India-Japan Relations: Tightening Old Ties
and Building New Bridges
India’s ‘Act East’ foreign policy is providing much
momentum to the country’s growing relations with
East, South and Southeast Asia. This “extended
neighbourhood” policy has Japan playing a very
critical role economically as well as strategically.
If India wants to play a “balancing act” in Asia
keeping in mind China’s growing assertiveness,
it is important to analysis the scope and potential
of India-Japan cooperation. In this regard the
paper will first provide a brief historical base
underpinning the relationship. Then it will
critically examine various avenues for
cooperation, based on common stakes and
concerns, which are driving the relationship
forward. Issues such as contesting Chinese claims
in the Indian Ocean, Africa and building ports in
strategic locations have profound economic,
strategic and geopolitical implications for both
the countries. In this context, the paper will
present an assessment of the initiatives taken so
far and what may lie in the path ahead.
India, as a major power in the Indo Pacific,
is making great headways as a security provider by
holding out against terrorism, piracy, supporting peace
operations and establishing a rule-based world order.
The burgeoning rise of China and the claims it is
making in India’s neighbourhood and beyond has
solicited response from all countries large and small.
The Indo-Pacific, then, represents common goals,
aspirations and challenges, which require collaborated
effort for maintaining regional peace and security.
While the term ‘Indo Pacific’ has a colonial
background, with the Indonesian archipelago called
by the same term by the Dutch occupation, currently
it has many geopolitical resonations, having being
replaced with ‘Asia-Pacific’. 1 The changing
geopolitical reality of Asia and the fickle-minded case
of United States’ foreign policy led by President
Donald Trump has laid immense focus on Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s foreign outreach.
With the general recognition that China is a power to
India-Japan Relations: Tightening Old Ties and Building New Bridges
Atmaja Gohain Baruah
be reckoned with, India has changed its diffident
attitude for a more assertive one. By focusing
purposefully on its neighbourhood and coalescing with
like-minded powers, the Modi Government is
developing strategies to increase economic
cooperation and strengthen national security. By not
cowering under China’s belligerent attitude and
holding its ground in the recent Doklam standoff, India
has presented itself as a strong and unassailable force.
Moreover, India’s geography, strategic location,
cultural heritage and economic complementarities with
some of its neighbours have become the cornerstone
of its greater strategic confidence.
In fact, the “neighbourhood first” policy is a
key feature of India’s diplomatic approach and Japan,
in this regard, has become an important, almost
natural partner for Indian ambitions- given the two
countries’ historical affinity and current geopolitical
synergies.2 Both are integrated by oceans, combining
resources which are bound to make them two of the
biggest power holders and contributors to global output
by 2050. One could see this relationship in its full
glory during the 2017 India-Japan Annual Summit,
when Narendra Modi and Japan’s Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe fortified their Strategic
Partnership with more conclusive joint statements.3
What has drawn these countries so close together
does not only go back in history but has an economic
and political basis as well. Contemporary Japan is
massive economically, with high capital and
investment opportunities, however it is on a downward
curve. Meanwhile India, is at the peak of high growth
and development trajectory. Its young and dynamic
youth is hungry for more technological opportunities,
and has found a best friend in Japan. Next, Tokyo’s
interests in the Indian Ocean is understandable- it is
reliant on it for its trade and energy supplies, and is
also a better choice than haggling with China in the
East China and the South China Sea. Therefore Japan
can be now seen refocusing its emphasis to the Indo
Pacific with India at its centre. Indeed, during his
93
visit to India in September 2017, Abe affirmed that
New Delhi and Tokyo “will strengthen collaboration
with those countries with whom we share universal
values”.4 Their strategic partnership is based on joint
statements and combined military exercises in the
Indian Ocean. The annual Malabar naval exercises
between India and the US have Japan as a permanent
participant since 2015.5 The idea behind such joint
exercises is to create a network of stakeholders to
counter Chinese incursion and uphold freedom of
navigation, inclusive trade and stability in the region.
Stronger maritime cooperation is the cornerstone to
not letting the geopolitical construct of the Indo-Pacific
tilt too much towards China.
