JOHN DOE

12345 W. Cottontail Pl.

Liverpool, NM (96321)
(888) 873-7283

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA

MARICOPA COUNTY

The state of Arizona

(alleged plaintiff) CASE NO. CR2008- l 54760

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

V. DISMISSAL AND TRAVELING IS A "RIGHT,"
NOT A GRANTED PRIVILEGE and NOTICE
John Doe TO THESE COURTS OF THEIR SWORN
(Aggrieved Accused) DUTY TO PROTECT AND DEFEND THEIR
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS AND
THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE

(Assigned to Mr. George Foster) Note for

Hearing 19 Nov. 2008

S
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 The state of CASE NO. CR2008-154760
Arizona (alleged
plaintiff)

V.

John Doe Note for Hearing 19 Nov. 2008

(Aggrieved
Accused)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AND TRAVELING IS A "RIGHT," NOT

A GRANTED PRIVILEGE and NOTICE TO THESE COURTS OF THEIR SWORN DUTY TO
PROTECT AND DEFEND THEIR STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS AND THE PEOPLE
THEY SERVE

1. The Aggrieved Accused, without prejudice, without an agent or

representative, without representing himself, retaining all his God-given rights as those
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, appearing specially (not generally) and limited as John
Doe, under threat, duress, and coercion, only to protect the Aggrieved Accused's
interests, without any appearance of an adverse party, where the issue is whether this
Sovereign Man is required to obey the provisions in the Motor Vehicle Code/statutes of
the 50 united States of America. It is the declaration of this Sovereign Man that because
he is a Free-born and Natural Man and not an artificial creation of government who has
given up none of his RIGHTS, that the Motor Vehicle Code/statutes do not apply to
him. It is also the declaration of this Sovereign Man that traveling upon the streets,
highways and byways in the 50 united States of America by this Sovereign Man is an
unalienable RIGHT and therefore not subject to commercial regulation or legislation by
the states' legislative bodies.

2. Let us first consider the declaration of this Sovereign Man that traveling
upon the streets or highways in America is a RIGHT. Various courts have ruled on this
issue. The
U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

1 of35
2.1 The RIGHT to travel is a part of the liberty of which the Citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of the law under the 5th Amendment. (Emphasis added). See: Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125.

3. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in 1909:

 3.1 The term "public highway," in its broad popular sense, includes toll roads-any road
which the public have a RIGHT to use even conditionally, though in a strict legal sense it is
restricted to roads which are wholly public. (Emphasis added). See: Weirich v. State, 140 Wis. 98.

4. The Supreme Court of the state of Illinois ruled:

4.1 Even the legislature has no power to deny to a Citizen the RIGHT to travel upon the
highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though
this RIGHT might be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience.
(Emphasis added). See: Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 N.E. 22.

4.2 The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is NOT a mere
PRIVILEGE, but a COMMON AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT of which the public and
individuals cannot rightfully be deprived. (Emphasis added). See: Chicago Motor Coach v.
Chicago, supra; Ligare v. Chicago, 28 N.E. 934; Boone v. Clark, 214 S.W. 607; American
Jurisprudence l st Ed., Highways § 163.

4.3 Citizen's RIGHT to travel upon public highways includes RIGHT to use usual
conveyances of time, including horse-drawn carriage, or automobile, for ordinary purposes
of life and business. (Emphasis added). See: Thompson v. Smith (Chief of Police), 154 S.E.
579, 580.

4.4 The RIGHT of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his
property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may
prohibit or permit at will, but a COMMON RIGHT which he has under the RIGHT to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. (Emphasis added). See: Thompson v. Smith, supra.

5. "Regulated" here can only mean traffic safety enforcement. stop lights, sign, etc. NOT a
privilege that requires permission, i.e.; licensing, mandatory insurance, automobile
registration, etc..

6. So we can see that a Citizen has a Right to travel upon the public highways by
automobile, and the Citizen cannot be rightfully deprived of this Liberty. So where do state
governments derive and perpetuate the misconception that the use of the public road is always
and only a privilege?

PRIVILEGE OR
RIGHT?
 6.1 "... For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in
whole or in part, as a place for private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right
to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or a license which the legislature may grant or
withhold at its discretion." State v. Johnson, 243 P. l 073; Cummins v. Homes, 155 P. 171;
Packard v. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256; Hadfield v. Lundin,98 Wash 516

7. Here the court held that a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public
highways, but that he did not have the right to conduct business upon the highways. On this
point of law all authorities are unanimous.

7.1 "Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a Citizen has the
Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does
not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private
gain." Willis v. Buck, 263 P.I982; Barney v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, l 7 P.2d 82

7.2 'The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property
thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of
one who makes the highway his place of business for private gain in the running of a stagecoach
or omnibus." State v. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864

8. What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so "radically and obviously" from one
who uses the highway as a place of business? Who better to enlighten us than Justice Tolman of
the Supreme Court of Washington State?In State v. City of Spokane, supra, the Court also noted a
very "radical and obvious" difference, but went on to explain just what the difference is:

8.1 'The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a common right to all, while
the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."

8.2 'This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the
authorities." State v. City of Spokane, supra.

9. This position does not hang precariously upon only a few cases, but has been proclaimed
by an impressive array of cases ranging from the state courts to the federal courts.

9.1 "... the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property
thereon in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of
one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain in the running of
a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right
common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary." Ex Porte Dickey,
(Dickey v. Davis), 85 SE 781
 9.2 "The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his
property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under
the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and
safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day,
and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or
wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life
and business." Thompson v. Smith, supra.; Teche Lines v. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784

1O. It should be noted and emphasized the courts mentioning "travel upon the public
highways ..."in direct relation to the "existing modes of travel ..."(i.e., horse drawn carriage or
wagon, or automobile). Thus to interfere with one's Right to travel necessitates the
interference with one's mode of travel (property) and vice versa.

10.1 There is no dissent among various authorities as to this position. (See Am. Jur. [1st]
Const. Law, 329 and corresponding Am. Jur. [2nd].)

10.2 "Personal liberty - or the right to enjoyment of life and liberty - is one of the
fundamental or natural rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the
various constitutions, which is not derived from nor dependent on the U.S. Constitution.... It is
one of the most sacred and valuable rights [remember the words of Justice Tolman, supra.] as
sacred as the right to private property ... and is regarded as inalienable." 16 C.J.S. Const. Law,
Sect.202, Pg. 987

11. It is evident that the courts have made the distinction between a "Right" to use the
public roads and a "privilege" to use the public roads by drawing upon this line of "using the
road as a place of business". Moreover, the various state courts have held the same. In examining
what have the U.S. Courts held on this point, we see:

11.1 "First, it is well established law that the highways of the state are public property, and
their primary and preferred use is for private purposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is
special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees
fit." Stephenson v. Rinford, 287 US 251; Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F.
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592; Railroad commission v. Inter-City Forwarding
Co., 57 SW.2d 290; Parlett Cooperative v. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313

12. What then have the courts determined is a privilege to use the roads? By now it
should be apparent even to the "unlearned" that an attempt to use the road as a place of business
is a privilege. One must draw a distinction between:

A) Traveling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads, which is a God-given
Right; and ...

B) Using the public roads as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business that is a
privilege.
 12. l “[The roads] ... are constructed and maintained at public expense, and no
person therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, a vested right to their use in
carrying on a commercial business.” Ex Parte Sterling, 53 SW. 2d 294; Barney v.
Railroad Commissioners, 17 P. 2d 82; Stephenson v. Binford, supra.

12.2 “When the public highways are made the place of business the state has a right
to regulate their use in the interest of safety and convenience of the public as well as the
preservation of the highways.”

12.3 “[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the nature of the
business and the use of the highways in connection therewith.” Ibid.

12.4 "We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for commercial
purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in the interest of the
public, the state may prohibit or regulate ... the use of the highways for gain." Robertson
v. Dept. of Public Works, supra.

13. There should be considerable authority on a subject as important as this - i.e.,

governments looking to deprive its Citizens of the liberty of "using the roads in the ordinary
course of life and business." However, it should be noted that after extensive research, there is
no case or authority acknowledging the state's power to convert the individual's right to travel
upon the public roads into a "privilege."

