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Chapter Eight:
Language and Thought
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Learning Objectives ......................................................................................................... ............................. 234

Key Concepts: Why is this Chapter Important to Psychologists? ................................................................. 234
Student Motivation: Why Should Students Care? ................................................................................... ..... 234
Barriers to Learning: What are Common Student Misconceptions and Stumbling Blocks? .................. ...... 235
Reflections on Teaching: How Can I Assess My Own “Performance”? ............................................... ....... 235
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Key Themes in Chapter 8 .................................................................................. 236
Psyk.Trek Module and Simulation ................................................................................................................ 226
Demonstration/Activity: Defining Language ................................................................................................ 237
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Animal Communication ..................................................................................... 237
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Cognition in Animal Learning ........................................................................... 238
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Language Acquisition ........................................................................................ 239
Demonstration/Activity: “Learning to Read” ............................................................................................... 240
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Understanding the Meaning of Text .................................................................. 240
Demonstration/Activity: Ambiguity and Levels of Sentence Structure ........................................................ 242
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Overview of the Problem-Solving Process ........................................................ 243
Demonstration/Activity: Scientific Thinking and Problem Solving in Riddles ............................................ 244
Demonstration/Activity: Functional Fixedness ............................................................................................. 245
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Solving Problems Through Algorithms and Heuristics ..................................... 246
Demonstration/Activity: Illustrating the Drawbacks of Algorithmic Problem Solving ................................ 247
Demonstration/Activity: Incubation in Problem Solving ............................................................................. 247
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Errors in Decision Making ................................................................................. 248
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Concept Learning ............................................................................................... 249
Demonstration/Activity: Concept Learning in Class .................................................................................... 250
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Culture and Concepts ......................................................................................... 251
Demonstration/Activity: Practice in Problem Solving .................................................................................. 252
References for Additional Demonstrations/Activities .................................................................................. 253
Suggested Readings for Chapter 8 ................................................................................................................ 253
Handout Masters (HM) ................................................................................................................................. 245
Transparency Masters (TM) .......................................................................................................................... 261
8: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 233

LEARNING OBJECTIVES
After completing this chapter, students should be able to

 Describe the four key properties of language which include that language is symbolic,
language is semantic, language is generative, and language is structured.
 List and describe the elements that make up the hierarchical structure of language (i.e.
phoneme, morpheme, word, phrase, and sentence).
 Explain how children progress in their use of words and sentences and describe the
types of mistakes they tend to make.
 List the types of problems psychologists study.
 Describe what algorithms and heuristics are in problem solving.
 Explain some of the useful problem solving strategies
 Explain how culture is related to cognitive style.
 Explain how people make choices about preferences.
 List the factors important in risky decision making.
KEY CONCEPTS: WHY IS THIS CHAPTER IMPORTANT TO PSYCHOLOGISTS?
 Language is the main cognitive ability that makes us appear different from other
animals. The study of language is very interdisciplinary. Research from neuroscience,
developmental psychology, animal studies, memory studies, linguistics, and philosophy
etc. together provide a strong understanding of language processing. This chapter
provides information about language processing from studies performed in many
different disciplines. This provides a strong understanding of language processing that is
useful for many different areas of psychology.
 Understanding what influences problem solving and decision making is valuable for
many areas of psychology. Most theories of behaviour or cognitive processing involve a
decision making component.
STUDENT MOVITATION: WHY SHOULD STUDENTS CARE?
 This chapter will provide students with an understanding of how the nature nurture
debate is related to language acquisition.
 This chapter highlights the importance of research methods when attempting to
understand language and thought.
 Students will develop an understanding of how cultural factors are related to cognitive
processes involved in language and thought.
 Students will gain a better understanding of problem solving which can help them in the
future when faced with important decisions.
234 ENRICHED INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL

BARRIERS TO LEARNING: WHAT ARE COMMON STUDENT MISCONCEPTIONS AND STUMBLING
BLOCKS?
 Students are fascinated with the problem solving examples that are provided in the
chapter. However, many examples are provided and students sometimes struggle with
trying to memorize all this information.
 It is difficult for students to understand how expected value, subjective utility, and
objective/subjective probability are related to risky decision making.
 Students sometimes struggle with the notion of the gambler’s fallacy and the law of
small numbers. This may be due to their own beliefs and experiences.
REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING: HOW CAN I ASSESS MY OWN “PERFORMANCE”?
Checklist for Instructor Self‐Assessment

1. What worked? What didn’t?
2. Were students engaged? Were they focused or did they go off on tangents?
3. Did my assessments suggest that they understood the key concepts?
4. What should I do differently next time?
5. How can I gather student feedback?

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: KEY THEMES IN CHAPTER 8
Theme 1 (Psychology is empirical) is an important topic in Chapter 8. In fact, Theme 1 almost prevented thought from
being a viable subject matter in psychology. Behaviourists held almost absolute sway over experimental psychology in
the early part of this century. Because of their strong belief that only observable phenomena could be studied, cognitive
aspects of behaviour were not considered legitimate fields of inquiry. However, as the Weiten & McCann text points
out, the 1950s and 1960s ushered in a new era in psychology, and cognitive topics became acceptable. Interestingly, the
development of the computer seemed to provide some of the impetus for this change. As machines became capable of
dealing with information in ways similar to humans, it seemed more acceptable to talk about human thought processes.
However, empirical methodology was still seen as a must in dealing with cognition. Cognitive scientists have had to
work at developing “scientific” and rigorous techniques. Today, cognition is a field of major interest, probably in part
because of the development of empirical techniques for dealing with its subject matter.
Theme 5 (Our behaviour is shaped by our cultural heritage) is demonstrated in Chapter 8. Students may react to the
notion of cultural differences in thought in somewhat the same fashion that they reacted to the idea of cultural
differences in perception. When we refer to culture influencing thought, we are not referring to the biology of thought,
but rather to the style of thought. One’s culture can influence the way that people interpret information from their
environment or the way that they approach various problems. Thus, students are again reminded that their way of
viewing the world is not the only way or necessarily the correct way.
Theme 6 (Heredity and environment jointly influence behaviour) is also important to Chapter 8. We could debate
the source of all cognitive skills, but the topic of particular interest in this chapter is language and its acquisition.
Historically, we have been faced with opposing theories of language acquisition, one of which is rooted in environment
(Skinner) and one in heredity (Chomsky). As is often the case, evidence exists to support both claims. Skinnerians can
point to the fact that various sounds (phonemes) drop out of usage because they are not reinforced and to the powerful
role of reinforcement through imitation and praise. Advocates of Chomsky’s theory can counter with examples of
unique utterances that have not been heard or reinforced previously and of the speed and universality with which
language is acquired. It appears likely, as in controversial areas like colour vision, that both theoretical viewpoints have
some truth to them. It seems difficult to account for all that happens in language development through either
reinforcement or innate language acquisition devices. To further complicate matters, other theories of language
acquisition are being developed. For example, the text examines cognitive theories, and there is evidence that social
factors are important in developing language (see “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Language Acquisition”). Thus, there is
evidence that not only are heredity and environment involved in language but other factors as well.
Theme 7 (Our experience of the world is highly subjective) plays a small role in Chapter 8. Our decision processes
when faced with risky decisions are particularly subjective. Also, research shows us that the way a particular question is
asked can affect the way it is answered—thus, the same question asked in two different ways may result in two different
answers. Finally, it may also be appropriate to highlight Theme 4 (Behaviour is determined by multiple causes),
although Weiten & McCann do not highlight it in Chapter 8. Language is clearly a complex and involved topic.
PSYK.TREK MODULE AND SIMULATION

You can use two modules from Unit 7 and a simulation from the Psyk.Trek CD-ROM to help illustrate concepts from
Chapter 8.
Module 7e (Problem Solving) illustrates different types of problems and barriers to problem solving. Students will
review text concepts about problem solving and get some practice at solving problems and avoiding roadblocks to
solutions.
Module 7f (Decision Making) illustrates the text material toward the end of the chapter (“Decision Making: Choices
and Chances” and “Personal Application: Understanding Pitfalls in Reasoning About Decisions”). Students have several
chances to see these pitfalls in operation.

Simulation 7 (Problem Solving) confronts students with the hobbits and orcs problem from Weiten & McCann’s
Figure 8.8C. Students attempt to solve the problem with three hobbits and three orcs, then have a chance to solve the
problem with five hobbits and five orcs. If they have learned from the first attempt, the second problem may take fewer
steps although it is a more complex problem. There is one drawback to this simulation: The answer to the three
hobbit/three orc problem appears in Figure 8.9 of the text.
DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: DEFINING LANGUAGE

Weiten & McCann define language as “symbols that convey meaning, plus rules for combining those symbols, that can
be used to generate an infinite variety of messages” (p. 350). Nowhere does it mention that language must be vocal. In
fact, attempts to train animals to learn language have used nonvocal languages.
Hunter (1981) recommended a demonstration that will challenge your class to think about defining language.
Introductory psychology students typically bring a very narrow definition of language with them, so anything to
challenge that narrowness can be fruitful. Hunter suggested that you enter the classroom a little late to ensure that there
is a noisy background. Without speaking, try to get the class to become quiet. You could use hand signals, clap your
hands, or use some other gesture. If absolutely necessary, you could write quiet on the board, but preferably you would
not. After you have gotten a quiet room, give some simple nonverbal directions: “For example, indicate that students in
one row should move their desks over, or gesture that a student (or students) should stand, turn around, or clap three
times” (p. 103). Again, without speaking, have the students divide into discussion groups. Hunter suggested that you
then perform a short mime routine. If you would prefer not to engage in this act, your point has probably been made
already anyway.
You will need to speak or use the board at this point. Have the discussion groups address three questions:
• What is communication?
• What is speech?
• What is language?
You can generate different or additional questions if you desire. After the groups talk, have them report to the class.
You can end the demonstration with a lecture centered on a definition of language or a question-and-answer session
dealing with language. Hunter suggested having students resolve certain questions to gain closure. For example, is mime
language? Is mime communication? Is sign language truly a language? If you wish to lead into the text’s discussion of
chimpanzees, you can ask whether animals can communicate and whether they have language.
Hunter noted that a teacher who does not speak is so alien to students that the demonstration can become quite
humorous. However, he also noted that it leads to productive discussion and serves as a good lead-in to discussing
language, animal studies of language, and cognitive topics.
Ask how many of the students are bilingual. Trilingual? Ask about the ages they learned the second language, or
were they raised bilingual from birth. Discuss whether they had any problems learning the second language since that is
a concern often expressed. Which language they think in? Dream in?
Hunter, W. J. (1981). Language and communication: Defining language can leave you speechless. In L. T. Benjamin, Jr., &
K. D. Lowman (Eds.), Activities handbook for the teaching of psychology (pp. 103–104). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: ANIMAL COMMUNICATION

This topic can be an interesting follow-up to “Demonstration/Activity: Defining Language.” The Weiten & McCann text
tackles the tough question about animal language through the ape-language studies. On the surface, these studies seem
to show evidence of apes using language, but many have disputed this claim. Even Terrace changed his mind about
Nim’s ability to use language after looking more closely at the evidence. Perhaps we might gain more insight into such
studies of animals if we think in terms of communication abilities rather than language. In studying and defining animal

language, our focus seems to have been on forcing animals into our image rather than allowing them their natural
differences. On the other hand, looking at animal communication gives us the freedom to focus more on the activity and
not the manner of the activity.
Glass and Holyoak (1986) listed several features of human language and compared them to animal communication
systems to determine commonalities. You may note for the students that there are some similarities between the
information in the text and Glass and Holyoak’s list.
• Use of speech: Although animals may vocalize, they do not use any distinctly human speech sounds. However,
not all forms of human language use vocalization either. This should be clear from “Demonstration/Activity:
Defining Language.”
• Arbitrary associations: As the text points out, “no built-in relationship exists between the look or sound of
words and the objects they stand for.” Glass and Holyoak noted that similar arbitrariness exists in some animal
systems of communication and cited the song a bird uses to signal readiness to its mate as an example.
• Naming: We use a large collection of words to name objects in our environment. Glass and Holyoak suggested
that animals may be capable of using a similar notation system, but on a smaller and perhaps less universal
scale. They gave the example of monkey warning cries and noted that monkeys can signal different predators
(snakes, leopards, eagles) with different-sounding cries.
• Generativeness: Glass and Holyoak believed that “generativeness is the strongest candidate for a property that
distinguishes human languages from animal systems” (p. 447). They found no evidence for an animal system
that rearranges a finite set of symbols into many new messages on a regular basis, as humans do. Although
birds may rearrange basic melodic structures, there seems to be no attached change in meaning.
• Expressive power: Because of the generativeness principle, we can express a wide range of thoughts, even
about narrow topics. Although a monkey might be able to name a snake through a warning cry, it cannot
communicate about large versus small snakes, black versus red snakes, live versus dead snakes, snakes it has
seen in the past, or snakes it might see in the future, or even ask questions about snakes.
Despite the fact that animal communication and human language may have similarities, the two are not the same.
Animal communication is not as rich, fully developed, or wide-ranging as human language. Will it ever be thus? It
would seem that either smarter animals or more ingenious trainers will be required for animals to learn something that
truly is a language.
Glass, A. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1986). Cognition (2nd ed.). New York: Random House.
LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: COGNITION IN ANIMAL LEARNING

Many researchers and theorists have successfully broken away from the earlier reliance on behaviouristic theories to
explain all types of learning. Weiten & McCann detail the rise of cognitive psychology, which helps to set the stage for
this chapter.
One piece of information that may surprise students is the application of cognitive theories to animal learning, an
area that has traditionally been dominated by behaviouristic approaches. Remind them of the relevant information from
Chapter 6 concerning this topic (“Lecture/Discussion Topic: Cognitive Interpretations of Classical Conditioning”) such
as taste aversions, contingency theory, and blocking. Cognition has been applied even more broadly within animal
learning. Herrnstein has worked extensively with pigeons, which have the capacity to learn concepts. For example,
Herrnstein, Loveland, and Cable (1976) trained pigeons to discriminate among pictures of trees, bodies of water, or
certain people. The pigeons readily learned the discriminations at a high level and could generalize these concepts to
new pictures. The text does not cover concept learning per se, but it is a topic typically considered to be cognitive in
nature.
Also, parallels to the Atkinson and Shiffrin model of human memory exist for animals. Some research seems to
support the possibility of differing memory stores in animals, similar to Atkinson and Shiffrin’s findings. For example,
much research has shown that administering electroconvulsive shock (ECS) to animals may disrupt their memory
(Gordon, 1989). The greatest disruption occurs if the ECS is administered shortly after learning; memory disruptions
decrease as the interval between learning and ECS administration grows longer. Also, research has shown that

stimulants shortly after learning increases memory but that this effect decreases as the time since learning lengthens.
Both lines of research appear to show that animals may have short-term and long-term memory storage systems.
For further information concerning this topic, see Rootlet (1987).
Gordon, W. C. (1989). Learning and memory. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Herrnstein, R. J., Loveland, D. H., & Cable, C. (1976). Natural concepts in pigeons. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal
Behavior Processes, 2, 285–302.
Roitblat, H. L. (1987). Introduction to comparative cognition. New York: W. H. Freeman.
LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: LANGUAGE ACQUISITION

