The Ready-Made Garment Industry A Bangladeshi Perspective (D)

9 -3 1 8 -0 2 8
REV: AUGUST 1, 2018
NIEN-HÊ HSIEH
SALONI CHATURVEDI
The Ready-Made Garment Industry: A Bangladeshi

Perspective (D)
In 2012, a fire at Tazreen Fashions factory killed 112 people. The tragedy highlighted not only the
issue of worker safety, but also the challenges inherent in a supply chain in which garments for a
Western brand—in this case, Walmart—could end up being subcontracted to a factory unbeknownst
even to the factory that took the original order. The collapse of Rana Plaza, a building that housed five
garment factories, and a second factory fire in 2013 brought Bangladesh’s ready-made garment (RMG)
sector under even greater international scrutiny. The RMG sector, retailers, apparel brands, and the
Bangladesh government were pressured to make changes beyond existing initiatives in the sector to
address questions about safety standards, labor rights, subcontracting, and the distribution of
responsibility across the global garment supply chain.
Rana Plaza
Before the industry could recover from the repercussions of the Tazreen fire, another 1,133 people
lost their lives when Rana Plaza collapsed on April 24, 2013. 1 News reports speculated that the number
of people dead and injured was higher than the reported figures. The building housed five garment
factories, a bank, and several shops. 2 Reports also indicated that a crack was spotted on the building’s
exterior wall the day before the collapse. 3 The bank, heeding a warning from an engineer who had
inspected the building the evening before, had temporarily closed its operations in the building. 4
However, the garment factory officials forced workers to report for duty. 5 Thus, most of the victims of
the collapse were workers employed by the five garment factories. Investigations into the building’s
fall revealed that the eight-story building was structurally unstable; its foundation was built on a lot
filled only with sand. 6 Inferior construction material had been used in the building, and several floors
had been constructed illegally. 7 The owners had also placed generators on the rooftop, vibrations from
which added to the building’s instability. 8
IndustriALL, a global union for workers’ rights, called for $74 million in compensation on behalf of
the victims of the Rana Plaza collapse. It called upon retailers to pay $34.6 million of this, and the
government and factory owners, $39.4 million. 9 In collaboration with the International Labour
Professor Nien-hê Hsieh and Researcher Saloni Chaturvedi (India Research Center) prepared this case. This case was developed from published
sources. Funding for the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School and not by the company. HBS cases are developed
solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or
ineffective management.
Copyright © 2017, 2018 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-
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This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Rajnish Rai's PGP II (Term : 4) Business Leadership and Corporate Accountability (BLCA) 2024 - 25 at Indian Institute of Management -
Ahmedabad from May 2024 to Sep 2024.
318-028 The Ready-Made Garment Industry: A Bangladeshi Perspective (D)
Organization (ILO), a it invited the 28 retailers that sourced from the factories housed in Rana Plaza to
a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland; however, only 9 retailers attended. 10 While the 28 retailers struggled
to reach a consensus, a few retailers that had worked with factories located in Rana Plaza extended
temporary relief to the victims. For example, Primark, a retail brand headquartered in Dublin, Ireland,
provided six months’ wages to the workers and families affected by the collapse. 11 In October 2013,
Primark extended this temporary relief to victims of the collapse in the form of another three months’
wages. 12 Eventually, the brands sourcing from Rana Plaza and other international donors came
together to create the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund, which aimed at collecting $30 million to
compensate victims. 13
By February 2015, only 40% of the victims had received compensation. 14 It would take another three
months before the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund raised the stipulated amount of $30 million. 15 The
fund’s objective was to provide relief for the loss of income to the victims’ families; however, it was not
meant to be a final compensation for their loss. This allowed victims’ families to pursue other avenues
of redress. In fact, a number of court cases were filed in the United States, Canada, and Bangladesh
against retailers such as Walmart, J.C. Penney, Loblaws, and The Children’s Place. In Bangladesh, these
grievances took the form of cases demanding compensation, criminal complaints, and complaints to
the labor court. The owner of Rana Plaza, Sohel Rana, and the owners of the garment factories housed
in the building were charged with negligence in May 2013. 16 Further, in June 2015, 41 people including
Rana and the factory owners, as well as several government officials who had cleared the building and
failed to heed warnings of the building’s instability, were charged with murder. 17
Accord and Alliance

