FRENCH ARMY FAILURES IN INDOCHINA AND ALGERIA

MASTER SERGEANT JOSEPH R. CARRETERO

UNITED STATES ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY

NON-RESIDENT COURSE CLASS 35

MSG JOSEPH R. CARRETERO

I. Introduction

A. During the late 1950s and 1960s, the French Army fought and lost two large

scale counterinsurgency wars in Algeria and Indochina. The French Army lost these

conflicts because they were unprepared to fight this type of warfare.

B. The French Army and Government were unprepared to fight

II. Root causes of failure on the battlefied:

A. No strategic objectives in Indochina for the military

1. No clear objectives dictated by the French Government in Indochina to achieve

Success

2. Clear objectives by the enemy in Indochina to force a defeat so the French

would negotiate on their terms

B. French Army used wrong tactics in Algeria

1. Alienated the population of Algeria by using harsh tactics and methods

2. Used wrong tactics in dealing with the insurgency, which made it stronger

C. French Colonial government overextended and sensitive to world opinion

1. The French government attempted keep control over a vast worldwide

number of territories during a time in history when independence of

European colonies and nationalism was widespread

2. French government unable and also unwilling to commit the necessary

forces to achieve victory in the battlefield and very susceptible to world

opinion

It is important to understand the history and factors that led to the failure of these two

wars for the French so we can avoid making the same mistakes in the current Global

War on Terrorism. The lessons learned have implications for our government and for

Soldiers engaged in Iraq or Afghanistan.

 The French occupation of Algeria which started in 1830 led to a colonial situation in which a minority of

European settlers (mainly French) their descendants dominated the Algerian economy. The French maintained

control through monopolies of political power and intimidation. During the first half of the Twentieth Century,

various local native leaders sought first to participate in the political process and obtain greater autonomy for

the large Muslin majority. Those efforts were ignored by the French. This was a critical mistake on the part of

the French government when the Algerian discontent at least at this time was manageable.

The young Muslin radicals then initiated and founded a movement called CRUA by its French initials

which roughly translated to The Committee of Unity and Action. It started with several hundred and grew to

several thousand militants. They started attacking French military posts in many parts of the country. The

militants in the process of making an impact killed many European civilians. The French over responded by

killing a far larger number of Muslims. These events in the middle 1950’s polarized the European and Muslin

communities and the initial small insurrection became a widespread revolution. The French Army and

government built up their forces by the hundreds of thousands, eventually reaching half a million. The French

government believed that a massive amount of troops were the answer to pacify the country. This large number

of troops, which was resented by the general population initially, brought most of Algeria under physical

control. In the late 1950’s the French Army was the closest it would be to victory. The CRUA grew to become

the FLN; National Liberation Front and all Algerians of many political persuasions joined and supported this

movement.

Towards the late 1950’s, the political leadership in France itself was very sensitive to world opinion and

the escalating violence in Algeria. The French nation was becoming very much torn with the Algeria

“problem.”; much like the Vietnam war did to the United States in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. This French

army and the local French Algerians undermined the government so much that it brought down the French

Fourth Republic and the legendary General Charles de Gaulle became head of the government.

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 The French government tried at that time to institute radical changes in Algeria and to offer Algerians full

French citizenship and become full partner in the new Republic. Although this approach probably would have

given good results years ago, it was too little, too late. The majority of Algerians rejected these French political

overtures and campaigned to win world support for Algerian independence. This was the period of the

decolonization by the European countries throughout the world, which was mandated by the United Nations.

Several local groups also fought local French civil authority and launched a campaign of terror against Muslims

which did not help the French government make their case. In my opinion, the government was unwilling to be

flexible in the beginning or to listen to the people. In the later stages when the government tried to craft a

political solution, the independence movement was then too large to contain. In 1962 after several hundred

thousand dead Algerians and wide destruction and to the dismay of the French Army, Algeria was granted full

independence.

A similar situation evolved in Indochina which the French dominated for many years, Following the

Japanese surrender, the French again took over Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh did not want for the French to reassume

their colonial power and having been trained in Communist China and the Soviet Union, initiated a movement

for independence. When the French bombed the port city of Haiphong in 1946, this is when The French

Indochina War officially begun, In many ways this war was nothing but a prelude of the US involvement

there and the Vietnam War.

