Chapter 8

Empowering Maritime Security Cooperation to Strengthen Marine Ecosystem Protection

and Maritime Sustainable Development

Huzaifah Ashraf Abdul Jamal

Abstract
This chapter highlights the significance of strategic partnership and maritime security cooperation
among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states in establishing the suitable
condition of a stable region by providing stability to explore Blue Economy (BE) potential and
sustainability in maritime ecosystem development as well as addressing emerging security threats.
Incorporating evidence from reviews of other research and the case study analysis, this chapter
provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of Maritime Security Cooperation among
ASEAN states in the region, including case studies of successful initiatives and identifies
challenges that must be addressed to achieve effective and comprehensive collaboration.
Territorial dispute and strategic trust have been identified as the main obstacles to a practical
maritime cooperation and have dominated the debate amongst the challenges. This chapter also
argues that solely depending on traditional surveillance methods in protecting marine ecosystems
are insufficient due to their lack ability to conduct continuous environmental monitoring
providing real-time data for a broad area. This issue has worsened with inadequate and outdated
asset conditions due to a lack of defence spending budget. It is found that strengthening
institutional frameworks for collaboration; enhancing capacity-building programmes; leveraging
the existing partnership in security cooperation activities and exercises; utilising technology for
real-time monitoring, and promoting information sharing among stakeholders are among the
practical recommendations to be adopted in order to enhance cooperation efforts among ASEAN
states. Overall, this chapter offers valuable insights into the complex interplay between maritime
security cooperation, sustainable development, and ecosystem protection in this region by
emphasising the need for collaborative approaches to address emerging challenges while
unlocking the BE potential for sustainable growth.

Keywords: Maritime security cooperation, blue economy, maritime sustainable development,

ASEAN

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1.0 Introduction
Maritime security cooperation is a strategic partnership approach in that the government engages
in a bilateral or multilateral agreement with other countries, including various agencies and
organisations. It is both an obligation and a necessity, especially in the complex maritime domain
of the Indo-Pacific region, as it plays a crucial element in establishing the suitable condition of a
stable region by providing stability to explore Blue Economy (BE) potential and sustainability in
maritime ecosystem development. Sam Bateman (2015) claimed without cooperation, border
disputes will increase, fisheries will be overfished, marine habitats will be destroyed, and littoral
countries may come to lack the scientific knowledge required to manage and develop their
maritime interests.
Over the past decade, the primary focus of maritime security has gradually shifted to non-
traditional threats, such as the illegitimate extraction of marine resources and the pollution of the
marine ecosystem. Therefore, maritime security cooperation is seen as one of the solutions to
strengthen marine ecosystem protection and could be done through bilateral, regional and global
frameworks. Octavian et al. (2020) suggest maritime security cooperation is the most effective
and efficient means to solve maritime security issues by conducting joint and coordinated
operations. Significantly, it also parallels the Malay proverb "Bersatu Kita Teguh, Bercerai Kita
Roboh", demonstrating that the superiority of cooperative endeavours is always preferable and
beneficial to unilateral enforcement or disputes.
However, numerous undefined and unresolved disputes pose substantial obstacles to regional
cooperation in this region (Bateman et al., 1999). They are further complicated by distrust caused
by historical precedents and political tension. Conflicting claims to offshore territory, established
suspicion and distrust among countries, competition over resources, and increasing political
tension are among the factors that contribute to difficulties in cooperation (Yinghui, 2011). Thus,
the question arises, whether maritime security cooperation among the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) states is still relevant and can be the best solution to strengthen marine
ecosystem protection and sustainable maritime development in this region. Hence, this chapter
will be divided into three sections. The importance of maritime security cooperation in this region
will be covered in Section 2. Section 3 will delve into the issues and challenges of maritime
security cooperation efforts among the ASEAN states, and Section 4 will cover the practical
recommendations for policymakers to enhance cooperation efforts among ASEAN states.

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2.0 Importance of Maritime Security Cooperation
The United States (US) President's congratulatory letter to the Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’
Seri Dr Anwar Ibrahim on January 2023 serves as important evidence in the significance of
bolstering bilateral relationships and cooperation to economic growth, security, and prosperity:

“The relationship between Malaysia and the US – built on a strong foundation of ever-
growing economic, security, and people-to-people ties has also helped strengthen
freedom, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. Together, we are advancing a
secure digital economy, tackling the climate crisis and addressing energy security
challenges” (Joe Biden, 2023).

