COLLECTIVE SECURITY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE POST-COLD

WAR PERIOD

PREPARED BY:

LTC LOUIS D. HUDDLESTON, USA

5 NOVEMBER 1990

C O U R S E I: FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

B L O C K D: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN N A T I O N A L SECURITY
STRATEGY

SEMINAR LEADER: DR. M E L G O O D M A N

FACULTY ADVISER: LTC(P) ED SHIRRON

NATIONAL DEFEN~'r~ UNIVF.RS~TY

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 COLLECTIVE SECURITY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE
POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

What is an appropriate national security strategy for

the post-Cold War period? For strategists, this question is

especially relevant given the changes in today's world. My

purpose here is to assess past national security strategies

and recommend an appropriate strategy for the post-Cold War

period.

My assessment will focus on the most prominent of past

national security strategies. These include isolationism,

hemispheric defense, balance of power, and collective

security arrangements. There have been others, but these

strategies represent four of the most significant ones. Of

the four, I consider collective security as the best

strategy for U.S. national security during the post-Cold War

period. But before discussing my reasons for selecting

collective security, I'll first offer a brief assessment of

the other strategies.

America's first truly discernible national security

strategy was isolationism. Its roots go back as far as the

late eighteenth century. America's geographical location,

and the fact it had achieved independence from Britain, set

the nation on an initial course of isolationism. As an

emerging nation, America consciously and at times,

unconsciously, practised isolationism.

 But this s t r a t e g y p r e s e n t e d A m e r i c a w i t h a dilemma: how

was the n a t i o n to prosper, grow and access E u r o p e a n markets,

and at the same time, avoid e n t a n g l e m e n t in the E u r o p e a n

b a l a n c e of p o w e r struggle? America's initial e x p e r i e n c e s

with i s o l a t i o n i s m drove home the a n s w e r to this question.

The n a t i o n ' s l e a d e r s h i p q u i c k l y r e a l i z e d that i s o l a t i o n i s m

i n t e r f e r e d w i t h n a t i o n a l prosperity.

Since its founding, A m e r i c a had been linked h i s t o r i c a l l y ,

s o c i a l l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y to most of the world. But a

national s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y w h i c h isolated the nation, also

i g n o r e d its linkage to the rest of the world, thus r e t a r d i n g

n a t i o n a l prosperity.

Furthermore, w o r l d linkage and its a s s o c i a t e d

activities - e s p e c i a l l y e c o n o m i c ones - c r e a t e d an

i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e r e q u i r i n g g o v e r n m e n t protection. This posed

an a d d i t i o n a l d i l e m m a for the nation: h o w to protect its

interests from a p o s i t i o n of isolation? America discovered

e a r l y on t h a t it c o u l d n ' t p r o t e c t its i n t e r e s t s f r o m

isolation. Thus i s o l a t i o n i s m as a n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y

w a s not only c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e to prosperity, it a l s o m a d e

it v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e to p r o t e c t ones i n t e r e s t s a r o u n d the

world. T h e s e d i l e m m a s are as a p p l i c a b l e t o d a y as t h e y w e r e

in t h e past. And it is for these reasons, isolationism

o f f e r s us little value as a p o s t - C o l d War s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y .

For r e a s o n s similar to those just cited, I do n o t

s u p p o r t a hemispheric defense s t r a t e g y either. It too

places serious l i m i t a t i o n s on the n a t i o n ' s a b i l i t y to

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p r o s p e r and p r o t e c t its interests in an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t

world. Furthermore, h e m i s p h e r i c d e f e n s e s t e n d to be no m o r e

t h a n h y b r i d s t r a t e g i e s of isolationism.

Few n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y strategies r e f l e c t b e t t e r the

s h o r t c o m i n g s of h e m i s p h e r i c d e f e n s e t h a n the M o n r o e

Doctrine. The M o n r o e D o c t r i n e was d e s i g n e d to d e t e r

E u r o p e a n states from intruding into w e s t e r n h e m i s p h e r i c

politics, the D o c t r i n e became a r e v e r e d and e v e n s a n c t i f i e d

policy, an end in and of itself. 1 But as w i t h its

predecessors - n e u t r a l i t y and i s o l a t i o n i s m - the M o n r o e

D o c t r i n e was i n f l e x i b l e and u n r e s p o n s i v e to the d e m a n d s of

an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t world.

