Missile Multinational: Iran’s

New Approach to Missile

Proliferation
April 2021

The International Institute

for Strategic Studies
Contents

Iran’s new strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Quds Force leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Houthi missile arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Iranian-enabled missile production in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Conclusion and outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The proliferation of ballistic missiles and artillery rock-
ets to non-state actors by the Islamic Republic of Iran is
a constant source of tension in the Middle East. Yemen’s
Houthi rebels conduct ballistic-missile strikes on Saudi
Arabian cities, airports and oil installations; Hizbullah’s
ever-growing rocket and missile arsenal sparks Israeli
consideration of military options; and Iranian prox-
ies rocket the United States’ installations in Iraq on an
almost weekly basis.
But how does Iran equip its proxies and allies with
increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic
missiles and artillery rockets? For years, the answer has
been through smuggling. In one example, on 19 March
2021 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel
al-Jubeir claimed that all Houthi missiles fired at the
Kingdom were ‘made in Iran’,1 and there is ample evi-
dence that Houthis were the recipients of weapons such
as Iran’s short-range Qiam ballistic missile.2 Iran doubt-
lessly continues to directly transfer missiles outside its
borders to some degree. However, in recent years smug-
gling has been augmented by two other transfer meth-
ods: the provision of guidance kits to modify existing
Iran’s new strategy
While reports about Iran’s transfer of missile- and
rocket-production technology have been published
more frequently in recent years, Iranian officials have
been talking about their strategy for some time. In a 2014
documentary, IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amir
Ali Hajizadeh stated that the idea to transfer production
technology had been the brainchild of the former leader
of Iran’s missile programme, the now-deceased Hassan
Moghaddam.5 An unnamed co-worker of Moghaddam
The Quds Force leaks
Just how far Iran’s strategy of ‘teaching a man how to
fish’ goes in practice is amply demonstrated by docu-
ments posted by VS Quds, a website publishing informa-
tion pertaining to the QF’s regional and global activities.9
3 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
stockpiles of artillery rockets, and the wholescale provi-
sion of manufacturing capabilities.
Iranian support for enabling local rocket produc-
tion is not new. Reports about the rocket arsenals of
Palestinian factions in Gaza regularly cite Iranian assis-
tance for domestic manufacturing,3 and Hizbullah’s
alleged missile factory in the Beqaa Valley became
the topic of competing accusations in the Israeli–
Hizbullah relationship.4 However, closer examination
of Iranian sources, documents likely leaked by Israeli
intelligence and the missiles unveiled by the Houthis
reveal a strategy of empowering Iranian proxies that
is more comprehensive than previously thought. In
cooperation with Iran’s missile industry, the Quds
Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) appears intent on enabling all its main prox-
ies to be able to autonomously manufacture artillery
rockets and precision-guided missiles. Also, a spe-
cial development effort seems to be aimed at creating
simple artillery rockets and short-range-missile sys-
tems and production units custom-tailored for local
production.
explained in 2017 how development work had factored
in the need for simplicity and technology transfers.6
According to journalist Ali Hashim, the strategy was
adopted after the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah
to insure rocket supply against a potential cut-off of
supply routes.7 In a 2020 interview with Lebanese
Hizbullah TV station Al-Manar, Hajizadeh likened the
strategy to ‘teaching a man how to fish’ instead of giv-
ing him fish.8
With many details matching other data available from
open sources, as well as never-before broadcast video
clearly filmed at an IRGC facility inside Iran, the infor-
mation seems credible.
Figure 1: Badr-3 rockets seen in a video released by the PIJ’s al-Quds Brigades in 2019
As part of its strategy to reveal IRGC QF opera-
tions, the website published information, dubbed the