The concept of maritime security cooperation plays a vital role in protecting marine ecosystem
resources by having better regulation and enforcement of marine protection laws, preventing
damage to the marine environment and ensuring sustainable use of ocean resources. Illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, marine pollution, and other activities that harm marine
life can be better addressed through collective efforts. Regional states can also have better
coordination on information sharing management, coordinate patrols, and effectively respond to
maritime security incidents in a timely and effective manner, eventually creating the suitable
condition for exploring the potential of the Blue Economy (BE) and fostering the sustainable
growth of maritime development.
Significantly, maritime security cooperation will aid in mitigating the effects of climate change,
which has been increasingly impacting the marine environment in recent years. Cooperation in
areas such as monitoring and response to climate change-related disasters can aid in mitigating
the effects of rising sea levels, ocean acidification, and other climate change effects. In addition,
maritime security cooperation is consistent with Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14),
which aims to preserve and sustain the use of oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable
development (Octavian et al., 2020).
The 1982 United Nations Convention on The Law of The Sea (UNCLOS), moreover, requires
cooperation on the marine environment's ecosystem protection (Bateman, 1999). Article 61
requires the conservation of the Exclusive Economic Zone's (EEZ) resources and Article 192
obligates the states to protect the marine environment. Article 6 of the Declaration on the Code of
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOD) also stipulates maritime cooperation, but the
implementation effect in the past ten years has yet to be particularly satisfactory (Duo Ding, 2020).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreement on the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources also provides opportunities for many countries in the region to cooperate
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on environmental matters (Bateman et al, 1996). From the academic perspective, maritime
security cooperation also parallels Ken Booth's Trinity theory that analyses the Navy's universal
role and function, which consists of the military, constabulary and diplomacy roles. These
common functions, especially for the constabulary function and supported by the diplomacy role,
bring about simplicity in formulating a cooperation framework with other countries, both bilateral
and multilateral (Octavian et al., 2020).
Regionally, Indonesia is among the ASEAN states actively promoting maritime security
cooperation on sustainable development. Indonesia has stressed cooperation and collaboration in
strengthening maritime sustainability and marine ecosystem protection through the Indonesian
Maritime Fulcrum. In the 2014 East Asia Summit, President Joko Widodo presented the five
pillars of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum: to rebuild Indonesia's maritime culture, maintain
and manage marine resources, develop maritime infrastructure and connectivity, enhance its
maritime diplomacy and develop its maritime preferences (Witular, 2014).
Furthermore, the interagency collaboration between maritime and energy-related companies with
maritime enforcement agencies is another evidence of maritime security cooperation's importance
in enhancing maritime security. For instance, In Malaysia, under the supervision of the Group
Security Department, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) has coordinated several
interagency collaborations by conducting interoperability collaboration and coordination with
other government agencies. PETRONAS has collaborated with the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) to enhance the safety and
security of Malaysia's offshore oil and gas facilities and has also signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) to strengthen collaboration in security
management practices (PETRONAS, 2022).
Also, Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC Berhad) and RMN have conducted
Exercise Naga Emas annually to evaluate RMN Special Force’s capability in combating maritime
violence (Chang, 2015). These justifications serve as the driving factor for the ASEAN states to
increase their cooperative efforts in maritime security in this region. However, numerous issues
and challenges pose substantial obstacles to regional cooperation development Therefore, the next
section will discuss the issues and challenges imposed on maritime security cooperation efforts
among the ASEAN states.

3.0 Issues and Challenges of Maritime Cooperation Efforts among the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) States
The unpredictable security environment has posed an urgent need to catalysing maritime security
cooperation among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. However, these
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issues are complicated by several issues and sensitivity regarding national sovereignty. Thus, the
following subsection investigates the issues and challenges of maritime cooperation efforts among
the ASEAN states.

