well-rested worker had both a higher output
and a lower accident record than his overworked counterpart.
Perhaps it is the 'Protestant work ethic' or its equivalent in other moral
terms which makes increased leisure seem undesirable, 'wrong' in some sense, or
even sinful. Social historians tell us that since the coming of the clock, h u m a n
society has been ruled by time, and the habit of regular working periods has
become deeply ingrained in industrial communities. T o a finer extent the time

study of work, combined with motion study (Taylorism), imposed even stricter
discipline on the labour force. Another constraint on the contraction of work
periods is the resistance of organized labour to 'work sharing'.
Nevertheless Dickson gives numerous examples of attempts in the United
States to introduce methods spreading available work over the existing work-force
as a means of avoiding or at least alleviating redundancies. T h e Motorola Cor-
poration has introduced the 'compressed workweek', with the agreement of its
workers and staff, a three-day, thirty-six-hour week, worked in three shifts a
day, to maximize plant usage. S o m e firms that have adopted such methods have
even been able to announce productivity increases as a direct consequence,
increased leisure apparently bringing beneficial results in terms of increased
effort and efficiency—not such a surprise to the proponents of the human-relations
school of occupational psychology.
A s long ago as 1972 the American Management Association m a d e a survey
of 143 companies operating a four-day week and found that 80 per cent were
able to report 'improved business results' as a direct consequence.7 A m o n g the
advantages of the shorter working week, findings confirmed by the Washington
Bureau of Labor Statistics, have been decreased absenteeism, higher morale and
increased efficiency, together with reduced production costs, because of less
scrap and fewer defective products. T h e United States Labor Department has
commented that industrial fatigue and its effects on accidents at work and on
productivity is still an ' u n k n o w n factor', after about half a century's development
of occupational psychology and research since the celebrated Hawthorne exper-
iments and the rise of the human-relations school.
T o balance the record it has to be added that Dickson also records that
some A M A m e m b e r firms reported increased costs as a result of the shorter week,
confusion over hours of work on the part of customers, suppliers and transport
services, so that gains from work contraction were by n o means automatic. O f a
sample of 1,500 firms experimenting with the shorter working week, about 4 per
cent reverted to the five-day week fairly quickly, and the suggestion is that
this figure m a y by n o w have doubled. Even so it looks as if the majority
of companies have found the contracted week profitable while also socially
beneficial.
So m u c h for enlightened if profit-conscious employers. N o t m u c h in c o m -
parison is k n o w n about worker initiatives. T h e 'human/technology relationship'
has been examined in a book by M . Cooley, a British technologist w h o is also a
trade-union official. In the quaintly titled Architect or Bee?a—a reference to Marx's
Capital in which he compares the automatic perfection of the bee's cell construc-
tion with the abstract and thoughtful planning of a h u m a n architect—Cooley
approaches the redundancy problem from the point of view of the worker trained
in high technology, and specifically the venture k n o w n as the Lucas Aerospace
Combine Shopstewards' Committee, allied with the Centre for Alternative Indus-
trial and Technical Systems (GAITS), operating out of the Polytechnic of North
London. Colley acknowledges that the successive waves of technological progress
have in m a n y cases freed h u m a n beings from routine, fatiguing, boring tasks,
but too often and increasingly such progress has m a d e some of them free to d o
nothing, their acquired skills and knowledge having been taken over by machines.
Machines can work faster, more accurately in repetitive series of tasks, more
consistently and smoothly than h u m a n operators and never get tired—though
they m a y break d o w n . The well-known result of this trend is that a highly skilled
labour force (machine operators, setters, even toolmakers) is whittled d o w n to
the point where a handful of people watch control panels and another handful
stand by for maintenance.
Cooley warns that the computer is the vehicle of a n e w and stricter Taylorism
with time allowances for bodily relief being measured in seconds. T h e m a n is
paced by the machine more rigorously than before. This greater intensity of work
not only accelerates the bodily decline of the operatives (one British automotive
company tried to get union agreement not to recruit m e n over 30 years of age
because their effective assembly line life is only ten years) but the obsolescence
of his skill and knowledge. A s change occurs so a person's school or university
education and his subsequent training are overtaken, so that he must give u p an
increasing proportion of his time to keeping up, even supposing that his propensity
to learn does not decline with age. Cooley cites the extreme case of the physical
scientist whose education n o w takes so long that by 24 years of age he is already
too old to solve the latest problems in his science. Such drastic conditions m a y
not apply to the engineering worker, but the growing demands of the man-machine
interface still force him to slow d o w n earlier than hitherto.
The concentration of capital which results from the elimination of labour
in favour of automatic machine systems can be highly profitable. Cooley gives
the example of the General Electric C o m p a n y in the United K i n g d o m which cut
its workforce from 260,000 in 1968 to 200,000 in the mid-1970s, raising profits
from £75 million to £105 million, quoting its chairman as saying, 'People are like
elastic, the more work you give them, the more they stretch', adding that he is
by no means 'particularly heinous'.8 The view is widespread nowadays that profits
must come before people for an economy to remain competitive. Thus, tech-
nological innovation and its economic impact bring with them social implications
which are not yet being faced foursquare by the governments of developed
countries, even though they have been foreseen forfiftyyears or more.
Has the Lucas Aerospace experiment, about which Colley writes, a solution
to offer to this problem, this conflict of interests? It came about as ä result of ration-
alization at Lucas Aerospace, following the shrinkage of the British aerospace
industry during the 1970s. The Combine Shopstewards' Committee was formed
to bring together for mutual aid and benefit the practical skills of the «hop-floor
engineering worker and the analytical ability of the research-and-development

scientists and technologists. Later they linked up with workers in similar companies
which had been working o n aeronautical equipment, and particularly for the
Concorde supersonic airliner project.
At Lucas Aerospace attempts had been m a d e to curb redundancy and the
transfer of work from sites earmarked for closure by the usual resistive
tactics—sit-ins, work-ins and other such campaigns. But in the end the best solution
seemed to be for the workers themselves at all levels to get together and produce,
not the familiar high-technology products for which demand w a s obviously
falling but socially useful and saleable lower-technology devices, such as simple
self-propelled vehicles for handicapped children, life-support systems for hospitals,
energy solar collectors, a road/rail carriage, and other marketable ideas which
might also enhance the quality of life.
Cooley comments that a hidden advantage of this programme was that,
for thefirsttime, researchers, designers and production workers were engaged
together in making things for markets they could understand and be in touch
with, not parts and assemblies for a remote and high-technology market, which,
while not u n k n o w n entirely to a few senior scientists, was unreal in any practical
sense to the majority of the people at Lucas Aerospace. >
In their early days they compiled an inventory of the joint skills and k n o w -
ledge and other resources which they could offer to potential customers. They
distributed 180 copies around the United K i n g d o m and received three replies:
from the O p e n University, Queen M a r y College, London, and the Polytechnic
of North London, with which they set up C A I T S . This centre now.has a powerful
steering committee of scientists, engineers and social scientists. But it has its
critics, one of w h o m , from the Manchester School, has referred to' it as a 'flawed
strategy' because so far it has failed to integrate scientists and other workers with
management, leaving the n e w company's position looking as yet another example
of the 'them and us' syndrome, which still hampers the adaptation of industrial
organizations to the changes taking place in technology and society.
Technological innovation, if it is not to be irreparably damaging to industrial
societies, must be accompanied by social innovation. Science and technology
are social phenomena, and come together in times of social need (there : is an
analogy here with the theory that inventions (science) become innovations (tech-
nology) when social pressures are brought to bear). Scientific inquiry came to
replace the crude technology, of trial and error which prevailed in primitive society,
leading initially to a better understanding of the nature of technology and its
underlying science but not ipso facto of the social consequences.
Compared with previous generations humanity in the 1980s faces a fdis-r
continuity'. with the past in two ways. First, certain quantitative increases have
reached critical points and a new phase in which the change has become qualitative.
Atomic weapons, 'trans-human' information technology, genetic engineering and
space science all point to novel social potentials. Secondly, these massive social
changes are 'species-wide' dangers and opportunities.
Science has become world science in a world market so that 'resource
accounting' has become planetary, regardless of local or national variations, just
as world population is also a global, not a local, threat or crisis, like global war.
T h e world's protective response to these threats is a kind of religious solidarity
irrespective of traditional or innovatory sects or cults. It is also possible to talk
of 'world failures': failure to eliminate Third World poverty; failure on the part
of social science to explain this; failure of education to offer understanding of
technology (specialist education has an elitist aspect); failure to solve the distri-
bution of capital world-wide; failure of science and technology to transcend
elitism; and the lack of recognition of the social problem of technological and
consumerist fetishism.
There are also special cases of technological advance, as yet incomplete,
of word significance:
Military science based on nuclear warfare and other advances—lasers, satellites, etc.
Cybernetics, robots threats to h u m a n intelligence.
Informatics—the software revolution—artificial intelligence.
T h e green revolution—agribusiness—saltwater culture—with unforeseeable conse-
quences in benefits as yet.
Bio-engineering transforming the 'bio-industries' such as medicine, pharma-
ceuticals, genetics, etc.
Population control, not novel, but facing slow social acceptance which m a y
accelerate.
M a s s communication—the 'global village'—television by satellite.
T h e n e w medicine—automated diagnoses, tissue transplants, information tech-
nology for general practice.
Polymer science in the 1990s—large molecules can reveal the nature of life.
Science-technology-production as a total social process.
Controlled economic planning—not yet a working possibility but could be.
T h e super-threat of these is that they are all are handled by élites.
There are also the threats of this elitism to democracy, of elitism to self-
management (worker-participation), and of hot-line elitism to humanity—the
speed of military respone to threat. A s well as the social threats: of technology
to sensitivity, to 'customary rites' (mass media prevent participation), and to
values such as the social relations of production, of pleasure and 'cultural
m o m e n t u m ' , to planning (seen by individuals as fragments) and to ideology.
Technology is indeed a 'two-edged sword' and harmful in the wrong hands.
C o m m u n i t y leaders need to be m u c h better informed if potentially dangerous
consequences are to be foreseen and avoided. In certain planned economies, for
example the U S S R , technological advance did not create unemployment but did
eliminate drudgery and permit a shorter working day. A national policy of
retraining and redeployment should be part of the management of change. Har-

m o n y can only be achieved when science is applied with regard to social needs
(there is a grave 'disharmony' when old people die of cold and neglect in winter
while a m a n is sent to the m o o n ) .
The observation has been m a d e that science, if used by a power group for
the pursuit of knowledge, is regarded as 'pure', but only partially so if used to
pursue half-truths, and becomes pseudo-science when used to 'prove' particular,
unsoundly based findings. Science tends to be trapped between traditional roots
and contemporary paymasters, hence the talk of 'Western' science, though science
is universal. A n d science, because of the w a y in which it is funded, tends to be
conformist, but cannot be neutral.
Mass societies are passive towards socio-technical problems until ill-effects
appear. S o far there is n o effective system of prediction and control. True there
are the threats as described, but there are also benefits and the secondary and
tertiary effects of n e w technology, which might be adverse, could be unforeseen
because screened by those very benefits, especially in the Third World, and more
so if the scientists are from the First or Second.
Social scientific analysis of technological advance tends to be 'post mortem'
not predictive; h o w can the soft sciences monitor the hard? In the United States,
this is being done, but not on a national scale, partly because of government
apathy—the involvement of social science in the so-called military-industrial
complex being minimal. In the end technical choice (technology policy) is governed
by specific conditions at a particular time; careful adaptation is essential but often
the time factor renders a situation desperate when the speed of change is
accelerating.
O n the question of the interaction between technology and society
A . R a h m a n ' s article, below, suggests that it is a two-way process: social needs
call for innovation, whether in agriculture, construction or even armaments.
The industrial revolution introduced sweeping changes which spread from the
West to developing countries: independent nations like Japan, semi-colonial
states like Egypt and China, and colonized countries like India.
In colonies n o deep roots were put d o w n , so w h e n independence came
technologies were withdrawn. In India some, which were well established (the
railways, the land survey, for example), had been intended to exploit local materials
and labour. After independence an economic revival was needed to reduce import
dependence, which meant new technologies again, which tended to create conflict
between themselves and traditional crafts, even though mass communication
had begun to weld together a country hitherto divided by distance, nationality
and caste. O n e of the ironies of new technology in Indian agriculture has been
the country's increasing self-sufficiency in food marred by the enrichment of the
rich farmers and the impoverishment of the poor because of the high cost of the
capital equipment needed.
Technology does least harm in a society with a well-developed infrastructure

and adequate m a n p o w e r and where it can become part and parcel of indigenous
tradition and harmonize with the ethos and culture of the society. Technology
can be a force in society aggravating inequalities and injustice, or it can be the
opposite. A country's technological relationship is part of its economic and pol-
itical relations with others, especially if it is a developing country. Therefore,
the interaction of a society with technology is part of the total dynamics of the
social scene, based on the economic, social and cultural evolution of a country
in a world context.
The point has been m a d e that scientists and technologists are merely the
instruments of policy and therefore not in a position to foresee the social conse-
quences of their activity. Also, w h e n a developing country does develop local
talent in order to cope with technological advance there is the danger that it will
be attracted away (the 'brain drain') to work in developed countries. Unless
imported technology fits in with policy and political decision-making there is
distortion of effort, and it should not be regarded as a marketing opportunity
for a developed country's overseas interests but as part of the developing welfare
of the less developed country.
The two-edged nature of technology has to be understood and such examples
as Indian agricultural development foreseen and avoided. O n e constraint is the
narrow choice of technological opportunities open to developing countries: for
example, if staple food crops are replaced by cash crops, the latter tend to attract
research investment, which leads to local technical dependence on the investor,
to land concentration and eventually to soil exhaustion, especially during c o m -
modity b o o m s . T h e only answer is self-reliance in science and technology as a
basis of successful technology transfer, but it must be remembered that initially
the h o m e market for local k n o w - h o w will be small.
Finally, the contrast with developed countries is that they have become
relatively systematic in innovation, while less-developed countries tend to rely
on the commitment of knowledgeable groups of local people, w h o in their
enthusiasm might lose touch with reality, which in practice means that developing
countries adopting advanced technology would eventually encounter the hard
social problems experienced by the industrialized countries more than a century ago.
K . N e w c o m b e ' s article opens with the suggestion that not all non-
industrialized communities want Western technology and its accompanying life-
style. Indigenous technology has evolved to suit the local conditions of life.
'Appropriate technology', so-called, is by definition a mixture of the old and the
new, so that changing conditions can be met without social disruption.
In terms of social-impact assessment, technology is the tip of the iceberg,
meaning that a machine is useless without energy to drive it, materials to process
or an environment to w o r k on, skills and components to maintain it and a social
system capable of delivering these support services and of distributing and utilizing
its output. Failure to provide such a support system spells failure for the tech-
nology. In a word, compatibility of technology with society is critical to successful
adoption and adaptation. Sometimes change begins by being acceptable because
it is subtle, but unless monitored and controlled it can quickly lead to unexpected
ill-effects.
Factors to be taken into account are numerous: institutional (e.g. tribal),
political, parochial, customary and conventional; these all have to be weighed
by overworked local administrators. T h e case of biogas energy in N e w Guinea
is pertinent; the venture failed as an innovation because it violated tribal taboos,
despite wide acclaim as a small-scale energy source in India and China. But,
whereas in central and southern China there is a genuine ecological need for this
innovation, the need appeared to be less pressing in Papua N e w Guinea, and
lacked the urgency to counter traditional beliefs and practices. T h e alternative
source, pig manure, would require m u c h more w o r k and investment to set u p
a system of collection; so village energy problems remain, while elsewhere the
use of effluents and sewage provides an alternative source of gas not open to the
villages and not offering any cultural barriers.
T h e lesson is that research in developing countries is needed, but should
be applied research of a kind addressed to local conditions and understanding,
not imported as a package from an alien environment. T h e most 'elegant' tech-
nology brings benefits to both the developed country providing it and to the
developing country accepting it. T h efirststep in transfer and adoption should
be the calculation of the social and biological costs and benefits. T h e controversy
must take place before rather than after commitment, thus avoiding politi-
cally awkward circumstances and serving the interests of an ecologically sound
approach.
The question of appropriate technology has n o doubt been oversimplified,
leaving out the twin problems of time-lapse and indigenous change, a material
which seems apt and suitable today could be replaced with advantage by an even
more suitable material tomorrow. A n example is to be found in disease control:
local remedies could be replaced by imported substitutes but, unless subsidized
somehow, these are usually too costly. In short, innovations must never be imposed
upon the recipients but skilfully transferred and willingly adopted. W h a t seems
to be needed is an international data bank to indicate what k n o w - h o w is available
and where it might be needed and mostfittinglyapplied. Perhaps a kind of
technological early-warning system, a technological clearing house, could be estab-
lished, to permit the safe and fruitful interaction of 'macro', or worldwide, tech-
nology coming from the developed side with 'micro', or local, technology existing
in the Third World, T h e next few years should see the development of cross-
cultural and interdisciplinary consciousness if errors of judgement are to be
avoided in future.
W . Ackermann's article deepens the discussion of technologically induced
conflict. H e questions the validity of the assumption that cultural values decide
social behaviour in traditional societies (causality), that these values are shared
by all (homogeneity) and should be preserved (stability).
In the 1950s there was an assumption that modernization is automatically
beneficial, but this view has changed. N o w a d a y s , it is thought that Western
technology can be harmful to non-Western societies, undermining traditional
values, which then collapse, leaving a void. Thus alien technology is looked upon
as a threat, giving rise to uneasiness and suspicion, and the 'golden age' syndrome:
in the old days things were better than they are n o w .
Values are a means of ordering and evaluating experience, usually trans-
mitted in an irregular pattern by groups. These interest groups foster or resist
change, depending entirely on their particular interests. Those w h o are disad-
vantaged by change m a y thereby create a new set of values. So a n e w technology,
if it is to be accepted, must be seen to be integrated into a wide range of acceptable
alternatives. In itself a n e w technology seldom affects cultural values directly.
In the past n e w technology arrived via the market mechanism, but n o w
it is more likely to be the product of a central policy decision, especially if it is
on a large scale (hydro-electric stations, nuclear programmes, n e w polytech-
nics, etc.). Such scale creates tensions a m o n g those directly affected by the change,
and a m o n g others w h o are interested in the consequences but powerless to inter-
vene. Decision-making on such developments usually takes place at the highest level.
In some cases clashes occur between those agents whose actions increase
dependence u p o n external k n o w - h o w , and nationalists w h o resent such depen-
dence. The ultimate decisions reside with the policy-makers and their pressure
groups, if the latter have access to the decision process. In an 'emergency'—a
sudden need to acquire external know-how—traditional values m a y be swept
aside. It should be feasible to set u p a diagnostic process which would reveal
the options a m o n g available technologies and reduce the range of unexpected
and undesirable consequences.
W e m a y distinguish between specific and diffuse technology: the former is
deliberate and planned, the latter more random because it diffuses through the
market mechanism; but they interact, the diffuse building upon the specific.
Resistance to change springs from the awareness of those involved of the
adverse consequences which they perceive and would like to eliminate or moderate.
In any given social structure the social impact of an innovation will depend in the
end upon the use to which it is put.
T o o often, the innovators from outside a developing country tended to adopt
a tabula rasa or carte blanche mentality; previous to this k n o w - h o w there was
nothing, n o past, only future. Such thinking can only lead to conflict with local
values. A n important example is to be found in thefieldof medicine where reliable
native remedies have often been pushed aside in favour of so-called modern drugs
which are no more than placebos.
Technologkai innovations and their social impacts 443
In contrast to cases of innovation in less developed there are also significant

examples from developed countries, microprocessors and nuclear energy amongst
them.
Thus the microprocessor has not only begun to affect all sectors of physical
work but also that of intellectual work. Micro-electronics promised to open quite
new horizons for flexible, programmable and 'intelligent' automation. In the
foreseeable future w e can expect not only automatic workshops and automatic
centres for information storage and processing, but also large, global automatic
communication networks.
Automation, information and communication are tending to become an
integrated process leading to major changes in the division of labour. The tra-
ditional divisions between work and knowledge, work and management, production
and science are likely to disappear. Hitherto, automation, so-called, affected
about 15 per cent of the work in industrialized countries, but in the future it m a y
c o m e to dominate all forms of work as a general principle.
O n the one hand, therefore, while w e m a y welcome micro-electronics as
an important step in increasing the productivity of labour, and material and
cultural wealth, o n the other hand this m a y also be regarded as a threat to skills,
to work satisfaction and to the accepted fabric of society. In the West the use
of micro-electronics m a y result in the creation of a capital surplus that could bring
about an economic crisis, with inflation and unemployment coinciding;
The fundamental question today, therefore, is h o w , consciously, to combine
scientific, technological, economic, social and moral progress to preserve the
social values of mankind and the social environment on which they depend. O f
course there are countries lacking the basic prerequisities or infrastructure for the
development of micro-electronics. They are preoccupied with different problems
and so far do not see these advances as in any way a threat; but even they have to
consider the future development of production, changing techniques, consumer
demand and cultural consciousness. There can be n o holding back the building
up of industrial processes and of communication. A balance will be struck w h e n
the dominant interests promoting technical progress match the c o m m o n interests
of society as a whole, which means that the 'soft' and 'hard' sciences must progress
side by side.
That automation can have an integrative influence in society, if properly
managed, is borne out by Czechoslovak experience with the Plan of Social Devel-
opment, comprising science, technology, the production process and social life.
The plan is designed to educate people to think in terms of work organization as a
whole, to establish collaboration between workers and engineers, to enlarge skills,
to promote mutual understanding and to promote welfare and culture based o n
the workplace. Technical advance is an irregular, evolutionary process, but w h e n
the social factors are integrated with technological progress, then h u m a n progress
is least disturbed and subject to conflict.
The acceleration of technical advance m a y be measured by the consumption

of energy per head of population, from mere food intake by primitive m a n to
the 1970figureof 12 tonnes of coal equivalent per capita a year in the United
States of America. According to K . Kopecki, in his article below, the world used
in 1978 an average of 2.5 tonnes of coal equivalent per head, ranging from 0.24
to 1.4 tonnes in poor and developing countries to 13.4 in the United States. This
is a significant divergence that has grown slowly but steadily and is closely
dependent upon standards of living or the gross national product per capita in
each country, which in turn is a function of the economic structure producing
that G N P .
The industrial revolution from the steam engine to electricity generation and
the internal-combustion engine w a s m a d e possible by progressively cheaper
energy, especially since the discovery of oil. This also led to wastage of materials,
abuse of transport (in the sense of unproductive use), a rising threat to the environ-
ment and a general disregard for the future.
T w o serious questions to consider in relation to energy are the depletion
of natural resources and the disparity of energy supplies between developed and
developing countries. Therefore w e must n o w ask not merely whether nuclear
energy is necessary but also 'what dangers and what benefits does it bring?' A s
regards risk, nuclear power is less likely to cause death to an individual than his
being struck by lightning! The nuclear power production cycle is no less safe than
that involved in hard coal production. Such dangers as there are could be con-
tained by reinforcing regulations and inspection, by the control of apparatus and
materials, and by the international management of fuels and waste products.
Although there are safeguards in the nuclear-power industry, any accidents
that do take place could have long-lasting and irreversible consequences, and in
addition it is unrealistic to hope that h u m a n behaviour can be improved as a
safeguard. There is more hope in selecting alternative technologies or in changing
life-styles to reduce energy consumption. The key question is h o w to bring about
an international system of k n o w - h o w exchange so that policy options in the
selection and application of n e w technology can be m a d e as rational as
possible.
The issue of this Journal devoted to 'The Social Assessment of Technology'
(Vol. X X V , N o . 3, 1973), referred to at the beginning of this article, suggested
three main areas of consideration for policy-makers: (a) monitoring the effects
of existing technologies; (b) the screening and selection of n e w technologies;
and (c) research aimed at evolving technologies in relation to social objectives
and priorities. These are obviously highly desirable goals and the means to reach
them, but what is still lacking is any authoritative international agency for carrying
them out.
The basic lesson that emerged and been heard since, if not learnt before,
is that the adoption of any technology hitherto unfamiliar to the society contem-
plating its adoption, sometimes under pressure from outside, is fraught with prob-
lems if not dangers. Innovation theorists are also familiar with the observed fact
that innovations not appropriate for the market at which they are aimed will
sooner or later fail, with consequent loss and waste for all parties concerned,
including international agencies. The same fate will also overtake innovations of
a non-market character if their social application does not harmonize with the
nature and characteristics of the community involved (the simple low-level case
of biogas in Papua N e w Guinea is highly instructive).
O n e m a y consider the number of seminars, conferences and symposiums
already devoted to this well-worn theme, both internationally and nationally.
The consequences of technological misfits have often been dire, and one reason
for such disasters (a list of post-war technical crises would be formidable) has
been the eagerness of the innovators to apply their invention or discovery as soon
as possible, not to mention the desire of commercial interests to see a return on
their investment. Here are two sources of data for the edification of both inno-
vators and adopters: the consensus of the m a n y meetings held hitherto, and the
synthesized lessons of actual experience.
O f the m a n y recommendations emerging from the latest Unesco meeting
on technology and society (Bonn, November 1980) perhaps the following constitute
a m i n i m u m desirable effort:
1. T h e setting up of an international advisory group (perhaps within Unesco
but not necessarily) which could be consulted by innovators and adopters
w h e n technology n e w to the adopter was being considered, to seek for
precedents or parallels. Once established such a group would quickly acquire
a data base for the support of its work. Its impartiality would s o m e h o w
have to be assured.
2. The conducting of regular international reviews of innovation case histories
and their outcomes, by means of symposia and published proceedings.
It would constitute an international Office of Technology Assessment.
3. Finally this agency would develop a general framework of recommendations
by which to guide decision-making and action in the matter of future
technological innovation. It should be possible to chart successful and less
successful cases of innovation adoption for scientific review and evaluation,
and at a simpler level for wide dissemination to non-scientific officials
and others involved in the decision process, including the general public'
Notes
1
F . Hetmán, 'Steps in Technology Assessment', In- electronics and the Engineering Industry,
ternational Social Science Journal, Vol. X X V , London, Frances Pinter, 1980.
3
N o . 3, 1973. R . Rothwell and W . Zegfeld, Technical and E m -
2
P . Senker and N . Swords-Isherwood (eds), Micro- ployment, London, Frances Pinter, 1979.
Notes (continued)
F . Weltz and G . Schmidt, Introduction of New American Management Association, The Four-day
Technologies, Employment Policies and Indus- Week, N e w York, 1972.
trial Relations, London, Anglo-German Foun- M . Cooley, Architect or Bee?, London, Hand
dation, 1976. & Brain, 1980.
Senker and Swords-Isherwood, op. cit. Symposium on Technological Innovations and
P . Dickson, The Work Revolution, London, Allen their Social Impacts, Final Report, pp. 18-25.
& Unwin, 1977. (Unesco document SS-80/CONF.804/11.)
Cultural values
and social choice of technology
Werner Ackermann
Introduction
T h e relationship between 'cultural values' and 'technology' is not u n c o m m o n l y
presented as one of direct interaction. O n the one hand, cultural values are seen
as a determining factor in the choice and impact of technology; o n the other
hand, technology is conceived as potentially transforming cultural values. This is
particularly true of the analysis of the relationship between values and technology
in traditional societies. In this type of analysis it is often assumed that: (a) values
determine social behaviour (assumption of causality); (b) values form a coherent
system, shared by the whole of a given society (assumption of homogeneity);
and (c) values constitute the core of culture and lend it creativity and capacity
of resistance.
This simplistic kind of analysis, closely associated with cultural determinism,
takes order as the central feature of (traditional) society, and views social change
as essentially evolutionary or incremental. B y contrast, technological determinism
assumes that technological innovation is the driving force behind social change,
imposing its o w n logic on the social actors and their relations.
The debate on development has reflected these opposed views. In the 1950s
emphasis was placed on the benefits of modernization: the liberation of m a n from
the constraints of traditional society, brought about by increased access to n e w
technology, favouring in turn new, more universal patterns of social life (Lerner,
1958). M o r e recent literature has, advanced a rather more ambivalent, if not
outright negative, evaluation. M o d e r n technology is seen as essentially alien
to traditional cultural systems, intruding into them by force or with the complicity
of some local groups, thus cutting off the potential for developing endogenous
technologies. With respect to Western industrialized countries, there is also a
Werner Ackermann, a Chilean social psychologist, is Maître de Recherche at the French Centre
National de Recherche Scientifique and a member of the Centre de Sociologie des Organisations,
19 rue Amélie, 75700 Paris. He has published numerous articles on the dissemination of scientific
knowledge, and the impact of technical change in industry. His current research interest is in the
social reactions to danger and feelings of insecurity.
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981

448 Werner Ackermann
general uneasiness about the social impact of technological innovations, in par-

ticular their consequences on employment. A strong nostalgic feeling has devel-
oped that the essential virtues of the past have been lost, and nothing worth while
has c o m e to replace them: the 'golden age syndrome' (Moore, 1980).
Understood in this w a y , notions of 'cultural values' and 'technological
innovation' seem too general and loaded with emotional and political overtones
to be used in sociological inquiry.
Values and technology in their social context:

two illustrations
S o m e concrete examples m a y be helpful to illustrate the complexity of the relation-

ship between, on the one hand, values and technology and, on the other, the
broader context of social change. Thefirstexample concerns the profound changes
that have, in the United States, affected the economic activity classed on 'eating and
drinking places' as a part of the broader transformation of the whole of the' service
sector in that country.
In a recent article, Rothschild (1981) indicates that
by 1979,43 per cent of all Americans employed in the private, non-agricultural economy
worked in services and retail trade, [and that] within these two vast sectors . . . three
industries each provided more than a million new jobs during the 1973-1979. period:
eating and drinking places, including fast food restaurants, health services . . . and
business services. [Furthermore] the increase in employment in eating and drinking
places since 1973 is greater than total employment in the automobile and steel industries
combined.
The employment in these eating and drinking places has several distinctive
characteristics. First of all, employees are predominantly w o m e n and young people
( w o m e n alone account for 56 per cent). Second, workers have the shortest working
week (an average of 26.4 hours). This means there are m a n y part-time-workers,
simply paid by the hour. Third, wages are low: workers have the lowest average
earnings per hour (excluding tips). Fourth, for m a n y they are dead-end jobs,
without any prospect for promotion or a career. A n d ,fifth,they are hardly pro-
tected by unionization. For what follows it is important to note that the sector is
(still) labour-intensive and rather low on productivity.
In this sector, especially as regards fast foods, far-reaching, labour-saving
technological innovations are beginning to be introduced, at least in the larger
chains; machines m a y take over a good part of the work of these part-time, largely
female, employees not protected by unions. These changes m a y increase productivity,
as well as having a number of other effects. The technological innovations, m a y be
seen as an advantage in a competitive market. It m a y be presumed that they will
Cultural values and social choice of technology 449
have an adverse effect on employment as well as on skills. If a recession is added

to technological innovation the impact m a y be disastrous, because of an adverse
multiplier effect: w o m e n are laid off, eating out diminishes, etc.
N o w w e should step back and consider this instance of technological inno-
vation in its historical and socio-economic context. There are a number of long-
term trends that have promoted the development of eating out in thefirstplace.
For example, m a n y more people live alone: a high percentage of marriages end
in divorce. M a n y more (married) w o m e n work than before, which seems directly
related to eating out. Prosperity has increased for a number of years, and eating
out is sensitive to the level of income.
If, in the coming years, automation of the production of fast and other food
outside the h o m e increases and leaves m a n y people without work, a number of
different developments m a y be hypothesized. The most 'conservative' hypothesis
would be that the w o m e n n o w employed in that sector (and in other services)
will again stay at h o m e and thus change families' eating habits back to what
they were before. O n the other hand, one m a y imagine that these w o m e n will not
return to their previous roles but instead look for other work. Perhaps their work
experience, however little rewarding, has stiffened their resistance against a return
to being an unpaid child-minder, house-keeper and cook. With respect to this
most directly affected group, one could say that it first entered the labour force
before the technological innovations were introduced, and that dismissal presented
a conflict—the choice between returning h o m e or looking for alternative work.
W h a t is to be said about the entrepreneurs presented with the n e w tech-
nology? Are they simply compelled to adopt and use the new devices for economic
survival? Are they the bearers of the value of innovation? O r do they weigh the
relative advantages of labour- or capital-intensive production systems, in a d o w n -
to-earth, strategic manner? Productivity itself is a value, functioning as a guideline
for decision-makers.
Consumers constitute a third affected group. T o assess the impact that
technological change m a y have upon consumer behaviour, more general aspects
of concomitant social change should be taken into account: for example, the
general changes in what is considered to be the proper role of w o m e n and the
family. Perhaps eating-out habits are more closely related to such changes than
tofluctuationsin income. Technological innovation m a y provide m u c h cheaper
fast food. If prices are to be substantially reduced, eating out will become more
accessible to even more people, thus giving them a greater choice. Increased
differentiation in the catering services m a y be the result, higher quality requiring
highly skilled labour and resulting naturally in higher prices. Eating out m a y
also become part of a set of new social practices, related to changes in time allo-
cation and patterns of social interaction.
It m a y perhaps be helpful to complement this rather complex example
with a simpler one, to illustrate the interaction between technology, cultural
values and social practices in a different context. A n interesting study has been
conducted of the introduction of the gas stove in Senegal (Abou Bacry, 1981).
A r o u n d 1975 the Senegalese Government wanted to promote the use of gas
stoves in urban dwellings, gradually to replace the charcoal stoves until then
widely used. (Note that the charcoal stove itself had been a relatively recent
technological innovation for urban dwellers, developed by local entrepreneurs in
an artisanal manner.) T h e government's decision to promote the use of the gas
stove was based on two considerations: that the extensive use of charcoal would
contribute to deforestation; and that the country produced an excess of butane
gas which could be utilized.
Therefore, in 1975/76 an intensive campaign was conducted to induce the
people to buy and use gas stoves. The campaign appealed essentially to the value of
'modernity'—the gas stove was presented as modern, clean and fast; in short the
preferable thing to have and to use. In fact, quite a few people bought gas stoves
(between 1975 and 1978 their use increased from zero to 80,000, while the use of
charcoal stoves declined), so w e m a y conclude that the appeal to modernity
was rather effective.
However, the gas stove had at least one important drawback for its
Senegalese users: it could hardly be used for the proper preparation of the tra-
ditional tea. Apparently, the stoves were such that the flame level could not be
properly regulated. Serving good tea to the family and especially to guests is a
very important aspect of social life. It was felt that tea could only be properly
prepared on a charcoal fire. Thus, the desire to prepare good tea and the desire
to use the 'modern' gas stove soon came into conflict. It is such conflict that brings
into the open the relative weight of the different cultural values involved. T h e
latter serve as guidelines for deciding whether or not to use the gas stove. In
fact, m a n y people kept the gas stove as a piece of furniture in the house without
using it, also because of fear of accidents. The example shows that an available
technology was not fully used because, in the form.in which it was presented,
it could not be integrated adequately into dominant social practices tied to
important cultural values.
Cultural values and collective interests
Cultural values m a y then be considered as ways of ordering and evaluating objects,

experiences, and behaviours, manifesting themselves above all in situations of
choice. In most societies the set of values that m a y be identified will not be either
wholistic representing a single system;, only, or uniform for all groups. That is to
say, on the one hand, there m a y be internal contradictions within a given set
of values and, on the other, within a given society there m a y be a range with
respect to a number of elements of the value set. Even the set of values held by
individual members of a society m a y be considered as not being altogether

coherent: opposed values m a y come to the fore in a situation of choice. Never-
theless, in most societies, a subset of dominant values m a y be identified; some
values seem to be shared by large sectors, even if they d o not constitute a coherent
value system.
Cultural values do not exist without their bearers—people or social
groups—and are not normally m a d e explicit without the tensions caused by
alternative behaviour patterns. The values acted out by these social groups through
their choices lend meaning to their particular w a y of life, to the structure of their
social relations, their manner of solving the problems of physical subsistence and
social reproduction. The functioning of society implies complex relations of power,
of work, of mutual assistance, of exploitation. The values that are m a d e manifest
in these social relations m a y frequently be seen as the crystallized reflections of the
diverse, and often contradictory, interests pursued by the social groups involved.
For example, there exist situations where the social structure consists of
different groups forming a hierarchical system, legitimated by the belief that
people are inherently of unequal worth. That belief favours the interests of certain
sectors over others, even if in fact all social groups share them, by and large.
Resistance to changes in the hierarchical structure m a y be explained in this
case by the combination of the underlying interests of the privileged and the
generally shared dominant values and beliefs. Through n e w social experiences
the disadvantaged m a y realize that they are disadvantaged, and that they m a y
find better opportunities under a different social dispensation. Social conflict
m a y develop, that is n e w behavioural alternatives appear as possible and n e w
beliefs and values m a y become attached to them.
Values must, then, be considered in intimate connection with what could
be called the collective interests of the very social groups that hold them. Never-
theless, it is important to realize that cultural values and beliefs have an historically
acquired force to some extent independent of the current social structure. A s a
result, they will be embodied in the projects of individuals and groups, contribute
to the ordering of their priorities, and affect their strategies to achieve whatever
goals they have set themselves, without being explicit preferences over alterna-
tives. Thus, for example, the widely held value of having numerous children and
of maintaining extensive relations with the kinship group would seem to correspond
to the collective needs of members to rely on one another. M a n y a project to
promote family planning and the use of contraceptive devices—developed for
purposes external to the more immediate interests of the groups concerned—has
confronted the need for large families, a m o n g other things, as an insurance against
the problems of old age. The new technology—with its intended benefits—offers
an additional strategy. T o be adopted it must be integrated into the range of
socially acceptable alternatives of behaviour.
A s has been said above, not all social groups share the same values, and
even attachment to the same values m a y have different roots and meaning in various
groups. It is more likely that a society harbours conflicting values, and that conflicts
a m o n g these are brought to the fore by the manifold possibilities that technological
innovation brings with it. Therefore, in investigating the relationship between
values and technology, one should carefully consider whose values are affected
(threatened, lost) and what these values stand for, with respect to each of the
groups involved.2
The choice of technological innovation
Technology, for present purposes, will be taken in a broad sense, so as to include

