HAZOP Study Report - Galaxy- CCTG

REPORT
OF
HAZOP STUDY
FOR
NEBULA PROJECT
Product: CCTG
For
Galaxy Surfactants Ltd.

Tarapur, India
October 2020
By
AcuTech Consulting Private Limited

Level 13, Platinum Techno Park
Plot No. 17/18 Sector 30A,
Vashi, Navi, Mumbai
www.acutech-consulting.com
Client: Author:
Galaxy Surfactants Ltd. Vijay Mandlik
Tarapur, Maharashtra - India Senior Consultant,
AcuTech Consulting Pvt. Ltd.
Ref.: PO No.: 4500110851 Dt. 11.03.2020
HAZOP Study Report – Nebula Project – CCTG
Tarapur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

2.0 PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE .......................................................................... 2
3.0 STUDY APPROACH ......................................................................................................... 3
3.1 HAZOP Methodology ..................................................................................................... 3
3.2 Review Team ................................................................................................................ 11
4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................. 12
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Node Descriptions

Appendix B: Hazop Recommendations
Appendix C: Hazop Worksheets
Appendix D: Noded P&IDs
List of Figures
Figure 1 HAZOP Process Flowchart ............................................................................................. 7

Figure 2 Risk Ranking Matrix ..................................................................................................... 10
List of Tables
Table 1 HAZOP Deviation Matrix............................................................................................... 8

Table 2 Definitions of Severity .................................................................................................... 9
Table 3 Definitions of Likelihood ................................................................................................ 9
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report describes the results of HAZOP Study conducted for Galaxy Surfactants Ltd. (Galaxy)
for Nebula Project being set-up at Tarapur, Maharashtra, India. The HAZOP Study was conducted
by AcuTech Consulting Pvt. Ltd. (ACUTECH) during 10 th August – 3rd October 2020 through
remote meetings with Galaxy Tarapur and Taloja teams. AcuTech Hazop Facilitator had visited
the project site to understand the project layout.
The HAZOP Study systematically reviewed hazard scenarios potentially generated by deviations
from normal operation of the Nebula process. HAZOP is one of the methodologies identified as a
universally acceptable Process Hazard Analysis technique.
Following products were studied using Hazop Methodology:

1. Sunbeat
2. Galhueshield-HCS
3. Galaxomer
4. CCTG
5. KCP
6. APG
This report consists of the results of Hazop Study conducted for CCTG product.
The objective of the HAZOP Study was to identify potential impacts on safety, environment and
health due to deviations during processing of above products. Of most importance were those
hazards that could lead to injury of personnel or members of the community, environmental
damage, or equipment damage resulting in unit downtime. Recommendations were considered to
reduce either the severity or the likelihood of those potential hazards.
Recommendations were identified during the study to reduce the risks associated with the
operations. These recommendations should be resolved as soon as possible and implemented in a
timely manner. Responsibilities to implement the recommendations have been assigned and noted
in the HAZOP worksheet.
The report includes the HAZOP documentation generated from PHA-Pro® 8 software.
Mr. Ajinkya Sajanikar coordinated for this Hazop Study on behalf of Galaxy Surfactants Ltd.
Mr. Vijay Mandlik, Senior Consultant, AcuTech Consulting Group, facilitated the HAZOP
Sessions, with team participation by key personnel from Galaxy.
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Tarapur
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report describes the results of HAZOP Study conducted for Galaxy Surfactants Ltd. (Galaxy)
for Nebula Project which is being set-up at Galaxy site, Tarapur, Maharashtra, India. The HAZOP
Study was conducted by AcuTech Consulting Pvt. Ltd. (ACUTECH) during 10 th Aug & 3rd
November 2020 through remote meetings with Galaxy Taloja and Tarapur teams.
The HAZOP Study systematically reviewed hazard scenarios potentially generated by deviations
from normal operation of the Nebula process.
HAZOP is one of the methodologies identified as a universally acceptable Process Hazard

Analysis technique.
Following products were studied using Hazop Methodology:

1. Sunbeat
2. Galhueshield-HCS
3. Galaxomer
4. CCTG
5. KCP
6. APG
This report consists of the results of Hazop Study conducted for CCTG product.
The objective of the HAZOP Study was to identify potential impacts on safety, environment and
health. Of most importance were those hazards that could lead to injury of personnel or members
of the community, environmental damage, or equipment damage resulting in unit downtime.
Recommendations were considered to reduce either the severity or the likelihood of those potential
hazards.
Section 2.0 describes the objectives and scope of the work. Section 3.0 describes the study
approach and identifies the HAZOP team members. Section 4.0 provides the results and Section
5.0 lists the references used in the study.
Node Descriptions, List of Recommendations, HAZOP Study worksheets and Noded P&IDs for
the CCTG product are provided in Appendices A, B, C and D.
AcuTech has expended its best professional efforts in performing this work. However, it should
be noted that this report describes a joint work effort between AcuTech and Galaxy personnel
using information on the process provided by participants. Consequently, AcuTech can accept no
liability for any use that Galaxy may make of the information contained herein.
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2.0 PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The purpose of this study was to review the design and operation philosophy of the Nebula process
to detect latent faults or hazardous interactions and identify areas where improvements to safety
and operability are necessary.
The objectives of the HAZOP study are to:
1. Identify the response of the plant and equipment to process perturbations and deviations
from normal design conditions;
2. Assess whether the reaction of the system, or equipment will produce effects which are
harmful to the personnel, environment, physical assets and business continuity policy of
the company;
3. Investigate the operability of the process;
4. Identify availability and maintainability issues;
5. Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards;
6. Recommend corrective actions, which will mitigate or eliminate adverse effects; and,
7. Protect the plant, people, environment and assets.
The scope of this HAZOP Study was the Nebula Process which will be operated at Tarapur site.
The HAZOP methodology reviews a process design and operation of the process for deviations
from design conditions. As such, the methodology assumes that the design has been competently
performed and that fabrication has been accomplished according to design. The HAZOP team does
not attempt to perform a detailed design review of engineering assumptions, fabrication, or
installation. However, where the design and/or operation do not appear to be consistent with good
practices, this deviation was discussed. Recommendations for additional reduction of risk are
made as determined by the team.
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3.0 STUDY APPROACH
This study was conducted in several stages, including:
 Preparation for the HAZOP Study;

 Team review of the designated scenario using the HAZOP methodology; and,
 Development and quality control review of the HAZOP Report.
The first stage included a review and analysis of the plant related documentation and site visit by
AcuTech consultant. The team sessions included a systematic review of the process using the
HAZOP methodology. Finally, the HAZOP report was developed and processed through a quality
control review to ensure that the study conforms to accepted industry standards.
The Hazop Study process comprised of steps as shown in Figure 1 and is described in the following
section.
3.1 HAZOP Methodology
The guideword HAZOP technique is a means of systematically reviewing a process to identify

potential hazards and operability problems resulting from credible deviations from design intent.
A HAZOP study is conducted by a team of individuals with knowledge of engineering, operations,
safety, and maintenance. Section 3.3 identifies the HAZOP Study team. The study of the process
was led and recorded by an individual with expertise in the HAZOP technique.
Hazard scenarios that resulted from deviation from normal operation were used for this study. The
flowchart in Figure 1 illustrates the typical procedure for a HAZOP.
The guideword HAZOP is based on the premise that hazards and operability problems stem from
deviations from design intent. Guidewords capture the ways in which process parameters can
deviate from design intent. The seven guide words typically used are: No, More, Less, As Well
As, Reverse, Part Of, and Other Than. These guidewords are systematically combined with process
parameters to yield deviations that are then judged for credibility. If credible causes exist, the
deviations are then examined further to determine the potential consequences, assuming the
deviations were to occur. If potential safety, health, property, or environment related consequences
are identified, existing safeguards, if any, are identified. Safeguards are equipment, systems, and/or
human interaction that are intended to detect, prevent, or mitigate the hazard scenario. The
deviations shown in Table 1, HAZOP Deviation Matrix, are reviewed as applicable to each specific
node.
Worksheet Entries
For deviations that the HAZOP team finds both to be credible and to result in potential safety,
health, property, or environment related consequences, the following is recorded in the HAZOP
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worksheets: Deviation, Causes, Consequences, Safeguards, Severity, Likelihood, Risk Ranking,