‘Quds leaks’, detailing Tehran’s ambition to equip
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Iran’s closest ally
in the Gaza Strip, with artillery-rocket technology.
Systems examined in detail include the PIJ’s Badr-3
heavy-artillery rocket (also named Nafea) as well as
other unguided systems, such as the Jihad and the Imad.
According to the Quds leaks, the effort is led by QF Unit
340.10 While this information cannot be independently
verified, it does align with comments by Hajizadeh
that the Iranian rocket- and missile-proliferation effort
was under the control of the IRGC QF rather than its
Aerospace Force.11
Figure 2: Left: Badr-3 warhead diagram marked in Farsi; Right: artillery-rocket motor test at Bidganeh
N21
N20
N19
N18
N17
N16
N15
N14
N13
Source: Al-Quds Brigades media wing.
At first glance, the rather primitive Badr-3 looks
like quintessential improvised Gaza rocket artillery.
Yet the documents released by VS Quds show quite
a different reality. Blueprints of the Badr-3’s warhead
and propellant-casting case are clearly marked in
Farsi, while one of two videos showing the testing of
motors was recorded at the IRGC’s Bidganeh site west
of Tehran.12
Another VS Quds video shows the test launch of a
Badr-3 with mountains and vast empty spaces visible in
the background. Considering the population density and
geography of the Gaza Strip, the test must have taken place
outside Hamas-ruled Palestinian territories. The Quds
leaks mention training at the Semnan firing range east of
Source: VS Quds leaks
Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation 4
Figure 3: Flight test of the Badr-3 at what appears to be the Semnan firing range
Tehran, and the mountain ridge visible in the background
does seem to match the mountains near the Semnan site.
The available information indicates an Iranian role in
the Badr-3 development that goes far beyond mere tech-
nical or financial assistance; rather, it seems to indicate a
comprehensive development effort by Iran on behalf of the
PIJ that includes motor and flight testing inside Iran. What
is remarkable in this case is that the Badr-3 is a much less
complex system than the rocket artillery developed by Iran
for its own armed forces. Considering the remarks made
by former colleagues of Moghaddam, it seems highly likely
that the system was purposely designed in an extremely
simple fashion to enable local production outside Iran.
Another indication that the Badr-3 rocket is not a
Palestinian innovation but rather an Iranian design for use
exclusively by proxies and allies is the appearance of the
Iraqi al-Qasim. The latter rocket, presented as a product
Figure 4: The Badr-3 rocket in its Palestinian and Iraqi incarnations
Nafea/Badr-3
Simple Iranian 17-inch artillery
rocket custom designed for
production by proxies
Badr-3 (Palestinian Islamic Jihad)
5 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
Source: Google Earth Maxar and VS Quds leaks
of the Technical Directorate for Military Production, the
Shia-militia-dominated industrial-production arm of the
Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU),13 is largely identical to
the Badr-3 down to the location and number of bolts and
screws, and exhibits only a slightly altered warhead design.
Yet, according to VS Quds, the IRGC has ambitions
beyond simple artillery rockets. The website published
several blueprints annotated in Farsi of a precision-guided
missile with a diameter of 225 millimetres that is claimed
to have a range of 85 kilometres with a 50-kilogram war-
head, and which is unnamed in open sources.14
The diagrams allow for a detailed reconstruction of the
missile design.
Neither the missile nor its specifications match
any design known to be operated by Iran itself.
Iran’s own system with the same role and range, the
precision-guided Fajr-5, has a calibre of 333 mm and
al-Qasim (Iraqi PMU)
Source: Fabian Hinz
Figure 5: Diagrams of the 225 mm rocket for proxy production
a substantially heavier warhead. Yet the design style
of the 225 mm missile, including the location of the
guidance section, its opening and access panel and the
trapezoid control fins, is strongly reminiscent of other
Iranian designs.
The most likely explanation is that, like the Badr-3, the
225 mm precision-guided missile was developed inside
Iran but optimised for proxy production. According to
the Quds leaks, the system is intended for local produc-
