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CHAPTER 6
Section 6.1
Statistical Literacy and Critical Thinking
1 No, we should not expect to get exactly heads. As shown in Figure 6.1,
you would get exactly 50 heads only about 8% of the time. However, if
the coin is fair, you should expect to get a result that is fairly
close to 50 heads.
2 A result is statistically significant if it is unlikely to have
occurred by chance.
3 Statistical significance applies to samples. If you conducted a census
that allowed you to determine the actual value of a population
parameter, then there would be no need to quantify the probability that
the value is correct, since it would have been measured. In contrast,
when you measure a sample statistic, there is always some probability
that it does not accurately reflect the true population parameter, and
the concept of statistical significance is designed to quantify that
uncertainty.
4 Statistical significance at the 0.05 level means that there is a 0.05
(or 5%, or 1 in 20) or less probability that the result occurred by
chance, and statistical significance at the 0.01 level means that there
is a 0.01 (or 1%, or 1 in 100)or less probability that the result
occurred by chance. A result that is statistically significant at the
0.05 level is not automatically also significant at the 0.01 level,
because a probability of 0.05 or less does not necessarily mean that
there is a 0.01 or less chance. However, a result that is statistically
significant at the 0.01 level is automatically also significant at the
0.05 level, because a probability of 0.01 or less is also less than a
0.05 chance.
5 This statement does not make sense. The term statistical significance
has a particular meaning with regard to the probability that results
occurred by chance; it does not simply mean that a topic is important.
6 This statement makes sense. Statistical significance is a measure of
the probability of the observed difference happening by chance. If the
probability of these differences happening is almost 50%, it would be
likely to have happened by chance!
7 This statement does not make sense. The question is not whether we
expect to get exactly 501 girls, but whether the result differs
significantly from what would be expected to occur by pure chance,
given that we always expect some distribution of results around the
most likely value. Instead of focusing on the probability of exactly
501 girls, we should include the probability of any other outcomes that
are more extreme, that is, should consider the probability of 501 or
more girls.
8 This statement does not make sense. At any level of statistical
significance, there is always some probability that the result is
incorrect.
Concepts and Applications
9 Statistically significant. The probability of ten correct answers with

random guesses is very small and much less than 0.05 (5%) which is a
common measure of statistical significance. (The student was probably
prepared for the quiz.)
73 Copyright © 2018 Pearson Education, Inc.

74 CHAPTER 6, PROBABILITY IN STATISTICS
10 Statistically significant. Given that Independents typically make up only

about 1 in 3 voters, the result of getting 25 Independents among 25 randomly
selected voters is extreme, and it is unlikely to occur by chance. The
probability is less than 0.05 (5%).
11 Statistically significant. The chance of getting a 6 in each of 10 rolls is
(1/6)10 = 0.0000000165, which is much less than 0.05.
12 Not statistically significant. The result could have occurred by chance.
The chance of not getting a single 6 in 10 rolls is (5/6)10 = 0.162, which is
greater than 0.05.
13 Statistically significant. The result is unlikely to occur by chance. It
would be rare to see that many passengers of a single gender.
14 Statistically significant. The result is unlikely to occur by chance. A
subway car containing 50 men (and no women), all of whom are bald, seems
unlikely.
15 Statistically significant. The result is unlikely to occur by chance. The
population in question has a proportion of almost 80% Americans of Mexican
ancestry and yet the sample taken showed a proportion of only 39% Americans
of Mexican ancestry.
16 Not statistically significant. The rate of headaches is about 6% in the
treatment group and 5% in the control group, and the difference between
those two rates could easily be explained by chance.
17 Even though the sample size is relatively small, such a large (21%)
improvement in mileage is most likely significant.
18 Based on the sample sizes (73 and 83 patients) and the large difference
between the two success rates (92% – 72% = 20%), it appears that the results
are statistically significant.
19 With 945 babies, the number of girls would usually be around 945/2 = 472.5,
so the result of 879 girls is a substantial difference (879 – 472.5 = 406.5)
from the results expected by chance. The results appear to be statistically
significant.
20 The results do have statistical significance at the 0.05 level, but not at
the 0.01 level. The bed nets do appear to be effective in reducing malaria,
although they do not guarantee protection from malaria. This makes some
sense if the subjects do not spend all of their time in bed. Mosquitoes can
bite at any time of day, not just at night. Preventing bites at night with
bed nets is not total protection.
21 a) If 100 samples were selected, the mean temperature would be 98.20°F or
less in 5 or fewer of the samples if the true mean were 98.60°F.
b) Selecting a sample with a mean this small is extremely unlikely if the
true mean is 98.60°F and would not be expected by chance.
22 The likelihood of such a difference occurring simply by chance is less than
0.01% (or 1 in 10,000), so the difference is likely due to the use of the
seat belts.
23 Yes, statistically significant. The result is unlikely to occur by chance.
24 Not statistically significant. The probability of getting another sample
with the same results is 87% and the result could easily occur by chance.
Section 6.2
1 An outcome is the most basic possible result of an observation or

experiment. An event is a collection of one or more outcomes that share a
property of interest. For example, if you toss two coins, one possible
outcome is HT and another possible outcome is TH, but if you are interested
in whether the coin comes up heads, both of these outcomes represent the
same event of 1 head (and 1 tail).
Copyright © 2018 Pearson Education, Inc.

SECTION 6.2, BASICS OF PROBABILITY 75
2 The notation P(A) means the probability that event A will occur. We
often denote events by letters or symbols. The range of possible values
for P(A) is from 0 to 1 (inclusive), with 0 meaning there is no chance
that event A will occur and 1 meaning it is certain that event A will
occur.
3 The theoretical method is based on the assumption that all outcomes are
equally likely and relies on the known probabilities of individual
outcomes. The relative frequency method uses past data to make a
prediction about a future probability. The subjective method bases
probability on intuition and judgment. Examples will vary.
4 A probability distribution represents the probabilities of all possible
events. It can be displayed using a table with two columns (events and
probability of those events) or a graph or a formula.
5 This statement makes sense. The four different outcomes are HTTT, THTT,
TTHT, TTTH.
6 This statement makes sense. There are no months with more than 31 days,
so there is no chance of selecting such a month at random.
7 This statement makes sense. Subjective probabilities are based on
intuition, and it’s certainly reasonable to think that there is a 50%
chance that calculator batteries will need to be replaced during the
next 3 years.
8 This statement does not make sense. The two possibilities are
complements and therefore must always total to 1, but that does not
mean they are each 1/2.
9 There are eight possible outcomes: GGG, GGB, GBG, BGG, GBB, BGB, BBG,
BBB. Only one outcome (GGG) corresponds to the event of three girls:
P(all girls) = 1/8, or 0.125.
10 There are 16 possible outcomes: GGGG, GGGB, GGBG, GBGG, BGGG, GGBB,
GBGB, GBBG, BGGB, BBGG, BGBG, GBBB, BGBB, BBGB, BBBG, BBBB. There are 6
possible outcomes that include two boys and two girls, taking into
account birth order: P(2 boys and 2 girls) = 6/16, or 0.375.
11 3/4, assuming that heads and tails are equally likely to occur. There
are four possible outcomes (HH, TH, HT, TT), and only three of them
include one head or two heads.
12 1/2, assuming all sides of die are equally likely to be rolled. There
are six numbers, and half of them are odd.
13 30/365 = 6/73, or 0.0822, assuming that the selection is random in the
sense that all of the 365 days have the same chance of being selected.
14 1/5, or 0.2, assuming that the guess is random in the sense that all
five possible answers have the same chance of being selected.
15 4/52 = 1/13, assuming that each card is equally likely to be drawn and
because there are four aces in the deck of 52 cards.
16 1/7, assuming that births on each day of week are equally likely.
17 1/365, assuming that births on the 365 days are equally likely.
18 1/2, or 0.5, assuming that heads and tails are equally likely to occur.
Each coin toss is independent of the tosses before it, and the
probability is unaffected by prior information.
19 1/2, or 0.5, assuming that boys and girls are equally likely. Each new
birth is independent of the preceding births, and the probability is
unaffected by prior information.
20 6/6 = 1, assuming that each face of the die is equally likely (a fair
die). Since the possible outcomes are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, any roll
would have a result less than 10.
21 P(day of week doesn’t have a “y”) = 0/7 = 0.
22 P(day of week has a “d”) = 7/7 = 1.
23 P(not queen) = 1 – P(queen) = 1 – 4/52 = 1 – 1/13 = 12/13. We are assuming a