3.1 Disputes and Distrust

Maritime security cooperation is one of the best solutions for resolving maritime issues, but the
implementation is more complex than it appears. It has been overshadowed by mistrust and
distrust caused by historical precedents and political tensions. Historically, territorial and
sovereignty disputes have been barriers to negotiated regional security measures (Bateman et al.,
1999). Moreover, Sam Bateman (2011) found that the Indo-Pacific region is awash with pressing
and highly complex issues that "involve many causal factors and high levels of disagreement
about the nature of a problem and the best way to handle it." Given the many political issues and
disputes among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, expecting effective
cooperation at the operational level is seen as unrealistic.
According to Zhang and Sam Bateman (2011), trust permits mandatory and essential civil
maritime cooperation to move forward without jeopardising sovereignty claims. Currently
conflated with operational trust, strategic trust has become one of the main obstacles to practical
maritime cooperation and has dominated the debate amongst the challenges. Sam Bateman states
that a strategic trust is crucial in resolving "high-level political and maritime disputes in particular"
(Zhang and Bateman, 2011). Strategic issues, such as overlapping sovereignty and claims disputes
over insular features and maritime zones, can undermine maritime security cooperation (Yinghui,
2011). Some countries strongly adhere to independence and sovereignty, and for instance, due to
its complexity and multilateral nature, the Spratly dispute has dominated the debate and stands as
one of the maritime security concerns and challenges in this region (Fairuz, 2020).
Another significant factor in the dispute over territory and sovereign rights in the continental shelf
and waters surrounding the islands is economic interests, first in the alleged oil and gas in the
Spratlys region's seabed and later in the islands' potential for fisheries and eco-tourism (Bateman
et al., 1996). In addition, at the operational level, there is some doubt among regional states that
surveillance assets will be utilised for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
missions instead of maritime surveillance. Some countries are generally reluctant to agree to
cooperative activities if they appear to compromise national sovereignty or security.
It is also claimed that the Maritime Confidence and Security Building Measures (MCSBMs) are
lacking, and they can only be overcome by a greater willingness of regional states to cooperate
and has been worsened by the increase of "Naval Modernisation" or an "Arms Race" in this region,
especially among Southeast Asian countries, which has increased the mistrust (Yinghui, 2011).
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The existing mistrust can be very adverse when attempting multilateral maritime operations or
initiatives.
Disputed maritime boundary claims may result from more intrinsically difficult claims to title to
offshore territory claims (Bateman et al., 1996). They may also arise concerning overlapping
claims to continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) originating from the
uncontested territory. In the latter case, such claims are typically made with explicit resource-
based economic interests in mind, whether they be living (fisheries), non-living (oil and gas), or
environmental (eco-tourism). Disputed claims to offshore territories, such as those in the South
China Sea, will be the most difficult to resolve in the short to medium term, while disputes
involving resources rather than territorial claims appear to have a greater chance of being resolved.
It appears that the potential sources of conflict in the Indo-Pacific region are also opportunities
for environmental issues to be the focus of confidence building and cooperation. However, even
with the most comprehensive yet sophisticated maritime security cooperation framework, one
shortcoming of deploying traditional surveillance methods is the lack of continuous and persistent
environmental monitoring providing real-time data for a broad area.

3.2 Lack of Persistent Monitoring and Real-Time Information Sharing Data

Achieving maritime sustainability and marine ecosystem protection requires persistent
surveillance and complete situational understanding to facilitate the best analysis and fast
decision-making. It is nearly impossible to monitor hundreds of thousands or, in some instances,
millions of square kilometres of the sea with manned assets alone. Given the best scenario on how
this issue affected the oil pollution enforcement, it is discovered that any delay in taking an oil
pollution sample would cause the pollutant to vanish and would allow the suspected ship to leave
the area (Sutarji Kasmin, 2010).
According to Iqbal Jamaluddin (2021) although Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) has done a vital
part and put much effort into safeguarding maritime boundaries, there are still loopholes or some
limitations to conducting persistent surveillance due to huge area of operation, compared to the
number of ships available as well as financial issue to maintain ageing assets. Despite a lack of
resources largely related to the annual defence budget and ageing assets, RMN still requires tools
to provide persistent surveillance to build a navy capable of performing maritime security
operations in blue water (Iqbal Jamaluddin, 2021). The current maritime security and safety issue
within territorial waters has shown that effective maritime surveillance and gathering Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) are very important for maritime security.
However, it is challenging and not flexible enough for warships to conduct persistent maritime
surveillance in the wide maritime area of operation due to limitations such as radar coverage, risk
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of collision, endurance and sustainability (Iqbal, 2021). Gunnar Jan Olsen's comment on this
mention, "the old way of sending out a plane, a frigate, or the coast guard no longer cuts it. Needs
now are about persistent environmental monitoring providing real-time data" (Jonassen, 2021).
Persistent monitoring and real-time data are crucial to facilitate the best action and fast decision-
making. It significantly parallels John Boyd's Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loops
concept, as illustrated in Figure 1, where speed greatly affects the best decision-making (Coolfire,
2019). Originally conceived for the fast-paced world of air-to-air combat, the OODA loop mirrors
Sun Tzu's thinking while accounting for current technology's ability to inform real-time decision-
making. At the American Dynamic Summit 2022, Brandon Tseng explained the significance of
John Boyd's OODA loop concept to the current warfare fundamentals: "whoever OODAs the
faster will win the battle" (Shield AI, 2023).

Figure 1: John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loops Strategy
Source: Coolfire (2019)

3.3 Inadequate Defence Budget and Outdated Asset

Military spending is a delicate matter of sovereignty for many states worldwide (Hellendorff,
2013). The military budget constraint issue in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) region refers to the challenge of balancing the need for defence spending with the
competing demands for resources. There has been growing concern in recent years that spending
the budget on infrastructure, education, healthcare, and other economic and social growth issues
has historically taken precedence over defence and security in this region (Daniel, 2018). Since
2000, military spending has skyrocketed in Southeast Asia (Hellendorff, 2013), but globally it is
still far beyond other regions to facilitate the complex maritime domain in the Indo-Pacific. Based
on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure database,

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Figure 2 shows that no Southeast Asian countries are among the top 15 military spenders in 2021
out of a total global military expenditure of US$ 2113 billion.