tion inside Lebanon and Gaza, with the latter project
proceeding slowly, having run into trouble. Hizbullah’s
possession of precision-guided missiles and inter-
est in a manufacturing capability have been widely
Figure 6: 3D reconstruction of the precision-guided 225 mm missile
225 mm Missile
Short-range precision-guided solid propellant
missiles developed by Iran for production by
local proxies
guidance section
warhead
aerodynamic control fins
Source: . VS Quds leaks
documented.15 Both a PIJ commander and the Iranian
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali
Shamkhani have mentioned a precision-guided-missile
capability in Gaza.16
The Quds leaks also document Iran’s training of PIJ
cadres in the production of aluminium powder and
ammonium perchlorate which, alongside hydroxyl-
terminated polybutadiene, form the key components
of more advanced ammonium-perchlorate compos-
ite propellants. It is claimed that Iran helped set up a
PIJ ammonium-perchlorate production facility inside
Syria, which might be the same site bombed by Israel
in February 2020.17
rocket motor
Source: Fabian Hinz
Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation 6
Houthi missile arsenal
Another indication of Iran’s new approach is found in
the Houthis’ increasingly diverse missile arsenal. Since
the beginning of the Saudi-led intervention, the Yemeni
group has waged a relentless missile campaign against
targets inside both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. At first, the
group used old stocks of Yemeni-army ballistic missiles it
inherited due to its initial alliance with former president
Ali Abdullah Saleh. Over time, however, new missile sys-
tems became apparent. Much attention has been focused
on the liquid-propellant Burkan-2H and Burkan-3/Zulfiqar
The Houthi Arsenal
Sort-range precision-guided solid-propellant
missiles likely to be manufactured inside
Yemen using Iranian-supplied equipment and
components
Figure 7: Overview of precision-guided Houthi missiles
precision-guided version; they claimed to have developed
and produced the system themselves. Some commentators
speculated that the Badr-1P might simply be a rebranded
Fajr-5, yet the missile’s diameter seems smaller than the
Fajr-5’s 333 mm and the missile does not match the details
of any known precision-guided Fajr-5 configurations.19
Also, the United Nations Panel of Experts examined the
wreckage of one basic Badr-1 and found the missile to be
locally produced, likely using steel piping salvaged from
oil installations.20 Then in 2019, the Houthis unveiled
another precision-guided missile, the Badr-F/Nakkal, with
an alleged range of 160 km and optimised for airburst
shrapnel warheads. Unlike the Badr-1P, the Badr-F/Nakkal
does not resemble any known Iranian design.
In March 2021, the Houthis presented three new pre-
cision-guided short-range missiles (Qasim, Qasim-2 and
7 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
ballistic missiles, which the Houthis have used for high-
profile strikes against cities such as Jeddah, Dhahran and
Riyadh. Experts have conclusively established that these
missiles are modified Iranian Qiams that were smuggled
into Yemen in pieces and locally reassembled.18 Yet, some-
what below the radar, the Houthis began to use another
class of missiles that could be broadly described as solid-
propellant and precision-guided short-range missiles.
The first of these was the Badr-1P, an artillery rocket
that the Houthis unveiled in 2018 in an unguided and a
Badr-1P
Saeer
Qasim
Badr-F/Nakkal
Qasim-2
Source: Fabian Hinz
Saeer), all of which were marked as ‘Made in Yemen’.
While not matching any known Iranian systems, most
of them exhibited classic signatures of Iranian precision-
guided-missile design such as fixed double rear fins, and
trapezoid or triangular control fins attached to a guidance
section installed between the motor and the warhead.
Combined with the low production quality seen
in some of the examples, the most likely explanation
is again an Iranian design effort for simplified missile
systems and partial local production using Iranian-
supplied equipment and components. This would be
consistent with an under-reported statement by the
then-head of Israeli Military Intelligence Major-General
Herzl Halevi, who in 2017 remarked that Iran was set-
ting up factories for precision weapons in Lebanon as
well as Yemen.21
 Characteristic Iranian design features observed on the Houthis’ Qasim missile

