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 Chapter 12 - Sample Size

I. Learning Objectives:
1. To review the statistical principles and procedures for determining sample size to achieve a
desired level of precision and a desired degree of confidence when:
a. estimating a population mean
b. estimating a population proportion
2. To discuss how one can use anticipated cross classifications of the data to determine
sample size.

II. Key Terms:

standard error of estimate relative precision
absolute precision coefficient of variation
degree of confidence

III. Chapter Outline:

A. Introduction
B. Basic considerations
C. Sample size determination when estimating means
1. Relative precision
2. Multiple objectives
D. Sample size determination when estimating proportions
1. Absolute precision
2. Relative precision
E. Population size and sample size
F. Other probability sampling plans
G. Using anticipated cross classifications to determine sample size
H. Using historic evidence to determine sample size
I. Summary

IV. Discussion Suggestions:

Time: 2 days
Objectives Addressed: 1 and 2

1. Begin by pointing out that the illustration of sample size determination discussed in the
chapter is for the most basic of cases: simple random sampling to estimate a mean or a
proportion with no regard to cost. Point out that if one is considering other sampling plans
or other statistics, the principles will remain the same although the sampling distribution
with which one works will change.

2. Next emphasize the distinction between precision and confidence. For some reason, this
seems to be a point of confusion among students having only an introductory statistics
course. Once grasped, the students experience much less difficulty in understanding
sample size determination.
 3. Turn then to a discussion of estimating a population mean with a desired degree of
absolute precision and a specified degree of confidence. It helps the students if one
begins the discussion with Case I of known population variance. The formula for
determining sample size can then be grasped intuitively by using the following diagram.

z x
x x
The number of standard deviations the sample
mean is removed from the population mean is set
equal to the specified half interval; i.e., H = z x
and the equation is solved for n. One can use an
example to then illustrate the procedure.

4. Turn then to the determination of sample size to

estimate a population mean when the population
variance is unknown. It is useful here to
distinguish the two questions of:
a. estimating the sample size
b. establishing the confidence interval after the
information is collected.

The first question involves, of course, the estimation of


σ subjectively, say by  ,

so that the sample size can be determined by


substituting  for σ in the formula.

The second question implies that s , the unbiased
sample standard deviation, be

s
substituted for in establishing the interval x x + zs x where now s x =
n


It is helpful here to review by example what happens when  is estimated to be more  or
less variable than the estimate provided by the unbiased sample standard deviation, s .
5. Once the student has grasped the calculations with absolute precision, the question of
relative precision poses few new problems, although it is helpful to review:
a. what is meant by relative precision
b. how relative precision changes the calculation formula so that one needs an estimate
of the coefficient of variation in order to solve for the sample size.

6. Turn then to a discussion of multiple objectives. Point out that each objective requires a
separate calculation of sample size and the tradeoffs among objectives one is forced to
make if the calculations do not all produce the same sample size.

7. Turn then to a discussion of determining sample size to estimate a population

proportion. It is helpful to distinguish early between absolute precision and
relative precision with respect to proportions, as students often display some
difficulty with this distinction. Using absolute precision, one can easily
demonstrate the parallels in the procedure to estimate proportions with that to
estimate means, since the basic trade-off is now:

H
Most students find the fact that
some initial estimate of is needed
in order to solve for the size of the
sample so that can then be
estimated by p disconcerting. Thus, zp p
it is helpful to spend a little time
discussing how such estimates
might be generated because
marketing managers must provide
these very estimates to the
researcher.

8. By this time the question of sample

size determination with a specified
relative precision should be easily
dispatched.
9. It is also valuable to spend a couple of minutes discussing the fact that population size
does not affect sample size except indirectly;
a. through the variance, in that larger populations may exhibit more variation in a given
characteristic.
b. through the finite population correction.

10. Finally, discuss the question of sample size determination based on having sufficient
observations in each cell of a cross-tabulation table to have confidence in the conclusions
drawn. Begin with a two-way tabulation and then progress to a three-way. It is
particularly helpful if the students have been forced to first specify the factors that might
influence some variable of interest, e.g., success in college. While they are generally
displeased by only taking account of one of these variables in a two-way table, they
appreciate the problems and the size of the sample needed to adequately answer the
problem as one then moves to three-way tables and beyond.

V. Answers to Applications and Problems:

1. a. Variable 1: (Maintenance Expenditure)
The range is $400 and the standard deviation is estimated to be $67 with a desired
precision of +$20 and a 95 percent confidence interval. The calculation of the sample
size is

z
H=
n

or

n= (z)2 (σ)2
(H)2

= (2)2(67)2
(20)2

= 17956
400

= 45

Variable 2: (Malfunctions or Breakdowns)

The range is 3 and the standard deviation is estimated to be 0.5 with a desired precision
of +1 and a 95 percent confidence interval, the calculation of the sample size is

z
H=
n
or
n= (z)2 (σ)2
(H)2

= (2)2(0.5)2
(1)2

= 1

Variable 3: (Service Contract Length)

The range is 36 and the standard deviation is estimated to be 6 with a desired precision of
+3 and a 95 percent confidence interval, the calculation of the sample size is

z
H=
n

or
n= (z)2 (σ)2
(H)2

= (2)2 (6)2
(3)2

= 144
9

= 16

b. If expenditures on repairs is the most important and the length of service contract
the least important, management should select a sample size of n=45.

c. The confidence interval for maintenance expenditure is calculated as:


(s )
x  (z)s x = x  (z)
n

= 100 + (2)( 60 )
√ 100

= 100 + 12

88 < µ < 112

The interval is narrower than planned because the population standard deviation
was initially overestimated. The obtained precision is greater than the desired
precision.
2. a. With a desired precision of +0.5 ounce and a 95 percent confidence level, the
calculation of the sample size is
z
H=
n

or
n = (z)2(σ)2
(H)2

= (2)2(4)2
(0.5)2

= 256

b. With a desired precision of +0.25 ounce and a 99 percent confidence interval, the
calculation of the sample is
z
H=
n

n = (z)2(σ)2
(H)2

= (3)2(4)2
(0.25)2

= 2304

There is a tradeoff between sample size on one hand and precision and confidence
on the other. The sample size necessary for twice the precision (H=0.25 vs. 0.50)
and 99 percent confidence versus 95 percent confidence (z=3 vs. 2) is nine times
larger.