fair deck of cards where each card is equally likely to be drawn.
24 P(not heart) = 1 – P(heart) = 1 – 13/52 = 1 – 1/4 = 3/4. We are assuming a
fair deck of cards where each card is equally likely to be drawn.
25 P(not correct) = 1 – P(correct) = 1 – 1/5 = 4/5 or 0.8, assuming that the
guess is random in the sense that all five possible answers have the same
chance of being selected. [See the answer to Exercise 14 for P(correct).]
26 Three names of days include the letter “t” (Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday).
So P(no t) = 1 – P(t) = 1 – 3/7 = 4/7.
27 P(missing basket) = 1 – P(making basket) = 1 – 3/4 = 1/4, or 0.25
28 P(not born on Saturday) = 1 – P(born on Saturday) = 1 – 1/7 = 6/7
[See answer to Exercise 16 for P(born on Saturday)]
29 P(not type O) = 1 – P(type O) = 1 – 0.45 = 0.55
30 P(not defective) = 1 – P(defective) = 1 – 0.02 = 0.98
31 P(red) = 13/100 = 0.13; P(blue) = 27/100 = 0.27; P(yellow) = 8/100 = 0.08;
P(not orange) = 1 – P(orange) = 1 – 25/100 = 75/100 = 0.75. We are assuming
that all of the 100 of M&M’S are equally likely to be selected.
32 You would expect to get a score of 20%. We are assuming that with random
guessing, the different answers are all equally likely.
33 There are eight possible outcomes: GGG, BGG, GBG, GGB, BBG, BGB, GBB, BBB
For each of the parts below, the solution is obtained by dividing the number
of outcomes in the event by 8.
Result Probability
Three girls 1/8 = 0.125
Two girls, one boy 3/8 = 0.375
One girl, two boys 3/8 = 0.375
Three boys 1/8 = 0.125
Total 1.000
a) 1/8 = 0.125 (GGG)

b) 3/8 = 0.375 (BBG, BGB, GBB)
c) 1/8 = 0.125 (GBB)
d) 7/8 = 0.875 (GGG, BGG, GBG, GGB, BBG, BGB, GBB)
e) 4/8 = 0.5 (BBG, BGB, GBB, BBB)
34 a) 16: BBBB, BBBG, BBGB, BGBB, GBBB, BBGG, BGBG, BGGB, GBGB, GBBG, GGBB,
BGGG, GBGG, GGBG, GGGB, GGGG.
Result Probability
Four girls 1/16 = 0.0625
Three girls, one boy 4/16 = 0.2500
Two girls, two boys 6/16 = 0.3750
One girl, three boys 4/16 = 0.2500
Four boys 1/16 = 0.0625
Total 1.0000
b) 2/16 = 1/8, or 0.125 (BBBB, GGGG)

c) 1/16 = 0.0625 (BGBG)
d) 6/16 = 3/8 = 0.375 (BBGG, BGBG, BGGB, GBGB, GBBG, GGBB)
35 The forecaster has been right 26 out 30 times, a relative frequency of 26/30
= 13/15, or 0.867. Thus, her probability of being correct on the next
forecast is 0.867.
36 A hundred year flood occurs about once every one hundred years, so the
probability of one this year is 1/100, or 0.01.
37 P(Success) = 0.72.
38 P(Success) = 67/73 = 0.918.

SECTION 6.2, BASICS OF PROBABILITY 77
39
Outcomes for Tossing Four Fair Coins
Coin 1 Coin 2 Coin 3 Coin 4 Outcome Probability
H H H H HHHH 1/16
H H H T HHHT 1/16
H H T H HHTH 1/16
H H T T HHTT 1/16
H T H H HHTH 1/16
H T H T HTHT 1/16
H T T H HTTH 1/16
H T T T HTTT 1/16
T H H H THHH 1/16
T H H T THHT 1/16
T H T H THTH 1/16
T H T T THTT 1/16
T T H H TTHH 1/16
T T H T TTHT 1/16
T T T H TTTH 1/16
T T T T TTTT 1/16
Event Probability Distribution for Tossing Four Coins

4 heads, 0 tails 1/16 0.0625 HHHH
3 heads, 1 tail 4/16 0.25 HHHT, HHTH, HHTH, THHH
HHTT, HTHT, HTTH, THHT, THTH,
2 heads, 2 tails 6/16 0.375 TTHH
1 heads, 3 tails 4/16 0.25 HTTT, THTT, TTHT, TTTH
0 heads, 4 tails 1/16 0.0625 TTTT
Total 16/16 1
a) P(all same) = 2/16 = 1/8, or 0.125

b) P(not same) = 1 – P(same) = 1 – 2/16 = 14/16 = 7/8, or 0.875
c) P(two heads and two tails) = 6/16, or 0.375
40 a) P(any number) = 1/27, or 0.037
b) Based on the histogram 10 occurs the most with a relative
frequency of 82/1639, or 0.0500.
c) The histogram would have a shape that is very close to a uniform
distribution.

Section 6.3
1 The law of large numbers states that if a process is repeated through many
trials, the proportion of the trials in which event A occurs will be close
to the probability P(A). It does not apply to a single trial (observation or
experiment), or even to small numbers of trials, but only to a large number
of trials.
2 With the relatively small number of 10 tosses, the probability of getting a
result slightly away from the most likely outcome of 5 is still quite high.
However, when the number of tosses is 1000, the outcomes will be tightly
distributed around the most likely outcome of 500, so a result of 600 would
be highly improbable.
3 The expected value of a variable is the weighted average of all its possible
values. It is computed using the formula given in the text. Because it is an
average, we should expect a value close to the expected value to occur only
when there are a large number of events, so that the law of large numbers
comes into play.
4 The gambler’s fallacy is the mistaken belief that a streak of bad luck makes
a person “due” for a streak of good luck (or that a streak of good luck will
continue). Examples will vary.
5 This statement makes sense. Most people lose money in the lottery, so the
expected value, which represents what you can expect to get as a return,
should be less than what you spend. Furthermore, a lottery is a business,
and good business plans are created so as to make money rather than lose
money over the long term.
6 This statement makes sense. For every $1 bet, the expected return is 64¢,
so this is a losing game and there is no reason to bet much money on it.
7 This statement does not make sense. All sets of three numbers have the same
probability and the same chance of winning.
8 This statement does not make sense. This is an example of the gambler’s
fallacy.
9 No, you should not expect to get exactly 250 girls since the probability of
that particular outcome is extremely small. The proportion of girls should
approach 0.5 as the number of births increases.
10 It means that the driver is “due” for an accident or a traffic citation. If
citations happen randomly, then the statement is not true. If citations
depend on driving habits, it may be a true statement.
11 For each of the possible outcomes heads or tails, your net winnings would be
(after subtracting the $10 it costs you to play) 5$ or $0. Therefore, your
expected net winnings = ($5)(1/2) + ($0)(1/2) = $2.50. It appears that you
should play. However, you are not tossing the coin, so there is a chance of
cheating occurring. It would be wise to be wary of such a bet.
12 You have a 1/10,000 chance of winning $4999 and a 9999/10,000 chance of
losing $1. Thus, your expected value is
($4999)(1/10,000) + (-$1)(9999/10,000) = -$0.50, or a loss of $0.50.
13 a) –$161 for surviving and $100,000 – $161 = $99,839 for not surviving.
b) P(surviving) = 0. 9986, P(not surviving) = 1 – P(surviving) = 0. 0014.
c) The expected value is –$161 × 0.9986+ $99,839 × 0.0014= -$21.
d) Yes, the insurance company can make a profit. The expected value for
the insurance company is $21, which indicates that the company can
expect to make an average of $21 for each such policy.

SECTION 6.3, THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS 79
14 a) –$226 for surviving and $50,000 – $226 = $49,774 for not

surviving.
b) P(surviving) = 0. 9968, P(not surviving) = 1 – P(surviving) = 0.
0032.
c) The expected value is –$226 × 0.9968 + $49,774 × 0.0032= -$66.
d) Yes, the insurance company can make a profit. The expected value
for the insurance company is $66, which indicates that the
company can expect to make an average of $66 for each such
policy.
15 Your waiting time is uniformly distributed between 0 and 24 minutes.
The center of this symmetric distribution is 12 minutes, so 12 minutes
is your expected waiting time.
16 a) For a $5.00 bet, the expected value is –$5.00 × 20/38 + $5.00 ×
18/36 = $-0.26.
b) The best option is to not bet, because the expected value for no
bet is 0, which is better than ‒26¢.
17 The expected value for a $20 bet is –$20 × 251/495 + $20 × 244/495 = –
$0.28. So, in the long run, the expected value for each dollar bet is -
$0.28/$20.00 = -$0.014 or ‒1.4¢.
18 The expected value is (-$0.50)(9,999/10,000) + ($2788 –
$0.50)(1/10,000) = -$0.22. In the long run, you can expect to lose
$0.22 for each $0.50 bet.
19 For the 1-point attempt, Expected value = (1 × 0.94) + (0 × 0.06) =
0.94. For the 2-point attempt, Expected value = (2 × 0.37) + (0 ×
0.63) = 0.74. The 1-point attempt makes more sense in most cases.
However, if a team is two points behind with little or no time left, it
makes no sense to go for 1 point. The same is true if the team is
behind by 16 points and it is unlikely that the team will have enough
time to score three times.
20 a) The expected value is ($1,000,000)(1/90,000,000) +
($100,000)(1/110,000,000) + ($25,000)(1/110,000,000) +
($5,000)(1/36,667,000) + ($2,500)(1/27,500,000) = $0.012
b) 1.2 cents minus the cost of the stamp. Mathematically, it is not
worth entering the contest, but the small cost might be worth the
excitement of anticipating a win.
21 a) Decision 1:
Option A: Expected value = $1,000,000
Option B: Expected value = (%2,500,000 × 0.10) + ($1,000,000 ×
0.89) + ($0 × 0.01) = $1,140,000
Decision 2:
Option A: Expected value =
($1,000,000 × 0.11) + ($0 × 0.89) = $110,000
Option B: Expected value =
($2,500,000 × 0.10) + ($0 × 0.90) = $250,000
b) Responses are not consistent with expected values in Decision 1,
but they are consistent in Decision 2.
c) It appears that people choose the certain outcome ($1,000,000) in
Decision 1.
22 a) If you toss a head, with probability 0.5, the difference
decreases to 23; If you toss a tail, with probability 0.5, the
difference increases to 25.
b) On each of 1000 additional tosses, the probability is 0.5 that
the difference will increase and 0.5 that it will decrease. So,
overall, the difference is equally as likely to be greater than
24 as it is to be less than 24.
c) Once you have 24 more tails than heads, the difference is as
likely to increase as to decrease; thus, the number of tails is
likely to remain greater than the number of heads.
d) By part (c), the number of tails is likely to exceed the number of