fixed double rear fins

guidance section between
warhead and motor

trapezoid or triangular
aerodynamic control fins

Figure 8: Iranian design characteristics of the Qasim missile Source: Fabian Hinz

At first, the hypothesis of Iran-enabled local missile
production in Yemen might seem to contradict the well-
documented instances of Iranian missile smuggling to
Yemen. However, from a technical point of view such a
dual approach would make sense. Producing Badr-class
precision-guided artillery rockets is no trivial matter,
but it is comparatively easier than manufacturing a
medium-range ballistic missile. Production inside Gaza
of unguided rockets with ranges up to 160 km proved
such an endeavour can succeed even in extremely
adversarial conditions. However, more complex sys-
tems such as ballistic missiles with the range required
to hit Riyadh, advanced cruise missiles and air-defence
missiles are likely well beyond the current scope of
what the Houthis can produce, even with major Iranian
support. Therefore, it might not be a coincidence that
the documented cases of smuggling all involved com-
plex systems. Also, unlike liquid-propellant ballistic
missiles or cruise missiles, solid-propellant missiles
cannot simply be disassembled into smaller pieces for
transport, offering yet another incentive for the domes-
tic production of such systems.
Exact numbers of Houthi missile launches are
extremely hard to come by and the numbers of specific
types of missiles launched are almost impossible to
establish. However, there is no doubt that the Houthis
have made much use of their new generation of pre-
cision-guided missiles, especially against targets inside
Yemen. This has been documented by various drone-
shot videos of precision-guided missile attacks released
by the Houthis and evidenced by several high-profile
strikes such as the attack against a military parade in
Aden in 2019,22 and the attack on Yemeni government
members at Aden airport in 2020.23 Thus, while the
discussion of Iran’s regional ‘precision project’ focuses
mainly on Lebanese Hizbullah, Yemen has already
and openly been the scene of Iran’s precision project in
action for several years.

Figure 9: Drone footage of a successful Badr-1P strike against the Khalid ibn al-Walid base in western Yemen – 13.368667°, 43.590644°24