The clear objective of Ho Chi Minh and his followers was simple, complete independence of the North

and South parts of the country from the French by weaken the political will of the French and its army to stay

and fight on. As with the Americans later on, the French had superior firepower and military technology. The

French main objective was to maintain the status quo and keep the politicians at home content with French

population and world public opinion. This insurgency in Indochina quickly became a protracted war. In this

war the French failed to win the support of the people who found easier (and safer) to support the Vietminh

as they were called early in the war.

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 From 1946 through 1950, the war in Indochina was much like in Algeria and was fought as a series of

guerrilla actions. After Chinese Communists were victorious in China, they started providing more training,

weapons and political support to Ho Chi Minh and the northern part of the country where the Communists had

consolidated power. This external support was not existent in the Algerian conflict. The heavy weapons

provided by China, were used by Ho Chi Minh to mount powerful offensives against the French Army. The

Vietnamese incurred very heavy losses more often than not but gained tactical superiority over the French.

The French used massive amounts of Soldiers to draw the Vietminh into big sets which culminated in heavy

French losses but the big battles never materialized. Much like in Algeria, by using heavy handed tactics and

in Indochina using constant bombardment from the safety of the air, the French almost assured that the

population stayed with Ho Chi Minh and his Communist movement. At the time the US provided billions of

dollars to the French in order to stop what was seen at the time as Communist expansion. The French Army by

fighting an unconventional war with conventional weapons and tactics assured its defeat.

In 1951 after heavy losses on both sides, Ho Chi Minh negotiated with the French and received

recognition for a regime in the North within the French union of colonies. This is the period after WW II that

the Allied European powers tried to hang on to the different colonial territories at the same time that a wave of

nationalism was sweeping the world. The French were running against the tide of history. A battle of attrition

continued for years after the agreement since the French left a large number of soldiers in the North. This battle

of attrition continued up to 1954 and culminated in the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu. By this time in the war

it reached this high point at Dien Bien Phu, a large valley near the border with Laos. The French discounted the

possibility that General Giap moving heavy artillery into the surrounding hills. When the Vietnamese did, they

started a barrage of steel followed by massive human wave attacks. This ended causing thousands of casualties

on both sides as the entire world watched with keen interest, especially the United States.

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 After a two-month siege, the troops were overrun and most of the French surrendered. Leadership is

critical to any insurgency. The Vietnamese were clearly better led here with General Giap and Ho Chi Minh.

After this battle the French back home were demoralized with the heavy losses and the sinking world opinion

manifested through the United Nations. The war officially ended with the 1954 Geneva Accords, under which

France Ho Chi Minh ended with controlling the north; while a US assisted government was installed in the

south, basically partioning the country in two. This partition was supposed to be temporary and the Geneva

Accords also called for elections in 1956. France’s defeat in Indochina seriously damaged its prestige

elsewhere in their colonial empire and empowered the Algerians in their own insurrection. France also agreed to

withdraw from its former colonies there. The festering political problems that the French left and the flawed

Geneva Accords led to the US involvement there in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the end the fact that the French never gained the respect and assistance of the population

throughout their years there proved to be a fatal flaw of their strategy. Because of their brutal tactics

those local people that hesitated or collaborated with the French returned to their own people. There was

no viable alternative for the population on who to support. The French never developed the local military and

police forces to protect the people and they also did not invest in the infrastructure of the countries thereby

failing to make life better for its citizens.

Nation building was not one of the tenets of the French strategy. The more force the French used

against the guerrillas in Algeria and Indochina, the less effective and counterproductive it became. The

French concentrated their military forces in large garrisons and forts which were again isolated from the

mainstream population. Their hard tactics in both wars did not win them any friends. Back in that time in

history, the French Army, as most armies during that period were trained to fight conventional wars with

massive firepower, set pieces, tactics and battles. The counterinsurgencies strategies of today were not yet

developed or understood. These are all lessons learned from these failed wars that should not be repeated

during the current Global War on Terrorism.