POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
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BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations,
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
What are the basic purposes of the constitutional guarantee
to form associations?
(1.) To enable an individual to join others of like persuasions
to pursue a common objective;
(2.) To enhance opportunities of human beings; and
(3.) To widen the sphere for expression or personality.
What is the extent of the right to form associations?
The people can form any associations but the right is
circumscribed by the phrase “not contrary to law.” If the
organization is intended to commit crimes, that is not
protected by the constitutional guarantee.
Note: The right to form associations cannot be impaired
without due process of law. Right to form associations shall
not be impaired, except through a valid exercise of police
power.
This is deemed embraced in freedom of expression because
the organization can be used as a vehicle for the expression
of views that have a bearing on the public welfare.
To whom is the right to form associations applicable?
It is a right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors.
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Can the right to form associations be impaired?
• The right to form associations cannot be impaired
without due process of law.
• Right to form associations shall not be impaired, except
through a valid exercise of police power.
• It is deemed embraced in the freedom of expression
because the organization can be used as a vehicle for the
expression of views that have a bearing on public
welfare.
The right to join associations include the right not to join
The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association
includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose
whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and
essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the
provision guarantees the right to form an association. it does
not include the right to compel others to form or join one.
The assailed act, far from infringing the constitutional
provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces
it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects
from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate with labor
unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the
labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor
union compel them to join.
The right to strike is not included in the guarantee of
association to government employees
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission shows that in recognizing the right of the
government employees to organize, the Commissioners
intended to limit the right to formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
Note: The right to strike is a separate civil right granted to
workers of private employers under the Labor Code.
Can we say that the right to association is only applicable to
the working sector because of the phrase, “those employed in
the public and private sectors”?
No. The constitutional guarantees apply to all, even to
students. The phrase “those employed in the public and
private sectors” only gives importance of this right to the
working sector.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85279. July 28, 1989
Facts:
➔ SSS filed for a complaint for damages against SSSEA,
alleging that the latter staged an illegal strike and
barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSS
members from transacting business.
➔ Subsequently, the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor Management Council which ordered the
strikers to return to work. However, the strikers refused
to return to work and SSS suffered damages as a result
of such.
SSSEA’S CONTENTION
They went on strike after SSS failed to act on their demands:
(1.) Implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
CBA;
(2.) Payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay,
and holiday pay;
(3.) Conversion of temporary or contractual employees, with
6 months or more of service, into regular and permanent
employees, and that their entitlement to the same
salaries, allowances, and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and
(4.) Payment of the children’s allowance
Issue: W/N the SSS Employees Association (SSSEA) have the
right to strike.
Held: No.
Doctrine: The right to form an organization does not carry
with it the right to strike. Thus, Government employees may,
through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation, or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law. But,
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
walkouts, and other temporary work stoppages, like workers
in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to
their demands.
Are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against
the right to strike?
Yes, because they are covered by the Civil Service Law Rules
and Regulations. Under the Constitution, the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
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Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974
Facts:
➔ Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the religious sect
known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ
of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958.
➔ As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union which had with the Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop
provision which reads as follows: "Membership in the
Union shall be required as a condition of employment
for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement."
➔ Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875,
prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the
employer was not precluded "from making an
agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the
employees."
➔ On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was
enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as
follows: "but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".
➔ Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the
affiliation of its members with any labor organization.
➔ Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union
in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he
reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974.
➔ The Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking
the latter to separate Victoriano from the service in view
of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member.
➔ The management of the company informed Victoriano
that unless they could achieve an agreement with the
Union, the company would be constrained to dismiss his
service.
➔ Victoriano then filed an action for injunction.
➔ On the other hand, the Union invoked the "union
security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement,
assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350,
and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over
the case.
CONTENTION OF THE UNION:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3350 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUE TO THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
It infringes the fundamental right to form lawful associations:
It alleged the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, it
said that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form
lawful associations; that "the very phraseology of said
Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor organization is
banned to all those belonging to such religious sect
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization", "prohibits
all the members of a given religious sect from joining any
labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
thereto"; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or
organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935
Constitution.
It impairs the obligation of contracts:
It also contends that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional
for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the
Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining
agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act
relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of
cooperating in the maintenance of union membership as a
condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore,
impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues
from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the
obligation to continue as such members
It discriminatorily favors those sects which ban their members
from joining labor unions: Furthermore, it also contends that
RA 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which
ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of
Article III, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said
Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights
or protection to labor organizations.
It violates the no religious test clause as well as the freedom
of religion:
That Republic Act No. 3350, violates the constitutional
provision that "no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his
civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law
has to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a
religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to sever his
religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in
a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor
organization, said Act would violate religious freedom.
It violates the equal protection clause:
It being a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as by
exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the
members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said
members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for
while the Act exempts them from union obligation and
liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the
enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments
that the union might secure from the employer.
It violates the Constitutional provision regarding the
promotion of social justice.
The Union furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop
provision" in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be
considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; and that
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unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional,
trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as
employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with labor organizations.
CONTENTION OF VICTORIANO:
➔ Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form
lawful associations, for the right to join associations
includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor
organization, if one's conscience does not allow his
membership therein, and the Act has given substance to
such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to
join labor organizations;
➔ That said Act does not impair the obligation of contracts
for said law formed part of, and was incorporated into,
the terms of the closed shop agreement;
➔ That the Act does not violate the establishment of
religion clause or separation of Church and State, for
Congress, in enacting said law, merely accommodated
the religious needs of those workers whose religion
prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and
balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the
constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his
chosen religion;
➔ That the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's
religion has primacy and preference over union security
measures which are merely contractual;
➔ That said Act does not violate the constitutional
provision of equal protection, for the classification of
workers under the Act depending on their religious
tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to
the purpose of the law, and applies to all the members
of a given class;
➔ That said Act does not violate the social justice policy of
the Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely to
equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the
midst of the diversities of their religious beliefs.
Issue: Does Republic Act no. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision on freedom of association.
Held: No. The contention of the Union that Republic Act No.
3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects
that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from
joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of
Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by
necessary implication therefrom.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize
freedom of association.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees
shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid or protection.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
It is the employee who should decide for himself whether he
should join or not an association; and should he choose to
join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he
would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the
liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership
with said organization at any time. It is clear, therefore, that
the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution
and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed
to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his
choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in
the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join
associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up
with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations
recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is,
however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right
to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where
a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop,
by virtue of which the employer may employ only members
of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the
contract in order to keep their jobs.
Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although
it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization" the employer is,
however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a
labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees".
By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless
of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
employment, he must become a member of the collective
bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to
join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop
arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception,
when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act
the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization".
Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the
application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the
employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members with any labor organization.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of
said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
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agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be
refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining
union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it.
It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from
affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor
unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the
labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor
union compel them to join.
Doctrine: Members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that
in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed
from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members
of the collective bargaining union.
Which part of the Constitution provides that the right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged?
(1.) Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935
(2.) Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution of 1973
What does the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
recognize and guarantee?
It is the "right" to form or join associations.
A “right” comprehends at least two broad notions, namely:
(1.) Liberty or Freedom – The absence of legal restraint,
whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law;
(2.) Power – Whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join
or refrain from joining an association.
Does the right to join or form an association include the right
to cancel his membership and leave the association?
Yes. The employee retains the liberty and the power to leave
and cancel his membership with said organization at any time.
Does the law enjoin an employee to sign up with any
association?
No.
Is there an instance where the legal protection granted to the
right to refrain from joining is withdrawn?
Yes, by operation of law. Where a labor union and an
employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which
the employer may employ only members of the collective
bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
members of the union for the duration of the contract in order
to keep their jobs.
Is a closed-shop provision exempting those who, by religious
beliefs, cannot be members of a union valid?
Yes. The right to join associations include the right to not join
associations. The exemption is intended to benefit laborers
who are inhibited from joining labor unions because of their
religious beliefs.
SC’s EXPLANATION:
The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court
is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional
right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our
answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.