14. It could not be stated more Conclusively that a Sovereign Man does have the
"Right" to travel and transport his property upon the public highways and roads using the
mode of travel of his choice and the exercise of this Right is not a "privilege" in the 50
united States of America, without approval or restriction, (license), and that these courts
have the constitutional duty to protect this RIGHT within the confines of the U.S.
Constitution. After all, to whom do the streets, highways, roadways and waterways belong
anyway? The People-At-Large! The 50 states and the federal government are only stewards
of the People's Property! Here are other court decisions that expound the same facts:

14. l . . [T]he streets and highways belong to the public, for the use of the public in
the ordinary and customary manner. See: Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wn. 657; 168 P. 516.

14.2 All those who travel upon, and transport their property upon, the public
highways, using the ordinary conveyance of today, and doing so in the usual and ordinary
course of life and business. See: Hadfield, supra; State v. City of Spokane, 109 Wn. 360;
186 P. 864.

14.3 The RIGHT of the Citizen to travel upon the highways and to transport his
property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously
from that of one who makes the highways his place of business and uses it for private gain
.... (Emphasis added). See: State v. City of Spokane, supra.
 14.4 . . . [F]or while a Citizen has the RIGHT to travel upon the public highways and to transport
his property thereon,that RIGHT does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in
part,as a place of business for private gain. For the latter purposes no person has a vested right to use the
highways of the state,but is a MERE PRIVILEGE or license which the legislature may grant or withhold
at its discretion.... (Emphasis added). See: Hadfield,supra; State v. Johnson,243 P. l 073; Cummins v.
Jones,155 P. 171; Packard v. Banton,44 S.Ct. 257,264 U.S. 140 and other cases too numerous to
mention.

15. The Washington State Supreme Court stated:

15. l I am not particularly interested about the rights of haulers by contract,or
otherwise,but I am deeply interested in the RIGHTS of the public to use the public highways
freely for all lawful purposes. (Emphasis added). See: Robertson v. Department of Public
Works,180 Wash. 133 at 139.

16. The Supreme Court of the State of Indiana ruled in 1873:

16.1 it is not the amount of travel,the extent of the use of a highway by the public that
distinguishes it from a private way or road. It is the RIGHT to so use or travel upon it, not its
exercise. (Emphasis added). See: Ind 455,461.

17. American Jurisprudence 1st,has this to say:

17. l The RIGHT of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property
thereon,by horse-drawn carriage,wagon,or automobile,is NOT a mere PRIVILEGE which may be
permitted or prohibited at will,but a COMMON RIGHT which he has under his right to
life,liberty,and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guarantee one
may,therefore,under normal conditions,travel at his inclination along the public highways or in
public places,and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner,neither interfering
with,not disturbing another's RIGHTS,he will be protected,not only in his person,but in his safe
conduct. (Emphasis added). See: 11 American Jurisprudence 1st.,Constitutional Law,§ 329,page
1123.

18. The Supreme Court of the State of Georgia ruled:

18.l In this connection it is well to keep in mind that,while the public has an absolute
RIGHT to the use of the streets for their primary purpose,which is for travel,the use of the streets
from the purpose of parking automobiles is a privilege,and not a RIGHT; and the privilege must
be accepted with such reasonable burdens as the city may place as conditions to the exercise of the
privilege. (Emphasis added). See: Gardner v. City of Brunswick,28 S.E. 2d 135.

19. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado discussed the issue in the following
way in 1961.
 19.1 The Constitution of the State of Colorado, Article II, § 3 provides that: All persons
have certain natural, essential and unalienable RIGHTS, among which may be reckoned the
RIGHT ...of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; ....

19. 1.1 An automobile is property and a Sovereign Man cannot be deprived of property without
due process of law.The term property, within the meaning of the due process clause, includes
the RIGHT to make full use of the property which one has the unalienable RIGHT to acquire.

19.1.2 Every Citizen has an unalienable RIGHT to make use of the public highways of the state;
every Citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty.
(Emphasis added).See: People v.Nothaus, 147 Colo. 2 10.

20. The meaning of the Article above can only include (or refer to) the Sovereign Man,
not corporations, since governments create corporations and extend to then certain privileges,
not rights.

21.

2 2. To be that statutes which would deprive a citizen of the RIGHTS of person or property
without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of common law, would not be the law
of the land.(Emphasis added).See: Hoke v.Henderson, 15 N.C. 15, 25 AM.Dec.677.

23. Other authorities have arrived at similar conclusions:

23.1 The Constitution for the United States of America, Amendment 9:

23.1.1 The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.

24. The Constitution of the State of Arizona, Article 2, § 33:

24.1 Reservation of rights. The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights

shall not be construed to deny others retained by the people.

25. This Sovereign demands and declares all of his other rights, including the right to travel
upon the public highways and byways in the 50 united States of America.

26. The Constitution of the State of Arizona, Article 2, § 2:

26.1 A// political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their
just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and
maintain individual rights.
 27. This Sovereign,the Aggrieved Accused,not only is free to use the highways and
byways in the 50 united States of America without restriction. He maintains his
in/unalienable right to use these highways and byways.

27.1 Highways are public roads which every Citizen has a RIGHT to use.
(Emphasis added).See: 3Angel Highways 3.

27.2 A highway is a passage,road,or street,which every Citizen has a RIGHT to

use. (Emphasis added). See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

28. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that:

28. 1 Undoubtedly the RIGHT of locomotion,the RIGHT to remove from one place to
another according to inclination,is an attribute of personal liberty,and the RIGHT, ordinarily,of
free transit from or through the territory of any state is a RIGHT secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution.(Emphasis added). See: Williams v.
Fears,343U.S. 270,27 4.

29. Thus, there can be little doubt that when this Sovereign Man travels upon the streets
or highways in the 50 united States of America,he does so as a matter of RIGHT and not privilege.The
authority for such travel is described variously as a RIGHT,a COMMON RIGHT,an ABSOLUTE
RIGHT,an IN/UNALIENABLE RIGHT,and a RIGHT protected by the Constitution of the United
States for the United States of America.Let us then examine the importance of these terms to
this Sovereign Man by defining their meaning.

29.1 RIGHT-In law,(a) an enforceable claim or title to any subject matter whatever; (b)
one's claim to something out of possession; (c) a power,prerogative,or privilege as when the
word is applied to a corporation. (Emphasis added). See: Webster Unabridged Dictionary.

29.2 RIGHT - As relates to the person,RIGHTS are absolute or relative; absolute RIGHTS,such as
every individual born or living in this country (and not an alien enemy) is constantly clothed with,and
relate to his own personal security of life,limbs,body, health,and reputation; or to his personal
liberty; RIGHTS which attach upon every person immediately upon his birth in the kings dominion,and
even upon a slave the instant he lands within the same.(Emphasis added). See: 1 Chitty Pr.32.

29.3 RIGHT-A legal RIGHT, a constitutional RIGHT means a RIGHT protected by the
law,by the constitution,but government does not create the idea of RIGHT or original RIGHTS;
it acknowledges them....(Emphasis added).See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary,19 1 4,p. 2961.

29.4 Absolute RIGHT-Without any condition or incumbrance as an absolute bond,simplex

obligatio,in distinction from a conditional bond; an absolute estate,one that is free from all
manner of conditions or incumbrance.A rule is said to be absolute when,on the hearing,it is
confirmed.(Emphasis added). See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
 29.5 Unalienable - A word denoting the condition of those things, the property in which
cannot be lawfully transferred from one person to another. (Emphasis added). See: Bouvier's
Law Dictionary.

30. It shows from these definitions that the states and these courts have an obligation to
acknowledge the RIGHT of this Sovereign Man to travel on the streets or highways in the 50
united States of America. Further, the states have the duty to refrain from interfering with this
RIGHT and to protect this RIGHT and to enforce the claim of this Sovereign Man to it.

31. Now if this Sovereign Man has the absolute RIGHT to move about on the streets or
highways, does that RIGHT include the RIGHT to travel in a automobile upon the streets or
highways? The Supreme Court of the State of Texas has made comments that are an appropriate
response to this question.

31.1 Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the
unrestricted RIGHT of use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything which destroys any of these elements
of property, to that extent destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its
use. If the RIGHT of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is
rendered a barren RIGHT. Therefore, a law which forbids the use of a certain kind of property,
strips it of an essential attribute and in actual result proscribes its ownership. (Emphasis added).
See: Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513.