a wide variety of ways of doing things; producing foodstuffs, settling disputes,
communicating, making war, etc.
All societies develop their specific procedures to this end, and in all
societies technology has always been subject to change. N e w means of agricultural
production have been developed (e.g. elaborate irrigation systems in Sri Lanka),
n e w forms of public administration have emerged (e.g. the system of government
developed by the Mayas), the printing press was developed in Europe and China,
the telephone in the United States. The latter example represents perhaps a j u m p
in technology, whereas m a n y technological changes are rather gradual (e.g. the
development of a legal system by the R o m a n s ) , though no less of a change for
all that.
While technological innovation is in itself a form of change, it also brings
with it other changes in social, economic and political life. A n agricultural system
as the basis for producing the necessary foodstuffs and other consumer goods
leads to w o r k relations different from those of a pastoral economy, and a c o m -
munity largely engaged in trade and commerce organizes itself differently again.
W h e n a society changes from being, for example, largely pastoral to being largely
agricultural, n e w social relations will develop and thus the social institution called
the 'family' m a y equally change appreciably.
The introduction of the power loom in the textile industry of Western
Europe and, more generally, the n e w technology associated with the Industrial
Revolution caused profound changes, not only in the social structure of work
relations, but also in most other social relations. This long process of change gave
rise, a m o n g other things, to the modern labour movement, and to political
economy as a w a y of analysing this very process.
For our purposes, the following distinction should be introduced. M a n y
technological innovations in the past, like today, have been introduced through
the market mechanism. The relatively recent history of the telephone is illustrative
(Pool, 1978). Contemporary examples are the massive introduction of electronic-
processing technology in such sectors as banking and insurance, as well as the
use of electronic devices in the fast-food and retail trades. B y contrast, there
are also deliberate decisions on the part of governments and other political bodies
to adopt certain n e w technology. Such decisions include constructing hydro-
electric dams, steel mills, n e w transportation systems, space and nuclear pro-
grammes. A t the same time, in the countries where such decisions are m a d e , the
market mechanism continues to function and introduces other types of technology.
Sometimes the public and the private sectors share responsibility, applying a
division of labour. .
T h e important role assumed by governments in introducing n e w technology
is a relatively recent development. A historical perspective shows that, for a
number of choices, the decisions structure has changed. Technocratic government
apparatuses intervene increasingly between the producers and sellers of n e w
technology and those sectors of the population that will be involved in its
implementation one w a y or another. It is characteristic of this development that
a twofold tension has emerged around the adoption of technological innovation,
especially, but not exclusively, in non-Western countries.
There isfirstthe tension between the technocratic state apparatus and the
political decision-making bodies and the m u c h larger 'civil' sectors. These sectors
include two important groups; the people directly affected by the technology
(to be) introduced (for example, the Senegalese charcoal-stove users), and a m o r e
specific sector of entrepreneurs and professionals w h o are themselves interested in
certain technological innovations, but whose participation in the decision-making
process is rather restricted, if not altogether excluded.
Governmental choices do not always correspond to the interests of these
groups and political conflicts m a y result. M e m b e r s of these groups often feel that
the values and interests that have inspired the choice of the government agencies
are not theirs, and that the technology thus introduced negatively affects a type of
social structure they want to preserve or promote. Other social actors m a y approve
the government decisions and profit substantially from them. 3
Also, there.is tension between the technology-importing public agencies
and those w h o provide it. The buyers of technology try to limit their dependence
on external centres of k n o w - h o w and to negotiate better conditions for its
acquisition. The relative success of such attempts will depend greatly o n the
international economic and political situation, e.g. the possibility of exploiting
the competition a m o n g the sellers of technology, the relative scarcity of particular
natural resources etc., and also on the strength and stability of the domestic
power structure.
Obviously, the producers and sellers of technology continue to provide it
through the private market as well. But o n the whole the locus of decision-making
is being shifted upwards in society, involving m o r e restricted technocratic and
political circles and excluding, by and large, the participation of social and
economic actors.
If the locus of decision-making is removed from those more directly affected

by n e w technology governments m a y have to obtain some sort of approval or
at least acceptance of their decisions, to facilitate their implementation. O n e
w a y m a y be an official discourse appealing to (supposedly) widely shared values
such as 'modernity', 'national development', 'increased well-being of the poor', etc.
T h e more governments act in isolation, the greater the need for ideological
discourse.*
Values intervene in the process of examining possible technological alterna-
tives. The values and preferences of the decision-makers themselves function as a
filter, broadly screening out the potential range of possibilities, focusing attention
on only a limited number. For example, the importation of capital-intensive
technologies m a y be preferred because of their assumed efficiency, precluding the
local development of more labour-intensive technologies. Also, complex techno-
logies characterized by centralized forms of operation m a y be more or less
deliberately chosen over more decentralized ones. Within the range of feasible
alternatives, the more specific interests of decision-makers and pressure groups
determine the choice ultimately arrived at.5
A historical example illustrates clearly h o w a particular technology was
adopted at a relatively high level of government, as a response to a serious
community problem. It concerns the decision to install sewerage systems in
various American cities in the second half of the last century. The growth of
American cities (like that of others) had as one of its consequences the urgency
of finding a solution to the problem of disposal of used waters, rain-waters, and
excrement. A detailed study has been conducted (Dupuy and Tarr, 1981) on what
decisions were reached and h o w , and what were their consequences on subsequent
technological developments in the area. Initially, solutions were adopted at the
city government level. They favoured the unitary sewerage system which resolved
the three problems simultaneously. This particular solution was very expensive
and highly technical. Nevertheless, it prevailed over other available technologies,
such as, for example, improving the existing system of septic tanks for domestic
waste, while disposing of rain-waters in some other w a y . Totally different
technologies were k n o w n and in limited use at the time (e.g. mixing excrement
with sand, in small towns and rural areas). T h e system of sewerage had already
been in use in various parts of Europe for some time, before its adoption in the
United States.
The dominant value behind the adoption of the integrated system of disposal
of used waters was public health. This technology was consonant with the current
belief that running water had a purifying effect, through dilution. In the same
context of concern for public health, treatment of water before domestic use was
believed to be necessary. The technology developed was therefore limited to pre-
use water treatment.
Once this system had developed it became clear that not all the problems
had been solved. T h e problem of downstream users arose, and extensive regu-
lations became necessary, at an ever higher level of geographical inclusiveness
(county, state, federal). In recent years it has become imperative to treat used water
before it is released into open waters. Furthermore, the environment in general
has become more and more valued by the population at large, thus emphasizing
the need for post-use water treatment. Thus, the deficiencies of the system, not
perceived at the outset, have been remedied piecemeal, within the framework of
the initially adopted technology.8
The example shows two things. First, the adoption of a certain technology
in the face of a 'problem' is not a matter of course but a matter of choice. Second,
the initial adoption of a certain, pervasive technology limits the subsequent
choices of alternative technologies in the same area. It is simply difficult to change
the whole system of sewerage, for various interacting reasons (high cost, opposition
from the professional groups concerned, etc.). At the same time, there is n o
particular reason to transplant such a sewerage system to countries where
conditions are very different from those prevailing in the nineteenth-century United
States. There is still a choice to be m a d e , and it will have the benefit of experience.
T o summarize, the values of different groups have played a role in the
process of initial decision-making, as well as in the subsequent adaptations of the
system. First, there were the new, at the time, bourgeois values of cleanliness and
public health, reflected in the concern of the public authorities. Second, there were
the values of the technicians, expressed in their preference for a high degree of
technicity. Third, in the process of development of the sewerage system n e w values
have come to prominence on the part of consumers, e.g. the value of a clean
environment for recreation. Effective pressures on public authorities have led to,
on the one hand, restrictions on the disposal of pollutants and, on the other hand,
the search for anti-pollution technologies, both preventive and remedial.
The same framework relating social problems, values, and particular interests
m a y be applied to other issues of economic and technological policy, to explain
h o w they are decided upon and implemented. The possible options concerning the
appropriate way to modernize the country, to fight inflation, etc., correspond to
conflicting values and preferences of different social sectors; industrialists, farmers,
salaried workers, etc. S o m e groups favour a strong and autonomous national
economy, based on the expansion of the internal market, protectionism and
related measures. T o this end they m a y look for political alliances accross the
classes, for the sake of national development. Other groups advocate an open
economy, relying on the relative trade advantages of the country on the inter-
national scene, a strong monetary position, etc. Obviously, their political alliances
will have a different social composition. Both of these views about the preferred
style of development or the appropriate reaction to a crisis are characterized by a
particular interplay between the more permanent values of the groups concerned
and their more immediate interests.
It should not be presumed that the values held by any group are i m m u n e
to the force of these immediate interests and that they will not be modified in due
course, even by a mere change of interpretation.
Social diagnosis and choice of technology
T h e choice of technology is properly seen as a m o m e n t in an ongoing social and

political process. The process as a whole is moulded by socio-political preferences
and interests. Analytically, different phases within the process m a y be distinguished,
although in practice it m a y be difficult to separate them clearly. T h e process
starts with the identification of a problem-situation calling for some remedy. A
m o r e or less detailed initial analysis m a y give rise to different diagnoses, in the
sense that some groups will emphasize different aspects than others, as a function
of their o w n values or preferences. S o m e h o w , each diagnosis already contains
elements of the remedial policy considered appropriate; With respect to the
process of diagnosis one can observe the same pattern of upward shift that w e
have noted for the decision structure: its elaboration is increasingly left to expert
consulting groups, sometimes called in from abroad. There is the possibility that
in this case the values of the people directly affected are being replaced by those
of the experts. However, the more technocratic approach does not preclude the
diagnosis.from becoming a political bone of contention/Alternative procedures
in view of reaching a diagnosis m a y be conceived, for instance including the
participation of local groups in the formulation of their needs and appropriate
remedies. T h e latter approach implies an acknowledgement of different values
occupying their legitimate place in the consideration of alternative policies. T h e
more carefully elaborated the diagnosis, the easier it will be to anticipate the
impact of the project and its implementation, and to reduce the range of
unintended, undesirable consequences.
Choice and implementation of technology:

the case of Ecuador
Let us consider the development of more productive dairy farming in Ecuador in

the 1960s and 1970s (Barril et al., 1980). The lower valleys of the Andean m o u n -
tains—the Sierra region—were traditionally occupied by large, rather unproductive
land-holdings. A s in other Latin American countries, a small percentage of all
holdings accounted for a high percentage of all the land, but only a relatively low
percentage of its output.
These haciendas had a characteristic system of production. The land was
worked predominantly by unpaid workers, living on it—the huasipungo system.
These peasants had a set of duties and rights, a m o n g which were the following:
they had to work the land of the owner four days a week; they had rights of use
of individual plots of land; miscellaneous services, such as domestic work, were
also to be performed. These traditional haciendas produced mostly potatoes and
cereals for popular consumption.
The 1950s and early 1960s saw a rapid urbanization and a certain concen-
tration of wealth in these urban centres, resulting in a larger and more differ-
entiated market for consumer goods. Accordingly, a number of landowners hit
on the idea of producing milk and dairy products for this growing urban market.
Their project was wholly capitalistic: they wanted to produce efficiently for people
w h o could afford to pay the price, and they were to enlist the assistance of the
state for the more difficult aspects.
Profound changes in the whole structure of production were the result.
First of all, the rural entrepreneurs transformed the system of landholding. They
reserved for themselves the better part of their land and handed over other pieces
(freehold) to their peasants. This constituted a privately initiated agrarian reform,
more or less at the same time w h e n a law to that effect was prepared and
adopted (1964). It should be noted also that there had been n o militant peasant
movement up to then, but that upheavals were feared, in view of the recent Cuban
revolution. For the work to be done the rural entrepreneurs relied entirely o n
paid workers, both in more or less permanent service and as day labourers. In
any case, they opted for a capital-intensive production system. T o this end they
imported modern machinery and introduced modern biological techniques like
artificial insemination. Also, as a group, they obtained facilities and help from
the state. Traditionally, large landowners had been closely associated with the
ruling political groups. Thus, they had easy access to the state apparatus and had
little problem in obtaining the necessary financial and technical assistance. A
specialized public agency, the Agronomic Research Institute (INIAP), helped
them with the particularly difficult and expensive problem of improving the
pastures. Natural pastures were not very good and artificial ones were developed
on a relatively large scale. This technical assistance by the state benefited above
all m e d i u m and large entrepreneurs.
This process of modernization has been highly successful. A n efficient
sector of modern agriculture developed: the medium-sized farms did especially
well. T h e division of labour between the private sector and the state has also
been efficient. The major changes m a y be summarized as follows. In the structure
of landholdings, medium-sized farms became c o m m o n , while very large land-
holdings diminished sharply in number. A t the same time, large numbers of
very small landholdings were created, where productivity was low. T h e structure
of the social relations of production also changed substantially. The n e w capital-
intensive farms relied totally o n wage labour, traditional work relations having
lost their function. In these farms the number of workers decreased and a number
of poor peasants migrated to other regions and to the cities. In addition, the
composition of agricultural production had greatly changed. T h e growing of
staple foodstuffs decreased while the production of milk and dairy products
increased greatly.
It is difficult to understand this process of large-scale technological inno-
vation in terms of values, whether they be 'traditional' or 'modern'. A number of
landowners saw a possibility for a change which would be beneficial to them,
but would it be correct to say, for example, that they opted for a drastic change
in their economic activity on the basis of the value of 'modernity'? Or that the
value of 'tradition' prevented other landowners from taking part in the change?
W a s the decision of the government agencies concerned to support the modernizing
farmers based on any particular value? It does not seem to be helpful to reason in
these terms. Rather w e should see these innovations as part of a larger economic
(and political) strategy.
Let us follow the sequence of events. By the end of the 1970s the government
realized that the situation in the Sierra region was not optimal. The production of
staple foodstuffs had declined to the point that some had to be imported. T h e
small plots of land handed over to peasants could hardly be m a d e productive
without adequate implements and a certain investment in fertilizers, for which
the peasants would need credit.
Different approaches to this problem were conceived and implemented.
T w o government agencies developed distinct strategies to assist small peasants both
individually and through their local communities. These were the Ministry of
Agriculture and F O D E R U M A , the Rural Development Agency, which was set
up by the Central B a n k of Ecuador.
In 1978, the ministry started a campaign to m a k e technical assistance more
accessible to small peasants. T o this end, it had to reorganize the structure of its
external services (Ackermann and Fausto, 1978), which had for several decades
been oriented towards benefiting the agricultural entrepreneurs. Networks of
contacts between the state technicians and their customers had been formed.
The implementation of the n e w orientation did not add material and manpower
resources; instead, it was n o w expected that the existing technicians would devote
their time to small peasants in need of assistance. However, these officials lacked
the necessary k n o w - h o w : the technology they had developed for the large-scale,
capital-intensive farmers w a s not appropriate for the small peasants; the n e w
approach called for general assistance, the specialized skills the state technicians
had applied in their former network being hardly useful. It is therefore not
surprising that strong opposition arose a m o n g them, in the n a m e of 'pro-
ductivity'. They had fully integrated the value of modern agricultural productivity
as practised by the larger farmers. W h e n a conflict developed between what they
preferred and what they were required to do, their resistance to the latter was
justified in terms of 'productivity': they did not see their new work as contributing
Cultural valúes and social choice of technology 459
to higher agricultural productivity. A n d they had not been given sufficient

opportunity to appreciate and integrate the long-term economic and political
objectives of the reform, to constitute at least a countervalue.
F O D E R U M A took another approach. It relied wholly on the initiative of
local communities in requesting technical assistance of different types, e.g. a bridge
to facilitate access to markets, seeds, fertilizer, infrastructure. F O D E R U M A
evaluated the appropriateness of the request and the modality of its implemen-
tation. The agency tried to follow the desires and preferences of local communities
rather than trying to impose its o w n ideas and projects upon them. Its whole
approach was based on a respect for traditional ways of life and the desire to
help the people to improve certain aspects thereof. It was obviously difficult to
evaluate these improvements after the manner of measuring 'project implemen-
tation' by applying quantitative criteria (Ackermann, 1979). In part because of
this difficulty, the F O D E R U M A approach was not wholeheartedly supported by
the government agencies required to help implement its development projects.
These strategies show two roles of values in the process of social change
implying choices of technological innovations. In the case of the ministry the
values of the technicians served to legitimate their resistance against the newly
required behaviour and w a s an obstacle to implementing the proposed reform.
The values inspiring this reform (improving the day-to-day living of small
peasants) were not perceived by the technicians and did not operate in their
evaluation of alternatives.
In the case of F O D E R U M A , values played a different role. Traditional
values (as perceived by the agency) were considered as instrumental: they could
help mobilize the rural population for the improvement of their living conditions,
largely through their o w n efforts. Also, F O D E R U M A induced a higher level of
consciousness of these values and resulting preferences o n the part of the very
peasants whose development was promoted. The process of choice was intended
to set in motion a series of social changes, leading to ever more autonomous
decision-making.
The impact of technology on cultural values
In the foregoing sections w e have dealt principally with the role of values in the
process of choice and implementation of new technology. The issue of the impact
of technology on cultural values, and more generally on different aspects of
social relations, has received extensive attention in the sociological literature. A s
mentioned in the introduction to this article, divergent broad hypotheses have
been advanced. Explanatory concepts relating technological innovation and
changes in social relations and cultural values range from the rather mechanistic
notion of a differential rate of change of technology as compared with other
cultural components (cf. Ogburn's idea of the 'cultural lag'), to the m u c h more
complex conceptions, of Marxian inspiration, regarding the interplay between
the forces of production and the social relations of production.' Whereas these
more inclusive perspectives are valuable for an understanding of long-range
trends, w e have already argued that it is indispensable also to analyse on a
smaller scale the specific consequences of the introduction of new technology on
the behaviour and values of the social actors concerned.
In this context, it would be useful to distinguish the impact of two kinds of
technological change. O n one side, there are those that have a geographically
and socially rather limited incidence (although these m a y profoundly affect the
w o r k and life of those directly involved, e.g. the mechanization of mining
operations, the construction of a d a m in a rural area, etc.). O n the other side, there
are m u c h more diffuse technological innovations affecting society at large. It
should be recalled that some pervasive technological innovations have developed
incrementally, with a n impact o n ever wider sectors (e.g. the development of
transport.and communication networks).
Specific and diffuse technology
Let us elaborate this distinction briefly. In the case of specific technology, as a set
of operations introduced deliberately in a delimited context, frequently with the
aim of solving a problem (e.g. low output in agriculture or mining) or of producing
a n e w commodity or service, some agent—public or private—must have m a d e
a decision to introduce it. Diffuse technology is typically a commodity or a service
offered for use through the market to the public at large. Admittedly, what n o w
appears as diffuse technology, pervasively present, m a y have been introduced
deliberately at an earlier stage. Typical examples of currently diffuse technology,
connected to specific development projects in the past, are public transportation and
the sewerage system. B y contrast, the diffusion of the telephone has had a different
history (Pool, 1978). T h e distinction between diffuse and specific technology is
relevant for the analysis of their consequences. Specific technology, for instance,
the electronic processing of banking operations, directly affects a circumscribed
group of people, in this case certain categories of bank employees, although their
number m a y be large. Also, specific technology is generally imposed on a group:
its members have not m u c h choice but to adopt it in one w a y or another. B y
contrast, access to diffuse technology is in principle, open to an unlimited number
of people, though in practice its use is restricted, through the mechanism of
price, social discrimination, and so on. A t the same time, those w h o have
access m a y choose whether or not to use it, and, if so, to what degree.
T o summarize, specific technology induces a transformation of social
relations affected in a rather immediate way, in particular of the social organization
of work, while diffuse technology offers options for alternative social behaviours.
The diffuse technologies that n o w pervade a society have necessarily

developed in consonance with the prevalent social practices and cultural values.
The exchange and consumption of goods and services are important aspects of
such social practices and express these cultural values. The capacity to buy goods
and services and to display consumption is a (symbolic) aspect of power, and as
such enters into power relations. Whatever goods a person or a group can obtain
or produce and not consume immediately are accumulated as capital. A part of
that capital will be displayed, another part m a y be hidden. T h e s u m of the
accumulated resources is a material basis of power. T h e introduction of n e w
consumer goods as a form of diffuse technology m a y change the patterns of
consumption and the accumulation of capital. Such modified behaviour patterns
m a y or m a y not imply a change in values.
With respect to services, it should be noted that n e w and old technology
will frequently overlap. For m a n y of the purposes for which Western society
has invented a certain device, other cultural systems have their o w n : a postal
service m a y be complemented by a system of messengers. A s a matter of fact, the
same applies to industrialized countries. T o the extent that the state postal
service is not satisfactory or adequate, parallel systems will be maintained or
even developed: private communications systems, such as private mail and
tele-xeroxing. T h e same overlap phenomenon m a y be seen in areas such as
medicine, law, education and security.
The two technological modalities w e have distinguished interact in their
impact. For one thing, specific technology being introduced n o w mostly builds
upon a more or less extensive basis: an educational system, communication net-
works, managerial skills, and the like. For another, the interaction m a y assume the
form of mutual reinforcement: specific technology prepares the w a y for the
introduction and use of more diffuse technology while the social sectors most
exposed to diffuse technology m a y demonstrate a preference for technological
innovations.
Technology in its social context
A good part of the literature concerned with these issues has dealt with the effects
of the pervasive presence of diffuse 'modern' technology in society (Lerner, 1958).
Whether considered positive or negative, these effects were seen as opening u p
the world. This was thought to lead progressively to the disappearance of cultural
differences, and hence to the spread of a uniform, urban-industrial culture and its
corresponding values. Even instances of specific technological innovations were
seen as having a far-reaching, incremental impact, through a process of social
reverberation: the change began in the work-place, affectingfirstw o r k relations,
then the network of social relations around the work-place, and from there the
social structure of the region and the nation. The adoption of new ways of life and
values associated with 'modern' technology is considered as an essentially passive

process, not the result of a choice between alternatives through social interaction
(Sainsaulieu and Ackermann, 1970).
A more appropriate conceptualization of the impact of technological
innovation is that it modifies above all.the range of behavioural alternatives. For
s o m e groups it offers n e w ways of doing things, for others it eliminates existing
options. Except under conditions of extreme control, new technology does not
determine entirely the n e w set of social behaviours.
This m a y be most clearly illustrated for diffuse technology. Where it is
introduced it affects the group or society, but not all its members in the same way.
W h e r e a Western system of law was introduced some people used it while others
did not want or were unable to do so. All the same, in this case there is an
additional choice of behaviour. If some form of public transportation develops
a number of people will have the option to take the bus or the train instead of
walking. But in the long run the options m a y be reduced again because some of
the original behavioural alternatives cease to exist.
N e w behavioural patterns are deliberately adopted by social actors to the
extent that the latter perceive certain interests and want to express certain
demands. Technological innovation m a y offer n e w strategic possibilities within
their social situation. It is quite conceivable that the n e w behavioural alternatives
are used in an instrumental w a y to satisfy constant traditional values. For
example, if an extended family with a strong head w h o exercises control and
provides leadership is a value, it is possible that some family members will take
advantage of certain technological innovations in commerce and management to
amass a larger fortune as the basis for power and leadership within the family,
while certain of their relatives will continue to focus on, say, agriculture and
trading in a traditional manner. T h e former will provide more family members
with formal educational opportunities and thus add to their status and power.
T h e goals and values have remained constant, but ways of attaining them have
been diversified.
The same considerations apply to specific technology. Its introduction
creates a new set of technical tasks, to some extent requiring a different organ-
ization of work; yet leads to the elimination of certain types of work. There m a y
be a certain overlap of different technical systems, the m o r e traditional one being
replaced only gradually. In some cases, as in the example of Ecuador cited above,
a whole category of production relations is transformed. It has been frequently
emphasized that specific technological innovation has profound consequences on
the structure of employment. I shall not elaborate this complex problem here,
but see the article by Andrew Robertson in this issue, and also R a d a (1980).8
Specific technological innovation m a y at the outset not appear to offer real
behavioural alternatives to those affected. It m a y be in the interest of some social
actors to present the n e w technology as applicable in only one way, as determining
in and by itself the manner in which to operate it (i.e. optimal, 'scientific' organ-
ization of work). However, some classical studies show that, for example, the
mechanization of coal mining was compatible with different ways of organizing
the work (Trist and Murray, 1948). Similarly, in the automobile industry, inde-
pendent work groups, organizing their o w n work, have in some factories replaced
the more traditional assembly-line organization. These well-known examples
serve to show that the impact of technology on the immediate social context,
that is, the organization of work, is by n o means rigidly determined. T h e structure
of w o r k relations that develops around technological innovation is to be seen as
the result of the interaction between the actors involved, managers and employees.
In this interaction, both sides will mobilize all the resources at their disposal to
defend their perceived interests and values.
T h e set of perceived interests and values varies from country to country
and is a product of specific historical development. A s such it will mediate between
changes in technology and social behaviours related to them. Recent studies,
comparing in different countries the social organization of work in industrial
units matched for their technology, show that the structure of control was quite
different: in the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, the more highly paid
supervisory personnel were less numerous than in France (Maurice et al., 1979;
Gallie, 1978).»
Conclusion
The analysis of the relationship between technology and cultural values cannot
be separated from a consideration of the social relations concerned. T w o types
of relationships should be distinguished: the role values m a y play in the process
of choice and the implementation of n e w technology, and the impact of techno-
logical change on cultural values.
W e have argued that, in both types of relationship, important intervening
variables operate. In the case of the choice of n e w technology, values have the
function of delimiting the range of possible alternatives, while the more immediate
interests m a y strongly influence thefinaldecision-making process. T h e implemen-
tation of technological innovation will in part depend upon the degree of it's
compatibility with strongly valued social practices.
The impact of technology on values is hardly ever direct. Rather, it is
mediated by the changes it m a y bring about in social relations affected. These
changes themselves should be viewed as resulting from the interaction of social
groups pursuing their o w n , frequently opposed interests. This is most clearly the
case in instances of the introduction of specific technology.
The impact of diffuse technology is even more difficult to assess. Techno-
logical innovation of this kind provides n e w behavioural alternatives, at least for
certain groups. The consequent emergence of new patterns of social practices m a y

lead in turn to a change in cultural values.
Technology does not constitute an instrument of social domination or
cultural alienation in itself; nor does it contribute automatically to greater freedom
of choice or social emancipation. Its impact depends on the use to which it is
put within a given social structure.
Notes
1
Similar trends to those outlined above have been nuclear energy programmes, the same type of
observed with respect to retail trade in the inertia is to be expected.
7
United Kingdom, concerning the introduction Cohen (1978) has recently restated the causal role
of labour-saving electronic devices ,in a context of productive forces (technical organization
of changing shopping habits (Cosyns et al., of work) in the transformation of the relations
1981). of production. A discussion has developed
2
For a more detailed discussion of different ap- around this renewed emphasis on technology
proaches to the conflict between various as the determining factor in history (Levine
cultural groups within one society, see and Wright, 1980).
8
Najenson (1979). Predominant concern has been about unemployr
3
In certain historical situations the ruling sectors ment. The problem is by no means clear cut,
have opted for a form of what Barrington M u c h depends on the scale considered. T h e
M o o r e (1969) called 'conservative moderniz- introduction of new technology within existing
ation', that is, trying to introduce modern work situations or branches of industry m a y
industry while maintaining the fundamental lead to unemployment. The establishment of
features of the social structure (e.g. Japan new industries in places where there were none
and, more recently, Brazil). This conserva- before obviously creates jobs. A more c o m -
tive 'revolution from above' is generally plicated case is the development of quality-
associated with an authoritarian form of improving technology, as in the culture and
government; it m a y imply choices that are communications industry, which may result
contrary to the more immediate interests of in increased employment.
8
the dominant sectors of society. Such a The development of industrial relations in Japan is
process of modernization requires consider- another example, at a high level of generality!
able separation of the government from civil Large-scale technological innovations have
society. been introduced, totally transforming the
* A problematic gap may develop between a high technical aspects of production, while at the
degree of dependence o n external k n o w - h o w same time some fundamental features of the
and the nationalistic elements advanced in the social relations of work and the traditional
official discourse, destroying its credibility. values associated with them have been delib-
6
This aspect of public-private linkages influencing erately preserved. It has been suggested that
public decision-making has been analysed in maintaining the traditional work relations
detail for Brazil by F . H . Cardoso and by was part of a strategy: it was meant to prevent
L . Martins; for the case of an industrialized a possible social mobilization of an uprooted
country, France, see Friedberg (1979). labour force.
s
The same argument applies to the development of
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A B O U B A C R Y , L y . 1981. L a donn6e socio-culturelle A C K E R M A N N , W . 1979. Utilización de indicadores

de l'empreinte de la technique. Culture tech- sociales para el desarrollo rural. F O D E -
nique (Paris), N o . 4 , February. R U M A Seminar, Ibarra, Ecuador.
References {continued)
A C K E R M A N N , W . ; F A U S T O , A . 1978. Estudio pre- Production de la hiérarchie dans l'entreprise:

liminar sobreladescentralizaciónen el M . A . G . recherche d'un effet societal. Rev. franc.
Quito, F L A C S O . Soclol., Vol. X X , N o . 2, pp. 331-65.
B A R R I L , A . ; B A R S K Y , O . et al. 1980. Ecuador: M O O R E , Barrington. 1967. Social Origins of Dic-
cambios en el agro serrano. Quito, F L A C S O - tatorship and Democracy. Harmondsworth,
CEPLAES. Penguin Books.
C O H E N , G . A . 1978. Karl Marx's Theory of History: M O O R E , F . T . C . 1980. La philosophie analytique
A Defence, Oxford, Oxford University Press. hors de chez elle. Critique, N o . 399/400,
C O S Y N S , J.; L O V E R I D G E , R . ; C H I L D , J. 1981. Micro- pp. 765-73.
electronics, Organization and the Structuring N A I E N S O N , J. L . 1979. Ensayos sobre cultura y poli-
of Employment in Retailing (in press). tica. Mexico City, F L A C S O .
D U P U Y , G . ; T A R R , J. A . 1981. Assainissement des P O O L , I. de S., et al. 1978. The Social Impact of the
villes. Culture technique (Paris), N o . 4 , Telephone. Cambridge, Mass., M I T Press.
February. R O T H S C H I L D , E . 1981. Reagan and the Real America.
F R I E D B E R O , E . 1979. Industrial Policy in France. New York Review of Books, N o . 28, February.
Berlin, I.I.M. R A D A , J. 1980. Microelectronics and Information
G A L L I E , D . 1978. In Search of the New Working Technology. Social Science Information,
Class, Cambridge, Cambridge University Vol. 19, N o . 2.
Press. SAINSAULIEU, R . ; A C K E R M A N N , W . 1970. L'étude so-
L E R N E R , D . 1958. The Passing of Traditional Society. ciologique du changement technique: pour une
N e w York, The Free Press. analyse stratégique. Bull. CERP, Vol. X I X ,
L E V I N E , A . ; W R I G H T , E . O . 1980. Rationality and pp. 1-22.
Class Struggle. New Left Review, N o . 123, TRIST, E . L . ; M U R R A Y , H . 1948. Work Organization
pp. 47-68. at the Coal Face: A Comparative Study of
M A U R I C E , M . ; SELLIER, F . ; SILVESTRE, J. J. 1979. Mining Systems. London, Tavistock Institute.
Technology policy for self-reliance:
some major issues
Dieter Ernst
Control over technology has become a major instrument of domination, both in

domestic power relations and in international relations, especially in the North-
South context.1 For instance, a worker operating a machine with highly frag-
mented k n o w - h o w , but n o k n o w - w h y , will hardly be able to control his labour
effectively. N o r can a society achieve effective control over accumulation and
related changes of class structure without control over technology. Thus, while
control over technology is necessary for any strategy of transition towards
increased self-reliance, it is still clearly lacking in the majority of developing
countries. Technological dependence, defined as the inability to generate, adapt
and use technological systems to meet needs,2 constitutes a major element of their
distorted economic and social development.
W e have shown elsewhere3 that international transfer of technology, left
to the laws of oligopolistic competition, has led to a further increase in the already
extremely unequal global distribution of control over both inputs and outputs of
research, development and engineering. T h e international transfer of technology
has thus been instrumental in perpetuating the hierarchization of North-South,
but also of South-South relations, with all its inherent implications for under-
development, misery and potential for global conflict.
T h e key to an understanding of technological dependence is to analyse it
as part of the overall dependency characterizing Third World societies and to
view it as a dynamic process which has recently gained increasing importance as
an obstacle to transition towards self-reliance. In other words, without a compre-
hensive and coherent national science and technology policy, designed as an
integral part of the national plan, there can hardly be any self-reliant development.
But what kind of development is to be pursued and h o w are socially relevant
scientific and technological priority areas to be identified?*
Dieter Ernst, an economist, is research fellow at the Projekt Technologie-transfer, Universität

Hamburg, Floot 5, Hamburg 60, Federal Republic of Germany, and lecturer at the University of
Bremen. He has been consultant to several international organizations on technology planning and
transfer and the impact of new information techniques on Third World industrialization.
Int. Soc. Sei. J„ Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981

Technology policy for self-reliance 467
In this article, I will focus on the following points: the close interlinking
of key development objectives with priority areas for science and technology, and
conditions for success, especially with regard to identifying carriers of strategy
and timing.
Selective technological delinking
After centuries of externally geared underdevelopment, most Third World

countries today need technology imports if they propose to raise output,
productivity and their long-term development potential. T h e crucial problem is
h o w to prevent the import of foreign technology on a significant scale leading to a
qualitative intensification of dependence. This implies the need to internalize the
technological dimension as part of an autonomous decision-making process by
selective technological delinking and by defining priorities for technological self-
reliance.5 T h e following points must be stressed.
First, it is not insufficient scientific-technological capacity per se which is
the real problem, but the almost complete lack of autonomy even with regard
to very basic decisions concerning technologies incorporated into a 'national'
development plan. This applies both to decisions on the selection of suitable
technologies and to those sources of their supply.
In fact, the term 'technological self-reliance' should cover both the ability
to generate, adapt and use technological systems to meet social needs and the
ability to choose and control the areas of partial technological dependence,
which will remain unavoidable everywhere for m a n y years to c o m e .
Second, instead of an indiscriminate proliferation of high-technology
imports, emphasis should be placed on the selective acquisition of strategic
technologies with significant multiplier effects for increasing self-reliance. This is
the essence of what I call 'selective technological delinking'. O n e w a y of going
about it is by focusing on technologies for capital-goods production related to the
fulfilment of basic needs, i.e. a priority for capital goods meeting basic needs and
for those applied to down-stream to local resources. For example, in a country
well endowed with natural gas and iron ore, but not with coking coal, basing
the steel on coke-fired blast furnaces might be called an extreme form of resource
waste. A better approach would be to combine direct reduction with miniatur-
ization of the plant. The negative consequences of an indiscriminate proliferation
of high-technology imports are most obvious in the recent attempts by a growing
n u m b e r of developing countries to build u p their nuclear energy capacities, which
has rightfully been called the 'nuclear trap'.8
Strengthening technological self-reliance further implies promoting basic-
needs-oriented domestic engineering capacities and fundamental research. In
their absence, the domestic production of capital goods is easily co-opted
468 Dieter Ernst
and reintregrated into the worldwide network of international capital.

Third, the focus o n technologies for basic-needs-related capital-goods
production is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. It is a necessary
condition because it implies policy autonomy about what is needed to meet basic
needs and the conditions under which goods are to be produced. It m a y thus be
called a necessary first step towards effective participation by those directly
involved, i.e. the majority of the population. Yet this is only one side of the coin,
and if further illusions are to be avoided, one must hasten to examine the other
side, that is, the identification of those industries and their, optimal interlinkages,
which, under given geographic, historical, social and economic conditions, will
best enhance the long-term national accumulation potential. <
Fourth, success should not be perceived in a narrow sense. Considerations
like what institutions, social and political coalitions are necessary to adopt n e w
approaches must be central.
•••'.' Technological needs for development must be defined endogenously both
with regard to the optimal use .of local resources and the meeting of basic needs.
T h e identification of the manifold manifestations of technological dependence
has to take place as a social learning process, with the realistic participation of
those directly affected. It must be added, however, that increasing participation
of workers and peasants in the choice and assessment of technology also has
significant implications for the acquisition of skills and for income redistribution.
. N o doubt, any serious approach to social control over technology involves
some very harsh divisions with regard to priorities and the institutions and political
instruments to promote the long and painful internal social transformation which
is the only sound basis for self-reliance.
Delinking is therefore definitely not a n easy option. Without fundamental
transformations it is a chimera. Delinking can only have significant chances of
success .under conditions that do not in any case leave m u c h choice with regard
to. economic, political and military autonomy. But such 'emergencies' are in fact
quite normal cases for a great m a n y developing countries. Invariably, delinking
will be accompanied by very high social costs, will have to be partial and full of
contradictions. T o m a k e it. viable the social costs must be explicitly identified
and translated into policy variables in terms of trade-offs by comparison with
the always possible alternative strategies of progressive world-market integration:
Lastly, strategies to enhance technological self-reliance are bound .to be
long term. The path will be strewn with contradictions and setbacks. A n y attempt
to identify the prevailing forms and mechanisms of technological dependence and
dominance, and. to implement effective countervailing policies, will for long, be
confronted with every n e w form and .mechanism of dependence, dominance, and
so on. That is w h y delinking strategies must be both selective and flexible.
Interlinking key development objectives

with priority areas for science and technology
A successful strategy of self-reliance requires the identification and adoption of a

complex set of alternative technology systems which allow for the m a x i m u m
mobilization of domestic resources and the extension of development capacities.
T h e solution cannot be found in a single-shot decision.7 A variety of technological
levels m a y co-exist at a given m o m e n t in sectors, sub-sectors, products or even
plants, ranging from advanced a n d sophisticated to so-called traditional ones.
T h e choice of a socially optimal technology mix supposes the systematic identi-
fication of sector- and product-specific alternatives and their principal advantages,
this being one of the most urgent current research requirements.
T o identify such priorities, w e must be clear o n the key developmental
objectives to which they are to be subordinated. I would propose the following:8
(a) effective control of key sectors; (b) bringing needs into line with effective
d e m a n d ; (c) support of agriculture, especially to achieve self-sufficiency in food;
(d) o p t i m u m social benefits b y using a n d processing natural resources; a n d
(e) identifying and strengthening'industrializing industries', which w e m a y consider
in greater detail.
Effective control of key sectors
In m a n y developing countries, key sectors of the e c o n o m y are controlled b y

private capital, mostly originating from the O E C D countries. This m e a n s that,
by and large, the development of these sectors has been governed b y the require-
ments of the worldwide strategies of international capital.
A n effective public control over key sectors of the e c o n o m y is a basic
requirement for dynamic inter-industry linkages a n d the strategies of transition
towards a n alternative development pattern. Nationalization is just thefirststep,
and should by n o m e a n s be confused with effective control, which m u s t include
control of the market, control of the essential inputs, control of forward a n d
backward linkages and, last but most important, control over basic research and
technologies.'
Bringing needs into line with effective demand
In most developing countries, the gap between needs, or m o r e specifically the

needs of the underprivileged majority, a n d the effective d e m a n d is widening
dramatically. U n m e t basic needs and overconsumption in certain urban growth
poles are the familiar s y m p t o m s . A deliberate and comprehensive policy to
bring needs into line with effective d e m a n d is one of the utmost importance,
470 Dieter Ernst
implying three interrelated elements: (a) identifying social needs; (b) defining
criteria for the adjustment of effective demand to social needs; and (c) restructuring
supply.
Identifying social needs

T o do this as a technocratic exercise would be useless: it must and can be done
as a social learning process,10 as has been documented in a recent case-study on
Guinea-Bissau.11 Yet w e lack empirical research on success and failure in this
area, which could be used as a starting point for in-depth, participatory field
research.
W e m a y take, for instance, the case of energy. H o w to identify the
energy needs of a society? Let us define the energy system as a set of social,
technical, economic and commercial activities whose objective is to meet the
energy needs of a society. Starting from the end of the stream, there are four
elements:
1. The consumers.
2. T h e production complex, which includes the exploration and exploitation
of primary energy resources (e.g. coal, oil, natural gas) and the conversion
of these resources into secondary energy (e.g. solid and liquid fuels,
electricity).
3. T h e upstream industries that provide the energy-production system with
intermediates and capital goods (e.g. equipment for the generation and
distribution of electricity).
4. The services that enable the energy system to function and develop, including
maintenance and research and development.12
Estimating energy needs and identifying options of energy technology is highly
complex in itself: it cannot be done at all without a basic value judgement. W h o
is going to benefit and w h o is going to pay? For instance, catering to the urban
élites in n e w 'growth poles' will pose completely different energy requirements
than meeting the basic needs of the poor and underprivileged. T h e different
energy options are no more alike than are the technologies needed for either of
these alternatives.
This is obscured in the prevailing 'technocratic' approach to estimating social
energy needs, usually based on so-called national energy balances. It has recently
been shown that these balances are extremely misleading for at least four
reasons.13
They deal only with the flow of commercial energy, thus excluding w o o d ,
charcoal, animal and vegetal waste, amounting to up to 80 per cent of the
primary energy consumption of certain countries. They are ¡global, and do not
explain regional inequalities, particularly important where only one part of a
country is linked u p to the transport and energy-distribution networks. Further,
they completely ignore the distributional issue and tend to blur the difference
between primary andfinalconsumption of energy, i.e. they identify energy needs

with the amount of energy actually used, without taking into account the possible
enhancement of thermodynamic efficiency.
Thus, estimating energy needs technocratically most probably leads to
choices hardly consistent with the requirements of self-reliance. There is an urgent
need to re-assess energy requirements, especially in the rural areas, both in
quantity and quality, bearing in mind that they are both thermal (principally for
cooking and drying) and mechanical (for pumping and power for cottage
industries); that they are small scale, coverage of which by commercial carriers
is extremely sensitive to the cost of energy; and there are needs to be met in
regions with very low. population densities.
Defining criteria for the adjustment of effective demand to social needs