Source: Houthi media wing

Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation 8

Iranian-enabled missile production in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria
Iran’s ambition to teach its proxies and allies ‘how to
fish’ does not appear to be limited to Gaza and Yemen.
As previously noted, Hizbullah attempts to both con-
vert some of its older unguided rockets into preci-
sion missiles and produce entire missiles on its own.
According to the Israeli government, the latter effort
seems to be centred around a facility in the Beqaa
Valley, which Israel exposed in 2019.25 Satellite imagery
indicates some production activity taking place at the
site, yet it remains unclear whether the site is fully oper-
ational. To sabotage the effort, Israel appears to have
targeted the bottleneck of planetary mixers required
for solid-propellant production, with one such piece of
equipment being destroyed in a drone strike in south-
ern Beirut in 2019,26 and another targeted while being
transported by ship.27
Iran seems to support a domestic production strategy
in Iraq as well. As noted, in 2017 the military-produc-
tion arm of Iraq’s PMU revealed several simple artil-
lery rockets, including its own version of the Badr-3.28 In
Figure 10: Hizbullah’s alleged missile-production site in the Beqaa Valley
9 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
2018, a Reuters report mentioned several alleged rocket-
or missile-production sites operated by Shia militias in
the country,29 and, in March 2020, an American airstrike
destroyed what the US government described as a solid-
propellant production site operated by Shia militias in
Jurf al-Sakhar.30
Syria was the very first recipient of Iranian assistance
in the solid-propellant field, producing copies of the
Fateh-110 (M600/Tishrin) and the Zelzal (Maysalun). With
the beginning of the conflict in Syria and consequent
approaching rebels, the country’s solid-propellant man-
ufacturing infrastructure was moved from as-Safira31 to
a new factory near Masyaf.32 The Masyaf site, as well
as other dispersed facilities associated with missile
production, has been repeatedly struck by Israel and
it is unclear whether any missile production currently
takes place in Syria.33 Also unknown is whether projects
such as the Masyaf facility are under the complete con-
trol of the Syrian regime, or whether Iranian forces or
Hizbullah is in charge of the programme.
Source: Google Earth/Maxar
Conclusion and outlook
Perhaps the best way of thinking about Iran’s new
approach is to use the analogy of a high-end car man-
ufacturer expanding into the market of a developing
country. The company’s signature car designs are inter-
nationally renowned for their reliability and high qual-
ity. However, they are just too sophisticated for local
road conditions, too high-end for local manufacture and
too expensive for potential customers. Other conditions
also provide a strong incentive for local manufacture. In
order to adapt to the new market, the company devel-
ops simpler and cheaper cars that are not identical to
its main line of car designs, but will be broadly similar
in style and use some shared components. In order to
cheaply produce the new design, a factory will be set up
in the developing country using production equipment
and expertise provided by the main company. It aims
to locally produce as much of the design as possible,
even if many sophisticated parts will still come from the
car company’s main factories or other international sup-
pliers. While the localised design serves well the main
everyday needs of the target country, at the same time
there is still a small market for high-end cars. To fill
this niche, some examples of the company’s main car
line will be either imported or locally assembled from
knock-down kits in parallel to the production effort of
the localised car.
Such a strategy has several advantages from Tehran’s
point of view. Spreading out the production of bal-
listic missiles helps avoid crucial bottlenecks, such as
overland smuggling, that can be affected by interdic-
tion efforts. While some components, such as advanced
guidance systems and actuators, are likely to still come
from inside Iran, the relatively small dimensions of these
systems compared with whole missiles make their pro-
vision through smuggling routes much easier.
Iran provides itself with an additional two levels of
deniability by supporting local production outside its
borders of missiles not identical to models of its own use.
The first is its use of proxies for combat either as part of
local conflicts, which in turn further Iran’s aims, or as
part of Iranian grey-zone campaigns. The second level
of deniability concerns potential diplomatic pressure
on Iran’s missile programme. For example, the missile
arsenals of loyal proxies such as Lebanese Hizbullah,
while not technically part of Iran’s armed forces, very
much have to be seen as part of Iran’s deterrence capa-
bility. Therefore, local production might help ease dip-
lomatic pressure on Iran’s missile programme while
simultaneously expanding Iranian capabilities.
This new level of deniability has important implica-
tions for analysis and attribution. Previously, the basic
operating assumption was that missiles and rockets used
by Iranian proxies were Iranian systems shipped abroad
and given a new name, and thus identifiable through
comparative analysis in the same way as identifying
a standardised Russian or American missile system.
However, with Iranian proxy designs differing from
Iran’s own systems and some expected variation due to
sub-standard local production, this may no longer be a
valid approach.
Partial ownership of production capabilities by Iran’s
proxies might help anchor ballistic missiles and rock-
ets more deeply in the strategies of proxies themselves.
While this might appear to be a peripheral concern at
first, it must not be forgotten that in Iran’s narrative,
domestic development has played a key role in form-
ing a particular strategic-missile culture that Iran is
likely to be keen on exporting. In this regard, one of the
most interesting questions raised by Iran’s new pro-
liferation strategy is just how autonomous its proxies
could become in their production efforts. Actors such
as Hizbullah, which commands a vast international net-
work, could have the ability to procure more sophisti-
cated components on the international market and thus
gradually decrease its reliance on Iran (whether due to
the group’s desire or being forced by circumstance).
Perhaps the most interesting question is what Iran’s
production proliferation means for the long-term stra-
tegic outlook of non-state actors. There are two ways to
read this development. The first is to see it as an odd
exception. No other country in the region, and poten-
tially in the world, possesses a network of proxies
operating with such ideological cohesion, loyalty and
state support as Iran does. Due to these exceptional
Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation 10
conditions, Iran-sponsored groups might be able to
acquire capabilities, such as precision-guided-missile
production, that will be out of reach for other non-state
actors for the foreseeable future. The second reading is
that precision-guided-missile production by Iran’s non-
state allies is merely a harbinger of things to come for
the world in general. In this interpretation, the massive
11 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
amount of state support provided by Iran might simply
enable non-state actors to be the first in a global trend.
An apt parallel may be drones: Hizbullah had already
used reconnaissance drones in 2004 and suicide drones
as early as 200634 – two capabilities that have since widely
proliferated among non-state actors. Only time will tell
whether precision-guided missiles will go the same way.
Notes
1 Joseph Haboush, ‘Missiles, Drones Targeting Saudi 10 ‘Afshagari: bakhsh-e fanni-ye niru-ye ghods (340) be in surat

Arabia Were All Iranian Made or Supplied: Al-Jubeir’, Al amal mikonad’

Arabiya, 21 March 2021, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/ ‫ ) به این صورت عمل میکند‬۳۴۰( ‫ بخش فنی نیروی قدس‬:‫[ افشاگری‬Exclusive:

gulf/2021/03/19/Missiles-drones-targeting-Saudi-Arabia- Quds Force’s Technical Department and the Way It Works],

were-all-Iranian-made-or-supplied-Al-Jubeir. VSQuds.info, last updated 6 December 2020, https://www.