heads at any time. The gambler’s fallacy is that the difference
between heads and tails will eventually be corrected.
Section 6.4
1 Travel risk is a rate that quantifies the risk involved in traveling and is
often expressed in terms of an accident rate or death rate. These rates are
in essence expected values and represent probabilities. For example, an
annual accident rate of 750 accidents per 100,000 people tells us that the
probability of a person being involved in an accident (in one year) is 750
in 100,000 = 0.0075. Travel risks must be interpreted with care, as
sometimes they are stated per 100,000 people, as above, but other times they
are stated per trip or per mile.
2 Vital statistics are data related to births and deaths. The rate of 13.2
births per 1000 people means that on average, for every 1000 people in the
population, there are 13.2 births.
3 Life expectancy is the number of additional years a person of a given age
can expect to live on average. A 30-year-old person will have a shorter life
expectancy than a 20-year-old person because the 30-year-old person is not
expected to live as many additional years as the 20-year-old.
4 It means that based on current medical and health data, a person who is 20
years old today will, on average, live to be about 80 years old. However, if
there are improvements in medical treatments and public health, today’s 20-
year-olds will live longer than that on average.
5 This statement does not make sense. Many products do this, including
automobiles.
6 This statement does not make sense. Many fewer people ride motorcycles, so
the higher death rate does not imply higher absolute numbers of deaths.
7 This statement does not make sense. Life expectancy is an average based on
current medicine and public health statistics. An individual’s life span
depends on many other factors.
8 This statement makes sense. On average, a 60-year-old has fewer remaining
years of life than a 20-year old, which means a shorter life expectancy.
9 For 2000, the fatality rate per thousand departures was 92/9035 = 0.0102;
For 2008, the fatality rate per thousand departures was 3/10,437 = 0.0003;
For 2014, the fatality rate per thousand departures was 2/8,987= 0.0002.
The year 2014 was the safest because it had the lowest number of fatalities
per 1000 departures.
10 In 2000, the fatality rate per billion passenger miles was 92/692.8 =0.1328;
In 2008, the fatality rate per billion passenger miles was 3/722.8 =0.0042;
In 2014, the fatality rate per billion passenger miles was 2/ 868.4 =0.0023.
The year 2014 was the safest because it had the lowest rate of fatalities
per billion passenger miles.
11 For 2000, the fatality rate per million passengers was 92/666.2 =0.1381;
For 2008, the fatality rate per million passengers was 3/690.2 =0.0043;
For 2014, the fatality rate per million passengers was 2/ 756.0 =0.0026.
The year 2014 was the safest because it had the lowest number of fatalities
per million passengers.
12 For 2014, the fatality rate per passenger mile is 2/ 868,400,000,000 =
0.0000000000023 (or 2.3 × 10‒12) deaths per passenger mile. This very small
number is inconvenient to write and is not easily understood.
13 The birth rate in the United States was 3,952,937/316,128,839 = 0.0125 or
12.5 births per 1000 people.
14 The birth rate in California was 503,634/38,332,521 = 0.0131 or 13.1 births
per 1000 people.

SECTION 6.5, COMBINING PROBABILITIES 81
15 The death rate in California was 250,567/38,332,521 = 0.0065 or 6.5

deaths per 1000 people. The death rate in Florida was
182,121/19,552,860 = 0.0093 or 9.3 deaths per 1000 people.
Florida probably has a higher death rate due to the large number of
older people who retire there.
16 The death rate in California was 250,567/38,332,521 = 0.0065 or 6.5
deaths per 1000 people. The death rate in the United States was
2,540,928/316,128,839 = 0.0080 or 8.0 deaths per 1000 people.
California has a lower death rate than the United States.
17 Based on current life expectancy data, a randomly selected 20-year-old
would be expected to live 59.5 additional years beyond his or her 20th
birthday.
18 Based on current life expectancy data, a randomly selected 18-year-old
would be expected to live 61.4 additional years beyond his or her 18th
birthday.
19 The death rate was 65 deaths per 100,000 people or approximately 6.5
deaths per 10,000 people.
20 The death rate was 74 deaths per 100,000 people or approximately 7.4
deaths per 10,000 people.
21 The death rate due to Alzheimer’s disease was 84,767/325,000,000 =
0.0002608 or 26.08 per 100,000 people.
22 The death rate due to heart disease was 611,105/325,000,000 = 0.0018803
or 188.03 per 100,000 people.
23 The death rate due to stroke was 128,978/325,000,000 = 0.0003969.
So, in a city of population 500,000 people, you would expect 0.0003969
× 500,000 = 198.43, approximately 198 people, would die due to a
stroke.
24 The death rate due to chronic respiratory diseases was
149,205/325,000,000 = 0.0004591. So, in a city of population 500,000
people, you would expect 0.0004591 × 500,000 = 229.55, approximately
230 people would die due to chronic respiratory diseases.
25 The death rate for 60-year-olds is estimated at 7.5 per 1000 people.
So out of 14 million people, 7.5 × 14,000,000/1000 = 105,000 people.
26 The death rate for 25-year-olds is estimated at 2 per 1000 people.
So out of 42 million people, 2 × 42,000,000/1000 = 84,000 people.
27 Based on current life expectancy data, they would be expected to live
another 40 years to age 80.
28 Based on current life expectancy data, they would be expected to live
another 10 years to age 90.
29 The life expectancy percentage increase is (80 – 48)/48 = 0.66 or a 66%
increase. Women in 2100 would be expected to live to 80 × 1.66 = 133
years old.
30 The life expectancy percentage increase is (74 – 46)/46 = 0.61 or a 61%
increase. Men in 2100 would be expected to live to 74 × 1.61 = 119
years old.
Section 6.5
1 The student that is chosen from the statistics class for event A does
not affect the probability of choosing a female from the psychology
class for event B. Since the students are picked from different
classes, the two events are independent.
2 When the geneticists selects one pea out of the 4 peas (event G), it
will change the probability of choosing another pea from the remaining
three peas (event Y). The outcome of the first event affects the
probability of the second event, so the two events are dependent.

3 Yes, a pollster could select an adult that is a male Republican. Events M

and R could occur at the same time, so the events are overlapping.
4 No, since you cannot roll an odd number and an even number at the same time,
these events are complementary as well as non-overlapping. By definition,
the complement of an event does not overlap with the event itself.
5 This statement does not make sense. The numbers drawn are independent of
previous outcomes.
6 This statement does not make sense. The outcomes are H1, H2, H3, H4, H5,
H6, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, so P(H or 2) = 7/12, not 2/3.
7 This statement makes sense. It is a valid application of the either/or rule
for non-overlapping events.
8 This statement makes sense. Lottery results from week to week are
independent, so what happened in the past does not affect what happens now
or in the future.
9 Since the births are independent, P(Fourth child is a girl) = 1/2 = 0.5.
10 P(GGBB) = P(G1 and G2 and B3 and B4) = P(G1)P(G2)P(B3)P(B4) =
(0.5)(0.5)(0.5)(0.5) = 0.0625 since the four births are independent.
11 Since the digits are independent, P(12) = (1/10)(1/9) = 1/90.
12 a) When sampling with replacement, the outcomes of the first two
selections are independent, so
P(Orange1 and Orange2) = P(Orange1) × P(Orange2) = (6/123)(6/123) =
36/15129 = 0.00238.
b) When sampling without replacement, the outcomes of the first two
selections are dependent, so
P(Orange1 and Orange2) = P(Orange1) × P(Orange2 given Orange1) =
(6/123)(5/122) = 30/15006 = 0.00200
c) If hunters are being selected for a follow-up study, it doesn’t make
much sense to select the same hunter twice, so selecting without
replacement makes more sense. The probability from part (b) would be
more useful.
13 Since the selections can be repeated, the probabilities of each type remain
the same for each selection: 15/50 = 3/10 for rock, 20/50 = 2/5 for jazz,
and 15/50 = 3/10 for country.
a) P(two rock selections in a row) = (3/10) × (3/10) = 0.09
b) P(three jazz selections in a row) = (2/5) × (2/5) × (2/5) = 0.064
c) P(jazz and then country) = (2/5) × (3/10) = 0.12
d) There are 60 equally likely songs available for each selection.
No matter which song is played first, the probability that the next
one is the same is 1/50 = 0.02.
14 a) Dependent events, since the pollster will not call the same person
more than once, the first event will affect the probability of the
second event.
b) P(first male and second female) = P(first is male) × P(second is
female given first is male) = (60/100) × (40/99) = 0.242.
15 The number of people who either pled guilty or were sent to prison is
392 + 564 + 58 = 1014. Therefore, P(guilty plea or sent to prison) =
1014/1028 = 0.986.
16 The number of people who either pled not guilty or were not sent to prison
is 58 + 14 + 564 = 636. Therefore, P(not guilty plea or not sent to prison)
= 636/1028 = 0.619.
17 Altogether, 956 pled guilty out of the total of 1028.
P(First pled Guilty and Second pled Guilty) =
P(First pled Guilty) × P(Second pled Guilty given First pled Guilty) =
(956/1028)(955/1027) = 912,980/1,055,756 = 0.865.