In this area, detailed research has been almost completely lacking. A t a very
general level some criteria are rather obvious, such as meeting the basic needs of
the underprivileged; the most production deployment of the labour force; the
best use of local natural resources; and optimal mobilization of local scientific
and technological capabilities and (upgraded) traditional skills.
Traditional consumption and living patterns should be preserved, at least
in so far as they do not lead to discrimination or exploitation.
W h a t is n o w needed is field research and case-studies at a m u c h m o r e
disaggregated level which could help to orient policies to establish a realistic n e w
consumption model.
A case in point would be the need for fresh research on food technology.14
N o doubt, in a majority of developing countries, there is a growing gap between
effective demand for food and needs in terms of nutritional value, health and
cost. In m u c h of the Third World, massive advertising and product promotion,
together with modern food processing, has already resulted in highly distorted
consumption patterns. Consequently, readjusting effective food demand to social
needs must have high priority. Translating this into research requirements
wouldfirstentail a projection of demand for different products implied by redis-
tribution of income in conjunction with a self-reliant strategy. The next research
step would be to trace and project those technologies and/or technological
innovations corresponding to each line of demand. There is a growing body
of empirical evidence to indicate that developing countries have at their disposal
a wide range of alternatives for adapting and developing food technologies
suited to their particular needs,15 if only these needs were reflected by effective
demand.
472 Dieter Ernst
Restructuring the supply side

M u c h lip-service has been paid to this. But without knowing social needs and
without having matched these with effective demand, the best-intentioned policies
to restructure the supply of goods and services will lead nowhere. It is the choice
of product problem that still requires m a n y case-studies and the interrogation of
those directly involved, especially the rural poor.
W h a t is needed is a n e w social technology extension service which would
enable development planners, producers and consumers to exchange and cumulate
information and experience o n the development and testing of alternative
production lines.
Let us take as an example a country that has undergone a political
a) Consumer goods
/
t
I For basic needs II Luxury consumer goods
(to meet basic needs
broadly defined)
b) ^ ' " f Capital goods J^

s ^, -^ ».^
/
I For basic needs
/' V in For products
\
/
goods / for local \
t luxury \
I
II For down-stream consumption IV As inputs

activities on for world
local resources market
production
II. 1 As inputs for
local agriculture
and industry
II.2 For production for
the world market,
if comparative
advantages can be
exploited
F I G . 1. Choice of product for a self-reliant policy.
revolution. The new government, w e assume, tries to initiate a process of economic

and social transformation, which would lead to a development policy based o n
self-reliance and the needs of the underprivileged. Such a self-reliant strategy would
clearly affect choice of product and technology.
Figure 1 delineates possible priorities for choice of product. With regard to
consumer goods, product choice will have to rely almost exclusively o n basic
needs, preferably o n public ones. With regard to capital goods, product choice
must, ceteris paribus, be restricted to I and II.1*
N o w , let us assume that the economic, social and political constraints o n
'appropriate' choice of product, as defined in Figure 1, can be overcome. Indeed,
these constraints would be formidable—nothing less than a complete reversal of
the dominant m o d e of accumulation would be at stake. But even this would
only be part of the story, because a second level of constraints n o w has to be
accommodated. This is precisely where the problem of technological dependence
enters. The issue at stake is: h o w to acquire the basic research, development and
engineering capacities which would enable the country to produce priority basic
needs goods and the capital goods of categories I and II.
But again this is not the whole story, since even these priority products can
be produced by different technologies, based o n different modes of organizing
labour. In fact, the primary objective of the technology and forms of labour
organization dominant today is to reduce labour costs, i.e. the wage bill. There
are two ways of going about this: to dismiss workers or to deskill a growing part
of the labour force, or both at once.
• T w o further considerations must therefore be taken into account in the
context of a self-reliant policy. First, technology and the organization of labour
should be adjusted to m a k e it possible to absorb the active population into the
process of social production. In fact, developing countries have been experiencing
a long-term decline in their absorptive capacities for labour which, as growing
empirical evidence has shown, is essentially a result of the type of technology
imported.17
Secondly, the dominant technology and domestic means of production
should be tailored to fit the skill level of the available work-force. T h e definition
of skills should go far beyond the mere willingness of the labour force to
subordinate itself to the necessities of production processes, and include the
capacity to comprehend, control and reproduce these very processes. T h e growing
deskilling of the developing countries' labour forces, as a result of the present
pattern of international transfer of technology, m a y in fact be the key to
their technological dependence, though systematic research o n this hardly
exists.18
474 Dieter Ernst
Support of agriculture, especially to achieve

self-sufficiency in food
Today, most developing countries, even those with an abundant potential for
agricultural production, are becoming increasingly dependent on food imports.
Self-sufficiency in food being a major objective of a self-reliant strategy,19 support
for agriculture must be a priority in general and especially for industrialization
strategies. This applies to sectors producing agricultural inputs (implements,
fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation equipment, etc.), to sectors serving transport and
distribution requirements and to those processing agricultural goods. Oppor-
tunities abound for the application of science and technology to increase
agricultural productivity, to improve post-harvest technology and to introduce
innovations into plantations,fisheriesand forestries.
It should be noted that these are sectors where international capital (the
so-called agro-business, especially originating from the United States) has recently
gained a particularly strong position. Consequently, if agriculture and agro-allied
industries are to be used as instruments to achieve self-sufficiency in food, they
must be given effective protection against penetration and denationalization. This
is a necessary pre-condition for the effective use of some of the very useful
knowledge recently accumulated in certain international and national institutions,
such as the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development ( U N R I S D ) ,
the F o o d and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ( F A O ) , the
International Rice Research Institute (IRRT) at Manila, Philippines, a n d the
International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics ( I C R I S A T ) at
Hyderabad, India.
Social optimization of natural resource use
Minerals, water, agriculture,fisheries,forests, wild-life and renewable and non-

renewable energy resources are a m o n g the bases for industrialization and
development: national control over their prospecting, exploitation, production
and marketing is thus a n essential element for a self-reliant policy.
Yet most such resources, at least if they have a significant profit potential,
have been systematically screened and tapped b y international capital, which
takes great care to preserve its monopoly of knowledge. T o carry out rapid and
detailed surveys of natural resources requires the use of highly sophisticated
technologies, such as remote sensing by satellite imagery, aerial surveys and aerial
photography, which are dominated by a few private and publicfirmsin the major
industrialized countries. They are also extremely costly.10 T h e same is true, by and
large, of technologies for the exploitation and processing of natural resources.
In other words, most developing countries still need basic capacities to detect,
exploit and process their o w n natural resources. Research in this field should
therefore have top priority, including the systematic exploration of patterns of

possible co-operation between developing countries.
O n the other hand, the availability of natural resources should determine
industrialization strategy with regard to the choice of sectors, processes and
techniques. Here again, w e k n o w little about the desirable linkages between
resource endowment as defined above and industrialization patterns. Such k n o w -
ledge is urgently needed to prevent industrialization from misusing those natural
resources which are scarce and non-renewable, to give priority to sectors linked
with processing renewable ones and to develop the production of inputs and
equipment for sectors exploiting local natural resources. In other words, developing
countries need systematic research, which would enable them to adapt indus-
trialization to ecological requirements, i.e. to the protection and development of
the resources of the biosphere.
Identifying and strengthening 'industrializing industries''
Industrialization is potentially the key to socio-economic development. It has

enormous potential for accelerating the growth of other sectors, such as agri-
culture, transport and communications, energy, drugs and pharmaceuticals,
health and social services.
Yet, in reality, industrialization in the Third World has nearly always meant
the progressive disintegration of such economic and social circuits, with inherent
consequences for structural distortion.
A concerted effort is therefore needed to redefine industrialization patterns
and to define its operational content as part of a strategy of transition towards
self-reliance.
Priority should be given to the identification and promotion of what have
been called 'industrializing industries',21 i.e. those that would allow the o p t i m u m
use of local natural resources, guarantee the meeting of basic needs and optimize
long-term accumulation and the enhancement of scientific-technological capacities.
Such a strategy includes, inter alia, the build-up of a machine-tool industry, the
production of textile and agricultural machinery, and a reorientation of basic
industries, processing locally available resources, to the benefit of down-stream
activities and their integration both with industrial and agricultural production.
This strategy would include efforts to strengthen local engineering capacities,
especially pre-investment studies, chemical engineering and equipment design,
and the control of technological components and life cycles.
T h e general principles of such a strategy have by n o w been established. W h a t
is still needed is a series of concrete sector- and product-specific case-studies to
clarify the scientific and technological requirements in detail.22
T h e concept of industrializing industries must be a dynamic one: every
historical period and each stage of socio-economic development has its particular
476 Dieter Ernst
set of industrializing industries. For instance, the growing internationalization of

capital and the recent proliferation of micro-electronic innovations have significant
effects not only o n process and product technology, but also on consumption
patterns and life-styles. Furthermore, they have already set in motion basic changes
of the overall accumulation pattern of Western societies. In a growing number
of developing countries, there are also already significant signs of a basic change
of accumulation patterns. In fact, a n e w generation of industrializing industries
is increasingly displacing the traditional key industries, such as steel, electro-
mechanical engineering and chemical industries.23 It is to such dynamic changes
and their impact o n industrial priorities in the Third World that case studies
should be mainly addressed.
Chances of success
Restructuring the international context
T o apply science and technology effectively to the key development objectives,

developing countries would obviously have to restructure quite considerably
their present international economic, political and military relations. This would
have to include concerted attempts to widen the range of international co-operation
especially economic and technical co-operation within the Third World itself.24
W e still lack systematic research undertaken from a Third World perspective
on h o w the crisis of international economic, and political relations is to affect
industrialized countries' international co-operation, and especially n e w forms
of national and collective self-reliance in the Third World.
Clearly, prevailing trends point to m u c h m o r e rigid and uncompromising
positions.25 But this is only a global picture and reality is m u c h more complex. N o
doubt there will be considerable differences as between countries and industrial
sectors, even more as between political groupings and social classes. In the O E Ç D
m e m b e r states, for instance, notwithstanding recently successful moves to strengthen
the c o m m o n bargaining power vis-à-vis an increasingly fragmentated Third
World, there is n o doubt that the economic crisis is permanently generating new
conflicts and political frictions between different factions. T h e same would
apply to the global scene, whether in terms of greater multipolarization
or not.26 .
It is even m o r e important to analyse these conflictual dynamics at the level
of. specific industrial sectors and branches. F r o m the viewpoint of the O E C D
countries this has been extensively analysed, for instance by the O E C D ' s o w n
'Interfutures' project, by the O E C D Directorate for Science, Technology and
Industry, and by the French think-tank, G R E S I (Groupe de Réflexion pour
les Stratégies Industrielles).2' Finally, it is no secret that trade unions, by and large,
do have somewhat different ideas than, say, employers' associations, o n h o w to

integrate developing countries into a restructured world economy.
Third World countries should be able to draw o n research o n such diverging
positions and conflicts of interests a m o n g industrialized countries. Only thus can
areas of conflict and areas where conciliation of interests is possible be established
in an operational manner, and only then can realistic options be identified for
national and collective Third World strategies to diversify dependence.
T h e educational systems in developing countries would have to be thoroughly
overhauled. A t present, they are not only unadapted to development needs, but
constitute a major source of dependence;28 Education should become a training
ground for self-reliance29 to produce an 'appropriately' skilled labour force,
i.e. workers w h o are neither overskilled in the sense of being the highly specialized
overseers of 'automated factories' nor deskilled in the sense of being deprived of
certain general-purpose skills as, for instance, welding. Scientific and technical
managers committed to social cost-benefit analyses, and selective recovery and
upgrading of 'traditional' innovative capacities are also needed.
Carriers of the strategy and timing
In order to m a k e self-reliance viable one must k n o w not only what it should aim
at, and w h y , but also identify w h o is to be responsible (i.e. the carriers), and h o w
they are going to execute it. This requires a critical inventory of the prevailing
class structure, especially with regard to w h o controls the generation a n d use
of the social surplus and thus can decide which technologies will become
dominant and which will be displaced.
T h e analysis of domestic distribution patterns is necessary for understanding
the social conflicts underlying the introduction, diffusion, adaptation and further
development of technology. In other words, a research approach is required to
identify those social groups or regions that stand to benefit from the application
of a certain technology and those that are going to pay and suffer. Only thus can
one hope to identify in an operational manner the social and political forces
promoting or opposing self-reliance, the areas of conflict and those where
conciliation of interests is possible, the necessary institutional frameworks, and,
finally, the social and political coalitions for carrying out this strategy. This type
of analysis focusing o n the internal class basis for choice of technology should of
course be linked back to the analysis of the prevailing international order, referred
to above. Otherwise w e would lose track of some major factors and mechanisms
underlying the political, economic and scientific-technological systems prevailing
in the Third World.
Identifying carriers of self-reliance and their conflicting interests is a highly
complex and multi-dimensional task. Yet w e still lack systematic research o n this
essential issue. .
478 Dieter Ernst
Another crucial problem is the question of timing. Galtung has recently

pointed out that it has two dimensions: the principle of ripe time, and the principle
of correct time order.30 If developing countries would base their strategies and
tactics on a careful scrutiny of the timing question, they would n o longer simply
have to react towards the dominant activities of the North. Rather, they might
for thefirsttime be able to use the inherent imbalances and contradictions of the
world economic crisis as a driving force to increase their space for manœuvre for
national and collective self-reliance. Yet, the time factor has been nearly
completely ignored in discussions on h o w to proceed with self-reliance.
T o conclude, without thoroughgoing political and economic change, that is,
without a complete restructuring of the prevailing class structure and state
functions for the benefit of the underprivileged, the application of science and
technology to self-reliant development is not only impracticable but illusory.
Such change must occur as m u c h in the industrialized countries as in the
Third World. Otherwise, the misuse of science and technology will not end. ,
Notes
1
O n the role of technology for intra-OECD conflicts, 8 The following arguments owe m u c h to François
see, for instance, the work of the O E C D Le Guay, op. cit., and Jacques Perrin, Reper-
Interfutures Project, Facing the Future: Mas- cussions sociales des transferts de technologie.
tering the Probable and Managing the Un- Conditions de travail et transfert de technologie,
predictable, Paris, O E C D , June 1979. Grenoble, IREP-Université des Sciences so-
2
Problems of h o w to conceptualize technological ciales de Grenoble, July 1977.
dependence are discussed in Dieter Ernst (ed.), 9 For further details, see Dieter Ernst, Muthana
The New International Division of Labour, A . Jabbar and Praxy J. Fernandes, 'Report
Technology and Underdevelopment—Conse- of the Working Group on the Role of Public
quencesfor the Third World, Chapters I and II, Enterprises in the Development of Technology
Frankfurt a m Main and N e w York, C a m p u s , and its Implications on Technology Transfer
1980. Contracts', presented to the Expert Group
3
Dieter Ernst, 'Transfert de technologie et servitudes Meeting on 'Structuring of Contractual R e -
du capital', Le Monde diplomatique (Paris), lations in Transfer of Technology Trans-
M a y 1979. actions of Public Enterprises in Developing
4
Unfortunately, most of the documents prepared for Countries (Model Contracts/Provisions)', In-
the United Nations Conference on Science ternational Centre for Public Enterprises in
and Technology for Development do not deal Developing Countries, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia,
with these issues. See, for instance, United 22-26 October 1979. . , ••.
10
Nations, Report of the United Nations Confer- See, for instance, the illuminating and pioneering
ence on Science and Technology for Develop- concepts of Ainilcar Cabral in Unité et lutte,
ment. Vienna (20-31 August 1979), N e w Paris, François Maspero, 1975; or in Return
York, October 1979. (A/Conf.81/16.) to the Source: Selected Speeches by Amilcar
5
This argument has been developed in Dieter Cabral, N e w York and London, Monthly
Ernst (ed.), op '. cit. Review Press, 1973.
0 11
For steel, see Pierre Judet, 'Iron and Steel Industry Denis Goulet, Looking at Guinea-Bissau: A
and Transfer of Technology—concerning the New Nation's Development Strategy, Washing-
Direct Reduction Process', in Dieter Ernst ton, D . C . , Overseas Development Council,
(ed.), op. cit. March 1978. (Occasional Paper N o . 9.)
7
François Le Guay, 'Industrialization as Part of a 12 W e have derived this definition of the energy sys-
Self-Reliance Strategy*, IFDA Dossier (Nyon), tem from methodology developed in U N I D O ,
N o . 2, November 1978; and in Dieter Ernst Draft World-Wide Study on Agro-Industries,
(ed.), op. cit. 1975-2000. A Sectoral Study prepared by the
Notes (continued)
International Centre for Industrial Studies,21 This concept was first developed by Gérard
pp. 18 et seq. (UNIDO/ICIS.65, 12 Decem- .. | Pestanne de Bernis for the Algerian Planning
ber 1977.) See also United Nations Research . Model: see 'Industries industrialisantes et
Institute for Social Development, Food Sys- , contenu d'une politique d'intégration régio-
tems and Society ( U N R I S D / 7 8 / C . 1 4 / R e v . l , nale', Économie appliquée, Vol. 19, N o . 2,1966,
27 June 1978). and 'Les industries industrialisantes et les
15
Denise Cavard and Patrick Criqui, Les bilans options algériennes', Tiers Monde, Vol. XII,
énergétiques comme outils d'évaluation de N o . 47, July/September 1971. For a critique
l'énergie solaire dans les pays en voie de déve- of some of its shortcomings as experienced in
loppement, Grenoble, IEJE, 1978. the Algerian context, see M a r c Rafflnot and
11
U N C T A D , Technological Policies in the Food , Pierre Jacquemot, Le capitalisme d'état algé-
Industry: Issues for Research, p p . 32 et seq. rien, p p . 140 et seq., Paris, Maspero, 1977.
22
(TD/B/C.6/40, 16 November 1978.) See, for instance, case-studies by RafaelTiberghien,
15
See Appropriate Technology for Employment Cre- Daniel Malkin, Seifeddine Bennaçeur and
ation in the Food Processing and Drink Indus- François Gèze on capital goods and electronic
tries of Developing Countries, Geneva, I L O , devices for automation systems, in Dieter
1978; and the special issue of World Develop- Ernst (ed.), o p . cit. A somewhat similar
ment, Vol. 5, September/October 1977, edited approach is being followed by some sectorial
by James Pickett. case-studies, co-ordinated by Pierre G o n o d at
lc
W e are leaving aside some crucial problems related the U N I D O International Centre for Indus-
to II.2. See, for instance, Hveem's case-study trial Studies. See his Progress Report on the
on Algeria, in Dieter Ernst (ed.), o p . cit., World-wide Study on Capital Goods Industry.
and Pierre Judet, 'L'économie algérienne et (UNIDO/ICIS.108, 12 April 1979.)
la logique de l'indépendance', Le Monde 23 For a stimulating account of some of these devel-
diplomatique (Paris), February 1979. opments see thefinalreport of the O E C D
17
A . S . Bhalla (ed.), Technology and Employment in Interfutures Project, op. cit., p p . 334 et seq.
21
Industry, Geneva, I L O , 1975. These issues are more extensively discussed in
18
For two interesting research approaches concern- Dieter Ernst, 'Technical Cooperation a m o n g
ing industrialized countries, see Benjamin Developing Countries ( T C D C ) : A Viable
Coriat, L'atelier et le chronomètre. Essai sur Instrument of Collective Self-Reliance?', in
le Taylorisme, le Fordisme et la production de Victor L . Urquidi (ed.), Science and Tech-
masse, Paris, Christian Bourgois Editeur, nology in Development Planning, Oxford,
1979, and Michel Freyssenet, La division Pergamon Press, 1979.
capitaliste du travail, Paris, Savelli, 1977. 25 See, for instance, ' N e w World Economic Order',
19
See the Programme of Action, adapted during the Business Week, 24 July 1978. With regard to
F A O World Conference on Agrarian Reform Western Europe, see Constantine Vaitsos,
and Rural Development, published in, F A O , ' F r o m a Colonial Past to Asymmetrical
Report on the World Conference on Agrarian Interdependence. T h e Role of Europe in
Reform and Rural Development, p p . 4-25. North-South Relations', paper presented at
( W C A R R D / R E P , July 1979.) For a brilliant the General Conference of E A D I (European
discussion of the social, economic and politi- Association of Development Research and
cal issues involved, see Susan George, How Training Institutes), Milan, September 1978;
the Other Half Dies. The Real Reasons and Commission of the European C o m m u n i -
for World Hunger, Harmondsworth, Pelican ties, Europe—Third World Interdependence,
, Books, 1978. Brussels, February 1979.
20 26
For satellite crop identification by American Some interesting ideas on h o w developing countries
commercial télédétectionfirms,see A . B . Park could proceed with identifying new forms of
(Vice President of the Earth Satellite Corp. ad hoc co-operation with the so-called like-
Inc.), 'Inventorier la planète', CERES ( F A O ) , minded countries (e.g. the Scandinavian
January/February 1975. For recent develop- countries), see Antony J. D o l m a n , The Like-
ments with regard to Lacie (Large Area Crop minded Countries and the Industrial and Tech-
Inventory Experiment), which will allow for nological Transformation of the Third World,
an integrated worldwide system to control Rotterdam, Foundation Reshaping the Inter-
and regulate food production, see Computer, national Order (RIO), April 1979.
27
Vol. 12, N o . 1, 1979. Most of these studies have only a restricted
480 Dieter Ernst
Notes {continued)
distribution. For some results of the O E C D See Paulo Freire's writings, for example his Edu-
Interfutures Project, see O E G D Interfutures cation for Critical Consciousness, N e w York,
Project, op. cit. For G R E S I , see L'évolution Seabury Press, 1973. See also, for the case of
à long terme de la division internationale du the Philippines, Renato Constantino, Neocol-
travail, Paris, November 1975. (Document de onial Identity and Counter-consciousness. Es-
Travail.) See also, Yves Berthelot and G6rard says on Cultural Decolonisation, London,
Tardy, Le défi économique du Tiers Monde, Merlin Press, 1978.
Paris, L a Documentation Française, 1978; This term isle Guay's, see op. cit.; p . 7.
and Proceedings of the Hearing on 'North- Johan Galtung, 'What is a-Strategy?, 1FDA
South-Interdependence' in the Parliament of Dossier, N o . 6, April 1979, p p . 4, 5.
the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn,
Deutscher Bundestag, April 1979.
The case for nuclear energy
Kazimierz Kopecki
Historical stages
The interdependence of the evolution of civilization and energy input, which has
taken place in six consecutive stages to date, is represented in Figure 1.
Stage 1. Primitive man (East Africa, about 1 million years ago) used only the
energy of food. H e did not know energy in the form offire,and converted
food energy into muscular labour, growth, and the preservation of the species.
H e vyas able to use simple stone tools and wooden sticks.
Stage 2. Hunting man (Europe, about 100,000 years ago, Neanderthal m a n ) had
more food and also burned firewood for heating and cooking. H e moved
over larger distances, as a result of his ability to supply his organism with
greater energy, i.e. nourishing food. H e had better tools at his disposal
and was for example able to make simple tools to' augment muscular power,
e.g.bows.
Stage 3. Primitive agricultural man (about 7,000 years ago, fertile crescent) grew
crops and employed animal energy to help in primitive agricultural pro-
duction, irrigation; he also used domesticated animals as stored food. Burned
w o o d enabled him to w a r m his household and to m a k e clay pottery and
brass artifacts.
Stage 4. Advanced agricultural man (north-western Europe around 1400) created
a developed agriculture, utilized water and wind power, some coal to
supplement depleted w o o d resources, and used highly developed animal
transport. Obviously, he had k n o w n iron for a long time and had some
skills to fashion products by means of water power and fire.
Stage 5. Industrial man (Great Britian, 1875) used three times as m u c h energy
due to the use of coal, the steam engine and also, from the end of the
eighteenth century, town gas produced from coal.
Professor K. Kopecki is Chairman of the Committee on Energy Problemsand member of the Presi-
dium of the Committee of Research and Prognosis'Poland 2000' of the Polish Academy of Sciences,
Warsaw. However, the opinions expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institutions with
which he is associated. His address is Derdowskiego 28,,80-310, Gdansk, Poland,

482 Kazimierz Kopecki
Households and 20 tce/a

£ ¿ ¿ J Transport commerce
W/////M Industry and
WEM agriculture • .Food
GJ/aplltce/a
LjO r 200 Meal/day
-9
•300 |
8
150
7
6
1-200 -
100
:
100 - 3
r 50
LLL I II III TV V VI VII
F I G . 1. Stages of energy evolution (Kopecki, 1976; H a m m o n d et al., 1973).
EJ/ar ÏEJ=1018J
„..—»— 'new energies'
900 L = 0.948 x l 0 1 5 B T U
nuclear
800 . =34.13 million tee
=23.89 million toe
700 ¿S
600 ./'
500 /
400 X/"' natural gas
300 =i crude oil * tar sands
200
100
sC coal
fire: wood, peat, dung

hydro
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 Year
F I G . 2. World primary energy consumption.

The case for nuclear energy 483
Stage 6. Contemporary technological man (United States, 1970) already used

230,000 kilocalories per capita per day. (twelve tonnes of coal equivalent
per year) in m a n y forms of primary energy, of which electricity and hydro-
carbons (i.e. liquid oil products and natural gas) played a greater and
greater part. Thesefiguresalso include non-energy uses of fossil fuels, which
in the United States constitute about 7 per cent of the total energy inputs.
Contemporary energy use
Before w e go on to the next stage—the era of nuclear energy—let us consider the

significance of the last stage. In 1978, the world consumed 308.9 exajoules (EJ)
= 10.5x109 tonnes of coal equivalent (tee) of primary energy, i.e. .73.4 giga-
joules (GJ) = 2.5 tee per capita per a n n u m on the average. But the divergences
between countries were very great, for example: in the United States, per capita
consumption was 13.4 tee per a n n u m (tce/a); the nine countries of the European
C o m m o n Market (EEC), 5.75 tce/a (from 3.6 in Ireland to 6.8 in the Netherlands);
the countries of Eastern Europe, 6.3 tce/a; developing countries possessing their
o w n oil and gas resources, 1.4 tce/a; developing countries without such resources,
0.25 tee.
This divergence between industrialized and developing countries grew
slowly and was closely related to the size of gross national product ( G N P ) as
well as the structural aspects of its achievement.
In the developed countries three factors were principally responsible for
the continuous growth of the G N P , and hence also the demand for energy: the
philosophy of the Enlightenment, liberal economic policies and the appropriate
application of numerous discoveries in thefieldof science and technology which
resulted in progress over the centuries. These technological innovations were:
(a) 1787-1842, the steam engine and textile machines; (b) 1825, the steam railway;
(c) 1843-97 metallurgy (iron and steel); and (d) 1898-1960 electricity in all its
applications (in particular petro-chemicals), the internal combustion engine.
Mass consumption (including transport), which is characteristic of our
times, was undoubtedly due to the use of electricity and the electric motor 150 years
ago, the Otto engine 100 years ago, followed by cars, radios and, subsequently,
televisionfiftyyears ago, m a n - m a d e fibres and materials (perlón, nylon, acryl,
polyester, polyurethane, and others) forty years ago, andfinally(also forty years
ago) the jet-propelled plane.
All these were the result of the utilization of cheaper and cheaper energy,
particularly from the time when oil came into play. It is worth remembering that,
in 1960, the price of a barrel of oil was $1.80.
That is also the reason w h y in a developed country like the Federal Republic
of Germany the length of roads increased from 1.5 k m per k m 2 (1960), to 1.9 k m
484 KazimierzKopecki
per k m 2 (1980), while the consumption, of petrol and diesel oil increased from
184 kg per capita annually (1960) to 600 kg. The increased consumption of petrol
resulted in a tremendous development of oil, refineries and the utilization of
by-products, particularly fuel oil, subsequently modifying building and heating
and even having some influence on the style of architecture through the adoption
of curtain-walling, for example.
The problem of oil will be dealt with in the next section. Here, let us note
that in the years of cheap energy and inexpensive mass production there took
place in the developed countries a saturation of households with different kinds
of electric devices (irons, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, refrigerators,
television sets in nearly 100 per cent of households, etc.), which of course affected
ways of living. Nearly 80 per cent of the number of households in highly developed
countries owned a car.
Waste of various kinds of, materials and energy, abuse of transport,
packaging, advertising and above all a rising threat to the environment charac-
terize contemporary economies.
Food as energy
The production of food has also become very expensive and energy-intensive.
T h e data in Table 1 relate to maize, the world's most important cereal crop.
In the case of the Industrial-type farm (United States, 1970), the main
energy inputs are: machinery 4.34, fuel 8.9 and fertilizers 11.12.
Thus, the effects of industrialization of agriculture (and cheap' energy
input) are that labour productivity has increased 200- to 300-fold. This roughly
T A B L E 1. Energy inputs and outputs for maize production
Total
Human energy Crop Energy Energy
labour input output output1 : efficiency
GJ GJ * GJ
• output/
ha/yr . ha/yr ha/yr ha/yr , input :
Subsistence farm, Guatemala , 1.13 1.2 10.5 16 , 13.6

Advanced farm, United
States, 1945 0.05 9.55 21.2 32.2 3.2
Industrial-type farm,
United States, 1970 0.02 29.8 ' 50.6 76.9 , 2.6
1. Content: 15.2 M J / k g .
Source: Leach (1976).
explains the decrease in the diminished time devoted to agriculture and the gigantic
growth or urbanization.
Energy used to grow cereal crops is only a minor part of the total energy
needed for food production. According to Leach (1976), the total energy require-
ments for the production and delivery of white bread are 20.7 M J / k g of which
19.4 per cent are the inputs to grow wheat, 12.9 per cent to mill it, 64.3 per
cent (!) to bake, package and transport the bread and 3.4 per cent for retail
overheads.
The dominant role of oil
The twentieth century, particularly since 1945, has witnessed the growing role of
petroleum as an energy input on a world scale. T h e trends are represented in
Table 2 and Figure 2.
It can be seen that in a few years the share of coal (which at the beginning
of the century was over 90 per cent) decreased to nearly 25 per cent, while the
share of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) at the same time increased from about 10 to
approximately 60 per cent. The amount of oil delivered rose 6.6 times. A n d here
the question arises: W h y has 'the kingdom of oil' developed in such a dominant
way and what has it contributed to our civilization? Regardless of the criteria
applied to evaluate the quality of life, it is clear that that of any privileged peoples
depended on the availability of large amounts of low-cost energy in a useful form.
A n d this is a problem that deserves examination.
T A B L E 2. Primary energy balance by carriers
Non-
Water com-
Coal Oil Gas power mercial1 Nuclear Total
1950 EJ/a 2 44.8 19.6 7.3 3.2 17.6 — 92.6 3

Percentage 48.5 21.2 7.7 3.5 19.0 100.0
1975 EJ/a 69.5 110.5 50.4 15.8 28.4 3.2 277.8
Percentage 25.0 39.8 18.2 5.7 10.2 1.1 100.0
1978 EJ/a 75.6 129.3 53.3 15.8 28.4 6.5 . 308.9
Percentage 24.5 41.8 17.4 5.1 9.2 2.0 100.0
1. Fire-wood, peat and dung.

2. 1 EJ(exajoule) = 1018 J = 0.948 x 1 0 1 5 B T U = 34.13million tonnes of coal equivalent (tee)=28.89 mil-
lion tonnes of oil equivalent (toe).
3. Discrepancies in tbe totals result from rounding off the figures.
Source: Kopecki (1979/, 1979').
The reason arises from the immense technical and economic properties of
oil (and natural gas) as sources of primary energy. Anderson (1979) points out:
The major cause was an energy economy peculiar to this century which equated the
cost of a barrel of oil [in Western countries] to one hour of manual labour. As the barrel
of oil has 4,000 times as much energy as one man-hour, the replacement of m a n by
machine was a sound economic investment. This economically sound inefficiency was
the shortsighted policy of an unsound 'bank' whose capital (oil accumulated through
the millennia) was expended rather than invested. Natural tendencies toward complex,
efficient ecosystems were thus thwarted by energy inputs (oil) which subsidized urban-
ization [industrialization] and population growth.
Moreover the fact must be taken into account that the use of oil and gas products
as energy carriers has opened up enormous possibilities for mechanized agriculture,
building, transport, and m a d e possible qualitative progress of industrial^roduction
through improved control (which is not the case with solid,fuels), and also lowered
the costs of production plants, e.g. power stations. It stimulated a new, very
progressive branch of chemical industry: petroleum chemistry in place of the very
inefficient carbo-chemistry, lowered significantly the transport costs of primary
energy to distant places by the use of huge tankers and long, large-diameter
pipelines, and also had an effect o n the conduct of wars.
But the irresistible appetite for energy has resulted in great waste of natural
resources and despoliation of the environment:
The awareness of limits c a m e only at the end of 1973 w h e n the price of oil,
including its products and also natural gas, and to some extent coal as well, started
to increase. W h a t next?
The prospective energy economy
T h e main problem of today is not that of energy resources, for they are sufficient
to serve for a long time, but the need to overcome the political, economic and
technological limits to growth, and to grasp and transform the primary energy
carriers in good time and at appropriate costs. T h e second main problem is the
dramatic misuse of energy by advanced nations, primarily by the United States,
which consumes over twice as m u c h per capita energy per a n n u m than the devel-
oped countries of Western Europe, and 20 to 50 times more than the developing
countries. This cannot be regarded as an internal problem since the United States
alone consumes nearly 30 per cent of the world's energy, which is in striking
disproportion to its 5 per cent share of the world's population.
Contemporary energy consumption is not always justified and a great
number of industrialized countries use energy in all forms very prodigally, especially
crude oil and its products. This is often the result of m a n y years of deeply rooted
convictions and myths about long-term, cheap and inexhaustible energy, creating
TABLE 3. Per capita primary energy use in Western developed countries (tee)
1973 1978 1980 1990 2000
United States 12.9 13.4 14.3 17.1 20.8

European Economic C o m m u n i t y
Austria 5.8 6.4 6.9 10.2 11.6
Belgium 6.2 6.2 7.0 10.1 12.5
Denmark 6.0 5.8 5.8 6.9 ,:7.6
Federal Republic of Germany 6.5 6.7 7.1 10.8 12.7
France 5.7 5.5 6.6 . 10.7 • 12.4
Italy 3.9 4.0 4.2 6.5 7.7
Luxemburg 5.9 6.8 7.2 9.4 11.8
Netherlands 6.6 6.8 7.3 . 9.4 12.6
United K i n g d o m 6.1 5.9 6.0 7.2 9.2
a peculiar style of life and manners. Thus, without introducing not only ration-
alization and conservation of all forms of energy but also significant changes in
life-styles and social behaviour the meeting of future energy demands will hardly
be possible. •
Such convictions are shared in the m e m b e r countries of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe. 1 These have shown that developed countries
anticipate a wide p r o g r a m m e of energy conservation including: the thermal insu-
lation of buildings; reduction of fuel for transport through improved engine effi-
ciency; the use of mass transport; the elimination of energy-intensive technology;
the application of low-cost energy conversion technologies, e.g. through combined
heat and power production, and so on; and also the reduction of waste through
the recycling of various kinds of refuse. Yet all these measures will not be very
effective in preventing a further rapid rise of fuel and primary energy consumption
according to the E E C .
Thus, the anticipated per capita annual consumption is presented in Table 3.
Referring back to Figure 1 in which a transition period w a s adopted as
Stage 7, the situation of the United States in the year 2000 was taken as significant.
The period will be characterized by a considerable restraint of economic growth
in developed countries (up to 3-3.5 per cent annually) and hence a significant
decrease in the rise of the d e m a n d for energy.
The nuclear social impact

Let us n o w consider the following questions: Is nuclear energy necessary and w h y ?
W h a t dangers does it pose? W h a t merits does it have? A s a further supplement
to Table 1 it is possible to m a k e a prognosis for energy supply in the world emerging
from the developmental prospects of groups of countries (Table 4).
T A B L E 4. Prospective world primary energy consumption
Non-
com-
Coal Oil Gas Water mercial1 Nuclear ' N e w ' 2 Total
2000 EJ/a 164 176 132 35 26 147 15 695

Percentage 23.7 25.2 19.2 5.0 3.8 21.0 2.1 100.0
2030 EJ/a 220 32 38 44 22 516 64 936
Percentage 23.5 3.4 4.0 4.7 2.4 55.2 6.8 100.0
1. Firewood, peat and dung as fuel.
2. Solar energy, geothennal, marethcrmal, maremotrix,, biogas.
Sources: Kopecki (1979a,
, 19796); W E C (1978); Penczynski (1979); Häfele (1980).
In Table 4 all opportunities of energy conservation have been considered. T h e

point is to what extent and in what way the energy patterns as presented (see also
Fig. 2) can be attained.
The values concerning coal, oil, gas,, water and 'new' energies can be
considered as maxima. Oil and gas supplies, after peak production in the 1990s,
will decline. Coal production cannot be increased over a given amount and that
only at the expense of enormous efforts. The use of 'new' energies is linked to
great investments, more dynamic growth being hardly conceivable. Thus the
share of nuclear energy tofillthe gap is the m i n i m u m and cannot be substituted
by any other energy source, assuming that world demand has, I hope, been
correctly defined. It should be added that such a relatively great growth of
d e m a n d for primary energy does not imply an equally large increase of energy
consumption. It is clear that in the meantime the consumption of secondary
energy must rise considerably, especially of electrical energy accompanied by a
significant rise of conversion losses. Thus, for example, in most developed
countries energy losses will increase from 25-30 per cent at present to 50 per cent
and more by the year 2000. The most efficient patterns of energy conversion must
be developed to limit that process, and certain nuclear alternatives can be helpful
that way.
The social needs determining the final d e m a n d for energy are as follows:
A considerable growth of the world's population to reach the figure of about
6,300 million in the year 2000, and about 8,000 million by 2020.
Immense needs for agriculture and associated industries: the production of arti-
ficial fertilizers, chemical substances, agricultural machines, the food-
processing industry, etc.
A large increase in the number of dwellings, involving building materials, the
construction trades, heating and in some areas, also air-conditioning.
The need to open u p fresh employment opportunities, to reduce unemployment,
to modernize old installations and technology, to raise productivity.
Greater environmental protection, at present still neglected, and the creation

of appropriate means and technologies.
The improvement of transport, particularly in large agglomerations.
The development of education, science, research programmes, culture, recreation,
and health services.
In accordance with energy possibilities, raising the standard of living of the
developing nations.
T o m a k e possible the further development of nations w h o will gradually run short
of natural resources.
In view of all this, it cannot be doubted that it is necessary to break d o w n all
barriers that hinder development, notably energy deficiency. A rising energy deficit
would result in tension, which might threaten the whole of mankind or even destroy
the world.
Nuclear energy today
A s of mid-1980, a total of 570 nuclear power plants with an aggregate capacity

of 450,169 M W e in thirty-six countries are in operation, under construction or
committed. O f these, 133 plants with an aggregate capacity of 132,588 M W e
are in operation, 240 with a capacity of 222,423 M W e are under construction,
and ninety-seven with a capacity of 95,158 M W e have been committed. 2 The main
reactor type in use and under construction is P W R (light water pressure reactor)
and B W R (boiling water reactor) both of enriched uranium; however in the
future a great development of breeder reactors mainly L M B R (liquid metal
breeder reactor) such as the French Super-Phénix type with liquid sodium as
coolant will take place. O f this type eight plants with a capacity of 2,760 M W e
TABLE 5. Nuclear plants in mid-1980
In operation Under construction Committed

Plants MWe Plants M W e Plants M W e
United States 72 52 477 94 103 109 33 . 37 850

France 18 11001 29 29 095 11 12 650
USSR 34 14245 12 11260 14 15 000
Federal Republic
of Germany 14 8 620 11 11931 4 4 511
Japan 24 15 007 6 5 087 4 3 794
Total 162 101 350 152 160 482 66 73 805
Percentage of world
total 69.5 76.4 63.3 72.0 68.0 77.6
are in operation and under construction (Federal Republic of Germany, France,

United K i n g d o m , U S S R ) . T h e newest type is H T G R (high temperature gas
reactor)—two already existing plants of 315 M W e in the Federal Republic of
G e r m a n y but studied in m a n y other countries. T h e latter, cooled with helium
at an outlet temperature of 950 °C will be of great importance as an effective
source of heat for the allothermic conversion of coal into liquid and gaseous
products, making economies so that coal can be used merely as a chemical raw
material not as a heat carrier, and replacing the more and more deficient hydro-
carbons by synthetic-coal products.
In mid-1980, five countries had a major share in the utilization of nuclear
energy, as shown in Table 5. The most dynamic growth is foreseen in France:
an annual addition of 6,000 M W e over the next ten years. The eleventh World
Energy Conference in Munich in September 1980 provided other interesting
information. At the preliminary session, in his opening address P. S. Neporozhny,
Minister of Power and Electrification, described the C M E A drive towards nuclear
energy for rapid electrification, district heating and cogeneration. 'It is a group
responsibility, for the world's nations to do away with barriers to nuclear power',
he said.
The barriers
The main social obstacle to nuclear implantation is fear arising from the Hiroshima
cataclysm. Such fear is caused by identifying the nuclear reactor with the atomic
b o m b , a fear that is unfounded. But there are other objective questions connected
with nuclear problems.
. . In 1978 a decline in the growth of nuclear capacity (except, in France and
in the Soviet Union) took place, reflecting not only a downward revision of elec-
tricity growth forecasts but also public concern over certain questions connected
with nuclear power. They included safety of reactor operation, health, environ-
mental risks and especially the management of nuclear wastes and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. These are air serious problems that must be discussed.
The accident at Three Mile Island, in the United States, has confirmed
these concerns all over the world, although it was found that the. accident
initiated by a mechanical'malfunction was magnified by a series of h u m a n errors
in response to it. Fortunately, only extensive material damage and no substantial
threat to h u m a n life occurred. T h e accident demonstrated what might happen
in case of a serious emergency, which could take place in the future, and on the
other hand it provided very valuable ideas on h o w to improve the construction
of nuclear plants, considered so far to be very safe. But the danger of a serious
emergency will exist for all that.
One study3 estimated the probability of fatalities, (as personal risks per
IMAGES OF TECHNOLOGY
(Documents by Florence Bonjean)
Eternal classics
Ancient Greek
furnace.
Rapho
T h e aesthetics of artefacts
'1":LST v
Tin* ÍS«i
''' 7*58»-. ""Is
T O * - i . . I* **•, T -- ,
Ethiopian cho-cho,
a container for
butter or milk,
calabash and woven
grass with leather
straps.
Russian padlock
iron and brass.
Contemporary
Italian chair.
Technologies change, forms persist
4úffi?W-
Gerster-Rapho
Reed house in the
souk of Bagdad.
A Lorraine-Dietrich motor car,
Specifications for a diligence.