32. The Supreme Court of Texas went on to say further;

32.1 To secure their property was one of the great ends for which men entered into
society. The RIGHT to acquire and own property, and to deal with it and use it as the owner
chooses, so long as the use harms nobody, is a natural RIGHT. It does not owe its origin to
constitutions. It existed before them. It is a part of the Citizen's natural liberty-an expression of
his freedom, guaranteed as inviolate by every American Bill of RIGHTS. (Emphasis added). See:
Spann supra.

INDIVIDUAL (MAN) AND A CORPORATION

33. When the state allows the formation of a corporation it may control its creation by
establishing guidelines (statutes) for its operation (charters). Corporations who use the roads in the
course of business do not use the roads in the ordinary course of life. There is a difference
between a corporation and an individual. The United States Supreme Court has stated:

33.1 "...We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an
individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and
papers for examination on the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon his Constitutional
Rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to
contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to
open his doors to investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty to
the state, since he receives

nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life, liberty, and property. His Rights are such as the
law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by
due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his Rights are the refusal to
incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under
warrant of law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights."

33.2 The Emphasized statement is also consistent with common law of England, as far as it
is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States in all cases not
provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts in the states. Since the
statutes of the 50 united States of America cannot apply to this Sovereign Man, he becomes subject
to the Common Law that maintains that he owes nothing to the public while he does not trespass
upon their RIGHTS.

33.3 A corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit
of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises and holds them, subject to the laws
of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its RIGHTS to act as a corporation are only preserved
to it while it obeys the laws of its creation. (Emphasis added). See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
1914 p. 684

33.3. l "On the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and
holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its rights to act as a
corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right
in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would
be a strange anomaly to hold that the state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain
franchises, could not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire how those franchises had been employed,
and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of corporate books and papers for that
purpose." Hale v. Hinkel, 201 US 43, 74-75

33.4 Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the purview of the state's
admiralty jurisdiction, and the public at large must be protected from their activities, as they
(the corporations) are engaged in business for profit.

33.5 "...Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the plenary
control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police power (see police power, infra.),
may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business
for gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary Right of the Citizen
to use the streets in the usual way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a main
instrumentality of business for private gain. The former is a common Right; the latter is an
extraordinary use. As to the former, the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter, it
is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a common carrier
in the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but a mere license of privilege." Hadfield v.
Lundin, 98 Wash 516
 33.6 The liberty guaranteed is that of a natural person and not of artificial persons;
Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 where it was said "a corporation cannot be deemed
a Citizen within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution of the United States which
protects the privileges and immunities of Citizens of the united States against being abridged or
impaired by the law of a state." See also 203 U.S. 243.

33.7 The Constitutions of the United States and the states guarantees this Sovereign Man
the RIGHT to own property. The Supreme Courts of North Carolina and Texas have affirmed that the
RIGHT to own property includes the RIGHT to use it while its use harms nobody. Thus it shows
that this Sovereign Man has the RIGHT to use an automobile (property) on the streets or
highways in 50 united States of America.

34. Now if this Sovereign Man has the RIGHT to use an automobile on the streets or
highways in the 50 united States of America, to what extent can the states regulate or diminish
that RIGHT? There are some who maintain that specific performance is required of every
Sovereign Man who uses an automobile upon the streets or highways in the 50 united States of
America. Let us examine this contention in detail.

AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE

35. There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle. An

automobile has been defined as:

35.1 "The word 'automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of
persons on highways." American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., v. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH
200

36. Courts, while making the distinction clear between the two, have similarly stated:

36.1 "A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an
automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received."
International Motor Transit Co. v. Seattle, 251 P. 120

36.2 “The term 'motor vehicle' is different and broader than the word
'automobile.” City of Dayton v. DeBrosse, 23 NE. 2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232

37. The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31(6):

37.1 Motor vehicle - The term "motor vehicle" means every description of carriage or
other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes
on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or
cargo.

38. “Used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any
fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or directly or indirectly in connection with any
business, or other undertaking intended for profit.
 39. It becomes clearly that on automobile is private, not corporate property in use for
private purposes, while a "motor vehicle" is a (corporate) machine which may be used upon the
highways for trade, commerce, or hire. Any governmental infringement or restriction upon one
man's property is a restriction in the “use, enjoyment and disposal and anything which destroys any
of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property itself.” See: Spann v. City of
Dallas, 235 S.W. 513.

PROPERTY

39.1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines;

39.1.1 Property - The ownership of property implies its use in the prosecution of any
legitimate business which is not a nuisance in itself. See: In re Hong Wah, 82 Fed. 623.

40. The United States Supreme Court states:

40.1 The Federal Constitution and laws passed within its authority are by the express
terms of that instrument made the supreme law of the land. The Fourteenth Amendment binds
alls protects life, liberty, and property from invasion by the states without due process of law.

40.2 Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it
includes the "RIGHT' to acquire, use and dispose of it. (Emphasis added). See: Buchanon v.
Warley 245 U.S. 60, 74.

41. These authorities point out that the RIGHT to own property includes the RIGHT to use
it. The reasonable use of an automobile is to travel upon the streets or highways on which this
Sovereign Mon has an absolute RIGHT to use for the purposes of travel.

TRAVEL

42. The term "trove/" is a significant term and is defined as:

42.1 "The term 'travel' and 'traveler' are usually construed in their broad and general sense
... so as to include all those who rightfully use the highways vioticolly (when being reimbursed
for expenses) and who hove occasion to poss over them for the purpose of business, convenience, or
pleasure." 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect.427, Pg. 717

42.2 'Traveler - One who posses from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction,
business, or health." Locket v. State, 47 Alo. 45; Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3309

42.3 'Travel - To journey or to poss through or over; as a country district, rood, etc. To go
from one place to another, whether on foot, or horseback, or in any conveyance
 as a train, an automobile, carriage, ship, or aircraft; Make a journey." Century Dictionary, Pg. 2034

43. Therefore, the term "travef' or "traveler'' refers to one who uses a "conveyance" to
go from one place to another, and included all those who use the highways as a matter of Right.
Notice that in all these definitions, the phrase "for hire" never occurs. This term "travel" or
"traveler'' implies, by definition, one who uses the road as a means to move from one place to
another and using the mode of "conveyance" of his choice. See: Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE
579

44. Therefore, when this Sovereign Man uses the road in the ordinary course of life and
business for the purpose of travel and transportation, he is a traveler.

45. The term "driver'' in contradistinction to "traveler," is defined as:

45. l "Driver - One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle
..." Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 940

46. Notice that this definition includes one who is "employed in conducting a ...
vehicle". It should be self-evident that this individual could not be "traveling" on a journey,
but is using the road as a place of business and/or commercial gain.

47. Today, many assume that a "traveler'' is a "driver," and a "driver'' is an

"operator." However, this is not the case.

47. l "It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be
drawn between the terms 'operator' and 'driver'; the 'operator' of the service car being the person
who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for hire;
while the 'driver' is the one who actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of
business, it was possible for the same person to be both "operator'' and "driver." Newbill v.
Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658

48. To further clarify the definition of an "operator" the court observed that this was a
vehicle "for hire" and that it was in the business of carrying passengers for gain. This definition
would seem to describe a person who is using the road as a place of business, or in other
words, a person engaged in the "privilege" of using the road for gain. This definition, then, is a
further clarification of the distinction mentioned earlier, and therefore:

48. l. A) Traveling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads is a matter
of Right and meets the definition of a traveler.
B) Using the road as a place of business is a matter of privilege and meets the
definition of a driver or an operator or both.

49. Having defined the terms "automobile," "motor vehicle," "traveler," "driver," and
"operator," the next term to define is "traffic":

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 49. l "... Traffic thereon is to some extent destructive, therefore, the prevention of unnecessary
duplication of auto transportation service will lengthen the life of the highways or reduce the cost
of maintenance, the revenue derived by the state ... will also tend toward the public welfare by
producing at the expense of those operating for private gain, some small part of the cost of repairing
the wear ..." Northern Pacific R.R.
Co. v. Schoenfeldt, 213 P. 26

(Justice Tolman expounded upon the key of raising revenue by taxing the "privilege" to use the
public roads "at the expense of those operating for gain.")

50. In this case, the word "traffic" is used in conjunction with the unnecessary Auto
Transportation Service, or in other words, "vehicles for hire." The word "traffic" is another word
which is to be strictly construed to the conducting of business.