The Inception
It was even before the global financial crisis of 2008,
when Tokyo and New Delhi had begun inching closer
together. Undoubtedly China has remained the cause
of geopolitical migraine for both throughout, but Abe
has always had the field of vision for India very
optimistic and promising. Manmohan Singh, Modi’s
predecessor, had laid the foundations for Japanese
investments, hailing their relationship as
‘transformational’.6 He wanted a quick developmental
path for India’s growth and Abe served him that
exactly. His proposal in 2007 to construct enormous
industrial corridors and strengthen the manufacturing
sector out of its dormancy was quickly embraced by
Singh.
When the Modi Government came to power,
a fast track model was adopted to advance relations
with like-minded countries like Japan and Israel. Modi
had to revive India and he could perceive that to
complement his projects like ‘Make in India’ and
‘Digital India’ Japan could be his top partner.
Infrastructure projects like the 1,500-km Delhi-
Mumbai industrial corridor require massive
investments and technological knowhow.7 Abe too
has a keen and ambitious domestic agenda towards
India. Coming from the nationalist school, he is eager
to close Japan’s post-war pacifism. In 2016, during
Modi’s visit to Japan, they marked the year 2017 as
the year of friendly exchanges between the countries,
to be enhanced with more people-to-people contact.
Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA),
has been the backbone for India’s economic growth
for a long time and is still continuing to be one of the
94 World Focus May 2018
most trusted and promising ones. Japan has provided
investments to fund long-term projects such as India’s
metro networks, helped formalise the massive Delhi
Metro Project, mega projects like the Western
Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC), the Chennai-
Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC) and the Delhi-
Mumbai Industrial Corridor.8 While the World Bank
is financing the Eastern part of DFC, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is providing
Rs 38,722 crore loan for the Western DFC.9 India is
also an exporter of chemicals, non-metallic mineral
ware, elements, fish, metalliferous ores, textile, iron
and steel products, yarn, fabrics etc. to Japan. The
focus thus has mostly remained on capacity-building
mechanisms at every possible level — institutional,
economical, security and even workforce.
When it comes to providing Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI), Japan has always been a lavish
donor to middle income countries. However, lately
its bids are being outshined by China’s chequebook
diplomacy. So, in a bid to boost its funding abroad,
Tokyo has sought to deepen its economic partnership
and collaborate with India to fund various
infrastructure projects in Africa, Sri Lanka, Iran and
Southeast Asia. Since India’s “Act-East Policy” is
also geared towards enlivening ties with the Southeast
Asian countries, such collaborations with Japan are
a win-win for both the nations. The “India-Japan Act
East Forum” has certainly come at a rather opportune
time, with Japan striving to construct a more effective
“Free and Open Asia Pacific Strategy” and India
striving to cultivate its “Act-East Policy”. 10
Nonetheless the path ahead for Asian security is bound
to be bogged down by edgy geopolitical concerns
thrusted upon nations not quite capable of handling it
single-handedly. Though Trump’s recent statements
delegate much importance to India and Japan, there
are doubts on how decisive American policies are
actually going to be in the Asian security equation.
Therefore New Delhi and Tokyo, while evaluating
the dilemmas of excessive security dependence on
US, should also consider other security arrangements.
Consequently, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC), though a small sub-regional economic-
oriented association, can be used to form a security
covenant too. India, being its largest member, can
leverage BIMSTEC, to work as a treasure trove,
having positive relations with Japan in a variety of
fields like trade and investment, fishery, agriculture
etc.
Avenues for Cooperation between India and
Japan
·Bimstec: Economy and Infrastructure
In the recent 20th anniversary of BIMSTEC, Modi
described it as “a natural platform” for India’s Act
East and Neighbourhood First policies11. It is one of
the reasons why India when hosting the BRICS
Conference in 2015 in Goa invited the BIMSTEC
members. This BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit
gave a much required push to the grouping which so
far has mostly been viewed as ineffective. Though
the association caters to a range of priority sectors
such as transportation and infrastructure,
environment, disaster management, promoting tourism
and countering terrorism and transnational crime, it
has not received as much attention as it should have.