Experiments
m¡¿*M¡£m^'
A n electrical
experiment by
Watson, on the
Thames in London,
eighteenth century.
Édimages
Laurent G u z m a o , a Lifted by hot air,
m o n k from Rio de the top was m a d e of
Janeiro, built this paper stretched over
experimental balloon a cane framework.
in 1709 and Further work on this
demonstrated it to balloon was stopped
the King of Portugal. by the Inquisition.
The imaginary rocket
?%^%3%gS%%^^ Wè. m^^mS^áÊ^S^Smm.

Illustrations to
Jules Verne's From
the Earth to the
Moon.
Illustration by Boris
Vallejo for Frederik
Pohl's novel
Gateway.
T h e heroics of agricultural mechanization
Seventeenth-century
device to 'drain
land, uproot stumps,
remove stones and
weed' to improve
yields as used in
Germany and the
L o w Countries.
Snark International
'Harvesting on a
Bonanza Farm' by
W . A . Rogers,
Harper's Weekly,
29 August 1891.
Nostalgic embellishment
t• 1 . . . . . . . . . . ' I
-
* * i * a ; * * ' t i * « » « a A "
** * | * "> * » ! * ¿ * í * * , * * * * A *-
A factory in France,
1874.
Bridge over the

Elbe in Hamburg,
1877.
The bent for construction
House-building in
ancient Egypt.
Atop a skyscraper
in Chicago.
-7-
', > * ^ " ' " ? . .

The symbiosis of man and machine
T"-ÇT«T"r^iT-"
*'»ï
•«Si»" '*RÍ
Wit
ItH ^käSE^B"^
"Il*&í
£»-iír ™ s e * » w
;jMfc'
les;
líRIH
it¡ *<f 3Î"
- JflpKJ
''^wte*.*..
Casting the bronze Russia, in a foundry

capital of Alexander's in the city in 1834.
C o l u m n in
St Petersburg,
Automated casting engine turbine Pratt & Whitney
facility to build up blades. Passing from works in East
wax models robot to robot, the Hartford,
duplicating the process takes some Connecticut,
patterns of aircraft six hours at the United States.
Improvisation with technological cross-breeds
A steam car.
The human dimension
~W
Syr
l: t'-t.
,áá. • V t -
jdkújk-
:«\Ví
rts^t-
M
f
t ^i** mm ^SPSN*.
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•z&.'¿;x^L*j,*jrii¡ ¿ii&SSei
Roger-Viollet
Technology procures
leisure: early
washing machine o n
an Illinois farm,
1914.
Models illustrating
the principles of the
bridge over the
Firth of Forth,
Scotland, 1890.
Facilitating work
Snark International
^#g
f%
A French chromo,
c. 1900, anticipating
a schoolroom in
the year 2000.
A schoolroom
in 1980 (United
States).
Early vacuum
cleaner, requiring
two persons to
work the bellows.
A pea-shelling
machine to do the
work of 'several
hundred w o m e n ' .
m
aÈémm:"pm
Édimages-Forcst
Adapting to the technological environment
Snark International
The French actress,
Beatrix Dussane, in
a recording studio,
1920.
' T h e only w a y to
enjoy a motor-car
ride through a dusty
country. Adopt
costumes of the
this type,
hermetically sealed
and warranted
dust-proof.'
A space-saving
piano bed with desk,
drawers,
washstand, etc.,
1866.
Playful technology
Henri Cartier-Bresson
Ir**5"- V *".i
ifi^áflF«•¡¡•••••^
^~~^mJl
•gm' »«-^¡^^
4'i
W'M
-
f¿# V- y ^zJt^d^é
- '^V' '/l
Motor cycle spiked

with gadgets.
Japanese video
system: the customer
sees herself with her
future hairstyle.
A dead-end technology
London to
Buckingham steam
coach (c. 1840).
•r;-, ^ v c -<e* >• '- ^ .»-•* r?*(_i, -hàf.. • > * ->/?*«

year) from nuclear reactors at 2.10 - 1 0 (for 100 nuclear power plants) whereas
for all causes together it is 31.10 6 times greater. For motor vehicles it is 125.10",
for drowning 208,000, for air travel 50,000 and for lightning 2,500 times greater.
The risk from nuclear reactors is therefore very small, from a probability stand-
point. However, this is not satisfactory from the social point of view, because
people evaluate more critically possible accidents on a mass scale, which is concen-
trated in time and place, than they do those m u c h more likely to occur but extended
in time and place (as, for example, car accidents or smoking), or accidents that
m a y be prevented (death byfireor drowning). This psychological aspect cannot
be neglected, but only long-term instruction, better staff training, and more reliable
protection of reactors against accidental failures can convince the public to accept
the nuclear solution. It is doubtful whether it will ever convince those w h o m a k e
a career of anti-nuclear politics.
Where the normal operation of reactors is concerned, no particular problems
are foreseen. N o r m a l radiation in the vicinity of nuclear plants is extremely low
(1 millirem) whereas the annual average radiation dosage from various sources
is 130 m r e m , i.e. 45 m r e m from cosmic rays, 15 m r e m from the soil, 45 m r e m
from brick and concrete houses, 25 m r e m from water, food and air, 4 m r e m from
a round trip from London to N e w Y o r k by air, 20 m r e m from diagnostic X-rays
and 6 m r e m from colour television (three hours a day) (United Nations, 1972).
In 1928 the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP),
an independent non-governmental body was established. Its recommendations
are universally accepted both by national and international bodies responsible for
radiation protection.4 The upper dose limit, recommended by I C R P for workers
is 5 rem (5,000 millirem) per year. In addition, the present operating rules
recommend that radiation doses must be kept as low as is reasonably possible,
and result in doses on the average less than 1 rem per year, with few exceptions.
The problems of the nuclear production cycle remain to be dealt with. It
m a y seem to m a n y astonishing that this cycle (i.e. extracting raw uranium ore,
converting it into enriched fuel, the production of electrical energy and removal
of wastes) is as safe (or unsafe) as the hard-coal production cycle (i.e. extracting
and transport of coal, production of heat or electrical energy, and removal of
ash), with the exception that the removal of radioactive components in the hard-
coal cycle can be m a n y times greater than in the nuclear case for equal energy
production. The ecological impact can also be assessed to be of the same order
taking into account above all the outlet of C 0 2 into the air by factories combusting
natural fuel, which has irreversible environmental consequences.
The quality, security and reliability of nuclear energy require: (a) reinforced
regulatory commissions and inspecting bodies and the installation of special
emergency planning; (b) the close control of the production of nuclear apparatus
and other materials; and (c) the international supervision of management of
nuclear fuel and wastes.
The last problem is terrorism. In m y opinion (and that of m a n y others),

if nuclear fuel and installations must be specially protected, it is practically
impossible for a terrorist to produce a h o m e - m a d e atomic weapon without deadly
danger to himself. But it is impossible for a society to protect completely all its
means of transport, its oil pipelines and railway stations, its political, economic
or industrial leaders, technical or scientific élites, and also nuclear plants from
threat. T h e danger of terrorist activity, aimed at paralysing or threatening to
paralyse society must be met by society itself and by the removal of its reason
and roots.
Positive nuclear social impacts
A s noted, further socio-economic progress cannot be achieved without nuclear

energy taking a progressively greater share in covering energy needs. This will
not only require very large material and manpower inputs but also the construction
of appropriate equipment and appliances, which will have implications for employ-
ment in numerous industrial countries. In effect, as m u c h as 60 per cent and
even more of the total cost of nuclear power plants, their construction included,
can be spent domestically in every industrially developed country without
involving imports.
But account must be taken of the delicate balance between nuclear energy
supply and the quality and reliability of the equipment.
A damaged valve or p u m p (these being the most frequent causes of damage
in nuclear power plants) occurring in a conventional power station can be repaired
in several hours without disturbing the operation of the whole system. The same
kind of damage in a nuclear plant is followed by a prolonged breakdown. If a
favourable social effect accompanying the development of nuclear energy is
to be a significant rise of industrial production, it is clear, that this calls for as
m u c h care and precision concerning equipment as is lavished on outer space
equipment. The same applies to the skills of the personnel employed.
S o m e scientists foresee restrictions not only on.oil and gas extraction but
on coal mining as well. This is unlikely. T h e exploitation of oil and gas, as already
mentioned, will become less intensive due to the gradual exhaustion of resources,
but in spite of the fact that the nuclear production of electrical energy and heat
will undoubtedly be cheaper than that produced by using coal, both coal and
nuclear power will become major sources of world energy in the general energy
penury over the coming decades (see Fig. 2).
The increase of nuclear energy will m a k e it possible gradually to develop
'new' energy sources, which at present are far too expensive. There is still a long
w a y to go because of the investments connected with these, but nobody denies
that it is necessary to base future energy production as soon as possible on 'new'
sources. In some countries solar heating of dispersed homes will be economic,

and also (mainly in the Third World countries) the production of fertilizers,
biogas and ethanol from plants and animal refuse will develop.
Through socio-economic progress during the transition period mainly by
using nuclear energy and coal it will be possible to proceed smoothly to the next
epoch, based on 'new' energies.
S o m e draw the conclusion that the nuclear epoch will result in a world-
wide 'all-electric' age, and that the heating that consumes such an enormous
quantity of energy will gradually become electrical. This seems a false hope, for
heat produced in this w a y would be m u c h more expensive than that from nuclear
or coal heat-and-power generating plants combined, or even from simple nuclear
heat reactors. Hence, nuclear energy is not to be connected with electrical heating,
but with the expansion of district heating in industrial countries, mainly through
the heat produced in combined heat-and-power generating plants. Thus, oil and
gas heating n o w widely used, which is extremely damaging to the environ-
ment, will gradually be replaced. Together with the possibility of converting
coal into gas and liquid products, this represents an advantage not to be
underestimated.
Ecological threats
The contemporary stage of world evolution has resulted in numerous arid quali:
tatively very dangerous ecological threats to mankind. They are predominantly-
(a) depletion of resources; (b) pollution of air, water and earth by chemical
compounds, radiation, heat and dust; (c) piling up of wastes; (d) possible deterio-
ration of the climate; (e) noise; (f) contamination of food; and (g) arable land
threatened by urbanization, erosion and encroaching desertification.
Will nuclear deployment add new ecological threats or increase the existing
risks?
After examining the problem in detail it can be stated that nuclear energy
can in general weaken that dangerous trend and contribute to improvement of
environmental protection. For example:
Radioactive pollution of the air can be considerably lowered in nuclear plants
than it can in power stations fuelled by coal.
Chemical pollution of water is m u c h greater in the case of coal extraction, but
thermal pollution is higher for nuclear plants, which require the selection
of appropriate sites or expensive artificial cooling.
Noxious nuclear waste-products must be treated; this technique has been mastered,
but is very expensive (about 20 per cent of energy-production costs) and must be
taken into consideration in the effectivity account (the noxious waste-products
accompanying the combustion of coal must not be forgotten).
Carbon dioxide pollution does not take place in nuclear plants, since there is no
combustion of hydrocarbons.
Nuclear deployment does not exhaust natural resources as coal, petroleum and
natural gas, particularly in the case of developing of fast-breeder and high-
temperature reactors.
Notes
1
See ECE Questionnaire on Selected Energy Issues, Accident Risks in US Commercial Nuclear
Geneva, E C E , 1979/80 (in press). Power Plants, United States Nuclear Regu-
2
See Atomwirtschaft Atomtechnik, Vol. X X V , lator Commission, 1975.
4
N o . 8-9, 1980. Recommendations of ICRP, London, Pergamon
* Source Reactor Safety Study. An Assessment of Press, 1966. .
Bibliography
A N D E R S O N , R . E . 1979. Biological Paths to Self-re- Friends of the Earth. Cambridge, Mass.

liance. N e w York, VanNostrand Reinhold Co. International Bellinger Publishing C o .
H A M M O N D , A . L . et al. 1973. Energy and the Future, PENCZYNSKI, P . 1979. Energy Strategies to Achieve
Washington, D . C . , A A A S . Social and Political Aims. Atom & Strom,
H Ä F E L E , W . 1980. Long-term Strategies in World Vol. 25, N o . 6.
Energy Supply. Atomwirtschaft Atomtechnik, P O L L A R D , W . G . ; S C H W A R Z , E . Theological Reflec-
N o . 8/9. tions on Nuclear Energy. Atom & Strom,
K O P E C K I , K . 1976. Man in the World of Energy. Vol. 25, N o . 5, 1979.
Ksiazka i Wiedza. (In Polish only.) United Nations. 1972. Ionizing Radiation: Levels
. 1979a. The Fuel and Energy Economy in and Effects. (A Report of the United Nations
Poland up to the Year 2000 as an Object of Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Development Studies. Review of Polish Aca- Radiation to the General Assembly.) N e w
demy of Sciences (Warsaw), N o . 6. York, United Nations.
. 19796. The Problems of Coal in Poland in W E C Conservation Commission. 1978. World En-
the Light of Energy Forecasts. Polish Coal ergy: Looking ahead to 2020. Guildford and
Review, N o . 10-12. N e w York, IPC Science and Technology
L E A C H , G . 1976. Energy and Food Production. Press.
Guildford, I P C Science and Technology W I O N C Z E K , M . S. Interdependence and Co-operation.
Press Ltd. Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth Pugwash
L O W I N S , A . B . Energy Strategy: The Road not Conference of Science and World Affairs.
Taken? Foreign Affairs, N o . 55, 1976. Mexico City, 18-23 July 1979.
. Soft Energy Paths—Toward a Durable Peace.
Technology assessment and policy:
examples from Papua N e w Guinea
Ken Newcombe
Technology is neither environmentally passive nor socially inert. The technology

of traditional societies exists because it serves to ensure a level of environmental
exploitation capable of maintaining that society in ecological equilibrium; a state
of local or regional self-sufficiency. Technology is not, however, the exclusive
means of securing this objective, but in effect one component of a package of
social, cultural, and economic tools deployed in concert with one another.
T h e need for new technology—for technological innovation—arises funda-
mentally from disruptions to the ecological equilibrium of subsistence production,
or through the perception of needs that cannot be satisfied through production
maintained at levels previously compatible with ecological equilibrium. Such dis-
ruptions, from whatever cause or causes, are the essence of economic development.
For the purposes of this article, I will take the need for economic develop-
ment as given, and will address the question of h o w to develop, or to select and
assess, technologies which serve this purpose in what is deemed to be socially
the most desirable way.
This assumption is important for it m a y be presumed that economic develop-
ment is being embraced for its o w n sake, or that traditional life-styles and their
sustaining technologies are, of necessity, deficient, and will readily be forgone in
favour of the modus vivendi, of the market economy. In Papua N e w Guinea, let
alone other countries, there are m a n y examples of communities rejecting the
trappings of Western life-styles because they are already satisfied with their social
and material well-being.
There are even m o r e instances of village groups rejecting regular paid
employment, although it is available right next to their homes, thereby occasioning
the need for immigrant labour where m a n p o w e r superficially appeared to be
abundant.
It is possible in Papua N e w Guinea, as elsewhere, that the experience of,
Ken Newcombe is Head of the Energy Planning Unit in the Department of Minerals and Energy,
P.O. Box 2352, Konedobu, Papua New Guinea, and Research Fellow at the Centre for Resource and
Environmental Studies of the Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T., Australia.
Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X X m , N o . 3, 1981

496 Ken Newcombe
and subsequent demand for, the consumer durables,in use in urban societies and
in rural enclaves of Western life-styles, is a sufficient stimulus to engage in economic
production above traditional levels; but such a d e m a n d m a y simply follow more
fundamental changes disrupting a previous ecological equilibrium. Wilkinson
(1973) elaborates further on these concepts.
There is n o question but that, for all communities that are either urbanized
or in some w a y engaged in transactions with the wider market economy, economic
development has become an objective beyond dispute. T h e original sustaining
equilibrium n o longer exists, and a new and higher level of resource utilization is
necessary, which can only occur through the introduction of a new technology
arid techniques.
Development strategy and technology assessment
Technology can only be deemed 'appropriate' in the context of some predetermined

goals and objectives that are provided, or generally accepted, as the direction of
beneficial change. Once these goals are determined, then technology can be
assessed in terms of whether it is likely to lead to their fulfilment or not. Obviously,
patterns of economic development can vary widely, and can be politically deter-
mined in accordance with predetermined goals.
This is implicit in the interpretation of appropriate technology adopted by
the ministerial-level meeting of the International F o r u m on Appropriate Industrial
Technology ( U N D P , 1979):
The concept of appropriate technology was viewed as being a technology mix contributing
most to economic, social and environmental objectives, in relation to resource inventories
and conditions of applications in each country. Appropriate technology was stressed
as a dynamic andflexibleconcept, which must be responsive to varying conditions and
changing situations in different countries.
In Papua N e w Guinea, there is a popularized Eight-point Plan ( N P O , 1978),

which emphasizes the following: increased indigenous control of the economy,
more equal distribution of economic benefits, decentralization of economic activi-
ties, small-scale artisan activities, a more self-reliant economy, increasing contri-
bution of locally raised revenue government expenditures, more equal participation
by w o m e n in national affairs, and government control of sectors important to the
achievement of desired development.
O f course it m a y , in some cases, be questioned whether the goals espoused
by the government reflect those of the people, or, more particularly, of every
group under the political umbrella of the ruling party. But it is to the development
of objectives of the national government of the day, and then to the regional,
local, andfinallyvillage-level administrations (to the extent that they are articulated)
Technology assessment and policy: 497
examples from Papua New Guinea
that w e must look to obtain afirst-orderdefinition of what technology is appro-

priate. T o the extent that these criteria lead to an ecologically viable technology
set in the course of fulfilling development goals, there will be no dispute. Unfor-
tunately this is not always the case.
It is obvious, too, that going from the general to the specific lends m u c h
r o o m for interpretation, and here lies the real art and science of technology
assessment. T h efirststep in technology assessment is a conceptual one; it must
be recognized that the technology itself is the 'tip of the iceberg', especially when
it comes to social impact assessment.
Technology: 'the tip of the iceberg'
A machine is useless without energy to power it, materials to process, or an

environment to do work on, materials and skills to maintain it, and a socia,
system capable of producing and delivering these feedstock and sustaining servicess
and distributing and utilizing its produce. Failure to sustain any one of there
support systems at the level compatible with its economic operation spells failure
for the technology.
Redistribution of the use of the community-time resource is perhaps one
of the most important factors in technological innovation. M o s t productive
technology delivers into its social setting a set of time constants that m a y or m a y
not readily be compatible with the communities' existing use of time. In other
words, the time demands for effective machine management mustfitcomfortably
into the life-space of the individual operators of the technology, and that of
the managers of its support systems.
Technology, especially that powered by muscles, pre-empts the allocation
of time, not only directly through its operation, but upstream in production and
delivery of feedstock, energy and services, and downstream in the delivery of the
product to consumers. Ulich (1974) illustrates well the extent of the invisible time
demands of technology w h e n he speaks of the American consumer's devotation
to his motor-car. Illich estimates that the typical American devotes m o r e than
1,600 hours a year to his car; he spends four of his sixteen working hours on the
road, or gathering resources to enable his road transportation. Here he is simply
illustrating the point that, while w e are pleased by being able to travel for short
bursts at speeds in excess of eighty kilometres per hour, if one calculates the total
time devoted to maintain the transport in comparison to the actual kilometres
travelled, w e are in effect, moving at a speed of less than eight kilometres per hour.
Time used for technology support is time reallocated from some other
activity. Even in assessing the value of replacing an 'inefficient' technology with
an 'efficient' modern device, defining efficiency in terms of man-hours invested
per unit product is n o simple matter. A n apparently tedious and laborious act
498 Ken Newcombe
" Energy.
— - E h , vgy.
Fia. 1. A n ecosystem which includes a h u m a n population. ( H u m a n culture is a product of the

activities of the h u m a n population and any effect that the non-biotic or biotic components of
the system m a y have on it are always through their effect on h u m a n beings. Similarly, culture
can only influence the non-biotic and biotic components of the system through the h u m a n
population. Nevertheless, it is often convenient to consider the interactions between culture
and the non-biotic and biotic components as if they were direct and hence the broken lines in
this diagram.)
Total environment Human experience
F I G . 2. Relationship between total environment and h u m a n experience.

m a y have some unnoticed social or cultural value, or the time saved by the techno-
logical innovation m a y be reallocated in surprising and not necessarily productive
ways. Salisbury (1962) found that time saved by m e n of the Siane of Papua N e w
Guinea in felling trees with steel rather than stone axes w a s reallocated not to
relieving the general burden, thereby reducing w o m e n ' s work, but was invested
instead into more ceremonial activity,fighting,and leisure time for m e n .
In a previous survey of technological change and social impacts by the
United Nations system, a pertinent example was given of the social value embodied
in the conduct of the apparently ardous and inefficient process of fetching water
in earthen jugs from a well some distance from a village. A stand-pipe was installed
in the village as a public convenience, but the w o m e n complained bitterly for
their major focus of social exchange had been removed. It seems that, in such
circumstances, traditional water-fetching w a s a necessary complement to the
maintenance of social networks in the village, and the idea that the labour involved
was onerous was more a well-meaning outsider's perception than a reality.
In summary, I a m , on the one hand, claiming that the demand for n e w
technology is stimulated largely by disruptions to a prevailing ecological equi-
librium, and that in order to evaluate the impact of n e w technology the source
(or sources), of this disruption must be understood. O n the other hand, I wish
merely to illustrate that the impact of technology change is complex, impinging
as widely on social systems as on their physical context.
Methods of technology assessment
A useful start is to conceptualize the general structure of a human-dominated

ecosystem, and the environmental interactions that determine the state of h u m a n
well-being and that influence an individual's or a population's response to environ-
mental change.
During the past decade or more specialists at the Australian National
University, Stephen Boyden in particular, have developed flow charts to help
with the study of the ecology of h u m a n communities (Figs. 1 and 2). The tools for
initiating such studies were considerably refined during a study of the h u m a n
ecology of H o n g K o n g (Boyden et al., 1980) and I present them here as they appear
in Unesco, M A B publications (Unesco, 1976, 1978).
I have also reworked a model of the response to environmental change within
the general framework Boyden provides, to represent the advent of technical
innovation towards economic development, in response to real or perceived needs,
following, perhaps, a collapse in ecological equilibrium at the local level (Fig. 3).
Boyden (1979) has also compiled a check-list of c o m m o n social and physical
requirements for h u m a n well-being, and this m a y serve to orientate afirstattempt
to capture the most important variables of change in an ecosystem under study.
500 Ken Newcombe
Total environment >. Life conditions — • . Biophysic state
. Concern at loss of ecological equilibrium •
F I G . 3. E x a m p l e of evolution of need for technological innovation.
F r o m this general overview one can derive a quite specific representation

of the dynamics of the population under study. A strategy of research, identifying
targets, methodology, and time-lines is then compiled. T h e orderliness of this
scenario of study is to a certain extent misleading, for once the research has begun
there is as m u c h time spent working backwards, iteratively uncovering the deter-
minants of c o m m u n a l economic and social behaviour important locally as there
was selecting the relatively few variables deserving intensive study in the first
instance. Nevertheless, a systematic approach, acknowledging the ecological
nature of the problem, and the interactions likely in any h u m a n population between
the cultural and biological components of the ecosystem is always rewarding,
and indeed essential, to wise decision-making.
The pitfalls of an insular, hardware-orientated, strictlyfinancialapproach
to technological innovation are nowhere more apparent than in energy develop-
ment and management, especially in rural areas and at village level. A s an energy
planner, I can provide some colourful examples to show that the social and cultural
context of technological change is perhaps its most important dimension.
Technology assessment arid policy: 501
Biogas in Papua New Guinea villages
Small-scale biogas technology has received wide acclaim in India and China.
In China, some 7 million units are reported to have been installed, though little
information is given as to w h y u p to a third of these units fail (Chen and Chen,
1979). In southern and central China at least, these is a genuine ecological need
for the technological innovation which biogas represents. Even in the 1920s
there were convincing records of the deficiencies of major plant nutrients, and of
energy (Buck, 1937). T h e extraordinary population growth since then has only
exacerbated these needs.
In Papua N e w Guinea there is rarely an ecological need strong enough to
warrant the denial of m a n y fundamental cultural reasons w h y biogas technology
might be rejected. In the early 1970s at least twenty biogas installations were tried,
and those at village level failed miserably. T h e primary reasons for rejection are
cultural, specifically traditional practices and beliefs (Samana, 1980). M o s t Papua
N e w Guineans have very strong superstitions concerning the use by others of their
excrement in any form, and this cultural taboo mitigates against its collection for
use in biogas production. In order to use pig manure, the pigs have to be appro-
priately penned together close to the village, which would not only require capital
investment for concrete, slattedfloorsand water supply, but would also require
m u c h more w o r k to provide the food the pigs obtain by free foraging.
Village-level energy problems, though notable, d o not impel people to alter
their life-styles and community arrangements sufficiently to facilitate close daily
management of a biologically difficult technology for little return in gas and less
regard for the productive use of effluents.
Major installations of 10,000 to 60,000 gallons have been introduced in the
coffee industry, and by an urban council for processing coffee pulp and sewage
respectively. But these face n o significant cultural barriers, being away from the
village context, and can afford full-time management and sophisticated controls.
Early in 1980, village-level biogas was again promoted on a trial basis, this
time starting with a detailed description of the inputs and management required,
and the products generated. T h e village people rejected the technology outright!
Village-level charcoal production
Thefirstcharcoal production at village level in Papua N e w Guinea was begun

by a mission group in 1976, at Ialibu in the Southern Highlands. The earthen-kiln
method of charcoal production was applied. Village people started to w o r k . o n
this industry with enthusiasm, expecting great rewards. They were excited about
the prospects in an area where not even cash cropping was possible.
T h e earthen-kiln method involved a trench two to three metres deep, u p
to ten metres long, three to four metres wide, with channels dug away from the
502 Ken Newcombe
floor of the trench to allow water to drain out, and air to flow in. W o o d is cut
and stacked inside the top of the trench and leaf matter and soil laid over the top
of the w o o d . A fire is lit inside, and the air-flow then carefully controlled to ensure
carbonization, but not complete combustion. Control is difficult because air-holes
keep forming as the internal charge shifts during the reduction in volume caused
by carbonization.
The method is at least cheap, and can be applied in most places quickly,
but the disadvantages of social and resource costs are almost prohibitive. It
involves constant attention to prevent excess air entry and burn-out for seven
to eight days and nights. Then the kiln must be closed off and left to cool for seven
more days. Village people are no more inclined to stay u p day and night beside
a smoking heap than anybody else. Complaints were m a n y , as were burn-outs.
The yield of this method is notoriously low. According to A . Welsing,
cited by Powell (1973), tests in G h a n a show that the traditional earth-mound
kiln, a very similar technique, yielded 5.9 per cent of the oven dry weight of the
w o o d as charcoal (excluding burn-outs). Moreover, the charcoal is infiltrated with
soil from the roof, and the task of sifting charcoal out from the mixture is dirty
and socially unattractive. Labour productivity was eighteen to twenty kilograms
per person per day. The end result is a huge unfilled pit in the forest, dangerous
and unproductive.
In short, people complained long and hard, and the industry faded away,
despite a lack of alternatives.
In 1979, at the request of village people I introduced a modified West Indian
retort to the Ialibu area. This consists simply of two tubes of 200-litre drums,
suitably fortified and placed partly in the ground, on durable stands, with suitable
roofing and walls to contain heat without deterioration. Underneath the drums,
a fire-box is fashioned and scrap w o o d is used to heat the charge of good char-
coaling w o o d , sealed inside the tubes at the beginning of each cycle. After about
an hour the water is driven off the w o o d inside, and the volatile gases are emitted
strongly through small holes in the drums above thefire,leading to a self-sustaining
reaction, through to completion of charcoal production.
Carbonization takes only six hours and is spectacular. Apart from initial
fire-lighting, there is n o management required. T h e charcoal production fits
comfortably within daylight hours. The efficiency of the retort method is high,
yielding about 25 per cent of the dry weight of the w o o d as charcoal, including
scrap w o o d use in the fire-box. This means four to five times as m u c h charcoal
per unit of w o o d , hence less effort and greater economic return (50-100 kg of
charcoal per man-day is achievable). D r u m s are readily available, but durability
is a problem, leading us to manufacture m u c h stronger tubes of thick steel.
The village charcoal people are, however, delighted with the industry, and
keen to press ahead with the improvements to give long life to the retorts. Socially,
the industry is n o w entirely acceptable. •
Institutional problems and technology assessment:

time and resources
T h e concept of technological innovation affecting social change must by n o w
be well appreciated in every government and administration, and in most it is to
be expected that planners and policy-makers believe that significant changes can
be wrought in the life of communities by technological change. It is quite another
thing, however, adequately to assess the nature and dimension of the social impact
likely to occur, and to figure these equitably into project evaluation.
In thefirstinstance, even in the developed countries, the science of social-
impact assessment is young, despite legislated requirements for such analysis for
major developments in certain states of the United States.
Secondly, the time and resources are simply not available in developing
countries, even if the skills and the desire exists, to weigh social costs adequately
against the purely financial consideration of development projects. T h e urgency
of the economic problems facing most countries, including the developed ones,
leads inevitably to compromises in the depth and extent of social-impact assess-
ment related to anything from a large mine to a village-level food-processing
device. T h e great temptation is to m o v e rapidly because 'development' is urgently
required. Once having embraced or engaged the wider market economy, following
inevitably upon a loss of local ecological equilibrium, the m o m e n t u m for devel-
opment is great, and the urgency is hardly deniable.
H o w can a small overworked administration hope to cope with the additional
burden of detailed social-impact assessment in this turbulent environment, infused
and complicated, as a rule, by political biases, jealousies and parochialism? In
academia w e prevaricate about scaling intangibles in the social cost-benefit analysis.
In the realities of government w e are often m o r e than satisfied just to get the
cash-flows right!
Intentions and preconceptions

It would be wrong, however, to think that, amongst the planners and policy
makers of the Third World, there was not a deep concern for the problems in
social change occasioned by rapid economic development, and its technological
catalysts.
The urbanization that accompanies economic development brings with it
a n e w social order, one that overturns traditional authority structures, makes
the young m e n more equipped for survival than the old, and places m a n y people
in the void of transition between the stabilizing traditions of village society and the
cosmopolitan disorder of urban societies. There changes bring temporary and
sometimes lasting social disruption; crime, gambling, alcoholism, prostitution,
504 Ken Newcombe
paralleled by the loss of cultural traditions which, at least, provided an identity

in space and time.
The manifestations of poorly adapted technological change are frequently
bemoaned by community and political leaders in Papua N e w Guinea. It is not
clear, however, that thoughtful integration is taking place, linking cause and
effect and seeking to understand the evolution of the changes regarded as u n -
desirable so that a truly corrective development strategy can be induced.
There is often, for instance, an unhelpful preconception that research is an
unwarranted activity for a developing country, thereby confusing fundamental
with applied research. Very little n e w technology originates from most small
Third World countries, but the social and economic impact of technology trans-
ferred from a developed industrialized economy is of particular interest, deserving
careful demonstration and research before widespread promotion occurs. T h e
village charcoal and biogas examples cited above illustrate the need for such
applied research.
T w o c o m m o n precepts influence the policy of technology assessment; one
is the 'small is beautiful' idea, and the other is that labour-intensive technology is
necessarily good for developing countries. Although there is m u c h to recommend
both, they prove valid only in specific contexts even though they are often promoted
loosely as universally desirable.
Small is beautiful, and so is labour-intensive technology?
If, for example, a nation-state, with a population of millions, has the resources
to substitute largely for a major imported good, and desires self-sufficiency,
large-scale production is inevitable. Alcohol-fuel production in Papua N e w
Guinea provides an example.
Alcohol-fuel production in developing countries can be shown to be a
respectable, but rarely a super-profitable industry (World Bank, 1980). It is obvious
that w e are n o w at the mid-point in a global transition towards economically
competitive production of liquid fuels from m a n y sources other than petroleum.
In Papua N e w Guinea a cassava-alcohol industry has been promoted initially
with smallholders, in the hope that they might participate in crop production.
Very quickly it became clear that the industry would only be viable with sophis-
ticated management of the cassava plantation, the factory being located in the
plantation complex. This enables full use of stalkfibrefor factory fuel, the leaf
matter for protein food, and the stilläge to be recycled efficiently as a fertilizer.
These benefits are of great ecological and economic significance.
. Transporting roots from smallholder village plots to a factory added pro-
hibitively to the cost, considering the very low price that could be paid for the
tubers in relation.to 'on farm' production costs. Stillage fertilizer could not be
recycled economically to village plots some distance away and, with such low
crop prices, chemical fertilizer could not be afforded by village people. T h e result
would be slow deterioration of the village agro-ecosystem.
The choice, quite simply, w a s to meet two development objectives: rural
development and increased self-reliance, and not to let attempted direct small-
holder participation spell failure for the whole exercise. T h e local people will
be taking part in this industry through the employment and investment oppor-
tunities created by its ownership by the national and provincial governments.
There is another approach in Fiji. The government has insisted o n small-
holder participation in cassava production for ethanol fuel, and has placed a
shadow value on smallholder input adequate to compensate for the financial
disincentives of the resulting negative cash flows ( M c C a n n et al., 1980). There are,
then, two interesting approaches to the same problem. In Papua N e w Guinea one
cannot economically justify the shadow-price approach that Fiji imposed, and
expect that the higher efficiency of the less labour-intensive approach will be
rewarding by stimulating the development of ancillary industries or other rural
development benefiting from the infrastructure created by thisfirst,economically
sound development.
In fact the cassava alcohol industry being developed is small by any stan-
dards, with a capacity of only 7,000 litres per day, for a cropping area of
500 hectares. Nevertheless it serves to stimulate discussion of the general issues.
F r o m an ecological perspective it cannot be assumed that manual labour is
desirable for its o w n sake. The history and ethnology of hunter/gatherer and neo-
lithic groups shows most of them enjoying more leisure time than contemporary
societies (Sahlins, 1972). Unless the ecological balance of a society is destroyed
there will be n o desire to spend more time at work. The unemployment problem
m a y often be more an illusion than a reality in m a n y village societies. If the demand
for cash employment stems from the desire for some of the commodities of the
market economy, such as tape-recorders and radios, then employment will be
sought to the extent that it satisfies these needs, and m a y , as Papua N e w Guinea
experience shows, be intermittent at best.
If in addition to being labour-intensive the modes of production available
are also the least efficient in converting resources into goods, as with the charcoal
example I have provided, there is even less justification for labour-intensive pro-
duction per se. In fact, it will very frequently be true that the most elegant tech-
nology, reflecting thoughtful consideration of the social, resources and financial
constraints will offer advantages in both developed and developing countries, and
not exclusively to either group. In any case, there is n o unwritten law that divides
the Third World from the First in the terms of the kinds of technology that would
be suitable in each.
The First world has n o prior right to suitably elegant sophisticated tech-
nology. Rather the assessment of technology should be m a d e in an integrated w a y
506 Ken New combe
reflecting an appreciation of all the factors which influence h u m a n well-being and

economic production in any particular ecosystem. I can readily believe that there
are m a n y circumstances in which the sensitive deployment of small amounts of
solar P V C electricity, and microprocessors can greatly increase the biological and
social productivity of traditional village society n o w suffering from population/
resource imbalances.
Coping with comprehensive assessment
A s I have outlined here the problems of limited time and h u m a n resources, and
the obvious expediency of rapid development in a 'cash-hungry' world, work
against a thorough ecological assessment of proposed industrial development,
and of the social impact of the technology to be applied.
The experience of the past, ignorance and resultant failures should not,
however, be daunting. B y virtue of the failures of previous rapacious development,
m a n y central planning authorities have become aware of the economic costs of
social change, recognizing it as a major component in the social cost-benefit
equation. While the skills, experience and methodology of the ecologically orien-
tated analysis required to understand the social advantages and disadvantages of
a development m a y be lacking, I do not believe there is a paucity of concern.
There is a need to delineate methodologies, and the experience of their
application to particular problems. It will help to define the ways in which cultural
attitudes, beliefs, and the expectation they generate, impinge directly and indirectly
on apparently straightforward problems of resource extraction and utilization,
and manifest themselves in changes to the bottom line of thefinancialbalance
sheet. T h e growth of environmental agencies and legislative tools, and, more
recently, the proliferation of energy policy and planning workshops indicates that
changes in the institutional approach to problems at the national and international
levels can become widespread within the nextfiveto ten years.
Perhaps the most simple and immediately effective approach to the problem
of technological change that any government can take is merely to demand that
the social and biological cost and benefits of a proposed development be addressed
first, before engineering-design and cash-flow considerations. Reversing the order,
and making the latter contingent upon the former, removes the classical problem
of the m o m e n t u m that especially large projects obtain w h e n it becomes clear that
there is m o n e y in them, at least for somebody. T o o often, by the time the social
concerns are being voiced, the funds for feasibility studies have been spent, and
those raising concerns are regarded as a pestilence seeking to frustrate urgently
needed economic development.
If the analysis is comprehensive, and systematically tackles the problem
initially of whether the technology is socially and biologically acceptable, and
strategically sound, politically awkward situations would be avoided. Controversy

would arise before, rather than after, commitment, and that could only serve the
interests of an ecologically sound approach to technology assessment.
References
B O Y D E N , S. V . 1979. An Integrated Ecological cations in the Developing World. A A A S

