African Affairs Advance Access published May 29, 2013

African Affairs, 1–10 doi: 10.1093/afraf/adt037

© The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved

BRIEFING
MALI: POLITICS OF A CRISIS
SUSANNA D. WING*

MALI’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE ONLY FIVE weeks away when a

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mutiny in Kati led to the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré,
often called ATT. The country’s decline into instability appeared to be rapid,
but there had been, over time, a consistent erosion of the country’s former
standing as one of Africa’s model democracies. While support for democracy
had grown during the first decade of the Third Republic under the presidency
of Alpha Oumar Konaré, it dropped steadily under ATT.1 In the months
leading up to the March 2012 coup, and the forestalled April 2012 presiden-
tial elections, discontent in the country increased dramatically. A resurgent
Tuareg rebellion, disgruntled military personnel, and growing tension around
a constitutional referendum scheduled to take place at the same time as the
presidential election all created a challenging political terrain.
Mali had earned a reputation as a democratic success story and yet the
reality was far different. In the two decades following the 1991 coup d’état
and the 1992 adoption of the constitution for the Third Republic, Mali had
used multiple building blocks of democracy to piece together a precarious
structure that would not survive a political crisis. At the same time, a
Tuareg separatist insurgency and militant Islamist uprising escalated.
While the breakdown of political order, imposition of Shari’a law in the
north, and subsequent French military intervention have gained worldwide
attention, the resolution of the crisis requires political solutions to be found
in the north and south. Elections are planned for July 2013. Questions
remain as to whether or not the entire country will be ready to hold elec-
tions, and whether hundreds of thousands of displaced people will be able
to participate. Elections that are rushed will not serve to create legitimate
government and may even further exacerbate political tensions. The alter-
native of delaying elections is not much better as the legitimacy of the
current government is weak and the influence of the junta leader Captain
Amadou Haya Sanogo remains powerful. A National Commission for
Dialogue and Reconciliation has been formed to lead the effort at

*Susanna D. Wing (swing@haverford.edu) is Associate Professor of Political Science at

Haverford College.
1. Massa Coulibaly and Michael Bratton, ‘Crisis in Mali: ambivalent popular attitudes on
the way forward’ (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 113, Michigan, February 2013).

1
2 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

inter-communal dialogue. At the same time, those groups fighting for the
creation of an Islamic state in Mali have fled to the mountains and the
desert and have continued to attack Gao, Timbuktu, and other towns.
While the Secretary-General of the MNLA (National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad), Bilal Ag Achérif, is seeking to negotiate with the
government, he has refused to disarm prior to negotiations, complicating
the prospects for peacebuilding.2
This briefing explains the political context that set the stage for Mali’s
ongoing crisis, explores the failings of Malian democracy and the recurrent
rebellions in the north, and discusses the domestic politics of the French

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intervention. It concludes by considering the multiple challenges to the
reconstruction of democracy.

Mali’s democratic model

In March 1991, student protesters gathered in the streets of Bamako
demanding an end to the dictatorship of Moussa Traoré. Shots were fired
into the crowd by troops defending Traoré’s regime and approximately
three hundred protesters were killed. This sparked a mutiny among soldiers
who refused to fire into the crowds and Lt-Col Amadou Toumani Touré
led a successful coup d’état against Moussa Traoré. He earned a reputation
as a ‘soldier of democracy’ when he did not retain power but instead
stepped aside and cleared the way for a National Conference, a new consti-
tution, and democratic elections that were held in 1992.
Mali’s democracy was never solid, but several building blocks for legitim-
ate, democratic government existed. These included civilian government
with regular elections, an independent constitutional court willing to rule
against the President, decentralization, and various participatory mechan-
isms discussed below. Malian democracy was rooted in the country’s cul-
tural heritage and heavily influenced by a French colonial legacy that
included, perhaps most importantly, a strong presidency. Dialogue, which
many argue is a central aspect of Malian political history, was a key compo-
nent of the country’s democratic foundation. Dialogue was evident in the
national conference, the regional and national forums, and an annual
Question and Answer Assembly (Espace d’interpellation démocratique,
EID). The National Conference took place in 1991 and nearly 2,000 indivi-
duals representing a broad range of society participated in reimagining
Malian government and creating the Third Republic. In addition to the
National Conference, local, regional, and national dialogues were held on
educational, healthcare, judicial, and electoral reforms, among others.