In the aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse, there was immense pressure on large brands that
sourced their merchandise from Bangladesh to take responsibility for the state of the industry and
improve worker safety. As a result, the Bangladesh Fire and Building Safety Accord (“Accord”) was
instituted. The Accord was a legally binding five-year pact between global brands, retailers, and trade
unions to improve the safety conditions of the factories that member brands worked with. (See Exhibit
1.) Starting with an initial membership of 80 retailers and 2 trade unions, by 2015, the Accord had over
200 global brands as signatories, as well as 8 Bangladesh trade unions and 2 global trade unions. 18
Enforcement of the Accord was the responsibility of a body comprising three labor group
representatives, three brand representatives, and one representative from the ILO. 19 Under the pact,
this institutional mechanism would inspect factories working for the signatory retailers within nine
months. 20 Factories that did not meet the safety criteria set out by the Accord would be shut while the
factory carried out repair. The cost of enforcement would be shared across the retailers in proportion
to percentage of production, up to a maximum of $2.5 million per retailer over five years. 21 Disputes
would be subject to arbitration, and the arbitration decree would be legally binding in the brand’s home
country. 22
A number of North American retailers did not sign the Accord, citing liability concerns. b On July
10, 2013, 17 such retailers created the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety. By 2015, membership had
grown to 29. 23 The Alliance’s terms were similar to those of the Accord. However, the Alliance was not
a Founded in 1919, the ILO was the only tripartite UN agency, bringing together “governments, employers and workers of 187
member States to set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and
men.” http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm, accessed July 2017.
b The retailers believed that since, unlike the European Courts, the American legal system allowed for large class action suits
without a ceiling on damages awarded, the legally binding nature of the Accord could prove detrimental to them.
The Ready-Made Garment Industry: A Bangladeshi Perspective (D) 318-028
legally binding, c and the retailers’ direct funding of repairs was limited to $1 million. The Alliance also
included a provision for $100 million, which it would disburse as loans for upgrading factories. 24
Further, while under the Accord, retailers were bound to continue operations in Bangladesh for five
years; the Alliance allowed retailers to withdraw from Bangladesh at any time, as long as they had paid
their contribution. 25 Scholars also pointed out that the Alliance was built on a fairly traditional CSR-
based approach and involved labor unions only in an advisory capacity. However, the Accord was
broadly based on the principles of industrial democracy, such that it included labor groups and unions
in the design process as well as at the highest level of decision making. 26
Retailers and international organizations had been involved in efforts to improve the conditions of
Bangladesh’s RMG factories, both through individual and collective efforts such as the International
Finance Corporation’s sustainable business advisory business line as well as the Multi-Fiber
Agreement Forum—created to assist countries during the phasing out of the Multi-Fiber Agreement—
long before the Rana Plaza tragedy. 27 However, the Accord and the Alliance were the largest collective
efforts to date.
Inspections by Accord employees revealed that many factories had safety issues. They lacked fire
doors, alarm systems, and safety exits. Some had developed cracks from years of being overloaded.
While some factories did not have access to resources or expertise to make changes that met the
standards put forth by the Accord, others refused or delayed implementing the required changes. 28
The Accord contained a clause that forced retailers to pull out from factories that refused to comply.
However, such instances were few, and most factories continued to operate while deadlines for
implementing the identified safety measures were extended.
By the end of October 2015, the Accord had inspected over 1,300 factories and was working on
refurbishing 250 additional factories identified by the Alliance. 29 However, there was some discontent
among stakeholders in the RMG sector regarding the two programs. Despite agreeing to a common
standard, inspection reports from the Accord and the Alliance often contradicted each other. There
were complaints that the Accord was not adhering to its commitment to pay partial wages while a
factory was closed for repair. 30 Factory owners also felt that the Accord and the Alliance were
interfering in management issues. 31 Moreover, even though the Accord included local unions, it
excluded local manufacturers from decision-making structures. Conversely, the Alliance included local
industry in its governance structure, but excluded local unions. 32 Researchers pointed out that while
program activities under both the Accord and the Alliance focused on fire and building safety, they
failed to address broader labor rights issues such as harassment and the restriction of freedom of
association. 33 Some scholars also tied the impact of the two programs to their design and underlying
philosophies. For example, a study indicated that since the Alliance followed a CSR-based approach,
it was able to quickly dispense wages promised by retailers in the case of factory closures, thereby
providing immediate relief to displaced workers. 34 However, since the Accord followed a more
participatory approach, it advocated for and aided unions to negotiate with employers on the issue of
compensatory wages in the case of factory closures. While the latter approach invariably entailed
c The legally binding nature of the Accord was the element that distinguished it most from the Alliance. Under the Accord,
signatories could approach the Accord Steering Committee. The decision of the Steering Committee could be appealed through
arbitration resulting in legally binding, enforceable awards. However, the extent of the Accord’s legally binding nature was
debated by experts, who pointed out that the Accord only created rights and obligations for its signatories and largely excluded
workers. For example, the Accord did not provide access to remedies for workers who suffered from poor working conditions.
Experts believed that the effectiveness of the Accord’s legal measures depended on the signatories’ will to use the rights and
mechanisms under the Accord. (Source: Bjoern Fasterling, “Bangladesh Accord: ‘laws’ that lack bite,” ECOTEXTILENEWS,
August/September 2014, https://www.ecotextile.com, accessed July 2017).
delays in receiving compensation, it built long-term capabilities in labor groups, empowering them to
negotiate with employers on contentious issues. 35
Retailers had set up the Alliance and the Accord for a period of five years and would phase out the
two initiatives in 2018. H&M (a signatory to the Accord) had proposed extending the Accord to 2021,
since it estimated that remediation of identified factories might not be complete by 2018. 36 However,
the Bangladesh government believed that the garment sector did not require the presence of the Accord
and the Alliance beyond 2018, since it had significantly strengthened its Department of Inspection of
Factories and Establishments. 37
Legal and Policy Changes