50. l 'Traffic - Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, or the like.
The passing of goods and commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or
money ..." Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3307

51. Here again, notice that this definition refers to one "conducting business." No mention is
made of one who is traveling in his automobile. This definition is of one who is engaged in the
passing of a commodity or goods in exchange for money, i.e., vehicles for hire.

52. Furthermore, the words "traffic" and "travel" must have different meanings that the courts
recognize. The courts recognized the difference in Ex Porte Dickey, supra:

52. l "...in addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses, taxicabs, and hacks, when
unnecessarily numerous, interfere with the ordinary traffic and travel and obstruct them."

53. The court, by using both terms, signified its recognition of a distinction between the
two. But, what was the distinction? We have already defined both terms, but to clear up any doubt:

53.l 'The word 'traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary sense, and has reference to
the business of transportation rather than to its primary meaning of interchange of
commodities." Allen v. City of Bellingham, 163 P. 18

54. Here the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has defined the word "traffic" (in
either its primary or secondary sense) in reference to business, and not to mere travel! So it is clear
that the term "traffic" is business related and therefore, it is a "privilege." The net result being that
"traffic" is brought under the (police) power of the legislature. The term has no application to one
who is not using the roads as a place of business.

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 55. It seems only proper to define the word "license," as the definition of this word will
shed light in understanding the statutes as they are properly applied:

55.1 "The permission, by competent authority to do an act which without permission,

would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort." People v. Henderson, 218 NW.2d 2, 4

55.2 "Leave to do a thing which licensor could prevent." Western Electric Co. v.
Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118

56. In order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the state would have to take up
the position that the exercise of a Constitutional Right to use the public roads in the ordinary
course of life and business is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which the state could then regulate or
prevent. This position, however, would overwhelmingly raise great Constitutional controversy
as this position would be diametrically opposed to fundamental Constitutional Law and the Bill
of Rights. (See "Conversion of a Right to a Crime," infra.)

57. In the instant case, the proper definition of a "license" is:

57.1 "... a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for

consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation or to carry on some
business which is subject to regulation under the police power." Rosenblatt v. California State
Board of Pharmacy, 158 P.2d 199, 203

58. This definition would fall more in line with the "privilege" of carrying on business on
the streets.

59.

60. Most would agree that the existing police power is there for the public's protection -
in this instance over the use of the public streets or highways. Although, in part, this is
accurate, such police power should not infringe a man's common RIGHT to freely travel.

60.1 "With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right
secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police
authority." Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier v. Grand Trunk R.R. Co.,
24 A. 848; O'Neil v. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887

60.2 'The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of
the U.S. Constitution." Bacahanan v. Wanley, 245 US 60; Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v.
State Highway Commission, 294 US 613

60.3 "It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion by the
police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied prohibitions in the
Constitutions." Tiche v. Osborne, 131 A. 60

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 60.4 "As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are found
in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although they are just as efficient as if
expressed in the clearest language." Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882

61. As it applies in the instant case, the language of the Fifth Amendment is clear:

61.1 "No person shall be ... deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property without due process
of law."

62. As has been shown, the courts at all levels have firmly established this
Sovereign Man's absolute Right to travel.

63. In the instant case, this state, by broadly applying commercial statutes to all entities,
natural men and artificial persons alike, has attempted deprived the Aggrieved Accused, a free-born
and natural man, of the Right of Liberty without cause and without these courts exercising their
duty bound mandate to provide equal protection.

JUDUCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DUE PROCESS

64. These courts have a judicial responsibility to administer due process.

65. l 'The essential elements of due process of law are ... Notice and The
Opportunity to defend." Simon v. Craft, 182 US 427

65.2 'There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty ..." Barbour v.

Connolly, 113 US 27, 31; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356

65.3 'The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the
Magna Carta." Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958)

65. In assessing the focal point of this question of police power and the courts duty to act
judicially according to their constitutional mandates, one must first make the distinction between
"traveling" and "driving", for legislation, through its codes, statutes, and regulations, has regulated
police powers only to those drivers/operators, functioning in a corporate capacity. Hence, there only
exists loose arguments asserting police powers over the traveler and his automobile with exception
to him (the traveler), while in exercising his right to travel, causes injury to another "traveler" or
"driver". It is at this critical point of injury, not simply the (future) threat of injury, that the idea of
ensuring to every man equal protection under the law becomes the driving force of the state
legislature in its deployment of police powers.

66. In a common law venue, if one travels in a manner that creates actual damage, an
action would lie (civilly) for recovery of damages. The victim would therefore have just cause
to bring acting (suit) against the accused and may seek assistance from the state in his
prosecution. The accused, if found guilty by a group of his peers, should then pay restitution to
the victim. Yet, his right to travel should remain

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 complete. This process would fulfill the due process requirements of the Fifth and/or Fourteenth
Amendment while at the same time insuring protection and security of each man's natural, God-given
Rights, antecedent to the U.S. Constitution and the state constitutions. But until harm or damage
(a crime) is committed, there is no cause for interference from legislative police power in the
private affairs or actions of a Citizen.

67.l One of the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of due process of law,
is that of Daniel Webster in his Dartmouth College Case (4 Wheat 518), in which he declared that
by due process is meant:

67.l.l "... a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial." See also State v. Strasburg, 110 P. l020; Dennis v. Moses, 52 P. 333

67. Somewhat similar is the statement that is a rule as old as the law that:

68.l "... no one shall be personally bound (restricted) until he has had his day in court,"

68.l.l "... by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an
opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks all the attributes of
a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and it is oppressive and can never be upheld
where it is fairly administered." (12 Am. Jur. [lst] Const. Law, Sect. 573, Pg. 269)

68. It must be noted that this sounds like the process used to deprive one of the
"privilege" of operating a motor vehicle "for hire." It should be kept in mind, however, that we
are discussing the arbitrary deprivation of the Right to use the road that all men have "in
common."

69. The futility of the state's position can be most easily observed in the 1959
Washington Attorney General's opinion on a similar issue:

70.l 'The distinction between the Right of the Citizen to use the public highways for private,
rather than commercial purposes is recognized ..."

70.l.l "Under its power to regulate private uses of our highways, our legislature has required that
motor vehicle operators be licensed (1.C. 49-307). Undoubtedly, the primary purpose of this
requirement is to insure, as far as possible, that all motor vehicle operators will be competent and
qualified, thereby reducing the potential hazard or risk of harm, to which other users of the
highways might otherwise be subject. But once having complied with this regulatory provision, by
obtaining the required license, a
motorist enjoys the privilege of traveling freely upon the highways ..." Washington A.G.O. 59-60 No.
88, Pg. 11

70. It alarmingly appears as though this opinion states that everyone, using an
automobile as a matter of Right, must give up the Right and convert the Right into a
 state privilege. (It may even be his intent to deceive the general public under the guise of state
regulation.} Any lawmaker however knows this is far from the truth and diametrically in opposition
to his constitutional charter. Such broad-stroke statements by legislators are indicative of their
insensitivity,even the ignorance,of their government's constitutional limitations under which they
must operate.

70.1 This legal rhetoric may have been able to stand in 1959; however,as of 1966, in the
United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda,even this weak defense of the state's actions must
fall.

70.1.1"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved,there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona,384 US 436,491

71. Thus,the Supreme Court has reminded the various state legislatures and their courts that none
has the power to abrogate one's RIGHT to travel upon the public roads,by passing legislation forcing
its citizen to waive his RIGHT and convert that RIGHT into a privilege. Furthermore,we have previously
established that this "privilege" has been defined as applying only to those who are "conducting
business in the streets" or "operating for-hire vehicles."

71.1 These courts have attempted to use color of law and misapply commercial statutes to a
non-commercial,living soul,this Sovereign Man,by broadly and inappropriately applying
statutes to him in an effort to deprive of his RIGHT to use the roads in the ordinary course of life
and business. In doing so,these courts and their actors do not fulfill their sworn,constitutional oaths
to safeguard and defend men's RIGHTS through a lawful,judicially equitable process of law.

SURRENDER OF RIGHTS

72. One cannot be forced to give up his Rights in the name of regulation.

72.1 "... the only limitations found restricting the right of the state to condition the use of the
public highways as a means of vehicular transportation for compensation are (1} that the state must
not exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they surrender any of their
inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use ..."
Riley v. Laeson,142 So. 619; Stephenson v. Binford,supra.