2. ‘Communiqué du MNLA: Demande de désarmement du MNLA par les Chefs d’Etats

de la CEDEAO, MNLA’, <http://bit.ly/16JjZ9D> (20 March 2013).
 MALI: THE POLITICS OF A CRISIS 3

Concertations régionales took place in 1994 as a key part of the govern-

ment’s response to the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s, which Malians often
refer to as the ‘problem of the north’. While the inclusiveness of the process
can certainly be questioned, it remains true that dialogue is commonly re-
ferred to as a central aspect of Malian culture and conflict resolution, and
that any strategy that avoids dialogue is often considered suspect. However,
a lack of resources and commitment on the part of the government meant
that these dialogues, which were also used to address educational and elect-
oral reforms, failed to bring lasting resolution to a number of important
issues including recurring rebellions, a weak educational system, and elect-

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oral irregularities.
The EID, an annual forum created to allow individuals to bring human
rights violations before responsible government officials, represents another
important example of dialogue in action. For instance, an individual with a
concern about a court case would be able to pose a question directly to the
Minister of Justice. The day’s events are broadcast on radio and television.
Unfortunately, however, this brilliant innovation was undermined by a lack
of follow-through, and a pattern of government ministers making eloquent
interventions while avoiding the central issues at hand.3 Such lack of com-
mitment on the part of individuals within the government was all too
frequent.
Mali gained a reputation as a model democracy after free and fair elec-
tions in 1992 and 2002 resulted in peaceful transitions to newly elected pre-
sidents. After winning the 1992 presidential elections, Alpha Oumar
Konaré served his constitutional limit of two terms in office. Elections,
however, were by no means smooth. In 1997, the opposition boycotted the
polls in protest against irregularities in the voter rolls and the activities of
the ruling party, the Alliance pour la Démocratie en Mali (ADEMA). In
2002, ATT was elected President as an independent. His lack of party affili-
ation would become a core challenge to Mali’s democracy, as discussed
below. Before the coup in 2012, Mali was just one month away from what
most observers expected to be another peaceful transfer of power from one
civilian president to another. As Malians prepared to go to the polls there
was excitement over the lack of a clear front-runner, but also suspicion that
elections would not be truly free and fair, and that the outcome might be
manipulated.4 In recognition of the need for electoral reforms, ATT had
appointed a constitutional review commission whose proposals were to be
put before the electorate as a constitutional referendum in 2012. Against
this, the collective ‘Touche-pas à ma constitution’, an organization of over

3. Susanna D. Wing, Constructing Democracy in Africa: Mali in transition (Palgrave,

New York, NY, 2010).
4. Interview, opposition leader, Bamako, 6 October 2011.
4 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

70 local associations, challenged the proposed constitutional referendum,

arguing that it would reinforce the power of the presidency.5
Thus, while Mali’s democratic standing in the world relied heavily on
elections and civil liberties, including freedom of association and freedom
of the press, elections were obviously not sufficient to consolidate democ-
racy.6 Beneath the surface serious problems were festering and these
would soon contribute to a coup d’état and the subsequent failure of the gov-
ernment to control its own territory in the face of separatists and religious
militants.