SECTION 6.5, COMBINING PROBABILITIES 83
18 Altogether, 450 out of the total of 1028 were sent to prison.

P(First to Prison and Second to Prison) =
P(First to Prison) × P(Second to Prison given First to Prison) =
(450/1028)(449/1027) = 202,050/105,5756 = 0.191.
19 Of the total of 1028 defendants, 392 pled guilty and were sent to
prison, so P(Pled Guilty and Went to Prison) = 392/1028 = 0.381.
20 Of the total of 1028 defendants, 564 pled guilty and were not sent to
prison, so P(Pled Guilty and Did not go to Prison) = 564/1028 = 0.549.
21 The number of accidents in which the pedestrian was intoxicated or the
driver was intoxicated is 59 + 79 + 266 = 404. Therefore,
P(the pedestrian was intoxicated or the driver was intoxicated) =
404/985 = 0.410.
22 The number of accidents in which the pedestrian was not intoxicated or
the driver was not intoxicated is 266 + 581 + 79 = 926. Therefore,
P(the pedestrian was not intoxicated or the driver was not intoxicated)
= 926/985 = 0.940.
23 The number of accidents in which the pedestrian was intoxicated or the
driver was not intoxicated is 59 + 266 + 581 = 906. Therefore,
P(the pedestrian was intoxicated or the driver was not intoxicated) =
906/985 = 0.920.
24 The number of accidents in which the pedestrian was not intoxicated or
the driver was intoxicated is 79 + 581 + 59 = 719. Therefore,
P(the pedestrian was not intoxicated or the driver was intoxicated) =
719/985 = 0.730.
25 Of the 985 accidents, 138 involved intoxicated drivers. When two
accidents are selected without replacement, P(First Driver intoxicated
and Second driver intoxicated) = P(First Driver intoxicated) × P(Second
driver intoxicated given First Driver intoxicated) = (138/985)(137/984)
= 0.0195.
26 Of the 985 accidents, 325 involved intoxicated drivers. When two
accidents are selected without replacement,
P(First Pedestrian intoxicated and Second Pedestrian intoxicated) =
P(First Pedestrian intoxicated) × P(Second Pedestrian intoxicated given
First Pedestrian intoxicated) = (325/985)(324/984) = 0.109.
27 a) P(drug or placebo) = (120 + 100)/300 = 220/300 = 0.733
b) P(improved or not improved) = (138 + 162)/300 = 1
c) We can work this one in two ways:
P(drug or improved) = (65 + 55 + 42 + 31)/300 = 193/300 = 0.643;
also P(drug or improved) = P(drug) + P(improved) -
P(drug and improved) = 120/300 + 138/300 - 65/300 = 193/300 =
0.643.
d) P(drug and improved) = 65/300 = 0.22.
28 a) P(both improved) = (138/300) × (138/300) = 0.212
b) P(both improved) = (138/300) × (137/299) = 0.211
c) The results are close but different.
29 a) There are 1205 people surveyed, 1049 of whom responded and 156 of
whom refused to respond. Therefore, P(Refuse) = 156/1205 = 0.129.
This probability suggests that high refusal rates may be a
problem for pollsters since the survey might result in a sample
that is not representative of the population being surveyed.
Those who refuse may constitute a group with opinions that differ
from those who respond.
b) There are 202 people 60 and over who responded, so the
probability of choosing such a person at random is 202/1205 =
0.168.

c) There are 1049 who responded plus 11 more in the 18-21 age group who
did not respond, for a total of 1060. Thus the probability that a
person is randomly chosen who responded or is in the 18-21 age group
is 1060/1205 = 0.880.
d) There are 156 people who refused to respond plus another 202 who are
over 59 and responded. Therefore, the probability that a randomly
chosen person refused to respond or is over 59 is 358/1205 = 0.297.
30 a) There are 156 people who refused to respond.
P(both refused) = (156/1205) × (156/1205) = 0.0168.
b) There are 156 people who refused to respond.
P(both refused) = (156/1205) × (155/1204) = 0.0167.
c) The results are close but different. In practice, we can treat them as
independent events, since 2/1205 is less than 5% of the population
size.
31 a)
Positive results Negative results Total
Used marijuana 119 3 122
Didn’t use 24 154 178
marijuana
Total 143 157 300
b) The total number of applicants that had a positive result was 143.
The total number of applicants that said they didn’t use marijuana was
178. Since the applicants that had a positive result and also said
they didn’t use marijuana was counted twice, we take away 24.
P(positive or does not use) = (143 + 178 – 24)/300 = 297/300 = 0.99
c) P(both tested positive) = (143/300) × (143/300) = 0.227
d) P(both tested positive) = (143/300) × (142/299) = 0.226
e) If two job applicants are being selected for follow-up testing, it
doesn’t make much sense to select the same person twice, so selecting
without replacement makes more sense.
32 a) P(B number) = 15/75 = 0.20
b) P(two B numbers in a row) = P(B number on first draw) × P(B number on
second draw | B number on the first draw) = 15/75 × 14/74 = 0.038.
c) P(B number or O number) = 30/75 = 0.400.
d) P(B number, then a G number, then an N number) = P(B number) ×
P(G number | B number) × P(N number | B number and a G number) =
15/75 × 15/74 × 15/73 = 0.0083
e) P(five non-B numbers) = 60/75 × 59/74 × 58/73 × 57/72 × 56/71 = 0.316.
Chapter 6 Review Exercises
1 The total number of subjects is (15 + 42 + 32 + 9) = 98. The total number

of subjects that lied was 42 + 9 = 51. P(Lied) = 51/98 = 0.520
2 The total number of subjects is (15 + 42 + 32 + 9) = 98. The number of
subjects that lied and their polygraph indicated not lying was 32.
P(Didn’t Lie and polygraph indicated not lying) = 32/98 = 0.327
3 The total number of subjects that lied was 42 + 9 = 51. The total number of
subjects whose polygraph indicated lying was 15 + 42 = 57.
P(Lied or polygraph indicated lying) = P(Lied) +
P(polygraph indicated lying) - P(Given lied and polygraph indicated lying) =
(51 + 57 – 42)/98 = 66/98, or 0.673.
4 The total number of subjects that did not lie was 15 + 32 = 47. The total
number of subjects whose polygraph indicated they did not lie was 32 + 9 =
41.
P(did not lie or polygraph indicated did not lie) = P(did not lie) +
P(polygraph indicated did not lie) - P(did not lie and polygraph indicated
did not lie) =(47 + 41 – 32)/98 = 56/98, or 0.571.
CHAPTER 6, QUIZ 85
5 The total number of subjects that lied was 42 + 9 = 51. The total
number of subjects that did not lie was 15 + 32 = 47
P(lied or did not lie) = (51 + 47)/98 = 1.0
6 P(both lied) = (51/98) × (50/97) = 0.268
7 P(all three lied) = (51/98) × (50/97) × (49/96) = 0.137
8 Based on data from J. D. Power and Associates, 22% of car colors are
black, so any estimate between 0.05 and 0.35 is reasonable.
9 a) P(Not Good) = 1 – P(Good) = 1 – 0.27 = 0.73
b) P(Both good) = P(Good1 and Good2) = P(Good1)P(Good2)
=(0.27)(0.27) = 0.0729.
c) Expected number of good chips = 0.27 × 5 = 1.35.
d) P(all 5 good) = 0.275 = 0.001435. Getting 5 good ones in 5
selections has a very small probability if 27% of the chips are
good, so we would tend to believe that the true yield is greater
than 27%.
10 a) P(death due to motor vehicle crash) = 10.3/100,000 = 0.000103.
b) The probability that one person does not die in a crash is
1 – 0.000103 = 0.999897.
P(two randomly selected people do not die in vehicle crash) =
0.999897 × 0.999897 = 0.9998.
Chapter 6 Quiz
1 P(Correct) = 0.6, so P(Wrong) = 1 – 0.6 = 0.4 or 40%.