However, BIMSTEC is considered a much better
option than South Asian Free Trade Agreement
(SAFTA) because there are negligible regional issues
between its member states unlike SAFTA, take in
case India and Pakistan. Pakistan has not only been
reluctant in giving India the status of the Most
Favoured Nation (MFN), it also sponsors cross-border
terrorism. Owing to such reasons India had boycotted
the 2016 South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in Islamabad. 12
Therefore, the absence of major issues between
BIMSTEC nations is a major relief for the Modi
Government, which is why he is actively striving for
more economic integration and promotion of
commercial ties. Even India and Bangladesh have
resolved their boundary disputes peacefully. In fact
the BIMSTEC members have been expediting a Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), to be finalized at the earliest.
13
Having a combined population of over 1.5 billion
people, their gross domestic product (GDP) of US$
2.85 trillion with an average economic growth of about
6.5%, this association if properly channelled has
tremendous scope of progress. 14
To understand India’s growing regard
towards BIMSTEC it is important to understand the
historical, cultural and geographical ties between the
member states. Geographically, except for Sri Lanka
all the other members are contiguous to each other.
India-Japan Relations: Tightening Old Ties and Building New Bridges
With India Bangladesh shares a border of 4,096-km,
and trade flows have also been stable and
rewarding.15 India already has an FTA with Sri Lanka
and Thailand. With Nepal there is an open border
and with Bhutan as well there are no visa
requirements.16 Infrastructure to connect India’s
North East Region (NER) and Myanmar is in the
course of being constructed, though their boundaries
have mostly been unfenced. These regions are known
worldwide for their diverse variety of handicrafts. If
proper research is undertaken to improve the cottage
base industries, especially the bamboo-based
products, it could substantially improve the overall
income of the region. Silk production and woodcraft
is already much sought-after, but again it needs to be
marketed on a bigger and more competitive scale to
garner enough value. Organic food production in the
Himalayan regions- Nepal and Bhutan- can also be
made more profit oriented. As the income realisation
of the artisans is low, trade flows have remained
sluggish.17
It is also important to link the BIMSTEC
nations to global market chains, as apart from India,
Thailand and Bangladesh, the rest are yet to
experience the full impact of globalization. Trade for
them is thinly spread, mostly only in their
neighbourhood and with China. With India their trade
has grown at a growth rate of 10 percent, though
intra-BIMSTEC trade is at an abysmal low of 0.62
percent. BIMSTEC’s world trade share was only
about 3.7 percent in 2014, while for ASEAN it was
29 percent, and even SAARC had a higher share of
seven percent. 18 So, while trade and investment
opportunities are many, trade flows have a long way
to go to reach the optimum level. The Modi
Government’s Act East Policy though is directed
towards completing the infrastructure projects and
increasing economic connectivity, they need to be
overseen more proactively. India’s NER is suffering
from a dearth of functional road, rail or sea transport.
A seamless trade flow also necessitates proper
telecommunication links, availability of cold storage,
parking space for the transiting vehicles and a stable
power supply, which has been abysmally low. Since
connectivity and infrastructure are the linchpin of
successful commercial ties, a lack of proper facilities
hinders smooth cooperation and decreases the
likelihood of making BIMSTEC-FTA a reality.In this
95
regard, inflow of FDI, technological transfer and
essential know-how could really foster greater
progress. Here, Japan could easily pitch in, as not
only it is one of the most technologically advanced
countries but falls within India’s extended
neighbourhood too. Moreover, there is no historical
legacy between the BIMSTEC countries and Japan,
thus inviting no uneasiness in accepting the latter’s
financial assistance. For Japan too, economic and
technological assistance to these countries will not
only leverage its standing in Asia but commensurate
Chinese influence in the region.19 There are several
other complementarities that can be observed
between Japan and BIMSTEC countries. While
Japan is a member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), in the look-
out for countries to provide infrastructural help and
financial assistance to, the BIMSTEC countries are
the ones in dire need of it, thus creating a win-win
situation. While on one hand Japan has vested interests
in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean due to its
dependence on them for its trade flows, the
BIMSTEC countries on the other hand require
Japanese presence to keep these vital sea routes
secure.