72.2 "We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another." Simons v. United States,390 US 389

73. Any compulsory legislative statute,enforced through actual police power, which compels
this Sovereign Man,moving as a traveler,to exchange is right to travel for a privilege to drive
remains unconstitutional and is void. Yet,the constitution provided safeguards for anyone the right
to contract as he sees fit. If one then chooses to contract with another, he should make certain that he
understands the terms of the
contract. The driver's license is however not a contract, nor is it truly a quasi-contract that is expressed
or implied by one's action.

CONVERSION OF A RIGHT TO A CRIME

74. As previously demonstrated, this Sovereign Man has the RIGHT to travel and to transport his
property upon the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business. However, if he
exercises this RIGHT to travel (without first giving up the Right and converting that Right into a
privilege) one may believe by reading the state statutes that he is guilty of a crime. This is indeed
far from the truth. See: Miller v. U.S. and Snerer v. Cullen.

75.1. 'The state cannot diminish Rights of the people." Hurtado v. California, 110 US
516

75.2 "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda, supra.

75. Indeed, the very purpose for creating the state under and within the limitations of the
constitution was to protect the rights of the people from governmental and commercial intrusion.
Thus, we can see that any attempt by the legislature to make the act of using the public highways
as a matter of Right into a crime, is void upon its face. Moreover, one will have difficulty in finding
a statute compelling anyone to perform anything that would violate his rights. The reason is that
legal writers, professional wordsmiths, acutely understand their constitutional mandates and
restrictions to craft codes, statutes, and regulations in such a way that protect and preserve every
man's God-given RIGHTS. These courts know this to be true.

75.1 Anyone who claims his Right to travel upon the highways, and so exercises that Right,
cannot be tried for a crime in so doing. It has already been established that the term "drive" can only
apply to those who engage in the "business of transportation" for commercial gain. It has also been
shown that "freedom" includes the Citizen's Right to use the public highways in the ordinary course
of life and business without restriction (license or regulation) by the state corporate police.

CONTRACT?

76. Specific performance is a term used to designate an action in equity in which a party to a
contract asks the court to order the other party to carry out the terms of the contract which he has
failed or refused to perform. Thus, if specific performance is expected, a contract must exist. The
question then becomes: What are the terms of the contract, when was it executed, and by whom?
Since specific performance seems expected of every user of an automobile on the streets or
highways in the 50 united states of America, the user of a automobile seems to be one of the
parties to such alleged contract. And since the state appears the party demanding specific
performance, the state is the other party to the contract. Hence, the supposed contract exists
between the automobile user and the state. When was this contract

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 executed and what are its' terms? Some contend that when an automobile user avails himself of the
(licensed) "privilege" of driving on public thoroughfares that he enters a contract with the state
that requires him to abide with all the laws in the union of states' statutes. Others contend that the
contract is executed when a driver's license is obtained. We need now to determine what a contract
is.

77. A contract may be defined as an agreement enforceable in court between two or

more parties, for a sufficient consideration to do or not to do some specified thing or things.
Thus, a contract has four essential features:

77.1 It must be an agreement.

77.2 There must be at least two parties to the contract.

77.3 There must be a consideration.

77.4 There must be an obligation or thing to be done.

78. Several types of contracts exist but all must contain the essential features listed.
Contracts can be classified under three principal categories:

78.1 1 Express

78.2 Implied

78.3 Quasi

79. We will not consider quasi contracts - while being called contracts are not really
contracts -in this discussion of contracts but we will examine them more closely in a separate
section later.

UNILATERAL & BILATERAL CONTRACTS

80. There can also be unilateral and bilateral contracts that are presumed to exist under
some or all the above headings. Let us examine each types of contracts to see if the license
obtained by this Sovereign Man falls under any of the categories of contract.

81 .1 An express contract is one in which the agreement of the parties is fully stated in
words, and it may be either written or oral, or partly written and partly oral. See: Bergh Business
Law 30.

81 .2 A true implied contract is an agreement of the parties arrived at from their acts and
conduct viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, and not from their words either
spoken or written. Like an express contract, it grows out of the intention of the parties to the
transaction and there must be a meeting of the minds. See: McKevitt et al v. Golden Age
Breweries, Inc., 126 P.2d l 077 (l 942).

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 81.3 License - Authority to do some act or carry on some trade or business,in its nature
lawful but prohibited by statute,except with the permission of the civil authority or which would
otherwise be unlawful. See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

81.3. l "The permission,by competent authority to do an act which without permission,would

be illegal,a trespass,or a tort." People v. Henderson,218 NW.2d 2,4

81. In obtaining a license,what has the state given in return and what is the licensee's
presumed obligation? Some may suggest that the State has given or extended to the licensee the
privilege of driving on the streets or highways in the 50 united States of America; yet the
Sovereign Man already has the RIGHT to travel on the streets or highways in 50 united States of
America. The state cannot require or force this Sovereign Man to give up a RIGHT to obtain a privilege.
See: Miranda v. Arizona,384 US 436,491

82. It would be foolish for this Sovereign Man to exchange a RIGHT for a privilege since it
would mean giving up his God-given inheritance,his RIGHT,valuable property, in exchange for
something having less value. It is impossible for this Sovereign Man to do such a thing.

83. l A /'impossible nu/ n'est tenu. No one is bound to do what is impossible. l

Bouv. Inst. n. 601.

83.2 Consent -- In criminal Law. No act shall be deemed a crime if done with the consent of
the party injured,unless it be committed in public,and is likely to provoke a breach of the peace,or
tends to the injury of a third party: provided no consent can be given which will deprive the
consenter of any unalienable RIGHT. (Emphasis added). See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

83. Thus,even if this Sovereign Man wanted to do so,he could not give up his RIGHT to
travel on the streets or highways in the 50 united States of America or exchange it for the
privilege of having a driver's license. Thus,in exchange for the supposed obligation of this
Sovereign Man,the State has given nothing. Consequently, there is no consideration.

84. One may contend that the seal on the driver's license is sufficient consideration by the
State. It is true that under the common law,the question of consideration could not be raised
concerning a contract under seal. The seal provided conclusive presumption of a consideration.
Still,states have abolished by statute the common law presumption of consideration.
Subsequently,though a seal may be present,it is not evidence of consideration in the 50 united States
of America. Of course, the document in question is a contrived and copied document and lacks validity
in any case as a contract.

85. As to an obligation,since the license contains no statement of agreement, since there are
no parties to any agreement,and since there is no consideration,there

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can be no obligation. The driver's license thus is not a contract since it fails to contain any of the
four essential features of a contract.

86. Can the driver's license be an implied contract? The same elements must exist in an
implied contract as exist in an express contract. The only difference is that an implied contract is not
written or spoken and the elements of the contract are shown by the acts or conduct of the parties
involved. It was never (nor is) the intention of this Sovereign Man to give up his God-given, common
RIGHTS to accept a privilege from the state. Such an action would be ridiculous. Is it possible that
there were two parties to the supposed contract, the state and this Sovereign Man? There was no
consideration in the implied contract for the same reasons that there was no consideration in the
express contract.

87. An obligation is the thing to be done. It may be to pay money, to do work, or to

deliver goods; or it may be to refrain from doing something that the man contracting had a RIGHT to
do. Some may say that the state was obligated to allow this Sovereign Man to drive on the streets or
highways in the united States of America and that this Sovereign Man was obligated to obey all the
statutes contained in the states' statutes. It would be just as easy to say that the state could not be
obligated to allow this Sovereign Man to travel on the streets or highways in the 50 united States of
America because they did not have the lawful RIGHT or the lawful power to prevent him from
doing so. (Police powers used in direct relation to this Sovereign Man's RIGHT are constitutionally
unlawful and improper.)

88. If the state cannot lawfully prevent this Sovereign Man from traveling on the streets or
highways in 50 united States of America, it does not have any discretion in the matter and does not
have the choice of whether to obligate itself or not. Thus, the obligation of the state cannot be to
grant this Sovereign Man the privilege of traveling on the streets or highways in the 50 united States
of America. The obligation of the state must be to preserve and defend this Sovereign Man's RIGHT
to travel in his automobile on the streets or highways in the 50 united States of America since this
is a state's constitutional objective to protect and defend the people's rights.