Figure 2: World’s top 15 military spenders in 2021

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Database (2022)

Based on the analysis of the data captured from the same source, Figure 3 shows Southeast Asia's
military expenditures increased between 2010 and 2021. Comparatively, Southeast Asia's military
spending was the lowest compared to other maritime sub-regions in the Asian continent, averaging
only US$ 39.5 billion between 2010 and 2021, while East Asia's was the highest at US$ 302.8
billion, followed by West Asia (Middle East) at US$ 185.2 and South Asia's with US$ 78.0 billion.
Figure 4, on the other hand, illustrates uneven capacities of military spending in this region where
there is a huge gap between the "Big Five" ASEAN, namely Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand,
Vietnam, and Malaysia, which collectively have spent an average 83.29% of total Southeast Asian
military expenditure in the last ten years (Mordor Intelligence, nd). For instance, between 2012 to
2021, Singapore allocated an average of US$ 9.9 billion for its military, while Laos allocated an
average of US$ 21.5 million (460 times less than Singapore).

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 Average
Region 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
(2010-2021)

World 1803.0 1806.5 1791.4 1757.2 1750.5 1777.6 1786.9 1810.2 1859.0 1932.1 1992.2 2113.3 1848.3

Africa 32.6 36.0 36.0 38.4 40.0 38.5 37.1 36.5 34.7 35.8 36.4 39.7 36.8
North Africa 10.5 13.1 14.0 15.9 17.0 17.3 17.4 16.9 16.4 17.5 18.3 19.6 16.2
sub-Saharan Africa 22.1 22.9 21.9 22.5 23.0 21.1 19.8 19.7 18.4 18.4 18.0 20.1 20.7
Americas 940.5 930.6 883.1 821.1 775.6 761.3 758.1 756.7 778.8 818.6 856.2 883.4 830.3
Central America and the
5.5 5.9 6.3 6.7 7.0 6.8 7.4 7.0 7.6 8.4 10.2 11.0 7.5
Caribbean
North America 893.4 883.6 834.6 770.5 724.3 710.6 708.7 705.5 726.0 765.7 801.7 827.1 779.3
South America 41.6 41.0 42.1 43.9 44.4 43.9 41.9 44.2 45.2 44.5 44.3 45.3 43.5
Asia & Oceania 345.3 358.1 374.2 390.5 411.1 433.8 456.2 476.8 494.9 519.4 534.2 586.1 448.4
Oceania 23.2 22.8 22.0 21.9 23.6 25.8 28.2 28.3 28.0 29.1 30.5 35.3 26.6
South Asia 65.8 66.9 67.0 66.8 70.6 71.7 78.0 83.4 87.8 92.7 90.1 95.1 78.0
East Asia 222.7 233.7 249.0 261.9 277.2 294.4 306.2 319.6 336.8 353.6 367.5 410.8 302.8
Southeast Asia 32.4 33.4 34.7 38.2 37.9 41.6 42.2 43.9 40.7 41.9 44.3 43.1 39.5
Central Asia 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7 0.2 1.6 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.5
Europe 332.0 326.5 329.4 324.0 327.3 335.9 347.8 339.3 345.9 363.7 381.3 417.8 347.6
Central Europe 19.8 19.3 19.0 18.8 20.1 22.7 23.0 24.8 28.0 31.7 33.9 36.6 24.8
Eastern Europe 51.2 55.5 63.8 66.7 71.9 77.7 81.6 66.9 65.7 69.2 71.5 76.3 68.2
Western Europe 260.9 251.7 246.6 238.5 235.4 235.5 243.1 247.6 252.2 262.8 275.8 305.0 254.6
Middle East 152.7 155.3 168.8 183.2 196.4 208.2 187.7 200.8 204.7 194.6 184.2 186.3 185.2

Figure 3: Regional Military Spending Comparison in US$ (2010-2021)

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Database (n.d)

Figure 4: Southeast Asia Defence Market: Revenue (%) comparison in 2019

Source: Mordor Intelligence (n.d)

Defense News (2022) found that due to the economic crisis caused by the Coronavirus (COVID-
19) outbreak, many Southeast Asian countries are reducing their defence spending. Additionally,
it is found that when ASEAN states are under financial pressure, cutting defence spending is seen
as a relatively simple way to save money. Defence spending has also been slashed across all
ASEAN states except Singapore during the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (Simon, 1998). As a
result, fewer assets are available, key agencies, such as the Navy and Coast Guard, have not only

9
had to make the enforcement with fewer assets but also with existing ones that are both inadequate
and outdated which would otherwise be significant to the lack of cooperation toward
strengthening sustainable maritime development in this region. Since ASEAN members have
uneven capacities, regional cooperation has become a challenge.
However, considering the need to fight against the various types of littoral surveillance, in
preventing pollution, in responding to climate change and natural disasters as well as the lack of
military spending in this region, countries should increase their cooperation in areas of common
concern. Suggestions were also made towards utilising an ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting (ANCM)
and an ASEAN Coast Guard Forum as the mechanism for capacity-building assistance and
discussing issues relating to the high seas (RSIS, 2017). Therefore, regional states should
cooperate to improve their human and infrastructure capacity in maritime sustainability and
marine ecosystem protection and increase information sharing without undermining their
information infrastructure and national defence.