Furthermore, Japan is the only country India
trusts enough to conduct infrastructure projects in
the Northeast, despite China’s displeasure. Numerous
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
experts are preparing manuals for higher sustainable
development in the region. As part of India’s Act East
Policy, Japan is financing a Rs 4,000 crore highway
infrastructure project as well as Rs 900 crore hydro
growth project, particularly to boost connectivity and
complement India’s BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Nepal) as well as BIMSTEC Agreements. Other
projects include setting up a biodiversity capability in
Sikkim, a forest resource management system in
Tripura, and a loan of Rs 2,239 crore for the ‘North
East Road Network Connectivity Improvement
Project’ which will build a bypass on the NH-54.20
This keenness to invest in India’s Northeast has a
“historic emotional link” according to the Japanese.
It is in fact the greatest testimony to the increasingly
stronger trust in their bilateral ties. Such projects are
a great incentive when it comes to strengthening ties
between BIMSTEC and Japan via India. It is certain
that economic integration between Japan and the
96 World Focus May 2018
BIMSTEC countries will have significant benefits for
both the sides. It will strengthen trade links between
East Asian and South Asian countries, thus creating
a pan-Asian integration model. Bereft of Chinese
influence, such collaboration can lead to a sustained
flow of FDI and resistance to external financial crises.
However, a planned prioritization of feasible targets
is very important if tangible results are to be attained.
The strength of the BIMSTEC countries can become
a weakness here if their diverse financial structure is
not supervised by proper regulatory mechanisms. This
is the current challenge faced by these countries, thus
making cooperation time-consuming and perplexing
to conduct. Multilateral institutes like the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) can assist regional policy
schemes by testing feasibility studies, improving
capacity building and taking on a general subsidiary
role in supporting financial integration.
There is no denying that India, being the
largest member has to take up the most responsibility
in keeping the association up and running. Therefore
in order to enhance sub-regional cooperation, India is
working on three major projects with these countries-
meant to substantially transform the movement of
goods and services throughout the region. First, the
Kaladan Multimodal project is being developed
between India and Myanmar. While a framework
agreement was signed in 2008, the implementation is
yet to be done. It envisages connectivity between
Kolkata and Sittwe port in Myanmar, and also through
Mizoram directly to Myanmar.21 Second, the Asian
Trilateral Highway between India and Thailand
passing through Myanmar signifies an inclination
towards connecting Southeast Asian countries. It is
envisaged to link Moreh in Manipur to Thailand’s Mae
Sot via Myanmar.22 Third and the most difficult, the
BBIN has the longest route and is also facing
difficulties in securing internal clearances from all
the members involved. However, upon
accomplishment it will certainly have the deepest
impact on enhancing the movement of goods and
services.
·Maritime cooperation: common stakes
The BIMSTEC countries are formed of both land
locked (Bhutan, India’s NER and Nepal) and littoral
countries (Myanmar, Thailand, coastal India and Sri
Lanka). As a result securing their water boundaries
and interests in the Indian Ocean Region is crucial.
Owing to this convergence of interests, maritime
cooperation is another arena of cooperation with
Japan. The prominence of maritime security
governance cannot be understated, especially faced
with shared concerns over Freedom of Navigation
and safe flowing of energy cargos. In fact, it has
been observed that several Chinese submarines,
ranging from humble flotillas to destroyers and
warships, have infiltrated into the Indian Ocean. India
has been engaging with Singapore, Indonesia and
Thailand in conducting joint naval exercises in the
region but it is not enough. So, India is vying to
participate in the Malacca Strait Patrol Group (MSP)
consisting of Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and
Malaysia that had started in 2004.23 Currently, Indian
Navy conducts two kinds of operations- it operates
its fleet of reconnaissance aircrafts over the Malacca
and patrols warships in the west of Malacca. Being
a part of the MSP group is going to be beneficial for
India in three important ways- it will provide
coordinated and timely information on any suspicious
activities with MSP’s real-time information-sharing
network, secondly, it will keep an eye on military
activities and thirdly, its top notch technology will
provide up-to-date information on passing trade and
energy cargos.24 At present, the negotiations to give
permission to India is underway, though India has
bilateral agreements separately with all the countries
involved.