3. a. The range is $60 (people who live nearby spend $0, people who come from 250
miles times 24 cents = $60 expenditure) and the standard deviation is estimated to
be $10 (assume normal, divide by 6). With a desired precision of +50 cents and a
95 percent confidence interval, the calculation of the sample size is
( z ) 2 ( ) 2
n=
(H) 2

= (2)2(10)2
(.50)2

= 1600

b. The confidence interval for the average travel expenditure is calculated as

 x  ( z)s x

 ˆ   s 
= x  ( z )  = x  ( z ) 
 n  n

 15.00 
= 24  (2) 
 1600 

= 24  (0.750)
= 23.25    24.75

The interval is narrower than planned as the standard deviation was overestimated
using the estimated range. The estimate is more precise than desired because of this

. a. With a desired precision of +0.03 and a 95 percent confidence interval, the

calculation of the sample size is

H=zp
 (1 − )
=z
n

z 2 ()(1 − )
or n=
( H) 2

= (2)2(.2)(.8)
(.03)2

= 711

(b) With a desired precision of +1 hour and a 95 percent confidence interval, the
calculation of the sample size is

z
H=
n

( z ) 2 ( ) 2
or n=
(H) 2

n = (2)2(5)2
(1)2

= 100

c. As both variables are considered important for the study the larger sample size of
711 should be chosen.

d. The 95 percent confidence interval for the percentage of individuals owning video
games is calculated as:

p + (z)(sp)

p(1 − p)
= p  (z)
n

(.30 )(.70 )
= 0.30  (2)
711

= 0.30 + (2)(.017)

= 0.30 + 0.034

0.266 < π < 0.334

 The obtained precision is lower than the desired precision, that is, the interval is wider
since the proportion was underestimated.

e. The 95 percent interval for the average usage rate is calculated as

x  (z)s x

s
x  (z)
n
4
= 13 + (2)
711
= 13 + 0.3

12.7 < µ < 13.3

The obtained precision is greater than the desired precision. The interval is
narrower than desired since the estimated population standard deviation was larger
than the sample standard deviation.

. a. Assume that the proportion is .5 since this will result in the largest possible sample
size or the worst outcome. With a desired precision of +.05 and a 90 percent
confidence interval, the calculation of the sample size is

H = zp

(1 − )
=z
n

z 2 ()(1 − )
n=
( H) 2

n = (1.645)2(.5)(.5)
(.05)2

= 271

b. The 90 percent confidence interval is calculated as

p + (z)(sp)

p(1 − p)
= p  (z)
n

(.20 )(.80 )
= 0.20  (1.645 )
271
 = 0.20 + (1.645)(.024)

= 0.20 + 0.039

0.161 < π < 0.239

The level of precision is greater than expected because the sample size was
estimated under the worst case scenario (α =.5). The proportion adopting the
energy-saving program was less than the estimated proportion and therefore the
interval is narrower than expected.

. a. Percentage of children preferring the new brand

n=(z2/r2)[(1− π)/π]
n=[(2)2/(.01)2](.25/.75)
n=13,334

b. Number of hot dogs

n=(z2/r2)(σ/µ)2
n=[(2)2/(.01)2](1/5)2
n=1,600

c. The consequence is that the proportion preferring the new brand will be estimated
with less precision than desired, while the number of hot dogs a child eats in a
month will be estimated with more precision than desired.

d. The average of the two estimates is 13,334+1,600 = 7,467.

2

Thus, the confidence interval is calculated as follows:

sp = √ p(1-p)/n = √ (.63/.37)/7,467 = .0056

p+zsp =.63+1.96(.0056)=.63+.0100.

Thus .619< π <.641.

e. The confidence interval is calculated as follows:

s 2x = s2/n = (2)2/7467 = .000536

and s x = .023

Thus, x + 1.96 s x = 7 +1.96(.023)=7+.045.

Thus, 6.95<µ<7.05.

. a. The needed sample size is calculated as follows:

n=(z2/H2)σ2 =[(2)2/(.75)2](5)2 = 178
 b. The confidence interval is calculated as follows:
s x = s/√ n = 10 √178 = .75 and

x x  zs x = 20+2(.75) or 18.5<µ<21.5.

c. The confidence interval is calculated as follows:

s x = s/√ n = 5 √178 = .37 and

x x  zs x = 20+2(.37) or 19.26<µ<20.74.

. a. Assuming a normal distribution of ages, one can calculate the estimated standard
deviation by dividing the range of expected values by 6.

25/6=4.17=est.s and H=9 months/12 months in a year=.75

Thus
n=(z2/H2)s2
=[(2)2/(.75)2](4.17)2
=302.37
=302

b. The confidence interval is calculated as follows:

s x = s/√ n = 15√ 302 = .86 and

x x  zs x = 35+2(.86) or 33.28<µ<36.72.

. The level of precision is calculated as follows:

a. n=(z2/r2)[(1-p)/p]
100=[(2)2/r2]*[.4/.6)
150=4/r2
r2=.0267
r=.163

b. The level of confidence is calculated as follows:

n=(z2/r2)[(1-p)/p]
100=[z2/(.05)2]*[.4/.6)
150=z2/.0025
z2=.375
z=.612
73% confident

c. There is a trade-off between degree of confidence and degree of precision with a

sample of a fixed size. In order to be more confident in an estimate, then the
precision must not be as great. One can see this from parts a and b above. Both
 rely on the same information with the exception of level of confidence and level
of precision; however, both a and b produce very different results: a: confidence
95%, relative precision 16.3%; b: 73% confidence, relative precision 5%.

b.
VI. Thorndike Sports Equipment Videocase: None

VII. Student Exercises and Answers:

Exercises
1. Assume you are a marketing research analyst for TV Institute, and you have just been
given the assignment of estimating the percentage of all American households that
watched the ABC movie last Sunday night. You have been told that your estimate should
 have a precision of +1 percentage point and that there should be a 95 percent
"probability" of your being "correct" in your estimate. Your first task is to choose a
sample of the appropriate size. Make any assumptions that are necessary.

a. Recast the problem in a statistical format.

b. Compute the sample size that will satisfy the required specifications.

c. What is the required sample size if the precision is specified as +2 percentage

points?

d. What would be the sample size if the probability of being "correct" were decreased
to 90 percent, keeping the precision at +1 percentage point?

e. If you only had enough time to take a sample of size 100, what precision could you
expect from your estimate? (Assume a 95 percent confidence interval).

f. Assume that instead of taking a sample from the entire country (60 million
households), you would like to restrict yourself to one state with 1 million
households. Would the sample size computed in part 2 be too large? Too small?
Explain.