The process of acquiring language is a complex one, marked by many milestones and transitions. Despite the fact that
language is such a complex behaviour, most children’s language development follows such a consistent pattern that a
table of norms like the one in Weiten & McCann’s Table 8.2 can be derived.
Students may wonder why babies don’t start to talk earlier than they do. Hoffman, Paris, Hall, and Schell (1988)
pointed out that speech requires a certain level of maturational readiness. Until the child has reached this state, speech is
physically impossible. For example, babies cannot control the flow of air over their larynxes or manipulate their tongues
well. Also, they have no teeth to help with making sounds. According to Hoffman et al., the vocal tract of a baby is more
similar to an adult chimpanzee’s than to an adult human’s. As the child matures physically, the vocal cords become
more changeable, muscular control increases, and the oral cavity becomes larger. All of these physical changes are
necessary before the child can produce language sounds on demand. Also, brain development, such as more neuronal
connections in the sensorimotor cortex, is vital to the development of speech capability.
Another important component of language is the ability to perceive speech. Research shows that infants have some
remarkable abilities in this area very early in life (Hoffman et al., 1988). For example, 3-day-old infants prefer their
mother’s voice reading a story over that of another female. Infants become emotionally sensitive to adult patterns of
speech very early. At a month to 6 weeks of age, babies can distinguish between different speech sounds. However, if
the child does not continue to be exposed to such differences in the environment, the ability to discriminate between
speech patterns is lost. Similarly, the ability to produce some phonemes is lost if they are not heard in the language.
Social factors also play an important role in the development of language. For example, interaction seems to be a
particularly important event for normal language development. Many studies, across cultures, have confirmed the
existence of “motherese,” or child-directed speech in adults interacting with children: “The pitch of parents’ voices
becomes higher; the rise and fall of intonation is exaggerated; parents say only a few words at a time, pausing between
utterances; and they often repeat words and phrases” (Hoffman et al., 1988, p. 163). Exposure to this type of interaction
pattern seems to be important: It fosters early language acquisition, vocabulary, and even linguistic functioning in
adolescence. Another social aspect of language development is the idea of taking turns. Although parents typically begin
interacting with their babies by supplying all the conversation, they gradually begin to leave gaps for the child to
respond, visually or verbally. Thus, the infant learns important patterns in communication—taking turns, not
interrupting, paying attention, and making eye contact.
Finally, Hoffman et al. (1988) pointed out that there are cognitive precursors to language. Object permanence is
necessary for attaching labels to objects and being able to use labels to represent them. Development of concepts is
important for organizing the world into categories so that thought is more streamlined and efficient. Imitation shows
evidence of the use of internal images that have been stored. Symbolic play refers to play that centers on pretending; the
child can call on previous experience and translate that experience into symbols for use. Intention is necessary so the
child will attempt to use communication for a specific purpose. Up to the age of around 9 months, infants’ sounds and
signals are more a reaction to events than an attempt to communicate meaning. At this age, children develop the intent to
communicate and begin to use gestures and grunts in an attempt to get their meaning across to others.

Many important factors take place in language development and acquisition before those mentioned in the text. It
appears that we begin to prime ourselves to use language from birth—or earlier. Hoffman et al. (1988) reported a study
in which mothers read a certain children’s story twice daily during the last months of pregnancy. Three days after birth,
babies heard recordings of the same story and of a different story. Babies sucked more consistently to the familiar story,
thus seeming to prefer it. Clearly, language development can take place under interesting conditions.
Hoffman, L., Paris, S., Hall, E., & Schell, R. (1988). Developmental psychology today. New York: Random House.
DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: “LEARNING TO READ”

Reading is a behaviour we take for granted, yet it is an integral and important aspect of language. Being able to speak
but not read would leave us lacking a significant skill that is vital in everyday life. Students probably have been readers
so long that they have forgotten their own struggle to read. This lack of understanding creates at least two problems.
First, in class it is somewhat difficult for students to comprehend theories of language acquisition. Second, in real life
the failure to understand may lead to a lack of empathy for adult nonreaders or one’s own children.
When teaching this chapter, I use a customized version of a first-grade reader, passed along to me by Ludy
Benjamin, to combat students’ lack of understanding about the difficulty of learning to read. This reader appears to be
based on (or derived from) a set of similar readers developed for Houghton Mifflin (McKee, 1971, 1972). Houghton
Mifflin produced at least two primers aimed at helping parents understand what their children would be going through as
they learned to read. This reader substitutes unfamiliar symbols for letters of the alphabet (see TM 8-1 to TM 8-7). Thus,
the task is similar to learning to read.
To use this demonstration in class, project the pages of the “book,” and ask the class to read aloud in unison, so that
no one student will become overly embarrassed. Usually, their reading is clumsy and halting. After the demonstration,
the students will be able to discuss the difficulty of reading with new understanding.
Students enjoy this exercise and learn from it. A sizable number of my students also report that it rekindles early
memories of learning to read. Thus, it appears that this activity is well worth a few minutes of your class time.
McKee, P. (1971). A primer for parents (rev. ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
McKee, P. (1972). Primer for parents (rev. ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF TEXT

Walter Kintsch developed a model of text comprehension that is very much related to data gathered in experiments
dealing with memory and that grew out of a verbal learning background and tradition. We saw in Chapter 7 that the
memory of text information is not stored verbatim but instead is actively processed so that the gist or main idea can be
stored. Even a main idea may be further broken down for memory storage into propositions (Gordon, 1989). For
example, the sentence “The little girl rode the red tricycle” contains three propositions:
• The girl was little.
• The girl rode the tricycle.
• The tricycle was red.
Evidence indicates that each proposition is stored separately in memory. For example, Kintsch and Glass (Kintsch,
1974) found that subjects asked to recall a sentence verbatim performed better when the sentence contained only one
proposition, even when sentence length was constant. Also, Kintsch and Keenan (1973) found that subjects could learn
the meaning of a paragraph with fewer propositions more quickly than one with more propositions, even if they
contained the same number of words.
Although the notion that meaning is represented by propositions seems to be fairly well accepted, there is
controversy over the structure of propositional codes (Gordon, 1989). The debate seems to center on the issue of
whether the subject and predicate of the sentence are equal elements or whether the predicate is the central element of
the proposition. The structure of the proposition, however, seems to be less important than the means by which
propositions are used to understand text, particularly for students in introductory psychology.

Kintsch has theorized that we combine propositions in a text base, which is a coherent hierarchy dealing with all the
propositions in a block of text. This text base is much like an outline, with main points (propositions) given higher
positions within the hierarchy. Secondary propositions are relegated to lower positions in the text base, but they may
help clarify the main proposition. The clarifying or expanding phrases that are often found under each proposition
basically exist to make the meaning of the higher-level proposition more comprehensible. Each proposition is presumed
to consist of a subject and verb. For example, consider the sentence “The waves crash heavily onto the beach and wash
away the sand on the surface, causing erosion along the shore” (Gordon, 1989, p. 240). This complex sentence contains
three propositions: the main proposition of “waves crash” and two secondary propositions of “waves wash away sand”
and “waves cause erosion.” The text base might look something like this:
1. Waves crash (proposition based on main verb)

a. heavily (how)
b. onto the beach (where)
2. Waves wash away sand (proposition based on secondary verb)
a. on the surface (where)
3. Waves cause erosion (proposition based on secondary verb)
a. along the shore (where) (Gordon, 1989, p. 240)
If we can retrieve this text base from memory, we can recall the meaning of the text block. Note that no exact copy
of the text exists; instead, meaning is recovered by looking at the main proposition and reading downward to expand on
that proposition. My own observations of memory performance indicate that it may be easier to store or retrieve
propositions than to deal with the clarifying phrases. For example, on exams, students will often produce the general
sense of the correct answer to an essay item but will fail to produce the details that expand on or clarify the main idea(s).
The research of Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) is consistent with this anecdotal view of memory. They gave subjects a
report and asked for recall immediately, 1 month later, or 3 months later. They found that subjects could produce several
lower-level propositions immediately but were likely to produce only high-level propositions after a delay.
Finally, Kintsch’s position helps explain the fact that we typically draw inferences from a block of text. A text base
exists as a “logical, coherent structure” (Gordon, 1989, p. 241), meaning that the propositions should be interrelated into
a whole unit of meaning. Again, exact copies of the original propositions are unlikely to be available. If the text base’s
structure is not logical and coherent, we may draw an inference that allows us to make a logical, coherent whole. For
example, Kintsch (1976) presented his subjects with text bases like “A burning cigarette was carelessly discarded. The
fire destroyed many acres of virgin forest.” Afterward, subjects were given a set of true/false statements about the
meaning of the sentences they saw. Subjects tested immediately after the original presentation were slow in responding
to statements like “A discarded cigarette started a fire,” which require an inference to be drawn. However, after 15
minutes had passed, the same subjects responded quickly to those items on the test. Immediately, the original sentences
may still have been available in memory. But after 15 minutes, the inferences had been drawn and only the gist was left.
Bransford and Franks (1971) used sentences that contained only one proposition. These sentences were also
combined into sentences that contained two or three propositions. After hearing a series of these sentences, subjects
were given a surprise recognition test. Interestingly, the subjects were most likely to judge a four-proposition sentence
as having been seen before, despite the fact that none were ever shown. Again, it seems that inferences were drawn and
memory was affected.
Kintsch’s work has been influential in notions of comprehension and recall. Although it is based on a traditional
verbal learning paradigm, the conclusions show that an active, cognitive process is involved in the process of extracting
meaning from text.
Bransford, J. D., & Franks, J. J. (1971). The abstraction of linguistic ideas. Cognitive Psychology, 2, 331–350.
Gordon, W. C. (1989). Learning and memory. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Kintsch, W. (1974). The representation of meaning in memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Kintsch, W. (1976). Memory for prose. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of human memory (pp. 90–113). San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman.
Kintsch, W., & Keenan, J. M. (1973). Reading rate and retention as a function of the number of propositions in the base structure of
sentences. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 257–274.
Kintsch, W., & van Dijk, T. A. (1978). Toward a model of text comprehension and production. Psychological Review, 85, 363–394.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY:
AMBIGUITY AND LEVELS OF SENTENCE STRUCTURE
Chomsky developed phrase-structure rules and transformational rules of grammar. Phrase-structure rules specify how
we can combine words into phrases and sentences and thus may be helpful in deciphering the meaning of sentences
(Reed, 2000). Much interesting work has been done with ambiguous sentences; phrase-structure rules can sometimes be
used to distinguish the meanings. For example, consider “They are flying planes.” One interpretation refers to some
people who are engaged in the act of flying planes; flying is part of the verb phrase. The second interpretation refers to
some planes that are currently being flown; flying is now an adjective describing the planes. Phrase-structure rules can
clarify the two meanings because of the verb-adjective distinction (see TM 8-8).
On the other hand, Chomsky’s transformational rules specify how simple declarative sentences can be rearranged
into questions, negatives, and other types of sentences. These rules may also be necessary to distinguish between
different meanings of an ambiguous sentence (Reed, 2000). For example, consider “Flying planes can be dangerous.”
Does this sentence refer to the act of flying being dangerous or to planes that pose a threat to someone? Phrase-structure
rules are not helpful in this case because “flying planes” serves as the subject of either interpretation. Chomsky designed
his transformational grammar to consist of two levels: “the surface structure, directly related to the sentence as it is
heard, and the deep structure, directly related to the meaning of the sentence” (Reed, 2000, p. 299). The only way to
resolve the ambiguity of the “flying planes” sentence is to know which of the two deep levels is intended.
Moates and Schumacher (1980) provided a long list of ambiguous sentences that you can present to your class (see
HM 8-1). By doing so, you can accomplish several objectives. First, you can demonstrate the importance of Chomsky’s
transformational rules. Second, you can demonstrate the importance of context. Many sentences we hear are potentially
ambiguous, but the meaning is made clear because of the context surrounding the sentence (Reed, 2000). Third, you
may be able to alert students to think about things that they say and write. Learning to express oneself clearly and
unambiguously is a treasured skill. Students are often careless about crafting unambiguous sentences. Finally, the class
can have a great deal of fun interpreting some of the sentences. Challenge students to derive as many different meanings
for each sentence as possible. Also, ask for examples of sentences that could clarify the meaning of each ambiguous
sentence. Moates and Schumacher’s sentences and explanations follow:
The simplest kind of ambiguity is lexical ambiguity. This occurs when one word in a sentence yields two or more
meanings and hence two or more underlying representations. For example,
1. California is a great state to live in despite its faults.
2. There is a fork in the road ahead.
The two meanings of fault and fork lead to two different interpretations of these sentences. If you keep your mind limber,
you will find similar examples almost daily. Consider these:
3. To a waiter: “Do you have frog legs?”
4. Newspaper name: The Chattanooga News-Free Press
5. One of the more gruesome examples, “He shot off his mouth,” is so grisly you can hardly bear it.
The pun is a popular form of lexical ambiguity, though the surface structure for the pun often differs slightly for the two
meanings, as shown in these examples by Bennett Cerf (1968):
6. And then there was the fellow who inherited 392 clocks and is now winding up the estate.
7. A Texan down on the range is suing for a divorce. He found his dear and an interloper playing.
8. Then there was the seashore eccentric who spent all his time throwing rocks at gulls. He left no tern unstoned.
A second level of ambiguity embraces units larger than the word and permits two or more entirely different
interpretations of the same surface structure. For example,
9. The car was stopped by the tree can mean The tree blocked the movement of the car or The car was parked
alongside the tree.
Similarly, there are two very different underlying representations for
10. The magician made the prince a frog.
Students of ours have found at least eight meanings for
11. Jane reports that her neighbour had her second car stolen.