' Approach to the Study of Human Settlements. Selected Symposia Scries. Boulder, Colo.,
(Prepared in co-operation with U N E A . ) Paris, Westview Press.
Unesco. ( M A B Technical Notes, 12.) SALISBURY, R . F . 1962. From Stone to Steel. Mel-
BOYDEN, S. V.; MILLAR, S. E.; NEWCOMBE, K.; bourne University Press.
O ' N E I L L , B . 1980. The Ecology of a City and S A M A N A , U . 1980. Premier's Address on the Occasion
its People: The Case of Hong Kong. Canberra, of opening the Biogas Plant in Taraka, Lae.
A N U Press. Lae, Morobe Provincial G a v m a n .
B U C K , J. L . 1937. LandUtilization in China. Shanghai, SAHLINS, M . 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago,
Commercial Press. Aldini.
C H E N Guang-Qian; C H E N Ming. 1979. The Develop- U N E S C O . 1976. Task Force on Integrated Ecological
ment of Chinese biogas. Paper presented at Studies on Human Settlements. Within the
U N I T A R Conference on Long-term Energy Framework of Project II. Unesco/UNEP.
Resources. Montreal, 27 November-5 D e - Paris, Unesco. ( M A B report, 31.)
cember. (F7/SP/21.) U N E S C O . 1978. Planning Meeting for Project II, with
ILLICH, I. 1974. Energy and Equity. London. Cal- Emphasis on Industrialized Settlements Final
der & Boyars. Report. Paris, Unesco. ( M A B report, 42.)
M C C A N N , D . , et al. 1980. Cassava Ethanol in Fiji. A U N D P . 1979. Appropriate Industrial Technology for
Feasibility Study for the Fiji Government and Energy for Rural Requirements, N e w York,
Mobil Oil, Australia. Milthorpe, D . McCann United Nations.
and Associates. W I L K I N S O N , R . G . 1973. Poverty and Progress. An
N P O . 1978. The National Public Expenditure Plan, Ecological Model of Economic Development.
1979-1982. P . O . Wards Strip, Waigani, London, Methuen.
National Planning Office. W O R L D B A N K . 1980. Alcohol Production from Bio-
P O W E L L , J. W . 1973. W o o d Waste as an Energy mass. Potential and Prospects in the Develop-
Source in Ghana. In: N . L . B R O W N (ed.), ing Countries. Washington, D . C . , World
Renewable Energy Resources and Rural Appli- Bank. (Report N o . 3021.)
T h e interaction between science,
technology and society:
historical and comparative perspectives
A . Rahman
Introduction
T h e interaction of science and technology with society m a y be seen from m a n y

angles. A s a part of the development of European society, its internal structure,
value system and ideology, and the role these played in social and political
evolution. T h e role can also be examined in terms of the impact of European
developments on Asia. Both dimensions will be looked at here.
Francis Bacon clearly visualized the role that science and technology were
likely to play in developing an industrial society, the way they should be organized
to achieve m a x i m u m results and the type of outlook which m e n of science should
develop in order to play an effective role.1
The first impact of the developments of science and technology and the
application of ideas generated by the former and innovations m a d e in the latter,
was to encourage hopes for a new society—which would meet all needs and allow
all people to be creative.2
The hopes generated by the developments of science and technology, the
ethos of society which these engendered m a y be summarized briefly. First, science
and technology came to be considered as an independent force in society, and
it was thought that their development would determine its future. Secondly, it
was thought that developments in science and technology and their application
would lead to the modernization of society, and any resistance to this process
was therefore considered reactionary. The transfer of science and technology by
the benevolent European countries to the underdeveloped countries was supposed
to transform and modernize them. T o measure their progress various indices were
evolved. Thirdly, science and technology were considered socially, politically and
ethically neutral. Responsibility for the misuse of science and technology was laid
on the shoulders of the users and not on scientists and technologists. Finally, it was
Professor A . Rahman is Chief (Planning) and Head of the Centre for the Study of Science, Tech-
nology and Development, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Rafi Marg, New Delhi
11001, India.
Int. Soc. Scl. J., Vol. XXXlir, N o . 3, 1981

The interaction between science, 509
technology and society
suggested that as a result of these developments, a scientific outlook o n the one

hand and the development of productive forces o n the other would lead to the
solution of social and political conflicts.
Views on science, technology and society
However, these hopes have not been fulfilled, and a series of questions have been
raised about each of the above assumptions. There are a n u m b e r of others being
advocated at present, for example, the Marxist formulations, which have undergone
a major change since the time of J. D . Bernai and others in the 1930s. In the
writings of earlier Marxists, science was considered a positive force and its aber-
rations and misuse were attributed to the capitalist system. Hence, all that was
necessary to do away with its disadvantages w a s to control it politically. S o m e
contemporary Marxists, like Gary Wersky, David Dixon, Hillary Rose and others
associated with various movements of the left have put forward different ideological
formulations. According to Dixon, for example,
[the] scientific world view is an ideological representation—or even a legitimation—of

the bourgeois world, but . . . as the intellectual tool which capitalists use to organize,
plan and control the labour process, it is, in fact, a constitutive element of this world.
A n d . . . the need for this tool has not been determined merely by the requirements to
increase the 'efficiency' of production in any neutral sense, but in addition by the need
of capital to impose such organization, planning and control over labour, in order to
secure the generation and subsequent appropriation of surplus value.3
T h e other reaction to science and technologies comes from humanists and has
been well stated by Morazé:
Science provides [the h u m a n race] with neither the means to survive nor a meaning for
the hardships endured and for death The new knowledge and know-how have served
the privileged of this world to the detriment of the rest. . . . Science banished from its
o w n objectives all that was human in nature, believing that the solution of material
problems would suffice for the other problems—spiritual, psychological, social or
cultural—to work themselves out by the end of the expected synthesis. . . . Because it
did notfirstmake humanity its objective, it contributed to betraying the promises of
liberty, equality and fraternity.1
In addition, M o r a z é emphasizes that while the analytical spirit has led to the
abandoning of supreme values and humanitarian synthesis, the preoccupation
with war has led civilization to lose its authenticity. T h e ambition of entrepreneurs,
societies, classes, nations and states has resulted in the production and sale of
devices which have devalued cultures. Finally, the analytical approach has devel-
oped an esoteric language which means that people are unable to. comprehend
510 A. Rahman
n e w developments and their implications. The result is that they cannot participate
in the decision-making process and influence the direction of its growth or the
purpose for which it is used. Consequently, it has become a preserve and instru-
ment of those in power. This is similar to situations w h e n priests used the invention
of writing as an instrument to control and use knowledge for promoting a class
society. . ,
These propositions, m a d e at different moments in the history of European
culture reveal the duality of impact of the development of science and technology
o n society and the nature of the reactions to them at different times. These reac-
tions, as can be seen in Dixon's and Morazé's comments are also a result of n e w
perceptions which are the result of hopes raised and unfulfilled, new problems
which have been generated and the h u m a n quest for fresh goals. These perceptions
are: social, in that they seek equality and justice; technological, since they are
based on the assessment of the impact of new technologies; environmental because
they are generated by pollution and the deterioration of ecological balance; and
moral and ethical judgements inspired by the diversion of resources and creative
energies for purposes of destruction.5
Apart from the interaction of science and society in European culture,
an important dimension has been the interaction of Europe with Asia, over a
period w h e n science and technology were developing. A study of this is vital to
our understanding of the problem for two reasons. First, the resources for the
development of science and technology and its linkage with manufacturing, were
provided by the Asian countries, which became colonies or semi-colonies. T h e
greater the resources provided, the greater the development of industry which
led to demands for n e w knowledge. This meant progress in science and technology
and the greater this progress, the greater the exploitation of the semi-colonies and
colonies.
Secondly, after the Second World W a r , once these colonies had attained
political independence, they sought to attain economic independence and to
achieve certain social goals. In the process, they tended to re-examine European
civilization, its culture and its values and also tried to take a second look at their
o w n cultures, history and civilization. This was in order to avoid the pitfalls of
European cultures and traditions and to overcome their o w n limitations. S o m e
of the basic assumptions, which had been taken for granted so far were called
into question.
In this context, the understanding of historical relations between science,
technology and society and between Europe and Asia assumed a n e w significance.
Science and technology had long been viewed as European phenomena, with their
origins in ancient Greece. The development of science, its conceptual framework
and its contribution to the development of the ancient civilizations of Asia were
ignored. So too were the medieval developments of science and technology and
their contribution to culture and civilization of the period in Asia, which was
termed the 'dark ages'. A s a result, the conceptual framework and the theoretical
understanding of the process of development of science and technology w a s
deprived of its roots. With n o effort at comparative evaluation of their role and
interactions in different cultures and civilizations, they came to serve the purpose
of the political and intellectual hegemony of Europe.
Historical dimensions of science and technology

in non-European cultures
Studies in the history of technology have brought to light cultural and economic
patterns of society, which have evolved as a result of opportunities created by
technological innovation and change. A close examination would also reveal
that the two phenomena have gone together, interacting with each other so as
to m a k e it difficult to identify cause and effect.
Historically, five cultural areas are important: the European, the Arab
(including North Africa), the Persian, the Indian and the Sino-Japanese. T h e
scientific ideas and discoveries of these cultural areas are sufficiently well recorded
to reveal not only the nature of knowledge developed during the various periods
but also a historical perspective. The history of technological innovation is less
documented and at best fragmentary. In the case of Europe, despite m a n y gaps,
there is a fairly good account of the technological innovations, their applications
and evolution.' There is n o w also a fairly wide and growing body of knowledge
about Japan 7 and China, 8 which, in a decade or so, will be able to provide a
better understanding and help to form a comparative picture of the evolution of
European and Sino-Japanese cultures. The situation is not so favourable with
regard to the Arab, Persian (which also includes Afghanistan and Soviet Central
Asia) and Indian cultures. Studies of Arab science are n o w being promoted, but
attention to technology is not as great as it should be. 9 Soviet Central Asia is also
being studied and some very important discoveries have been m a d e , but the full
impact of the knowledge available has not been felt because of translation dif-
ficulties.10 Indian studies o n technology are marginal and hence there is n o proper
understanding of the technological base of the different cultures which developed
in India as a result of various external influences and the innovations introduced
at different periods of history.11 It m a y , therefore, be difficult to discuss compara-
tively, an innovation and its impact on different societies in a given period. O n e
m a y , however, briefly indicate h o w knowledge, based on the structure of society
and its goals was directed to certain specific uses. A few illustrative examples are
chosen from India, for this purpose.
512 A. Rahman
The medieval period
Medieval society had, a m o n g others, two distinctive needs: agriculture and

armaments. In agriculture the aim was improvement to provide more revenue
as well as to supply variety to meet the requirements of the rich. There is not
m u c h record of the former except in the case of building and constructions of
water tanks and canals for irrigation. But for the latter, there is some account of
the introduction and development of n e w varieties of food. Pineapple, for
instance, was brought to India by the Portuguese, immediately cultivated in the
royal garden by Emperor Jehangir and a rich harvest reaped.12
During the medieval period a technique of grafting was discovered and
adopted: as a result a wide range especially of tropical fruits, designed to meet
various requirements became available.13
In armaments, similarly, a series of developments to suit requirements are
worth noting: a gun-cleaning machine, a machine gun having a number of barrels,
which could befiredby one matchlock, to release, m e n forfightingand to give
greaterfirepower, and a screw cannon, which could be effectively used for m o u n -
tainous terrain and fixed on hill tops to m a k e it more effective.11
Nothing, however, illustrates more clearly the relationship between societal
needs and goals and technological developments than civil engineering and archi-
tecture. Here the objective was to construct impressive buildings which were
also permanent, in order to perpetuate their builders' m e m o r y . Mausoleums
are a good example. So long as stone was used, their size and height was not
imposing and the size of the d o m e was small compared with the square below.
After a number of empirical exercises (with the use of mathematics and the k n o w -
ledge of engineering) problems appear to have been solved in a rather ingenious
w a y by using stone as a surfacing material over a brick-and-mortar base, as is
evident from the beautiful buildings left by M o g h u l kings. B y contrast, the same
engineers could not construct bridges over rivers for the simple reason that the
heavy piers needed to withstand the rush of waters and to support the super-
structure acted as an obstruction; in the north of India for example, silt carried
by the rivers was deposited at the piers causing the course of the rivers to change,
making the bridges redundant. This problem was not solved because the need for
bridges was not great. Rivers provided natural protection to the city against
invaders and the necessary trade could be conducted across the rivers by boat.15
Such examples from different cultures can be multiplied to show the techno-
logical responses to social problems and the conditioning of innovations by the
prevalent cultures.
W h y did these developments in science and technology not continue in
these countries? Did they have to come to a dead end, and were they not capable
of evolving further? W e r e there social factors within Indian society that were
responsible for thwarting any further development? W a s there no need for industrial
development such as took place in Europe, because the Indian feudal system based
on medieval technology, was able to meet the needs of people, and the motivation
was not present? O r were these developments disrupted and further progress m a d e
impossible as a result of colonization?
Technology, industrial revolution and Asian societies
A n examination of the impact of technology on society, following the industrial

revolution in Europe reveals a series of extremely important factors.
The industrial revolution in Europe, based on the utilization of technological
innovations, the organization of methods of production and increase in trade,
expanded the sphere of influence of European nations in Africa, Asia and the
Americas. T h e impact of these developments was felt differently by different
countries with regard to the evolution of technology, its use in production and
its impact on society. They can be categorized o n the basis of status of a country
or area. These categories are: (a) countries that received the influence, absorbed
it and developed it to suit their goals and remained politically independent, like
Japan; (b) countries that retained nominal independence or became semi-colonies
like Egypt or China; and (c) countries that became colonies of one or another
European power, like India.
There are considerable variations and differences in the impact of European
technology, its absorption and development within each category and these
require to be studied in some detail. A few general points m a y , however, be
mentioned here.
Japan maintained her independence. Teachers of science and technology were
imported and nationals were sent abroad for training. Science and technology were
then taught in Japanese and it was decided to m a k e a major industrial investment,
even though it was in thefieldof armaments, and an independent course of develop-
ment. 18 In Japan, as in Europe, the growth of technology, its use in industrial
development and the armaments industry go side by side.
The differences in the interaction of scientific tradition and its role in society
is described by Kinnosuke w h e n he compares European and Japanese history.
According to him, science in Japan was a part of a feudal and bureaucratic struc-
ture and did hot develop the traditions of freedom. T h e scientific community being
controlled by the government did not show any social conscience or play a leading
role in social transformation. The result was division into academic cliques with
an authoritarian bias.17
Science and technology in India was imported by the British in opposition
to the indigenous tradition. It was channelled into purposes of exploitation and
its development was controlled to meet political requirement. There were simi-
larities with the situation in Japan of a feudal and bureaucratic culture, which
even n o w dominates its ethos. Further, Indian scientists developed two cultures:
514 A. Rahman
thefirst,as a result of their training in science and its practice in the laboratory,
and the second, as a result of their social environment, cultural background and
nationalistic assertions.18 T h e scientific community under these circumstances
did not develop those qualities and roles which were assumed and played by
European scientists.
In countries that were nominally independent or semi-colonies (though
later, they became colonies), science and technology even when imported from
Europe did not take root. There are three good examples from Africa. Emir Abdul
al Kader (1832-47) of Algeria was keenly interested in European technology and
did m u c h to develop industry in Algeria through the importation of French tech-
nicians. However, from the records it appears that his efforts were not successful,
and European science and technology was not implanted.19 The same was true of
the efforts of Sultan'Said bin Sultan of O m a n (1806-56) w h o , with the help of
European technicians, started a sugar mill in Zanzibar, but the endeavour failed
with the departure of these technicians.19 The same story was repeated with the
m o r e extensive efforts of M u h a m m a d Ali of Egypt (1805) w h o , with the help of
French engineers, constructed a number of dams and irrigation canals. H e also
employed a large number of European doctors, engineers and technicians for his
numerous technical programmes. These industries continued to function as long
as they were manned by the Europeans but collapsed as soon as they left.19
It m a y be worthwhile to consider briefly the possible reasons for the failure
of these ventures. First, they were not technologically evolved from indigenous
crafts, as was the case in Europe. There was n o attempt to reach local technical
m a n p o w e r to understand the processes and to continue to use them after the
foreign technicians left; there were also political factors. It m a y be that the people
of the country did not possess the technological outlook necessary for develop-
ment, at that time. In view of the last factor, Western technology and the industry
based on it, had hardly any impact till modern times. This is in sharp contrast
to Japan probably because of a clear-cut policy of overall national development
which ranged from education to the creation of industries. B y making science
and technology a part of the educational system, the Japanese aimed to produce
local technical manpower. They hoped to create technical understanding in society
and a technological ethos, and in this way to enhance efficiency and productivity.
B y establishing basic industries, they provided an outlet for creative energies
as well as employment.
Lastly, let us briefly consider the case of India. With colonization, there
was a well-organized and directed effort to destroy the indigenous industries,
to m a k e the country a source of raw material for British factories and a market
for thefinishedgoods.
The development of British industry, and the needs this created meant
that the development of technology and science, was to a large extent based o n
the colonization of India by the British for the benefit of manufacturers at h o m e .
According to Eric H o b s b a w m , the impetus was provided by Great Britain 'cap-

turing a series of other countries' export markets and destroying domestic c o m p e -
tition within particular countries, that is by the political or semi-political
means of war and colonialism'.20 This colonization led to the banning of Indian
textiles exports to Great Britain,21 and the Indian sub-continent 'opened to
de-industrialization and massive import of Lancashire Cotton. 22 T h e purposes
and the degree to which this de-industrialization w a s organized a n d achieved
can be judged by the remark m a d e in 1837 by R . M . Grindlay: 'India can never
again be a great manufacturing country, but by cultivating her connections with
England she m a y be one of the greatest agricultural nations.'23
T o facilitate the transport of raw materials andfinishedgoods a network
of railways, roads and communication systems, post and telegraph, w a s devel-
oped. 24 The impact of these technological innovations and their utilization, only
shortly after their introduction in Europe, w a s not to bring about major social
changes and prosperity, as was the case in Great Britain, but rather to increase
the process of underdevelopment of the country.
Transport and communication systems were to provide effective control,
through easy communication and the rapid deployment of troops in the colony.
In order to secure raw materials and establish the transport system, surveys were
m a d e to m a p the country, its geological features and natural resources. In order
to exploit them, mining became extensive.26 Lastly, a number of institutions were
established to train technicians to work under the supervision of the British
and help in the further exploitation of the country.
The impact of the exploitation of India, the destruction of industries, the
plight of craftsmen, unemployment, poverty and misery and the destruction of
society as a whole has been described in some detail b y M a d a n M o h a n Malviya,
in his note of dissent to the Holland Commission. 26 T h e impact on Great Britain
has been described by Eric H o b s b a w n :
Furthermore, war—and especially that very commercially minded and middle-class

organization, the British Navy—contributed even more directly to technological inno-
vation and industrialization. Its demands were not negligible: the tonnage of the Navy
multiplied from about 100,000 in 1685 to about 325,000 in 1760, and its demands for
guns grew substantially though in less dramatic manner It was worth a businessman's
while to introduce revolutionary methods to supply them. Time and again, w e find
some inventor or entrepreneur stimulated by so lucrative a prospect. Henry Cort, w h o
revolutionized iron manufacture, began in the 1760s as a Navy agent, anxious to
improve the quality of the British product in connection with the supply of iron to
the Navy. 2 '
W h a t was the impact of these developments and the opportunities provided b y

them on the outlook of m e n and societies? First, it justified ruthless exploitation.
The employment of child and female labour for long hours, under unhygienic
516 A. Rahman
and sub-human conditions and at wages below subsistence level was justified as
a necessary price for progress and future prosperity. The concepts of 'the struggle
for existence' and 'the survival of thefittest'were evolved to m a k e the exploitation
appear as natural law. Further, as an extension, the idea of superior and inferior
races was developed and the whole philosophy and ideology of the empire was
evolved, of which Rudyard Kipling became a celebrated spokesman. 28 .
Another dimension was the separation of the problems of justice and ethics
from those of science and technology. Once this divorce w a s established, the
question of subjecting the. advancement of science and technology to h u m a n
considerations and values was solved and the former could then be assessed by
internal factors of sophistication only, and the trend towards exploitation and
use of science and technology for purposes of destruction could continue
unchecked. :
In this process, instead of controlling development, people became ciphers
in the labour force and units of consumption of mass-produced goods, and in
both guises a source of profit to manufacturers. Furthermore, the function and
purposes of manufacturing also underwent a radical change, from those of meeting
needs to those of making a profit. Consequently, science and technology were
directed more and more to increasing profits. Studies of productivity starting
from time-and-motion study and a very large amount of research, such as h o w to
increase the water content of bread, and technological innovations, such as those
aimed at quick obsolescence, were aimed towards this goal.
In addition, psychological motivation w a s used to generate a demand for
goods, quick changes of fashions to keep production going and the philosophy
of waste and consumerism evolved to meet productive capacity and profit. Prof-
ligacy reflects the w a y in which cultural values were debased, and new habits
emerged. These in turn tended to govern technological innovation.
Such developments which were taking place in Europe, evoked different
reactions in developing countries depending u p o n h o w they affected different
strata of society.
In India, as interpreted in certain writings of north Indians this m a y be
summarized as follows: (a) the British were superior people and should be copied;
(b) since the British had conquered the country, and were exploiting it ruthlessly
they and everything brought by them must be opposed—including science and
technology. Consequently, a large section of the national movement aimed at
reviving medieval arts and crafts; (c) science and technology represented a new
and powerful element of European culture and if India wants its o w n regeneration
it must adopt and develop them. 29
With the passage of time the demands of colonization and exploitation
led to a series of phenomena. O n e of these was technical education; a number of
technical institutions, professional colleges, research establishments, societies,
and journals were established. There was. therefore an increase of trained m a n -
power which in turn began to exert pressure on the colonial structure.30 There
were then developments in two directions. First, towards the revival of the
indigenous industries based o n handicrafts: handwoven and hand-spun cloth,
the handloom becoming a symbol of the national struggle against foreign domi-
nation. This direction was spearheaded by Gandhi, and had considerable influence
in generating feeling against both technology and science, considered as alien to
the Indian tradition and as instruments of European domination and exploitation.
It was felt that both ought to be rejected and that one should return to the past
and draw inspiration and support from it to shape the future. Second, Indians
began establishing industries based on European technology to produce consumer
goods such as soap, oil and sugar, which were being imported from overseas,
and also basic materials like iron, steel and machinery. This led to the importation
of k n o w - h o w and technologies to cater for the needs of the élites. T h e heavy
industries aimed at the creation of an industrial base.
A possibly unintended dimension w a s the social impact of technology on
India. This could briefly be summarized as:
The creation of a national sentiment—rapid communication and transport
system enabled people to travel, in and to get to k n o w different parts of the
country, thus reducing the pull of local factors. Consequently, a considerable
amount of literature was able to project India as one, despite her diversities.
The mass transportation system also helped to erode practices which were part
of Indian society, based on the caste system. A poor Brahmin and a scheduled
caste could travel in the same train compartment or within a city in a bus
or train occasionally sitting next to each other.
Contemporary impacts and consequences
However, the major impact of these developments was the creation of two rival
sectors: one based on handicrafts, which employed a large number of people and
was supported by a part of the national movement and another based on imported
technology.31
This dichotomy was to have serious consequences for society as it created
a major schism in the social structure. A Europeanized élite emerged,first,as a
service class whose aspirations, goals and tastes were similar to those of their
colonial masters. Later, this was further strengthened by those w h o favoured
imported technology and the goods it produced—food, consumer goods, such as
cosmetics, textiles and clothes and a life-style of household goods, gadgets and
entertainment systems. T h e other class, the urban poor and the rural sector, apart
from the rich peasants, continued to depend upon the handicraft and handloom
system. This schism created numerous social tensions. The consequences of these
in an underdeveloped economy were considerable, particularly because of the
518 A. Rahman
role of the mass media which projected the image of a rich and affluent society,
and created aspirations and hopes amongst those w h o were denied the benefits
of the technological society, specially a m o n g educated people, w h o came from
rural or poor urban backgrounds and attended indifferent types of educational
institution. These institutions awarded them degrees but did not impart the
necessary knowledge or develop their capacities to enable them to compete with
those from affluent backgrounds and better institutions, w h o also had the oppor-
tunity of going overseas to gain better opportunities to become acquainted with
the latest technology and its possible uses. T h e image created by technology
attracted a large number of young m e n from rural areas to study science and
technology, through which they sought to better their conditions and to improve
their future career possibilities.32
A few more serious consequences were noticed in agriculture and land
distribution. These have a number of dimensions, and since they are generally
valid for other developing countries, they are worth mentioning here briefly.
At the time of independence, India did not have enough food to meet the
population's m i n i m u m requirements. T h e national movement, which had the
massive support of the rural population, felt that low productivity, was due to
land distribution patterns. Consequently, land reforms were one of its major
promises. It undertook to implement these promises after independence and a
major programme of land reform was undertaken, though it was not well
executed. However, the population continued to increase, and a large number of
those w h o had land did not possess the resources for the necessary input for
cultivation or increasing productivity,33 so that India fell more and more short
of the m i n i m u m requirements. In order to meet these, it had to depend on food
imports. T h e larger the quantities imported the more dependent India became
politically.
India emerged from this vicious circle as a result of massive scientific and
technological inputs—by developing high-energy agriculture and using high-
yield agricultural varieties. The increase in food production brought with it two
major consequences. First, India became self-sufficient in food and thus politically
more independent. In addition, it also released resources which could be and were
utilized in industrial development. Secondly, high-energy agriculture could only
be practised b y the rich farmers, w h o could provide the necessary inputs:
irrigation p u m p s , pesticides and necessary amounts of fertilizers, to ensure good
yields. The social impact of this was to nullify the effect of land reform. The rich
peasants became richer, and the poor poorer. The rich peasants came to exercise
once again a major influence on the political system and to exploit it to benefit
themselves at the expense of the poor. 31
Thefirstsignificant feature to emerge is the duality of the social role of
technology which led to more rapid development and greater freedom and, when
not socially controlled, created an increasingly wider gap between those w h o
benefit and those w h o do not. W h a t is true within a country is also valid between
different countries.
The second feature is the importance of creating a strong scientific base in
terms of infrastructure and manpower in order to realize fully the potentialities
engendered by modern technology and to achieve the set of goals set by society.
This would be evident from a cursory glance at Arab and Persian cultures, which
as a result of the export of fossil fuels have become extremely rich and are
exposed to the most advanced technology. If the impact of technology on society
or the interaction between the two is considered from the point of view of
providing a practical and effective response to the challenges facing society and
generating the capacity to handle the future, then the Arab scene assumes
considerable significance. T h e situation can be analytically s u m m e d u p as
follows.35
The Arab countries continue to trade primary products and continue to
import technology. There is little participation in the planning and execution of
projects (this is reminiscent of efforts in the nineteenth century, such as those of
M u h a m m a d Ali of Egypt). A s a result, the generation of endogenous technology,
if any, is limited. This has also prevented the development in society of a
technological outlook and ethos and thus productivity is low and the production
system inefficiently managed. Management and consultancy is undertaken by
foreigners, which has resulted in: (a) lack of information about recent development
and use of information in decision-making; (b) w e a k bargaining power and
negotiating capacities; (c) high cost of importing technology, particularly due to
over-invoicing of equipment and intermediate products; (d) continued techno-
logical dependence.
The consequences of the lack of infrastructure and of a technological ethos
of society and the gap in society between those w h o benefit from technological
development and those w h o do not can be seen in the present crisis in Iran.
Iran's model of development was no different from those of Arab countries.
Sophisticated technology was associated with Europeans; it was imported by the
ruling élite and used as an instrument of ruthless exploitation and suppression of
the people. Consequently, those w h o were denied the benefits developed their
o w n ethos, closely associated with leaders, w h o were in opposition to the ruling
élite and were persecuted by them. Their revolt, w h e n it did occur, not only
overthrew the exploiting class¿ but also rejected science and technology. It is
interesting to note in this context h o w the advantages of the most sophisticated
technology can be nullified by the people w h e n it becomes an instrument of
exploitation. In Iran, people developed their o w n network of communication
which turned out to be more effective as well as quicker compared with the
sophisticated technological communication system of the ruling élite which was
rendered ineffective.
The factors that have resulted in the present situation in Iran are operative
520 A. Rahman
in nearly all the developing countries, which are importing technology without
creating the necessary infrastructure, m a n p o w e r and scientific and technological
ethos. This creates an élite whose aspirations and goals are closely associated
with European culture and deprives a large majority of the population of the
advantages of development. The result is that in most of these countries technology
has become an alien intrusion, and is often seen not as a n e w opportunity but
as a n instrument of destruction of traditional crafts and of exploitation and
foreign domination with little promise of an alternative better life. The people
are thus subjected to exploitation of two kinds: one arising from the destruction
of their crafts, cultures and attitudes and the other from the dehumanizing effects
of industrial development. O n e direction that social movements for radical change
in these countries could take in promising a better life for the underprivileged
would be a return to medieval life, based on low technology and crafts. This also
has an emotional attraction, as it conjures u p the picture of an easy, simple life
with plenty of food, fresh air and a serene environment, a release from contem-
porary stress and strains. Such movements have received considerable impetus
under the slogan of 'appropriate technology', generated by the advanced countries
for the benefit of developing ones.
The points that emerge from the examples and their brief description are
as follows:
The interaction of technology and society depends upon whether the former has
taken roots in society and has a well-developed infrastructure and sufficient
m a n p o w e r on the one hand, and on the other whether it has become a part
of indigenous tradition, ethos and culture.
T h e forces which technological innovations and their application have generated
in society—whether it has increased inequality and injustice or vice-versa.
W h a t relationships technology has with international forces as a part of the
international economic and political relationships. This assumes considerable
significance if the country happens to be a developing one.
Notes
1
For a general introduction, see Benjamin Farring- Goals and Planning of Science, N e w Delhi,
ton, Francis Bacon, Philosopher of Industrial CSIR, 1978; and Introduction and Concep-
Revolution, 1951. For specific and detailed tual Framework for Agenda Item 4 of
points see Francis Bacon's Advancement of U N C S T E D , Science in the Future, 1979.
6
Learning and Novum Organum, N e w York, Singer, Holmyard Hall and Williams, A History of
Wiley, 1944. Technology (5 vols.), Oxford, Oxford Uni-
2
See the works of Saint-Simon and others. See also versity Press. Besides a number of classical
J. D . Bernai, Science in History, Watts, 1954. histories, see J. D . Bernai, Science in History
3
Radical Science Journal, N o . 8, 1979, p. 32. (4 vols.), Harmondsworth, Pelican. See also
4
Charles Morazé, Science and the Factors of In- J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The West-
equality, pp. 255-6, Paris, Unesco, 1979. ern Intellectual Tradition, London, Hutchin-
5 son, 1960.
For a detailed discussion, see A . R a h m a n , Social
Notes (continued)
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in19 See A . B . Zahlan, Technology Transfer and Changes
China, Cambridge, Cambridge University in Arab World, Oxford, Pergamon Press,
Press. See also, S. Nakayama and Nathan 1978. It would be desirable to go into the
Sivin (cds.), Chinese Science, Cambridge, reasons of failure; were they due to the fact
Mass., M I T Press. that European technicians failed to train local
8
S. Nakayama, David Sivin and Yagi Eri, Science people or did they wilfully destroy the enter-
and Society in Modern Japan, Tokyo, Uni- prises when they were asked to leave for
versity of Tokyo Press. political reasons.
8
The studies brought out by the Institute of History 20 Eric J. H o b s b a w m , Industry and Empire, H a r -
of Science, Aleppo, is a major eifort. However, mondsworth, Pelican, 1968.
21
they are deficient in the study of technology. Archibald and N a n Clow in their book, Chemical
Some idea of the latter can be had from Revolution, state that anyone found wearing
S. H . Nasr, Islamic Science, World of Islam Indian prints was fined £10 and anyone
Festival Publishing C o m p a n y , 1976. giving information was awarded £5.
10
See for instance, a recent book published by 22 H o b s b a w m , op. cit., p . 49.
A . R . M u h a m e d Zrou on the history of ' 2 3 See Daniel Thorner, Investment in Empire, p . 1,
medieval irrigation and canal system in Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania
Uzbekistan, Tashkent, 1978. Press, 1950.
11
The efforts of the Indian National Commission for 21 Ibid.
25
the History of Science has been far from R a h m a n , et al., op. cit.
satisfactory. Their major effort, A Concise 28 Holland Commission Report, see R a h m a n , et al.,
History of Science, is not informative, besides op. cit.
it does not throw much light on this aspect of 27 H o b s b a w m , op. cit., p . 50.
28
the problem. It was not only Rudyard Kipling w h o wrote:
12
M . A . Alvi and A . R a h m a n , Jehangir, the Natu- 'East is East and West is West and never the
ralist, N e w Delhi, Indian National Science twain shall meet', but it is also evident in
Academy, 1968. French literature, see, for example, Flaubert
13
A . R a h m a n , R . N . Bhargava, M . A . Qureshi and in Kuchuk Hanem.
S. Pruthi, Science and Technology in India, 29 A . R a h m a n , Science and Cultural Values in India,
N e w Delhi, Indian Council for Cultural N e w Orient, 1960.
30
Relations, 1973. R a h m a n , et al., op. cit.
14
M . A . Alvi and A . R a h m a n , Fathullah Shirazi, 31 Scientific and Traditional Technologies in Devel-
N e w Delhi, Indian National Science Acad- oping Countries, lecture delivered by Amilcar
emy, 1968. O . Harrera of Bariloche Foundation at
15
The author's personal observations based on the Centre for the Study of Science, Technology
study of the medieval period. This inciden- and Development, C S I R , February, 1975.
tally was in sharp contrast to southern India, 32 Aqueil A h m a d and S. P . Gupta, Opinion Survey of
where rivers did not carry much silt, and Scientists & Technologists, N e w Delhi, C S I R ,
some of the bridges constructed still stand. 1967.
16 33
The point was emphasized during the discussion K . Sundaram, Non-Cultivator Household in India,
on Japanese Science in the course of a 1976 (mimco).
31
symposium at the time of the International Francine R . Rankel, India's Green Revolution
Congress of History of Science, Tokyo, —Economic Gains and Political Costs, B o m -
1973. bay, Oxford University Press, 1971.
17 35
S. Kakayama, Japanese Studies in the History of A . B . Zahlan, Technology Transfer and Changes
Science, N o . 11, 1972. in Arab World, Oxford, Pergamon Press,
18
R a h m a n et al., op. cit. 1978.
Continuing debate
Our last issue, 'At the Frontiers of Sociology' (Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, 1981),
contained a series of articles reflecting the concerns of several of the research
committees of the International Sociological Association. The study below is an
addition to this collection relating to an area of significance to numerous social
science disciplines, which has been a focus of considerable international attention
for many years and also links up closely with our issue on ' Work' (Vol. XXXII,
No. 3, 1980).
Alienation theory and research:

trends, issues and priorities*
David Schweitzer
Introduction
Despite some scepticism which has arisen over the meaning and viability of
alienation, either as a tool of social inquiry or as an instrument for social
criticism and practical action, scholarly and scientific interest in the idea of
alienation has persisted as never before in the contemporary evolution and career
of the concept. T h e large and rapidly increasing body of literature in philosophy
and the social sciences, and the growing international and multidisciplinary group
of scholars and researchers at present engaged in alienation theory and research,
suggest that the study of alienation has emerged today as a firm and legitimate
David Schweitzer is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of British Columbia, Van-
couver, B.C. V6T2B2, Canada. He is co-editor of the new journal Aliénation Theory and Research,
author of Status Frustration and Conservatism (1974), and editor of Theories of Alienation:
Critical Perspectives in Philosophy and the Social Sciences (with R . F. Geyer, 1976) and of
Alienation: Problems of Meaning, Theory and Method (with R . F. Geyer, 1981).
* The author is indebted to D r R . Felix Geyer of the