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Malian democracy falters
In the middle of a US-funded military training seminar, a Malian military
officer asked: ‘When is it okay to have a coup in a democracy?’7 A Malian
who assisted in the seminar shared the quote with me as evidence of how
far the country still needs to go in terms of democracy. The statement is not
surprising given Malian history, where coups d’état have been a method of
regime change. It also sheds light on the March 2012 coup – which many
Malians who are deeply committed to democracy saw as an essential first
step to ending widespread corruption within the state as well as halting state
involvement in illicit criminal activities. Ironically, for many Malians the
only way to get democracy back on track was a coup d’état, and the current
rush towards elections is viewed with suspicion and the fear that hurried
elections will only bring Mali right back to the pre-coup status quo.8 This
may be linked to Malian history, in which a coup d’état by Moussa Traoré
overturned the dictatorial regime of Modibo Keita in 1968, and multi-party
politics was introduced after Traoré’s regime was overthrown by ATT in
1991. It can also be linked to a lack of trust in the National Assembly and
the Office of the President. Only 42 and 43 percent of the population trust
these institutions, respectively, which is substantially lower than the 67
percent of the population that trusts the military.9
The extent to which Malians perceived democracy to be in decline is
evident in interviews conducted in 2004 by former US Ambassador to Mali,
Robert Pringle. Malians specified multiple failures of democracy – including

5. Issa Fakaba Sissoko, ‘Referendum: ‘Touche pas à ma constitution!’, Journal du Mali,

12 September 2011, <http://www.journaldumali.com/article.php?aid=3614> (20 March 2013).
6. Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the world 2013: democratic breakthoughs in the balance’,
2013, < http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013> (26 March
2013).
7. Anonymous military officer being trained by the United States government, Bamako,
1997.
8. Jean Goita, ‘Tenue des élections générales: La COPAM dénonce l’imposture du FDR’,
Le Pouce, 22 March 2013, <http://bit.ly/165qpi6> (22 March 2013).
9. Coulibaly and Bratton, ‘Crisis in Mali’, p. 3.
 MALI: THE POLITICS OF A CRISIS 5

systemic corruption; a failing and corrupt judicial system; weak political

parties and no opposition; and incivisme or lack of civility within communi-
ties.10 Incivisme often refers to the refusal to pay taxes or lack of commitment
to one’s community, and might also be viewed as a lack of social capital.
Democracy was further eroded as ATT undermined dialogue and the oppos-
ition through what he called ‘consensus politics’. As an independent, with no
political party allegiance, ATT built a large coalition of political parties and
co-opted the opposition. Whereas the opposition had been very vocal during
the ten years of Konaré’s presidency, this dropped precipitously under ATT.
The opportunity to be part of the presidential coalition offered too many

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perks for politicians who were easily co-opted. The end result was that the
opposition was silenced, and a political elite who seemed to have no concern
for the daily struggles of ordinary people gained influence and power. A
culture of corruption and impunity was spreading rapidly among the political
class.
Another aspect of Malian democracy that was undermined during ATT’s
presidency was decentralization. Political decentralization has a long
history in Mali and was used, in part, as a tool to address Tuareg grie-
vances. The idea that greater vertical accountability could be achieved
through decentralized local governance had great currency in Mali, and
throughout the 1990s over 700 communes (or municipalities) were created
and elections for local councillors held. Unfortunately, these plans were not
implemented effectively; they even increased opportunities for corruption
at the local level. Resources and responsibilities were not transferred as
required by the programme, and in many cases confusion arose over re-
sponsibilities at multiple administrative levels. This confusion also allowed
corrupt individuals to use a lack of budget transparency to their own advan-
tage.11 In addition, Tuareg leaders like Iyad Ag Ghali or Alghabass Ag
Intalla, who argued for decentralization, ultimately seemed to have little
interest in the process as they ended up working closely with the central
government: Iyad as a diplomat, Alghabass Ag Intalla as a deputy in the
National Assembly. Moreover, while decentralization was a centrepiece of
Konaré’s regime, there was little political commitment to the project
during ATT’s two terms. This led to widespread disillusionment with the
government.
Despite the creation of the Office of the Auditor General (Vérificateur
général) and promises to stamp out corruption, the problem grew worse

10. Robert Pringle, ‘Democratization in Mali: putting history to work’ (United States
Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 2006), pp. 23–6.
11. Susanna D. Wing and Brehima Kassibo, ‘Comparative assessment of decentralization in
Africa: Mali desk study’ (United States Agency for International Development, Washington,
DC, July 2010), <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/
governance/decentralization_in_africa.html> (22 March 2013).
6 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

daily. The apparent complicity of state authorities in drug trafficking

created a dangerous partnership between AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb), other criminals in the north, and state officials.12 Accountability
eroded and democracy became a hollow shell. For many observers, the
current crisis in Mali is tied primarily to the MNLA separatists and Islamist
militants linked to AQIM, MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in
West Africa), or Ansar Dine. However, there is little doubt that the erosion
of democracy, rise of criminality, and impunity of state officials are at the
very root of the Malian crisis, and that these processes opened the door for
various groups to flourish in the north, gaining territory and, in some

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instances, popular legitimacy.

