601 forward induction, NTT 194 fully insured, @4R09 game theory, HAE game trees FERL gang of four model, PY A RR grab the dollar, (ARE HEAE grim strategy ¥ TAK RE Groves-Clarke mechanism, #4 A see SE UL Harsanyi doctrine, ffi" JE FE Harsanyi transformation. #0 J/E9¢i® hidden action. FRR a) hidden information, Raw fa Hotelling model, 338 HOW imperfect information, 75% 32/8 & incentive compatibility, #x HAHA ~eonstraint, BGM AL incomplete information, RIFE independence of irrelevant alternatives. J3¢ i E04 Ot TEE individual rationality constraint, 7 A SEZ infinite game, AAR IGIE infinite strategy space, JL3f ME [i] infinitely repeated game. JC BAUR Ht PRZE602 information. {¢7EL information partition. + fi Lape information sets. informational rents, {;3 5 informed players. MH. GRAHAM SSA, (tH A insurance game, $R BEML PFE imtuitive criterion, EOMLARHE invariance, RATE itcrated dominance, HES BIRR AAU ~equilibrium iS SURRY fey lemons game, #7 PREF IA FE THESE limit pricing model . fi ifI-FEZE (PRE, . EPA AY al location model , (2 LEEPER AL lower semi-continuous correspondence. [ -FIESE A BY linear contract, {# marginal likelihood , 2x 436 matching pennies, Sik IE matrix game, HME RESE menu of contracts, 4 SEM minimax criterion, Res RORHRHE minimax payolls, HARA AL minimax punishment. AeA K ES mixed strategy, #243 MREmonotone likelihood 1: > property. HMR AR ERME moral hazard, 3 2 Ape multiple equilibrium, 4% H+ (tf mutual knowledge Hi: [rd Tif, Nash bargaining sussion, HHP PETE GARE Nash equilibrium, 44¢¢3) 47 Nature, AS (HEA AD obey le node, £4 non-cooperative game. 47 (HEI normal form of a game, FPR) bat AR nuisance suits, BRIA one-short game, —UCHER IE one-sided asymmetry. Js JERE EF optimal contract, RAE order of play, 2 )0F out-of equilibrium behavior, JEN @ TH outcome. 445 overlapping generation model. (CHG Pareto dominance. WASRTEG Ht. MM BHR Pareto perfection. | BACH partially adverse selection. *$4)i% (IEEE Ey PB RE partially pooling equilibrium , partially revealing equilibrium,604 partially separating equitibrium, #84} 25940 participation constraint, & G25 partition, 3} path, #48 payoff, 4, BH payoff-equating method, 483% Ata perfect equilibrium, $Y PRG perfect Bayesian equilibrium, #71 D1 ty ae perfect Nash equilibrium, AERA TH perfect information, 362047 & perfect recall, ¢¢H1Z. HHI perfect sequential equilibrium, #UHR/F BI @ player, BAA pooling equilibrium, 7HI]+9 posterior belief, JF5¢#E3% precommitment strategy. “HAT7K WARE predecessor, BUMT24 preemption game, #25¢i A fa36 principal, B#EA principal-agent theory, Z4€--{R#FEE principalship, 464% prior belief, SEH 435 prisoners’ dilemma, [A ¢é1A bE private information, #4 A(S proper equilibrium , 35/619 6 pseudo-player, HEB 4s A.605 public information, ASHA Rh, AMAR pure strategy» 24 HOR random action. BHPLt 3) ratchet effect , PRILBY. rationalizable strategy» FLARE (oak ae reaction curve, KOS HRS reaction correspondence + 5¢ PLATE reaction function. }< BEER BL reactive equilibrium, [< B13 refinement of equilibrium. J3@GHU#TER. S93 aE renegotiation, PREPS. BIKA repeated game, ii HIE reputation, #37 reservation utility. (Rif 3A reservation wage, (RM T.