2. Assume TV Institute has hired you to do another study estimating the average number of
hours of television viewing per week per family in the United States. You are asked to
generate an estimate within +5 hours, and further there should be 95 percent confidence
that the estimate is correct. Make any assumptions that are necessary.

a. Compute the sample size that will satisfy the required specifications.

b. What would be the required sample size if the precision were changed to +10
hours?

3. The Exhilarate Resort, located in Wisconsin Dells, Wisconsin, is considering changing

the period during which it is open. The resort is presently open from April 1 to
September 30; however, 65 percent of its patronage is concentrated between July 4 and
Labor Day. The resort is considering year-round operation on account of the increased
activity in the area during the fall and winter months, for example, hunting in the fall and
snowmobiling in the winter. The resort's management is only interested in staying open
these additional times if the level of traffic (that is, number of patrons) makes it
worthwhile.

The Exhilarate Resort maintains a rather complete file of its guests, and management is
considering drawing a sample of people from this file. These people would then be
questioned as to whether they might patronize the resort during the fall and winter
months. The file is constructed in the following way. A separate card is prepared for
each person or group of persons on the first visit to the hotel. All subsequent visits with
the dates of such visits and the number of days stayed are recorded on the same card.
 a. What statistical universe is implicit in management's choice of the sample? If
practical considerations dictate that a different universe be studied, indicate the
universe that you suggest be employed.

b. Assume now that the sample will be drawn from the guest file. Describe how you
would select a sample from this universe BY EACH of the following methods: (i)
simple random sampling; (ii) stratified sampling; (iii) cluster sampling; (iv) Which
method would you recommend and why?

c. Assume now that a simple random sample of size 600 was selected, that all 600
responded, and that 240 of those queried expressed an interest in the longer season.
Establish a 95 percent confidence interval for the true population proportion who
are interested in the longer season.

4. The manager of a local bakery wants to determine the average expenditure per household
on bakery products. Past research indicates that the standard deviation is $10.

a. Calculate the sample size for the various levels of precision and confidence. Show
your calculations:

Desired Desired Estimated

Precision (+) Confidence Sample Size
1 0.50 0.95
2 1.00 0.99
3 0.50 0.90
4 0.25 0.90
5 0.50 0.99
6 0.25 0.95
7 1.00 0.90
8 1.00 0.95
9 0.25 0.99

b. Which alternative gives you the largest estimate for sample size? Explain.

5. A manufacturer of liquid soaps wanted to estimate the proportion of individuals using

liquid soaps as opposed to bar soaps. Prior estimates of the proportions are listed below.

a. For the various levels of precision and confidence indicated, calculate the needed
size of the sample.

Desired Precision Desired (%) Estimated Estimated

Percentage Points(+) Confidence Proportion Sample Size
1 6 0.99 20
2 2 0.90 10
3 6 0.99 10
4 4 0.95 30
5 2 0.90 20
6 2 0.99 30
7 6 0.90 30
8 4 0.95 10
 9 4 0.95 20

b. Which alternative gives the largest estimate of the sample size? Explain.

Answers
1. The calculation of sample size requires the determination of three items: the sampling
distribution of the statistic in question, the degree of confidence, and the degree of
precision. Items 2 and 3 are provided in the problem, the degree of confidence is
specified at 95 percent, and the degree of precision as plus or minus l percentage point.
What remains, then, is the determination of the sampling distribution of the statistic.
Since we are interested in estimating a population proportion, the appropriate statistic is
the sample proportion. Further, while the sample proportion is theoretically binomially
distributed, it is convenient to employ the normal distribution in estimating sample size.
If the results of the sample suggest that the normal approximation to the binomial might
not be appropriate, the binomial can be employed to establish the confidence interval.

a. The use of the normal distribution requires that the size of the half-interval be
equated to the appropriate number of standard deviations to determine sample
size. Here the standard deviation in question is the standard error of a proportion.

H=(z)(σp)

(1 − )
=z
n

or
z 2 ()(1 − )
n=
( H) 2

= (1.96)2(π)(1−π)
(0.01)2

b. The calculation formula suggests that we need some initial estimate of if we are
to calculate sample size to estimate π. We might use past studies to generate this
estimate, although we realize the audience for any movie is probably much more
unique than it is for any regular program. Suppose we take a past average of the
size of this listening audience which suggests = 0.3. Sample size is then
calculated to be

= (1.96)2 (.3)(.7)
(0.01)2

= 8,068

which represents a rather large sample.

 c. If the allowed precision were +2 percentage points, on the other hand, the
required size sample is reduced to one-fourth this size.

(1.96)2 (.3)(.7)
n= (0.02)2

= 2,017

d. If the allowed confidence were reduced to 90 percent while maintaining the

precision at +1 percentage point, the required sample size is also reduced since z
now equals 1.645 and

(1.645)2 (.30)(.70)
n= (.01)2

= 5,683

The problem requirements as initially specified are thus seen to be somewhat

demanding.

e. If there were only enough time and money to take a sample of size n=100, the
precision expected from the estimate is calculated to be

σp = .30(.70) = .0458
100

meaning the estimate will only be accurate within approximately

1.96σp = .0898,

nine percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.

f. If instead of taking a sample from the entire country, one were to select a sample
from only one state, then he could not say a priori if the sample size calculated in
part 2 would be too large or too small. It all depends on the similarity of viewing
habits in the state in question with those of the country as a whole. If the
proportion viewing the ABC Sunday Night Movie in the state in question were
higher than that of the general population, then one would actually need a larger
sample from this state, while if the proportion viewing were less than what was
true in general, one could get by with a smaller size sample. The key, of course,
is the fact that sample size is directly proportional to the product π(1-π) and the
size of this estimated quantity for the state versus the entire country would
determine which population would require the larger size sample.