In Re: IBP Membership Dues Delinquency COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A
of Atty. Marcial Edillon LAWYER’S CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE.
A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
Facts: of which he is not already a member. He becomes a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
➔ For respondent’s stubborn refusal to pay his
integration actually does is to provide an official national
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
Philippines since the latter’s constitution,
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
resolution recommending the removal of respondent’s
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
name from its Roll of Attorneys.
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
➔ Respondent, although conceding the propriety and
to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
membership therein and the obligation to pay
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
membership dues arguing that the provisions therein
lawyers.
(Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an
invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is
PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE. A REGULATORY MEASURE
being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his
NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW.
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the
Supreme Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
said organization to which he is admittedly personally
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
5 of the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
Issue: W/N compelling a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
Held: No. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every

The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
police power over an important profession;
which is voluntary.
 that the requirement to pay membership fees is
imposed as a regulatory measure designed to raise
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share
of integration;
in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to
 that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not
bear his portion of its responsibilities.
void as unreasonable or arbitrary;
 that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and power to Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers
Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X, Section are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
judicial function by a host of decided cases.

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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also
to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of
the Court.
The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the
holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. The expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent
of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE. A REGULATORY MEASURE
NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
A lawyer refused to pay his IBP dues; hence, his name was
stricken off the list of lawyers. He contended that compulsion
on membership is an invasion of his right to associate and not
to associate. Was his contention correct?
No. Admission to the law profession is a matter of privilege,
not a matter of right. The Bar Integration does not compel all
lawyers to associate with anyone. They are free to attend all
meetings, or not at all. The only compulsory act is the
payment of dues which is justified under the police power of
the State.

We must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a

property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

Doctrine:

COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A

LAWYER’S CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
of which he is not already a member. He becomes a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.

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