4.0 Gearing Up for the Future

The ever-changing security environment requires cooperation and innovation to address security
threats and challenges. The successful development of maritime security cooperation depends on
several factors. Therefore, this section will discuss the way forward to be implemented by ASEAN
states to overcome the issue highlighted in the previous section to have better coordination in
order to enhance the effectiveness of maritime security cooperation.

4.1 Stimulate Confidence Building Through Diplomacy

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states should take confidence-building
measures (CBMs) programmes and conduct bilateral and regional cooperation in this context.
CBMs can be military measures or broader initiatives encompassing almost anything that builds
confidence and promotes dialogue between states, including formal and informal measures,
whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, which contribute to reducing misperceptions and
uncertainty (Bateman, 2013).
Track 1, Track 2, and Track 1.5 diplomacy have all been used globally to implement CBMs, all
of which complement and reinforce one another. While Track 1 establishes the requisite
institutional foundation for regional cooperation, Track 1.5 and Track 2 offer additional channels
for dialogue and information-sharing. Through CBMs, Track 1 diplomacy between governments
has been established, leading to legally binding agreements and policies to improve maritime
security cooperation. Dipua et al. (2021) explain that track 1 diplomacy is the "formal and official
communication between governments, which often involves high-level officials, such as ministers
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or heads of state." This mechanism is crucial for ASEAN to address political, security, and
economic issues that require immediate attention or resolution.
Through track 1 diplomacy, ASEAN member states can engage in dialogue and negotiations with
one another, leading to consensus-building and the development of solutions that benefit the
region as a whole. In 2002, for instance, the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC)
in the South China Sea (SCS) was adopted, establishing a framework for peaceful and cooperative
behaviour in the region by promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes.
At Track 2 diplomacy, CBMs have fostered non-governmental actor engagement and contributed
to greater knowledge-sharing and information dissemination among academics, civil society
organisations, and private sector entities. According to Weissmann (2008), Track 2 diplomacy
can be defined as "unofficial, non-governmental efforts to bring together individuals and groups
from different countries to discuss and develop solutions to problems of mutual concern" Through
the ASEAN Maritime Forum, non-governmental actors have discussed marine ecosystem
protection, sustainable maritime development, and other related issues. It has greatly aided the
ability to pinpoint and improve potential areas of cooperation.
The Track 1.5 diplomacy refers to "the interaction between governmental (Track 1) and non-
governmental (Track 2) actors in international relations." According to Mirumachi (2020), this
mechanism is a hybrid approach that combines the formal diplomacy of state actors (Track 1)
with the informal diplomacy of non-state actors (Track 2). This CBMs approach recognises the
importance of involving civil society, academia, and the private sector in environmental decision-
making. Doing so fosters a more inclusive and participatory governance system that can lead to
more sustainable outcomes. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an example of a Track 1.5
platform where government and non-governmental actors can engage in dialogue on security
issues, including maritime security cooperation.
Nonetheless, the Track 1.5 diplomacy mechanism represents a step forward in addressing
environmental challenges in ASEAN and promoting more inclusive and democratic governance
systems. Through such partnerships, stakeholders can develop policies and initiatives that balance
marine resources' conservation and sustainable use. Therefore, in order to stimulate confidence
building among regional states, regional dialogue and discussion of maritime security cooperation
through ASEAN Mechanisms on security platforms like ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF),
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) as illustrated
by Centre for International Law (2019) in Figure 5 are amongst suitable mechanisms to be
adopted. These discussions have led to the development of best practices and recommendations
for addressing confidence building and dispute issues and have promoted sustainable maritime
development.
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 Figure 5: ASEAN Regional Bodies Dealing With Marine Environment
Source: Centre for International Law (2019)

There should also be a region-wide awareness of the importance of maritime security to the
region's peace and stability through the Track 2 conference and dialogue. All peoples in the region
should recognise that threats to maritime security are not only direct to piracy and maritime
terrorism but also indirect, like climate change, pollution, and depletion of natural resources. The
"Maritime Security Matrix" as shown in Figure 6, which considers the country's overall national
security, marine environment, economic growth, and human security, shall be promoted (Bueger,
2015).

Figure 6: Maritime Security Matrix

Source: Christian Bueger (2015)

Overall, CBMs programmes at various levels of diplomacy can contribute to developing a more
stable and secure ASEAN region and have helped foster greater collaboration on maritime
security, marine ecosystem protection, and sustainable development issues. CBMs can help

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prevent conflicts and facilitate cooperation on common challenges by fostering trust, reducing
tensions, and promoting mutual understanding among various actors.