Two of these are
a. Jane’s neighbour was the victim of car theft for a second time.
b. Jane’s neighbour arranged the theft of Jane’s old family jalopy.
How many meanings do you find for the following sentences?
12. The police were ordered to stop drinking at midnight.
13. She missed the boat.
14. Norman Rockwell painted me on his front porch. (Moates & Schumacher, 1980, pp. 139–140)
After presenting these examples to the class, you might have volunteers relate humorous incidents they have
experienced that arose through misinterpreting ambiguous sentences. It will help if you prime your audience by sharing
a personal story first.
Cerf, B. (1968). Bennett Cerf’s treasury of atrocious puns. New York: Dell.
Moates, D. R., & Schumacher, G. M. (1980). An introduction to cognitive psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Reed, S. K. (2000). Cognition: Theory and applications (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC:
OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS

The text provides much information about different types of problems and various approaches to solving problems but
never gives an overview of the entire process. Providing some structure for the activity of problem solving before
covering this material might give students a better context for encoding the material in the text. Also, this information
can be meshed with the Chapter 8 Personal Application (“Understanding Pitfalls in Reasoning About Decisions”) to aid
students in their personal problem solving.
Glass and Holyoak (1986) developed a flowchart representation of the problem-solving process (see TM 8-9). Each
step is important for achieving a specific goal that aids in solving the problem. Problem representation is a critical step,
because the manner in which a problem is represented may well determine whether it is solved. Many times a solution
cannot be found because the problem is poorly defined or poorly understood. Or information may be presented that is
irrelevant to solving the problem but that becomes the focus in seeking a solution (see the problems under Weiten &
McCann’s “Problem Solving” heading).
The second step in problem solving, planning a potential solution, allows you to evaluate your problem
representation. If it is poor, then the problem must be reformulated. If the problem was represented well, then you can
plan a possible solution and then proceed to test it. This step is the heart of problem solving and probably has the most
variations to it (see “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Solving Problems Through Algorithms and Heuristics”).
Next, if the initial problem representation was inadequate, the solver must reformulate the problem. Often the initial
representation was inadequate because of a common block or hindrance. For example, the text mentions functional
fixedness, unnecessary constraints on the problem, and the search for analogies. Glass and Holyoak (1986) included the
process of noticing and applying analogies in this stage of problem solving. Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker
originally used the following problem:
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumor in his stomach. It is impossible to
operate on the patient, but unless the tumor is destroyed the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that can be used
to destroy the tumor. If the rays reach the tumor all at once at a sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will be
destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays pass through on the way to the tumor will
also be destroyed. At lower intensities the rays are harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not affect the tumor
either. What type of procedure might be used to destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the same time avoid
destroying the healthy tissue? (Gick & Holyoak, 1980, p. 308)
Gick and Holyoak (1980) wanted to determine whether people could be aided in problem solving by working on
analogous problems. They first gave their participants a story about a general who wanted to capture a fortress in the
center of a country. The fortress was surrounded by many roads, but the roads had been mined so that only small
numbers of troops could safely traverse any road. However, the general had to have all of his forces to successfully
capture the fortress. Different solutions were given to different groups of subjects. Of primary interest was the group

who was told that the general sent small numbers of troops down each road to the fortress so they could converge on the
fortress. Gick and Holyoak found that 76% of the people receiving this story could solve the tumour problem, compared
with 8% of the control group who received no analogy. The solution to the tumour problem is similar to the solution of
the general’s problem: irradiate the tumour from several angles simultaneously with lower-intensity rays. The
convergence of the rays at the tumour will provide high enough intensity to destroy the tumour, but the low-intensity
radiation passing through healthy tissue will cause no damage.
Finally, the problem solver must execute the plan and check the results. Obviously, this step is critical in
determining whether the solution is correct. If the solution does not work, this step provides feedback about why the
solution failed, which can be used to plan a new solution or to reformulate the problem.
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 306–355.
SCIENTIFIC THINKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING IN RIDDLES

Hatcher (1990) endorsed solving riddles to illustrate the stages in problem solving and scientific thinking. The entire
class receives the following information:
You are walking in the desert and find a man lying face down with a pack on his back, dead.
How did he die? (p. 123)
After reading this statement, tell students that you will respond to any yes/no question but will provide no further
information. After asking questions for a few minutes, the class should arrive at the solution: The man’s parachute failed
to open after he jumped from an airplane.
Hatcher then divided the class into several small groups and gives each group several more riddles. One person in
the group, serving as the moderator, is given the answer in order to answer the yes/no questions. You may want to rotate
this role through the group so that everyone participates in the problem-solving process. Samples of Hatcher’s riddles
appear in HM 8-2.
After the groups have solved the riddles, Hatcher points out the similarity between solving riddles or other problems
and the scientific process. In particular, he emphasizes the following points:
1. It is often important to view a problem from more than one perspective.
2. Prior assumptions concerning data are dangerous.
3. Yes/no questions, properly formed, yield highly useful data.
4. Details that do not fit expected patterns are often of crucial importance.
5. Persistence is a key quality in problem solving.
6. By expecting complicated answers, simple ones may be overlooked.
7. Science is an enterprise that is frustrating, exciting, and requires considerable courage. (p. 123)
An interesting variation on this technique would be to have the groups solve one or two riddles and then give the
talk about the important points in solving problems. Afterward, the groups could be given another riddle or two to see
whether the information helped them solve riddles more easily.
Hatcher offered to share more riddles with interested parties. You can contact him at the following address:
Joe W. Hatcher, Jr.
Department of Psychology
Ripon College
Ripon, WI 54971

Oh, yes—the answers to the riddles in HM 8-2:
1. He had the hiccups.
2. He’s a baseball player standing on third base.
3. He was found cheating at cards by having an extra ace; there are 52 Bicycle playing cards in a normal deck.
Be sure that you are open to creative answers that also fit the situation. One hallmark of productive problem solving is
arriving at novel solutions.
Hatcher, J. W., Jr. (1990). Using riddles to introduce the process and experience of scientific thinking. Teaching of Psychology, 17,
123–124.
DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS

Weiten & McCann define functional fixedness as “the tendency to perceive an item only in terms of its most common
use” (p. 328). Someone who thinks to use a dime as a screwdriver is overcoming functional fixedness.
Weiten & McCann present two of the most famous experimental studies of functional fixedness in the text: the
string problem in Figure 8.8B and the candle problem in Concept Check 8.2. Reed (2000) reported that functional
fixedness is even stronger when an item is presented in the context of its typical function. For example, the candle
problem is made more difficult if the box that must be used as a platform for the candles is filled with tacks. It is then
seen as a tack container rather than as a potential part of the solution. Reed also noted that a good example of
overcoming functional fixedness in real life is found in the attempts of prisoners to break out of jail. Because prisoners
do not have access to tools to help them escape, they must use items that are around them in unique ways.
Bernstein (1991) presented a good example that you can use in class to demonstrate how functional fixedness may
hinder problem solving. Display an array of items to your class: a small sewing kit like those from hotel rooms, several
sheets of 8½  11 paper, a roll of tape, a sharpened pencil, and a phonograph record (33 rpm). To these, add various
items that will serve as distractors; Bernstein suggested a tennis ball, a tool kit, an apple, and the like. The problem
presented to students is to play the phonograph record so that the class can hear it, using only these items.
We often find ourselves under pressure when we try to solve problems. You may wish to illustrate the effect of stress on
problem solving by setting a strict time limit for devising a solution or by dividing students into groups that compete
against one another, with a reward for the group that solves the problem first.
SOLUTION: Take a sheet of paper, roll it from one corner to form a cone, and tape the edge to hold that shape.
Then tape a needle from the sewing kit to the outside surface of the narrow end of the paper cone so that its sharp
point extends an inch or so beyond the cone. Now push the pencil firmly into the hole in the record so that, by
resting the eraser end on a firm surface, the record can be turned clockwise in a level plane. Now, while turning the
record in this way, grasp the edge of the large end of the paper cone between thumb and forefinger and let the
needle rest on the turning record. It won’t be high fidelity or stereo, but the sound will be amplified enough for
everyone to hear. (Bernstein, 1991)
In coming years, you may encounter a new cognitive problem with this task. Future generations of students may ask
you, “What’s a record player?”
Bernstein, D. A. (1991, January). Functional fixedness in problem solving. Presented at the 13th National Institute for the Teaching
of Psychology, St. Petersburg Beach, FL.
Reed, S. K. (2000). Cognition: Theory and applications (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC:
SOLVING PROBLEMS THROUGH ALGORITHMS AND HEURISTICS

An important consideration in problem solving is choosing an approach that will lead to a solution. Two general types of
approaches are algorithms and heuristics. The information provided here will enable you to enlarge your coverage of
these topics.
According to Moates and Schumacher (1980), an algorithm is “any method that guarantees a solution to a problem”
(p. 255). This definition immediately gives rise to an image of an exhaustive test of every possible solution by a
trial-and- error process, but this approach is not absolutely necessary. For example, if we know the principles of
multiplication and division, we can solve a totally new, complex division problem. We would approach it with an
algorithm for solving division problems. This algorithm guarantees a solution to the problem but is not exhaustive.
In some cases, an exhaustive search may be required. For example, I have a briefcase with a combination lock. The
lock has three dials, each with the numbers 0 through 9. If I forget my combination, I can open the briefcase by applying
the algorithm of trying each possible 3-digit number combination, all 1000 of them. Eventually I will get the briefcase
open. However, if the problem is complex or has many potential answers, an exhaustive search may be too costly in
terms of time or effort. My mailbox has a combination lock with 50 digits on the dial. I know that the combination has 3
numbers and requires turning the dial in different directions each time. But the number of possible combinations is
astronomical. An algorithm is not a good strategy for opening this lock, although it would eventually work if I had the
time. If you think the mailbox combination represents a challenging problem, consider a more complicated one, such as
moving a piece in a game of checkers. Moates and Schumacher (1980) noted that “Samuel has calculated that such an
approach to checkers would involve about 1040 possible moves, which at 3 choices per millisecond would still take 1021
centuries to consider” (p. 257). For chess, the estimate is that there are about 10120 possible moves to consider.
Previously, experts thought that even computers could not cope with algorithmic strategies in such complex situations
because of the massive amount of time involved in considering every possible move. With the success of Deep Blue in
defeating Kasparov in 1997, that day may be gone!
Because of the drawbacks in using algorithms, heuristics are more likely to be used in problem solving. Weiten &
McCann define heuristic as “a guiding principle or ‘rule of thumb’ used in solving problems or making decisions.”
However, because a heuristic is only a selective search of possible solutions, it does not guarantee a solution. As Moates
and Schumacher pointed out, “heuristics thus reduce the cost of search at the risk of not solving the problem” (1980,
p.257). The Weiten & McCann text provides a good account of four different heuristics used in problem solving:
forming subgoals, working backward, searching for analogies, and changing the representation of the problem. In
addition, Glass and Holyoak (1986) listed five judgment heuristics, “strategies that can be applied easily in a wide
variety of situations and that often lead to reasonable decisions” (p. 346):
• Similarity judgments: In categorization situations where the resemblance of an item to a category is judged,
similarity judgments are often used. For example, a robin and a bluejay are similar because they belong to the
category bird. However, robins, penguins, and chickens are all birds, and they share little similarity.
• Representativeness: Closely related to similarity, representativeness refers to how well a given item epitomizes
the larger item or category or how good an exemplar of a concept the given item is. Robins may be more
representative of birds than penguins or chickens because robins have more features of birds.
• Availability: The availability heuristic involves “basing judgments on the ease with which relevant instances
can be retrieved from memory” (Glass & Holyoak, 1986, p. 355). More will be said about this heuristic in
“Lecture/Discussion Topic: Errors in Decision Making.”
• Analogical reasoning: When we are faced with a novel situation, we may think of a similar situation and use it
as an analogy to develop potential solutions for the novel situation. The success of this heuristic depends on
whether the similarities are important or superficial.

• Simulation: Rather than basing a decision on information stored in memory (availability), the simulation
heuristic bases decision making on examples constructed by the reasoner. For example, Glass and Holyoak
(1986) presented two hypothetical scenarios: (1) If Hitler had had the atomic bomb in 1943, Germany would
have won World WarII; (2) If Hitler had had one more airplane in 1943, Germany would have won World War
II. When presented with these statements, people find the first much more plausible than the second, despite the
fact that neither involves facts and both require supposition. Simulation allows us to evaluate each situation for
its potential impact and to draw a logical conclusion.
There are many ways to approach problem solving. The heuristics Weiten & McCann present in the text provide
only part of the picture.
ILLUSTRATING THE DRAWBACKS OF ALGORITHMIC PROBLEM SOLVING

As noted in “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Solving Problems Through Algorithms and Heuristics,” using an algorithm
guarantees a solution to a problem. If the particular algorithm to be used is known, as in solving mathematical problems,
this approach is quite effective. However, if the correct algorithm is unknown or consists of trying all possible solutions,
solving the problem may seem almost impossible.
Scoville (1990) illustrated this dilemma well in a problem-solving activity using a checkerboard pattern. He
provided students with pieces of the pattern and asked them to assemble the pieces. This puzzle could be solved with the
use of an algorithm: trying all possible combinations. If you have an old Rubik’s cube sitting around the house, you
could bring that to class as another example of the same type of problem.
However, in both cases there are thousands of possible combinations, and it is not easy to avoid the error of
attempting combinations that have been tried before. You can illustrate this pitfall with the puzzle provided in HM 8-3.
Provide students with a copy and have them cut out the pieces and attempt to assemble them (the solution is provided in
HM 8-4). Such problems do not lend themselves to incubation or insight and thus are quite difficult. For solving this
type of problem, a computer might be quite helpful. A computer can use the necessary algorithm with great “patience”
and can try the various combinations at high speed. This activity is typically quite useful in helping students distinguish
between algorithms and heuristics.
Scoville, W. E. (1990). Brute force in problem solving. In V. P. Makosky, C. C. Sileo, L. G. Whittemore, C. P. Landry, & M. L.
Skutley (Eds.), Activities handbook for the teaching of psychology: Vol. 3 (pp. 87–89). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: INCUBATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING
Wallas (1926) identified four stages of problem solving:

1. Preparation: Information is gathered, and initial attempts to solve the problem are made.
2. Incubation: The problem is put aside for some time.
3. Illumination: A sudden insight into the solution occurs.
4. Verification: The solution is checked to make sure it is correct.
This list of stages is similar to Glass and Holyoak’s flowchart of the problem-solving process (described in
“Lecture/Discussion Topic: Overview of the Problem-Solving Process”). However, Wallas included the stage of
incubation, which Glass and Holyoak did not. In numerous anecdotal accounts, people set aside problems that seem
unsolvable and, coming back to the problems later, suddenly discover solutions (illumination occurs).
Moates and Schumacher (1980) cited an unpublished study by Silveira concerning incubation. Silveira gave her
participants a problem to work on and varied their approaches to the work. One group of subjects worked continuously
on the task for about half an hour and achieved a 50% success rate. A second group worked on the problem, took a

half-hour break, and returned to work on the problem; 64% solved the problem. A third group worked on the problem
and took a 4-hour break before returning to work; they solved the problem at an 85% rate. In opposition to Wallas’s
theory, the subjects did not experience illumination during the incubation time nor immediately upon returning to the
problem, but they were nevertheless more likely to solve the problem.
Moates and Schumacher (1980) gave Silveira’s original problem, which you can use to demonstrate the incubation
process. You could give it to students at the beginning of the class, set it aside, and give it to them again toward the end
of class. Her problem:
A man had 4 chains, each 3 links long. He wanted to join the 4 chains into a single closed chain. Having a link
opened cost 2¢ and having a link closed cost 3¢. The man had his chains joined into a closed chain for 15¢. How
did he do it? (p. 245)
The second problem’s source is unknown; it simply appeared in my department after being passed around (see
HM8-5). Subsequently, I have found numerous such puzzles on the Internet (simply search for “26 L of the A”). Note
that the description of the test refers to the incubation process. I can personally attest that incubation does work on this
test. This set of puzzles may work better with a longer incubation period. You might hand out this page one day, take it
up the same day, and give it back at the next class meeting. You will probably see many glimpses of insight among the
students.
Answers to Chain Problem
One set of 3 links must be used for connecting links. Each link in the set is opened (3  2¢ = 6¢) and then used to
connect 2 links from two other sets (3  3¢ = 9¢). Thus, the total spent to create a single closed chain is 15¢.
Answers to Number Puzzles

26 Letters of the Alphabet
7 Wonders of the World
1001 Arabian Nights
12 Signs of the Zodiac
54 Cards in the Deck (with the Jokers)
9 Planets in the Solar System
88 Piano Keys
6 Sides on a Stop Sign
18 Holes on a Golf Course
3 Blind Mice (See How They Run)
24 Hours in a Day
57 Heinz Varieties
11 Players on a Football Team
1000 Words That a Picture is Worth
29 Days in February in a Leap Year
Wallas, G. (1926). The art of thought. New York: Harcourt.
LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: ERRORS IN DECISION MAKING
Weiten & McCann refer to Simon’s work showing that we often make decisions based on less than adequate
information. The result, of course, may be less than adequate decisions. Myers (2000) summarized many distortions in
social thinking that may lead to poor decisions. These will add considerably to the list of problems covered in the text
and mesh well with the Chapter 8 Personal Application (“Understanding Pitfalls in Reasoning About Decisions”).
• We often do not know why we do what we do: Research shows that people whose attitudes have been altered
often claim that they have always believed the same thing. We often err in explaining our behaviour; we may
ignore or minimize important factors and credit unimportant factors for having big effects on us. Also, we are
notoriously poor at predicting our future behaviour, as Milgram’s research indicates.