India has also been conducting joint military
exercises with US, Japan and now Sri Lanka from
time to time. With Thailand India has been having
bilateral talks on maritime security and trade, while
with Bangladesh, there is a stronger emphasis on
‘Blue Economy’. Blue Economy is in fact, gaining
much acclamation from these littoral countries, mostly
to secure economic benefits as a community. During
the Goa Retreat also the BIMSTEC countries had
agreed to promote sustainable development in the
IOR.25 So, to drive more cooperation, the Modi
Government is planning to turn the BIMSTEC into
an instrument of regional maritime security
cooperation. As one of the fastest developing
economies of the world, a large part of India’s
burgeoning energy imports take place via the Indian
Ocean. Japan too has security concerns in the region
as bulk of its energy imports take place via the same
India-Japan Relations: Tightening Old Ties and Building New Bridges
sea lanes. Therefore ensuring that the sea lanes of
communication is open and secure is critical. What
adds to their stress is China’s domineering stance
and imposing ambitions in the IOR, intensified recently
with China acquiring the Hambantota port in Sri
Lanka.
Just like NER, India had never approached
any country for the development of its Andaman and
Nicobar Islands. However, it is with Japan that India
for the first time has initiated discussions on the
upgradation of the islands’ civilian infrastructure.
Their location is very strategic, being situated
northwest of the maritime choke point at the Strait of
Malacca.26 It is geopolitically very crucial for India’s
‘Act East’ policy. Currently, there are a handful of
projects under way on the islands, mostly concerning
solar power generation. All these initiatives are fitting
but require much timely and coordinated action than
the current scenario. The Bay has always been
vulnerable to severe natural disasters, piracy and
unregulated fishing. Even the recent upheaval caused
by the Rohingya refugee crisis caused to inflate the
already existing criminal networks and sea pirates.
Ensuring maritime security will also provide the
BIMSTEC members an avenue to make inroads into
the uncharted territories of the Southeast Asian region
as well. In fact, recent statements made by the Indian,
Sri Lankan and Bangladeshi leaders have all indicated
the need to emerge from territorial confines and engage
more intensely with the other countries to the South
and East.27The lukewarm attitude of the BIMSTEC
countries towards each other should be changed for
a more positive interaction, keeping aside their internal
preoccupations. Since the stakes are the highest for
the Bay countries, it is high time they adopt a more
strategic maritime agenda, coupled with more capacity
building exercises. The Japanese Ambassador to
India, K enj i Hiramatsu had said, “ The geopolitics
of Asia is dynamically changing, we used to
discuss strategic issues with a focus on the
Pacific Ocean, but that focus has shifted to
India and the Indian Ocean.” 28 Multilateral
mechanisms can be fruitful in securing cooperation
in the maritime realm. While India, Sri Lanka,
Thailand and Bangladesh are already members of
the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Japan
is a dialogue partner. 29 The International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) can also be used as a platform
97
to exchange information and implement concerted
practices. All in all, geographical proximity, economic
dynamism, rich natural resources and extensive labour
pool makes BIMSTEC the most important if India
wants to strengthen its footprints in its neighbourhood.
·Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)
A frontier of development which was the culmination
of the recent India-Japan Summit in May 2017 was
the new Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). With
the broad agenda of increasing connectivity between
South, East, Southeast Asia and Africa, and also to
contest Chinese claims, AAGC is seeking to link the
Mekong-India Economic Corridor (MIEC) with the
Kenya-Tanzania-Mozambique (KTM) growth zone
through Kochi and Jawaharlal Nehru ports.30 Most
Chinese scholars are viewing this with suspicion as a
substitute to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
However, more than negating Chinese influence, India
and Japan need African cooperation to develop the
moribund sectors of their economies. Even to acquire
permanent membership in the UNSC, the support of
Africa is required. Lastly, there are rumours that
China is using it troops deployed in Africa for interests
other than anti-piracy missions and UN Peace
Keeping Operations, especially in the naval bases set
in Djibouti.31 Owing to all of these reasons, the Japan–
India Dialogue on Africa has already been held five
times during 2010 to 2016. Moreover, a successful
AAGC can serve to be the model for further Japan–
India cooperation in uncharted areas like the Arctic
region, Antarctic region and space technology.
· Strategizing in the Chabahar Port
Chabahar is important for a number of reasons. First,
it conjoins India, Iran and Afghanistan, thus linking
South Asia and Middle East. Second, by offering
direct means to the Indian Ocean, it becomes
extremely important for Asian maritime cooperation.