2. a. The required precision suggests H=5 and the required degree of confidence
suggests z is approximately equal to 2 (more strictly 1.96). Since we are
estimating a population mean, the appropriate statistic is the sample mean. We
can use the normal curve for the sampling distribution of this statistic because of
the operation of the Central Limit Theorem. The calculation
 H = ( z ) x

  
H = (z) 
 n

or

(z) 2 () 2
n=
(H) 2

upon substitution of the specified quantities, yields

(2) 2 () 2
=
(5) 2
and in order to determine the needed sample size, we require an initial estimate of
Suppose, on the basis of past studies, we estimated σ = 20. Sample size is thus
calculated

( 2) 2 ( 20 ) 2
=
(5) 2

= 1600
25

= 64

b. If the required precision were changed to +10 hours, the sample size would be
reduced considerably, since now

(2) 2 (20) 2
n=
(10) 2

= 1600
100

= 16.

3. a. The statistical universe implicit in management's choice of the sample is all those
who have previously stayed at Exhilarate Resort. While this provides a
convenient list of this target population, it does not provide an adequate sampling
frame for what would seem to be the appropriate target population. The
appropriate target population would seem to be all those who might reasonably be
expected to frequent the Exhilarate Resort during the fall and winter months.
While this might include those who have been there before, it could also be
expected to include a great many others who have not been there before simply
 because they are fall or winter sports enthusiasts and Exhilarate was not open
then. Thus, it would seem that Exhilarate might be interested in a target
population that includes all those living in some specified radius of Wisconsin
Dells. The radius would probably be less than that from which they draw summer
patrons because of the more treacherous winter driving conditions.

One way Exhilarate might proceed would be to study their guest card file to
determine what this radius would be. Then they might develop a sampling frame
by checking hunter licenses, snowmobile registrations, and other records. The
target population could then be defined as all those appearing on these lists who
live in the specified radius. While this is still not a perfect sampling frame, it is
better than the roster of previous guests.

Assuming the guest files were used to select the sample, there are still a variety of
ways one could proceed. The method actually chosen will clearly depend on the
manner in which the data are collected. Mail questionnaires would appear
appropriate for Exhilarate's problem.

b. A simple random sample could be drawn from the guest file by simply numbering
each one of the families from 1 to N and then using a table of random digits to
select the sample of size n. While easily implemented, simple random sampling
would not seem to be the preferred method. For example, a systematic sample
(cluster sample) would be easier to draw. One could use the guest file as is and
take every kth name after a random start or one would reorder the guest file
according to frequency of patronage before selecting the systematic sample. This
would be desirable if it were expected that propensity to patronize Exhilarate in
the winter might be somehow related to historical patronage. If this condition
were expected to hold, a stratified sample could also be drawn. One could stratify
the guest list by previous patronage and then select a random sample from each
subgroup. Alternatively, one might wish to group previous patrons by geographic
area if it were anticipated that area might differentially affect fall and winter
patronage.

c. Given n=600, and that 240 of those queried expressed an interest in the longer
season, p=240/600=.40. Further,

p(1 − p) .40 (.60 )

sp = = = .02 and z=1.96, and the 95 percent
n 600

confidence interval is p + z sp = 0.40 + 1.96 (sp)

where sp = .02

Thus p + z sp = 0.40 + 1.96(.02)

0.361 < π < 0.439

4. a. The sample sizes for the various alternatives are estimated by

   
H = (z) 
 n

or

(z) 2 () 2
n=
(H) 2

Desired Desired Estimated

Precision (+) Confidence Sample Size

1 0.50 0.95 1,600

2 1.00 0.99 900
3 0.50 0.90 400
4 0.25 0.90 1,600
5 0.50 0.99 3,600
6 0.25 0.95 6,400
7 1.00 0.90 100
8 1.00 0.95 400
9 0.25 0.99 14,400

b. Alternative 9 gives the largest estimate since the desired precision and desired
confidence are highest for this alternative.

5. a. The sample sizes for the various alternatives are estimated by

(1 − )
H=z
n

or

(z) 2
n= (1 − )
(H) 2

Desired
Precision (%)
Percentage Desired Estimated Estimated
Points Confidence Proportion Sample Size

1 6 0.99 20 400
2 2 0.90 10 225
3 6 0.99 10 225
4 4 0.95 30 525
5 2 0.90 20 400
6 2 0.99 30 4,725
7 6 0.90 30 58
 8 4 0.95 10 225
9 4 0.95 20 400

b. Alternative 6 gives the largest estimate. This alternative has the greatest precision
and the highest desired confidence.
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no related content on Scribd:
 BOOK I.

HISTORY
OF THE

G R E E K S C H O O L P H I L O S O P H Y,
WITH REFERENCE TO

P H Y S I C A L S C I E N C E.
 Tίς γὰρ ἀρχὰ δέξατο ναυτιλίας;
Τίς δὲ κίνδυνος κρατεροῖς ἀδάμαντος δῆσεν ἄλοις;
. . . . . . Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐμβόλου
Κρέμασαν ἀγκύρας ὕπερθεν
Χρυσέαν χείρεσσι λαβὼν φιάλαν
Ἀρχὸς ἐν πρύμνᾳ πατέρ Οὐρανιδᾶν
Ἐγχεικέραυνον Ζῆνα, καὶ ὠκυπόρους
Κυμάτων ῥίπας, ἀνέμων τ’ ἐκάλει,
Νύκτας τε, καὶ πόντου κελεύθους,
Ἀματά τ’ εὔφρονα, καὶ
Φιλίαν νόστοιο μοῖραν.
Pindar. Pyth. iv. 124, 349.

Whence came their voyage? them what peril held

With adamantine rivets firmly bound?
* * * * * * *
But soon as on the vessel’s bow
The anchor was hung up,
Then took the Leader on the prow
In hands a golden cup,
And on great Father Jove did call,
And on the Winds and Waters all,
Swept by the hurrying blast;
And on the Nights, and Ocean Ways,
And on the fair auspicious Days,
And loved return at last.

BOOK I.

HISTORY OF THE GREEK SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY, WITH

REFERENCE TO PHYSICAL SCIENCE.
 CHAPTER I.

Prelude to the Greek School Philosophy.

Sect. 1.—First Attempts of the Speculative Faculty in Physical

Inquiries.