• We often construct memories: We are often guilty of reconstructing our memories of past attitudes and
behaviours. Also, remember the work on memory construction—people’s memories can be altered based on
leading questions and expectations they hold.
• Our preconceptions control our interpretations: We perceive and interpret events in line with our expectations.
For example, notice how easy it is to catch others’ typos and how difficult it is to catch our own. Notice how
often the officials at a sporting event make bad calls against your team and good calls against your opponent.
Research shows evidence of belief perseverance: It is difficult to discredit a belief if you have already
generated a plausible explanation for it.
• We overestimate the accuracy of our judgments: When asked to answer factual questions with a range that
gives us 98% confidence, we end up being accurate only about 60% to 70% of the time (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). We are prone to the confirmation bias, in which we seek information that confirms our preconceived
notions. Engineers at NASA and private companies may have been guilty of this bias when they okayed the
launch of the Challenger shuttle, despite faulty O-rings.
• We often are swayed more by anecdotes than by statistical facts: We tend to rely on anecdotal information
even in the face of statistical information that would be more predictive of the true state of affairs. The
availability heuristic, mentioned in “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Solving Problems Through Algorithms and
Heuristics,” is relevant here. This heuristic would explain, for example, why people often rate flying as more
dangerous than traveling by automobile, despite statistics that indicate just the opposite. Plane crashes are
spectacular events that get much attention in the news and thus are easily available in memory.
• We misperceive correlation and control: We have difficulty recognizing random events as being random and
are likely to perceive order or correlation when there is none. For example, despite the fact that there is no
evidence to support the notion, many people believe there is a relationship between adopting a child and then
conceiving a child shortly afterward. If we expect a relationship between events, we probably pay more
attention to confirming rather than disconfirming events. We are prone to the illusion of control when we
believe that random events are somehow under our control. Gamblers and superstitious people are especially
prone to the illusion of control.
• Our beliefs can generate their own confirmation: The best example of this error is the self-fulfilling prophecy.
Rosenthal and Jacobson’s (1968) classic research showed that teachers’ expectations of their students had an
effect on how well the students actually performed.
Unfortunately, we are prone to many biases and errors in our thought processes. However, being made aware of
these biases may help us avoid such problems in the future.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures. Management Science, 12, 313–327.
Myers, D. G. (2000). Exploring social psychology (2nd ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmalion in the classroom: Teacher expectation and pupils’ intellectual development. New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: CONCEPT LEARNING

Concept learning is a topic often included in discussions of cognition, but Weiten & McCann do not cover it. Concepts
may be learned in similar ways as factual information, but concepts are much more broadly applied. As Moates and
Schumacher (1980) pointed out, “a concept is abstract; it represents a class of things, not any particular member of the
class” (p. 208). Concepts are similar to mathematical sets; they are defined by a list of properties. Items can be
categorized as belonging to a particular concept on the basis of those properties. The advantage of using concepts rather
than specific members is that concepts allow us to generalize from a known instance to an unknown event. Thus, we can
use concepts to solve the problem of novelty. We have some idea of what to expect when we go to a new grocery store
because we have been to other grocery stores and formed a concept of grocery store that leads us to expect certain
things in this new store.

“A concept is defined by one or more attributes related by a rule” (Moates & Schumacher, 1980, p. 209). Attributes
are features of concepts that can vary from instance to instance. For example, automobiles can vary in shape, size,
colour, number of doors, name, and so on. The fact that attributes can vary does not imply that they are important in
defining a concept. Relevant attributes help define concepts, but irrelevant attributes are not actually related to the
concept. Colour, for example, is an irrelevant attribute for defining car. The rule defines the concept in terms of how the
attributes are combined. We are able to distinguish cars from trucks because they are defined by differing sets of
attributes. However, we are able to lump a Rolls Royce and a Chevrolet Geo Metro into a common concept of car
because they are defined by a common set of attributes.
As with many behaviours, the laboratory analogy does not always seem to mimic real life. Although we may learn
concepts as diverse and broad as car, dog, and job as we grow up, the laboratory situation is often simplistic and
artificial. For example, a participant may be faced with the task of learning what a GAX is from a set of simple stimuli
that vary along three attributes—shape, size, and position. The concept’s definition could revolve around any or all of
those attributes. For example, a GAX could be a circular object, a large circular object, or a large circular object pictured
in the middle. Moates and Schumacher (1980) identified three processes that research subjects typically use in learning a
concept:
• Discovering the relevant attributes: The learner must attend to the defining attributes and ignore the irrelevant
ones. This process is influenced by the salience of the attributes. Salient attributes are those that are noticed
easily and quickly in a concept-learning task. If the relevant attributes are also salient, learning will take place
quickly. However, when salient features are irrelevant, learning is much more difficult. Moates and
Schumacher note that aircraft spotters during wartime have a difficult job when wing shapes of friendly and
enemy aircraft are similar, because wing shape is a salient attribute for airplane identification. Evidence
indicates that subjects in concept-learning experiments use a hypothesis-testing strategy in learning the correct
attributes (see below).
• Discovering the rule relating the attributes: Concepts are defined not only by relevant attributes but also by a
rule that relates those attributes. Thus, concept learning requires that both steps take place. In general, the
simpler the rule, the easier the concept is to learn. Affirmation and negation rules are fairly simple to learn,
whereas conditional and biconditional rules present difficulties to subjects.
• Testing hypotheses: In concept learning, the subject is seen as generating hypotheses about the attributes and
the rule and then testing those hypotheses. This view stresses the role of cognition in the process, rather than
assuming a mechanistic behaviouristic process. A difficulty in concluding that hypothesis testing goes on is the
fact that generating and testing hypotheses is unobservable and verbal reports may be unreliable. Levine (1966)
devised the blank trial approach to assess whether subjects actually used hypotheses. Levine gave his subjects a
regular concept-learning trial with feedback, followed by four trials with no feedback. By observing the
subjects’ choices during the blank trials, Levine was able to conclude that subjects used a hypothesis about
92% of the time, that they stayed with a correct hypothesis about 95% of the time, and that they chose a new
hypothesis after an incorrect response about 98% of the time (the “win stay, lose shift” strategy).
Levine, M. (1966). Hypothesis behaviour by humans during discrimination learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71, 331–
336.
DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: CONCEPT LEARNING IN CLASS

Benjamin (1981) provided an example of concept learning for use in the classroom. In much the same way that students
learned about such concepts as dog, car, and ball as children, they can learn a new concept in class.
This exercise requires a set of stimulus materials and a scoring sheet. Benjamin suggested using about 36 slides of
Greek-letter trigrams (transparencies would work equally well), such as ΠΒΔ and ΠΦΛ. Greek letters are low in
meaningfulness and association value (if you avoid fraternity and sorority names) and are not particularly
pronounceable. In constructing the trigrams, choose two letters that will define your concept. For example, let Λ be the
positive indicator of the concept and Δ the negative indicator. When constructing your trigrams, do not let these two

letters appear together in the same trigram. Every trigram with Λ will be an example of the concept, and every trigram
with Δ will not be an example of the concept. Benjamin also suggested preparing slides with the word true or false on
them, to use for feedback to your students, although you could provide oral feedback.
Read the following instructions to the class:
You are going to participate in a concept-learning task. In a moment I will show you some slides that contain three
Greek letters forming a trigram. Some of these trigrams are true, while others are false. Your task is to learn which
ones are true and which ones are false, by learning what characteristic of the trigrams determines their truth or
falseness. That is the concept you are to learn. I will present the trigrams in blocks of 12, showing them to you one
at a time. Each trigram will be followed by an answer slide indicating whether the previous slide was true or false.
Look at the answer sheet I have given you. Begin with Column 1, marking your answers down the column. The task
will proceed as follows: A Greek-letter trigram will appear on the screen very briefly, for approximately 5 seconds.
As soon as you see it, you are to decide whether it is true or false and then mark either the letter T or F in the first
box under Column 1. The next slide is an answer slide and will tell you if you were correct. If the answer slide
indicates you were not correct, circle that box on your answer sheet and be ready for the next trigram. Note that the
task will proceed very rapidly. All slides, both trigrams and answers, will appear on the screen for approximately 5
seconds each. Thus you must work very rapidly.
When you have learned the concept, you should keep that knowledge to yourself. Let your neighbours learn on
their own. I will define learning in this task as two successive trial blocks without an error (that is, 24 correct
responses in a row). When you reach that criterion you should sit quietly at your desk until the completion of this
demonstration. We are ready to begin. (Benjamin, 1981, p. 101)
At the end of each block, ask for a show of hands from everyone who got all slides correct. If you have time, run seven
or eight trial blocks so that a sizable portion of the class will have gotten one trial block correct.
After completing the last trial block, ask students not to talk to one another yet because the exercise is not
completed. Write a very long number on the board and point out that, despite the fact that none of the students have ever
seen this number, they can all classify it as being odd or even. They can do so because they have learned the concept of
odd and even numbers. Then write the trigram ΦΛΔ on the board. Tell them that they have never seen this trigram in the
experiment and you want those who think they learned the concept to vote on this trigram. Is it true, false, or
ambiguous? Count hands for votes in each category and record them. You can then point out that they actually were in a
double concept-learning task. There were actually two concepts that could be learned—namely, that Λ was true and Δ
was false. Students who learned both concepts should have voted for ambiguous. Those who voted true learned only
that trigrams with Λ were true; those who voted false learned only that trigrams with Δ were false. Do you find a
difference in your class between the number of people who learn from positive examples and those who learn from
negative examples?
This exercise will engage the class in an active learning experience and should create some interest and, perhaps,
competition among class members. Those who learned only one of the concepts may be chagrined but have still learned
something of the concept. Even those who did not master the concept in the exercise will learn about concept learning.
Benjamin, L. T., Jr. (1981). Concept learning. In L. T. Benjamin, Jr., & K. D. Lowman (Eds.), Activities handbook for the teaching
of psychology (pp. 100–102). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: CULTURE AND CONCEPTS

An area of cultural influence not covered in the text is the topic of concepts or categories. As with many of the cultural
topics, it appears not that the process itself is different but that the outcome of the process may be culturally influenced.
In other words, there is no reason to suspect that the processes summarized in “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Concept
Learning” differ from culture to culture. However, the concepts or categories that are formed do, in some cases, differ.
Matsumoto (1994) related a humorous story to provide a good example. He attended a party at an American’s house
with a Persian guest present. When they went to the living room, the Persian became visibly embarrassed. When the
host left the room, the Persian explained that the beautiful brass pitcher gracing the living room table served an
important function in the Middle East. In that culture, toilet paper is in short supply and people use brass pitchers full of
water to clean themselves after using the bathroom. Clearly the categorizations of the pitcher differed widely in this
example.Matsumoto (2000) listed some categories that seem to be relatively universal. One of these categories was

covered in Chapter 4 (“Lecture/Discussion Topic: Culture and Colour Perception”). Remember that research tends to
show that colour perception is invariant among cultures, despite large differences in language terms dealing with colour.
If you did not cover this topic in Chapter 4, you may wish to do so in this chapter. Another category that varies little
with culture is facial expression of emotion. You will recall that people of different cultures are able to accurately
identify basic emotions from pictures of faces alone. Weiten & McCann cover Ekman’s work on this topic in Chapter
10. Matsumoto also noted that shape categorization tends to be invariant across cultures. When asked to provide the best
examples of basic forms, people tend to respond with perfect circles, equilateral triangles, and squares rather than more
irregular shapes.
On the other hand, there are examples of categorizations that do not appear to be universal. In studying
categorization, researchers often use a sorting task (Matsumoto, 2000). Here, the subject is presented with a variety of
items and asked to sort them into groups. Of course, there are a variety of ways that the items can be grouped. With
Western subjects, this task appears to be developmentally linked. Given items that can be sorted by colour, shape, or
function, young children tend to sort by colour. As they get older, they begin to sort by shape and finally by function.
Therefore, Western adults can be expected to sort objects primarily by function. However, Suchman (1966) found that
African adults were more likely to sort by colour. This different result implies that the original finding is not related to
simple maturation.
Evans and Segall (1969) tested the hypothesis that colour versus function grouping reflected educational differences
by comparing Ugandan children and adults on a sorting task. Some of their subjects had attended school and some had
not. Indeed, they found that subjects with little or no education showed a preference for colour grouping. Thus, culture
in this instance may be a misleading term to students. However, you should remind your students that culture does not
necessarily refer to different racial groups or to persons from different countries (see “Operational Definitions of
Culture” within Chapter 2 “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Cultural Perspectives and Research”).
Evans, J. L., & Segall, M. H. (1969). Learning to classify by color and function: A study of concept discovery by Ganda children.
Journal of Social Psychology, 77, 35–55.
Matsumoto, D. (1994). People: Psychology from a cultural perspective. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Matsumoto, D. (2000). Culture and psychology: People around the world (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Suchman, R. G. (1966). Cultural differences in children’s color and form perception. Journal of Social Psychology, 70, 3–10.
DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: PRACTICE IN PROBLEM SOLVING