In addition to the creation of the Alliance and the Accord, several other changes to the institutional
environment were made. The ILO announced a $31.4 million program to support the implementation
of the National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural Integrity, developed by the ILO
and the Bangladesh government. 38 The plan was an agreement between factory owners, workers, and
the government to work toward a set standard of fire and structural safety.
In the months following the Rana Plaza incident, many worker unions protested against the low
wages and unsafe working conditions. Workers demanded that their salaries be raised from 3,000
Bangladeshi taka (US$39) to 8,000 taka (US$104). In November 2013, the government increased
minimum wages to 5,600 taka ($72). 39 However, labor rights unions were critical of this revision. The
Asia Floor Wage Alliance (AFW), a coalition of trade unions, labor rights groups, and human rights
organizations across Asia, estimated that the 2013 wage for the lowest-grade skilled worker in the RMG
sector was 2.25 times lower than their estimated living wage (see Exhibit 2). 40 The AFW held that wages
should cover the requirements of a family, including a child and an unpaid caregiver, allow for savings,
and be a floor rather than a cap. The AFW’s calculations assumed that a family included the worker
and two dependent adults (or one dependent adult and two children, or four children). The wage was
calculated by determining the cost of food (3,000 calories per day per adult) and doubling that amount.
The assumption was that 40% of the wage was spent on clothing, housing, children’s education, and
health expenses, and 10% on discretionary income, including savings or pension, and some
entertainment. 41
The Bangladesh government also adopted certain amendments to the Bangladesh Labor Act (BLA).
Although a number of amendments were positive, labor reform organizations felt that they still fell
short of international standards. One positive measure was the abolition of the rule that required the
Labor Ministry to share the list of trade union members with the employer as part of the union’s
registration process. However, certain rules created conditions under which employers could influence
the representation from the worker participation committees. The rules abolished the right to strike,
which violated international labor standards. Laws also continued to prohibit workers from forming
labor unions in export processing zones. The Clean Clothes Campaign, an organization focused on
improving working conditions in the garment and sportswear industry, found that despite reports of
300 new unions registered, a number of applications for registering unions were denied in 2015. It also
found that of the 300 new unions registered, nearly a third did not exist due to closure or relocation of
factories. 42
An Assessment: The NYU Stern Reports