A Tto anpursue
early period of history there appeared in men a propensity
speculative inquiries concerning the various parts and
properties of the material world. What they saw excited them to
meditate, to conjecture, and to reason: they endeavored to account
for natural events, to trace their causes, to reduce them to their
principles. This habit of mind, or, at least that modification of it which
we have here to consider, seems to have been first unfolded among
the Greeks. And during that obscure introductory interval which
elapsed while the speculative tendencies of men were as yet hardly
disentangled from the practical, those who were most eminent in
such inquiries were distinguished by the same term of praise which
is applied to sagacity in matters of action, and were called wise men
—σοφοὶ. But when it came to be clearly felt by such persons that
their endeavors were suggested by the love of knowledge, a motive
different from the motives which lead to the wisdom of active life, a
name was adopted of a more appropriate, as well as of a more
modest signification, and they were termed philosophers, or lovers of
wisdom. This appellation is said 7 to have been first assumed by
Pythagoras. Yet he, in Herodotus, instead of having this title, is
called a powerful sophist—Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ
Πυθαγόρῃ; 8 the historian using this word, as it would seem, without
intending to imply that misuse of reason which the term afterwards
came to denote. The historians of literature 56 placed Pythagoras at
the origin of the Italic School, one of the two main lines of succession
of the early Greek philosophers: but the other, the Ionic School,
which more peculiarly demands our attention, in consequence of its
character and subsequent progress, is deduced from Thales, who
preceded the age of Philosophy, and was one of the sophi, or “wise
men of Greece.”
7 Cic. Tusc. v. 3.

8 Herod. iv. 95.

The Ionic School was succeeded in Greece by several others; and

the subjects which occupied the attention of these schools became
very extensive. In fact, the first attempts were, to form systems which
should explain the laws and causes of the material universe; and to
these were soon added all the great questions which our moral
condition and faculties suggest. The physical philosophy of these
schools is especially deserving of our study, as exhibiting the
character and fortunes of the most memorable attempt at universal
knowledge which has ever been made. It is highly instructive to trace
the principles of this undertaking; for the course pursued was
certainly one of the most natural and tempting which can be
imagined; the essay was made by a nation unequalled in fine mental
endowments, at the period of its greatest activity and vigor; and yet it
must be allowed (for, at least so far as physical science is
concerned, none will contest this), to have been entirely
unsuccessful. We cannot consider otherwise than as an utter failure,
an endeavor to discover the causes of things, of which the most
complete results are the Aristotelian physical treatises; and which,
after reaching the point which these treatises mark, left the human
mind to remain stationary, at any rate on all such subjects, for nearly
two thousand years.
 The early philosophers of Greece entered upon the work of
physical speculation in a manner which showed the vigor and
confidence of the questioning spirit, as yet untamed by labors and
reverses. It was for later ages to learn that man must acquire, slowly
and patiently, letter by letter, the alphabet in which nature writes her
answers to such inquiries. The first students wished to divine, at a
single glance, the whole import of her book. They endeavored to
discover the origin and principle of the universe; according to Thales,
water was the origin of all things, according to Anaximenes, air; and
Heraclitus considered fire as the essential principle of the universe. It
has been conjectured, with great plausibility, that this tendency to
give to their Philosophy the form of a Cosmogony, was owing to the
influence of the poetical Cosmogonies and Theogonies which had
been produced and admired at a still earlier age. Indeed, such wide
and ambitious 57 doctrines as those which have been mentioned,
were better suited to the dim magnificence of poetry, than to the
purpose of a philosophy which was to bear the sharp scrutiny of
reason. When we speak of the principles of things, the term, even
now, is very ambiguous and indefinite in its import, but how much
more was that the case in the first attempts to use such abstractions!
The term which is commonly used in this sense (ἀρχὴ), signified at
first the beginning; and in its early philosophical applications implied
some obscure mixed reference to the mechanical, chemical, organic,
and historical causes of the visible state of things, besides the
theological views which at this period were only just beginning to be
separated from the physical. Hence we are not to be surprised if the
sources from which the opinions of this period appear to be derived
are rather vague suggestions and casual analogies, than any
reasons which will bear examination. Aristotle conjectures, with
considerable probability, that the doctrine of Thales, according to
which water was the universal element, resulted from the manifest
importance of moisture in the support of animal and vegetable life. 9
But such precarious analyses of these obscure and loose dogmas of
early antiquity are of small consequence to our object.
9 Metaph. i. 3.

In more limited and more definite examples of inquiry concerning

the causes of natural appearances, and in the attempts made to
satisfy men’s curiosity in such cases, we appear to discern a more
genuine prelude to the true spirit of physical inquiry. One of the most
remarkable instances of this kind is to be found in the speculations
which Herodotus records, relative to the cause of the floods of the
Nile. “Concerning the nature of this river,” says the father of history, 10
“I was not able to learn any thing, either from the priests or from any
one besides, though I questioned them very pressingly. For the Nile
is flooded for a hundred days, beginning with the summer solstice;
and after this time it diminishes, and is, during the whole winter, very
small. And on this head I was not able to obtain any thing
satisfactory from any one of the Egyptians, when I asked what is the
power by which the Nile is in its nature the reverse of other rivers.”
10 Herod. ii. 19.

We may see, I think, in the historian’s account, that the Grecian

mind felt a craving to discover the reasons of things which other
nations did not feel. The Egyptians, it appears, had no theory, and
felt no want of a theory. Not so the Greeks; they had their reasons to
render, though they were not such as satisfied Herodotus. “Some 58
of the Greeks,” he says, “who wish to be considered great
philosophers (Ἑλλήνων τινες ἐπισήμοι βουλόμενοι γενέσθαι σοφίην),
have propounded three ways of accounting for these floods. Two of
them,” he adds, “I do not think worthy of record, except just so far as
to mention them.” But as these are some of the earliest Greek
essays in physical philosophy, it will be worth while, even at this day,
to preserve the brief notice he has given of them, and his own
reasonings upon the same subject.

“One of these opinions holds that the Etesian winds [which blew
from the north] are the cause of these floods, by preventing the Nile
from flowing into the sea.” Against this the historian reasons very
simply and sensibly. “Very often when the Etesian winds do not blow,
the Nile is flooded nevertheless. And moreover, if the Etesian winds
were the cause, all other rivers, which have their course opposite to
these winds, ought to undergo the same changes as the Nile; which
the rivers of Syria and Libya so circumstanced do not.”

“The next opinion is still more unscientific (ἀνεπιστημονεστέρη),

and is, in truth, marvellous for its folly. This holds that the ocean
flows all round the earth, and that the Nile comes out of the ocean,
and by that means produces its effects.” “Now,” says the historian,
“the man who talks about this ocean-river, goes into the region of
fable, where it is not easy to demonstrate that he is wrong. I know of
no such river. But I suppose that Homer and some of the earlier
poets invented this fiction and introduced it into their poetry.”