Third, with China having acquired the Gwadar port
and strengthening China-Pakistan alliance, the
Chabahar port can be used as another outreach
medium which reduces the Central Asian countries’
dependence on China. Located just 100 km from
Gwadar and connected well with the large city of
Mashhad, the Chabahar port is considered as a golden
opportunity, a ‘strategic necessity’, to form an inter-
Asian cooperative framework to enhance trading
networks and security mechanisms. Recently, on the
98 World Focus May 2018
Gulf of Oman, the first phase of the Chabahar port
was accomplished with the opening up of a direct
route from Iran to Afghanistan and India bypassing
Pakistan. 32 Japan too has pledged to join India in the
development of this particular port. In fact, it has
strategic implications more for Japan- being an energy
hungry country, this port gives it direct access to
Iranian energy resources, as well as of
Russia’s. However, so far there have only been talks
without any concrete action. This is not useful,
considering that the Gwadar port has three
operational berths already and is progressing fast with
several new Chinese financial schemes.33 With so
much experience and time in its hand, China is already
making greater bounds in the region.
· Trincomalee port in Sri Lanka
China has already secured Sri Lanka’s Hambantota
port on a 99-year lease, where it is planning to build
an economic zone and speed up industrialization. 34Not
to be left behind, Japan and India are also seeking to
develop the Trincomalee port to the north of the
country, which was a former British naval base. This
particular port has got its own geopolitical advantages-
it is the most convenient port if a ship has to travel to
Myanmar, Bangladesh or any other coastal country
surrounding the Bay of Bengal. Moreover, it is
connected to Colombo through the Japanese
Trincomalee–Colombo Economic Corridor and can
help neutralize Chinese influence in the region. If
industrialized this port can help develop the eastern
part of Sri Lanka which is actually in need of FDI,
and bring internal stability and prosperity to the
region.35 Hence, it is imperative for Abe and Modi to
finalise these projects hastily as China has already
built a strong presence in those regions and is planning
to pitch in more this year. Cross-border infrastructure
projects need urgent addressal if Delhi and Tokyo
want to leverage their economic and strategic
outreach and weaken Chinese influence.
·Denuclearization of North Korea
India and Japan are today confronting one of the most
difficult conundrums for their security in the
neighbourhood. China is not only providing the rogue
state North Korea and Pakistan with nuclear weapon-
manufacturing equipments, but also giving them the
know-how to manufacture long-range missiles.36 The
Pakistan-China-North Korea security partnership
holds tremendous danger for global peace and order.
India and Japan have regularly condemned North
Korea’s nuclear programme, right from the 2006
‘Joint Statement towards India-Japan Strategic and
Global Partnership’, where both nations vouched for
the resumption of the Six-Party Talks and
denuclearisation of North Korea.37 Recently, in a
covert reference to Pakistan, they stressed on making
all the parties involved responsible for North Korea’s
nuclear ambitions. Abe and Modi are also striving for
early implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). With a view to draw
international cooperation, Abe applauded India’s
consent to the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 38 The
challenge of nuclear terrorism is getting extreme, and
Japan being a non-nuclear state is feeling its security
getting endangered more every day. India, though may
not be directly threatened, has still taken
responsibilities tantamount to that of Japan’s.
According to their ‘Vision 2025’, they are cooperating
in medium and long-term Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Energy Plans. Their defence and security partnership
regularly conducts upgradation of military platforms
and defence equipments like surveillance system
technologies. 39 However, in spite of numerous
Memoranda of Understandings, certain deals have
remained elusive. For example despite years of
negotiations, India and Japan have still not able to
conclude the Japanese amphibious aircraft
ShinMaywa US-2 deal.
Conclusion
Lately, a noticeable paradigm shift has also been
taking place in the ties between Japan and India.