89. It is the declaration of this Sovereign Man that the only obligation he incurs when using
an automobile upon the streets or highways in the united States of America is the Common Law
obligation to refrain from any act that causes another person to lose life, liberty, or property. This
agrees with The Holy Scriptures and the Ten Commandments.

89.1 "Any law contrary to the Law of God is no law at all." Sir William Blackstone.

89.2 'The law is from everlasting." Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1914, 'Maxim', page 2143.
(Psalm 90:2; 93:2; 145:13).

90. The actions of this Sovereign Man do not supply unambiguous evidence of a contract
with the state. Instead, the actions can, with equal weight, be said to be evidence of the fact that
this Sovereign Man was complying with The Holy Scriptures,

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 Common Law requirement that he harms no one. Thus, the driver's license is not an implied
contract because there is no consideration, there possibly may be two parties, but there is no
consideration, and there is not clear evidence of an obligation - three of the four elements
necessary for a contract are missing.

91. The question now becomes whether the driver's license application is a contract. In
completing this document, the applicant makes several statements and signs the paper upon
which these statements are written under oath. The statements concern the identity, physical
description, address, ability and experience in using an automobile, and one statement on the
physical condition of the applicant. None of the statements are as an agreement.

92. The application form contains the signature of the applicant and the signature of
the state agent taking the oath of the applicant. The reverse side of the application contains the
results of a vision test and rudimentary physical examination with the results of a driving test. The
examiner signs these results, not the applicant.

93. Thus the application takes more the form of an affidavit instead of a contract. But let
us see if the elements of a contract are present in the application.

93.1 There is no agreement.

93.2 There are not two parties.

93.3 There is no consideration.

93.4 There is no obligation.

94. Since none of the necessary elements of a contract are present, the
application does not constitute a contract.

95. The only document involved in obtaining a driver's license is the document, part of
which is copied to make the actual driver's license. It contains, besides the information that is
used in making the driver's license, the results of a vision test conducted by the driver's license
examiner.

96. Thus, neither the license nor the application of such can be a contract. So if none of
the documents executed by the driver when obtaining a license is a contract, then no contract
can exist between the licensee and the state as a result of obtaining a driver's license.

97. However, if one chooses to argue otherwise, some serious errors and
illegalities occur.

MISTAKE EITHER MUTUAL OR UNILATERAL

98. l Mistake either mutual or unilateral.

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 98.2 Fraud.

98.3 Duress.

98.4 Alteration.

98. If someone obtains a driver's license upon the representation by the state that
traveling upon the streets or highways of the united States of America was a privilege, then
he, the licensee, has accepted the state's representation as true.

98.1 It is an established fact that traveling is a "RIGHf' and not a privilege. Thus, there
exists a mutual mistake, and the "contract" is void. See: Deibel v. Kreiss, 50 N.E. 2d 1000
(1943).

99. But the legislative bodies of the states who passed the statutes contained in the union
of states' statutes are knowledgeable people, many of whom are lawyers, and they undoubtedly
knew at the time the law was passed that traveling was a RIGHT and not a privilege. The mistake
therefore is unilateral. A unilateral mistake known to the other party is sufficient grounds to void
a contract. (Ignorance of the law is no excuse of the law.)

100.

FRAUD

100.1 Fraud may consist in conduct, and may exist where there are no positive
representations. Silence, where honesty requires speech, may sometimes constitute fraud. The
rule that a man may be silent and safe is by no means a universal one. Where one contracting
party knows that the other is bargaining for one thing, he has no RIGHT by silence to deceive
him and suffer him to take an altogether different thing, from that for which he bargains.
{Emphasis added). See: Parish v. Thurston 87 Ind. 437 (1882).

101. If the driver's license is a contract, a case can be made for the contention that
it was an agreement obtained by the state by fraud.

101.1 Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human
ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to get any advantage over another.
No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, as it
includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and unfair ways by which another is
deceived. See: Wells v. Zenz, 236 P. 485.

102. With respect to contracts, the following statements can be made:

102.1 However, in the field of contracts, there are certain litmus tests for a claim of fraud
which make it possible to define fraud, in connection with a contract as any trick or artifice
whereby a person by means of a material misrepresentation creates an

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 erroneous impression of the subject matter of a proposed transaction, and thereby induces another
person to suffer damage computable in money. The misrepresentation may result from a false
statement, concealment, or a nondisclosure. The elements of a contractual fraud are the following:

102.1.1 A material misrepresentation, created by a statement, a concealment. or a

nondisclosure.

102.1.2 An intention to defraud.

102.1.3 Reliance on the representation by the defrauded party.

103. l .4 Damage caused to the defrauded party as the result of his acting upon the
representation. See: Bergh Business Law p. 56

104. In view of the many decisions by high courts, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, that traveling is a RIGHT and not a privilege, it would be hard to defend the
proposition that the legislative bodies of the states were unaware of these decisions, particularly
since many legislators are and were lawyers knowledgeable in such matters.

l 05. Therefore, any statements in the statutes that traveling is a privilege and that a driver's
license is necessary before traveling constitutes a material misrepresentation of fact to the licensee.
And since the legislature is and was aware of the fact that traveling was not a privilege, but a
"RIGHT," any statement that traveling is a privilege, when applied to this Sovereign Man,
constitutes a willful intention to deceive and, therefore, to defraud.

106. In as much as all the necessary elements of fraud are present if the driver's license is
considered a contract, the "contract" is void and the state's actions in this regard are
fraudulent.

DURESS

107. With respect to duress, Bergh supra supplies the following definition:

107.1 A party must consent to a contract of his own free will; free consent is an essential
element of an agreement. Consequently, if he is coerced into signing a contract by fear induced by
a threat to cause personal injury to him or to some close relative, the contract will not be a
legitimate agreement and shall be voidable at his option. The threat of personal injury must be a
threat to inflict immediate bodily injury or to institute a criminal prosecution against the person
threatened or some close relative.

108. With respect to alterations, Bergh supra has the following comments:

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 l 08. l Any material alteration in a written contract by one party without the consent of
the other party gives this latter the option of treating the contract as discharged or enforcing
it as it stood before the alteration.

l 09. If it is contended that the driver's license is an implied contract, the Statute of
Frauds comes into play. The states have enacted a Statute of Frauds.

110. In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum of it, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent.
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary
evidence of its contents:

111. Since the term (duration) of the driver's license is for a specific number of years
and the contract is not written, the Statute of Frauds does apply and the contract is
unenforceable.

112. The discussion up to this point has been concerned with bilateral contracts in
which each party promises something to the other party. ls it possible that the driver's
license is a unilateral contract? A unilateral contract is described as:

112. l A unilateral contract is a one-sided contract in the sense that only one side
makes a promise, and the other side performs an act for which the promise was given. See:
Bergh supra.

113. Since the expected act by the state is obedience to the statutes of the union of
states' statutes, what promise has the state offered in exchange for this expected act of
obedience? The only promise that the state could make this Sovereign Man is the promise to
protect and defend their constitutional oaths to preserve and defend his RIGHT to travel on
the streets or highways in the 50 united States of America. Since this Sovereign Man
already can do that as a matter of RIGHT, the state can promise him nothing. Thus there is
no consideration and a unilateral contract cannot exist.

114. Having shown that no contract exists between this Sovereign Man and the
state, let us examine the proposition that a quasi-contract exists between this Sovereign
Man and the state.

115.

QUASI-CONTRACT

l 15. l A quasi-contract is an obligation springing from voluntary and lawful acts of

parties in the absence of any agreement. See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

116. In order to establish the existence of a quasi-contractual obligation it must be

shown:

116. l That the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff.

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 116.2 That the retention of the benefit by the defendant is inequitable. See: Woodward Quasi
Contracts 9.

117. Thus, if it is contended that this Sovereign Man must obey the statutes in the union of
states' statutes because of a quasi-contract, it must be shown that this Sovereign Man has received
a benefit from the state. But traveling in one's automobile and on the streets or highways in the state
is not a benefit granted from the state. It is a RIGHT that is inseparable from this Sovereign Man at
the moment of his birth. The state cannot remove it. In this respect, this Sovereign Man has received
no benefit from the state, and thus a quasi-contractual obligation cannot exist.

118. It may be claimed that the statutes are made pursuant to the police powers of the state
and that every person in the state is obligated to obey them.

119. The police power is a grant of authority from the people to their governmental agents
for the protection of the health, the safety, the comfort and the welfare of the public which is
commiserate with it constitutional mandates. In its nature it is broad and comprehensive. It is
important to make the distinction that police power is simply power, not a "RIGHT."