Netherlands Universities' Joint Social R e -
search Centre for his tireless and invaluable
support during almost a decade of collabor-
ation on numerous scholarly and organiz-
ational projects associated with the ISA
Research Committee on Alienation Theory
and Research, including the joint delivery of
an earlier version of this essay at the ISA
Research Council meetings in Warsaw,
August 1980. The preparatory work for this
essay was initially supported by a leave
fellowship from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
524 David Schweitzer
field in its o w n right. For a sampling of major works that have appeared within the
last decade alone, see Schaff, 1981; Geyer and Schweitzer, 1976, 1981; Geyer, 1980;
Archibald, 1978; Torrance, 1977; Brenner and Strasser, 1977; Oilman, 1976;
Ludz, .1975; Meszaros, 1975; Gabel, 1975; Rinehart, 1975; Markovic, 1974;
Johnson, 1973; Schwartz, 1973; Finifter, 1972; Walton and Gamble, 1972;
Israel, 1971; Schacht, 1970; for a review of the extensive empirical literature, see
Seeman (1975); also the exhaustive bibliographic work in van Reden et al. (1980).
Considerable controversy over important problems and issues which divide
alienation theorists and researchers nevertheless remains. The debate over a wide
range of intellectual and ideological issues can be traced largely to fundamental
epistemic problems concerning the way questions and answers about alienation
are formulated, researched, and ultimately acted upon. Several of these issues
have arisen in the course of the evolution and secularization of the concept, from
its early intellectual roots which go back as far as ancient philosophy and the
Gnostic-mystic tradition in medieval theology, to contemporary theoretical and
empirical research applications in the social sciences. Another set of issues are
centred more specifically around a fundamental debate within contemporary
Marxism concerning the meaning, usefulness, and relevancy of the alienation
concept.
M a n y of the trends and issues outlined below are closely interconnected.
They have been separated only for purposes of the present discussion in an attempt
to bring some critical clarity to several of the debates and controversies which
divide alienation theorists and researchers today.
Alienation: an objective societal condition

or a subjective state of individual consciousness?
T h e uncompromising emphasis on alienation as a strictly objective or materialist
structural phenomenon has been a long-standing one in most Marxist approaches.
Yet one striking development within contemporary Marxist theory is the increasing
recognition that,subjective elements of individually perceived and felt alienation
are worthy of theoretical and empirical examination in their o w n right.
A t the same time, non-Marxist scholars and researchers, often disenchanted
with standard survey research techniques and individualistic psychological
approaches, are rediscovering Marx's classical idea of alienation as an objective
condition pertaining to the structural relations of domination and subordination,
appropriation and exploitation, and power or control in society. Several survey
researchers are focusing specifically o n structural forms or manifestations of
alienation arising from the substantive complexity of work, or the extent to which
workers have immediate control over the work process.
W h a t w e are witnessing in the social sciences is an increasing readiness to
Alienation theory and research 525
explore alternative theories, methods, and paradigms of social inquiry, charac-

terized by a marked trend toward potential convergence or synthesis of hitherto
traditionally opposed approaches and epistemologies. This is particularly evident
today in the alienationfieldat the levels both of theory and empirical methodology.
M o s t scholars today, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, recognize and often
address themselves to both the subjective and objective dimensions of alienation.
A major controversy has arisen in the last two decades, however, concerning the
legitimate point of departure for conceptualizing, analysing, and then responding
to alienation. T o emphasize one dimension over another in one's conceptual
approach implies a more fundamental epistemic choice with ideological and
practical implications.
The controversy has evolved in two distinct, yet related, directions. First,
the humanist-materialist debate within Marxism, which not only revives the
long-standing controversy over 'two Marxisms or one', but also pits the n e w
wave of Althusserian structuralism against the growing thrust of Marxist
humanism o n both sides of the Atlantic. Second, the response, especially a m o n g
the French sociologists, to the psychological reduction and neutralization of the
alienation concept which prevails in the mainstream American tradition of
empirical survey research. Controversies over these fundamental issues within
the alienation field have been conducted with near-religious fervour.
W h a t is at stake here is not so m u c h the choice between objective and
subjective definitions of alienation, but between competing epistemologies and
departure points explicitly associated with these distinct conceptualizations of
alienation. T h e choice between objective and subjective concepts, with their
concomitant points of departure, determines not only the w a y questions and
answers about alienation are formulated, but also the methodologies, strategies,
and remedies for change, action and de-alienation. A t this level, the stakes a m o n g
intellectuals and practitioners alike seem to be very high.
M a r x , of course, stressed both the objective conditions for, and the
subjective manifestations of, alienation. His theory contains statements at m a n y
different levels, including what might be referred to as subjective or psychological
ones. Parallels can also be drawn between the psychological elements of alienation
in Marx's early works and certain psychoanalytic concepts, i.e. Horney's (1945)
'neurotic personality', or Erikson's (1968) concept of 'identity crisis' (cf. F r o m m ,
1965; Marcuse, 1964; Tucker, 1961).
Others working within a Marxist frame of reference also take a dual stance
on the objective-subjective issue. The Polish philosopher, A d a m Schaff (1981), for
one, recognizes and expands upon both objective and subjective conceptions of
alienation in Marx's works. In the first instance, alienation is treated as an
objective relation, pertaining to the products of m a n which become, in a meta-
phoric sense, alienated, regardless of h o w he thinks or feels about it. Schaff
distinguishes this from self-alienation, a subjective social relation in the sense
that it is m a n w h o alienates himself from a world that he has socially created, from
other people, and from his o w n 'ego'. Subjective self-alienation for Schaff then
rests in the feelings, experiences, and attitudes of m a n .
The chasm between theory and research
While Marxist analysis and survey techniques m a y appear as odd bedfellows,

especially given the long-standing association between structural-functional analysis
and the mainstream tradition of survey research, a few recent empirical efforts have
indicated that survey techniques can be applied in certain qualified ways towards an
empirical investigation into Marx's theory of alienation.
The Canadian sociologist, Peter Archibald (1976), for example, provides a
few useful leads with his conceptual reformulation of Marx's four dimensions of
alienated labour, and the application of corresponding behavioural indicators and
measures of work alienation, in addition to the usual attitudinal job-satisfaction
items. This operational procedure at the same time adheres to a reasonably firm
Marxian analytical framework.
A few other empirical efforts in this vein are worth noting (e.g. K o h n , 1977,
1976; Tudor, 1972; Blauner, 1964), where emphasis is placed on some of the objective
conditions of work in addition to the standard survey items on the subjective
alienations. T h e objective dimensions in these studies include measures of the
substantive complexity of work, the degree of individual responsibility on the job,
the variety of tasks to be performed, the conditions of occupational self-direction,
the extent of routinization and supervision, and the extent to which workers have
immediate control over the process of work and production.
Manifestations of labour unrest, tardiness, absenteeism, labour turnover,
insubordination, industrial accidents and product sabotage might be singled out as
possible behavioural indicators of alienated labour amenable to empirical measure-
ment (e.g. Rinehart, 1975; Afonja, 1978). Other relevant empirical efforts never
use the terms 'alienation' or 'anomie', yet they deal explicitly with objective indicators
of the phenomena often subsumed under these terms; for example, Meissner (1970),
deals with the technical constraints of work, and Schweitzer (1974), with the fusion
of specified social structural conditions with measures of the anomie discrepancy
between status aspirations and actual status achievements.
Empirical efforts in the U S S R and a few East European countries have also
included survey items in their research designs concerning the extent of influence
that structural factors such as the division of labour, specialization, technology,
and automation have o n work dissatisfaction (cf. Ludz, 1975, p. 37; Fischer, 1967,
p. 15; for a unique alternative to all of these approaches from a prominent
Marxist philosopher in the G e r m a n Democratic Republic, see Klaus, 1962, and
the review by Ludz, 1975, pp. 32-3).
These empirical efforts a m o n g Marxists and non-Marxists point to some
of the theoretical directions and empirical.possibilities for further w o r k which

attempts to bridge the chasm between the classical notion of alienation and
contemporary empirical applications.
This clearly remains as one of the priority concerns in the alienation field
today. Apart from these efforts, there is little systematic empirical research which
provides for an adequately grounded investigation into Marx's theory of alienation.
Although Marx's analytical differentiations of alienated labour are cited repeatedly
by social scientists, they are seldom developed to the point where they can be
usefully applied in empirical research. It has even been argued that M a r x himself
'has not achieved very m u c h , despite his analytical differentiations. The term and
concept still lack specific meaning' (Ludz, 1975, p. 17; also Schacht, 1970, p. 112).
The debate within Marxism
N o t all alienation theorists and researchers, however, are in agreement with these
current trends. Joachim Israel (1976), a Danish Marxist sociologist, a m o n g others,
takes exception to the emphasis on subjective alienation in Marxist analysis. H e
has argued for a shift in the point of departure: from Marx's philosophical
anthropology to historico-structural and empirical analysis; from alienated labour
to commodity fetishism; from a theory of alienation to a theory of reification.
His emphasis is on objective structural forms of alienation and the process of
reification. Implicit in his rationale for a n e w departure point is the suggestion
that M a r x abandoned his theory of alienation—with its essentialist precon-
ditions—in his later, more mature works.
Another current element in the debate within Marxism is taken u p by two
American Marxist sociologists in the Althusserian vein, Horton and M o r e n o (1981).
Rather than abandoning the concept of alienation, they argue for a careful Marxist
rethinking and reformulation of the concept from the point of view of historical
materialism. Their charge is that the concept has been co-opted by 'petty-
bourgeois idealists' and some socialists. T h e 'philosophical reductionism' of
Lukács and the essentialist readings of M a r x by Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer
and others of the Frankfurt school of critical theory are especially singled out for
vehement attack.
A s Horton and M o r e n o see it, these different approaches to alienation have
distorted or subverted the main object of Marxist analysis: class analysis a n d the
class struggle. Moreover, co-optation of the concept by humanists, economistic
bureaucrats, revisionists and reformers alike has obscured and perpetuated class
differences in both capitalist and socialist societies. While Horton and M o r e n o
recognize that the Marxist conception of alienation m a y point to real, often
new, forms of class contradiction and struggle, they argue that it is too often
from what they consider to be a theoretically and politically regressive class
standpoint. O r as Althusser (1976, p . 63) puts it, the revival of alienation in the
last couple of decades signals a 'regression from the theoretical gains of historical
materialism and a revision of proletarian polities'. A s a result, the concept of
alienation has been expropriated from its proper domain of historical materialism,
class analysis and class struggle.
The call here is for a purge which exorcizes the concept of its philosophical
humanism, essentialist underpinnings and ontological connotations inherited from
Hegel by the young, presumably 'immature' M a r x . It must be reappropriated,
restored and returned to its rightful place: to a proletarian standpoint within the
theoretical framework of historical materialism and class analysis.
Horton and M o r e n o draw on Althusser's theoretical lead toward a rehabili-
tated Marxist analysis of alienation which 'starts from the social relations of the
existing m o d e of production, from class relations, and from the class struggle'
(Althusser, 1976, pp. 52-3) rather than the isolated individual or some 'bourgeois'
humanist's distorted conception of m a n .
Braverman's (1974) study of the conditions of labour in contemporary
American society, considered by m a n y Marxists a landmark of critical analysis,
provides what Horton and M o r e n o see as the model for future Marxist studies of
alienation. Braverman's analysis of the degradation of labour places the concept
of alienation squarely in the framework of class analysis and in the hands of the
proletariat by extending Marx's analysis of the division of labour to the conditions
of monopoly capital. His approach toward a rehabilitated treatment of alienation
narrows o n the specific condition of the working class and the very specific
history of the producer's loss of control over the process of production. This has
generated lively sectarian debate over both major and trivial points a m o n g
American Marxists concerning the political implications and theoretical adequacy
of Braverman's work, and more specifically concerning the concepts of alienation
and class, the process of class formation, and the nature of class struggle (see
the commentaries by Szymanski et al., 1978).
O n e question that Horton and M o r e n o , and the Althusserians, do not
satisfactorily answer concerns the relevancy of their claims concerning socialist
societies where the m o d e of production has been socialized. W h a t is it about the
nature of socialist class structures today which undermines historical materialism
and continued class struggle, and what specifically are the so-called 'petty-
bourgeois' elements, or at least their capitalist equivalents, within the developing
class structure of socialist societies which steer the planners and technocrats
toward a revisionist economism, or the philosophers and intellectuals toward a
socialist humanism—all at the expense of the class struggle? It has been recognized
by some American Marxists, e.g. Dixon (1976), that not all versions of the 'petty-
bourgeoisie' necessarily disappear with the socialization of private property under
socialism, and that indeed class contradictions of another kind arise depending
upon the specific nature of the relations of domination and control over the labour
process.
W h a t needs to be explicated here is h o w both revisionist economism and

socialist humanism emerge as the products of class relations, or the relations of
power and domination, in socialist societies. O n e important lead for further work,
especially of a comparative capitalist-socialist nature, concerns an extended
re-examination of changing class formations, structural relations, and n e w forms
of contradiction and struggle in socialist societies. There is a certain universal
ring to the analysis and critique here, which could be extended in more concrete
systematic ways to capitalist and socialist societies alike, and to the larger
world system.
In a very different, but provocative and challenging vein is Jacques Ellul's
Métamorphose de la bourgeoisie which contains, a m o n g other things, a polemical
attack o n the inability of Marxists today to update their class categories and class
analysis, and on their inability to account effectively for the successors of a
hitherto defunct bourgeoisie, i.e. the economistic bureaucrats, managers, and
technicians w h o control the process of development in both industrially developed
and developing nations.
The debate over 'two Marxisms or one' is a long-standing one, which
continues today in n e w forms under the impetus of Althusser's works, and in
France with the backlash polemics and controversies generated by several of
Althusser's disenchanted students of the 1960s, the nouveaux philosophes
(cf. F . Levy's Karl Marx, histoire d'un bourgeois allemand, J . - M . Benoist's La
révolution structurale, and A . Glucksmann's Les maîtres penseurs). Despite the
n e w twists and turns that the debate has taken, there nevertheless appears to be
a marked consensus today a m o n g Marxists and non-Marxists alike concerning
at least one important point: that while M a r x m a y have abandoned the term
'alienation', he did not abandon the idea or the fundamental questions raised
by it.
The mainstream tradition of empirical research and its critics
Ironically, the growing acceptance of subjective alienations a m o n g some Marxists

scholars today is paralleled by a gradual recognition of objective alienations
a m o n g non-Marxist scholars and researchers. Olsen (1976), for one, has docu-
mented his recent disenchantment with standard attitudinal approaches to
psychological conceptualizations of the alienation phenomenon. H e suggests, for
example, that the term 'political powerlessness' be reserved for those objective
situations in which the socio-political system prevents individuals from exercising
an effective influence o n governmental decisions, policies and actions. It seems
absurd, according to Olsen, to label as alienated those individuals w h o define
themselves as politically powerless, because m u c h of the time they are perfectly
correct in their assessment.
The call here is for social scientists—especially survey researchers—to
'rediscover' Marx's classical idea of alienation which refers to a set of objective

social conditions; political powerlessness in this sense is an objective fact, not a
subjective view of the world.
Olsen and others are responding to the mainstream social psychological
tradition of survey research which has dominated most empirical approaches to
alienation in the United States since Seeman's (1959) influential conceptual work
m o r e than three decades ago, i.e. the reduction of alienation to individual
perceptions of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation and self-
estrangement. T h e emphasis in this empirical approach is on the actor's personal
expectations and values, and the psychological varieties of alienation are generally
treated as intervening variables which link structural conditions to behavioural
outcomes. It is rare, however, that this full macro-triadic relation is treated within
a single study. A n d while most researchers in this empirical tradition tend to
recognize this general scheme, it is seldom understood in any substantial theoretical
way. This approach has nevertheless led to a staggering proliferation of terms
across the social sciences and to a massive outpouring of empirical results.
O n e recent development in the debate over subjective conceptualizations
and empirical measures of alienation is reflected in the charges levelled specifically
at survey researchers w h o claim to have reconciled their empirical applications
with Marx's theory of alienation. Archibald et al. (1981), for example, claim that
while there is some overlap between some of Seeman's varieties of psychological
alienation and certain psychological aspects of Marx's conceptualization, an
important gap between theory and research nevertheless remains. In their view,
these psychological conceptualizations of alienation gloss over Marx's four
analytical dimensions of alienated labour (i.e. alienation from labour, products,
others and self) by relying too exclusively on individual perceptions, feelings, and
attitudes as indicators of alienation rather than on behavioural indicators and
structural measures of alienation. They are consequently reluctant to accept at
face value m a n y of the conclusions generated in previous research concerning the
validity of Marx's theory of alienation.
This critique is not very n e w . But as they aptly point out, researchers w h o
continue to apply these standard attitudinal alienation items in their surveys
continue to mislead us in a n u m b e r of important ways. They especially take issue
with the claim by researchers from Blauner (1964) to K o h n (1976) that property-
lessness is not an important source of subjective alienation. Archibald and his
associates argue the contrary:first,by starting from what they view as a more
theoretically relevant Marxian conception of class which treats private property,
the division of labour, and commodity exchange as interdependent structural
components; second, by employing a mixture of alternative and presumably more
appropriate attitudinal and behavioural indicators of work-related alienation
a m o n g comparative samples of the Canadian and American labour forces. Their
results contradict previous findings by indicating, a m o n g other things, that
property ownership does have an important explanatory impact on alienation

according to their measures, i.e. owners of the means of production express
m u c h less work-related alienation than do the propertyless.
The issues at hand are theoretical, conceptual and empirical. T h e call is
for theoretical analysis, conceptual refinement and empirical measures, which
remain true to Marx's classical theory of alienation in general and to his concept
of alienated labour in particular. T h e work by Archibald represents one effort
towards bridging the wide gap which exists between classical theory and empirical
research applications in the social sciences.
The vigorous response a m o n g the French sociologists and critics adds
another important dimension to the debate (Touraine, 1977; Vidal, 1969;
Lefebvre, 1961). A s they correctly argue, the subjective emphasis o n the actor's
state of mind usually takes the problem out of the domain of sociological analysis
and understanding. O r , as the Althusserian structuralists argue, any kind of
reductionism (philosophical, essentialist, empirico-psychological) takes the problem
of : alienation out of the proper domain of historical materialism, class analysis
and class struggle.
W h a t is at stake here is a strategic epistemic choice between competing
paradigms and departure points in the study of alienation: a choice which
determines not only the w a y questions and answers about alienation are formulated
and researched, but also the strategies for change, action and de-alienation. T h e
starting point for the empiricists is the isolated individual rather than the organ-
ization of social relationships. B y relocating the problem of alienation in the
individual, solutions to the problem also tend to start with the individual,
i.e. solutions which emphasize individual adaptation or conformity to the
predominant values and institutions of society rather than organized collective
action directed toward substantive or radical structural changes. There is often n o
other recourse in an approach to alienation which ignores or underplays
sociological analysis.
In the realm of work, for example, this usually means accommodating
changes within the existing structure and process of the work situation, or
adjustive changes in workers' attitudes towards it. A s Mandel and N o v a k (1970)
argue, what the ' h u m a n relations' experts in industry are attempting to abolish is
not the objective reality of alienating labour, but the worker's awareness of this
reality. Or, as the G e r m a n social psychologist, Walter Heinz (1981), observes in
a recent study, preoccupational class-influenced socialization processes are
operating already at an early age. The family prepares individuals for an adaptive
normative acceptance of alienating work conditions and a built-in readiness to
absorb inhuman or impersonal conditions associated with the organization of
work. In the process, individuals develop coping mechanisms, value orientations,
and attitudes which blur or m a s k fundamental contradictions in the w o r k situation
in order to alleviate the stress they would otherwise experience. It is interesting,
in this respect, to compare Heinz's approach with Manderscheid's (1981) unique

biopsychosocial perspective on alienation, stress and coping.
Individual adjustment is facilitated through a wide array of other system-
maintaining processes and social control mechanisms, including the self-sustaining
sociological enterprise itself. T h e Canadian sociologist, André Thibault (1981),
points to the thriving market of psychotherapeutical recipes and pedagogical
resources. Because m a n y subjective conceptualizations of alienation treat the
individual's mental world as the very source of the problem, alienation is added
to a myriad of other psychologized diagnoses and judgements which are passed
on to the ordinary citizen, often in forceful or subtly coercive ways by the experts
and intellectuals.
On the positive value-connotations of alienation
O n e of the misleading implications often embedded in individualized concep-

tualizations of alienation is that an alienated person is 'abnormal', and that this
is objectionable or a bad thing. Yet one's awareness of one's alienation (power-
lessness or cultural estrangement, for example) can be viewed as not only a realistic
appraisal of one's condition, but also an indication that the process of de-alienation
and liberation, at least in the realm of consciousness, has already begun (cf. Vidal,
1967, p p . 186-7; Lefebvre, 1961, p. 210). N o t all researchers in the mainstream
empirical tradition, however, are unaware of the positive implications of the
subjective alienations (cf. K o h n , 1976, p . 121; Otto and Featherman, 1975,
p. 713).
The often neglected point here is that individually perceived and felt alien-
ation can have positive consequences for both the individual and society. A s
L u d z (1981) has aptly demonstrated, the concept of alienation in Western thought,
from ancient philosophy and medieval theology to Fichte and Hegel, contained
a wider spectrum of meanings and uses encompassing positive and neutral as well
as negative value connotations. But this broader perspective o n the notion of
alienation w a s obscured or reduced in the course of time by the progressive
secularization of Western thought. M a r x in particular was instrumental in reducing
the concept primarily to its negative value connotations, largely in response to the
intellectual climate of his time, and more specifically to Hegel's idealism in
accordance with Feuerbach's materialist prescriptions and conception of h u m a n
self-alienation in religious life as a dehumanizing process.
The positive functions and value connotations of the concept have been
revived in different ways by a few G e r m a n social scientists. Ludz points to
Simmel's (1923) notion of being alien (strange, the stranger) as an almost ideal,
but restless, mixture of proximity and distance with respect to the subject's
reciprocal relationship with a specific spatial and temporal milieu within society;
Adorno's (1955) 'negative dialectics' (the dialectical critic, the critical intellectual)
and the notion of alienation from the reified social world involving simultaneous
participation and non-participation in culture as a condition of m a n ' s creativity
(also Marcuse (1964), o n the positive implications of certain forms of alienation
for creative m a n , the artist); and Gehlen's (1955) 'alienated intimacy' and the
distancing of self from one's movements in the process of conscious and deliberate
reappropriation, combined with an emphasis o n the stabilizing functions of
revitalized social institutions in modern industrial societies which protect m a n
from his chaotic subjectivity (also Gehlen, 1980; Schacht, 1970, pp. 232-4).
Existential psychiatry and phenomenology:

towards convergence with Marxist theory
While the accent has been o n sociological and socio-psychological approaches to

alienation, social scientists have also drawn from the long-standing traditions of
psychiatry, phenomenology, existentialism and ontology. O n e of the current
trends in the interdisciplinary field of alienation is characterized by recent
theoretical efforts which draw on these traditions, towards a merger or synthesis
with Marxist theories of alienation, reification and false consciousness.
Before turning to these efforts, however, it is perhaps useful to outline
briefly a few of the definitive parameters of the psychiatric or psychoanalytic
perspective. M o s t psychoanalytic approaches view alienation not so m u c h as a
fixed state (as it is in ontological perspectives), but more as a process which,
unless checked in one w a y or another, tends to develop a self-perpetuating, self-
enhancing m o m e n t u m of its o w n . The works of Karen Horney (1945, 1950) are
important benchmarks in the development of this tradition. Within her conceptual
terms of reference, alienation is seen as a moving away from the 'real self. The
alienated person has m o v e d through his years of development away from some
notion about what is natural, unique, and inherent in m a n as a h u m a n being.
Others in the social psychiatric tradition (i.e. Sullivan, 1964; Szasz, 1970; Beckei,
1967), several of w h o m draw on Horney's lead, view the alienating process as a
more or less neurotic one, with the accent on some sort of impeded interaction
between the individual in his or her formative years and immediate environment.
The alienating process in this sense is seen as developing very early in a
climate that is adverse to the growth of the child as an individual. T h e stress
here is not so m u c h o n specific traumatic experiences, but o n the general family
atmosphere and the disregard for the needs and possibilities of the child. This
atmosphere is often determined by parents w h o have their o w n overriding
compulsive needs and egocentricities which hinder them from perceiving and
conceptualizing their child as the particular individual it is (Vollmerhausen, 1961;
for further discussion, see Geyer, 1980, pp. 83-98; also Gould, 1969; Ziller, 1969;
Reimanis, 1965, and the special symposium issue of the American Journal of
Psychoanalysis, edited by Weiss, 1961).
Joseph Gabel's (1975) innovative development of a general psycho-

sociological theory of consciousness, and of the conditions of dialectical thought
in particular, appeared in English only recently (the original French edition was
published in 1962), and it is n o w beginning to have some impact on the social
sciences in the English-speaking world. Gabel, a Hungaro-French sociologist and
student of Lukács, has drawn some fascinating parallels and potential lines of
cross-fertilization between Marxist social theory, existential psychiatry and
phenomenological sociology. While these perspectives stem from separate intel-
lectual traditions, they are to some extent complementary and convergent.
A s Gabel observes, Marx's early writings on alienated labour 'anticipated
certain mechanisms that psychiatrists discovered only m u c h later in their o w n
research' (p. xxi). For Gabel, the concepts of reification and false consciousness
developed in Marx's later works find their parallels in schizophrenia, i.e. false
consciousness viewed as a diffused and depersonalized state of mind resulting
from a regression in the dialectical quality of experience (cf.. Lukács, 1923/1971),
a ground-breaking work, where the underlying notion of alienation encompasses
some of these clinical dimensions). Several elements and correlates of Marxist
reification are also found in Gabel's concept of psychiatric reification, i.e. the
over-objectivation of certain elements of consciousness, false identification
resulting from a degeneration in the conditions which shape personal intelligence,
or Lukács' transformation of time into space in the 'universe of reification'.
Gabel concludes that false consciousness is a non-dialectical state of mind or
consciousness on a collective scale, whereas schizophrenia is an extreme version
of the same kind of non-dialectical consciousness on an individual scale.
Another ambitious preparatory effort towards merger and synthesis comes
from an American social psychiatrist, Frank Johnson (1976). H e draws from
phenomenology, existential psychiatry, and several analytical leads in Israel's
(1971) Marxist reformulation of reification theory, towards the development of a
therapeutic orientation to alienated or schizoid persons. A n d in an entirely
different vein, the American philosopher, John Lachs (1976), has formulated
his approach around the concepts of 'psychic distance' and 'mediation'. These
terms, he claims, deal more objectively and accurately with all the phenomena
embodied in the classic Marxian idea of alienation. The individual and his actions
are the point of departure in Lachs's philosophy of action. Mediated action—or
action performed on behalf of another person—produces certain dehumanizing
consequences: a growing readiness to manipulate h u m a n beings and to view them
as tools, as means to an end; a growing sense of passivity and impotence; and an
increasing sense of psychic distance between m e n and their actions. These efforts
toward merger and convergence reflect an increasing readiness to transcend
traditional disciplinary boundaries, and an explorative inclination to work with
alternative conceptualizations and approaches to the multifaced. notion of
alienation.
Ontological perspectives
Ontological orientations to h u m a n alienation have a long history in the evolution

of Western thought, and scholars especially in the existential and theological vein
continue to draw heavily on it. Alienation in this sense is seen as inherent in h u m a n
life. While formulations of the problem m a y differ, there is a fairlyfirmconsensus
concerning the omnipresence and inevitability of alienation, independent of
personality and society.
Ontological notions of alienation are considered here as manifestations of
inescapable cross-pressures. Examples include the eternal discrepancy between
existence and essence; Kierkegaard's subject-object dualism; Nietzsche's dialectic
between reality and the mind's instrumental constructs; Heidegger's 'fhrownness'
of m a n onto a world that he has not created; Sartre's failure to cope with the
discrepancy between m a n ' s actual as against his potential situation, resulting in
'ontological insecurity' and ultimate aloneness (être pour soi culminates in Gide's
acte gratuit as the only solution, since the ego's authenticity is lost in the process
of 'interacting' with another, or with social institutions); the gap between the
individual's basic h u m a n needs and the always limited responsiveness of society
(Etzioni, 1968) in so far as this gap is considered insurmountable and omni-
present; Simmel's ceaseless battle of creativity and self-expression against the
pressures of social institutions; Freud's instinctual libido opposed to the oppress-
iveness of civilization, Eros against Thanatos; the conflict between internalized
authority and the desire to be free (for further discussion, see Geyer, 1980,
pp. 78-83; also Barakat, 1969; Hobart, 1965; Greene, 1966; S h o h a m , 1970;
King, 1960; and the Marxist critiques in Schaff, 1967; Denisova, 1967).
Shlomo S h o h a m (1976, 1979), an Israeli sociologist and criminologist,
departs radically from the mainstream with an illuminating brand of ontological
existentialism and the application of rich illustrative metaphors from Greek
mythology. Alienation, for S h o h a m , is an ontologically given condition which
propels individual action, but which cannot be overcome by action. 'Separation',
a vector opposed to 'participation' in this conceptualization, refers to universal
influences o n the individual which operate independently of social relationships.
The pressures of separation which stem from three developmental stages that
every individual passes through (birth, the moulding of an 'ego boundary' and
socialization into an 'ego identity') produce a corresponding desire for partici-
pation; but striving to overcome separation through participation is futile: this
gap between ontological separation and ineffective participatory efforts to over-
c o m e it cannot be bridged.
The important point here is that ontological separation is the consequence
of interaction with the environment. S h o h a m therefore rejects the Marxist prin-
ciple of involvement through action. Yet he does not deny that individuals try
to reach their goals through social action, even though this is self-defeating in so
far as their real goal—regaining a lost participatory bliss—is concerned. T h e

achievement motive, for example, which characterizes the more industrialized
'tool-oriented' societies, is viewed as a participation surrogate that leads to either
one of two possible final states. Allowing oneself to be propelled by the
achievement motive ultimately leads to 'ressentiment d'anomie', illustrated by the
m y t h of Sisyphus; but w h e n the individual comes to the full realization that
the achievement motive does not bring h i m what he had hoped for and
consequently gives it up, the result is 'accidie', represented by the myth of Tantalus.
Philosophical reductionism, essentialism,

and the problem of normative judgement
F e w writers today seem willing to commit themselves to the metaphysical-

anthropological essentialism which pervades Marx's early work. This is a
predominant trend even a m o n g Marxists w h o recognize and work with the
subjective elements of alienation in Marx's works (e.g. Schaff, 1981; Archibald,
1976). T h e reasons, however, are varied. T h e notion of Gattungswesen, or the
'essence of the h u m a n species', is a Utopian philosophical category—an ideal
state of non-alienated man—which is generally avoided or discarded, because it
is conceptually obscure, or subject to metaphysical speculations, or cannot be
measured by the criteria of empirico-analytical science. -
Those w h o discount Marx's early writings are mere preliminary stages to
his 'mature' theory, or categorically reject the early writings altogether, find n o
problem in discarding the notion of essence in their approach to alienation.
Following Lukács' lead, Israel (1976), for one, argues that Marx's shift from a
theory of alienation to a theory of reification and commodity fetishism also
indicates a rejection of his previous essentialist assumptions about h u m a n nature.
Essentialist theory for others (e.g. Althusser, 1967; Horton and M o r e n o ,
1981) reduces the problem of real class contradictions to an abstract universal
or unidimensional condition which renders thought and struggle impossible.
Through a process of philosophical reductionism, class relations and structural
contradictions between the forces and relations of production are all reduced to
contradictions between subjects and objects. Alienation is thereby understood
as an ideological problem of individuals (subjects) w h o are presumably not well
adjusted to existing material or structural contradictions.
The rejection of Marx's essentialism seems to have emerged as a rather
convenient and fashionable trend a m o n g Marxists of varying persuasions: because
it is too speculative, obscure, inconvenient, insufficiently scientific; or, in the case
of the Althusserians, because it reduces the problem of class contradictions to a
universal condition which subverts or undermines the class struggle. Yet it can be
argued that it was precisely the essentialism and humanism in M a r x that were
Allenation theory and research 537
a m o n g the fundamental organizing concerns u p o n which he originally built his

larger world-embracing system, including his materialist conception of history, his
theory of class and class struggle, and, above all, his theory of alienation.
T o abandon Marx's early humanism and essentialism, which he never did
himself, is to deny a history to the evolution of his thought which ultimately
led to his theory of class. O n e cannot fully understand Marx's materialist
conception of history or his theory of class without first understanding the
idealist and essentialist roots of his thought: roots which were still firmly
implanted during his so-called 'mature' works o n capital and political economy.
It follows that, if essentialism is rejected in a wholesale way, the evaluative-
normative judgemental thrust essential to Marxist analysis begins to erode, and
the important philosophical foundations which give shape and direction to the
class struggle begin to disintegrate.
It is precisely the class struggle, purged of its original humanistic goals and
its normative theory of m a n , which erodes into the kind of revisionist economism
that the Althusserians so vehemently attack. Thus w e c o m e full circle. W h e n a
movement already loses sight of these original humanistic goals in the process of
struggle, and later during socialist development, it should not be surprising that
economistic planning and social engineering are subsequently emphasized as
guiding strategies for socialist development and as part of the state apparatus for
containing further class struggle, for putting a temporary 'end to history'.
T o reject or abandon the philosophy, essentialism and h u m a n i s m in Marxism
and the class struggle m a y be viewed as a form of revisionist thinking in its o w n
right; and perhaps these elements in Marxist theory and praxis need to be
rehabilitated, reappropriated, and brought back into the analysis, to be reunited
once again with the class struggle.
Because of its essentialist underpinnings, writers from Hegel and M a r x
to F r o m m and Marcuse have construed alienation as a judgemental as well as
descriptive concept. Thus, alienation not only describes the effects that social
relations and institutions have u p o n individuals; it is also a judgemental instrument
for criticizing the existing state of affairs. A s L u d z (1975, p. 19) shows, the concept
of alienation, especially in Marxist analysis, is applied in a n u m b e r of ways: as
an overall interpretation of the h u m a n situation in industrial society; a radical,
sometimes propagandist^ tool in the socialist struggle against capitalism; and an
instrument for moral and humanistic criticism directed at various conditions of
contemporary industrial society.
Implicit in the nature of all theories and concepts of alienation is a
normative conception of m a n , society, and the relation between them. A s
Schacht (1976, 1978) correctly argues, the concept of alienation indeed contains
an implicit judgement—grounded in essentialist assumptions about m a n ' s
nature—that certain conditions should not exist, that there is a certain w a y things
ought to be, and that, consequently, certain existing conditions ought to be
altered. A tfirstsight, the notion of alienation appears to enable us to bridge

the 'is-oughf gap by virtue of its descriptive content, combined with a normative
thrust. But the final result is that alienation is often viewed as some sort of
'disease', an undesirable state of affairs which should be changed.
Schacht, a m o n g others, shifts to a value-relative contextual frame of
reference. T h e normative standards of judgement vary according to relative
personal perspectives or social situations; what is personally dissatisfying (subjec-
tive alienations) or socially dysfunctional (objective alienations) in one context
m a y be satisfying or functional in other contexts. F o r m s of subjective and
objective alienation or discord can be reduced or overcome, either by an individual
adjustment of perspective or by a modification of the social environment. But
Schacht makes n o judgement about whether they ought to be overcome at all.
N o specific position is taken as to whether change should take place or h o w this
should eventually be brought about: through a change of the individual's
perspective or through a change of his social environment.
Psychological reductionism: a methodological choice

with ideological implications
O n e of the continuing trends in the evolution of the alienation theme in the social
sciences is the empirico-psychological reduction and value neutralization of the
classic concept according to the specifications and requirements of mainstream
survey research methods. Marxist critics in particular have argued that this
secularization or 'dehumanization' (Horton, 1964) of the concept has obscured its
classic meaning. B y reducing alienation to psychological variâtes and attitudinal
measures, the emphasis in meaning has shifted from normative evaluation to
descriptive analysis. This, of course, is one of the intended purposes of such
reductionism, i.e. to produce a scientific empirico-analytical tool devoid of
evaluative pretensions.
O n e of the underlying issues at stake centres around questions concerning
the : viability of an empirical research tradition which continues to operate
exclusively within a rigid positivist logic of social inquiry, especially w h e n dealing
with concepts such as alienation which stem primarily from a dialectical
paradigm of critical inquiry. B y shifting the source of meaning from an historico-
structural conflict frame of reference to an ahistorical socio-psychological frame
of scientific analysis, the meaning of alienation has been severed from its roots
in the critical philosophies of Hegel and M a r x . T h e concept, in effect, has been
stripped of its radical polemical content and normative critical power.
But it is only the appearance of value neutrality and objectivity that has
been achieved by this secular reduction. Built into this 'neutrality' is a masked or
unwitting brand of conservatism which tends to emphasize individual adaptation
or conformity to existing structural conditions at the expense of substantive or

radical structural changes. T h e reduction of alienation, then—from a critical
normative-evaluative concept to a descriptive analytic tool for scientific inquiry—is
a normative process in its o w n right, with its o w n predetermined value judgements
and directives for change and action.
T h e continuing trend towards the secularization and reduction of the
alienation concept can be explained in at least three related ways w h e n viewed
from a critical sociology-of-sociology perspective.
First, it can be linked to a more general trend in the modern social sciences
associated with a certain quest for scientific respectability. T h e concept has been
operationalized and transformed under the influence of fashionable survey
research methods and techniques. Its transfer from the domain of sociology and
class relations to that of individual perceptions, feelings and attitudes is largely
determined by the requirements of prevailing research techniques and intellectual
trends. The empirico-analytical theorists and researchers tend to operate here on
the methodologically questionable assumption that the aggregation of individual
data (opinions and attitudes) can produce findings and explanations about social
structural processes.
Second, it m a y be seen m o r e specifically as a function of mainstream
empirical efforts to objectify the concept under the guise of value neutrality or,
at best, value relativity, in the n a m e of scientific objectivity.
Third, and closely related to the above points, this reductionism is primarily
a function of the intellectual climate and prevailing empirical tradition in American
sociology. T h e attempt to neutralize and eliminate the concept's radical value
implications and normative critical powers only seems consistent with the
structural functionalism and latent anti-Marxism (or at least the lack of exposure
to Marx's early works) which prevailed especially about the time the concept was
introduced in its reduced form about two decades ago.
These trends have inexorably led to what might be viewed as the over-
psychologization of the concept of alienation, reinforced by a limited theoretical
understanding of the classic notion of alienation and the virtual absence of
macrosociological research methods. With only a few exceptions, it is rare for
empirical alienation studies to encompass the structural or environmental deter-
minants of the psychological alienation variâtes typically selected for investigation.
Researchers in this tradition are consequently unable to m a k e grounded
judgements about the determining structural conditions of alienation in the wider
society. Basically at issue here are only individual feelings, perceptions and
attitudes. B y focusing o n the subjective state of individuals, social structural
problems and material conditions which are assumed to lie at the source of the
psychological alienations are, by definition, too easily excluded from the analysis.
The debate began with Seeman's (1959) pioneering conceptual work. With
full awareness of m a n y of these problems, Seeman frankly states that his decision
to 'secularize' the concept of alienation—i.e. 'to translate what was sentimentally

understood into a secular question' (p. 791)—was a calculated risk, a strategic
enterprise geared ultimately towards the achievement of greater clarity, without
necessarily compromising the intellectual scope or the humanistic concerns that lie
at the heart of the classic theories.
Seeman (1972, p . 508) has responded to a few of the criticisms:
There is no doubt about the critical power originally tied to the concept of alienation,
or about the critical power shown by more recent advocates of the normative approach
(Marcuse, G o o d m a n , F r o m m and others). But what is gained in critical force is often
lost in repetition and unanalytical pronouncement—which is why the latter-day improve-
ment on Marx . . . in this recent critical literature is often hard to catalogue.
M o s t researchers in this tradition w h o draw on Seeman's lead also draw implicitly

on his rationale (Seeman, 1972, p . 508; also 1967):
The secularization of the concept of alienation is a strategic enterprise that does not
restrict our interest in, or our competence to talk about and examine, the full range of
problems that are captured in words like justice, evil, trust, ignorance, or personal devel-
opment.
W h a t nevertheless appears to be lacking a m o n g most others engaged in this

predominantly American-style tradition of empirical research is a certain critical
dialogue and understanding concerning the broader questions of theory, history
and structural analysis: questions raised largely by European sociologists, and by
Marxist critics in particular (e.g. Israel, 1971; K o n , 1969; Vidal, 1969; Touraine,
1967; also Plasek, 1974; Lee, 1972; Scott, 1963; Feuer, 1962).
Discussion and debate within this research community are generally
restricted to m o r e parochial concerns, i.e. attitudinal measurement, scaling
procedures, statistical techniques and internal issues, such as the question of unity
and the extent to which the psychological varieties of alienation are statistically
correlated, e.g. Neal and Rettig (1967).
Questions and answers about alienation in the mainstream empirical
tradition are largely shaped by the requirements and restrictions of standard
survey techniques which necessarily focus on individualized psychological or
attitudinal responses to structured, usually close-ended questionnaire items and
standardized interview schedules. B y restricting the scope of analysis to an
enumeration of individual characteristics, and thereby detaching the individual
from the larger historico-structural context, survey research too often emerges as
a form of aggregate social psychology. Moreover, the increasing emphasis on
quantitative methods, standardized alienation scales and high-powered statistical
procedures are usually adopted at the expense of substantive theory.
W h a t is usually lacking in empirical alienation studies is a larger mental
picture, a macro-theoretical grasp, and an historico-structural understanding of
the variables, relationships and processes involved. The call here is for a balancing
emphasis on the larger, more interesting and imaginative questions of sociological
theory and historical analysis, which draw into their purview some understanding
of the structural processes and conditioning mechanisms presumed to lie at the
source of the psychological alienations typically selected for special investigation
in the mainstream empirical studies. The parallel call is for macro-sociological
research methods which begin to tap in more direct theory-specific ways the
material or structural components of alienation and de-alienation, as well as their
subjective manifestations.
The problem of unity
The proliferation of alienation concepts, terms and synonyms that has occurred
over the last two decades has produced a corresponding interest in finding a core
theme, a c o m m o n denominator or a unifying multidimensional concept under
which all varieties of alienation can be subsumed. T h e suggestion is that alienation
is a 'syndrome' of diverse forms or manifestations which display a certain unity, and
that there is a c o m m o n meaning which extends beyond some general notion of
separation.
Whether this suggestion is plausible, or whether it is even worth pursuing, is
a matter for debate. It has been argued that alienation in abstracto does not exist,
but that there are innumerable concrete alienations, and that any attempt to
merge these into a single multidimensional conception should be abandoned as
theoretically and conceptually impossible. Even Marx's sub-types of alienated
labour share little more than a c o m m o n origin and the idea of separation. Ludz
(1975, p. 39) however concludes his review of the literature on an optimistic note
with the suggestion that the construction of a general theory of alienation which
ties together divergent concepts and methodologies is an ultimate possibility.
Perhaps the single most important factor that has led to the proliferation
of terms and concepts of alienation in the social sciences stems from Seeman's
original conceptualization of five (later extended to six) psychological alienation
categories: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, cultural estrangement
or value isolation, self-estrangement and social isolation. Seeman (1975) sum-
marizes the mass of empirical findings and recent developments with respect to
these varieties of alienation which have emerged since he published his original
conceptual article in 1959. It seemsfittingthat he should also choose to conclude
with the 'unity' issue, since it lies at the heart of considerable theoretical and
empirical debate. The debate, however, is cast by others in different conceptual terms.
In partial contradistinction to Schacht (1976), w h o denies essentialist
'unity' conceptions but not the possibility of 'family resemblance' between the
different varieties of alienation, some theorists operate on the principle that there
is indeed a c o m m o n denominator at least a m o n g Seeman's psychological varieties