2 These are independent events, so P(First Correct and Second Correct) =
P(First Correct) × P(Second Correct) = (0.6)(0.6) = 0.36 or 36%.
3 Answers may vary. This doesn’t happen very often, so an estimate of
0.01 or lower is reasonable.
4 Yes, the method appears to be effective, since the probability is very
small that the trial results could have occurred by chance.
5 P(Ā) = 1 – P(A) = 1 – 0.65 = 0.35
6
Passed Failed Total
Group A 10 14 24
Group B 417 145 562
Total 427 159 586
P(Passed) = 427/586 = 0.729
7 P(Group B or Passed) = (562 + 10)/586 = 0.976.
8 P(First is Group A and Second is Group A) = (24/586)(23/585) = 0.00161.
9 P(Group A and Passed) = 10/586 = 0.0171
10 P(Failed or Group A) =
P(Failed) + P(Group A) – P(Failed and in Group A) =
(159 + 24 - 14)/586 = 0.288.

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into the Government as a counter-balancing influence, can be read
in the biographies of all these men, and of many less famous.
London echoed with the Marquess’s deep disgust; every man of fair
parts in England sympathized with it, unless his personal interests or
feelings bound him to blind devotion. The yoke hung heavy on Whigs
and Tories alike. Even Lord Sidmouth rebelled against the
commercial system to which Perceval clung more desperately than
to his offices or power. “Of that destructive system,” wrote Sidmouth
in the summer of 1810,[236] “all are weary, ‘praeter atrocem animum
Catonis.’”
Even Henry Wellesley, at Seville and Cadiz, felt the same heavy-
hand deadening the effect of every effort, and longed to do at Cadiz
what Erskine had done at Washington. March 4, 1810,[237] Perceval
wrote to Lord Wellesley begging him to instruct his brother Henry to
obtain from the Spanish Junta exclusive or at least special privileges
in the trade of the Spanish colonies, such as would admit British
consuls to the chief places of South America, and “give us a decided
benefit and preference in the trade.” Of course this preference was
to be granted at the expense of the United States, the solitary rival of
England in those waters, but “as nearly hostile to Spain as she can
be without actually declaring war against her.” Soon afterward the
“Espagnol,” a Spanish periodical published in England, applauded
revolutionary movements in Caracas and Buenos Ayres, while it
asserted the impossibility of preventing the spread of the spirit of
independence in the Spanish-American colonies.
“You can have no idea,” wrote Henry Wellesley from Cadiz, August
31, to his brother Arthur,[238] “of the ferment occasioned here by this
article, which is attributed to the Government,—as it is supposed, and
I believe justly, that the ‘Espagnol’ is patronized by the Government,
and contains its sentiments with regard to the occurrences in Spain
and the measures necessary in the present crisis of her affairs.... It is
wonderful that they cannot be satisfied in England with a commercial
arrangement which would be attended with immense advantages to
ourselves, and would likewise be greatly beneficial to Spain. I
apprehend this to be the true spirit of all commercial treaties; and why
are we to take advantage of the weakness of Spain to endeavor to
impose terms upon her which would be ruinous and disgraceful? I
have it in my power to conclude to-morrow a commercial treaty which,
without breaking in upon the Spanish colonial laws, would pour
millions into the pockets of our merchants, and be equally
advantageous to the resources; but this will not do, and we must
either have the trade direct with the colonies, or nothing. However, I
have received my answer, and the Government will not hear of
opening the trade.”
The coincidence of opinion about Spencer Perceval extended
everywhere, except among the Church of England clergy, the
country squires, the shipping interests, the Royal household at
Windsor, and the Federalists of Boston and Connecticut. As though
to make him an object of execration, the long-threatened storm burst
on the trade and private credit of Great Britain. For some eighteen
months gold stood at a premium of about fifteen per cent; the
exchanges remained steadily unfavorable, while credit was strained
to the utmost, until in July, 1810, half the traders in England, and
private banks by the score, were forced to suspend payment. Never
before, and probably never since, has England known such a fall in
prices and destruction of credit.[239]
This was the impending situation when Parliament adjourned,
June 21, with no bright spot on its horizon but the supposed
friendship of America. Meanwhile Pinkney wearied Wellesley for an
answer to the question whether Fox’s blockade was in force. June
10, June 23, and finally August 6, he renewed his formal request.
“No importunity had before been spared which it became me to
use.”[240] He was met by the same torpor at every other point.
Wellesley promised to name a new minister to Washington, but
decided upon none. He invited overtures in regard to the
“Chesapeake” affair, but failed to act on them. Rumor said that he
neglected business, came rarely to Cabinet meetings, shut himself in
his own house, saw only a few friends, and abandoned the attempt
to enforce his views. He resolved to retire from the Cabinet, in
despair of doing good, and waited only for the month before the next
meeting of Parliament, which he conceived to be the most proper
time for declaring his intention.[241]
In the midst of this chaos, such as England had rarely seen, fell
Cadore’s announcement of August 5 that the Imperial Decrees were
withdrawn, bien entendu that before November 1 England should
have abandoned her blockades, or America should have enforced
her rights. Pinkney hastened to lay this information before Lord
Wellesley, August 25, and received the usual friendly promises,
which had ceased to gratify him. “I am truly disgusted with this,” he
wrote home, August 29,[242] “and would, if I followed my own
inclination, speedily put an end to it.” Two days afterward he
received from Wellesley a civil note,[243] saying that whenever the
repeal of the French Decrees should actually have taken effect, and
the commerce of neutral nations should have been restored to the
condition in which it previously stood, the system of counteraction
adopted by England should be abandoned. This reply, being merely
another form of silence, irritated Pinkney still more, while his
instructions pressed him to act. He waited until September 21, when
he addressed to Wellesley a keen remonstrance. “If I had been so
fortunate,” he began,[244] “as to obtain for my hitherto unanswered
inquiry the notice which I had flattered myself it might receive, and to
which I certainly thought it was recommended by the plainest
considerations of policy and justice, it would not perhaps have been
necessary for me to trouble your Lordship with this letter;” and in this
tone he went on to protest against the “unwarrantable prohibitions of
intercourse rather than regular blockades,” which had helped in
nearly obliterating “every trace of the public law of the world”:—
“Your Lordship has informed me in a recent note that it is ‘his
Majesty’s earnest desire to see the commerce of the world restored to
that freedom which is necessary for its prosperity;’ and I cannot
suppose that this freedom is understood to be consistent with vast
constructive blockades which may be so expanded at pleasure as,
without the aid of any new device, to oppress and annihilate every
trade but that which England thinks fit to license. It is not, I am sure, to
such freedom that your Lordship can be thought to allude.”
The Marquess of Buckingham’s well-advised correspondent
some weeks afterward[245] remarked that “Pinkney, who was at first
all sweetness and complaisance, has recently exhibited in his
communications with Lord Wellesley an ample measure of
republican insolence.” Sweetness and insolence were equally thrown
away. Pinkney’s letter of September 21, like most of his other letters,
remained unanswered; and before November 1, when Napoleon’s
term for England’s action expired, a new turn of affairs made answer
impossible. The old King was allowed to visit the death-bed of his
favorite daughter the Princess Amelia; he excited himself over her
wishes and farewells, and October 25 his mind, long failing, gave
way for the last time. His insanity could not be disguised, and the
Government fell at once into confusion.
CHAPTER XIV.
The summer of 1810 was quiet and hopeful in America. For the
first time since December, 1807, trade was free. Although little
immigration occurred, the census showed an increase in population
of nearly thirty-seven per cent in ten years,—from 5,300,000 to
7,240,000, of which less than one hundred thousand was due to the
purchase of Louisiana. Virginia and Massachusetts still fairly held
their own, and New York strode in advance of Pennsylvania, while
the West gained little relative weight. Ohio had not yet a quarter of a
million people, Indiana only twenty-four thousand, and Illinois but
twelve thousand, while Michigan contained less than five thousand.
The third census showed no decided change in the balance of power
from any point of view bounded by the usual horizon of human life.
Perhaps the growth of New York city and Philadelphia pointed to a
movement among the American people which might prove more
revolutionary than any mere agricultural movement westward. Each
of these cities contained a population of ninety-six thousand, while
Baltimore rose to forty-six thousand, and Boston to thirty-two
thousand. The tendency toward city life, if not yet unduly great, was
worth noticing, especially because it was confined to the seaboard
States of the North.
The reason of this tendency could in part be seen in the Treasury
reports on American shipping, which reached in 1810 a registered
tonnage of 1,424,000,—a point not again passed until 1826. The
registered foreign tonnage sprang to 984,000,—a point not again
reached in nearly forty years. New vessels were built to the amount
of one hundred and twenty-seven thousand tons in the year 1810.
[246] The value of all the merchandise exported in the year ending
Sept. 30, 1810, amounted to nearly sixty-seven million dollars, and
of this sum about forty-two millions represented articles of domestic
production.[247] Except in the year before the embargo this export of
domestic produce had never been much exceeded.[248] The imports,
as measured by the revenue, were on the same scale. The net
customs-revenue which reached $16,500,000 in 1807, after falling in
1808 and 1809 to about $7,000,000, rose again to $12,750,000 in
1810.[249] The profits of the export and import business fell chiefly to
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, where the shipping
belonged; and these cities could not fail to attract labor as well as
capital beyond the degree that a conservative republican of the
Revolutionary time would have thought safe.
More than half of these commercial exchanges were with
England or her dependencies. Great Britain and her American
colonies, Portugal and Spain in her military protection, and British
India consumed at least one half of the exports; while of the net
revenue collected on imports, Gallatin estimated six and a half
millions as derived from articles imported from Great Britain and the
British dependencies, all other sources supplying hardly six millions.
[250] The nature of these imports could be only roughly given. In
general, sugar, molasses, coffee, wines, silk, and tea were not
British; but manufactures of cotton, linen, leather, paper, glass,
earthen-ware, iron, and other metals came chiefly from Great Britain.
To the United States this British trade brought most of the articles
necessary to daily comfort in every part of the domestic economy.
The relief of recovering a full and cheap supply exceeded the
satisfaction of handsome profits on the renewed trade. Experience of
the hourly annoyance, expense, and physical exposure caused by
deprivation of what society considered necessities rendered any
return to the restrictive system in the highest degree unwise,
especially after the eastern people acquired conviction that the
system had proved a failure.
Thus the summer passed with much of the old contentment that
marked the first Administration of Jefferson. Having lost sight of
national dignity, the commercial class was contented under the
protection of England; and American ships in the Baltic, in Portugal,
and in the West Indies never hesitated to ask and were rarely
refused the assistance of the British navy. From time to time a few
impressments were reported; but impressment had never been the
chief subject of complaint, and after the withdrawal of the frigates
blockading New York, little was heard of British violence. On the
other hand, Napoleon’s outrages roused great clamor in commercial
society, and his needless harshness to every victim, from the Pope
to the American sailors whom he shut up as prisoners of war, went
far to palliate British offences in the eyes of American merchants.
News of Napoleon’s seizures at San Sebastian arrived before the
adjournment of Congress May 1; and as fresh outrages were
reported from every quarter by every new arrival, and as Cadore’s
letters became public, even Madison broke into reproaches. May 25
he wrote to Jefferson:[251] “The late confiscations by Bonaparte
comprise robbery, theft, and breach of trust, and exceed in turpitude
any of his enormities not wasting human blood.” These words
seemed to show intense feeling, but Madison’s temper indulged in
outbursts of irritability without effect on his action; in reality, his mind
was bent beyond chance of change on the old idea of his
Revolutionary education,—that the United States must not regard
France, but must resist Great Britain by commercial restrictions.
“This scene on the Continent,” he continued to Jefferson, “and the
effect of English monopoly on the value of our produce are breaking
the charm attached to what is called free-trade, foolishly by some
and wickedly by others.” He reverted to his life-long theory of
commercial regulations.
A few days afterward Madison wrote to Armstrong fresh
instructions founded on the Act of May 1, which was to be the new