4.2 Strengthening the Relation Through Leadership

To have better coordination on maritime security cooperation in this region, there also must be a
holistic understanding and good relations at all levels, from the highest political affair and national
policy all the way down to the operational level. At the political level, there is clear evidence that
a lack of strategic trust and leadership issues regarding maritime security initiatives in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have overshadowed strategic confidence in
implementing cooperation. Due to a lack of strategic trust and confidence in the region, minimal
support is shown when one or more ASEAN states try to take the lead on a particular maritime-
related issue (RSiS, 2017).
To address this issue, Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim (DSAI), the 10th Malaysian Prime Minister,
seems a suitable actor to connect the dots between ASEAN states. The appointment of DSAI as
Malaysia's 10th Prime Minister (PM) is significantly seen as a catalyst for the rekindling of hopes
for improved cooperation and relations in the ASEAN region. DSAI possesses a strong leadership
personality, has good relations with and is respected by his fellow ASEAN leaders. DSAI has
signalled his intention to revitalise Malaysia's foreign policy when he becomes the country's 10th
PM in November 2022, following the 15th Malaysian General Election (GE15).
The fact that he was able to reconcile with the enemy's political party and lead a unity government
in Malaysia is the first indication of his strong leadership qualities. Secondly, he has excellent and
strong communication skills that can be seen in any official speech and dialogue he delivers, a
crucial element for a leader to influence others to cooperate. Indonesian President Joko Widodo
and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei have publicly expressed optimism that ties with Malaysia
would improve under DSAI's leadership (David Han, 2022). DSAI could leverage his warm
personal ties with Indonesia's leaders to improve bilateral atmospherics. The invitation to speak
and share wisdom at the CT Corp Leadership Forum, specially organised for DSAI during his
official visit to Indonesia, attended by many leaders of the Indonesian business community and
several cabinet ministers, demonstrates the special bond that DSAI has with Indonesian leaders.
In that forum, DSAI highlighted his determination to cooperate with Indonesia to strengthen
ASEAN relations (CNN Indonesia, 2023).
Having Indonesia, a fellow Muslim majority nation and a leading power in ASEAN, on the same
side as DSAI and Malaysia enables collective bargaining and negotiation power on issues of
regional significance. The concept of serumpun, literally translated as 'of the same root,' is
frequently used to describe the Malaysia-Indonesia relationship, which has always been
13
characterised by its closeness (Nawaljeet Singh, 2023). Enhancing alliances with other ASEAN
members would benefit Malaysia's interests and the ASEAN organisation's prominence in
resolving regional issues.
Nevertheless, bilateral concerns, such as border disputes would be better managed. Malaysia and
Indonesia should use the opportunity as chairman of ASEAN as Indonesia has assumed the
ASEAN chairmanship this year, and subsequently, Malaysia will take over in 2025. DSAI assured
Malaysia would support Indonesia's leadership to ensure its effectiveness "Whatever we do, we
will do together". Additionally, at the strategic level, aside from political will and policies,
territorial and maritime conflicts should be resolved peacefully in accordance with international
law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on The Law of The Sea (UNCLOS).
It is also proposed that “a new mindset” is needed to replace the current mindset based on
sovereignty, unilateral rights, and agreed maritime boundaries (Yinghui, 2011). Active and direct
bilateral or multilateral diplomatic negotiations between the state parties to particular disputes
may, in turn, be considered to be at a slightly lower level of cooperation. At the operational level,
bilateral or multilateral engagement involving training, exercise, port visit and workshop can be
amongst the best methods to increase trust and people-to-people ties. It will improve operational
comfort levels, an important component of interoperability. "Increased participation in bilateral
and multilateral exercises across the region develops relationships based on shared values and
subsequently creates an environment built on mutual respect and trust. Confidence in each other
is the only way to achieve a collaborative and productive environment (Maed, 2018).