After students have learned about various barriers (and solutions) to problem solving in Chapter 8, you may wish to give
them a chance to apply their knowledge to problems that are similar to those described in the text. HM 8-6 gives several
problems that illustrate the common barriers people encounter in trying to solve problems. You could give students the
HM and ask them to list the relevant barrier to each problem and why that barrier makes an incorrect answer to that
question particularly likely for most people. Detecting the barriers and knowing how the barriers operate is more
important than giving an answer to a particular question.
1. availability heuristic
4. representativeness heuristic
5. representativeness heuristic

REFERENCES FOR ADDITIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS/ACTIVITIES
• From Teaching of Psychology:
Cognition and memory: A bibliographic essay on the history and issues, by M. S. Chodorow & S. K. Manning (1983), 10, 163–167
Köhler’s insight revisited, by G. Windholz & P. A. Lamal (1985), 12, 165–167
Prisoner’s dilemma as a model for understanding decisions, by J. D. Larsen (1987), 14, 230–231
Self-scoring: A self-monitoring procedure, by L. C. Light, W. J. McKeachie, & Y. Lin (1988), 15, 145–147
A decision tree for psychology majors: Supplying questions as well as answers, by R. E. Poe (1988), 15, 210–213
Demonstrating the influence of cognition on emotion and behavior, by J. L. Deffenbacher (1990), 17, 182–185
Learning about individual and collective decisions: All for one and none for all, by B. F. Peden & A. H. Keniston (1990), 17, 235–
238
Tracing the cognitive revolution through a literature search, by F. Hassebrock (1990), 17, 251–252
The self-reference effect: Demonstrating schematic processing in the classroom, by D. R. Forsyth & K. H. Wibberly (1993), 20,
237–238
An interactive classroom demonstration of propositional and analogical representation, by J. K. Kruschke (1996), 23, 162–165
Demonstration of research methodologies used in psycholinguistics, by W. Langson (1998), 25, 61–63
Intelligence as a unifying theme for teaching cognitive psychology, by R. J. Sternberg & J. Pardo (1988), 25, 293–296
Computerized cognition laboratory, by M. A. Motes & D. A. Wiegmann (1999), 26, 62–65
Using daily horoscopes to demonstrate expectancy confirmation, by G. D. Munro & J. E. Munro (2000), 27, 114–116
Classroom demonstrations in perception and cognition using presentation software, by J. Neuhoff (2000), 27, 142–144
Is a bee bigger than a flea? A classroom mental imagery activity, by W. B. Thompson (2000), 27, 212–214
Using ignorance questions to promote thinking skills, by D. W. Carroll (2001), 28, 98–100
• From Activities Handbook for the Teaching of Psychology, by L. T. Benjamin, Jr., & K. D. Lowman (Eds.), 1981,
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association:
Problem solving: Groups versus individuals, by W. J. McKeachie, C. Doyle, & M. M. Moffett, pp. 92–94
Problems of set, by L. Snellgrove, pp. 95–96
The Zeigarnick effect: Suffering to serve the psyche, by A. L. LaVoie, pp. 97–99
Suggestibility and susceptibility to set, by M. Wertheimer, pp. 180–181
• From Activities Handbook for the Teaching of Psychology: Vol. 2, by V. P. Makosky, L. G. Whittemore, &
A. M. Rogers (Eds.), 1987, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association:
The role of expectancies in the perception of language, by G. M. Diekhoff, pp. 57–59
• From Activities Handbook for the Teaching of Psychology: Vol. 3, by V. P. Makosky, C. C. Sileo, L. G.
Whittemore, C. P. Landry, & M.L. Skutley (Eds.), 1990, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association:
Psychological set and the solution of anagrams, by J. R. Corey, pp. 90–91
A problem-solving workshop: The Middle East comes to class, by G. Banziger, pp. 133–135
Cognitive maps of the history of psychology, by G. S. Howard, pp. 209–213
• From Activities Handbook for the Teaching of Psychology: Vol. 4, by L. T. Benjamin, Jr., B. F. Nodine, R. M.
Ernst, & C. Blair-Broeker (Eds.), 1999, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association:
An experimental demonstration of place schema, by M. G. Hartlaub, pp. 211–215
Functional fixedness in problem solving, by D. A. Bernstein & S. S. Goss, pp. 216–217
Reorganization and productive thinking, by M. Wertheimer, pp. 218–224
Set and information processing, by M. Wertheimer, pp. 225–227

SUGGESTED READINGS FOR CHAPTER 8
Anderson, J. (1990). Cognitive psychology and its implications. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. A concise, readable introduction to a
diverse array of topics in cognitive psychology.
Baars, B. J. (1986). The cognitive revolution in psychology. New York: Guilford Press. A lively review of the trends that led to the
paradigm shift from behaviorism to the cognitive perspective. The book is built around interviews with 17 key figures in the
cognitive revolution.
Bell, D. E., Raiffa, H., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1988). Decision making: Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. An edited volume that serves as an excellent update on research on decision
making.
Best, J. B. (1992). Cognitive psychology. St. Paul, MN: West. An excellent overview of cognitive research, with strong coverage of
artificial intelligence, language, and reading.
Carroll, D. W. (1994). Psychology of language. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. A lucid, understandable text on psycholinguistics,
intended for advanced undergraduates.
Gardner, H. (1985). The mind’s new science: A history of the cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. Another absorbing
account of how the field of cognitive psychology has evolved.
Gleason, J. B. (Ed.). (1985). The development of language. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill. A collection of well-crafted chapters
that summarize recent research and theory on language development.
Halpern, D. F. (2003). Thought and knowledge: An introduction to critical thinking (4th ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. A superb book
on critical thinking that is loaded with practical advice, which is nicely integrated with discussions of cognitive research.
Klahr, D., & Kotovsky, K. (Eds.). (1989). Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert A. Simon. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Acollection of chapters written by students and colleagues of Herbert Simon. Anecdotes of the cognitive revolution are
interspersed with state-of-the-art reviews of cognitive topics.
Reed, S. K. (2000). Cognition: Theory and applications. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. A very readable undergraduate text on cognition,
with strong chapters on attention, levels of processing, problem solving, and decision making.

COPYRIGHT © 2013 by Nelson Education Ltd.
HANDOUT MASTER 8–1: AMBIGUOUS SENTENCES
1. California is a great state to live in despite its faults.
2. There is a fork in the road ahead.
3. To a waiter: “Do you have frog legs?”
4. Newspaper name: The Chattanooga News-Free Press
5. One of the more gruesome examples, “He shot off his mouth,” is so grisly you can hardly bear it.
6. And then there was the fellow who inherited 392 clocks and is now winding up the estate.
7. A Texan down on the range is suing for a divorce. He found his dear and an interloper playing.
8. Then there was the seashore eccentric who spent all his time throwing rocks at gulls. He left no tern unstoned.
9. The car was stopped by the tree.
10. The magician made the prince a frog.
11. Jane reports that her neighbour had her second car stolen. (There are at least eight meanings for this sentence.)
12. The police were ordered to stop drinking at midnight.
13. She missed the boat.
14. Norman Rockwell painted me on his front porch.
From An Introduction to Cognitive Psychology (pp. 139–140), by D. R. Moates & G. M. Schumacher, 1980. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.

HANDOUT MASTER 8–2: PROBLEM SOLVING THROUGH RIDDLES
Solve the following riddles:
1. A man walks into a bar and asks the bartender for a glass of water. The bartender reaches under the bar, pulls out a
large pistol, and points it right in the man’s face. The man says “thank you” and turns and walks out of the bar. Why
did the man say “thank you”?
2. A man is at work and wants to go home. However, he will not go home because a man wearing a mask is waiting
there for him. What does the first man do for a living?
3. A man is found shot to death in a room with a table, four chairs, and 53 bicycles. Why was he shot?
From “Using Riddles to Introduce the Process and Experience of Scientific Thinking,” by J. W. Hatcher, Jr., 1990. Teaching of
Psychology, 17, 123–124. Reprinted by permission of Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

HANDOUT MASTER 8–3: PUZZLE

HANDOUT MASTER 8–4: SOLUTION TO PUZZLE

HANDOUT MASTER 8-5: PROBLEM-SOLVING TEST
This test does not measure your intelligence, nor your fluency with words, and certainly not your mathematical ability; it
will, however, give you some gauge of your mental flexibility. In the many years since the puzzle was developed, few
people have been found who could solve more than half of the puzzles on the first try. Many reported getting answers
long after the test had been set aside—in the middle of the night and at unexpected moments when their minds were
relaxed. A small percentage completed the test after several days. Take this as your personal challenge. Good luck!
INSTRUCTIONS: Each line below contains the letters of words that will make it a correct phrase. Find the missing
words.
For Example: 12 = M. in a Y. Months in a Year
26 = L. of the A. ___________________________________________
7 = W. of the W. ___________________________________________
1001 = A. N. ___________________________________________
12 = S. of the Z. ___________________________________________
54 = C. in the D. (with the J.) ___________________________________________
9 = P. in the S. S. ___________________________________________
88 = P. K. ___________________________________________
6 = S. on a S.S. ___________________________________________
18 = H. on a G. C. ___________________________________________
3 = B. M. (S. H. T. R.) ___________________________________________
24 = H. in a D. ___________________________________________
57 = H. V. ___________________________________________
11 = P. on a F. T. ___________________________________________
1000 = W. That a P. is W. ___________________________________________
29 = D. in F. in a L. Y. ___________________________________________
Adapted from unknown source. (Available at www.cyg.net/~ddoctor/math.html and numerous other Web sites)

HANDOUT MASTER 8–6: PRACTICE IN PROBLEM SOLVING
Questions about subjective probabilities:
1. How many cities that begin with the letter F do you think you can recall? Give your estimate before you start
recalling examples.
2. Are there more words in the English language that start with the letter K or that have a K as their third letter?
3. Which is the more likely cause of death—breast cancer or diabetes?
4. If a family has three boys (B) and three girls (G), which sequence of births is more likely—B B B G G G or B G G
B G B?
5. Are you more likely to find 60 boys in a random sample of 100 children or 600 boys in a random sample of 1000
children?
From Cognition: Theory and Applications, 5th ed. (p. 415), by S. K. Reed, 2000, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

TRANSPARENCY MASTER 8-1: A SPECIAL PREPRIMER
Courtesy of L. T. Benjamin, Jr.






TRANSPARENCY MASTER 8-7: A SPECIAL PREPRIMER (TRANSLATION)
1. Sam
2. Daddy
3. Look, Daddy.
Look, look.
4. Look, Daddy.
Look at me.
5. Look, Daddy.
Look at the duck.
6. See me, Daddy.

See me shoot.
See me shoot at the duck.
7. Shoot at the duck, Sam.

Shoot him, shoot him.
See him fall.
8. Daddy did see Sam shoot.

He looked at the duck.
The duck did not fall.
9. Daddy looked at Sam.

He saw Sam fall.
Daddy smiled at Sam.
10. Did you see the duck,

Sam. The duck did not fall.
“You did fall, Sam,” smiled Daddy.
11. “Look, Sam. Look at the duck.

See me shoot him. See him fall.”
Daddy did shoot the duck.
Sam saw the duck fall.
“You did not need to shoot”
smiled Sam. “The fall
killed him.”

TRANSPARENCY MASTER 8-8:

CLARIFICATIONS OF “THEY ARE FLYING PLANES”
From Cognition: Theory and Applications, 5th ed. (p. 299), by S. K. Reed, 2000, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

TRANSPARENCY MASTER 8-9:

THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS
From Cognition, 2nd ed. (p. 367), by A. L. Glass and K. J. Holyoak, 1986. New York: Random House.

Another random document with
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– De miért nem mondád ezt mindjárt? – szólt a főbiró, ki most
sokkal józanabbnak látszott, mint előbb maga Macskaházy
reménylé.
– Hisz csak esküdtedre nem bizhatok mindent. Küldd előre a
pandúrokat Sz.-Vilmosra, s mondasd a biztosnak, hogy néhány
vasvillás emberrel s pandúrral az erdő melletti csárdánál várjanak.
Esküdtedet hagyd itthon, csak bajunkra lenne.
– Igazság, de ha Czifra rászed, s az egész csak cselszövény,
mely vesztünkre koholtatott, – s Nyúzó sápadtabbnak látszott, –
Viola nekem boszút esküdött, s Czifra bandájához tartozik.
– Ne félj, nem szükséges, hogy épen közel menjünk, magam
sem szeretem a puskalövéseket. Egyébiránt Czifra biztos ember s
kezünkben van.
Egy idő mulva Kenyházy bejött s mondá, hogy a pandúrok már
Sz.-Vilmos felé indultak.
– Menjünk hát – szólt Macskaházy ismét magára akasztva
bundáját.
– Hát te is elmégy, Palikám? – szólt bámulva az esküdt, midőn
Nyúzót szinte bundában látá.
– El, te itt maradhatsz.
– De mit csinálhatsz nálam nélkül?
– Majd csak próbálunk valamit, – szólt Nyúzó nevetve – te
vigyázz a házra.
– Furcsa, – gondolá magában Kenyházy, midőn azok ketten
kocsira ültek s Czifra, ki ez idő alatt a pitvarban várt, hátul
felkapaszkodott, – szolgabiró esküdt nélkül!
És Nyúzónak elhagyott jobb-keze, midőn a kocsi elhajtott,
visszament a szobába, többször csóválta fejét, egy pohár vörös bort
ivott, s tovább éneklé:
A ki Bandit nem szereti, haj! haj! haj!
Azt az ördög elviheti, haj! haj! haj!
Mig végre az álom lelkes dalának is véget vetett, s a Nyúzó-

curián csak a kutyák ugatása szakítá félbe a nagy éjjeli csendet.
XX.
Ha boszorkány-szemekkel birnánk, kik – mint jámbor apáink