diplomatic guide. These instructions,[252] dated June 5, were of
course signed by the Secretary of State, Robert Smith, who
afterward claimed credit for them; but their style, both of thought and
expression, belonged to Madison. Even the unfailing note of his mind
—irritability without passion—was not wanting. He would wait, he
said, for further advices before making the proper comments on
Cadore’s letter of February 14 and on its doctrine of reprisals. “I
cannot, however, forbear informing you that a high indignation is felt
by the President, as well as by the public, at this act of violence on
our property, and at the outrage both in the language and in the
matter of the letter of the Duc de Cadore.” Turning from this subject,
the despatch requested that Napoleon would make use of the
suggestion contained in the Act of May 1, 1810. “If there be sincerity
in the language held at different times by the French government,
and especially in the late overture, to proceed to amicable and just
arrangements in case of our refusal to submit to the British Orders in
Council, no pretext can be found for longer declining to put an end to
the decrees of which the United States have so justly complained.”
One condition alone was imposed on Armstrong preliminary to the
acceptance of French action under the law of May 1, but this
condition was essential:
“If, however, the arrangement contemplated by the law should be
acceptable to the French government, you will understand it to be the
purpose of the President not to proceed in giving it effect in case the
late seizure of the property of the citizens of the United States has
been followed by an absolute confiscation, and restoration be finally
refused. The only ground short of a preliminary restoration of the
property on which the contemplated arrangement can be made will be
an understanding that the confiscation is reversible, and that it will
become immediately the subject of discussion with a reasonable
prospect of justice to our injured citizens.”
The condition thus prescribed seemed both reasonable and mild
in view of the recent and continuous nature of the offence; but
Madison could not, even if he would, allow his own or public
attention to be permanently diverted from England. As early as June
22 he had begun to reconstruct in his own mind the machinery of his
restrictive system. “On the first publication of the despatches by the
‘John Adams,’” he wrote to Jefferson,[253] “so strong a feeling was
produced by Armstrong’s picture of the French robbery that the
attitude in which England was placed by the correspondence
between Pinkney and Wellesley was overlooked. The public
attention is beginning to fix itself on the proof it affords that the
original sin against neutrals lies with Great Britain; and that while she
acknowledges it, she persists in it.”
The theory of original sin led to many conclusions hard to
reconcile; but, as regarded Napoleon, Madison’s idea seemed both
sensible and dignified,—that England’s original fault in no way
justified the recent acts of France, which were equivalent to war on
the United States, not as one among neutrals, but as a particular
enemy. Fresh instructions to Armstrong, dated July 5,[254] reiterated
the complaints, offers, and conditions of the despatch sent one
month before. Especially the condition precedent to action under the
law of May 1 was repeated with emphasis:—
“As has been heretofore stated to you, a satisfactory provision for
restoring the property lately surprised and seized, by the order or at
the instance of the French government, must be combined with a
repeal of the French edicts with a view to a non-intercourse with Great
Britain, such a provision being an indispensable evidence of the just
purpose of France toward the United States. And you will moreover be
careful, in arranging such a provision for that particular case of
spoliations, not to weaken the ground on which a redress of others
may be justly pursued.”
The instructions of June 5 and July 5 went their way; but although
Armstrong duly received them, and wrote to Cadore a letter evidently
founded on the despatch of June 5, he made no express allusion to
his instructions in writing either to the French government or to his
own. Although he remained in Paris till September 12, and on that
day received from Cadore an explicit avowal that the sequestered
property would not be restored, but that “the principles of reprisal
must be the law,” he made no protest.
Equally obscure was the conduct of Madison. Cadore’s letter of
August 5 announcing that the French Decrees were withdrawn, on
the understanding that the United States should by November 1
enforce their rights against England, reached Washington
September 25, but not in official form. Nothing is known of the
impression it produced on the Cabinet; nothing remains of any
discussions that ensued. If Gallatin was consulted, he left no trace of
his opinion. Hamilton and Eustis had little weight in deciding foreign
questions. Robert Smith within a year afterward publicly attacked the
President for the course pursued, and gave the impression that it
was taken on Madison’s sole judgment. The President’s only
authority to act at all without consulting Congress depended on the
words of the law of May 1: “In case either Great Britain or France
shall, before the third day of March next, so revoke or modify her
edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the
United States, which fact the President of the United States shall
proclaim by proclamation,” the non-intercourse of March 1, 1809,
should at the end of three months revive against the nation which
had not revoked its edicts. Under this authority, President Madison
was required by Cadore’s letter to proclaim that France had revoked
or modified her edicts so that they ceased to violate the neutral
commerce of the United States.
Madison was doubtless a man of veracity; but how was it
possible that any man of veracity could proclaim that France had
revoked or modified her edicts so that they ceased to violate the
neutral commerce of the United States when he had every reason to
think that at least the Bayonne Decree, barely six months old, would
not be revoked, and when within a few weeks he had officially
declared that the revocation of the Bayonne Decree was “an
indispensable evidence of the just purpose of France” preliminary to
a non-intercourse with England? If the President in June and July
thought that provision indispensable to the true intent of the law
which he aided in framing, he would assume something more than
royal dispensing power by setting the indispensable provision aside
in November.
This objection was light in comparison with others. The law
required the President to proclaim a fact,—that France had revoked
or modified her decrees so that they ceased to violate the commerce
of America. Of this fact Cadore’s letter was the only proof; but
evidently Cadore’s letter pledged the Emperor to nothing. “I am
authorized to declare to you,” wrote Cadore, “that the Decrees of
Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after November 1 they will
cease to have effect, on the understanding that in consequence of
this declaration ... the United States, conformably to the Act you
have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by
the English.” Napoleon not only reserved to himself the right of
judging whether the measures to be taken by the United States
should “cause their rights to be respected,” but in doing so he
reversed the process prescribed by the Act, and required the
President to enforce his rights before the Emperor should withdraw
his decrees.
From the standpoint of morality, perhaps the most serious
objection of all was the danger of sacrificing national and personal
self-respect by affecting to regard as honest a promise evidently
framed to deceive, and made by a man whom Madison habitually
characterized in terms that implied, to speak mildly, entire want of
confidence. If America would consent to assert her rights against
England in no way more straightforward than this, she might perhaps
recover her neutral profits, but hardly her national self-respect.
A few months afterward, when Robert Smith gave to the world
the amusing but not wholly new spectacle of a Secretary of State
attacking his own President for measures signed by his own name,
Joel Barlow wrote for the “National Intelligencer” a defence of the
President’s course, in which he gave reasons supplied by Madison
himself for holding that Cadore’s letter satisfied the conditions of
Macon’s Act.
To the first objection, founded on the Rambouillet and Bayonne
Decrees, Barlow replied that the American government had
habitually distinguished between maritime edicts violating neutral
rights and municipal edicts attacking private property. “We could not
in strictness arraign such municipal spoliations under the head of
violations of our neutral rights, nor of consequence regard them as
contemplated by the Acts of Congress defining the acts whose
revocation would satisfy the conditions of that Act.” This reasoning,
though not quite convincing, might have had weight but for two
objections. First, the President himself, in June and July, had
declared these municipal spoliations to be contemplated by Macon’s
Act as “an indispensable evidence of the just purpose of
France;”[255] and, second, the President in November notified
Armstrong, that,[256] “in issuing the proclamation, it has been
presumed that the requisition contained in that letter [of July 5] on
the subject of the sequestered property will have been satisfied.”
Barlow’s idea of a municipal spoliation, independent of the jus
gentium, was an afterthought intended to hide a miscalculation.
One other argument was advanced by Barlow. Erskine’s
arrangement having been accepted without question of previous
British spoliations, not only did impartiality require the same
treatment for France, but a different rule “would have led to the
embarrassment of obliging the Executive, in case the British
government should be desirous of opening a free trade with the
United States by repealing its orders, to make it a prerequisite that
Great Britain also should indemnify for her respective spoliations.”
Such a prerequisite would have been proper, and ought to have
been imposed; but Barlow’s argument was again answered by the
President himself, who actually insisted on the demand against
France, and assumed the demand to be satisfied. If this was
partiality to England, the President was guilty of it. Probably at the
time he saw reasons for thinking otherwise. The secrecy, the
continuance, the pretext of the French seizures, their municipal and
vindictive character and direct Imperial agency seemed to set them
apart from those of England, which, although equally illegal, were
always in the form of lawful trial and condemnation.
The same argument of impartiality served to justify immediate
action on Cadore’s offer as on Erskine’s, without waiting for its
execution. That one admitted mistake excused its own repetition in a
worse form was a plea not usually advanced by servants, either
public or private; but in truth Erskine’s pledge was distinct and
unconditional, while Cadore’s depended on the Emperor’s
satisfaction with a preliminary act. Had Erskine made his
arrangement conditional on Canning’s approval of the President’s
measures, Madison would certainly have waited for that approval
before acting under the law; and after the disastrous results of
precipitancy in 1809, when no one questioned Erskine’s good faith,
wisdom called for more caution rather than less in acting, in 1810, on
an offer or a pledge from a man in whom no one felt any confidence
at all.
In truth, Madison’s course in both cases was due not to logic, but
to impatience. As Barlow admitted: “We know it had been the aim of
our government for two or three years to divide the belligerents by
inducing one or the other of them to revoke its edicts, so that the
example would lead to a revocation by the other, or our contest be
limited to a single one.” Madison gave the same reason in a letter of
October 19 to Jefferson:[257] “We hope from the step the advantage
at least of having but one contest on our hands at a time.” He was
mistaken, and no one expressed himself afterward in language more
bitter than he used against Napoleon for conduct that deceived only
those who lent themselves to deception.
October 31, Robert Smith sent for Turreau and gave him notice of
the decision reached by the President and Cabinet:[258]—
“The Executive,” said Robert Smith, “is determined not to suffer
England longer to trammel the commerce of the United States, and he
hopes to be sustained by Congress. If, then, England does not
renounce her system of paper-blockades and the other vexations
resulting from it, no arrangement with that Power is to be expected;
and consequently you will see, in two days, the President’s
proclamation appear, founded on the provisions of the law requiring
the non-intercourse to be enforced against either nation which should
fail to revoke its edicts after the other belligerent had done so....
Although we have received nothing directly from Mr. Armstrong on this
subject, which is doubtless very extraordinary, we consider as
sufficient for the Government’s purposes the communication he made
to Mr. Pinkney, which the latter has transmitted to us.”
The next day Robert Smith made some further interesting
remarks.[259] “The Executive thinks,” he said, “that the measures he
shall take in case England continues to restrict our communications
with Europe will lead necessarily to war,” because of the terms of the
non-intercourse. “We have with us a majority of Congress, which has
much to retrieve, and has been accused of weakness by all parties.”
On leaving Smith, Turreau went to see Gallatin, “whose opinion in
the Cabinet is rarely favorable to us.”
“Mr. Gallatin (by the way long since on bad terms with Mr. Smith)
told me that he believed in war; that England could not suffer the
execution of measures so prejudicial to her, and especially in the
actual circumstances could not renounce the prerogatives of her
maritime supremacy and of her commercial ascendency.”