He then proceeds to a third account, which to a modern reasoner

would appear not at all unphilosophical in itself, but which he,
nevertheless, rejects in a manner no less decided than the others.
“The third opinion, though much the most plausible, is still more
wrong than the others; for it asserts an impossibility, namely, that the
Nile proceeds from the melting of the snow. Now the Nile flows out of
Libya, and through Ethiopia, which are very hot countries, and thus
comes into Egypt, which is a colder region. How then can it proceed
from snow?” He then offers several other reasons “to show,” as he
says, “to any one capable of reasoning on such subjects (ἀνδρί γε
λογίζεσθαι τοιούτων πέρι οἵῳ τε ἔοντι), that the assertion cannot be
true. The winds which blow from the southern regions are hot; the
inhabitants are black; the swallows and kites (ἰκτῖνοι) stay in the
country the whole year; the cranes fly the colds of Scythia, and seek
their warm winter-quarters there; which would not be if it snowed
ever so little.” He adds another reason, founded apparently upon 59
some limited empirical maxim of weather-wisdom taken from the
climate of Greece. “Libya,” he said, “has neither rain nor ice, and
therefore no snow; for, in five days after a fall of snow there must be
a fall of rain; so that if it snowed in those regions it must rain too.” I
need not observe that Herodotus was not aware of the difference
between the climate of high mountains and plains in a torrid region;
but it is impossible not to be struck both with the activity and the
coherency of thought displayed by the Greek mind in this primitive
physical inquiry.

But I must not omit the hypothesis which Herodotus himself

proposes, after rejecting those which have been already given. It
does not appear to me easy to catch his exact meaning, but the
statement will still be curious. “If,” he says, “one who has condemned
opinions previously promulgated may put forward his own opinion
concerning so obscure a matter, I will state why it seems to me that
the Nile is flooded in summer.” This opinion he propounds at first
with an oracular brevity, which it is difficult to suppose that he did not
intend to be impressive. “In winter the sun is carried by the seasons
away from his former course, and goes to the upper parts of Libya.
And there, in short, is the whole account; for that region to which this
divinity (the sun) is nearest, must naturally be most scant of water,
and the river-sources of that country must be dried up.”

But the lively and garrulous Ionian immediately relaxes from this
apparent reserve. “To explain the matter more at length,” he
proceeds, “it is thus. The sun when he traverses the upper parts of
Libya, does what he commonly does in summer;—he draws the
water to him (ἕλκει ἐπ’ ἑωϋτὸν τὸ ὕδωρ), and having thus drawn it,
he pushes it to the upper regions (of the air probably), and then the
winds take it and disperse it till they dissolve in moisture. And thus
the winds which blow from those countries, Libs and Notus, are the
most moist of all winds. Now when the winter relaxes and the sun
returns to the north, he still draws water from all the rivers, but they
are increased by showers and rain torrents so that they are in flood
till the summer comes; and then, the rain falling and the sun still
drawing them, they become small. But the Nile, not being fed by
rains, yet being drawn by the sun, is, alone of all rivers, much more
scanty in the winter than in the summer. For in summer it is drawn
like all other rivers, but in winter it alone has its supplies shut up. And
in this way, I have been led to think the sun is the cause of the
occurrence in question.” We may remark that the historian here
appears to 60 ascribe the inequality of the Nile at different seasons to
the influence of the sun upon its springs alone, the other cause of
change, the rains being here excluded; and that, on this supposition,
the same relative effects would be produced whether the sun
increase the sources in winter by melting the snows, or diminish
them in summer by what he calls drawing them upwards.

This specimen of the early efforts of the Greeks in physical

speculations, appears to me to speak strongly for the opinion that
their philosophy on such subjects was the native growth of the Greek
mind, and owed nothing to the supposed lore of Egypt and the East;
an opinion which has been adopted with regard to the Greek
Philosophy in general by the most competent judges on a full survey
of the evidence. 11 Indeed, we have no evidence whatever that, at
any period, the African or Asiatic nations (with the exception perhaps
of the Indians) ever felt this importunate curiosity with regard to the
definite application of the idea of cause and effect to visible
phenomena; or drew so strong a line between a fabulous legend and
a reason rendered; or attempted to ascend to a natural cause by
classing together phenomena of the same kind. We may be well
excused, therefore, for believing that they could not impart to the
Greeks what they themselves did not possess; and so far as our
survey goes, physical philosophy has its origin, apparently
spontaneous and independent, in the active and acute intellect of
Greece.
11 Thirlwall, Hist. Gr., ii. 130; and, as there quoted, Ritter,
Geschichte der Philosophie, i. 159–173.

Sect. 2.—Primitive Mistake in Greek Physical Philosophy.

We now proceed to examine with what success the Greeks

followed the track into which they had thus struck. And here we are
obliged to confess that they very soon turned aside from the right
road to truth, and deviated into a vast field of error, in which they and
their successors have wandered almost to the present time. It is not
necessary here to inquire why those faculties which appear to be
bestowed upon us for the discovery of truth, were permitted by
Providence to fail so signally in answering that purpose; whether, like
the powers by which we seek our happiness, they involve a
responsibility on our part, and may be defeated by rejecting the
guidance of a higher faculty; or whether these endowments, though
they did not 61 immediately lead man to profound physical
knowledge, answered some nobler and better purpose in his
constitution and government. The fact undoubtedly was, that the
physical philosophy of the Greeks soon became trifling and
worthless; and it is proper to point out, as precisely as we can, in
what the fundamental mistake consisted.

To explain this, we may in the first place return for a moment to

Herodotus’s account of the cause of the floods of the Nile.

The reader will probably have observed a remarkable phrase used

by Herodotus, in his own explanation of these inundations. He says
that the sun draws, or attracts, the water; a metaphorical term,
obviously intended to denote some more general and abstract
conception than that of the visible operation which the word primarily
signifies. This abstract notion of “drawing” is, in the historian, as we
see, very vague and loose; it might, with equal propriety, be
explained to mean what we now understand by mechanical or by
chemical attraction, or pressure, or evaporation. And in like manner,
all the first attempts to comprehend the operations of nature, led to
the introduction of abstract conceptions, often vague, indeed, but
not, therefore, unmeaning; such as motion and velocity, force and
pressure, impetus and momentum (ῥοπὴ). And the next step in
philosophizing, necessarily was to endeavor to make these vague
abstractions more clear and fixed, so that the logical faculty should
be able to employ them securely and coherently. But there were two
ways of making this attempt; the one, by examining the words only,
and the thoughts which they call up; the other, by attending to the
facts and things which bring these abstract terms into use. The latter,
the method of real inquiry, was the way to success; but the Greeks
followed the former, the verbal or notional course, and failed.