P r e s i d e n t T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t was instrumental in

c o r r e c t i n g the s h o r t c o m i n g s of the M o n r o e Doctrine. Long

b e f o r e the first w o r l d war, he a c c e p t e d the i n e x o r a b l e logic

of t h i n g s i n t e r n a t i o n a l as they had become. "More and

more," Roosevelt in 1902 d e c l a r e d to Congress, "the

increasing i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and c o m p l e x i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s r e n d e r it i n c u m b e n t on

c i v i l i z e d and o r d e r l y powers to insist on the p r o p e r

p o l i c i n g of the w o r l d .... " This was to be the b a s i s of the

R o o s e v e l t Corollary. Like the M o n r o e D o c t r i n e w h i c h it

e m p h a t i c a l l y amended, it p e r t a i n e d to the p o l i c y of the

U n i t e d S t a t e s not only in the A m e r i c a s but also - i m p l i c i t l y

- in o t h e r p a r t s of the world. 2

R o o s e v e l t c l e a r l y saw the need for m a i n t a i n i n g w o r l d

o r d e r e s p e c i a l l y w h e n it came to p r o t e c t i n g A m e r i c a n

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interests. He appreciated the various instruments of

statecraft, but more importantly, he felt that national

security strategies should facilitate intervention by

military forces when needed anywhere in the world. He was

unwilling to accept the limitations of h e m i s p h e r i c defense

in the form of the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt's Corollary

was p r e c e p t i v e and a lesson to America about its future. By

amending the M o n r o e Doctrine, he d e m o n s t r a t e d the importance

of f l e x i b i l i t y in security strategies in order to p r o t e c t

national interests.

H a v i n g briefly assessed isolationism and h e m i s p h e r i c

defense, the next strategy for assessment is b a l a n c e of

power. In A m e r i c a n National Security - P o l i c y and Process,

Amos A. J o r d a n and William J. Taylor, Jr. d e s c r i b e d balance

of power as, "several major actors, generally three to five,

depending upon which theorist is consulted, vie back and

forth, forming and reforming alliances to p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s

against hegemony of any one or group of the others.

Historically, to make such a system work, there has had to

be an e x c e p t i o n a l l y flexible major party w i l l i n g to shift

sides as n e c e s s a r y in order to preserve the balance. The

"theory" springs straight from the e x p e r i e n c e of e i g h t e e n t h

- and n i n e t e e n t h - century Europe in which England p l a y e d

the swing role." This is a traditional and useful

definition for purposes this balance of power discussion.

Unquestionably, the world became bipolar at the end of

W o r l d War II. This set into motion a w o r l d - w i d e struggle

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b e t w e e n A m e r i c a and the Soviet Union. The E a s t - W e s t split

i n f l u e n c e d the p o l i c i e s and s t r a t e g i e s of m o s t n a t i o n s of

the w o r l d for the next 45 years. A c o n s e q u e n c e of the East

- W e s t split was an A m e r i c a n grand s t r a t e g y d e s i g n e d to

c o n t a i n the Soviet Union.

Up until today, the p r i n c i p a l s t r a t e g y by w h i c h

A m e r i c a n p r e s i d e n t s and their a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d the

S o v i e t U n i o n was m a n a g e m e n t of the E a s t - W e s t b a l a n c e of

power. T h i s s t r a t e g y e n t a i l e d r e c o g n i t i o n of b a l a n c e of

p o w e r as b o t h a "situation" and "policy." The o n l y

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w h i c h r e f r a i n e d from s t r e s s i n g the E a s t - W e s t

b a l a n c e of p o w e r was P r e s i d e n t Carter's. G e n e r a l l y though,

by use of the v a r i o u s instruments of statecraft, military

alliances and o c c a s i o n a l l y actual m i l i t a r y forces, America's

management of the E a s t - W e s t b a l a n c e of p o w e r was s u c c e s s f u l

in the long run.

The Soviet threat has not disappeared, particularly its

n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y w h i c h remains impressive. However, as a

superpower, it is a less f o r m i d a b l e threat. W i t h the

r e l a t i v e d e m i s e of the Soviet Union as a superpower, America

m u s t n o w a d j u s t its s t r a t e g y of b a l a n c e of power. This

s t r a t e g y may h a v e u t i l i t y from a r e g i o n a l standpoint, but no

l o n g e r as a g r a n d strategy. B a l a n c e of p o w e r was an

effective s t r a t e g y as long as it was focused a g a i n s t a m a j o r

t h r e a t - the Soviet Union. M a i n t e n a n c e of an E a s t - W e s t

b a l a n c e of p o w e r s t r a t e g y will be p r o b l e m a t i c in the p o s t -

Cold War period without significant modification.