Both Smith and Gallatin evidently expected that war was to
result, not from the further action of the United States, but from the
resentment and retaliation of England. They regarded the non-
intercourse as a measure of compulsion which would require
England either to resent it or to yield.
Having decided to accept Cadore’s letter as proof that an actual
repeal of the French Decrees, within the meaning of the Act of
Congress, had taken place November 1, the President issued,
November 2, his proclamation declaring that “it has been officially
made known to this Government that the said edicts of France have
been so revoked as that they ceased, on the said first day of the
present month, to violate the neutral commerce of the United
States;” and simultaneously Gallatin issued a circular to the
collectors of customs, announcing that commercial intercourse with
Great Britain would cease Feb. 2, 1811.
By this means Madison succeeded in reverting to his methods of
peaceful coercion. As concerned England, he could be blamed only
on the ground that his methods were admittedly inadequate, as
Gallatin, only a year before, had officially complained. Toward
England the United States had stood for five years in a position
which warranted them in adopting any measure of reprisal. The
people of America alone had a right to object that when Madison
began his attack on England by proclaiming the French Decrees to
be revoked, he made himself a party to Napoleon’s fraud, and could
scarcely blame the Federalists for replying that neither in honor nor
in patriotism were they bound to abet him in such a scheme.
The Proclamation of Nov. 2, 1810, was not the only measure of
the autumn which exposed the President to something more severe
than criticism. At the moment when he challenged a contest with
England on the assertion that Napoleon had withdrawn his decrees,
Madison resumed his encroachments on Spain in a form equally
open to objection.
The chaos that reigned at Madrid and Cadiz could not fail to
make itself felt throughout the Spanish empire. Under British
influence, Buenos Ayres in 1810 separated from the Supreme Junta,
and drove out the viceroy whom the Junta had appointed. In April of
the same year Caracas followed the example, and entered into a
treaty with England, granting commercial preferences equally
annoying to the Spaniards and to the United States. Miranda
reappeared at the head of a revolution which quickly spread through
Venezuela and New Grenada. A civil war broke out in Mexico. Even
Cuba became uneasy. The bulky fabric of Spanish authority was
shaken, and no one doubted that it must soon fall in pieces forever.
England and the United States, like two vultures, hovered over
the expiring empire, snatching at the morsels they most coveted,
while the unfortunate Spaniards, to whom the rich prey belonged,
flung themselves, without leadership or resources, on the ranks of
Napoleon’s armies. England pursued her game over the whole of
Spanish America, if not by government authority, more effectively by
private intrigue; while the United States for the moment confined
their activity to a single object, not wholly without excuse.
As long as Baton Rouge and Mobile remained Spanish, New
Orleans was insecure. This evident danger prompted Madison, when
Secretary of State, to make a series of efforts, all more or less
unfortunate, to gain possession of West Florida; and perhaps
nothing but Napoleon’s positive threat of war prevented the seizure
of Baton Rouge during Jefferson’s time. After that crisis, the subject
dropped from diplomatic discussion; but as years passed, and
Spanish power waned, American influence steadily spread in the
province. Numerous Americans settled in or near the district of West
Feliciana, within sight of Fort Adams, across the American border.
As their number increased, the Spanish flag at Baton Rouge became
less and less agreeable to them; but they waited until Buenos Ayres
and Caracas gave notice that Spain could be safely defied.
In the middle of July, 1810, the citizens of West Feliciana
appointed four delegates to a general convention, and sent
invitations to the neighboring districts inviting them to co-operate in
re-establishing a settled government. The convention was held July
25, and consisted of sixteen delegates from four districts, who
organized themselves as a legislature, and with the aid or consent of
the Spanish governor began to remodel the government. After some
weeks of activity they quarrelled with the governor, charged him with
perfidy, and suddenly assembling all the armed men they could
raise, assaulted Baton Rouge. The Spanish fort, at best incapable of
defence, was in charge of young Louis Grandpré, with a few invalid
or worthless soldiers. The young man thought himself bound in
honor to maintain a trust committed to him; he rejected the summons
to surrender, and when the Americans swarmed over the ruinous
bastions they found Louis Grandpré alone defending his flag. He
was killed.
After capturing Baton Rouge, the Americans held a convention,
which declared itself representative of the people of West Florida,
and September 26 issued a proclamation, which claimed place
among the curious products of that extraordinary time. “It is known to
the world,” began this new declaration of independence,[260] “with
how much fidelity the good people of this territory have professed
and maintained allegiance to their legitimate sovereign while any
hope remained of receiving from him protection for their property and
lives.” The convention had acted in concert with the Spanish
governor “for the express purpose of preserving this territory, and
showing our attachment to the government which had heretofore
protected us;” but the governor had endeavored to pervert those
concerted measures into an engine of destruction; and therefore,
“appealing to the Supreme Ruler of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions, we do solemnly publish and declare the several districts
composing the territory of West Florida to be a free and independent
State.”
A few days afterward the convention, through its president, wrote
to the Secretary of State, Robert Smith, urging the annexation of the
new territory to the United States, but claiming all the public lands in
the province for “the people of this Commonwealth, who have
wrested the government and country from Spain at the risk of their
lives and fortunes.”[261] These words accorded ill with their appeal to
the Supreme Ruler of the world for the rectitude of their intentions,
and their protest of “our inviolable fidelity to our king and parent
country while so much as a shadow of legitimate authority remained
to be exercised over us.” Yet neither with nor without their elaborate
machinery of legitimate revolution could Madison have anything to
do with them. Innumerable obstacles stood in his way. They declared
the independence of territory which he had long since appropriated
to the United States. This course alone withheld Madison from
recognizing the new State; but other difficulties forbade any action at
all. The Constitution gave the President no power to use the army or
navy of the United States beyond the national limits, without the
authority of Congress; and although extreme emergency might have
excused the President in taking such action, no emergency existed
in October, 1810, since Congress would meet within six weeks, and
neither Spain, France, nor England could interfere in the interval.
The President’s only legal course was to wait for Congress to take
what measures seemed good.
Madison saw all this, but though aware of his want of authority,
felt the strongest impulse to act without it. He described his dilemma
to Jefferson in a letter written before he received the request for
annexation, then on its way from Baton Rouge:[262]—
“The crisis in West Florida, as you will see, has come home to our
feelings and interests. It presents at the same time serious questions
as to the authority of the Executive, and the adequacy of the existing
laws of the United States for territorial administration. And the near
approach of Congress might subject any intermediate interposition of
the Executive to the charge of being premature and disrespectful, if
not of being illegal. Still, there is great weight in the considerations
that the country to the Perdido, being our own, may be fairly taken
possession of, if it can be done without violence; above all, if there be
danger of its passing into the hands of a third and dangerous party.”
Casuistry might carry the United States government far. The
military occupation of West Florida was an act of war against Spain.
“From present appearances,” continued Madison, “our occupancy of
West Florida would be resented by Spain, by England, and by
France, and bring on, not a triangular, but quadrangular contest.”
Napoleon himself never committed a more arbitrary act than that of
marching an army, without notice, into a neighbor’s territory, on the
plea that he claimed it as his own. None of Madison’s predecessors
ventured on such liberties with the law; none of his successors dared
imitate them, except under the pretext that war already existed by
the act of the adverse government.
Madison was regarded by his contemporaries as a precise, well-
balanced, even a timid man, argumentative to satiety, never carried
away by bursts of passion, fretful rather than vehement, pertinacious
rather than resolute,—a character that seemed incapable of
surprising the world by reckless ambition or lawless acts; yet this
circumspect citizen, always treated by his associates with a shade of
contempt as a closet politician, paid surprisingly little regard to rules
of consistency or caution. His Virginia Resolutions of 1798, his
instructions in the Louisiana purchase, his assumption of
Livingston’s claim to West Florida, his treatment of Yrujo, his
embargo policy, his acceptance of Erskine’s arrangement, his
acceptance of Cadore’s arrangement, and his occupation of West
Florida were all examples of the same trait; and an abundance of
others were to come. He ignored caution in pursuit of an object
which seemed to him proper in itself; nor could he understand why
this quiet and patriotic conduct should rouse tempests of passion in
his opponents, whose violence, by contrast, increased the apparent
placidity of his own persistence.
Forestalling the action of Congress which was to meet within five
weeks, President Madison issued, Oct. 27, 1810, a proclamation
announcing that Governor Claiborne would take possession of West
Florida to the river Perdido, in the name and behalf of the United
States. This proclamation, one of the most remarkable documents in
the archives of the United States government, began by reasserting
the familiar claim to West Florida as included in the Louisiana
purchase:—
“And whereas the acquiescence of the United States in the
temporary continuance of the said territory under the Spanish
authority was not the result of any distrust of their title, as has been
particularly evinced by the general tenor of their laws and by the
distinction made in the application of those laws between that territory
and foreign countries, but was occasioned by their conciliatory views,
and by a confidence in the justice of their cause, and in the success of
candid discussion and amicable negotiation with a just and friendly
Power; ... considering, moreover, that under these peculiar and
imperative circumstances a forbearance on the part of the United
States to occupy the territory in question, and thereby guard against
the confusions and contingencies which threaten it, might be
construed into a dereliction of their title or an insensibility to the
importance of the stake; considering that in the hands of the United
States it will not cease to be a subject of fair and friendly negotiation
and adjustment; considering finally that the Acts of Congress, though
contemplating a present possession by a foreign authority, have
contemplated also an eventual possession of the said territory by the
United States, and are accordingly so framed as in that case to extend
in their operation to the same,”—
Considering all these reasons, substantially the same self-
interest by which France justified her decrees, and England her
impressments, the President ordered Governor Claiborne, with the
aid of the United States army, to occupy the country and to govern it
as a part of his own Orleans territory.[263] By a letter of the same
date the Secretary of State informed Claiborne, that, “if contrary to
expectation, the occupation of this [revolutionized] territory should be
opposed by force, the commanding officer of the regular troops on
the Mississippi will have orders from the Secretary of War to afford
you, upon your application, the requisite aid.... Should however any
particular place, however small, remain in possession of a Spanish
force, you will not proceed to employ force against it, but you will
make immediate report thereof to this Department.”[264] Having by
these few strokes of his pen authorized the seizure of territory
belonging to “a just and friendly Power,” and having legislated for a
foreign people without consulting their wishes, the President sent to
the revolutionary convention at Baton Rouge a sharp message
through Governor Holmes of the Mississippi territory, to the effect
that their independence was an impertinence, and their designs on
the public lands were something worse.[265]
A few days after taking these measures, Robert Smith explained
their causes to Turreau in the same conversation in which he
announced the decision to accept Cadore’s letter as the foundation
of non-intercourse with England. The wish to preclude British
occupation of Florida was the motive alleged by Smith for the
intended occupation by the United States.[266]
“As for the Floridas, I swear, General, on my honor as a
gentleman,” said Robert Smith to Turreau, October 31, “not only that
we are strangers to everything that has happened, but even that the
Americans who have appeared there either as agents or leaders are
enemies of the Executive, and act in this sense against the Federal
government as well as against Spain.... Moreover these men and