Recurrent rebellions
Historically, the Tuareg are a nomadic population and have often ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the states within which they reside to rule over
them. Today, many live in what they refer to as ‘Azawad’ – territory that
overlaps with parts of Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Libya. In Mali, the
‘problem of the north’ smouldered for years, boiling over periodically.
Following the end of Traoré’s reign, the Malian government responded to
Tuareg rebellions and demands for increased autonomy and development
by signing the National Pact (1992) and the Algiers Accord (2006). The
lack of implementation of these agreements is one major contributing
factor to the current crisis. These various agreements designated ‘special
status’ for the north and increased the region’s responsibility for its own se-
curity by reducing the presence of the Malian military. Although discrimin-
ation and abuse of Tuareg by soldiers who were predominantly from the
south had triggered the demand for increased autonomy and reduced mili-
tary presence, unfortunately the pullback of the state helped create more
opportunities for criminal behaviour. State officials (Tuareg and others)
participated in the growing lucrative criminal activity in the north, including
cigarette and drug trafficking. Peace agreements have also included the
training and integration of Tuareg into the Malian army, with further unin-
tended consequences. Three of the four military units operating in north-
ern Mali defected after the insurgency began in January 2012, bringing
arms and as many as 1,600 troops with them to join the MNLA.13

12. Wolfram Lacher, ‘Organized crime and conflict in the Sahel-Sahara region’ (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, September 2012), <http://bit.ly/
PeI6E1> (10 February 2013).
13. Adam Nossiter, Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazzetti, ‘French strikes in Mali supplant
caution of the US’, The New York Times, 13 January 2013, <http://nyti.ms/14cjZz9> (22
March 2013).
 MALI: THE POLITICS OF A CRISIS 7

The MNLA was founded in November 2011. This Tuareg separatist

group began an armed insurgency in January 2012. Tuareg leaders, some
of whom had fought for Gaddafi and were returning to Mali after his death,
were empowered by the influx of arms and seized the opportunity to chal-
lenge the Malian army and restart an insurgency in the north. Iyad Ag
Ghali, a prominent Tuareg figure, initially sought a leadership role in the
MNLA but was rebuffed. He then distinguished himself almost immediate-
ly by announcing the desire to create an Islamist state, thereby challenging
the predominantly secular nature of the MNLA. The collapse of ATT’s
regime provided a perfect opportunity for MNLA to make rapid territorial

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advances in the north. Several religious groups worked in conjunction with
the MNLA. These included Iyad Ag Ghali’s organization Ansar Dine,
AQIM, and MUJAO. The collaboration among these groups fell apart
shortly after the MNLA had gained control of the three key northern cities
of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. It rapidly became clear that the MNLA was
powerless to stop the takeover by the fundamentalist Islamist militants.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar broke from AQIM and created the Signed in Blood
Battalion that led the attack on Al Amenas, Algeria.
At the same time, the Tuareg are a minority population in Mali and the
diversity of peoples living in the north complicates the demand for an inde-
pendent Tuareg state of Azawad. As the MNLA conquered territory in the
north many Tuareg fled the region, along with Songhai, Fulani, and others
living in the area. There are also multiple, diverse Tuareg communities that
include various clans and castes. Power struggles among these different
groups have contributed to the proliferation of conflict.
Iyad Ag Ghali has played a prominent role in this process, first as the
leader of the Tuareg rebellions in the 1990s as head of the MPLA (Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad). He also served as a principal
Tuareg negotiator with the government during the 1990s and he helped to
negotiate an end to the rebellion, including the integration of Tuareg into
the civil service and military. In 1999 and 2003 he played a central role in
negotiations between the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC) and the government for the release of hostages. In 2008,
2010, and 2011 he served again as a negotiator.14 He reportedly negotiated
ransom payments between foreign governments, Mali, and AQIM, and
received a significant cut of these transfers. While he helped negotiate
peace agreements with the government, he did not always have the author-
ity to do so as far as other Tuareg leaders were concerned. These leaders
viewed Iyad Ag Ghali with a great deal of suspicion because of his close ties
with the government. In recognition of his role as an intermediary between