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 This leads me to the national security strategy which

offers America its best chance of success in the post-Cold

War period - collective security. Reference to collective

security specifically pertains to a strategy and arrangement

at the global level. Organizations such as the League of

Nations and the United Nations represent global collective

security arrangements. The essential ingredient to the

success of such organizations is "the hope that peace can be

preserved if all states are prepared to unite in opposition

to aggression. ''3

Staunch opponents to collective security contend that

the stakes are too high for America as a superpower to risk

compromise of its national interests in global and

international organizations. Additionally, it's argued that

Third World and regional resolutions rendered by, let's say

the United Nations, do not necessarily serve America's

broad long term interests. In the past, America compensated

for this by establishing various selective security

arrangements around the world (i.e. NATO, SEATO, CENTO).

Also, the argument against collective security

arrangements points to the difficulty of executing national

strategy and foreign policy when these activities become

anchored to the deliberations and decisions of world

organizations. Simply put, arguments against collective

security arrangements center on how much freedom of maneuver

a superpower is willing to surrender.

Page - 6
 Admittedly, world government bodies can claim few m a j o r

successes. However, we should not forget that most w o r l d

governing bodies were conceived and o r g a n i z e d at a time of

world instability. The United Nations for example, has

operated for the most part of its existence during the East-

West balance of power struggle.

We have a new world order today, one in w h i c h super

power struggles have diminished. Elements of a u n i f i e d

international community are beginning to take shape b e c a u s e

of the b r e a k d o w n in the communist system. The E a s t - W e s t

split w h i c h influenced the United Nations' activities for

years is no longer the dominant variable in the n a t i o n a l

security equation.

The time is right for our national s t r a t e g y to shift

to c o l l e c t i v e security. We can best implement this s t r a t e g y

by e l e v a t i n g the United Nations to a higher level of

importance than was done in the past. But why e l e v a t e the

U n i t e d Nations? Careful c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the f o l l o w i n g

reasons may provide answers: First, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena

is far too complex for nations to act unilaterally; second,

the a g g r e s s i v e activities of one n a t i o n - s t a t e against

another normally impact on neighboring countries; third,

t o d a y ' s world is e c o n o m i c a l l y interdependent; fourth,

America's fiscal situation necessitates collective security

arrangements; fifth, natural resources and the w o r l d

environment are too perishable to be left to the d e v i c e s of

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any single nation; sixth and finally , it is in the best

interest of a civilized world and its people.

As w o r l d events continue to unfold in the P e r s i a n Gulf,

the importance of a strong United Nations and c o l l e c t i v e

security arrangements becomes increasingly evident.

President Bush and his strategists were wise to frame

America's r e s p o n s e to Saddam Hussein's invasion of K u w a i t

a r o u n d the United Nations and Arab participation. His

strategy recognizes the reasons listed above w h i c h support

the need for collective security arrangements.

Of course, the final outcome of the P e r s i a n Gulf crisis

is yet to come. The approach taken by the U n i t e d States is

encouraging. By including the United Nations and A r a b

nations in c o l l e c t i v e security arrangements, our s t r a t e g y to

resolve the first real crisis of the p o s t - C o l d War p e r i o d

may h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d a precedent.

Whether this crisis is settled p e a c e f u l l y or by war,

it's s e r v i n g as a precursor for future security strategies

for the p o s t - C o l d War period. Moreover, we should p r o b a b l y

not be a s t o n i s h e d by the ease at which A m e r i c a n decision

makers achieved support from the United N a t i o n s and the r e s t

of the world. In fact, maybe the world has n a t u r a l l y

evolved into a state of decorum beckoning unity and

stability. If so, America should not miss this o p p o r t u n i t y

to t r a n s i t i o n its national strategy to c o l l e c t i v e security

in a n t i c i p a t i o n of the post-Cold War period.

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 FOOTNOTES

iSamuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, (New York, 1969),

38.
ZJohn M o r t o n Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, (Cambridge,
977), 127.
Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., A m e r i c a n
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y - Policy and Process (Baltimore, 1981),
14.

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