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Statistical Reasoning for Everyday Life

5th Edition Bennett Solutions Manual

Statistical Reasoning for Everyday Life 5th Edition

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Communication in Everyday Life A Survey of

Concepts and Applications

9 Statistically significant. The probability of ten correct answers with

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10 Statistically significant. Given that Independents typically make up only

1 An outcome is the most basic possible result of an observation or

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Concepts and Applications

23 P(not queen) = 1 – P(queen) = 1 – 4/52 = 1 – 1/13 = 12/13. We are assuming a

a) 1/8 = 0.125 (GGG)

b) 2/16 = 1/8, or 0.125 (BBBB, GGGG)

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Coin 1 Coin 2 Coin 3 Coin 4 Outcome Probability

Event Probability Distribution for Tossing Four Coins

a) P(all same) = 2/16 = 1/8, or 0.125

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Concepts and Applications

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14 a) –$226 for surviving and $50,000 – $226 = $49,774 for not

d) By part (c), the number of tails is likely to exceed the number of

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15 The death rate in California was 250,567/38,332,521 = 0.0065 or 6.5

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3 Yes, a pollster could select an adult that is a male Republican. Events M

Concepts and Applications

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18 Altogether, 450 out of the total of 1028 were sent to prison.

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Chapter 6 Review Exercises

1 The total number of subjects is (15 + 42 + 32 + 9) = 98. The total number

1 P(Correct) = 0.6, so P(Wrong) = 1 – 0.6 = 0.4 or 40%.

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