14. Steve Metcalf, ‘Iyad Ag Ghaly – Mali’s Islamist leader’, BBC, 17 July 2012, <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18814291> (28 March 2013).
8 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Tuareg and the government, Ag Ghali was given a diplomatic position in

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, which he held from 2007 to 2010, only to be ejected
from the country for supposedly interacting with extremists. As the leader
of Ansar Dine, he played an important role in the rebellion alongside the
MNLA.
Alghabass ag Intalla, a deputy in the National Assembly, was also part of
Ansar Dine until January 2013, when he distanced himself from Iyad Ag
Ghali and created his own group, the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA).
This split was clearly a move by Alghabass to separate himself from more
radical elements (AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO) in order to improve his

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position to negotiate with the government and remain relevant at the na-
tional level. The Briefing by Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh elabo-
rates further on this point, showing how groups such as Ansar Dine have
attempted to balance allegiance to global Ismalist discourses with the need
to maintain credibility as legitimate actors on the domestic scene - with
some success.15

Seeking legitimacy and rebuilding democracy

On 11 January 2013 the French intervened in Mali after interim President
Dioncounda Traoré requested their support. Nigerien President
Mahmadou Issoufou, Senegalese President Macky Sall, and Guinean
President Alpha Condé all favoured the French intervention.16 However,
despite considerable success against radical Islamic groups, French troops
have yet to act against the MNLA. Indeed, French support for the MNLA
is increasingly evident, as the group has been allowed to maintain control of
Kidal while the French and Chadian soldiers sought to root out elements of
AQIM from the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains to the north. Tensions over
French support of the MNLA will inevitably increase the longer the Malian
army is prevented from entering Kidal. The MNLA has agreed to negotiate
with the government but has refused to disarm ahead of time. Meanwhile,
many Malians feel betrayed by the French. One resident of Gao posed the
question, ‘did the French intervene to save Mali or did they intervene to
save the MNLA?’17 There are a number of reasons that may be motivating
French support for the MNLA. Primary among these is the view that the
MNLA knows the region well and can assist in efforts to fight insurgents in
the mountains and the desert, and to rescue French hostages who are being

15. Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh, ‘Briefing: The myth of global Islamic terrorism
and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel’, African Affairs, 112, 3, in press.
16. Roland Marchal, ‘Briefing: Military (mis)adventures in Mali’, African Affairs, 112, 3, in
press.
17. Peter Tinti, ‘Tacit French support of separatists in Mali brings anger, charges of betrayal’,
Christian Science Monitor, 21 March 2013, <http://bit.ly/YYtYnj> (21 March 2013).
 MALI: THE POLITICS OF A CRISIS 9

held, it is believed, in the mountains known as Adrar des Ifoghas. Were

hostages to be rescued alive, it would be a significant political boost for
President Francois Hollande.
But retaking territory and rescuing hostages is just one step to ending the
crisis: elections are planned for July 2013. The European Union, France,
and the United States have encouraged the country to move forward to
elections as soon as possible. In February 2013 the Malian National
Assembly adopted a roadmap outlining the commitment to elections in
July and building legitimate government. Within a week the EU released
€20 million of a €250 million aid package.18 This is no coincidence.