hitték – éjtszaka mint nappal mérföldekre láttak, s ha a téren, melyen
történetünk játszik, valamely magasabb hely volna található, most
valóban ritka dolognak lehetnénk tanui. A rónán, hol őszkor, főkép
miután az estharang a távol faluk tornyain elhangzott, csak a
tanyákról áthallatszó kutyaugatás, s néha távol lókopogás szakítják
félbe az ünnepélyes csendet, most egy hintó és egy szekér hajt
egyszerre Sz.-Vilmos felé. Két rendbeli utasok, ilyenkor, s e téren!…
a dolog oly rendkivüli, hogy olvasóim talán hihetetlennek tartanák, ha
nem beszéltem volna el, hogy ez éjjel a kislaki gulyás Violánéval, s
Nyúzó Macskaházyval, mindketten a sz.-vilmosi erdő felé indultak,
az egyik pár, hogy Violát akasztófára kerítse, a másik, hogy őt
megmentse; az egyik, mint kérlelhetetlen ellen, a másik őrző
angyalként. Mi e történetet még rendkivüliebbé teszi, az, hogy ez
alkalommal a barátok az ellenségeknél inkább sietnek, mi, mint
tudva van, a legritkább esetek közé tartozik, miután a közmondássá
vált tanácsot: lassan haladj, tovább érsz, senki barátainknál inkább
követni nem szokta, úgy, hogy tíz eset közt kilenczszer épen akkor
érnek segítségünkre, mikor hasznukat többé nem vehetjük s ők azon
keserű panaszszal vádolhatják végzetöket: mért nem jöttek csak
valamivel előbb? Hogy a jelen esetben ellenkezőt tapasztalunk, az
leginkább két oknak tulajdonítható. Az első, hogy Viola barátai nem
művelt emberek, s így azoknak szokásait magokévá nem teheték; a
második, hogy ildomos emberek – s Nyúzó s Macskaházy kétségen
kivül ezekhez tartoztak – még inkább szeretik magokat, mint a mily
mértékben másokat gyűlölnek, s ha valakit fel akarnak akasztatni, az
eljárást nem szivesen kezdik azon, hogy tulajdon nyakukat töressék,
mi – Nyúzónak tántoríthatatlan meggyőződése szerint – okvetlenül
megtörténik, ha a tiszaréti kocsis öt igáslovával úgy hajt az egész
úton, mint Garacs faluban megkezdé.
– Átkozott gazember! – kiáltott a főbiró, fejét dörzsölve, mely
hatalmas zöttyenés által a kocsifödél vasrészeivel nem a
legnyájasabb érintkezésbe jött – zsákokat viszesz a vásárra, hogy a
lyukakra nem vigyázsz? Lassan! mondom lassan! máskép úgy
nyakad közé vágok –
– Kérlek, ne félj – szólt Macskaházy, szintén fejét dörzsölve, –
nincsen a megyében biztosabb kocsis, mint ez; a nagyságos
asszony is vele jár.
– Biztos ember? részeg, mondom, Macskaházy barátom, részeg
mint a csap.
– Dehogy részeg, mióta Porvárról jöttünk, nem is fogott ki.
– Jaj nekem! – kiáltott Nyúzó, kikapva pipáját, mely egy második
zökkenésnél oly mélyen beütődött szájába, hogy ha nappal lenne,
mindenki azt hitte volna, a főbiró ez elválhatlan kedvesét végre
szeretetében el akarta nyelni, – jaj nekem, ez végsőítélet. Állj meg,
kocsis! állj meg, mondom! én kiszállok.
– Várj csak egy keveset – mondá Macskaházy türelmetlenül, – itt
csak nem szállhatsz ki a sár közepett, mindjárt kijövünk a gyepre, s
az sima, mint az asztal.
– Csupa disznótúrás – sóhajtott a főbiró, ki azalatt pipáját
félretevé, de az utolsó élvezet után, melyet szárából szítt, még
mindig köpködött, az még veszedelmesebb, itt legalább lágyan
eshetnék az ember. Én kiszállok.
– De ha kiszállsz, holnapig nem érünk Sz.-Vilmosra.
– Jaj, jaj, jaj! mindjárt felfordulunk! – kiálta Nyúzó, – uram
teremtőm! állj meg! tartsd a kocsit te gazember! Jancsi! – E
felkiáltások, melyek alatt Nyúzó, kezeivel görcsösen a vánkosokhoz
kapaszkodva, egyszersmind azon gondolkozott, mily oldalon lehetne
legjobban kiugornia, egy lejtős helynek valának tulajdoníthatók,
melyen a kocsi farolva kissé meghajlott. Mielőtt azonban az ily
nyájasan felszólított hajdú magas bakjáról leszállhatott, a kocsi ismét
egyenesen állt.
– Menjünk! menjünk! – szólt Macskaházy elnyomva nevetését –
a gyepen vagyunk, itt egyenes az út! csontig átfázunk, ha ily lassan
megyünk.
– Csak a csont maradjon meg épen – jegyzé meg a főbiró, ki mig
a kocsi állt, kissé nyugodtabbnak látszott.
– Igen, – mondá a másik – de rheumatismusom – tudod, mennyit
szenvedek; a levegő oly nedves, az egész vidék teli van betegekkel.
– Már hogy’ lehet az ember ily hypochondrikus? – gondolá Nyúzó
magában, míg a lovak lassan ügetve tovább haladtak, s Jancsi régi
magyar szokás szerint szarkaként egy felhágóról a másikra
ugrándozva, a kocsinak majd egyik, majd másik oldalához
csimpaszkodott. – Meglásd – szóla szomorúan utitársához, miután a
kocsi minden erősebb mozdulatát káromkodás vagy jajkiáltások
követék, – nem jövünk ép tagokkal Sz.-Vilmosra.
– Ej, barátom, ne légy oly poltron – mondá Macskaházy, – látod,
én nyugodt vagyok és én is csak csüggök éltemen.
– Neked könnyű – sóhajta a főbiró, – nőtelen ember vagy; de lám
én! feleségem s négy gyermekem.
Az ügyész, ki midőn eszébe jutott, hogy neki sem felesége, sem
gyermeke nincs, ebben arra, hogy életéhez ragaszkodjék, talán ép
oly erős okot talált, csak a nedvesség s hideg szél ellen
panaszkodott. – S pedig még bodzatheát sem hoztam magammal –
mondá nyugtalanul, – ha nem találok Sz.-Vilmoson s jól ki nem
izzadhatom magamat, meglátod, halálos beteg leszek.
– Ne légy oly hypochondrikus – mondá a főbiró, miután nem
szünő kiáltozásaira a kocsis lovainak gyenge ügetését lépésre
változtatá. S a két férfi egy ideig hallgatva ült egymás mellett,
álmélkodva mindenik, pajtásának gyávaságán.
Kit nevezhetni bátornak? ez egyike azon kérdéseknek, melyekre
felelni sokkal nehezebb, mint első pillanatra látszik. Egy vén franczia
ismerősömtől hallám többször, hogy jól nevelt ember, ha
veszedelemmel találkozik, elébb körülnéz, s ha maga van, elszalad;
ha pedig tanukat lát, bátran neki áll; – és ez bizonyos tekintetben
igaz; de végre mit bizonyít egyebet annál, hogy művelt ember mások
ítéletétől inkább fél, mint egyéb veszélyektől; két veszély között az
elől hátrál, melyet más fel sem vesz – a közvélemény elől; s lehet-e
ezt bátorságnak nevezni? Ha öngyilkosság követtetett el, a
társaságnak egy, főkép fiatalabb része bámulja a bátorságot, mások
fejet csóválva gyávának nevezik a szerencsétlent, ki élte terhét
tovább vinni nem merte. Kinek van itt igaza? egyiknek sem, vagy
mindenkinek? Nincs senki, ki e világon semmitől sem félne; nincs
senki, ki bizonyos tárgyak előtt, melyeknek látásán mások elijednek,
nem tartaná meg bátorságát. Barátom van, merész, hogy százakkal
szembe szállna, mutass neki egy kis ártatlan kigyót, s elkergeted;
egy földes urat ismertem, félt mindentől, vizen és szárazon, kocsin,
lovon s gyalog, a kutyáktól, mennydörgéstől, az utolsó földindulás
óta földindulásoktól, s mióta a pesti árvizről hallott, árvizektől, nappal
ökrök s bivalyoktól, éjjel zsivány- s kisértet-bandáktól: azt hivém,
végre feltaláltam a gyávaság ideálját, s im, akkor hallám, hogy mikor
a cholera uralkodott, senki a megyében több bátorságot nem
mutatott. Ez ember szüntelen kaczagott a többiek gyávaságán, s
nagy gyönyörrel s azon élvezettel, melyet a bátor érez, ha oly
valamit tesz, mit senki utánozni nem mer, evé töltött káposztáját és
sárga dinnyéit bámuló vendégei előtt, kiket a főorvos mind szörnyű
halállal fenyegetett, ha ehhez hasonló merényekre vetemednének.
Im, földesuramnak is megvoltak hős pillanatai, őt sem lehete
egészen gyávának neveznem, s valóban azok, kik – mint sokan –
nem a czélt, hanem csak a bátorságot becsülik tetteinkben, nem
tudom, hogy’ boldogulhatnak ítéleteikkel. Az előtt fogják-e levenni
kalapjokat, ki négy lábnyi magas akadályon lovával átszökik, s táncz
után fagylaltot eszik; vagy az orvos előtt, ki ha csak lovat lát,
elhalaványul, de a pestises betegnek puszta ujjakkal megtapintja
daganatát? Van egy neme a merészségnek mindenikben; az
emberek ítélete hihetőkép akként fog különbözni, miként magokat
vagy az akadály átugratására, vagy a beteg megérintésére
képesebbeknek érzik. Hisz az erényeket úgy értelmezi mindenikünk,
hogy magát az erényesek sorából ki ne zárja; mindenki oly morált
képez magának, mely mellett megélhessen.
Ismét eltértem… sebaj! – A kocsi a gyepet elhagyva az
országútra tért, s kit e hazában őszkor e szerencsétlenség ért, nem
haladhat oly hamar, hogy bármennyi eltérések után nem volna
utolérhető. Az utasok helyzete nem változott. A kocsis káromkodik,
Nyúzó minden zöttyenésnél jajgat s káromkodik, Macskaházy pedig
a kikerülhetetlen betegség miatt sóhajtozik, míg a hajdú a kocsi
egyik feléről a másikra siet s minden oldalon szidással fogadtatik,
mert mindig késő jő, s éppen akkor csimpeszkedik a kocsi egyik
vagy másik oldalába, mikor az úgy is arra hajlott s e segedelem
nélkül is felfordulhatna. Czifra a kocsi hátán az egész idő alatt
mélyen alszik s mi azon meggyőződéssel hagyhatjuk itt e
társaságot, hogy ha így haladnak, a gulyás két sárga lovával jóval
előbb ér a sz.-vilmosi erdőhöz.
István gulyás maga is azzal vigasztalá magát s szomorú társát.
Igaz, jó három órája, hogy Violáné Garacs mellett Czifrával
találkozott, s Garacs jó útban talán egy órával van közelebb a sz.-
erdőhöz, mint István tanyája. De a szolgabiró – kiről Peti által tudta,
hogy otthon van – talán nem indul el mindjárt; azután az urak
kocsiban járnak, s útjok rossz; míg ő könnyű szekeren, a legjobb
gyepen szinte repülhet. És végre van-e valakinek a világon két oly
sárgája, mint István gulyásnak?
Már sötét volt, mikor elindultak. A hold első negyede, melynek a
debreczeni kalendárium szerint ma este kelle megjelenni, a nehéz
ködfátyolon nem hathatott keresztül s valóban magyar pásztor-
ember tájismerete vala szükséges, hogy e roppant síkon irányát el
ne veszítse. Itt egy határhalom, vagy elhagyott gémes kút, mely a
ködből setét kísértetként kiemelkedett; ott egy mult évről fenmaradt
fél szalmaboglya, vagy árokhányás, vagy néha messze távolságra
egymástól magányos fűzfák, melyek az áradás járta réten felnőttek,
s véletlenül megmaradva, most az őszi szélben vékony lombatlan
ágaikat suhogtaták; ez vala minden. A gulyás bátran tovább hajtott,
kétkedés nélkül, mintha a világ legjártabb országútján haladna, s a
sárgák neki feküdtek a hámnak, mintha a garaboncziás diák
sárkányaival futnának versenyt. A lovak úgy mentek, de úgy… István
nem tudta, mit tegyen örömében. Feje felett suhogtatá ostorát,
barátságosan szólítgatva kedves tátosait: – Vércse ne!… ne te
sárga!… hogy kapaszkodik az istenadta!… mondom, nincs oly ló
Magyarországban.
Fűzfák s határhalmok, gémeskút s boglya, mintha elrepülnének a
szekér mellett. A lovaknak sörénye messze szállt párolgó nyakuktól;
a gulyás visszavetve bundáját, lobogó inggel, mintha szélvész ellen
hajtana, ült a szekér elején; a lovak rohanva haladtak, mintha a föld
égnek lábaik alatt, mintha ketté akarnák hasítani a ködfátyolt s tulsó
felére érni, még mielőtt az utánok ismét összefolyhatott.
– Ne félj semmit, Zsuzsim – mondá a gulyás vigan, – ott leszünk,
még mielőtt az az átkozott főbiró kikapaszkodik szobájából. Ne te
Vércse!
– Adja Isten! – sóhajta Zsuzsi.
– No az ördög elvihetné, ha még így is későn jőnénk – válaszolt
a gulyás. – Monddsza Zsuzsi, de igaz lelkedre mondd, mentél-e így
éltedben?
– Soha, – válaszolt ez, kinek gondolatai máshol jártak.
– Hiszem! Sárga ne!… No, Zsuzsi, semmi szomorúság, egy óra
mulva ott vagyunk, s elmegyünk a sz.-vilmosi csikóshoz
gulyáshúsra; ha más nincs, egy csikó csak találkozik s azzal vége.
Teringettét, hogy húznak, egész kezem elzsibbadt – tevé hozzá a
boldog kocsis, jobb kezébe fogva gyeplőjét, míg megfájult balját ép
oly gyönyörrel lógatá maga mellett, mint ki egy darab aranyat hordva
fárad el, s a fájdalmakon, melyeket érez, kincsének nagyságát méri.
A lovak egyszerre hortyogva félreugrottak. – Mi volna ez?! –
kiáltott a gulyás, ki bal kezével hamar ismét a gyeplőket ragadta meg
s ostorához kapott. – Sárga! Vércse!… ah, ez a baj – szóla, szemeit
a ködbe meresztve, midőn a farkast, mely útjokon keresztül futva,
most nem messze tőlök állt, meglátá. – Férget láttatok, no csak menj
Kislakra, átkozott, Tisza és Bodor majd megtépáznak. Reménylem,
Peti nem találkozott vele; no mi baj, vén czigányhús a farkasnak sem
kell.
A nyugtalanság azonban, melyet Violáné Petiért, a farkast látva,
érezni kezdett, s melyet István természettudományi megjegyzése
szétoszlatni képes nem volt, nem tarthatott sokáig, miután alig
indulva meg újra, egy határdombnál, melynél át kellett menniök,
maga a czigány állt.
Peti felült. – Idején jövünk – mondá, a gulyás mellé ereszkedve, –
a garacsi út, melyen azok jőnek, feneketlen, s mi gyepen megyünk.
– Csak férget ne láttunk volna; – szóla szomorúan Zsuzsi, –
mindig hallottam, az nem jót jelent.
– Legyen eszed, Zsuzsi – válaszolt a gulyás nevetve, – hány
férget láttam én életemben, mégis itt vagyok. Mi bajunk lehetne?…
ni, a sárgák nem is izzadnak.
– Csak a szekér ne törjék el – mondá Zsuzsi aggodalommal, –
higye el kend, én ma mindentől félek.
– Dehogy törik el – válaszolt a gulyás egyet suhogva ostorával, –
hisz nem fakó, nem is hintó. A hintó és szekér közt ép az a
különbség mint az úr és paraszt között. Amaz nagy, magos, csupa
vánkos, kifestve elől-hátul, úgy ránézve egész pompa, de ha bajba
jön rossz úton, vagy ha hidasra eresztik, zötty! oda van!… csupa sróf
és haszontalan ág-bog minden felől, mihelyt nem jár töltésen, vagy
lágy gyeputon, sárba marad; az ilyen szekér pedig elmegy
mindenütt, főkép az én szekerem! A kerekeket magam faragtam, a
vasat Peti verte rá. Ne, te sárga!
Peti nem egészen osztozott István nyugalmában. – Csak vizet ne
érjünk – szólt többször, fejét vakarva – mindig esik, s ha valahogy a
lápok megteltek –
– Ne félj, Peti minden rendiben lesz; s te is Zsuzsi, ne búsulj.
Öcsém, Pista, ki ott a Tiszán túl lakott, a mult héten halt meg. Már
régen felmondott uraságának s elbocsátó levelet s passust is kapott.
Ezekkel a haszontalan irásokkal, melyekkel Pista felesége most úgy
sem tehet semmit, te Violával és gyermekeiddel elmehetsz
akárhová. Magam is tudok szolgálatot húsz mérföldre innen, s ott
ismét mint becsületes emberek élhettek. Ez a vármegye kemény
dolog, – tevé hozzá a gulyás egyet suhantva – csak az jó benne,
hogy nem messze tart. Mit mondasz Peti?
De Peti nem szólt, nem felelt Zsuzsinak semmit, ki e jó hirek
hallására mintegy új reménycsillagot láta emelkedni sötét láthatárán,
s remegő hangon kérdezé: – Nem volna-e ez több boldogság, mint
hogy azt szerencsétlen helyzetökben reményleni lehetne? – A
czigány, keselyü szemeit a sötét ködbe meresztve, mozdulatlanul ült
helyén, csak néha, midőn aggályosan fejét csóválá, lehete látni,
hogy nem alszik. A gulyás, ki ezt nehányszor észrevevé, ilyenkor
egyet suhantva ostorával, csak azt válaszolá: – Nincs semmi baj, ne
félj, Peti, mindjárt ott leszünk. – S ők hallgatva tovább mentek;
csakhogy a köd, úgy látszott, még homályosabban ereszkedett le; a
tér, melyen lovaik száguldva haladtak, még elhagyottabbnak látszott.
Határhalom, fűzfa, boglyák s kutak rég eltüntek s a ki népünk
bámulatos ügyességét nem ismeri, melylyel útján eligazodik, habár
látszólag semmi sincs, mitől irányt vehetne, alig foghatná meg, a
sietők miként nem tévedtek el régen. A pocsogás, mely egyszerre a
lovak lábai alatt hallatszott, véget vetett haladásuknak.
A gulyás, noha nem szólt, régen osztozott Peti aggodalmaiban.
Egyes világosabb foltok, melyeket itt-ott a köd között is észrevett,
eszébe juttatták, hogy a Tisza talán mégis kiáradt. Most nem volt
többé kétség. A hely, melyen szekerökkel megálltak, noha a kákás fű
széles leveleivel a vizet eltakarta, már el volt borítva. A czigány
leugrott s pocsogva előre ment. Előtte széles vízláp terjedett el,
melynek határát a ködben nem láthatá. Visszafordult, s jobbra
keresett utat, itt is víz mindenfelől, csak egyes sötét foltok álltak ki
szigetekként a nagy áradásból, mely az emelkedő víz által
mozgásba hozva a síkot, s hullámozva tovább gerjed. Csak balfelől
látszott egy hátasabb hely, mely még szárazon állt s hova Peti a
lovakat most kivezette. – Ezen talán még az erdőig jöhetünk, –
mondá elébbi helyére ülve, – az áradás még nem töltött el minden
lápot; vigyázz, István, maradj mindig a víz mellett, máskép
eltévedünk, ez a sárga ér –
– Jézus Krisztusom! – kiálta Zsuzsi, kinek lelkében egyszerre
minden aggály újra fölébredt, – későn jövünk és szegény férjem!
– Még jókor jöhetünk – válaszolt a czigány biztatva, noha
szavának hangjából a legnagyobb nyugtalanság vala észrevehető;
ha a víz a békahágón át nem ment, a Fekete-tót szárazon találjuk s
akkor minden jól van. Csak rajta, István.
– Átkozott Tisza – mondá emez, párolgó lovait ostorával biztatva.
– Dehogy a Tisza! hogy beszélhet kend így – szólt a czigány fejét
rázva, – mikor a víz innen jő. Még tegnap láttam a Tiszát Réten, s az
alig mozdul; ez mind a Rákérből jő, mióta az urak új töltést csináltak,
egészen neki bolondult.
– A menkő üsse meg, itt is víz! – kiáltott a gulyás gyeplőjén
visszarántva lovait, melyeknek egyike lebukott. Peti, térdig gázolva a
vízben, a szekér elébbi irányában tovább ment. – Itt nincs baj –
kiálta végre, miután a nem széles éren átjutván, ismét szárazon látá
magát, s a szekérhez visszatérve, a hortyogó lovakat a víznek
vezeté. – Ne féljetek bolondok, Pista gulyásnál még többhöz fogtok
szokni. – A szekér szerencsésen a tulsó parton ismét szárazra jött. S
így mentek tovább, hol az árvíz a gyepet el nem borítá, vágtatva, az
egyes kisebb ereken át Peti által vezetve, míg egy széles vízróna
minden további haladást lehetlenné tett.
– A Fekete-tó betelt – kiáltott a czigány összecsapva kezeit, –
nincs ló a világon, mely ezen átmenne.
– Maradjatok itt, – szólt Zsuzsi remegő hangon – átmegyek én
magam.
– Te, Zsuzsi? Az kellene még! – mondá a gulyás, Violánét, ki már
szekeréről leszállni készült, helyén erőszakkal visszatartva, – a tó
teli van mélységekkel, s főkép te, ki beteg voltál, ha egyszer
elcsúsznál, nem birsz fölkelni, s oda vagy.
– Ereszd bundámat! Isten megsegít; férjemet csak nem
hagyhatom el végső nyomorúságában; tudod, föl akarják akasztani.