4.3 Leveraging the Existing Partnership

In establishing a suitable condition for cooperative security, regional states must engage in
security cooperation activities that will enable them to create an inclusive-relations, which
ultimately become the foundation for multilateral security frameworks (Tertia et al., 2018). The
success of maritime security cooperation in strengthening marine protection in other regions
should also be emulated and used as guidelines. In 2020, Ecuador's Navy and the United States
Navy conducted a Joint Patrol near Galapagos Island and successfully identified over 35 illegal
Chinese fishing vessels (The Maritime Executive, 2020). Several European countries have also
come together to combat pollution and illicit discharges in the Western Mediterranean Sea by
conducting OSCAR-MED surveillance exercises in June 2013 (UNEP, 2013).
Additionally, ArcticX21 shows the best example of how the technology collaboration offers
complete situational awareness of various maritime environment surveillance and monitoring in
Artic (Jonassen, 2021). Due to climate change, the Indo-Pacific region is vulnerable to devastating
natural disasters, namely typhoons and tsunamis, and this presents an opportunity for cooperation.
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As Bradford et al. (2022) have observed, "expeditionary disaster relief has become a core
capability for seapower in the 21st century", and cooperation in its execution "will not only
increase the ability to deliver assistance to those in distress, but it will build confidence and harden
norms of cooperation between maritime forces thereby enhancing the security across the maritime
domain".
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is an area of existing partnership and
considerable future opportunity in strengthening naval cooperation in the region (Khurana, 2017).
Additionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on Disaster
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and a Joint Task Force have cooperated to
promote synergy on HADR in the ASEAN region. Through this, the regional ASEAN
Coordinating Centre on HADR management gets its mandate and is the operational component
of the agreement (Shiloh Fetzek et al., 2020).
While HADR is focused on natural disasters, Search and Rescue (SAR) operations present another
opportunity for collaboration in a broader context. Grove has noted that cooperation on SAR
"enhances understanding and develops useful habits of cooperation and mutual knowledge of
training, communications and equipment" (Bateman et al., 1996). Various arrangements and
mechanisms for regional cooperation have been developed by ASEAN, serving as legal and
organisational foundations for effective and coordinated regional disaster relief operations. The
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has conducted several meetings and activities on SAR
cooperation and training. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) has also endorsed SAR
cooperation as part of overall maritime cooperation. Indeed, recently SAR exercises by regional
navies have been a common initial step in regional naval cooperation. (Bateman et al., 1999).
Dealing with maritime pollution is another area of potential cooperation. In 2018, ASEAN
adopted the ASEAN Regional Oil Spill Contingency Plan (ASEAN - ROSCP) in cooperation with
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (ITOPF, 2021). It is the subsequence to the
agreement on ASEAN Cooperation Mechanism on Joint Oil Spill Preparedness and Response
(ASEAN MoU) was signed in 2014, which aims to promote a regional collaborative mechanism
for building capacities and capabilities in preparedness for oil spill incidents and promoting
mutual assistance in preparing for controlling and combating oil spill incidents in this region.
Furthermore, the success of Malaysia in establishing an adequate, coordinated, and cost-effective
joint petroleum industry Tier 2 response capability for potential oil spill emergencies in Malaysian
waters through a joint service company called the Petroleum Industry of Malaysia Mutual Aid
Group (PIMMAG) (Murad, n.d.) shall be replicated by other states. As a result of these initiatives,
there will be a greater willingness to work together to combat marine pollution and improve
regional security. Interoperability military exercises that significantly impact marine ecosystem
15
protection, like Maritime Pollution Exercise (MARPOLEX), should be conducted frequently.
Conducted biennially since 1981, MARPOLEX posed as a significant effort to support regional
cooperation mechanisms to enhance readiness and skill through interoperability among states in
tackling oil spill pollution (Wijaya, 2022). Implementing maritime security cooperation on the
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing surveillance, particularly in overlapping areas,
is complicated but possible. The question arises of how to justify the "illegal foreign vessel" term
among neighbourhoods, especially in the area of dispute.
For instance, according to the Department of Fisheries Malaysia (DoF), on average 980, 000
metric tonnes of fish worth RM 6 billion were stolen from Malaysian waters annually by illegal
foreign vessels, usually from Thailand and Vietnam (Malay Mail, 2019). Yet, whether these
countries accept Malaysia's definition of "illegal foreign vessels" and whether they will allow the
Malaysian government to take action or punishment against their country's fishermen, particularly
in overlapping areas, will dominate the debate.
Two alternative ways are suggested to tackle this issue, firstly by cooperation, where arrested
fishermen are handed over to the respective country and tried under national law as conducted by
Vietnam and Malaysia on mutual agreement (RSIS, 2017). Secondly, regional states can initiate
cooperation by conducting joint patrols or exchanging information, and technological
advancements in low-sensitive areas with suitable policies and frameworks are adopted. For
instance, in 2022, Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to conduct joint patrols along the Straits of
Malacca and North Natuna Sea, intending to reinforce maritime security against IUU fishing (Loh
and Salwana, 2022).