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Similarly, the United States is legally prohibited from providing aid until
after elections have been held. Resources for moving forward – funding de-
centralization and dialogue – therefore depend on donors and elections.
Nevertheless, elections too soon might do more harm than good.
There is little question that the current regime lacks legitimacy and
perhaps an elected government will enjoy greater popular support. But
there is a risk that a rapid transition back to multi-party politics will only
serve to reinforce the political challenges that faced the political class prior
to the coup d’état. COPAM, a pro-junta coalition, views elections with some
trepidation, fearing that the political challenges that faced the country in
March 2012 prior to the coup have not been addressed; and, indeed, the
entire social fabric of the country is in tatters.19 Many Malians see politi-
cians as being self-serving and far removed from the daily concerns of most
people in the country. In addition, if there are over 400,000 Malians dis-
placed when elections are held, how will these individuals be able to partici-
pate in the elections? And how will those who fled the country be helped to
go home?
The European Union has begun training Malian soldiers through the
European Union Training Mission. This is just one area in which the EU
might take action. Roland Marchal rightly emphasizes the political nature
of the conflict, arguing that national reconciliation and a new social con-
tract are crucial.20
Accusations of crimes against humanity have been made against both the
Malian military and rebel leaders. Nearly 100 Malian soldiers who had sur-
rendered the military base of Alguelhok to the MNLA were executed in
January 2012. ATT was not forthcoming with information about what had
taken place, sparking marches by the families of soldiers in Kati and
Bamako in February 2012. After the coup, as the MNLA gained territory in

18. Reuters, ‘EU to organize Mali aid conference in May’, 18 February 2013, <http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/02/18/us-mali-rebels-eu-idUSBRE91H0P720130218> (20 February
2013).
19. Goita, ‘Tenue des élections générales’.
20. Marchal, ‘Briefing: Military (mis)adventures’,
10 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

the north, many Tuareg in Bamako feared for their lives as random attacks
took place against light-skinned Tuareg. There is an ongoing fear among
many Tuareg who would like to return to Mali that, if they do return, they
will be targets for retaliatory violence.
Elections must occur throughout the territory in order to hold any legit-
imacy and yet it is unclear that the country will be able to pull this off. It is
important to remember that past polls, while generally considered free and
fair, have not been without problems. Since 1997, there have been boycotts
of elections and accusations of fraud, and in some instances electoral con-
tests have had to be repeated. Significant logistical problems with the elec-

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tions would lend credence to junta supporters such as the leader of the
political party SADI (African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence)
and presidential hopeful Oumar Mariko. If the legitimacy of elections is
called into question it is certain that many Malians will take to the streets in
protest. Elections, simply for the sake of elections under pressure from
international forces, could cause continued instability.
Tiébilé Dramé, presidential hopeful for the political party PARENA,
believes that elections are essential. He also argues for inter-communal dia-
logue with representatives from all communities as well as armed groups, so
long as they renounce violence and agree to the basic principles of an indi-
visible, democratic, and republican Mali. Dramé adds that decentralization,
the election of governors (who hitherto have always been appointed), and
the transfer of necessary resources and capacities away from the centre
could breathe life into Malian democracy.21
A Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission has been created in the
hope that real inter-communal dialogue can be organized. Even if dialogue
takes place between the Malian government and insurgents in the north,
the government has made it clear that the secularity of the state and its terri-
torial integrity are non-negotiable. The removal of Prime Minister Cheick
Modibo Diarra and his replacement by Django Cissoko in December 2012
is widely believed to have been influenced by putsch leader Captain
Sanogo, whose continued role in politics raises serious concerns about the
country’s ability to rebuild democracy. Divisions within the military, par-
ticularly between the paratrooper Presidential Guard (Red Berets) and
pro-coup infantry (Green Berets) pose a threat to the capacity of the mili-
tary to address the twin challenges of securing peace in the north and main-
taining stability in the south. All these factors combine to make Mali’s road
towards democracy a challenge, but also a real opportunity to tackle more
decisively the problems that undermined the last democratic experiment.

21. Bruno D. Segbedji, ‘Conférence-débat marquant les 24 ans du journal Les echos:
“Il faut aller le plus vite possible aux elections” dixit Tiébilé Dramé’, L’independent, 19 March
2013, <http://bit.ly/YmMlTn> (19 March 2013).