A 2014 study by the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, “Business as Usual is Not
an Option,” on the RMG industry supply chain discussed the widespread nature of subcontracting in
the Bangladesh RMG industry. According to the report, factories engaged in subcontracting for several
reasons. There was economic rationale for subcontracting, since the government provided economic
incentives to factories with large production volumes. Banks also preferred to offer more capital to
factories with a large number of sales contracts. The report explained: “Numerous interviews across
the garment sector reveal that different forms of subcontracting have long been an essential feature of
the industry. An experienced compliance manager for a different European brand recounted a typical
example in which a factory with a capacity of 100,000 pieces/month takes orders for 10 times that many
pieces, does the most complicated (and therefore profitable) orders in the main factory, and
subcontracts the rest.” 43 Subcontracting also allowed factories to deal with the time and price pressure
as well as fluctuating demand and production delays. However, the practice also had detrimental
effects. Often, subcontracts were re-subcontracted. This process led to much lower margins at the
bottom of the production chain, restricting the ability of such smaller factories to improve safety and
working conditions.
In 2015, the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights released a second report, “Beyond
the Tip of the Iceberg: Bangladesh’s Forgotten Apparel Workers.” The report highlighted that although
the Accord and the Alliance were significant steps to address safety and working conditions, the two
programs covered only 27% of the factories in Bangladesh. 44 According to the report, over 7,000
factories were involved in garment manufacturing, with 1,900 covered by the Accord and the Alliance
(see Exhibit 3). 45 The 2015 NYU report based its assessment on a comparison of the lists of factories
published by the Alliance, the Accord, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters
Association (BGMEA), the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA),
and the Bangladesh government. 46 The report highlighted the great diversity among factories. Of the
total factories, nearly half worked directly with retailers, while the remainder worked as subcontract
factories, often involved in just one aspect of manufacture. Whereas factories associated with the
Accord and the Alliance had a median size of 1,200 workers, informal factories not listed for direct
export were estimated to have a median size of 55 workers. 47 As a result, of the collective $280 million d
committed to improving the conditions of the garment factory workers in Bangladesh, almost none
was being apportioned for factories involved in indirectly manufacturing for export. 48
The 2015 NYU report also highlighted that although 3,425 inspections had been conducted under
the Accord and the Alliance, only six factories had passed the inspection, and two had completed the
requisite remediation necessary to meet the safety standards. 49 On average, factories had fixed 56% of
the original renovations required to meet the standards. 50 Other reports indicated that 57 factories were
on track to complete remediation as per their corrective action plans; however, a majority of factories
were behind schedule. 51 The authors of the 2015 NYU report believed that the high cost of electrical
and structural improvements was the reason for so few factories being completely fixed; the Alliance
estimated that the average cost of remediation was $250,000–$350,000 per factory. 52 In fact, despite
reports of improvement, progress seemed slow and was hindered by the reluctance of both the retailers
and the factory owners to undertake the necessary expenditure.
In a public statement in December 2015, the BGMEA challenged the 2015 NYU report, stating that
it was untrue and expressing concern that the report would have a negative impact on the RMG sector.
d This included commitments by foreign governments and humanitarian agencies.
The BGMEA also denied the existence of illegal subcontracts, mentioning that while subcontracting
did exist, it was undertaken with the consent of the buyers. 53
What Next?
Walmart had faced a lot of criticism for its sourcing practices after the Tazreen fire. In addition to
joining the Alliance, in May 2013, it revised its sourcing policy. The new policy included detailed
provisions on fire and building safety. Walmart also announced that it would undertake thorough
safety inspections of all its supplier factories. The new guidelines adopted a “zero-tolerance” approach
to unauthorized subcontracting. 54 While the 2012 sourcing guidelines had merely required suppliers
to disclose any facilities to which they had subcontracted production, the new policy stated, “Walmart
may immediately terminate its relationship with any supplier engaging in any unauthorized
subcontracting when sourcing merchandise for Walmart.” 55 Debate continued about appropriate
policies. For example, zero-tolerance policies were criticized for driving routine subcontracting
practices further underground, away from scrutiny. 56
The RMG sector was the mainstay of Bangladesh’s economy. Competitive pricing and availability
of labor had enabled the industry to maintain an advantage over other garment manufacturing hubs.
However, while factory owners were responsible for the safety and well-being of their employees, they
also faced constant pressure from buyers and brands to keep manufacturing costs low. Retailers and
brands, in turn, faced pressure from consumers and competition to provide trendy clothing in a variety
of designs at low prices. They also were responsible to their investors and shareholders. What could be
done to develop a sustainable middle ground for dealing with these pressures while upholding labor
rights and ensuring worker safety?
318-028 -7-
Exhibit 1 The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety

Source: The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety, “About the Accord,” http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/Accord_infographic.pdf,
accessed July 2017.
-8-
318-028
“Tailored Wages 2014,” Clean Clothes Campaign, https://cleanclothes.org/livingwage/tailoredwages/tailored-wage-report-pdf, accessed July 2017.
Actual Wage vs. Living Wage
Exhibit 2
Source:
-9-
NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, “Garment Factories in Bangladesh,” http://people.stern.nyu.edu/twadhwa/bangladesh/maps.html, accessed
318-028
RMG Factories in Bangladesh
July 2017.
Exhibit 3
Source:
Endnotes
1 Marc Bain, “Years after the Rana Plaza tragedy, too many of Bangladesh’s factories are still ‘death traps,’” Quartz, October 25,
2011, http://qz.com/530308/more-than-two-years-after-the-rana-plaza-tragedy-too-many-of-bangladeshs-factories-are-still-
death-traps/, accessed July 2017.
2 Syed Zain Al-Mahmood and Tom Wright, “Collapsed Factory Was Built Without Permit,” The Wall Street Journal, April 25,
2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323789704578444280661545310, accessed July 2017.
3 Ker Than, “Bangladesh Building Collapse Due to Shoddy Construction,” National Geographic, April 26, 2013,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130425-bangladesh-dhaka-building-collapse-world/, accessed July
2017.
4 Julfikar Ali Manik and Jim Yardley, “Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores Dead,” The New York Times, April 24,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-building-collapse.html, accessed July 2017.
5 Syed Zain Al-Mahmood and Tom Wright, “Collapsed Factory Was Built Without Permit.”
6 “Rags in the Ruins,” The Economist, May 4, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21577124-tragedy-shows-need-