120. The powers of government are nowhere absolute. They are but grants of authority from
the sovereign people, and are limited to their true purposes. The fundamental RIGHTS of the
people are inherent and have not yielded to governmental control. They are not the subjects of
governmental authority.

120. l All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.
Constitution of the State of Arizona, Article 2, § 2

121. Constitutional powers are subject to man's God-given, natural RIGHTS. The police power is
subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon every power of government; and it will
not be suffered to invade or impair the fundamental liberties of the Sovereign Man, whose natural
RIGHTS are the chief concern of the Constitution and for whose protection the people ordained.

121. l To secure their property was one of the great ends for which men entered into society.
The RIGHT to acquire and own property, and to deal with it and use it as the owner chooses, so
long as the use harms nobody, is a natural RIGHT. It does not owe its origin to constitutions. It
existed before them. It is a part of the man's natural liberty-an expression of his freedom, guaranteed
as inviolate by every American Bill of RIGHTS.

121.2 It is not a RIGHT, therefore, over which the police power is paramount. Like every
other fundamental liberty, it is a RIGHT to which the police power is subordinate.

121.3 It is a RIGHT which takes into account the equal RIGHTS of others, for it is qualified
by the obligation that the use of the property shall not be to the prejudice of

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others. But if subject alone to that qualification,the Citizen is not free to use his lands and his
goods as he chooses,it is difficult to perceive wherein his RIGHT of property has any existence.
(Emphasis added). See: Spann supra.

122. Where inherent, unalienable,absolute RIGHTS are concerned, the police powers can
have no effect. The RIGHT to travel on the streets or highways and the RIGHT to own and
use property have been described as inherent,unalienable,and absolute. Thus the police power
cannot regulate this Sovereign Man's RIGHT to use an automobile on the streets or highways in
the 50 united States of America.

122.1 Where RIGHTS secured by the Constitution are involved,there can be no rule making or
legislation that would abrogate them. (Emphasis added). See: Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S.
436,491 (1966).

122.2 Derativa potestas non potest esse major primitiva. The power which is derived
cannot be greater than that from which it is derived.

123. The abrogation of unalienable RIGHTS by legislation or rule making is

unconstitutional.

124. If further proof is needed to show that this Sovereign Man need not be licensed to
travel in his automobile on the streets or highways in the 50 united States of America,it is provided
in the following decisions:

124.1 A license fee is a tax. See: Parish of Morehouse v. Brigham,6 S. 257.

124.2 A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a RIGHT granted by the
Federal Constitution. (Emphasis added). (However,rights are not granted by any piece of
paper,only privileges). See: Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105.

125. Since traveling on the streets or highways in the 50 united States of America is a RIGHT
which these licensed,courts agent,officers,and officials are required to enforce and protect,it is
therefore constitutionally unsound for any state to require this Sovereign Man to licensed his
RIGHT to travel in his automobile except he choose to use the public streets or highways for
extraordinary use,for commercial gain. It is constitutionally unsound for any state to regulate a
RIGHT through its legislative police powers.

126. Even the application for a Driver's License form recognizes the RIGHT of some people
to travel without a license. The union of states' statutes recognizes categories of peoples who are not
required to be licensed in the state. Why is it then that the first demand made by the law
enforcement personnel when making a traffic stop is: "Let's see your driver's
license,registration,and proof of insurance," when the first question should be; What is your status and
are you required to have a driver's license?"

127. Can it be that there is a conspiracy afoot within the states to reduce all Sovereign
Men to a commercial (corporate) status through contract? Why else would a

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law enforcement officer/person take a traveler to jail without even trying to discover if that man or
woman was exempt from the requirement of having a driver's license?

128. The question now becomes whether this Sovereign Man is required to obey any of the
statutes in the union of states' statutes. It has been shown that this Sovereign Man has a RIGHT to
travel on the streets or highways in the united States of America. So, any statute that describes
traveling on the streets or highways as a privilege cannot apply to this Sovereign Man since the
RIGHT of this Sovereign Man to travel cannot be abrogated. Any statute in operation that would
have the effect of denying access to the streets or highways to this Sovereign Man cannot apply
to this Sovereign Man.

129. Is it the declaration of this Sovereign Man that because the statutes contained in the
union of states' statutes do not apply to him that the statutes are unconstitutional? Absolutely not!
There is a class of persons in the 50 united States of America to whom these statutes apply without
reservation. Members of this class include corporations and those who operate for gain or profit in
commercial pursuits, i.e., Motor Carriers, taxies, buses, etc., on the streets or highways in the 50 united
States of America. A corporation is the creation of the state. See: State v. City of Spokane, 186
P. 864; Stephenson v. Rinford, 287 US 251; Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F.
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592; Railroad commission v. Inter-City Forwarding Co.,
57 SW.2d 290; Parlett Cooperative v. Tidewater Lines, 164 A.
313

130. It is worth being restated:

130. l A corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit
of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises and holds them, subject to the laws
of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its RIGHTS to act as a corporation are only preserved
to it while it obeys the laws of its creation. (Emphasis added). See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
1914 p. 684

132. It is a “person” in the eyes of the law, but it lacks character, morals, conscience and a
soul. It's every activity must be directed and supervised by the state because it is inherently wicked
for it has no soul that can be spiritually directed. Under the definition of Due Process of Law,
Bouvier's Law Dictionary states in part:

133. The liberty guaranteed is that of a natural person and not of artificial persons; Western
Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 where it was said “a corporation cannot be deemed a Citizen
within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution of the united States which protects the privileges
and immunities of Citizens of the united States against being abridged or impaired by the law of a
state.” See also 203 U.S. 243.

134. The statutes in the union of states are designed to direct the activities of the class of
persons of which a corporation is a member. Corporations are absolutely bound by these statutes. It
is imperative that a conscienceless entity not be allowed to roam the streets or highways in the 50
united States of America and jeopardize the

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Sovereign Man. It is for this purpose that the statutes of the 50 united States of America were
enacted and not for the control of a Free and Natural Sovereign Man.

CONCLUSION

135. There is no Court in This Land that could lawfully execute an Order that would or
could cause, or work to compel one to become a servant or slave of any city, county, state, or
government without a conviction and with full due process of law. Any city, county, state, or
government to pretend otherwise is an absolute absurdity because that would imply that the
Sovereign Man had the ability to grant these governmental agents the authority to tax or restrict
a RIGHT. Such would be impossible because such taxes and restrictions would infringe on
another Sovereign's unalienable RIGHTS.

135.1 A /'impossible nu/ n'est tenu. No one is bound to do what is impossible. 1 Bouv. Inst.
n. 601.

135.2 Furthermore, these agents of the People have bound themselves to a constitutional
oath to support and defend their state and federal constitutions, which oath of office becomes a
binding contract between each of them individually and the People for which they toil. As a part
of that contract, they have also pledged their allegiance to the Republic. It is indeed a binding
contract into which they voluntarily entered and agreed to the terms therein. HENCE, THEY
CANNOT, WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR OATHS AND THEIR PLEDGE, ENFORCE LAWS
THAT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL; NOR CAN THEY BROADLY APPLY TO ALL "PERSONS"
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND LAWS UNTIL THEY DETERMINE THE INDIVIDUAL'S CLASS AND
HIS REQUIREMENT TO FULFILL SUCH LAWS.

Incomprehensible and Frivolous

136. Some legal idiots and intellectual fools may very well dismiss this writing as
incomprehensible and frivolous. It will be important to first define what these words mean
before making judgment.

137. Incomprehensible: l) Not to be comprehended or comprised within limits;

illimitable. 2) Not to be comprehended or understood; that cannot be grasped by the mind.
Century Dictionary, p. 3042

137.1 Certainly, a child with an eight grade education can understand this writing in that
it is clearly written in plain (layman) English and not with legalese which can be confusing to
the unsuspecting reader.

137.2 Legalese: Dense, pedantic [absurdly learned, p 4352) verbiage in a language

description, product specification, or interface standard; text that seems designed to
obfuscate [muddled, p. 4055) and requires a language lawyer to parse it. Though hackers are
not afraid of high information density and complexity in language (indeed, they rather enjoy
both), they share a deep and abiding loathing for legalese; they associate it with deception,
suits, and situations in which hackers generally get the short end of the stick. (Emphasis mine)
The Free On-line Dictionary of Computing with references from the Century Dictionary (pp. 4055 &
4352)

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 138. Legalese, in comparison to common (layman) English, is extremely difficult to understand
and is the language of legal professionals. These professional wordsmiths hammer out laws on the paper
anvils and thereby create confusing script (out of thin air) whereby the ignorant layman often
misinterprets to his demise.