¥E residual claimant, #474 RH revealing equilibrium, BRU revelation principle, ARETE revenue-equilibrium theorem, 2349 Tse BL risk, DUBE risk-averse 5 A/S SLE risk-neutral, URE PTE rules of the game .f47 HLM screening {i BFAH)606 second best contract, Ht [a} second-order stochastic dominance. — Br BGM Ht second-price sealed bid, _ RSH THEATER GH ED self-selection constraint, AieFELTIK semi-separating equilibrium, HES} 24 rium » 5} 9 sequential equilibrium, Fe BEL ap sequential-move game. JF BtTTZHNEE sequential rationality, i A FEEE side payment, $# #23 ft signal, fa. Ail ff S signaling, ff S{4i# simultancous-move game, [i ht {73 FE single crossing property, 36% si PEA separating equili singleton information, d#{4 a stable equilibrium, Raa HOT Stackelberg equilibrium, #yiH 38 RARE starting node, #IGAF state-space . ARAS ZS fil] stochastic dominance, fWL4 OE strategic complements , ARMS 47h strategic form of a game [PAE RHE RR strategic substitutes, HAs AE strategy. NRE strategy profile, ERNE strategy set, HUA (>. RAE SE607 strategy space » ARBEE hl subgame. CREE subgame perfectness « BET HTHR sui ccessors FTAEL sufficient statistic. FE4}98 i sufficient statistic condition, FESP3E HE RIE BAR supergame «AR Ee 3E symmetric information, Xf P84 sunk cost. Ti team theory. PABAHEE teams. [IPA time consistency. fF BOVE. NaS SRE tournaments, #% biti E trembling hand equilibrium, BRE}FIY trigger strategy, Mk SeAems type, I uncertainty, A 89 TE unobservable 5 BUY Ri WR th upper-semicontinuous correspondence. F2RESER AZ verifiable, PL UESIEY unverifiable, RFT HE KAY Vickery auction, mC SHdT SE von Newmann-Morgenstern utility function, v-N-M608 BUH PRB war of attrition, #)REAR weak Nash equilibrium, 3944 #49 @ weakly-dominated strategy, 93 7 dam Wilson equilibrium, mt ARHh4 winner’s curse, MIA yardstick competition, # Jt #4609 BEAZROIR Alchian.A. . Bal RE Abreu, D., fal fa Akerlof, G. « fil x39 3% Arrow, K., SB Aumann, R., RZ Axelrod , Bi Set Baron, D., WF Barro. R., BF Bayes. UU0FHT Betrand, J.-P. . f/f Bulow, 3 Chatterjee, K., AIFS Clarke E. , 32403% Cho, L-K.. Cournot, A. EGERF Cramton. So fctG 9 Dasgupta, P. , WONT REISS Demsetz,H. , (iS610 Diamond. D.. Qe ft Fama.E., 22% Friedman. J. . dh Wig ad Fudenberg, D. . dH FU (ETHS Gibbons. R. , FPR HT Green, FE. Heit Groves J... fh # KF Hardin. G, Ij | Harris,M. , Wy HW; Harsanyi. J. Hee he Hart, O. , W3Hy Holmstrom ,B. AAO ER Hotelling HE, £3546 Klein. B. i KE Klemperer, Py Wf 3 WEE AK Kohlberg, E. + 45 (1% Kreps, D. sn Beli Kydland .F. .3L 24 Lazear, E.. ¥ BRAK Laffomt.J.—J. dh 44 Leffler. K. 646 4 Leland, UL. fi) Leontief, W. , SFR Majluf. N., #4 S¢de Malcomson.J. 445 AR Maskin, E.. ‘Saif611 McAfee. P. Ae se fife MeMillan, J. , BSE Mertens. J.-F. S43 Meyer. M. . 3H Milgrom, P. . 46 Rf 2h Mirrlees,J. Re AUF Moore. J. 56 Myers. S. 5 FUT; Myerson, R. » THERE Nash, J. + 494F Pearce, D. 5 KARE Porter, R. 5 (3 Pratts WEEE Prescott. 3H Ag Pyle, Do. HEA Raviv.V.. AER Riley. J.» Fa Roberts J. 8 (i Rosen. S.. DF Ross. BY Rotermbg, J. SF#(A Rothschild .M. . 2 7 #84 Rubinstein A. . BW as He Saloner. G.. ESF AY Samuelson. P. . BEAR ASHE Samuclson. W. . pe7B Aith612 Satterthwaite, M. , 39; RF Selten, R., PEAKE Shaked, A. , BEF} Shapiro, C., BRE Solow, RE Spence, A.M. , ##RH# Stackerlberg, H. . Wr SE AKA Stiglitz, J., Wray BAK Sutton, J., BBY Tirole, J., SBR Vickers, J. , 4EFE5% Vickery ,W. HE 323i Weiss A. iit Weitzman M. . Sik Wilson. 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