Professional Documents
Culture Documents
judgement2022-05-25
judgement2022-05-25
judgement2022-05-25
CC.No.101 of 2018
Between:
1. Kanjula Lakshmi Leelaja, D/o.K.Satyanarayana Reddy,
2. Kanjula Satyanarayana Reddy, S/o.(late) Gangi Reddy,
R/o. Door No.2-14-190, Shamala Nagar, 1st line,
Hakruthi High School, Guntur. …Complainants
and
ORDER
2. Brief facts of the case are that, the 1st complainant on ascertaining the
details about the opposite party‟s coaching institute through online for the
Indian Forest Service‟s Competitive Examinations, submitted online
application No.19, vide batch No.21 and got admitted herself, by paying fee
of Rs.1,50,000/- + Rs.1,000/- towards other incidental charges by way of
DD bearing No.828346, dated 07-09-2016, with the financial assistance
provided by the Andhra Bank, Pattabhipuram Branch, Guntur, vide loan
application No.04250000359, dated 18-08-2016 and sanctioned
Rs.1,50,000/- with repayment schedule of 36 monthly equated installments
of Rs.5,123/- per month. Thereafter, complainant No.1 joined and attended
the classes from 19-09-2016 to 23-10-2016, while matter stood thus, the
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mother of the 1st complainant fell ill due to ailment being continued from
June, 2016 and admitted in M/s. Hyma Hospitals, Guntur, as such, 1st
complainant compelled to stop attending her classes as she has to come
back to look after her mother, and the 1st complainant vacated her hostel on
25-10-2016 and requested the opposite party for refund of amount after
deducting the legally payable amount out of Rs.1,51,000/- and submitted
her requisition letter to that effect, but there was no response from the
opposite parties, so on 19-11-2016, the complainants have got issued a
legal notice requesting to refund the amount, having acknowledged the
notice, they neither responded nor replied. Hence, the complaint stating
that opposite party has committed deficiency of service.
5. On consideration of the entire case record, the points that arise for
consideration in this case are:
6. POINT No.1:- It is the contention of the opposite party that the name
of the opposite party as per records “M/s. Vaji Ram & Ravi IAS Study centre
LLP” where as the complainant shown the name of the opposite party as
“M/s.Vajiram & Ravi Coaching Institute” and therefore it is contended that
the complaint is liable to be dismissed on the ground of misjoinder and
non-joinder of the necessary party and also relied upon Judgement of,
GAWAHATI HIGH COURT reported in ‘1994 SCC online Gau-9’ in case of
Chupa Temsu AO & Ors. Vs. Nangponger & Ors.,
09-07-2021 in the case of, Sri Satyendra Nadh Basu Roy vs. The CEO,
Religare Health.
Therefore, it shall be deemed that, part of cause of action arose within
the territorial jurisdiction of this Commission, thus this point is answered
accordingly in favour of complainants.
10. POINT No.3:- The facts of the case in brief are that, the complainant
took admission in the coaching centre of the opposite party, to get coaching
for Indian Administrative services, which was for duration of about 9 months
of classroom coaching with two years access to the online courses. Though
the fee for entire course i.e., Rs.1,51,000/- by availing personal loan from
Andhra Bank, Guntur, was paid, the complainant discontinued the studies
after three weeks on the ground of ill-health of her mother and asked for
refund of the balance fee, which was declined, therefore, this complaint.
The opposite party resisted the claim of the complainant on the ground
that, at the time of admission, it was expressly stipulated that, „the fee paid
will not be refunded‟ and that the same has been duly agreed by the
complainant, and further contended that their institution is well-known
institute preparing candidates for the Civil Services Examination and it is
impossible to give admission to a new candidate in case, if any student who
decides to quit after four weeks and seeks refund.
It is admitted that, the 1st complainant took admission with opposite
party and the tuition fee for the entire course was paid on 10-09-2016 and
she attended the classes from 19-09-2016 to 23-10-2016 i.e., in all
1st complainant attended 34 days. Whereas, the opposite party claims that,
the 1st complainant attended classes for 5 weeks, and admits that they are
not maintaining any attendance register.
The main contention of the opposite party is that, in view of express
stipulation in the documents that, „the fee once paid shall not be refunded‟
and as the 1st complainant agreed for the same, therefore, the
1st complainant is not entitled for refund of the tuition fee.
The same issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in the case of,
“Sehgal School of Competition vs. Dalbir Singh” reported in 2009
3 CPJ(NC) 33, in which it is held that,
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The facts of the said case are directly applicable to the facts of the
present case on hand, and therefore, the contention of the opposite party is
not tenable and the opposite party cannot be permitted to say that in view
of the stipulation that they are not liable to refund the tuition fee.
The other contention of the opposite party is that, it is impossible for
the opposite party to give admission to a new candidate in place of any
student who decides to quit after four weeks and seeks refund.
The opposite party filed his version wherein in para 7 it was averred
that, it is impossible for the opposite party to give admission to a new
candidate in place of any student who decides to quit after 4 weeks and
seeks refund. Very interestingly there is no such averment in the affidavit
filed by the opposite party. On the other hand, the opposite party did not
plead that, the vacancy caused due to discontinuation of 1st complainant was
not filled by them, nor did the opposite party file any documents viz.
admission register etc., to show that the vacancy was not filled up and no
admission was given to any new student. In the absence of the same, this
Commission is unable to accept the contention of the opposite party, that
the vacancy caused due to discontinuation of coaching by 1st complainant
cannot be filled by giving admission to a new student.
The other contention of the opposite party is that the complainant is
not a consumer and there is no deficiency of service etc., are also not
tenable in view of the judgement of the “Hon’ble National Commission in
Fiit Jee Ltd., vs. Dr.Minathi Rath reported in 2012 CPJ (NC) 194”
wherein it was held that,
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14. So far as the first issue is concerned, even though in a very narrow
technical sense, for reasons pointed out by the counsel for petitioner in
his oral submissions, coaching institutions may not be conventional
education institutions, but since they provide coaching and training to
students of an educational nature to equip them for higher studies in
specialized educational institutions, the same principles that apply to
educational institutions would also apply to these institutions in
respect of the fees charged by them including advance fees. In any
case, Respondents are consumers and the Petitioners are the service
providers. Petitioners are rendering service for consideration and fall
within the purview of Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The judgment
of the Supreme Court would, thus override any bilateral agreement
between the parties. We are, therefore, of the considered view that
respectfully following the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the
petitioner/institute could not have charged full advance fees for two
years and could have charged prescribed fees for one semester/year.
In the instant cases, since petitioner/Institute do not follow the
semester system, they could only have charged advance fees for one
year. In view of these facts, the respondents are entitled to get
refund of the fees after deducting the non-refundable service tax for
the unattended second year of the course.
15. Regarding the contention of the petitioners that these cases do not
fall within the ambit and scope of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
because these complaints have not been made on the ground of
deficiency in service before the District Forum, we find that this
contention is not sustainable. In the first place, the complaints were
made on specific grounds of deficiency in service before the District
Forum and secondly as stated in the above para, as per Section
2(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the Respondents are
consumers who sought to avail of services for a consideration and the
petitioner/institute is very much a provider of these services and thus
these cases are consumer disputes within the meaning of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
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APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTS MARKED
For complainant:
Sd/-XXX
PRESIDENT