If Herodotus, when the notion of the sun’s attracting the waters of

rivers had entered into his mind, had gone on to instruct himself, by
attention to facts, in what manner this notion could be made more
definite, while it still remained applicable to all the knowledge which
could be obtained, he would have made some progress towards a
true solution of his problem. If, for instance, he had tried to ascertain
whether this Attraction which the sun exerted upon the waters of
rivers, depended on his influence at their fountains only, or was
exerted over their whole course, and over waters which were not
parts of rivers, he would have been led to reject his hypothesis; for
he would have found, by observations sufficiently obvious, that the
sun’s Attraction, as shown in such cases, is a tendency to lessen all
expanded and 62 open collections of moisture, whether flowing from
a spring or not; and it would then be seen that this influence,
operating on the whole surface of the Nile, must diminish it as well
as other rivers, in summer, and therefore could not be the cause of
its overflow. He would thus have corrected his first loose conjecture
by a real study of nature, and might, in the course of his meditations,
have been led to available notions of Evaporation, or other natural
actions. And, in like manner, in other cases, the rude attempts at
explanation, which the first exercise of the speculative faculty
produced, might have been gradually concentrated and refined, so
as to fall in, both with the requisitions of reason and the testimony of
sense.

But this was not the direction which the Greek speculators took.
On the contrary; as soon as they had introduced into their philosophy
any abstract and general conceptions, they proceeded to scrutinize
these by the internal light of the mind alone, without any longer
looking abroad into the world of sense. They took for granted that
philosophy must result from the relations of those notions which are
involved in the common use of language, and they proceeded to
seek their philosophical doctrines by studying such notions. They
ought to have reformed and fixed their usual conceptions by
Observation; they only analyzed and expanded them by Reflection:
they ought to have sought by trial, among the Notions which passed
through their minds, some one which admitted of exact application to
Facts; they selected arbitrarily, and, consequently, erroneously, the
Notions according to which Facts should be assembled and
arranged: they ought to have collected clear Fundamental Ideas
from the world of things by inductive acts of thought; they only
derived results by Deduction from one or other of their familiar
Conceptions. 12
12The course by which the Sciences were formed, and which is
here referred to as that which the Greeks did not follow, is
described in detail in the Philosophy, book xi., Of the Construction
of Science.

When this false direction had been extensively adopted by the

Greek philosophers, we may treat of it as the method of their
Schools. Under that title we must give a further account of it. 63
 CHAPTER II.

The Greek School Philosophy.

Sect. 1.—The general Foundation of the Greek School Philosophy.

T HE physical philosophy of the Greek Schools was formed by

looking at the material world through the medium of that common
language which men employ to answer the common occasions of
life; and by adopting, arbitrarily, as the grounds of comparison of
facts, and of inference from them, notions more abstract and large
than those with which men are practically familiar, but not less vague
and obscure. Such a philosophy, however much it might be
systematized, by classifying and analyzing the conceptions which it
involves, could not overcome the vices of its fundamental principle.
But before speaking of these defects, we must give some indications
of its character.

The propensity to seek for principles in the common usages of

language may be discerned at a very early period. Thus we have an
example of it in a saying which is reported of Thales, the founder of
Greek philosophy. 13 When he was asked, “What is the greatest
thing?” he replied, “Place; for all other things are in the world, but the
world is in it.” In Aristotle we have the consummation of this mode of
speculation. The usual point from which he starts in his inquiries is,
that we say thus or thus in common language. Thus, when he has to
discuss the question, whether there be, in any part of the universe, a
Void, or space in which there is nothing, he inquires first in how
many senses we say that one thing is in another. He enumerates
many of these; 14 we say the part is in the whole, as the finger is in
the hand; again we say, the species is in the genus, as man is
included in animal; again, the government of Greece is in the king;
and various other senses are described or exemplified, but of all
these the most proper is when we say a thing is in a vessel, and
generally, in place. He next examines what place is, and comes to
this conclusion, that “if about a body there be another body including
it, it is in place, and if not, not.” A body moves when it changes its
place; but 64 he adds, that if water be in a vessel, the vessel being at
rest, the parts of the water may still move, for they are included by
each other; so that while the whole does not change its place, the
parts may change their places in a circular order. Proceeding then to
the question of a void, he, as usual, examines the different senses in
which the term is used, and adopts, as the most proper, place
without matter; with no useful result, as we shall soon see.
13 Plut. Conv. Sept. Sap. Diog. Laert. i. 35.

14 Physic. Ausc. iv. 3.

Again, 15 in a question concerning mechanical action, he says,

“When a man moves a stone by pushing it with a stick, we say both
that the man moves the stone, and that the stick moves the stone,
but the latter more properly.”
15 Physic. Ausc. viii. 5.

Again, we find the Greek philosophers applying themselves to

extract their dogmas from the most general and abstract notions
which they could detect; for example,—from the conception of the
Universe as One or as Many things. They tried to determine how far
we may, or must, combine with these conceptions that of a whole, of
parts, of number, of limits, of place, of beginning or end, of full or
void, of rest or motion, of cause and effect, and the like. The analysis
of such conceptions with such a view, occupies, for instance, almost
the whole of Aristotle’s Treatise on the Heavens.

The Dialogue of Plato, which is entitled Parmenides, appears at

first as if its object were to show the futility of this method of
philosophizing; for the philosopher whose name it bears, is
represented as arguing with an Athenian named Aristotle, 16 and, by
a process of metaphysical analysis, reducing him at least to this
conclusion, “that whether One exist, or do not exist, it follows that
both it and other things, with reference to themselves and to each
other, all and in all respects, both are and are not, both appear and
appear not.” Yet the method of Plato, so far as concerns truths of
that kind with which we are here concerned, was little more
efficacious than that of his rival. It consists mainly, as may be seen in
several of the dialogues, and especially in the Timæus, in the
application of notions as loose as those of the Peripatetics; for
example, the conceptions of the Good, the Beautiful, the Perfect;
and these are rendered still more arbitrary, by assuming an
acquaintance with the views of the Creator of the universe. The
philosopher is thus led to maxims which agree with those 65 of the
Aristotelians, that there can be no void, that things seek their own
place, and the like. 17
16 This Aristotle is not the Stagirite, who was forty-five years
younger than Plato, but one of the “thirty tyrants,” as they were
called.