4.4 Utilising Current Technological Emergence

In addressing the lack of persistent monitoring and inadequate defence budget issues, it is
suggested that one of the best solutions to overcome this challenge is merging the current
technology emergence with the traditional maritime surveillance method. Regional states shall
emphasise limited defence budgets by channelling some into investing in technologies with
cheaper acquisition and operating costs. Satellites, drones, and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
technology have emerged as powerful tools for combatting traditional and non-traditional threats
worldwide in recent years. Compared to conventional surveillance methods, such as manned
aircraft and ships, satellites and drones are relatively cost-efficient to operate and maintain. They
can cover large ocean areas at a fraction of the cost of traditional methods, making them a cost-
effective alternative to the limited budget of the country in this region.
Also, surveillance and natural disaster management have been mentioned to be one of the largest
markets for drone technology, particularly when spaceborne technology, manned airborne, and in
16
situ methods are not as efficient for various reasons including accessibility, speed, cost efficiency,
and operational safety (Mansor and Saadatkhan, 2016). Additionally, drones can provide
persistent surveillance over a specific area for extended periods.
In contrast, satellites can provide a wide-area ocean view, allowing them to detect and track
vessels over large areas. It allows for more comprehensive and efficient surveillance of the
maritime domain. Technology will also offer better coordination and collaboration solutions. The
use of digital platforms and web-based applications can improve information sharing and
coordination among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, which can lead
to more effective and efficient management of maritime security incidents.
The complex maritime domain in the Indo-Pacific region significantly catalyses the need for drone
capability in the inventory. Several ASEAN states have been blessed with ScanEagle (tactical
drone) delivery under the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) programme, and others, like Brunei,
have even purchased their own. It would be beneficial for ASEAN states to cooperate in exploring
the ScanEagle capability through Maritime Security Cooperation, as it will help to bolster
surveillance on marine ecosystem protection in this region. ScanEagle has taken its architectural
excellence as the most reliable, safe, and efficient domain with tremendous outcomes in the
highest performance and economical approach, where it serves as a force multiplier to enhance
the effectiveness of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) capability.
It is supported by Iqbal Jamaluddin (2021) that conclude the role of Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS) has become a significant asset in filling some vulnerability and gap in gathering quick and
sufficient information at the targeted surveillance area for the maritime nation to enhance the
national interest safety and security besides the existence of warships and manned aircraft. “AI
enables to execute OODA loops (discussed in the previous section) at incredible rates in an
incredible scale that fundamentally believe will transform the character of warfare” (Shield AI,
2023). Persistent monitoring and timely data provided by technology assets discussed will be
more beneficial if regional states have the best information-sharing system and platform.
The International Fusion Centre (IFC) appears as one of the best mechanisms for meeting these
requirements. Over the years, the IFC has been key in ensuring safe and secure seas through timely
and comprehensive information sharing within regional states (Yong, n.d). In addition, IFC
provides smart partnerships in information sharing and facilitates the optimal method to leverage
timely data from technology assets. The exchange of information in combatting maritime issues
is vital as the actors capitalise on the loophole between countries (Fairuz, 2020). It will have a
significant positive impact on maritime security governance, which will interestingly be better

17
coordinated and be identified as the driving factor to enhancing maritime security cooperation in
bolstering marine ecosystem protection and sustainable maritime development.

5.0 Conclusion
The Indo-Pacific region, particularly the South China Sea, is incredibly biodiverse and holds
immense economic value as a maritime trade and fishing hub. The Blue Economy (BE), which
includes renewable energy, fisheries, and tourism, is projected to grow substantially in the coming
years. However, rapid economic and population growth poses serious threats to the region's
marine ecosystem, highlighting the need for marine protection and sustainability. It is essential to
enhance maritime security cooperation, as this method is one of the most effective ways to
strengthen marine ecosystem protection and maritime sustainability development and is still
relevant in this region. Maritime security cooperation among countries in the region can better
regulate and enforce marine protection laws, prevent damage to the marine environment, and
ensure sustainable use of ocean resources.
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing has been identified as the leading global
maritime security threat linked to serious human welfare abuses and non-traditional threats facing
maritime security in Southeast Asia. Climate Change and Marine pollution from shipping
activities are also significant threats to this region's maritime ecosystem. Oil spill pollution poses
a severe economic impact on countries that rely heavily on the fishing and tourism industries.
Comprehensive and holistic strategies are required to address these challenges, including stronger
commitments to bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements and adopting maritime security
cooperation. Given the complex situation in the South China Sea, an effective way is to promote
cooperation among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states in low-sensitive
areas among neighbouring states. Through bilateral activities, such as Humanitarian Assistance
and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Search and Rescue (SAR), joint scientific research, confidence
and cooperation mechanisms can be built among the ASEAN states. Tactical drones have taken
their architectural excellence as the most reliable, safe, and efficient domain with tremendous
outcomes in the highest performance and economical approach to enhance maritime surveillance's
effectiveness.
Way forward, the ASEAN states should utilise drones provided under the Maritime Security
Initiative (MSI) programme, and International Fusion Centre (IFC) seems as a suitable platform
to provide smart partnerships in information sharing to facilitate the best way to leverage timely
data from technology assets. The ASEAN regional states shall put aside the dispute and start
cooperating to emphasise the sustainability of marine development. Failure to cooperate on the
solution, particularly with maritime development sustainability, will lead to a tragedy of the
18
commons due to each country pursuing its self-interest, which in the end, all will eventually lose.
Better coordination was the driving factor in enhancing maritime security cooperation,
particularly in strengthening marine ecosystem protection and sustainable maritime development.

19
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