2 See, for example, Jeffrey Lewis and Aaron Stein, ‘Up Close vsquds.info/۳۴۰-۰‫قدس‬-‫نیروی‬-‫فنی‬-‫بخش‬/‫منطقه‬-‫در‬-‫نفوذ‬.

and Personal with the Qiam’, Arms Control Wonk Podcast, 11 ‘Interview with Amir Ali Hajizadeh, [Liqa’at khasa] ‫لقاءات خاصة‬

15 December 2017, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/ [Private Eye], al-Manar ‫[ المنار‬The Lighthouse], 3 January 2021,

archive/1204543/up-close-and-personal-with-the-qiam/; https://program.almanar.com.lb/episode/149547.

and United Nations Panel of Experts Established pursuant 12 ‘Afshagari: bakhsh-e fanni-ye niru-ye ghods (340) be in surat

to Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014), ‘Letter Dated 26 amal mikonad’

January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Mandated ‫) به این صورت عمل میکند‬۳۴۰( ‫ بخش فنی نیروی قدس‬:‫[ افشاگری‬Exclusive: Quds

by Security Council Resolution 2342 (2017) Addressed to the Force’s Technical Department and the Way It Works], VSQuds.

President of the Security Council’, United Nations Security info, https://www.vsquds.info/۳۴۰-۰‫قدس‬-‫نیروی‬-‫فنی‬-‫بخش‬/‫منطقه‬-‫در‬-‫نفوذ‬.

Council, S/2018/594, 26 January 2018, pp. 125–8, https:// 13 See ‘al-qudrat al-‘askariyya li-quwat al-hashd a’sh-sha’bi’

digitallibrary.un.org/record/1639536?ln=en. ‫[ القدرات العسكريه لقوات الحشد الشعبي‬The Military Capabilities of the

3 See Loveday Morris and Adam Taylor, ‘Gaza’s Homemade Popular Mobilization Forces], Facebook, 14 February 2018,

Rockets Still Stretch Israel’s Sophisticated Defenses’, https://bit.ly/3dI9ddA

Washington Post, 7 May 2019, https://www.washingtonpost. 14 ‘Porozheha-yey hai raketiye-e 340’ ۳۴۰ ‫[ پروژه های راکتی‬Unit 340

com/world/gazas-homemade-rockets-still-stretch-israels- Development Projects], VSQuds.info, last updated 9 February

sophisticated-defenses/2019/05/06/2ca3a46a-700c-11e9-9331- 2021, https://www.vsquds.info/‫یمن‬-‫در‬-‫ایران‬-‫تسلط‬-‫تحکیم‬/‫منطقه‬-‫در‬-‫نفوذ‬.

30bc5836f48e_story.html. 15 See Israel Defense Forces, ‘Hezbollah’s Precision Guided

4 See Jacob Magid, ‘IDF Publishes Photos Purporting to Expose Missile Project’, https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/hezbollah/

Hezbollah Precision Missile Factory’, Times of Israel, 3 September hezbollahs-precision-guided-missile-project/.

2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-publishes-photos- 16 ‘Shamkhani: Iran baraye afzayesh-e bord mushakha-ye nezami

purporting-to-show-hezbollah-precision-missile-factory/. hich gune tangna-ye elmi va ejrayi nadarad’

5 ‘Khatt-e Moghaddam’ ‫[ خط مقدم‬Frontline], Islamic Republic of ‫ ایران برای افزایش برد موشک‌های نظامی هیچ‌گونه تنگنای علمی و اجرایی ندارد‬:‫شمخانی‬
Iran Broadcasting Corporation, 2014, available on YouTube at [Shamkhani: Iran does not have any administrative or scientific

https://youtu.be/Wr5q34c-4cw?t=1751. bottleneck to increasing the range of its missiles], Khabargozari-ye

6 See ‘Haft daghighe ta Tel Aviv’ ‫[ هفت دقیقه تا تل آویو‬Seven minutes Tasnim ‫[ خبرگزاری تسنیم‬Tasnim News Agency], 29 January 2019,

to Tel Aviv], BeBin TV, 22 June 2017, available on YouTube at https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1397/11/09/1934063/ and

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLyYod4heRA. ‘Mostanad-e vizhe-ye al-’Alam az tunelha-ye sakht-e mushak-e

7 Ali Hashim, ‘Did Iran Train Gaza Rocket Makers?’, Al-Monitor, Ghaze’ ‫[ مستند ویژه العالم از تونل های ساخت موشک غزه‬Al Alam Special