radical-improvement-building-standards-rags-ruins, accessed July 2017.
7 Tansy Hopkins, “Reliving the Rana Plaza factory collapse: a history of cities in 50 buildings, day 22,”The Guardian, April 23,
2015, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/23/rana-plaza-factory-collapse-history-cities-50-buildings, accessed
July 2017.
8 “Power generators linked to Dhaka building collapse,” BBC News, May 3, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
22404461, accessed July 2017. Also see Tansy Hopkins, “Reliving the Rana Plaza factory collapse: a history of cities in 50
buildings, day 22.”
9 Syed Zain Al-Mahmood and Christina Passariello, “Bangladesh Victims Demand Payback,” The Wall Street Journal, October
24, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304069604579153553776683312, accessed July 2017.
10 Tony Burke, “Walmart and others fail to show up to compensation discussions for Bangladesh factory victims,” Left Foot
Forward, September 13, 2013, http://leftfootforward.org/2013/09/walmart-and-others-fail-to-show-up-to-compensation-
discussions-for-bangladesh-factory-victims/, accessed July 2017.
11 Ruma Paul, “Primark, Loblaw pay out to Bangladesh factory victims,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
bangladesh-retailers-compensation-idUSBRE99N09J20131024, accessed July 2017.
12 “Bursting at the seams,” The Economist, October 24, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21588393-workers-
continue-die-unsafe-factories-industry-keeps-booming-bursting-seams, accessed July 2017.
13 Tansy Hopkins, “After two years, the Rana Plaza fund finally reaches its $30m target,” The Guardian, June 10, 2015,
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/jun/10/rana-plaza-fund-reaches-target-compensate-victims,
accessed July 2017.
14 Sarah Butler, “Benetton agrees to contribute to Rana Plaza compensation fund,” The Guardian, February 20, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/20/benetton-agrees-contribute-rana-plaza-compensation-fund, accessed
July 2017.
15 Tansy Hopkins, “After two years, the Rana Plaza fund finally reaches its $30m target.”
16 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Rana Plaza 3 Years On: Compensation, Justice, Worker’s Safety,” April 23, 2016, p. 7-9,
https://cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/rana-plaza-three-years-on-compensation-justice-and-workers-safety-full-
report, accessed July 2017.
17 “Bangladesh murder trial over Rana Plaza factory collapse,” BBC News, June 1, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-32956705, accessed July 2017.
18 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, “Signatories,” http://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/, accessed July
2017.
10
19 John A. Quelch and Margaret L. Rodriguez, “Rana Plaza: Workplace Safety in Bangladesh (B),” Harvard Business School
and Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health No. 9-514-035 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2015),
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20 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Comparison: The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and the Gap/Walmart
Scheme,” July 10, 2013, https://cleanclothes.org/resources/background/comparison-safety-accord-and-the-gap-walmart-
scheme, accessed April 2017.
21 Mary Jan Bolle, Bangladesh Apparel Factory Collapse: Background in Brief, Congressional Research Service, January 10, 2014, p.
14, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43085.pdf, accessed July 2017.
22 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, “Dispute Resolution Process as agreed by the Steering Committee on 10th
April 2014,” http://bangladeshaccord.org/2014/04/dispute-resolution-process-agreed-steering-committee-10th-april-2014/,
accessed July 2017.
23 Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, “Membership,” http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/who-we-
are/membership, accessed July 2017.
24 Mary Jan Bolle, Bangladesh Factory Collapse: Background in Brief, p. 14.
25 Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, “Members Agreement,” http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files/Alliance-

Member-Agreement-FINAL.pdf, accessed April 2017.
26 Jimmy Donaghey and Juliane Reinecke, “When Industrial Democracy Meets Corporate Social Responsibility—A
Comparison of the Bangladesh Accord and Alliance as Responses to the Rana Plaza Disaster,” British Journal of Industrial
Relations, Vol. 0007-1080, April 2017, p. 2.
27 Sarah Karim, “IFC Cleaner-Production Initiative Yields Significant Savings for Bangladeshi Textile Factories,” IFC, October
17, 2011, http://ifcext.ifc.org/IFCExt/Pressroom/IFCPressRoom.nsf/0/3F39F8701FDB88378525792C004BBC1E, accessed July
2017; and Simon Zadek, “Reinventing Global Trade,” OpenDemocracy, April 16, 2007,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/global_mfa_4528.jsp, accessed July 2017.
28 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Rana Plaza 3 Years on: Compensation, Justice, Worker’s Safety,” p. 14.
29 Marc Bain, “Years after the Rana Plaza tragedy, too many of Bangladesh’s factories are still ‘death traps.’”
30 Tazlina Zamila Khan, “Accord, Alliance bungling RMG factory inspections,” Dhaka Tribune, June 10, 2014,
http://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2014/jun/10/accord-alliance-bungling-rmg-factory-inspections, accessed July
2017.
31 “Bangladesh clothing industry accuses European buyers’ alliance Accord of interference,” bdnews24.com, June 16, 2015,
http://bdnews24.com/business/2015/06/16/bangladesh-clothing-industry-accuses-european-buyers-alliance-accord-of-
interference, accessed July 2017.
32 Sarah Labowitz and Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, “Business as Usual is Not an Option,” NYU Stern Center for Business and
Human Rights, April 2014, p. 39, http://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/con_047408.pdf, accessed
April 2017.
33 Sarah Labowitz and Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, “Business as Usual is Not an Option,” p. 57.
Relations, Vol. 0007-1080, April 2017, pp. 17-18.
Relations, Vol. 0007-1080, April 2017, pp. 17-18.
36 “Accord, Alliance not required after 2018, govt tells EP team,” NewAge, November 18, 2016,
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37 “Accord, Alliance not required after 2018, govt tells EP team,” NewAge.
38 ILO, “Improving working conditions in the ready made garment industry: Progress and achievements,” September 2016,
http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Whatwedo/Projects/WCMS_240343/lang--en/index.htm, accessed July 2017.
11
39 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Bangladesh Minimum Wage,” November 21, 2013,