of alienation, provided they are viewed at a sufficiently high level of abstraction.
Hays (1976), for example, has attempted to demonstrate this through a
unique application of linguistic philosophy. H e locates a c o m m o n denominator in
the failure of what he calls the 'natural contract': the principle that an organism
can act to obtain what is good for it. T h e varieties of alienation elucidated by
Seeman reflect some of the ways in.which this natural contract can be broken,
through a severance of positive interaction between a person and his natural and
social environment. Geyer's (1980, 1976) application of general systems theory to
the question of unity is similar. Individuals are conceived of as systems operating
in m o r e or less open interaction with significant parts of their environment.
Viewed from a relatively high level of abstraction, all forms of alienation involve
information processing problems of individuals. Using general systems theory,
Seeman's varieties of alienation are seen as partial breakdowns of 'normal' system
functioning. Powerlessness, for example, is linked with information-processing prob-
lems located primarily in the system's output such that behavioural alternatives for
the individual are severely limited. Geyer and Hays, each in their o w n way, have
attempted to demonstrate a certain kind of unity by raising the level of abstraction.
While locating a c o m m o n denominator a m o n g Seeman's varieties, Hays
nevertheless raises doubts about whether all varieties of alienation can be subsumed
under one unifying conception. This is related to another version of the problem of
reductionism, again viewed in a value-neutral sense without its usual negative
connotations. Seeman employs a psychological approach, while M a r x used a
sociological one. The unification of the two depends on the more general problem
of the ontology of the social sciences. The natural sciences, according to Hays, have
a c o m m o n ontology: that of elementary particles. Biology can n o w , in principle,
be reduced to chemistry, and chemistry to physics. T h e problem is whether
sociology (with society as its central concept) can be reduced to psychology
(with mind as its central concept), and psychology in turn to biology. In
Hays' opinion, psychology has not yet solved the problem concerning the
reduction of mind to a composite of biological entities acting in accordance with
biological laws, while sociology has almost solved the problem of society as a
composite of psychological entities acting in accordance with psychological laws.
The empirical evidence on the unity question, based on correlational and
factor analyses of attitudinal survey data, is contradictory and inconclusive
(cf. Neal and Rettig, 1963, 1967; Streuning and Richardson, 1965; Cartwright,
1965; S i m m o n s , 1964/65). Seeman himself has insisted that there is no inherent
unity a m o n g his alienation variants (1972, p. 513). The lack of unity according to
the empirical evidence m a y be due to methodological problems throughout the
operationalization procedure, from the different conceptualizations and measure-
ments of the psychological alienation variâtes to differences in the statistical
techniques applied in different studies.
Allenation theory and research 543
The explanation, however, probably lies m o r e in fundamental epistemic

differences which separate these varieties of alienation. T h e social histories of the
concepts of alienation and anomie, for example, are rooted in competing ideologies
and normative assumptions about the nature of m a n and society, and about the
relation between them. Yet an attempt has been m a d e to merge Marx's radical
and optimistic perspective o n alienation with Durkheim's basically conservative
and pessimistic notion of anomie. The empirico-analytical approach has led to a
reduction of Marx's structural-relational concept of alienation to measures of
individual powerlessness or inefficacy, and Durkheim's purely sociological concept
of anomie to measures of personal normlessness, anomia or a n o m y . Once reduced
to these psychological categories, efforts are then directed toward demonstrating
their unity or disunity statistically.
But if w e trace these categories and variâtes back to their presumed roots
in the classic theories, w e find that alienation and anomie are counter-concepts.
They m a y both describe similar behaviours and discontents, and they m a y serve
as ethically grounded metaphors for a radical assault on the dominant institutions
and values of industrial society, but they are also grounded in different ideologies
and assumptions with different directives for change and action (cf. Horton,
1964, 1966; also Lukes, 1967).
This suggests, as m a n y alienation theorists and researchers d o , that w e
would d o better to find different and more accurate terms for what is too often
subsumed under the term 'alienation'.
Priorities
Conceptual and terminological clarification
Perhaps the single most important task that continues to face alienation theorists
and researchers of all persuasions centres around problems of meaning, concep-
tualization and terminology. W h a t has been lacking is a systematic survey and
analysis of the different ways in which alienation theorists and researchers have
used the term. Systematic work towards conceptual clarification and terminological
precision which cross-cuts traditional disciplinary and paradigmatic boundaries
remains a priority concern, and a prerequisite for the firm advancement of sub-
stantive knowledge in the largerfieldof alienation theory and research. A few
scholars have devoted themselves recently to this difficult undertaking, although
they differ considerably in their approaches.
O n e of the more definitive contributions to date is Ludz's (1979) recent
effort toward a systematic terminological and conceptual analysis. H e has pre-
sented a viable design for studying the etymology and Geistesgeschichte of the
word, and for identifying and analysing the key writers and different uses of the
term. While only in its preparatory stages, it nevertheless provides innovative leads
for further terminological and conceptual work which covers an extensive range
of meanings and uses in the legal, societal, medico-psychological and philosophico-
theological spheres.
In a parallel effort at breaking n e w etymological and conceptual ground,
L u d z (1981)—a G e r m a n social scientist—retraces the evolution of the term and
concept of alienation in Western thought. Focusing on the often neglected positive
value connotations of the concept, he delineates the lines of conceptual develop-
ment: from ancient philosophy and Gnostic-mystic thought (i.e. in M a n d a e a n
and Manichaean thinking, in the philosophy of the Corpus Hermeticum and
the early Christian Gnosis) through the works of Plotinus (205-70), Augustine
(354-430), T h o m a s Aquinus (1225-74), and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) to Fichte
and Hegel.
Ludz's treatment of the development of the term and concept in the history
of ideas reveals a broader, richer spectrum of meanings and uses encompassing
positive, neutral and negative value connotations. This tradition stops rather
abruptly with Feuerbach and M a r x . Ludz, however, picks u p the thread again
by tracing the Gnostic and Hegelian tradition further to a few twentieth-century
G e r m a n social scientists (Simmel, Adorno, Gehlen) w h o have revived, in one w a y
or another, both the positive and negative value connotations of the concept.
Another major effort in' tracing and distinguishing the different meanings
and uses of alienation in the history of ideas appears in the chronology of works
by the American philosopher, Richard Schacht. They range from his survey of
the diverse literature o n alienation (1970) to several tight conceptual efforts which
attempt to untangle the different meanings of, and distinctions between, objective
and subjective forms of alienation. W h a t is particularly refreshing is the systematic
logic that Schacht applies to the organization of his arguments and conceptual
categories. In one conceptual piece (1976), he treats the different forms of alienation
as forms of 'discord', which are categorized into two broad groups. These groups
distinguish psychological forms of discord from sociological ones. While they
are conceptually distinct, there is:an implicit interactional overlap within and
between the two groups. T h efirstgroup refers to subjective or psychological
dissatisfactions, with attention directed towards individual perceptions, feelings,
beliefs, attitudes, desires and aspirations regarding the situations and relationships
in which individuals find themselves. T h e second group refers to objective or
societal dysfunctions, and attention here narrows upon discord in social relations^
T h e problem of discord at this level of analysis is one of integrating individual
behaviour with group expectations and standards, and both individual and group
behaviour with societal laws and institutions.
In a more recent conceptual effort, Schacht (1981) focuses on the economic
alienations. T h e notion of economic alienation is narrowed d o w n to, specific
relations between economic agents and their economic activity, i.e. between a
worker and his labour or work-role performance. T w o types of economic alien-

ation are distinguished: one referring to an economic-relational state of aifairs,
which can be rendered useful as a purely, descriptive analytical (neutral) concept
in the social sciences; the other referring to an interpretative-evaluative (normative)
construct, best suited for moral and humanist criticism with regard to the dominant
institutions and values of industrial society. Schacht is concerned with the former.
Economic alienation, as a purely descriptive analytical category, is carefully
distinguished in objective and subjective forms. T h e objective forms consist of
observable socio-economic relations and behaviours, and alienation is manifest in
economic activities that are uncontrollable, impersonally regimented and basically
anonymous. Uncontrollability here involves the relinquishment or loss of
autonomy and control in relation to one's labour and products. T h e subjective
forms of economic alienation consist of experiential and attitudinal states of
individuals involved in economic activity, i.e. intrinsic work dissatisfaction.
Schacht also recognizes and works with the positive and neutral value
connotations of alienation as well as the negative ones. Certain forms of alienation
are viewed as objectionable only to the extent to which they are grounded in a
normative philosophical anthropology. Negative evaluative significance is con-
ferred to those forms of alienation which contain essentialist claims and humanist
commitments concerning the nature of m a n and the character of a genuinely
h u m a n life. But part of the formidable task he has set for-himself is to develop a
notion of alienation that is independent of any essentialist ideas or normative
assumptions about the nature of m a n and society. His aim is to arrive at a rationale
for employing certain notions of alienation for purposes of value-neutral description
and empirico-theoretical analysis in the social sciences. Schacht, in effect, has
attempted a rationale for neutralizing the concept and transforming it into an objec-
tive analytical tool, while at the same time maintaining m u c h of its classic meaning.
Another scholarly effort of recent note appears in Torrance's (1977) concep-
tual restatement of the distinct alienation and estrangement themes in the classic
theories. Torrance, a British sociologist, maintains, a sharp distinction between
two elements that are often confused in the concept of alienation: between alien-
ation, in the sense of loss or relinquishment (Entäusserung), and estrangement,
in the sense of strangeness or hostility {Entfremdung). While few scholars have
pursued this distinction very far, Torrance traces the evolution of these two
meanings of alienation, illuminating the theoretical significance of each in ways
that fundamentally depart.from the approaches of most other contemporary
writers. O n e of the guiding concerns here is to counter the usual ambiguities which
have plagued alienation theory, by separating and. contrasting these two elements
in rigorous definitional and conceptual terms that are relevant to sociological
theory and empirical research.
M o r e recently, Torrance (1981). has extended this work.in an ambitious
effort to find a use for the concept of alienation which incorporates social structural
components, owes nothing to philosophy or psychology, is potentially scientific,

does not duplicate existing sociological concepts, but nevertheless can claim
legitimate descent from the classic theories of Hegel, Feuerbach and M a r x . At the
same time, he draws from sociological theories of action and group formation in
a bridge-building effort at fusing such neglected theoretical elements as social
emotions, meanings and actions into a reformulated theory of alienation.
M u c h of the literature and dialogue o n alienation is still bedevilled with
overly comprehensive conceptualizations, terminological ambiguity and indis-
criminate applications so that serious discussion is often impaired. In fact, the
very meaning of alienation is often diluted to the point of virtual meaninglessness.
The etymological and terminological work of Ludz and the conceptual work of
Schacht and Torrance, a m o n g others (Geyer and Schweitzer, 1981; Hays, 1976;
Johnson, 1963), represent a concerted effort at countering these tendencies.
Towards a propositional inventory and the construction

of a general theory of alienation
Alienation theory and research have evolved to the point where w e could n o w
draw o n the leads of L u d z and others towards establishing an inventory of prop-
ositions and empirical findings. This calls for a systematic survey of the literature
in thefield,especially with regard to empirical statements and hypotheses about
alienation in relation to available empirical results. This could be viewed as an
early step towards determining the extent of grounded knowledge in the field.
The only effort which begins to touch on these concerns appears in Seeman's
(1975) summary review of developments in the empirical literature with respect
to his psychological varieties of alienation. While restricted to the mainstream
empirical tradition of survey research and ad hoc or middle-range theorizing, it is
nevertheless a useful account of the present stock of knowledge within at least one
influential tradition.
A n inventory need not be restricted to this empirical tradition. A s Ludz
(1975, p. 31) concludes in another review, an inventory of all manifestations and
of all propositions concerning alienation is urgently needed. Such an inventory
could incorporate into its larger purview systematic generalizations and theoretical
statements which draw on the history of the term and concept in Western thought.
While the problems and obstacles confronted in such a pursuit are enormous,
propositional inventories have been attempted with varying success in other
fields, for example Schermerhorn's (1970) schematic application of both inductive
and deductive methods to the literature on comparative ethnic relations. It is
primarily to the American theoretical sociologists that w e might turn for some of
our leads, especially concerning methods and strategies of theory building
(e.g. Mullins, 1971; Blalòck, 1969; Stinchcombe, 1968; Zetterberg, 1965).
The requisite building blocks for the construction of a more comprehensive
theory of alienation entail a careful specification of the main concepts, variables

(an important type of concept), and theoretical statements; and the development
of a format for systematically organizing these statements, i.e. according to the
principles of axiomatic reduction, pluralistic parallel deduction or causal inference
(see Turner, 1978, pp. 2-13). T h e order of priorities for general alienation theorizing
seems quite explicit here. Ludz, Schacht and others, each in their o w n way, have
begun some of the conceptual and terminological work that could begin to clear
the way for a more comprehensive theory-building effort.
The next step is to consider some of the possibilities for systematically
organizing the main concepts, variables and statements into a viable format.
If one opts for an axiomatic format, for example, it m a y call for a delineation of
abstract axioms, through logical derivations, to specific propositions and hypoth-
eses that predict h o w events in a concrete situation should occur. These steps in
the process of theory building, in turn, could pave the w a y for the preliminary
scaffolding of a plausible metatheory of alienation which transcends traditional
disciplinary and paradigmatic boundaries.
Theoretical extensions and reformulations
There is an increasing readiness to explore alternative theories and paradigms

and a marked trend towards reconciliation or qualified merger between tra-
ditionally opposed approaches to the study of alienation. Several recent theoretical
extensions and reformulations based o n the classic theories of alienation have
incorporated elements from a wide variety of other theoretical approaches and
intellectual traditions, including sociological theories of social action and group-
formation (Torrance, 1977, 1981), socialization theory (Heinz, 1981), and exis-
tential psychiatry and phenomenology (Johnson, 1976; Gabel, 1975).
Other recent theoretical and schematic efforts in thefieldhave focused m o r e
specifically on attempts at reformulating questions about alienation through a
variety of formal models and approaches: H a y s ' (1976) psycho-linguistic construc-
tion of cognitive maps and conceptual models; Ludz's (1978) etymological m a p s
and formal design for terminological and conceptual analysis; Geyer's (1980)
application of general systems theory; Manderscheid's (1981) cybernetic bio-
psychosocial systems model of stress and coping; N o w a k o w s k a ' s (1981) formal
mathematical model construction; Hajda and Travis's (1981) schematic w o r k
towards delineating some of the causal paths in the standard triadic relationship
between macro-systemic causal variables, the subjective varieties of alienation,
and hypothesized behavioural consequences within the socio-psychological tradition
of survey research and middle-range theorizing.
These efforts signify a growing trend and at the same time a priority study
concern a m o n g a growing international group of theorists. While grand theoretical
efforts and formal model constructions m a y provide some heuristic insights with
respect to alienation, they must nevertheless deal with the usual charges of abstrac-
tion which often distorts or mystifies the concrete conditions of alienation. O n e
of the long-standing requirements in the field is that theoretical and schematic
work of this kind have more direct potential for empirical research application
and verification, and more concrete leads for substantive change, action and
de-alienation relevant to the common-sense experiences and realities of everyday
life (a more comprehensive assessment of recent theoretical advances appears
in Schweitzer and Geyer, 1981).
Continuing concerns within Marxism
The current, almost staggering profusion of works directly or indirectly related to

Marx's theory of alienation is such that a confusing element of satiety has emerged
in the Marxist literature with respect to the meaning, purpose and usefulness of
the concept of alienation. This is due in part to the w a y M a r x formulated his
theory. Alienation for M a r x is a total phenomenon which encompasses the entire
h u m a n condition. With such an all-encompassing view, it can be argued that M a r x
has not accomplished very m u c h with his theory; that it still lacks specific meaning
despite the analytical distinctions in his early treatment of alienated labour,
repeatedly referred to in the literature but seldom pursued.
There is consequently little agreement within Marxism concerning its
meaning, purpose or usefulness. Uncompromising materialist interpretations are
pitted against abstract philosophical and essentialist readings of M a r x ; charges
of revisionism and economism are levelled at any interpretation that is seen as
undermining class analysis and struggle; while others argue that M a r x actually
abandoned the concept of alienation.
The contradictions within contemporary Marxism need to be examined
more carefully, and the evolution of the concept placed more firmly within a
Marxist history of ideas. This could include, a m o n g other things, sorting out in
a systematic w a y the different meanings, uses and connotations imputed to the
term and concept according to the different types of Marxism (for a general survey
of Marxist meanings and uses of alienation, see Strmiska, 1974; more thorough
treatments of the theory and concept in Marx's works appear in Oilman, 1976;
Mészáros, 1975).
T h e question of alienation under socialism remains another priority concern
a m o n g some Marxists. It has developed in n e w critical ways since Schaff's (1970)
startling pronouncement that the abolition of private property does not signify
the end of all forms of alienation, not even the economic alienations detailed by
M a r x . Socialism has not completely overcome any of the k n o w n forms of alien-
ation, if only because of the continued existence of a coercive state apparatus. N e w
or modified forms of alienation have emerged, associated with n e w forms of
contradiction and struggle in the changing class structure of socialist societies
(cf. Connor, 1979; Wesolowski, 1979; Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979; attempts at
restoring the concept of alienation a m o n g Soviet scholars appear in Oiserman,
1963; Amnrosov, 1972; Glezerman, 1972; see also the review by Yanowitch, 1967,
and the efforts of D a w y d o w , 1964).
The Yugoslav Marxist philosopher, Mihailo Markovié (1981) tackles several
of these problems from an explicit humanist standpoint. His notion of alienation
is grounded in premises and commitments concerning the nature of m a n and the
character of a genuinely h u m a n life. M a n is viewed as essentially independent,
autonomous, creative and sociable. T h e ideal h u m a n community is seen as free
from any external domination, where self-determining individuals can interact
in a co-operative climate of mutuality and reciprocity. It is with a vision of an
emancipated self-determining society, where individuals and communities take
control over the products of their h u m a n activity, that Markovié's conception of
workers' self-management takes on full meaning and historical perspective.
Workers' self-management is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition
for reducing certain forms of alienation and for radically improving the quality
of working life under socialism. H e does not stop with the socialist situation, but
extends his analysis to some of the comparative examples and possibilities for
improving the quality of working life through the development of self-managing
enterprises in capitalist and social-democratic societies (cf. Cherns, 1976, 1981,
and Rosner, 1980, on the kibbutz situation).
Perhaps the most useful and penetrating part of Markovié's recent contri-
bution concerns his critical schematic emphasis on the inseparable link between
micro- and macro-levels of analysis (and change) with respect to alienation,
de-alienation, and workers' self-management under socialism. H e is quite explicit
about the obstacles and limitations that must be dealt with. A s the Yugoslav
experience indicates, collective experiments with workers' self-management cannot
fully survive, and the quality of life cannot be radically or wholly improved,
without a corresponding emancipatory restructuring of the larger social system.
Such a restructuring necessarily entails firm checks against the fundamental
authoritarian structure of state power; against official ideology which glosses
basic systemic contradictions and undermines workers' socialist consciousness;
against moves for more power by the technocracy and political bureaucracy;
against tendencies towards inequality and hierarchy in the larger structure of
society; against increasing state control in all spheres of h u m a n activity which
appear in the n a m e of economic rationality.
While Markovié focuses o n the macro-triadic relation between workers'
self-management collectives and society, his debunking line of analysis could extend
to the political economy of the larger world system. If, as he tries to show, small
collective forms of workers' self-management cannot fully survive under the con-
straints of an authoritarian power structure in the society at large, then it is likely
that for similar reasons a more totally emancipated and restructured society also
cannot fully survive within the global framework of the capitalist world system.
W e are reminded here of Marx's early world-embracing call for the emancipation
not just of the workers alone in a particular society, but of humanity as a whole.
O n e of the explicit themes a m o n g m a n y East European Marxist critics,
w h o organize m u c h of their analysis around the concept of alienation, reification
or fetishism, is the charge that socialist states have lost sight of the humanistic
concerns that presumably gave original impetus to strategies for socialist devel-
opment, modernization and economic growth (cf. Heller, 1978; Kolakowski, 1978;
Bahro, 1978; Horvat et al., 1975; Supek, 1970; Stojanovic, 1969; Vranicki, 1965;
Almasi, 1965). It is only in recent years that Marxist scholars and researchers have
begun to m a k e a few reasonably sober analytical inroads into this neglected area
of study, often by applying a Marxist methodology to the critical analysis of official
mainstream Marxist theory and practice in socialist societies.
Despite the recent profusion of Marxist literature and the massive out-
pouring of empirical results on alienation, there is little systematic empirical
research, especially of a comparative cross-societal nature, which provides for a
firmly grounded investigation into Marx's theory of alienation. T h e methodological
problems involved seem almost insurmountable, especially w h e n attempts are
m a d e towards a merger of Marxist critical analysis with empirical survey methods.
A few recent empirical efforts, however, have indicated that survey techniques can
be applied in certain qualified ways toward an empirical investigation into Marx's
theory of alienation both in socialist (Whitehorn, 1979) and capitalist societies
( K o h n , 1977).
T h e call here is for more advanced conceptual and empirical work that
adheres firmly to a Marxist analytical framework. The ultimate objective is to
develop viable strategies for bridging the chasm which exists between classical
theory and contemporary empirical research applications. A m o n g the prerequisites
for Marxist-based empirical work are conceptualizations and measures that tap
the objective forms of alienation specified by M a r x , especially his analytical
differentiations of alienated labour. Most mainstream empirical research to date
has focused almost exclusively on the psychological varieties of alienation, so m u c h
so that the radical tradition of normative evaluation and critical analysis in Marx's
theory has been generally compromised.
International comparative studies
M o s t empirical alienation research has been restricted to the problems and

contradictions of single societies, with the bulk of this research concentrating
largely on the American situation. Those studies that lay claim to some compar-
ability are only quasi-comparative in the sense that an analytic sample survey
conducted within one society is simply replicated, often m a n y years later, in another
society. The lack of systematic and explicitly comparative work on the similarities
and differences between various societies, or between various time-spans involving

longitudinal comparative analysis, represents another neglected area. Recent
efforts in this vein, however, suggest that comparative cross-societal empirical
studies of alienation are n o w part of a developing research trend in the field
(cf. Archibald et al., 1981; Reimanis, 1978; Shepard and K i m , 1978; A r m e r and
Isaac, 1978; also Seeman, 1977; Simpson, 1970).
The rationale for more advanced international comparative research is
self-evident to those w h o formulate their questions about alienation within a
positivist paradigm of social inquiry. In this vein, the main objectives of compara-
tive inquiry are to specify or delimit those aspects of a given theory or proposition
about alienation that hold for all societies, those that are systematically relevant
only to certain types of societies, and those that are unique and valid only for
single societies. The aim, in effect, is to universalize theory and continually reassess
its propositions in comparative perspective (Marsh, 1967; Schweitzer, 1979).
Comparative studies, of course, need not be restricted to empirical surveys.
They could also extend to critical comparative socio-historical analyses which,
for example, reformulate questions and answers about alienation in more
encompassing terms, as a phenomenon inseparably interconnected with the wider
world economy. T h e study of alienation from the standpoint of historical
materialism and class conflict in single societies could be extrapolated to the
world division of labour, unequal exchange, and the relations of domination and
exploitation a m o n g nations and states. A n approach along these lines has a certain
affinity to current neo-Marxist theories of Third World dependency and under-
development a m o n g capitalist formations at the periphery of the modern world
system (e.g. Fröbel et al., 1981; A m i n , 1980; Wallerstein, 1979; Frank, 1979).
The problems involved are numerous, yet it appears a legitimate line of
pursuit. If the problem of alienation can be formulated according to contradictions
between subjects and objects, and then extended to structural contradictions
between classes, or between the forces and relations of production, then it follows
that this can be extended further to the relations of domination and subordination,
appropriation and exploitation, and production and resource control o n the larger
world scale.
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S C H W E I T Z E R , D . 1974. Status Frustration and Con- S I M M E L , G . 1923. Exkurs über den Fremden. Sozio-
servatism in Comparative Perspective. London logie. Munich and Leipzig, Duncker & H u m -
and Beverly Hills, Sage Publications. blot.
. 1979. Comparative Social Mobility: Problems S I M M O N S , J. 1964/65. S o m e Intercorrelations A m o n g
of Theory, Epistemology and Quantitative Alienation Measures. Social Forces, Vol. 44,
Methodology. In: J. Berting et al. (eds.), pp. 370-1.
Problems of International Comparative Re- S I M P S O N , M . 1970. Social Mobility, Normlessness
search In the Social Sciences. Oxford and and Powerlessness in T w o Cultural Contexts.
N e w York, Pergamon Press. American Sociological Review, Vol. 35,
S C H W E I T Z E R , D . ; G E Y E R , R . F . 1981. Advances and pp. 1002-13.
Priorities in Alienation Theory and Research. S T I N C H C O M B E , A . L . 1968. Constructing Social
In: R . F . Geyer and D . Schweitzer (eds.), Theories. N e w York, Harcourt, Brace &
Alienation: Problems of Meaning, Theory and World.
Method. London and Boston, Routledge & S T O J A N O V I C , S. 1969. The Dialectics of Alienation
Kegan Paul. and the Utopia of Dealienation. Praxis,
S C O T T , M . 1963. The Social Sources of Alienation. . N o . 3/4, p p . 387-98.
Inquiry, Vol. 6, pp. 57-69. STREUNING, E.; R I C H A R D S O N , A . 1965. AFactor Ana-
S E E M A N , M . 1959. O n the Meaning of Alienation. lytic Exploration of the Alienation, Anomie,
American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, and Authoritarianism Domain. American
pp. 783-91. Sociological Review, V o l . 30, p p . 768-76.
. 1972. Alienation and Engagement. In: A . C a m p - S T R M I S K A , Z . 1974. Structure de la problématique
bell and P . Converse (eds.), The Human sociologique marxienne et notion d'aliéna-
Meaning of Social Change. N e w York, tion. In: J. Gabel, B . Roussett, and T . Thao
Russell Sage. (eds.), L'aliénation aujourd'hui. Paris, Édi-
. 1975. Alienation Studies. Annual Review of tions Anthropos.
Sociology, Vol. 1, pp. 91-123; also Empiri- S U L L I V A N , H . S . 1964. The Fusion of Psychiatry and
cal Alienation Studies: A n Overview. In: Social Science. N e w York, Norton.
R . F . Geyer and D . Schweitzer (eds.), S U P E K , R . 1970. Soziologie und Sozialismus: Probleme
Theories of Alienation: Critical Perspectives und Perspecktlven. Freiburg, Rembach.
In Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Leiden, S Z A S Z , T . 1970. Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the
Martinus Nijhoff. Psychiatric Dehumanlzatlon of Man. Garden
. 1977. Some Real and Imaginary Consequences City, Doubleday.
of Social Mobility: A French-American C o m - S Z Y M A N S K I , A . , et ai. 1978. Braverman Symposium.
parison. American Journal of Sociology, The Resurgent Sociologist, Vol. 8 , pp. 33-50.
Vol. 82, pp. 757-82. T H I B A U L T , A . 1981. Studying Alienation Without
S E E M A N , M . , et al. 1967. Débat de l'utilité sociolo- Alienating People: A Challenge for Sociology.
gique de la notion d'aliénation. Sociologie du In: R . F . Geyer and D . Schweitzer (eds.),
travail. Vol. 2, pp. 180-209. Alienation: Problems of Meaning, Theory and
S H E P A R D , J.; K I M , D . 1978. Alienation A m o n g Method. London and Boston, Routledge &
Factory Workers in the U . S . and Korea: A Kegan Paul.
Comparative Study. Paper presented at the T O R R A N C E , J. 1977. Estrangement, Alienation, and
ninth World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, Exploitation: A Sociological Approach to His-
Sweden. torical Materialism. London and N e w York,
S H O H A M , S. G . 1970. Accidie, Anomie, Alienation Macmillan.
References (.continued)
T O R R A N C E , J. 1981. Alienation and Estrangement as V O L L M E R H A U S E N , J. 1961. Alienation in the Light of

Element of Social Structure. In: R . F . Geyer Karen Horney's Theory of Neurosis. American
and D . Schweitzer (eds.). Alienation: Problems Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 21, pp. 144-55.
of Meaning, Theory and Method. London and V R A N I C K I , P . 1965. Socialism and the Problems of
Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Alienation. In: E . F r o m m (ed.), Socialist
T O U R A I N E , A . 1967. L'aliénation: de l'idéologie à Humanism: An International Symposium,
l'analyse. Sociologie du travail, Vol. 9, pp. 299-313. Garden City, Doubleday.
pp. 192-201. W A L L E R S T E I N , 1.1979. The Capitalist World-Economy.
. 1977. The Self-production of Society. Chicago, N e w York, Cambridge University Press.
The University of Chicago Press. (Original W A L T O N , P.; G A M B L E , A . 1972. From Alienation to
French edition, 1973.) Surplus Value. London, Sheed and Ward.
T U C K E R , R . 1961. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. WEISS, F . (ed.). 1961. A Symposium on Alienation
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. and the Search for Identity. American Journal
T U D O R , B . 1972. A Specification of Relationships of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 21, pp. 117-279.
Between Job Complexity and Powerlessness. W E S O L O W S K I , W . 1979. Classes, Strata, and Power.
American Sociological Review, Vol. 37, Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
pp. 596-604. W H I T E H O R N , A . 1979. Alienation and Industrial
TURNER, J. H . 1978. The Structure of Sociological Society: A Study of Worker's Self-Manage-
Theory (rev. ed.). Homewood, III., Dorsey ment. Canadian Review of Sociology and
Press. Anthropology, Vol. 16, p. 206-17.
V A N R E D E N , C ; G R O N D E L , A.; GEYER, R . F. 1980. Y A N O W I T C H , M . 1967. Alienation and the Young
Bibliography Alienation. Amsterdam, Nether- Marx in Soviet Thought. Slavic Review,
lands Universities' Joint Social Research Vol. 26, pp. 29-53.
Centre. Z E T T E R B E R G , H . 1965. On Theory and Verification in
V I D A L , D . 1967. L'aliénation, structure du non-sens. the Social Sciences (3rd ed.). Totowa, N . J . ,
Sociologie du travail, Vol. 2, pp. 185-90. Bedminster Press.
. 1969. U n cas de faux concept: la notion d'alié- ZILLER, R . 1969. The Alienation Syndrome: A Triadic
nation. Sociologie du travail, N o . 11, Pattern of Self-Other Orientation. Sociometry,
pp. 61-82. Vol. 32, pp. 287-300.
The
social science
sphere
European co-operation in social science
information and documentation:
a process of maturation
György Rózsa
Social science information for all: tutional base is the European Co-ordination Centre
some characteristics for Research and Dodumentation in Social
Sciences, c o m m o n l y k n o w n as the Vienna Centre,
Social science information is not aimed at social a non-governmental organization and an auton-
scientists alone, it is for everybody; it tends to o m o u s body of the International Social Science
become universal in one form or another through Council founded in 1962, and established in
the media, m u c h in the same w a y as the most Vienna in 1963 under an agreement between
advanced physics manifests itself in the form of Unesco and the Austrian Government. 2 For ten
electronic gadgets. Both, the repacked information, years the centre was subsidized by Unesco. Since
transmitted by the media, and the products of this launching period, the centre has been sup-
micro-electronics equally shape our views and ported by Unesco contracts, by the twenty-one
w a y of life. Its global nature can be seen as another m e m b e r countries in various forms, and also by
feature: the world's major problems, such as the other bodies, such as academies of sciences,
upholding of peace, nutrition, energy, the struggle Unesco national commissions a n d the like. T h e
against terrorism, the supply of raw materials and main objective of the centre has been, and remains,
the like, affect every country, and they are all of a the development of comparative research work.
social scientific character as regards their sol- For m a n y years the documentation aspect
utions. Related with the latter there is also a large- hardly existed within the activities of the centre,
scale innovational process, necessary to the sol- it was n o more than a n a m e . But, to promote
ution of global problems, which includes science, linkages between Eastern, Western European and
production and information, the latter, being at North American scientists through structured
once of a natural, technological and social science information channels, and to facilitate c o m m u n i -
character. T h o u g h practically none of the so- cation a m o n g the European social science infor-
called global problems can be solved without mation institutions the Board of Directors of the
some contribution by the social sciences, it is centre, at its thirteenth session in Paris, 1976,
generally valid, that research on universal, global decided o n the launching the E C S S I D Project.3
and innovation problems is multidisciplinary in
O n e main difference between the E C S S I D
character, and so the corresponding information
and similar, regional projects and organizations
must be too.
lies in the complexity of this project, the objective
of which is rather ambitious. Its aims include the
exchange of publications, information on on-going
Antecedents and aims of E C S S I D
European Co-operation in Social Science Infor- * Director-General of the Library of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Chief Li-
mation and Documentation ( E C S S I D ) 1 as an brarian of the United Nations Library, G e -
initiative institutionally to establish Europe-wide neva, 1969-75; has published several m o n o -
co-operation in social science information is graphs, studies and articles in various
undoubtedly linked with the Helsinki Final Act. journals, national and international, in the
The generator of the conception and its insti- fields of information and social sciences.
Int. Soc. Scl. J., Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981

560
research, various aspects of automation (the 'focal points' as main contributors to E C S S I D

problems of thesauri, compatibility of magnetic activities. They play the same role within E C S S I D
tapes, etc.), education and training, publishing as do the National Commissions within Unesco,
activities, the organization of scientific conferences or the U N I S I S T focal points within the General
and workshops, various forms of exchange of Information Programme. It should be mentioned
experiences, and contributions to the development here that the interrelationship between a world
of national social science information and docu- information programme like U N I S I S T and the
mentation (SSID) through bilateral and multi- inclusion of social science information in such a
lateral programmes, all in co-operation with programme has repeatedly been examined by ad
existing similar programmes and organizations.4 hoc teams set up by Unesco. The focal points, on
This means that E C S S I D in no w a y the other hand, are linked with the national
contradicts other international programmes, nor committes of the Vienna Centre, and partly rely
does it overlap their objectives.5 on their o w n budgets.
E C S S I D meetings as a rule arefinancedby
the host countries (focal points) as far as accom-
The structure, organization modation and organizational costs, and fees are
and activities of E C S S I D concerned, while travel costs are covered by the
participants.
T h e current policy and management of E C S S I D Focal points are m o r e familiar to the
are carried out by the International Organizing socialist countries with their Academies of Sciences
Committee ( I O Q , whose members were initially than to countries without centrally planned econ-
nominated by the Board of Directors of the Vienna omies and science, yet difficulties have always been
Centre, selected on a reasonable geographic basis, solved despite the fact that in some countries even
and then completed by the representatives of the the role of focal points as national organizing
national S S I D services, focal-points of E C C S I D , bodies of S S I D sometimes raise problems.
during the meeting of its major decision-making Focal points take the main responsibility of
body, the General Conference. organizing, at the national level, the co-operation
T h e General Conference nominates work- in social science information, thus contributing
ing groups to discharge various activities, and E C S S I D , and also have the task of contributing
publication boards to deal with the editorial work. in various forms to thefinancingand assisting of
T h e structure of E C S S I D is very flexible. activities related with the working groups, publi-
In the centrally planned economies, it is usually cations, meetings, etc.
the social science information centres of the At present, there exist the following E C S S I D
Academies of Sciences that assume the role of national focal points:6
Austria Sozialwissenschaftliche Dokumentation der K a m m e r für Arbeiter und

Angestellte für Wien, Vienna.
Bulgaria Scientific Information Centre for Natural, Mathematical and Social Sciences,
Bulgarian A c a d e m y of Sciences, Sofia.
Canada Social Science Federation of Canada, Ottawa (Institutional partner of the Vienna
Centre).
Czechoslovakia Main Library, Centre of Scientific Information, Chechoslovak A c a d e m y of
Sciences, Prague.
Central Library of the Slovakian A c a d e m y of Sciences, Bratislava.
Denmark The Royal Library. Copenhagen (contact point).
Federal Republic Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften (IZ), B o n n .
of Germany
European co-operation 561
in social science information and documentation
France Le Groupe des Sciences Politiques, Économiques et Sociales (SPES), Paris.