139. Frivolous: [Specifically,] in law, so clearly insufficient as to need no argument to show its
weakness: as, a frivolous answer or plea. Century Dictionary, p. 2385

139.1 Professional wordsmith use this term quite frequently, when they care not to deal with the
subject matter at hand. This is not to imply that there are no matters that are truly frivolous; instead,
this becomes an easy way for judges to dismiss certain subject matters without an explanation as to
why they feel such subject matter may appear frivolous. If indeed all are equal under the law -
which maxim of law, by the way, this Sovereign Man believes remains in effect in spite of actions
by state agents, officers, and officials - then one accused could likewise be able to dismiss any
subject matter as frivolous that prosecutors may hurl his way. However, this is not the case. Judges
exhibit their prerogatives to dismiss certain subject matter without clear explanation and
employ the term “frivolous” as some formal stopgap to a true, complete, and honest
explanation as to why they feel the matter at hand is has no merit.

140. It seems as those who are entrusted with the law and whose primary purpose is to assist
and protect those who have suffered injury would fulfill their constitutional oaths to administer justice
to all and assist the layman to better understand the frivolity of his claims, if in fact his claims are
frivolous. However, to do so would necessarily mean that these legal professionals would have to
reveal (make plain) their legalese and possibly provide the layman a (legal) way out from his
adversary at the expense of the legal industry. This is just not good business for these professional
wordsmiths; therefore, the unsuspected layman most often fails without knowledge why he failed. He
is left on his own to determine his failures. Seeking professional legal help will never help him to
understand. He will only incur additional costs but no greater understanding.

141. This brief is most serious and should be handled accordingly. It continually reminds these
courts of their constitutional mandates to administer justice at all costs to safeguard this Sovereign Man's
rights. It addresses this Sovereign Man's God-given right to travel unrestricted from governmental
agencies and their corporate police. However, This Sovereign Man recognizes his bias and subjectivity
towards his owns words, feelings, and beliefs, and as such understands that one reading this may take an
opposing view. Moreover, he welcomes these courts taking such an opposing viewpoint for he
understands all are entitled to their opinions.

142. He is not however moved by these courts opinions and demands them to
only present the facts. If it is these courts' opinion that this brief is “frivolous” then so be it. However,
this Sovereign Man demands these courts to answer the following questions:

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 142.1 If traveling on the streets or highways in one's automobile (property) is a privilege
requiring licensing (driver's license) and not a God-given, common RIGHT long established before the
writers of these courts constitutions, then when did the RIGHT became a mandatory, licensed
privilege for the non-commercial traveler? In what year did this RIGHT allegedly become a
mandatory, licensed privilege when one has not chosen to function in commerce? (When, in law, was
it appropriate to restrict this RIGHT – any RIGHT?)

142.2 What was the conclusive Supreme Court ruling (that these courts can cite) declaring the
abolition of the RIGHT to travel (as stated above) and the implantation of the licensed privilege to
drive for a Sovereign Man who cares not to function in commerce?

142.3 Do these courts have certified proof that this Sovereign Man has surrendered his God-given
RIGHT to non-commercially travel in his automobile (property) on the streets or highways?

142.4 Where do these courts get their authority to act? Do they derive their powers (authority)
from the Constitution or from the Sovereign People, the Republic?

143. If these courts cannot answer these questions and provide proof of their divergent
position under oath and with full liability, this Sovereign Man therefore declares his words as
law and any and all courts actions against him as fraudulent and therefore void on their face.

Submitted this 17th of November 2008.

seal

as John Doe ALL

RIGHTS RESERVED

32 of35
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Note: § means Section

CONSTITUTIONS
Constitution for the United States of America, Amendment
9 Constitution of the State of Colorado, Article II,§ 3
Constitution of the State of Arizona, Article 2, § 2
Constitution of the State of Arizona, Article 2, § 33

STATUTES
3 Angel Highways 3
11 American Jurisprudence. 1st.,Constitutional Law,§ 329, page 1123
12 American Jurisprudence. l st.,Constitutional Law,§ 573, page 269
60 Corpus Juris Secundum § 1, Page 148
American Jurisprudence 1st Ed., Highways § 163 Transportation,
Title 49, U.S. C.A. § 10102 (17)

CASE HISTORIES
l Chitty Pr. 32
16 C.J.S. Const. Law,Sect.202,Pg. 987
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect.427, Pg. 717
Allen v. City of Bellingham, 163 P. 18
American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH
200 Bacahanan v. Wanley,245 US 60;
Barbour v. Connolly,113 US 27,31;
Barney v. Board of Railroad Commissioners,17 P.2d 82
Barron v. Burnside 121 U.S. 186
Boone v. Clark, 214 S.W. 607
Bovier's Law Dictionary,1914 ed., Pg. 3309
Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60,74
Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 N.E. 22
City of Dayton v. DeBrosse, 23 NE. 2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App.
232 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540;
Cummins v. Jones, 155 P. 171
Deibel v. Kreiss, 50 N.E. 2d 1000 (1943)
Dennis v. Moses, 52 P. 333
Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey v. Davis), 85 SE 781
Ex Parte Sterling, 53 SW. 2d 294;
Ferrante Equipment Co. v. Foley Machinery Co., N.J., 231 A. 2d 208, 211, 49 N.J. 432
Frost and F. Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592;
Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 28 S.E. 2d 135
Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wn. 657; 168 P. 516
Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash 516
Hale v. Hinkel, 201 US 43,74-75
Hoke v. Henderson,15 N.C. 15,25 AM. Dec. 677
Hurtado v. California,110 US 516
In re Hong Wah, 82 Fed. 623
International Motor Transit Co. v. Seattle,251 P. 120 Kent
v. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958)
Lafarier v. Grand Trunk R.R. Co.,24 A. 848;
Ligare v. Chicago, 28 N.E. 934
Locket v. State, 47 Ala. 45;
McKevitt et al v. Golden Age Breweries, Inc.,126 P.2d 1077 (1942)
Mehlos v. Milwaukee,146 NW 882
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,491 (1966)
Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105
Newbill v. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658
Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. Schoenfeldt, 213 P. 26
O'Conner v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37
O'Neil v. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887
Pachard v Banton, 264 US 140,and cases cited;
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613 Parish of
Morehouse v. Brigham, 6 S. 257
Parish v. Thurston 87 Ind. 437 (1882)
Parlett Cooperative v. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313
People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 21O
People v. Henderson, 218 NW.2d 2,4
Railroad commission v. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW. 2d 290;
Riley v. Laeson, 142 So. 619;
 Robertson v. Department of Public Works,180 Wash. 133 at 139 Rogers Construction
Co. v. Hill, Or.,384 P.2d 219,222,235 Or. 352 Rosenblatt v. California State Board of
Pharmacy, 158 P.2d 199, 203 See also State v. Strasburg, l l O P. l 020;
Simon v. Craft, 182 US 427
Simons v. United States,390 US 389
Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513
State v. City of Spokane, 109 Wn. 360; 186 P. 864 State
v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073
State v. City of Spokane,186 P. 864
State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073;
Stephenson v. Binford, supra.
Stephenson v. Rinford, 287 US 251;
Teche Lines v.Danforth, Miss.,12 S.2d 784
Thompson v. Smith (Chief of Police),154 S.E. 579,580
Thompson v.Smith, supra.;
Tiche v. Osborne,131 A.60
Weirich v. State,140 Wis.
98 Wells v. Zenz,2 36 P.485
Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118
Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359
Williams v. Fears,343 U.S. 270,274
Willis v. Buck, 263 P.I 982;
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,118 US 356

FEDERAL CODES

Title 18 USC 31(6)

LAW DICTIONARIES
The Holy Scriptures (The Holy Bible)
Bergh Business Law 30
Bouvier's Law Dictionary
Woodward Quasi Contracts 9

ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARIES

Webster Unabridged
Dictionary Century Dictionary
The Free On-line Dictionary of Computing

MISCELLANEOUS
Washington A.G.O.59-60 No. 88,Pg. 11