17 Timæus, p. 80.

Another mode of reasoning, very widely applied in these attempts,

was the doctrine of contrarieties, in which it was assumed, that
adjectives or substantives which are in common language, or in
some abstract mode of conception, opposed to each other, must
point at some fundamental antithesis in nature, which it is important
to study. Thus Aristotle 18 says, that the Pythagoreans, from the
contrasts which number suggests, collected ten principles,—Limited
and Unlimited, Odd and Even, One and Many, Right and Left, Male
and Female, Rest and Motion, Straight and Curved, Light and
Darkness, Good and Evil, Square and Oblong. We shall see
hereafter, that Aristotle himself deduced the doctrine of Four
Elements, and other dogmas, by oppositions of the same kind.
18 Metaph. 1. 5.

The physical speculator of the present day will learn without

surprise, that such a mode of discussion as this, led to no truths of
real or permanent value. The whole mass of the Greek philosophy,
therefore, shrinks into an almost imperceptible compass, when
viewed with reference to the progress of physical knowledge. Still the
general character of this system, and its fortunes from the time of its
founders to the overthrow of their authority, are not without their
instruction, and, it may be hoped, not without their interest. I
proceed, therefore, to give some account of these doctrines in their
most fully developed and permanently received form, that in which
they were presented by Aristotle.

Sect. 2.—The Aristotelian Physical Philosophy.

The principal physical treatises of Aristotle are, the eight Books of

“Physical Lectures,” the four Books “Of the Heavens,” the two Books
“Of Production and Destruction:” for the Book “Of the World” is now
universally acknowledged to be spurious; and the “Meteorologies,”
though full of physical explanations of natural phenomena, does not
exhibit the doctrines and reasonings of the school in so general a
form; the same may be said of the “Mechanical Problems.” The
treatises on the various subjects of Natural History, “On Animals,”
“On the Parts of Animals,” “On Plants,” “On Physiognomonics,” “On
Colors,” “On Sound,” contain an extraordinary 66 accumulation of
facts, and manifest a wonderful power of systematizing; but are not
works which expound principles, and therefore do not require to be
here considered.

The Physical Lectures are possibly the work concerning which a

well-known anecdote is related by Simplicius, a Greek commentator
of the sixth century, as well as by Plutarch. It is said, that Alexander
the Great wrote to his former tutor to this effect; “You have not done
well in publishing these lectures; for how shall we, your pupils, excel
other men, if you make that public to all, which we learnt from you?”
To this Aristotle is said to have replied: “My Lectures are published
and not published; they will be intelligible to those who heard them,
and to none besides.” This may very easily be a story invented and
circulated among those who found the work beyond their
comprehension; and it cannot be denied, that to make out the
meaning and reasoning of every part, would be a task very laborious
and difficult, if not impossible. But we may follow the import of a
large portion of the Physical Lectures with sufficient clearness to
apprehend the character and principles of the reasoning; and this is
what I shall endeavor to do.

The author’s introductory statement of his view of the nature of

philosophy falls in very closely with what has been said, that he
takes his facts and generalizations as they are implied in the
structure of language. “We must in all cases proceed,” he says, “from
what is known to what is unknown.” This will not be denied; but we
can hardly follow him in his inference. He adds, “We must proceed,
therefore, from universal to particular. And something of this,” he
pursues, “may be seen in language; for names signify things in a
general and indefinite manner, as circle, and by defining we unfold
them into particulars.” He illustrates this by saying, “thus children at
first call all men father, and all women mother, but afterwards
distinguish.”

In accordance with this view, he endeavors to settle several of the

great questions concerning the universe, which had been started
among subtle and speculative men, by unfolding the meaning of the
words and phrases which are applied to the most general notions of
things and relations. We have already noticed this method. A few
examples will illustrate it further:—Whether there was or was not a
void, or place without matter, had already been debated among rival
sects of philosophers. The antagonist arguments were briefly these:
—There must be a void, because a body cannot move into a space
except it is 67 empty, and therefore without a void there could be no
motion:—and, on the other hand, there is no void, for the intervals
between bodies are filled with air, and air is something. These
opinions had even been supported by reference to experiment. On
the one hand, Anaxagoras and his school had shown, that air, when
confined, resisted compression, by squeezing a blown bladder, and
pressing down an inverted vessel in the water; on the other hand, it
was alleged that a vessel full of fine ashes held as much water as if
the ashes were not there, which could only be explained by
supposing void spaces among the ashes. Aristotle decides that there
is no void, on such arguments as this: 19 —In a void there could be no
difference of up and down; for as in nothing there are no differences,
so there are none in a privation or negation; but a void is merely a
privation or negation of matter; therefore, in a void, bodies could not
move up and down, which it is in their nature to do. It is easily seen
that such a mode of reasoning, elevates the familiar forms of
language and the intellectual connections of terms, to a supremacy
over facts; making truth depend upon whether terms are or are not
privative, and whether we say that bodies fall naturally. In such a
philosophy every new result of observation would be compelled to
conform to the usual combinations of phrases, as these had become
associated by the modes of apprehension previously familiar.
19 Physic. Ausc. iv. 7, p. 215.

It is not intended here to intimate that the common modes of

apprehension, which are the basis of common language, are limited
and casual. They imply, on the contrary, universal and necessary
conditions of our perceptions and conceptions; thus all things are
necessarily apprehended as existing in Time and Space, and as
connected by relations of Cause and Effect; and so far as the
Aristotelian philosophy reasons from these assumptions, it has a real
foundation, though even in this case the conclusions are often
insecure. We have an example of this reasoning in the eighth
Book, 20 where he proves that there never was a time in which
change and motion did not exist; “For if all things were at rest, the
first motion must have been produced by some change in some of
these things; that is, there must have been a change before the first
change;” and again, “How can before and after apply when time is
not? or how can time be when motion is not? If,” he adds, “time is a
numeration of motion, and if time be eternal, motion must be
eternal.” But he sometimes 68 introduces principles of a more
arbitrary character; and besides the general relations of thought,
takes for granted the inventions of previous speculators; such, for