http://www.cleanclothes.org/livingwage/bangladesh-minimum-wage, accessed July 2017.
40 “Precarious Work in the Walmart Global Value Chain,” Asia Floor Wage Alliance, May 31, 2016, p. 55,
http://asia.floorwage.org/workersvoices/reports/precarious-work-in-the-walmart-global-value-chain, accessed April 2017.
41 Ananya Bhattacharjee, Ashim Roy, Kajal Bharadwaj, and Sangeeta Ghosh, “Towards an Asia Floor Wage,” Asia Floor Wage
Alliance, November 2015, p. 62, http://asia.floorwage.org/resources/essays-and-reports/towards-an-asia-floor-wage/view,
accessed July 2017.
42 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Rana Plaza 3 Years on: Compensation, Justice, Worker’s Safety,” p. 18-19.
43 Sarah Labowitz and Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, “Business as Usual is Not an Option,” p. 18.
44 Sarah Labowitz and Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, “Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: Bangladesh’s Forgotten Apparel Workers,”
NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, December 2015, p. 27,
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/twadhwa/bangladesh/downloads/beyond_the_tip_of_the_iceberg_report.pdf, accessed July
2017.
p. 27.
p. 19.
p. 27.
p. 29.
p. 28.
52 Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, “Remediation,” http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/what-we-

do/remediation, accessed April 2017.
53 “BGMEA slams New York University study on Bangladesh RMG workers,” Dhaka Tribune, December 21, 2015,
http://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2015/dec/21/bgmea-slams-new-york-university-study-bangladesh-rmg-workers,
accessed July 2017.
54 Walmart, “Walmart announces plan to raise inspection standards and provide full transparency on safety conditions at all
factories in its Bangladesh supply chain,” May 14, 2013, http://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/news-
archive/2013/05/14/walmart-to-raise-inspection-standards-provide-full-transparency-safety-conditions-factories-bangladesh-
supply-chain, accessed April 2017.
55 Walmart, “Standards for Suppliers Manual,” March 2014, p. 32,
http://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/7c/c3/3d339cb74ec9a2fad98fd43d3589/standards-for-suppliers-manual-english.pdf,
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56 Jenny Avnis, “The way to start a real fashion revolution: put Bangladesh’s invisible garment factories on a map,” Quartz,
April 24, 2015, https://qz.com/390238/to-avoid-another-rana-plaza-lets-start-mapping-bangladeshs-invisible-garment-
factories/, accessed April 2017.
12

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REV: AUGUST 1, 2018

The Ready-Made Garment Industry: A Bangladeshi

Accord and Alliance

Legal and Policy Changes

An Assessment: The NYU Stern Reports

d This included commitments by foreign governments and humanitarian agencies.

Exhibit 1 The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety

Ahmedabad from May 2024 to Sep 2024.

RMG Factories in Bangladesh

6 “Rags in the Ruins,” The Economist, May 4, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21577124-tragedy-shows-need-

25 Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, “Members Agreement,” http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files/Alliance-

39 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Bangladesh Minimum Wage,” November 21, 2013,

52 Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, “Remediation,” http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/what-we-

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