National focal point including:
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique/Centre de Documentation des
Sciences Humaines;
Direction de la Documentation Française, Banque d'Information Politique et
d'Actualité (BIPA);
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Services de Documentation;
Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE),
Département de la Diffusion.
German Wissenschaftlicher Rat für Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Information und
Democratic Dokumentation bei der Akademie der Wissenschaften der D D R , Berlin.
Republic
Hungary Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.
The Netherlands Social-Wetenschappelijk Informatie en Documentatie Centrum ( S W 1 D O C ) ,
Amsterdam.
Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague (at this stage afinancinginstitution).
Poland Department of the Scientific Information of the Polish Academy of Sciences,
Warsaw.
Romania Office for Information and Documentation in Social and Political Sciences,
Academy of Social and Political Sciences, Bucharest.
Spain Departamento de Libro y Bibliotecas, Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid (contact
point and afinancinginstitution).
Sweden The Research Council for Humanistic and Social Sciences, Stockholm (national
focus agency);
USSR The Institute of Scientific Information in Social Sciences (INION), Academy of
Sciences of the U S S R , Moscow.
O n e crucial point, in addition to general inter- and the creation of the intellectual bases for the
national co-operation, within which E C S S I D acts latter: automation, compatibility in terminology
simultaneously as tool and product, is the extent and systematization, etc.
to which the national focal points can be built up The specific character of E C S S I D is not
and are becoming suitable to encourage and to explore terrae incognitae (still less to create
organize co-operation within countries. them) but rather to apply information transfer on
a regional basis to all social science, on the widest
scale, from the promotion of exchange of primary
Achievements and problems documents to the building u p of computerized
data bases. At the same time, it is certainly
E C S S I D relies on existing international co-oper- designed to explore lacunae or tasks demanding
ation programmes and does not overlap them. greater efforts such as, exchange of information on
Together with its other characteristics this ongoing research projects in social science.
represents a tendency rather than a precise pro- Thefirst'founding' conference, E C S S I D 1,
gramme of action and applies primarily to the was convened by the Vienna Centre under the aus-
overlapping, parallel work. After all, one crucial pices of Unesco, prepared by the I O C meeting in
feature of almost every programme of co-oper- Paris, and organized by I N I O N (Institute of Social
ation in information includes various forms of Science Information of the Academy of Sciences
exchange of experiences, the promotion of in- of the U S S R ) in M o s c o w , in June 1977, attended
formation exchange, professional education and by specialists from nineteen European countries
training, the introduction of up-to-date technology, and Canada, and also by representatives of six
562
Unesco
linked mainly through its General Information Programme (PGI), and
its Sector of Social Sciences
International Social Science Council
Vienna Centre
N . ECSSID Project
General Conference
usually at two-year intervals
International Organizing Committee (IOC)

(acting through the technical assistance of the Vienna Centre's Secretariat
;•*- and providing for the continuing activities between General Conferences)
/
/
f Editorial boards.
Working groups ( W G )
1. Exchange of primary and ECSSID Bulletin
secondary documents
(published three to four times a year
2 . Exchange of information on
by the Library of the Hungarian
on-going research
Academy of Sciences)
3 . T h e compatibility of
automated systems European Social Science
4 . Exchange of k n o w - h o w ; Bibliographies
education and training A series on the socialist
of SSID specialists and countries (to be published by
users the Pergamon Press)
A series on the all-European
literature on selected topics
(also published by the Pergamon
Press)
A d hoc publications
(e.g. the so-called Euroguide on
European SSID services, prepared
by the Information Centre of the
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
Occasional papers
A series under the control of the
I O C , three to four items of about
fifty to sixty pages per year on
selected topics, to be published by the
Library of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, under the supervision of the
same board as that of the ECSSID
Bulletin
F I G . 1. T h e structure a n d organization of E C S S I D .
international organizations.7 Its main purpose scale possible. These are the veryfieldsin which
was to form an overall picture of the situation of E C S S I D can n o w produce the most novelties, but
SSID in Europe, as well as of needs, potential and in this case, too, it relies heavily on existing pro-
existing possibilities of co-operation. This survey grammes, national and international.
resulted in a unique description of the situation, Working Group 1 is engaged in the regional
which has been published.8 The recommendations extension of the exchange of primary and second-
of the conference include the establishment of ary documents. While this is the most traditional
working groups related to specific information form of co-operation, it also has the greatest
topics (see Fig. 1) and the preparation of various potentials which are to be explored and activated.
documentation materials (e.g. bibliographies). Working Group 2 deals with the exchange
E C S S I D 2, supported by Unesco, was held of information on on-going research. Although
at Blazejevko, Poznan (Poland) in October 1978, Unesco and the Smithsonian Institution arranged
organized by the Polish focal point, the Depart- a large-scale conference in the last quarter of 1975
ment of Scientific Information of the Polish in Paris on the worldwide exchange of information
Academy of Sciences. Specialists from twenty-two in thisfield,this being an important issue o n the
countries and seven international organizations agenda of various European meetings, and organ-
were present.9 Its recommendations gave a precise izational efforts have been made to promote
definition of the objectives and range of activities regional co-operation, the results so far are
of the project, as well as of the means of achieving rather meagre. T h e related programme, co-
the objectives; it also defined the joint responsi- ordinated by the Dutch focal point, S W I D O C ,
bilities of the Vienna Centre and the national is a step forward, although the planned first
focal points (for example the Vienna Centre is report—due perhaps to the delicate nature of the
responsible for the co-ordination of I O C activities, topic—will hardly cover all the European
working groups and joint research projects of countries.10
the programme, while the national bodies are The scope of Working Group 3 ranges
responsible for the granting of fellowships or from the intellectual tools (e.g. thesauri) needed
exchange of specialists); it established certain for computerized data bases to the exchange of
rules of procedure for the I O C ; recommended that magnetic tapes. Various actions are proceeding
the national focal points provide the m a x i m u m in parallel and results can hardly be expected in
material andfinancialsupport possible; stressed the immediate future. Achieving compatibility of
the necessity of having national focal points in linguistic tools, terminologies, and different sys-
each participating country. The conference also tems is extremely energy- and time-consuming
adopted the programme of activities for 1979/80. work. Great efforts are being made to compare
E C S S I D 3 is expected to be held at the and m a k e as compatible as possible the U D C
end of 1981 in a Western European country. (Universal Decimal Classification: Class 3, social
sciences), the 'Rubricator* of M I S O N , and the B S O
(Broad System of Ordering) prepared by the
Working groups and publications International Federation for Documentation
(FID). Although supported partly financially,
The bulk of E C S S I D activities are carried out partly professionally by several international or-
within the working groups and find expression in ganizations (FTD, M I S O N , I N F O T E R M , Inter-
publications. East-West co-operation applies to national Committee for Social Science Infor-
the topics, to the experts, and also to the locations mation and Documentation), this work is hindered
of meetings. Let m e note that, in m y opinion, two by m a n y ideological, professionally conservative,
groups of activities are proceeding within E C S S I D traditional and linguistic obstacles. Unesco's pilot
which can be qualified as specific both as regards project I N T E R C O N C E P T is another constituent
their content and regional character: education clement in this context.11
and training in social science informatics, and Working Group 4 was formed to develop
tasks related with the building up of computerized co-operation in education and training of specia-
social science data bases, or rather the application lists in social science information, which seems
of informatics in social sciences on the widest to be one of the most promising ventures. It deals
564
with the comparison of curricula with the prep- plans, a volume of each is to appear every two years.
aration of recommendations for curricula, and E C S S I D also plans to publish a series of Occasional
especially with practical forms of training. Thus Papers consisting of three or four thematic issues
a week-long graduate seminar o n social science a year (of about fifty to sixty pages) with the same
data banks 1 2 was organized by the French focal editorial board and publisher as those of ECSSID
point S P E S and supported jointly by the French Bulletin.
authorities and Unesco for s o m e twenty-five A m o n g the ad hoc publications is Euro-
participants. Further efforts along these lines will guide, an undertaking of the Scientific Information
largely depend o n the outcome of this novel Centre of the Bulgarian A c a d e m y of Sciences to
undertaking. give comprehensive data o n social science infor-
A m o n g the publications are those of cur- mation institutions all over Europe.
rent or permanent type such as series and period- Brought out as a follow-up of the rec-
icals, and ad hoc publications. They are all super- ommendations of E C S S I D 2 by the Library of
vised by an international editorial board. the Hungarian A c a d e m y of Sciences, the ECSSID
Belonging to the current type are the Bulletin appears three or four times a year,
planned series of the European Social Science containing information o n the development or
Bibliographies to be published by the Pergamon structural, organizational and other changes in
Press in two sets: Social Sciences in Socialist European S S I D services, developments at national,
Countries, Vol. 1 (1977-79) to appear in 1981, international arid regional levels and reports o n
edited by I N I O N (Moscow), while thefirstvolume E C S S I D activities, as well as on the co-ordination
of the other, Social Aspects of Environmental work of the Vienna Centre. 13
Protection, is also in preparation. According to
Notes
1
A good part of Vol. II, N o . 4 , 1980, of the Unesco on the centre's activities with special respect
Journal of Information Science, Librarianship to the E C S S I D Project, see Mills, op. cit.,
and Archives Administration was devoted to and the Vienna Centre Newsletter.
the problems of social science information 3 The idea and experiment in international co-oper-
and documentation. T h e issue contains a ation among social science information insti-
number of references to E C S S I D in the tutions has existed over the past thirty years,
following articles: Jean Meyriat, 'Inter- and several bodies have been involved in it.
national and Regional Co-operation in Social In this respect, special mention should be
Science Documentation, pp. 227-33; György . made of the International Committee for
Rózsa and Tamás Földi, 'International C o - Social Science Information and Documen-
operation and Trends in Social Science Infor- tation, which has played a pioneer role.
mation Transfcr'.pp. 234-9; Stephen C . Mills, Cf. Rózsa and Földi, op. cit.
'Regional Co-ordination in Social Science 4
Cf. Meyriat, and Rózsa and Földi, op. cit.
Documentation: the Vienna Centre', pp. 240-4. B
T o mention just a few F I D (International Feder-
The following periodicals also include regular ation for Documentation) is a world-wide
information on the E C S S I D activities: Vienna and general organization for documentation
Centre Newsletter (Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1977) is with only a certain interest in SSID; I F L A
published three times a year by the Vienna (International Federation of Library Associ-
Centre, P . O . B . 974, 1001 Vienna, ECSSID ations) similar to FID; I F D O (International
Bulletin (Vol. 1, N o . 1, 1979), published Federation of Data Organizations for the
irregularly in practice four times a year, is Social Sciences); M I S O N (the SSDI organ-
devoted entirely to the E C S S I D Project and ization of the academies of sciences of the
published by the Library of the Hungarian socialist countries); E U S I D I C (co-operation
Academy of Sciences with the professional in the West European documentation in the
assistance of the Vienna Centre, P . O . B . 7, field of education), etc.
H-1361 Budapest. 6
For addresses see: ECSSID Bulletin, Vol. 2, N o . 1,
2
For the most up-to-date and detailed information 1980, pp. 26-7.
Notes {continued)
7
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslo- science data bases available in Europe or in
vakia, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic some parts of Europe whether from European
of Germany, German Democratic Republic, or overseas origin; (b) current policies of
Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, European countries referring to data bases in
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United general, and specifically to social science
Kingdom, U S S R , Yugoslavia; also partici- data bases: their creation, financing, exploi-
pating were Unesco, the Vienna Centre, tation . . . ; (c) an analysis of existing social
United Nations Library at Geneva, Inter- science data bases: structure, coverage, service
national Committee for Social Science Infor- provided, condition of on-line and off-line
mation and Documentation (ICSSID), Inter- access (from a technical as well as from an
national Federation of Documentation (FID), economic point of view), indexing and re-
and International Social Information System trieval tools; (d) multidisriplinary data bases
( M I S O N ) of the socialist countries. outside social science: their use for the social
8 science; (e) specific characters of data bases
The conference papers were initially published in
Russian and English versions by I N I O N , and in the social science and humanities: the role
later as a special issue of Information Pro- of national factors: political, legal, ideologi-
cessing and Management, Vol. 14, N o . 3/4, cal, economic...; (f) linguistic barriers; prog-
1978, Oxford, Pergamon Press. ress being m a d e towards c o m m o n indexing
* Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslo- languages and c o m m a n d languages; (g) net-
vakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal working: status and problems of West
Republic of Germany, German Democratic European networks; (h) networks in the
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Nether- U S S R and the C M E A countries; (i) regional
lands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, and transnational exchange of data; problems
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia; of international co-operation between bases
and Unesco, F I D , ICSSID, I F D O , IFLA, and networks; (j) concluding round table; the
I N F O T E R M and M I S O N . h u m a n factor; n e w functions of the infor-
10
Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities Including3 mation specialist, his training and status.
Migrant Workers, Bonn, IZ (in press). } This article is based mainly on data from the
11
Imre Moinar, Establishing the model of INTER- ECSSID Bulletin, four issues published to
CONCEPT. International Terminological In- date: Vol. N o . 1 1979; Vol. 2 , N o s . 1, 2
formation Network (INTERMIN) in Social and 3/4. The Bulletin is free of charge and is
Sciences. General Survey and Project. Project printed in about 700 copies. It can be ob-
manager: György Rózsa. Budapest, 1980, tained on request from the Library of
p. 112 (Unesco Contract N o . 3671. IDS/32 Hungarian Academy of Sciences P . O . B . 7,
270314). H-1361, Budapest. N e w s and announce-
12
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DD Professional
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Approaching international conferences1
1981
12-14 October Houston Operations Research Society of America; Institute of Management

Sciences: Joint Annual Meeting
J. W. McFarland, School of Business, University of Houston, Houston,
TX 77004 (United States)
November Colombo International Council of Voluntary Agencies: General Conference

(Theme: The Role of Voluntary Agencies in Building a N e w World
Community)
A. J. Kozlowski, ICVA Exec. Dir., 17, avenue de la Paix, 1202 Geneva
(Switzerland)
2-6 November Vienna International Organization for H u m a n Ecology: Fourth Vienna Inter-
national Meeting
International Organization for Human Ecology, Karlsplatz 13,1040 Vienna
(Austria)
11-14 November American Society of Criminology: Thirty-third Annual Meeting
Washington, D . C , ASC, Ms S. Hall, 1314 Kinnear Road, Room 212, Columbus, O H 43212
(United States)
11-14 November European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes:
Budapest General Conference
EADI, Kaerntner Strasse 25/6, 1010 Vienna (Austria)
9-16 December Manila International Union for the Scientific Study of Population: General
Conference
IUSSP, 5 rue Forgeur, 4000 Liège (Belgium)
28-30 December International Relations Research Association: Annual Meeting
Washington, D . C . IRRA, 7226 Social Science Buildg., University of Wisconsin, Madison,
WI53706 (UnitedStates)
1982
Florence International Institute of Anthropology: World Congress

(Italy) IIA, I Place d'Iéna, 75116 Paris (France)
1. N o further details concerning these meetings can be obtained through this Journal.
Int. Soc. Sch J., Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981

570
5-7 April Belgium

ICD Sir
V a n Clé Foundation: International Congress on Leisure Time and
Quality of Life
29 April- San Diego Population Association of America: Meeting
1 May (California) PAA, P . O . Box 14182, Benjamin Franklin Station, D C 20044 (United
States)
24-28 M a y Copenhagen International Association of Workers for Maladjusted Children: Tenth

International Congress
AIEJI, 66 chaussée d'Antin, 75009 Paris (France)
7-11 June Oslo International Federation for Housing and Planning: Thirty-sixth World
Congress
IFHP, 43 Wassenaarseweg, The Hague (Netherlands)
14-18 June Jerusalem The Israel Statistical Association: International Meeting on Analysis of
Sample Survey Data and Sequential Analysis
/ . Yahav, Dept of Statistics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Israel)
20-24 June Tel Aviv International Conference on Holocaust and Genocide (Theme: Towards
Understanding, Intervention and Prevention of Genocide)
International Conference on Holocaust and Genocide, P . O . Box 16271,
Tel Aviv (Israel)
July Dublin International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions:
Tenth International Congress
Professor Colette Chiland, Centre Alfred Binet, 76 avenue Edison,
75013 Paris (France)
August Rio de Janeiro International Political Science Association: Twelfth World Congress
IPSA Secretariat, c\o University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario KIN 6N5
(Canada)
August Warsaw Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs: Third-second
Pugwash Conference
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 9 Great Russell
Mansions, 60 Great Russell Street, London WC1B3BE (UnitedKingdom)
21-27 August Brighton International Council on Social Welfare: Twenty-first Conference
(Theme: Action for Social Progress: T h e Responsibilities of Govern-
mental and Voluntary Organizations).
Roy Manley, National Council of Voluntary Organizations, 26 Bed-
ford Square, London WC1B 3 H U ( United Kingdom)
23-28 August International Sociological Association: World Congress
Mexico City ISA Secretariat, Marcel Rafié, P . O . Box 719 'A', Montreal, P . Q . H3C
2V2 (Canada)
26 September- Anthropological Association of Greece: European Anthropological

1 October Pelralona- Congress
Khalkldlkl Anthropological Association of Greece, Zoe Tsioli, 5 Dafnomili Street,
(Greece) Athens 706 (Greece)
Autumn Rio de Janeiro International Federation of Catholic Universities: Symposium (Theme:

A Comparative Study on Demographic Policies)
Franco Biffi, University of Latran, 4 Piazza S. Giovanni in Lair ano,
00184 Rome (Italy)
Approaching international conferences 571
October Tangiers International Council on Alcohol and Addictions: Thirty-third Inter-

national Congress on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence
ICAA, A . Tongue, C.P. 140, 1001 Lausanne (Switzerland)
1983
14-16 April Pittsburgh Population Association of America: Meeting

PAA, P.O. Box 14182, Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington,
D C 20044 ( United States)
August Western Europe International Economic Association: Seventh World Congress (Theme:
Structural Change, Economic Interdependence and World Development)
IEA, 4 rue de Chevreuse, 75006 Paris (France)
August Canada International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences:
Eleventh International Congress
IUAES, A . Braxton, Dept of Anthropology & Sociology, 6303 N . W .
Marine Drive, University of British Columbia Campus, Vancouver
(Canada)
September Paris Information Processing Congress

M . Hermien, 6 Place de Valois, 75001 Paris (France)
Books received
General Sociology
B O Y N E S , Wynta (ed.). U.S. Non-Profit Organizations C A B R A L , Nelson Eurico. Le moulin et le pilon: les
in Development Assistance Abroad: TAICH îles du Cap-Vert. Paris, Agence de la coopó-
Directory, 1978. N e w York, Technical A s - ration culturelle et technique; Éditions l'Har-
sistance Information Clearing House, 1978. mattan, 1980. 185 p p .
525 pp. F E U O O , Mario del Carmen. Le Mujer, el desarrollo y
K H O L , Andreas; S T I R N E M A N N , Alfred (eds.). Öster- las tendencias de población en America Latina:
reichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, 1979. Munich, Bibliografia comentada. Buenos Aires, El
R . Oldenbourg Verlag/Vienna, Verlag für Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad,
Geschichte und Politik, 1980. 573 p p . 1980. 59 p p . (Estudios C E D E S , 3 (1).)
ScRiVEN, Michael. Evaluation Thesaurus (2nd ed.), G A N O C H A U D , Colette. L'opinion publique chez Jean-
Pt. Reyes, Edgcpress, 1980. 149 pp. Jacques Rousseau. Paris, Diffusion Librairie
Honoré Champion, 1980. 716 p p .
H A M E L I N K , Cees (ed.). Communication in the Eighties:
Philosophy, theory of knowledge A Reader on the 'McBride Report'. R o m e ,
I D O C International, 1980. 61 p p .
G A B B A Y , D o v M . Semantical Investigations in Hey-M A R T I N , Bernice. A Sociology of Contemporary
ting's Intuitionistic Logic. Dordrecht/Boston/ Cultural Change. Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
London, D . Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. 272 p p . , index. £12.50.
1981. 287 pp.figs.,bibliogr., index. (Synthese S I L B E R M A N N , Alphons. Communication de masse:
Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, éléments de sociologie empirique. Paris, H a -
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, chette, 1981. 125 p p . ,figs.,bibliogr., index.
148). (Langue, linguistique, communication.)
J A H N K E , H . N . ; O T T E , M . (eds.). Epistemological and Y u , Elena; Liu, William T . Fertility and Kinship in
Social Problems of the Sciences in the Early the Philippines. Notre D a m e , Indiana, Uni-
Nineteenth Century. Dordrecht/Boston/Lon- versity of Notre D a m e Press, 1980. 286 p p . ,
don, D . Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. illus., maps, tables. $20.
430 p p . , index.
Social sciences Demography
C A R L E Y , Michael. Social Measurement and Social B O U L A N G E R , Paul-Marie; T A B U T I N , Dominique. La

Indicators: Issues of Policy and Theory. mortalité des enfants dans le monde et dans
London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981. l'histoire. Liège, Ordina Éditions, 1980.
195 p p . ,figs.,tables, index. 450 pp., figs., tables. 980 Belgian francs.
K I S S O C K , Craig. Curriculum Planning for Social FRANCE. INSTITUT NATIONAL D'ÉTUDES DÉMOGRA-
Studies Teaching: A Cross-cultural Ap- PHIQUES. Transition démographique et moder-
proach. Chichester/New York/Brisbane/To- nisation en Guadeloupe et en Martinique, by
ronto, John Wiley & Sons, 1981. 148 p p . , Yves Charbit and Henri Leridon. Paris,
tables, bibliogr., index. Hardback £10; paper- Presses Universitaires de France, 1980.308 pp.,
back £4.75. graphs, tables. (Travaux et Documents, 89.)

574 9
INTERNATIONAL R E V I E W G R O U P O F SOCIAL SCIENCE

R E S E A R C H O N POPULATION A N D D E V E L O P -
QP D O R N B U S C H , Rüdiger. Exchange Rate Policies for
Developing Countries. Seoul, Korea Inter-
M E N T . Population Policy: Research Priorities national Economic Institute, 1981. 61 pp.,
in the Developing World—Report, prepared figs. (Seminar Series, 32.)
by Carmen A . Miro and Joseph E . Potter. H A R F F , Yvette. Les attitudes des travailleurs à l'égard
London, Frances Pinter, 1980. 197 pp. des produits. Sceaux, Centre de Recherches en
U N I T E D N A T I O N S . D E P A R T M E N T O F INTERNATIONAL Sciences Sociales du Travail, Université Paris-
E C O N O M I C A N D SOCIAL AFFAIRS. The World Sud, 1981. 189 pp.
Population Situation in 1979: Concise Report.I N A Y A T U L L A H (ed.). Land Reform: Some Asian Ex-
N e w York, United Nations, 1980. 115 pp., periences, Vol. 4. Kuala Lumpur, Asian and
tables. (Population Studies, 72.) Pacific Development Administration Centre,
1980. 424 pp., tables.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L INSTITUTE F O R L A B O U R S T U D I E S . Au-
Political science tonomie, besoins essentiels et nouvel ordre
économique international, by J. H . Vasileva
H O R N , Gustav-Herbert. Wãhlerspezialisierung: ein and E . Aventurin. Geneva, IILS, 1978. 25 pp.
Langzeitproblem der Demokratie. Frankfurt 6 Swiss francs. (Série de recherche, 46: Vers
a m Main/Bern, Verlag Peter D . Lang, 1980. des contrats de solidarité.)
107 pp., index. 24 Swiss francs (Democratia . The Construction Industry in Austria, by
Experimentalis: Schriften zur Planungsbe- G . Mikl-Horke. Geneva, IILS, 1980. 37 pp.,
teiligung, 3.) tables. 7 Swiss francs. (Research Series, 62:
I N T E R N A T I O N A L INSTITUTE F O R L A B O U R S T U D I E S . Strategic Factors in Industrial Relations
Impasse sur le monde contemporain et néces- Systems.)
saires mutations sociales, Table ronde, Genève, ——. Foreign Commerce and Solidarity Contracts,
23 novembre 1979: compte rendu. Geneva, by I. S. Chadha and Peter Tulloch. Geneva,
IILS, [1980]. 39 pp. IILS, 1979. 14 pp. 5 Swiss francs. (Research
M A C F A R L A N E , L . J. The Right to Strike. Harmonds- Series, 45: Towards Solidarity Contracts.)
worth, Penguin Books, 1981. 230 pp., figs., . Industrial Relations and the Political Process in
index. the Sudan, by A . H . El Jack and Chris
M A R Q U E S , Fernando Pereira. Exército e sociedade em Leggett. Geneva, IILS, 1980. 48 pp., tables.
Portugal. Lisbon, A Regra do Jogo, 1981. 8 Swiss francs. (Research Series, 49: Indus-
320 pp., tables, bibliogr. trial Relations and the Political Process.)
M I L L E R , William L . The End of British Politics? . Pilot Study on Social Criteria for Development
Scots and English Political Behaviour in the Co-operation. Geneva, IILS, 1981. 163 pp.,
Seventies. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981. figs., tables. 20 Swiss francs. (Research
281 pp.,figs.,tables, index, bibliogr. £17.50. Scries, 48: Towards Solidarity Contracts.)
M I N G I O N E , Enzo. Social Conflict and the City. . Towards a Social Contract on a World-wide
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981. 207 pp., figs., Scale: Solidarity Contracts, by G u y Ankerl.
index. Hardback £16; paperback £7.95. Geneva, IILS, 1980. 40 p. 8 Swiss francs.
V O N S E N O E R , Harro. Partei und Staat: Parteinormen (Research Series, 47: Towards Solidarity
und staatliches Gesetzesrecht in der Volks- Contracts.)
republik China. Basle, Social Strategies Pub- . African Symposium on the World of Work and
lishers Co-operative Society, 1981. 77 pp., the Protection of the Child, Yaounde, 12-
index. 12 Swiss francs. (Social Strategics • 15 December 1979: Proceedings! Colloque afri-
Monographs on Sociology and Social Policy, cain sur le monde du travail et la protection de
14.) l'enfance, Yaounde, 12-15 décembre 1979:
S U R , Serge. Le système politique de la V' République. compte rendu. Geneva, IILS, 1981. 144 pp.
Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1981. tables. 15 Swiss francs.
126 pp., bibliogr. ('Que sais-je?' Series.) . Workers' Participation in Management: The
Australian Experience, by R . D . Lansbury
and G . J. Prideaux. Geneva, IILS, 1981.
Economies 71 pp. (Research Scries, 67: Workers' Par-
ticipation in Management.)
B O S K O V I C , Blagoje; D A S I C , David (eds.). Socialist J A P A N . K Y O T O UNIVERSITY. C E N T E R F O R SOUTHEAST
Self-management in Yugoslavia, 1950-1980: A S I A N STUDIES. Econometric Models of Asian
Documents. Belgrade, Socialist Thought and Countries, 2—International Conference, Kyoto,
Practice, 1980. 446 pp. March 22-2$, 1979: Proceedings. [Bangkok],
Books received 575
Association of Development Research and formation. Paris, I N S E P ; Toulouse, Éditions

Training Institute of Asia and the Pacific, E R E S , 1981. 213 p p . , tables. (Pratiques en
October 1980. 91 p p . , tables. (Information Question.)
Service Series, 22.) S U R , Jean. Emilie ou de l'éducation des adultes:
K A R D E U , Edvard. Self-management and the Political témoignage d'un formateur. Paris, I N S E P /
System. Belgrade, Socialist Thought and Toulouse, Éditions E R E S , 1981. 200 p p .
Practice, 1980. 287 pp. (Pratiques en Question.)
S C O T T , Wolf. Concepts and Measurement of Poverty. C O O M B S , Philip H . Future Critical World Issues in
Geneva, United Nations Research Institute Education: A Provisional Report of Findings.
for Social Development, 1981. 62 pp., tables. Essex, International Council for Education
T R I F U N O V I C , Bogdan (ed.). A Handbook of Yugoslav Development, 1981. 79 p p . , tables. ( I C E D
Socialist Self-Management. Belgrade, Social- Occasional Paper.)
ist Thought and Practice, 1980. 327 pp.
U N I T E D N A T I O N S INDUSTRIAL D E V E L O P M E N T O R G A N -
IZATION. Appropriate Industrial Technology Management
for Construction and Building Materials. N e w
York, United Nations, 1980. 218 pp., tables. IGLESIAS, Gabriel U . ; C H A N D R A , Sushil; S A L A Z A R ,
W A N G , Yen-Kyun. An Econometric Analysis of the Melito Jr. (eds.). Training Public Enterprise
Korean Economy: Annual Econometric Model, Managers. Kuala Lumpur, Asian and Pacific
Effects of Economic Policies and Forecast, Development Centre, 1980. 753 pp., tables,
1981-1986. Seoul, Korea International Econ- bibliogr.
omic Institute, November 1980. 125 pp. F R A N C E . MINISTÈRE D U T R A V A I L . INSTITUT N A T I O N A L
tables. (KIEI Working Paper, 14.) D'ÉTUDES DÉMOGRAPHIQUES. CENTRE D ' É T U -
D E S D E L ' E M P L O I . La mobilité et le fonctionne-
Law, criminology ment d'un marché du travail. Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1981. 325 pp., figs.,
CENTRE D E FORMATION ET D E RECHERCHE D E L ' É D U - tables. (Cahiers du Centre d'Études de l'Em-
CATION SURVEILLÉE. Droit de l'enfance et de la ploi, 22.)
famille. Vaucresson, C F R E S , 1980. 273 pp. . Représentation et vécu du devenir professionnel.
C O U N C I L O F E U R O P E . L E G A L AFFAIRS/CONSEIL D E Paris, Presses Universitaires de France,_1980.
L ' E U R O P E . AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES. Crimino- 455 pp., tables. (Cahiers du Centre d'Études
logical Colloquium, 4th, Strasbourg, 26- de l'Emploi, 21.)
29 November 1979: Criminological Aspects of T H O M P S O N , Howard A . The Great Writings in Market-
the Ill-Treatment of Children in the Family/ ing (2nd ed.), Tulsa, Oklahoma, Penn Well
Collogue criminologique, 4C, Strasbourg, 26- Books, 1981. 682 p p . , tables, index, bibliogr.
29 novembre 1979: Aspects criminologiques des (The Penn Well Marketing and Management
mauvais traitements des enfants dans la fa- Series.)
mille. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1980.
193 pp.
Architecture
Education
E N G L A N D , Richard. Uncaged Reflections: Selected
N O Y É , Didier; P I V E T E A U , Jacques. Guide pratique du Writings 1965-1980. Valletta, M . R . S . M . Ltd,
formateur: l'art de concevoir et d'aimer une [1981]. 175 pp.
Recent Unesco publications*
(including publications assisted by Unesco)
Arkisyst Feasibility Study: Final Report. Paris, Intergovernmental Conference on Communication Poli-
Unesco, 1981. 65 p p . , figs., tables. 12 F . cies in Africa, Yaounde (Cameroun), 22-
(Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences, 31 July 1980: Final Report. Paris, Unesco,
45.) 1981. 81 p p .
Building the Future: Unesco and the Solidarity ofInterconcept Report: A New Paradigm for Solving the
Nations, by A m a d o u - M a h t a r M ' B o w . Paris, Terminology Problems of the Social Sciences,
Unesco, 1981. 258 p p . 18 F . by Fred W . Riggs. Paris, Unesco, 1981.
Can Equity Be Organized? by Bernard Schaffer and 49 p p . 10 F . (Reports and Papers in the
Geoff L a m b . Paris, Unesco; Farnborough, Social Sciences, 47.)
G o w e r , 1981. 166 p p . , index, bibliogr. 45 F . International Bibliography of the Social Sciences:
Communication Planning for Development: An Oper- Economics/Bibliographie internationale des
ational Framework, by Alan Hancock. Paris, sciences sociales: Science économique, Vol. 27,
Unesco, 1980. 198 p p . , figs., bibliogr. 1978. L o n d o n / N e w Y o r k , Tavistock Publi-
40 F . (Monographs on Communication Plan- cations, 1980. 526 p p . £30; 270 F .
ning, 2.) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences: Pol-
Community Communications: The Role of Community itical Science/Bibliographie internationale des
Media in Development, by Frances J. Berrigan. sciences sociales: Science politique, Vol. 28,
Paris, Unesco, 1981. 10 F . (Reports and 1979. L o n d o n / N e w York, Tavistock Publi-
Papers on Mass Communication, 90.) cations, 1981, 451 p p . £32; 290 F .
The Concept of International Organization, ed. by International Bibliography of the Social Sciences: So-
Georges Abi-Saab. Paris, Unesco, 1981. ciology/Bibliographie Internationale des scien-
245 p p . ,figs.,tables. 42 F . ces sociales: Sociologie, Vol. 28, 1978.
Evaluation Research and Social Change, by Alexander London/Chicago, Tavistock Fublications/Be-
Weilenmann. Paris, Unesco, 1980. 30 F . resford Book Service, 1980. 463 p p . £30;
General History of Africa, I: Methodology and African 270 F .
Prehistory, ed. by J. Ki-Zerbo. Paris, Unesco, New Values and Principles of Cross-cultural Communi-
1980. 818 p p . , ill., m a p s , tables. 100 F . cation, by Alcino Louis da Costa, Yehia
(Unesco International Scientific Committee Aboubakr, Pran Chopra and Fernando Reyes
for the Drafting of a General History of Matta. Paris, Unesco, 1980. 51 p p . 10 F .
Africa.) (Reports and Papers o n Mass C o m m u n i -
General History of Africa, II: Ancient Civilizations of cation, 85.)
Africa, ed. by G . Mokhtar. Paris, Unesco,
1981. 804 p p . , illus., m a p s . 100 F . (Unesco
International Scientific Committee for the * How to obtain these publications: (a) Priced Unesco
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and Papers of the Meeting of Experts organized lications can be obtained free from Unesco,
by Unesco at Port Louis, Mauritius, 15- Documents Division ( C O L / D ) ; (c) publi-
19 July 1974. Paris, Unesco, 1980. 192 p p . cations not put out directly or in co-publi-
36 F . (The General History of Africa: Studies cation by Unesco can be obtained through
and Documents, 3.) normal retail channels.
In!. Soc. Sei. / . , Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981

578
Peace on Earth: A Peace Anthology. Paris, Unesco, Thinking and Doing: Youth and a New International
1980. 277 p p . 38 F . Economie Order, by B . Brühl D a y . Paris,
Planning Methods and the Human Environment, by Unesco, 1980. 96 p p . , illus. 20 F .
Gilberto C . Gallopin. Paris, Unesco, 1981. Violence and Us Causes, by Jean-Marie D o m e n a c h ,
67 p p . , figs., tables. 20 F . (Socio-economic Henri Laborit, Alain Joxe (and others).
Studies, 4.) Paris, Unesco, 1981. 296 p p . 38 F . (In-
Population-Environment Relations in Tropical Islands: sights, 4.)
The Case of Eastern Fiji. Paris, Unesco, 1980. World Congress on Disarmament Education, Unesco,
230 pp. 50 F . ( M A B Technical Notes, 13.) 9-13 June 1980: Disarmament Education
Reporting Southern Africa: Western News Agencies —Report and Final Document. Paris, Unesco,
Reporting from Southern Africa, by Phil 1981.50 pp.
Harris. Paris, Unesco, 1981. 168 pp., tables, World Directory of Peace Research Institutions,
bibliogr. 28 F . 4th ed. rev. Paris, Unesco, 1981. 213 p p .
The Social Implications of the Scientific and Tech- 26 F . (Reports and Papers in the Social
nological Revolution: A Unesco Symposium. Sciences, 49.)
Paris, Unesco, 1981. 392pp., bibliogr., index. World List of Social Science Periodicals!Liste mon-
80 F . diale des périodiques spécialisés dans les scien-
Social Sciences in Asia, IV: Australia, Fiji, Hong ces sociales/Lista mundial de revistas especia-
Kong, India, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka. lizadas en ciencias sociales, 1980, 5th ed. rev.
Paris, Unesco. 98 pp., tables. 12 F . (Reports Paris, Unesco, 1980. 447 pp. 72 F . (World
and Papers in the Social Sciences, 42.) Social Science Information Services/Services
Socio-economic Indicators for Planning: Methodologi- mondiaux d'information en sciences sociales/
cal Aspects and Selected Examples. Paris, Servicios mundiales de. información sobre
Unesco, 1981. 122 p p . , tables. 20 F . (Socio- ciencias sociales, 1.)
economic Studies, 2.) Youth Prospects in the 1980s: Synthesis Report
Statistical Yearbook/Annuaire statistique)'Anuario es- Presented to the General Conference of Unesco
tadístico, 1980. Paris, Unesco, 1980.1,280 pp. at its Twenty-first Session. 43 p p . Paris,
280 F . Unesco, 1980.
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Past topics1
F r o m 1949 to the end of 1958, this Journal appeared under the n a m e of International
Social Science Bulletin, not all issues of which were devoted to a main topic.
Microfilms and microcards are available from University Microfilms Inc., 300 N . Zeeb
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Vol. XI, 1959 N o . 4. Problems of surveying the social

N o . 1. Social aspects of mental health* sciences and humanities
N o . 2. Teaching of the social sciences in
the U . S . S . R . * Vol. XVII, 1965
N o . 3. The study and practice of planning* N o . 1. M a x Weber today/Biological aspects
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zone* N o . 2. Population studies
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N o . 2. The social sciences and peaceful Vol. XVIII, 1966
co-operation* N o . 1. H u m a n rights in perspective*
N o . 3. Technical change and political N o . 2. Modern methods in criminology*
decision* N o . 3. Science and technology as
N o . 4. Sociological aspects of leisure* development factors*
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Vol. XIII, 1961
N o . 1. Post-war democratization in Japan* Vol. XIX, 1967
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N o . 1. Images of w o m e n in society* Vol. XX, 1968
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N o . 3. Changes in the family* management*
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research*
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N o . 1. Opinion surveys in developing modernization
countries N o . 4. The arts in society*
N o . ' 2. Compromise and conflict resolution
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America N o . 2. Approaches to rural problems*
N o . 3. Social science in the Third World*
Vol. XVI, 1964 N o . 4. Futurology*
N o . 1. Data in comparative research*
N o . 2. Leadership and economic growth Vol. XXII, 1970
N o . 3. Social aspects of African resource N o . 1. Sociology of science*
development N o . 2. Towards a policy for social research
1. The asterisk denotes issues out of print.

N o . 3. Trends in legal learning Vol. XXVIII, 1976
N o . 4. Controlling the human environment N o . 1. Science in policy and policy for
science*
Vol. XXIII, 1971 N o . 2. The infernal cycle of armament
N o . 1. Understanding aggression N o . 3. Economics of information and
N o . 2. Computers and documentation in information for economists
the social sciences N o . 4. Towards a new international
N o . 3. Regional variations in nation-building economic and social order
N o . 4. Dimensions of the racial situation Vol. XXIX, 1977
N o . 1. Approaches to the study of
Vol. XXIV, 1972
international organizations
No. 1. Development studies N o . 2. Social dimensions of religion
No. 2. Youth: a social force? N o . 3. The health of nations
No. 3. The protection of privacy N o . 4. Facets of interdisciplinarity .
No. 4. Ethics and institutionalization in
social science Vol. XXX, 1978
No. 1. The politics of territoriality
Vol. XXV, 1973 No. 2. Exploring global interdependence
No. 3. H u m a n habitats: from tradition to
N o . 1/2. Autobiographical portraits modernism
N o . 3. The social assessment of technology N o . 4. Violence
N o . 4. Psychology and psychiatry at the
cross-roads Vol. XXXI, 1979
N o . 1. Pedagogics of social science: some
Vol. XXVI, 1974 experiences
N o . 1. Challenged paradigms in N o . 2. Rural-urban articulations
international relations N o . 3. Patterns of child socialization
N o . 2. Contributions to population policy N o . 4. In search of rational organization
N o . 3. Communicating and diffusing social
Vol. XXXII, 1980
science
N o . 4. The sciences of life and of society N o . 1. The anatomy of tourism
N o . 2. Dilemmas of communication:
Vol. XXVII, 1975 technology versus communities?
N o . 3. W o r k
N o . 1. Socio-economic indicators: theories N o . 4. O n the state
and applications
N o . 2. The uses of geography Vol. XXXIII, 1981
N o . 3. Quantified analyses of social N o . 1. Socio-economic information:
phenomena systems, uses and needs
N o . 4. Professionalism in flux N o . 2. At the frontiers of sociology
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French edition: Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales

(ISSN 0304-3037), Unesco, Paris (France).

Topics Editor: Peter Lengyel

Technology and cultural values

Werner Ackermann Cultural values and social choice of technology 447

Dieter Ernst Technology policy for self-reliance: some major

Kazimierz Kopecki The case for nuclear energy 481

Ken Newcombe Technology assessment and policy: examples

A. Rahman The interaction between science, technology and

David Schweitzer Alienation theory and research: trends, issues

The social science sphere

Gyõrgy Rózsa European co-operation in social science

Professional and documentary services

Approaching international conferences 569

Books received 573

Recent Unesco publications 577

overtaken hundreds of thousands of others in the United K i n g d o m and other

reductions in manning, reorganization, which brings with it actual demotion of

N o r d o those same companies hand over training to a department. It is considered

become deeply ingrained in industrial communities. T o a finer extent the time

engineering worker and the analytical ability of the research-and-development

retraining and redeployment should be part of the management of change. Har-

Technology does least harm in a society with a well-developed infrastructure

In contrast to cases of innovation in less developed there are also significant

The acceleration of technical advance m a y be measured by the consumption

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981

general uneasiness about the social impact of technological innovations, in par-

Values and technology in their social context:

S o m e concrete examples m a y be helpful to illustrate the complexity of the relation-

have an adverse effect on employment as well as on skills. If a recession is added

Cultural values and collective interests

Cultural values m a y then be considered as ways of ordering and evaluating objects,

individual members of a society m a y be considered as not being altogether

The choice of technological innovation

Technology, for present purposes, will be taken in a broad sense, so as to include

If the locus of decision-making is removed from those more directly affected

Social diagnosis and choice of technology

T h e choice of technology is properly seen as a m o m e n t in an ongoing social and

Choice and implementation of technology:

Let us consider the development of more productive dairy farming in Ecuador in

to higher agricultural productivity. A n d they had not been given sufficient

The impact of technology on cultural values

Specific and diffuse technology

The diffuse technologies that n o w pervade a society have necessarily

Technology in its social context

values associated with 'modern' technology is considered as an essentially passive

certain groups. The consequent emergence of new patterns of social practices m a y

A B O U B A C R Y , L y . 1981. L a donn6e socio-culturelle A C K E R M A N N , W . 1979. Utilización de indicadores

A C K E R M A N N , W . ; F A U S T O , A . 1978. Estudio pre- Production de la hiérarchie dans l'entreprise:

Control over technology has become a major instrument of domination, both in

Dieter Ernst, an economist, is research fellow at the Projekt Technologie-transfer, Universität

Int. Soc. Sei. J„ Vol. XXXIII, N o . 3, 1981

Selective technological delinking

After centuries of externally geared underdevelopment, most Third World

and reintregrated into the worldwide network of international capital.

Interlinking key development objectives

A successful strategy of self-reliance requires the identification and adoption of a

Effective control of key sectors

In m a n y developing countries, key sectors of the e c o n o m y are controlled b y

Bringing needs into line with effective demand

In most developing countries, the gap between needs, or m o r e specifically the

Identifying social needs

between primary andfinalconsumption of energy, i.e. they identify energy needs

Defining criteria for the adjustment of effective demand to social needs

•r;-, ^ v c -<e* >• '- ^ .»-•* r?(_i, -hàf.. • > ->/?*«