Bilaterally, they have ushered in several new
initiatives, ranging from security and defence ties to
economic and cultural associations. Japan’s trade and
investments in India has grown to the extent that India
is now Japan’s largest aid beneficiary. Both Abe and
Modi are fond of each other, much salient in their
regular bilateral meets and joint statements. In fact it
was Abe who had first acknowledged Indo-Pacific
as the new important geopolitical domain in Asia. Both
nations are convinced that they have to back each
other up if the balance of power is to be restored in
Asia. However, according to recent data, India-Japan
bilateral trade is dwindling, with India’s exports nearly
India-Japan Relations: Tightening Old Ties and Building New Bridges
halved from $6.81 billion during 2013-14 to $3.85
billion during 2016-17 and imports from Japan as well
going down from $12.5 billion during 2012-13 to $9.63
billion during 2016-17. So, rather than counting the
number of new initiatives, it is more important to focus
on the calibre of their relationship instead. There are
indeed certain deterring factors such as poor
infrastructure, ineffective labour laws and
administrative bottlenecks for Japanese investors in
India. However, if India starts disseminating more
investment opportunity information, easing procedural
nuisances and removing delays, it can become a much
better ground for innovative Japanese investments.
Bilateral cooperation on defence equipment and
technology should also be put on the fast-track mode
for greater peace and security in the region. The Modi
Government should take this opportunity to
strengthen ties with its neighbours and position India
at the apex of Indo-Pacific, a power to be reckoned
with
Footnotes
Sen, Tansen, “The Indo Pacific is really nothing new, just ask the fish”, South China Morning Post, 30 th December 2017, http://
1
www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2126208/indo-pacific-really-nothing-new-just-ask-fish
2
Ministry of Externa l Affa irs, Annual Report 2 015-16 , https://www.mea .gov.in/Uploa ds/Pu blicationDocs/2 65 25_2 65 25 _
External_Affairs_English_AR_2015-16_Final_compressed.pdf
3
“India-Japan sign 15 agreements in the summit,” The Economic Times, 14 th September 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com /news/
politics-and-nation/india-japan-sign-15-agreements-in-the-summit/articleshow/60510295.cms
4
Dave, Amit and Miglani, Sanjeev, “With China in mind, Japan, India agree to deepen defence”, Reuters, 14 th September, 2017, https://
in.reuters.com/article/india-japan/with-china-in-mind-japan-india-agree-to-deepen-defence-idINKCN1BP1TO
5
“Japan permanent member of Malabar exercise: Sushma Swaraj”, Business Standard, 19 th June, 2016, http://www.business-standard.com/
article/news-ians/japan-permanent-member-of-malabar-exercise-sushma-swaraj-116061900674_1.html
6
“PM’s address to Japan-India Association, Japan-India Parliamentary Friendship League and International Friendship Exchange Council”,
28th May, 2013, http://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=1319
7
“Make in India: Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor to invite first anchor investors in August”, The Economic Times, 16 th February, 2016,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/make-in-india-delhi-mumbai-industrial-corridor-to-invite-first-anchor-
investors-in-august/articleshow/51015748.cms
8
“Japan to fund mass rapid transit systems in Gujrat, Haryana”, DMIC, 23 rd September 2017, http://delhimumbaiindustrialcorridor.com/
news.html
9
Ibid.
Ministry of Externa l Affairs, “ Launch of India-Japan Act Ea st Foru m”, http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/2915 4/
10
Launch_of_IndiaJapan_Act_East_Forum
11
“PM greets BIMSTEC nations on 20 th anniversary of BIMSTEC”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/
Print Release.aspx?relid=164448
12
“After Uri atta ck, India boycotts SAARC Summit in Islamabad,” The Ne w Indian Ex press, 2 7 th September, 2 016, http://
www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2016/sep/27/India-will-not-attend-the-SAARC-Summit-in-Islamabad-MEA-1523580—1.html
13
Free Trade Agreement, BIMSTEC, http://bimstec.org/fta/
Khan, A.R. (2006), “Towards BIMSTEC Japan comprehensive economic cooperation”, CSIRD, Anthem Press,USA
14
15
Sengupta, Jayshree, “BIMSTEC-FTA: A new hope for enhanced regional trade”, ORF, http://www.orfonline.org/research/bimstec-fta-new-
hope-enhanced-regional-trade/
16
Ibid.