17 July 2014, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/07/ Documentary of Gaza’s Missile Tunnels], ‘al-Alam’ ‫[ العالم‬The

gaza-rockets-palestine-iran-self-sufficient.html. World], 24 February 2019, https://fa.alalamtv.net/news/4080111/

8 ‘Interview with Amir Ali Hajizadeh‘, Liqa’at khasa, ‫لقاءات خاصة‬ 17 See Judah Ari Gross, ‘IDF Strikes Islamic Jihad in Syria, Gaza

[Private Eye], ‘al-Manar’ ‫[ المنار‬The Lighthouse], 3 January in Response to Rocket Fire’, Times of Israel, 23 February 2021,

2021, https://program.almanar.com.lb/episode/149547. https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-strikes-islamic-jihad-

9 VS Quds, ‘Iranian Terror Exposed’, http://www.vsquds.info. targets-in-gaza-in-response-to-rocket-attacks/.

The website appears to publish information gathered by 18 See, for example, Lewis and Stein, ‘Up Close and Personal with

foreign intelligence services, with the most likely candidate the Qiam’, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1204543/

being Israel, but no one has come forward to officially confirm up-close-and-personal-with-the-qiam/; United Nations Panel

the sources. of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution

Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation 12

 2140 (2014), ‘Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of 26 See Richard Spencer, ‘Israeli Drone Attack Targeted Iranian

Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution Missile Makers in Beirut’, Times, 28 August 2019, https://www.

2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council’. thetimes.co.uk/article/israeli-drone-attack-targeted-iranian-

19 While the available footage makes it very difficult to determine guided-missile-technology-5680836b9.

the exact measurements, the Badr-1P’s diameter seems to be 27 See Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman et al.,‘Israel’s

closer to 280 mm. Shadow War with Iran Moves out to Sea’, New York Times,

20 United Nations Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to 26 March 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/world/

Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014), ‘Letter Dated 25 middleeast/israel-iran-shadow-war.html.

January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to 28 See ‘Iran and Allied Iraqi PMF at IQDEX2017’, Intel on Iran

the President of the Security Council’, United Nations Security Blog, 9 March 2017, http://inteloniran.blogspot.com/2017/03/

Council, S/2019/83, 25 January 2019, p. 32, https://reliefweb.int/ iran-and-allied-pmu-at-iqdex2017.html.

sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2019_83_E.pdf. 29 ‘Exclusive: Iran Moves Missiles to Iraq in Warning to Enemies’,

21 Gili Cohen, ‘Israeli Army Intelligence Chief: Hezbollah Is Setting Reuters, 31 August 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/

up a Weapons Industry in Lebanon with Iranian Know-how’, us-iran-iraq-missiles-exclusive-idUSKCN1LG0WB.

Haaretz, 23 June 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/ 30 ‘US General: US Strikes Destroy Weapons Depots, More

hezbollah-producing-arms-in-lebanon-says-mi-director-1.5487683. Remain’, Associated Press, 13 March 2020, https://apnews.com/

22 See ‘Yemen War: Houthi Missile Attack on Military Parade article/5ff9d48d1bdb2d2b1e4243d18930b159. The coordinates

Kills 32’, BBC News, 1 August 2019, https://www.bbc.com/ for the site’s location are 32.873824°, 44.209712°.

news/world-middle-east-49189241. 31 The coordinates for the site’s location are 35.971338°, 37.409786°.

23 See ‘Rockets over Yemen: Inside the Houthi’s Botched Attack 32 The coordinates for the site’s location are 35.103542°,

on Aden’, Bellingcat, 9 February 2021, https://www.bellingcat. 36.381064°.

com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the- 33 See Institute for Science and International Security, ‘Serial

houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/. Bombings Observed at Masyaf, Syria’, 28 December 2020, https://

24 The original video released by the Houthis is available here: isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/serial-bombings-observed-at-

https://youtu.be/pOO1Arw-7X8. masyaf-syria.

25 ‘Israel Claims to Uncover Hezbollah Missile Plant in Lebanon’, 34 Milton Hoenig, ‘Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a Weapon

Associated Press, 3 September 2019, https://apnews.com/articl of Terrorism’, Federation of American Scientists, 5 June 2014,

e/533c970bafd74302a101a412e4149e89. https://fas.org/pir-pubs/hezbollah-use-drones-weapon-terrorism/.

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