– S ezzel a szegény asszony a szekérről leszállni készült.
– Legyen eszed, Zsuzsi – mondá a gulyás, hasonlókép leszállva
szekeréről, – ha férjedet fölakasztják s te itt fulsz belé a vízbe, mi
lesz gyermekeidből?
Zsuzsi leült a szekér mellé, s két kezével eltakarva képét, sirt
keservesen.
– Ne félj, fiam – mondá a gulyás biztatólag, – majd elmegyünk,
én vagy Peti; az erdő, látod, előttünk áll, valahogy csak átgázolunk –
Ej, Peti! Peti! te is oly vén ember vagy! minek hoztál ide?
A czigány, ki azalatt szemeit mindenfelé jártatva, mint látszott,
magát tökéletesen irányozni iparkodott, e panaszra csak azt
mormogá, hogy az út, a melyen jöttek, sáros időben két órával
közelebb, s hogy mikor most négy napja erre járt, a víznek még
nyoma sem volt. – Ne félj, Zsuzsi, – tevé hozzá – én átmegyek, ha
az ördög elvisz is, átmegyek, csak hagy ismerjem ki magamat egy
kissé. Nem az a nagy fa-e ez, hol minap voltunk? – szólt a
gulyáshoz Peti, kezével a tulsó partra mutatva, hol a ködből az erdő
sötét egyenes falként átlátszott, melyből csak itt-ott egyes magasabb
sudarak emelkedtek ki.
– Igen, meglehet – felele a gulyás, e magasabb sudarak egyikére
fordítva figyelmét, – csak az az átkozott köd ne lenne… de az erdő
szélén több magas fa van, az ördög ismeri meg.
– Balra a fától – folytatá a czigány gondolkozva – mintegy
kétszáz lépésnyire, az erdőben nyilás van. Aznap azon jöttünk át
szekerünkkel; nem emlékezik kend?
– Hogy a menkőbe ne emlékezném, s jobbra, hacsak le nem
kaszálták, a fához még közelebb nádasnak kell lenni.
– Igazság! – válaszolt ismét a czigány – még mondtad, mily jó
lenne kerítésnek. No, menjünk, te jobbra, én balra, ha a nyilást
megtalálom, s ez csakugyan az a fa, akkor átgázolok. A fától egész
a tóárok másik partjáig hátas hely van.
– Veletek megyek – szólt Violáné, ki, mint a rab ítéletét, e
beszélgetésnek minden szavát remegő figyelemmel hallgatá,
felkelve, – nem maradhatok itt nyugtalanságomban magam.
– Zsuzsi lelkem, – mondá a czigány, ki már futásra készült,
megfordulva – beteg voltál, a föld csupa sár és iszap, megfáznál, ülj
le itt s várj meg.
– De visszajöttök? nem mentek át nálam nélkül? Az Istenre
kérlek, Peti, ne hagyjatok itt, – kiáltá a szerencsétlen nő a távozó
után.
– Ha átmehetünk, – kiálta vissza a czigány, még egyszer
megfordulva – én magam viszlek hátamon a tulsó partra. – Ki e
pillanatban a czigány mellett áll, egy cseppet láthatott volna, mely
barna arczredői közt lefolyt.
A férfiak a köd homályában eltüntek, csak Zsuzsi maga állt ott a
víznek szélén, a tulsó partról átsötétlő erdőre meresztve szemeit. –
Ily közel, s én nem mehetek hozzá, – sóhajta, s lelkét a szerelem
minden fájdalmai dulták szét.
A szegény asszonynak igaza volt; a vizen túl alig ezer lépésnyire
a helytől, hol neje feléje terjeszti vágyó karjait, találjuk Violát s
társait. Taksony-megyének, a Tisza mentében fekvő síkságán,
nagyszerű tölgyesei vannak. Valamint a homok szép hajlongó nyíreit
s remegő nyárfáit termi meg, s némely helyen a festőileg elhelyezett
facsoportok között a legszebb kertben képzelhetnénk magunkat, ha
az ember mívelő keze itt-ott burgonya és tengeri földjeivel az
egésznek hatását nem rontaná meg: úgy a kemény agyagban, mely
a Tisza két partját képezi, hatalmas tölgyek emelik sötét koronáikat,
nem ápolva emberek által, de a természet egész pompájában
emelve széles sudaraikat az ég felé, melyeket nem a fejsze, hanem
csak az idő vagy a Tisza döntenek meg. Miután a fának ára
Magyarország e részében oly csekély, hogy ezen tölgyek kivágatása
többe kerülne, mint mit fájokért kapni lehet, az egyetlen jövedelem,
melyet belőle a birtokos húz, csaknem egyedül a makkolásban áll,
mely jó esztendőkben az erdőket a tiszai földesurak egyik
legjövedelmezőbb tulajdonává teszi. Ledőlt s helyökön rohadó fákat
ily erdőben találni ép úgy nem ritkaság, mint Amerika őserdeiben; s
az idő még talán távol van, hol a műveltség kiterjesztve hatalmát ide
is, a Tisza sötét tölgyesei jövedelmezőbbek lesznek, de szebbek
bizonyosan nem, mint most, midőn sötét ágaik alatt csak a varjuk
ezrei ütötték föl tanyájokat.
E nagyszerű tölgyesek egyike vala a sz.-vilmosi határon is. Az
erdőség, mely e határ kiöntéseknek kitett s így a gazdaság más
nemeire alkalmatlan részét takarta, lenyult egész a Tiszáig, melynek
tulsó partján hasonló, még mértföldekre terjedő tölgyesek álltak. Jó
esztendőkben, ha tudniillik makk termett, ez erdő teli volt zajjal s
élettel. Makkolásra fogadott állatok ezreinek röfögése s száz
kondásnak éneke s fütyülése hangzott a fák alatt, melyek nem egy
sebet mutathatának, mit e pásztorok pajkossága baltákkal sötét
kérgökbe vágott. Ha ilyenkor a sz.-vilmosi erdő mellett átmentél, a
fák között itt-ott nagy tüzet s körülötte bundájokba burkolt emberi
alakokat láthattál. Néha a sürűből egy magányos duda, vagy furulya
is kihangzott, néha víg hahota, hogy szinte irigyelhetéd ez
embereknek sorsát, kik oly kevéssel vigan s megelégedve lehetnek,
s kiknek minden gondjait egy kancsó bor elűzi. Most halotti csend
terül el ez erdő felett. A tölgyek ez évben épen nem termettek; s a
pásztorkunyhók, melyeket a kanászok mult esztendőkben, csak
épen hogy a legnagyobb fergetegtől legyen hova menekülniök,
építének, most vagy elhagyatva állanak, vagy szétdüledeznek. A
kanász építésközben nem gondol utódaira; ha a kunyhó, melyet
rakott, másnap, miután nyájával tovább ment, szétomlik, annyival
jobb; ha esztendőre visszajő, ujat épít magának nem nagy
fáradsággal. Szive épen annak örül leginkább, ha holvoltának
mennyivel kevesebb emléke marad.
E kunyhók egyikében, abban, mely Szt.-Vilmostól legtávolabb
fekszik, vonult meg Viola társaival. Viola bandájának legbiztosabb s
kedveltebb menhelye vala ez. Az erdőn át azon oldalon, hol a
kunyhó állt, nem vezetett út; maga a kunyhó körül sürű rengeteg s
mióta pár év előtt nem távol e helytől egy biztos és két pandur
agyonlövettek, a megye legbátrabb szolgái sem igen mertek e
helyhez közelíteni. Ha árulástól nem kell félnie, Viola oly biztosan
aludhatott e födél alatt, mint bármely király palotájában. S az miként
juthatott volna eszébe? Petin s István gulyáson kívül titkát csak
olyanok tudták, kikre, ha azt felfödözik, akasztófa vár.
E kunyhó, melynek egyik szögletében, kis hordón ülve, Violát
találjuk, egyike vala a nagyobbaknak, s ámbár butorzatában nem
látunk semmit, mi korunk kényelmeire emlékeztetne, a faajtóból,
melylyel az alacsony bejárást el lehete zárni, s a nádfödelen, mely
itt-ott ráborított ágakkal kijavíttatott, észre lehetett venni, hogy e
kunyhó soha egészen elhagyatva nem volt.
A fal mellett, mindkét oldalon, kevés szalma, mely bundákkal
takarva a zsiványoknak ágyul szolgált, egy darab deszka négy
faragott lábra szegezve, melyet asztalnak használtak, s egy kormos
vas bogrács, mely a falon függött, volt egyébiránt a jelenlevők
fegyverein s két kulacson kívül minden, mit e szűk hajlékban
találunk, s mire a kunyhó közepén pislogó tűz bizonytalan világát
veti. A kunyhó nádfödele, mely a falak mellett annyira leereszkedett,
hogy alatta egyenesen megállni nem lehetett, a sok tüzelés által
koromfeketévé vált, de ámbár a kunyhónak kéménye nincs s a füst
csak a nyitott ajtón s egyes kis lyukakon, melyek a falban e czélból
csináltattak, megy ki, a benlét az égő tűz mellett elég türhetőnek
látszik.
Viola mély gondolatokba merülve ül a szoba homályos
szögletében, míg két czimborája, ki e pillanatban vele van, bundákon
nyujtózkodik, s néha fölpiszkálva a parázst, vagy félig unalomból,
félig bánatból – mint magyar ember tűznél szokott – nagyokat
sóhajtva, nézi a mindig inkább elapadó lángokat.
A regényiróknak egy idő óta szokása bájló szinekkel festeni a
vétket. Mint a lovagregény boldog emlékű korában, az irók egészen
új, soha nem létezett középkort alkottak képzetökben, csupa hivség-,
s hősi erényből összegyártva, hogy az ember – én magam
emlékezem gyermekkoromból ily érzeményekre – szinte vágyódott
az ököljog boldog időszaka után s mintegy megvetéssel fordult el
pulya századunktól, melyben senki várából az átmenő kereskedőket
meg-megrohanni nem szokta, s a kínpad s boszorkányégetés
megszüntével minden, mi költői volt, elenyészett: úgy most a vétek
minden nemeinek nyájasan mosolygó képei készíttetnek a jámbor
közönség számára, oly szépek, oly csábítók, hogy szinte bámulni
lehet, miként nem találkoznak többen, kik e képek utánzását tűzik ki
magoknak czélul. Költők, egyéb művészekként, szivesebben
választanak magoknak typusokat, mint hogy a természetet örök
változékonyságában követnék, s ha egyszer egyike a nagyobbaknak
bizonyos úton megindult, a többiek utána rohannak, a nélkül, hogy
egyéb jutna eszökbe, mint az, miszerint eldődeiknél az ösvényen
hátrább ne maradjanak. Ez az, mit századunkban a művelt világ
majdnem minden irodalmában is észrevehetünk. – A középkor nem
ismert irgalmat a gonosztevő iránt, s mégis mennyi van sokszor a
vétkesnek életében, mi, habár emberi igazságunk szerint tettét
büntetnünk kell, részvétünket, könyörületünket érdemli!
Felvilágosodottabb korunk jól tudja ezt. A vad szenvedélyek, melyek
eldődeinket kegyetlenségre ragadták, rég elnémultak, s mégis lázas
állapotban, rohanva anyagi érdekeinek kielégítése után, korunk
részvét nélkül elfordul a szenvedésektől, melyeket socialis viszonyai
által előidézett, vagy melyeket legalább, ha ápoló kezeit feléjök
terjeszti, enyhíthetne. Nagy irók érezték ezt, s midőn a társaság
legundokabb sebeit merész kezekkel feltakarták, midőn emberi
természetünk azon nemes részeire emlékeztetének, melyek a
gonosztevő kebléből nem veszhetnek ki soha egészen, midőn
figyelmessé tettek, hogy azon undoron kívül, melylyel tetteitől
elfordulunk, van még valami, mit a bűnös iránt érezhetünk, –
szánakozás szerencsétlenségén: tettök nemes s tiszteletreméltó
volt. A sokaság érzéketlensége elleni visszahatás lelkesíté őket
műveikhez, s épen ezért sokszor – mi minden visszahatásnak
szükséges következése – túlmentek első szándékukon, s csakhogy
az undort s gyűlölést, melylyel az emberek nem annyira a vétek,
mint a vétkes ellen viseltettek, enyhítsék: szeretet vagy bámulat
tárgyaivá emelték azokat, kik iránt csak sajnálkozást akarának
gerjeszteni. S még egyszer mondom, e tett szép s nemes volt. Van
az irónak egy magasabb feladata, mint hogy bizonyos mennyiségű
fehér papirt fekete karczolással töltsön be, s ki ezt érzi, azt egy pár
kedvező birálat, vagy azon művészi élvezet, melyet művei
alkotásában talál, ki nem elégíthetik. A költészet kedves játékká
aljasul, ha a kor nagy érdekeitől különválva, nem a létező hibák
orvoslása, nem az érzelmek nemesítése után törekszik. S ki az
Istentől nyert tehetségeit, a helyett, hogy velök embertársai
legszentebb érdekeiért küzdene, a művészi forma mélyébe elássa,
csakhogy valamikép csorbát ne szenvedjen; ki magas helikonáról,
félistennek képzelve magát, kora szenvedéseiben csak művészi
studiumok tárgyát látja, s míg a föld vérben áll, s az egész emberi
nem vajudások között új életnek indul, virágokról s a langy esti
szellőről énekel: azt bámulhatjuk hideg magasságában, irigyelhetjük;
tisztelet- s szeretetünket azonban csak az érdemli, kinek Isten szivet
adott, hogy embertársai szenvedéseit megérthesse. De ha a költőtől,
ki nemes emberi czél után fáradva, hogy erősebben hathasson, azt,
mi a művésznek legdrágább, műve szépségét is feláldozá,
tiszteletünket meg nem tagadhatjuk, ha bámuljuk az önmegtagadást,
melylyel ő, ki keble mélyében gyémántokat találhatott, inkább éles
ekével szántotta fel földjét, mert érzé, hogy e munkával ön
dicsőségére kevesebbet, de embertársainak hasznára többet tehet,
ha az így támadott művek hibáit az érzelemért, melyből származtak,
szivesen megbocsátjuk, s megfeledkezünk gyengeségeiről, mert
érezzük, hogy mi ellen a kritikus kifogásokat tehetne, azt az
embernek bámulni kell, hogy a könyvben nem szép mű, hanem szép
emberi tett fekszik előttünk: mit mondjunk a mázolókról, kik minden
magasabb czél s indok nélkül e műveket utánozzák, kik romlott
képzetökkel gyönyörködve mindenen, mi szörnyű vagy undok, a
rothadást, mely között amazok illatos virágot találtak, fölvájják, nem
a virágért, hanem mert nekik jól esik az ocsmányságokban
körülkapargatni; kik a vétekben nem a nemesebb emberi természet
mindig fenmaradó töredékeit, hanem az erényben is mindig csak
azon aljas indulatokat keresik, melyek szerintök minden tetteink
egyedüli alapját teszik; kik, mint Diogenes lámpájával embert, úgy új
szörnyeteget keresnek képzelmök mélyében, s inkább örülnek, ha
feltalálták, mint ha embertársaiknak egy új vigasztaló gondolatot
nyujthatnának. Oh, ha valaha ez oly regényesnek festett
zsiványéletet közelebbről látnák, azon éhséget, mocskot s
mindennemű nyomort, melyek között e kalandok játszatnak, e
hősöknek egész aljasságát, kiknek bátorsága sokszor nem más,
mint a félelem az akasztófától: – a kép más volna, mint melyet
adnak!
– Te Mészáros! – mondá az egyik, kit az egész vidék Rácz Andor
neve alatt ismert, ősz haját visszasimítva homlokáról, – mit
mondasz, nem jó volna egy kis gulyáshús?
– Az ördög vigyen el – dörmögött a másik, ki eddig a tűzben
piszkálva meredt szemekkel nézé a lángokat, – minek beszélsz
ilyekről.
– Meg egy kis dohány, – folytatá a másik nevetve – úgy-e egy
pipa dohány sem volna rossz?
– Átkozott hóhér! – kiálta a másik, kinek ifjú, részegeskedés által
elbutult arczain boszúság mutatkozott, – mikor nincs, minek
boszantod az embert.
– Hát csak úgy! – válaszolt Rácz, – vagy talán nem tetszik? –
tevé hozzá azon méltósággal függesztve szemeit ifjabb társára,
melylyel ily öreg zsivány, ki mesterségét hat bandával egymásután
majdnem huszonöt esztendeig üzé, ily suhanczra nézhet.
– De mikor mindig tréfálsz – mondá Mészáros, az égő fát
megtaszítva lábával, – kora reggeltől vagyunk itt, s nincs egy
falatunk. Ha ez soká tart, felakaszthatnak bátran, elébb míg éhen
halunk meg.
– Hát mért nem mégy valamiért? – mondá Rácz, gúnyosan
mosolyogva.
– Mikor minden ember lábon van ellenünk, – sóhajtott emez –
adszide a kulacsot, hadd igyam legalább egyet.
– Melletted van, – válaszolt a másik, midőn nevetve nagy
kulacsot mutatott, mely Mészároshoz közel állt.
– Nem ezt, – szóla emez, fejét rázva, oly képpel, mintha
méreggel kinálnák – hisz ez csak víz, ott melletted áll.
– Ebből ugyan nem kapsz fiú – mondá a másik, messzebb tolva
a kulacsot, mely után a fiatal zsivány kezét kiterjeszté, – úgy is több
pálinka van fejedben, mint ész, s éhgyomorra, tudod, megárt. – S az
öreg zsivány nevetett.
– Adszide, – szólt emez, mindig haragosabban – én inni akarok,
nem vagyok bolondod, nekem nem parancsol senki.
– Majd meglátjuk, – mondá az öreg zsivány, s midőn sötét
szemeit pajtására szegezve, kezét, melylyel ez ismét a kulacs után
nyult, izmos markával megszorítá, mindenki láthatta volna, hogy a
tekintetet, melyben a banda között áll, nem tisztán hosszú
tapasztalásainak köszönheti, – ülj le gyerek és maradj nyugodtan.
– No várj, vén kutya, – kiáltott a másik, ki, mint látszott, a
kulacsból, mely után ismét vágyódott, már több s nem hasztalan
libatiókat tett, felugorva, s a falról lekapva fokosát – majd meglátjuk,
ki parancsol nekem.
Rácz, ki minden mozdulatait figyelemmel követé, ekkor szinte
felugrott, torkon fogta a fenyegetőt, s még mielőtt fokosát
fölemelheté, falhoz szorítá s kicsavarta fegyverét kezeiből. – Majd
adok fattyú, – szóla lángoló szemekkel – a kanászok elég disznót
öltek e fal mellett, ha moczczansz, egygyel több lesz.
– Mi a baj? – szólt Viola, ki beszédeikre, míg azok e tettleges
fordulatot nem vevék, nem figyelt, de most szintén felkelt hordójáról.
– Ez a fiú erőnek erejével pálinkát akar, – mondá az idősebb
zsivány, ki most szerencsétlen pajtását eleresztette s mosolygó
megelégedéssel nézte, hogyan dörzsöli fájó nyakát – s én neki
mindjárt más valamit adok.
– Hát adj neki pálinkát, ha van, – mondá Viola – – nekünk úgy
sem kell.
Mészáros reményteli tekintetet vetve a kulacsra, felkelt s feléje
indult.
– Nem adok biz én, – mondá Rácz, elébe állva – a fiú úgy is
többet ivott mint kellene, részeg ember mindig bajba kever.
– De mikor éhes vagyok – szóla a másik, kérő tekintetet vetve
Violára.
– Mért lett zsivány belőled, – mondá Rácz gúnyosan mosolyogva
– hisz nem parancsolta senki?
– Hát neked ki parancsolta? – mormogott ez fogai között.
– Az más, – mondá emez komolyan – én desentor voltam! Tíz
esztendeig szolgáltam a császárt, a legnagyobb háború idejében, s
mikor haza jöttünk s nem akartak elereszteni, tudja az ördög mért,
az jutott eszembe, hogy eleget katonáskodtam, s hogy most egyszer
megpróbálhatja más is. Oda dobtam puskát s patrontást, s azt
hittem, meg tudok élni, ha nem állok is silbaktot. Ha mészáros fia
lettem volna, mint te, bizony nem járnék itt az erdőben, és Viola sem,
azt elhiheted.
– Mit bánom én, – szólt a másik, kit a komolyság, melylyel az
előbbi szólt, úgy látszott, nem igen érdekelt – zsiványélet, pajzán
élet, én inni akarok.
– Add neki a kulacsot, – mondá Viola ismét – hadd töltse kedvét.
– Igen, de már most is részeg – válaszolt Rácz, ki a kulacsot a
földről fölvéve, még mindig kétkedve tartá kezei között. – A hol csak
megfordultam, minden bandának szerencsétlensége a részegségtől
jött.
– Ma nincs mit félni – mondá Viola – legfölebb ha még Peti jön, ki
által István gulyáshúst küld. A szolgabiró Porváron, s a hajdúk
magokban, ne félj, nem jőnek ennyire; ha tudnák, hol vagyunk,
elkerülnének inkább.
– Ej, nem kell azt hinni soha; – mondá Rácz, fejét csóválva – a
veszedelem akkor üt ki, mikor az ember legkevesebbé gondolja.
Isten neki, ha akarod. – S ezzel rosszkedvűen odanyujtá kulacsát,
melyből a másik minden szitkok mellett, melyek között vele
megkináltatott, az állati örömnek bizonyos kifejezésével nagyokat
szörpentett.
Ezek után a kunyhó ismét békességben állt. – Mészáros, ki egy
ideig hős tetteiről beszélt, midőn látta, hogy a másik szavaira nem