17
Khan, A.R. (2006), “Towards BIMSTEC Japan comprehensive economic cooperation”, CSIRD, Anthem Press,USA
18
Sengupta, Jayshree, “BIMSTEC-FTA: A new hope for enhanced regional trade”, ORF, http://www.orfonline.org/research/bimstec-fta-new-
hope-enhanced-regional-trade/
19
Khan, A.R. (2006), “Towards BIMSTEC Japan comprehensive economic cooperation”, CSIRD, Anthem Press,USA
20
“Signing of Japanese ODA loan agreements with India: Comprehensive support for further socioeconomic development in India over a
wide range of fields”, Press release, JICA, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2017/170403_01.html
21
“Why is BIMSTEC so important for India?”, Livemint, 24 th October 2016, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/4Js OSUC4N 81BK0T 7zNYecK/
Why-is-Bimstec-so-important-for-India.html
22
Ibid.
23
“India sets to join Malacca Patrol Group”, The Tribune, 10 th April 2017, http://www.tribuneindia. com/news/nation/india-set-to-join-malacca-
patrol-group/389602.html
24
“Fact sheet: The Malacca Straits Patrol”, MINDEF Singapore, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2016/
apr/21apr16_nr/21apr15_fs.html
25
Rahman, M. R. (2017), “Blue Economy and Maritime Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal: Role of Bangladesh”, Elsevier, Procedia Engineering
194 ( 2017 ) 356 – 361
26
Barry, Ellen, “As India collaborates with Japan on islands, it looks to check India,” 11 th March 2016, The New York Times, https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/world/asia/india-japan-china-andaman-nicobar-islands.html
G. Padmaja (2016), “Sri Lanka’s proposal for an ‘Indian ocean order’: an assessment”, NMF
27
28
“India a t ce ntr e of J a pa n’s In do-Pa c ifi c p oli cy: En voy ”, 9 th D ecem ber , 2 0 1 7, Th e N ew In d i a n Ex p re s s , ht tp:/ /
www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/dec/09/india-at-centre-of-japans-indo-pacific-policy-envoy-1722830.html
29
Rahman, M. R. (2017), “Blue Economy and Maritime Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal: Role of Bangladesh”, Elsevier, Procedia Engineering
194 ( 2017 ) 356 – 36130 Lin, Qi, “Japan’s strategic counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, 28th December 2017, Global Risk Insights,
https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/12/japans-strategic-counter-chinas-belt-road-initiative/
31
Villasanta, A.D. “China’s First Overseas Military Base at Djibouti Stokes US Suspicion“, China Topix, 17th March 2017, http://www.chinatopix.com/
articles/112522/20170317/china-first-overseas-military-base-djibouti-stokes-suspicion.htm
32
33
Bhatia, N.K. (2016), “India, Chabahar, and the changing regional dynamics”, CLAWS journal
Logistics Capacity assessment of the Pakistan Gwadar Port, 26 th October 2017, http://.logcluster.org/play/public/DLCA/2.1.3+Pakistan+
Gwadar+ Port; jsessionid=98C7E985B29E188 AC4732D4A2C9E25BD
34
Stacey, Kiran, “China signs 99 year lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port”, Financial Times, 11 th December 2017, https://www.ft.com/
content/e150ef0c-de37-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c
35
Borah, R., “Why Japan, India should join hands in Sri Lanka”, Japan Forward, 13 th October 2017, https://japan-forward.com/why-
japan-india-should-join-hands-in-sri-lanka/
36
Parthasarathy, G., “Beware the Pakistan-China nuclear axis,” The Hindu, 1 st November 2017, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/
beware-the-chinapakistan-nuclear-axis/article9937186.ece
37
Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Joint Statement towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership’, December 2006, MEA, http://mea.gov.in/
bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6368/Joint+Statement+Towards+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership
38
Ministry of External Affairs, “India-Japan Joint statement during visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India”, September 2017, http://
www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28946/IndiaJapan+J oint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+to+
India+September+14+2017
39
Ministry of External Affairs, “Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together
for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World”, December 2015, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/
2 61 7 6/J oint_Statement_on_ India_ a nd_ Ja pan_ Vision_ 202 5_ Specia l_ Stra tegic_ and_ Global _ Partnership_ Work ing_
Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_ of_ the_IndoPacific_R
99