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Learning Objectives ......................................................................................................... ............................. 234

8: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 233

After completing this chapter, students should be able to

KEY CONCEPTS: WHY IS THIS CHAPTER IMPORTANT TO PSYCHOLOGISTS?

STUDENT MOVITATION: WHY SHOULD STUDENTS CARE?

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REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING: HOW CAN I ASSESS MY OWN “PERFORMANCE”?

Checklist for Instructor Self‐Assessment

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PSYK.TREK MODULE AND SIMULATION

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DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: DEFINING LANGUAGE

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: ANIMAL COMMUNICATION

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LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: COGNITION IN ANIMAL LEARNING

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Gordon, W. C. (1989). Learning and memory. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: LANGUAGE ACQUISITION

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DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: “LEARNING TO READ”

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF TEXT

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1. Waves crash (proposition based on main verb)

8: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 241

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OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS

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SCIENTIFIC THINKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING IN RIDDLES

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DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS

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SOLVING PROBLEMS THROUGH ALGORITHMS AND HEURISTICS

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ILLUSTRATING THE DRAWBACKS OF ALGORITHMIC PROBLEM SOLVING

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: INCUBATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING

Wallas (1926) identified four stages of problem solving:

8: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 247

Answers to Number Puzzles

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: ERRORS IN DECISION MAKING

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LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: CONCEPT LEARNING

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DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: CONCEPT LEARNING IN CLASS

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LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: CULTURE AND CONCEPTS

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DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: PRACTICE IN PROBLEM SOLVING

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HANDOUT MASTER 8–1: AMBIGUOUS SENTENCES

1. California is a great state to live in despite its faults.

2. There is a fork in the road ahead.

3. To a waiter: “Do you have frog legs?”