and Recommendations. Each of these worksheet entries, as well as other worksheet information
relevant to the study, is explained in the following section. The completed HAZOP worksheets for
this study are provided in Appendices A, B, C, D, E & F.
Guidewords
Guidewords are typically used to describe the ways in which process parameters can deviate from
the design intent. Those commonly used include No, More, Less, As Well As, Reverse, Part Of,
Other Than. These guidewords are systematically combined with relevant process parameters to
develop meaningful deviations. The deviations are then judged to determine whether credible
causes of the deviation exist. If credible causes exist, the deviations are examined further to
determine the consequences, safeguards, and any recommendations. The HAZOP Deviation
Matrix (Table 1) summarizes the guidewords normally used with each typical process parameter.
The team uses other guidewords when they are useful and provide a clearer understanding of the
deviation. Since the guidewords are part of the deviation they are not explicitly assigned a
worksheet column.
Parameters
A parameter is a physical or chemical property associated with the process, for example,
temperature, pressure, level, and flow. Table 1 provides a list of typical process parameters
generally considered. Since the parameters are part of the deviation they are not explicitly assigned
a worksheet column.
Deviation
A "deviation" is an excursion in operating conditions outside the normal range. It is derived by

combining a guideword and a process parameter. For example, the guideword "More" combined
with the parameter "Temperature" yields the deviation "Higher Temperature". Table 1 is an
illustration of typical parameters and guidewords to develop deviations. Other deviations are
considered on a case-by-case basis as appropriate to the specific node.
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Causes
Causes are the specific events or failures that result in a deviation from design intent for a process
parameter. For example, "No Flow" may be caused by "pump failure". Detailed root causes (for
example, "pump not turned on due to operator error", or "coupling failure due to excessive
vibration") are sometimes listed if this is necessary to determine the consequences or safeguards.
General types of causes include equipment failure, human error, and external events. Equipment
failures are flaws in the equipment design or fabrication that result in predictable failures, where
the predictability is formed by the history of the equipment in its given service and environment.
Human errors include errors of both omission and commission. External events include both
naturally occurring events (e.g., weather induced events), and man-made events (e.g.,
transportation related events) that occur outside the process being studied but have an impact on
the process. In general, causes are only considered from within the node under study. All credible
causes are listed for the deviation under consideration. The team then reviews the consequences,
safeguards, and risk ranking for each cause as a separate hazard scenario.
Consequences
Scenario consequences are documented for each of the hazards or operability problems that would
result directly from the Cause, starting with the most immediate and followed by subsequent events
that result from the initial problems to the worst likely outcome. The consequences considered
credible in the study must fall within the defined objectives of the PHA. For example:
Cause: pump seal leak to surroundings

Consequences: - loss of flow to column
- release of flammable, possibly toxic liquid to area
- possible fire from ignition of leak
- potential personnel injury and equipment damage
Consequences are followed beyond the node under consideration to the furthest reasonable extent
that problems may arise, both upstream and downstream, so that the hazards are fully realized. For
example, if high flow is being considered as a deviation for a hydrocarbon storage tank, the
consequences of "possible overfilling and fire" should be documented. This generally assumes that
all active safeguards (those that require energy to function, e.g. human intervention or a pump
shutdown interlock) fail. Passive safeguards (those that do not require energy to function, e.g.
secondary containment) are assumed to function as designed unless they are affected by the hazard
scenario under review.
Safeguards
All existing measures that detect or warn of a cause of a deviation or consequence, prevent a cause
or consequence, or mitigate the effects of a consequence are entered in this column. This includes
hardware, software, and certain procedural/administrative safeguards. For example, a high level
shutdown interlock, a flammable gas detection system with alarms, or a pressure relief valve are
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all safeguards if they are available and reliable. Safeguards must be fully functional and applicable
to the scenario for which they are credited. Safeguards are included for all scenarios which involve
safety, health, property, or environment related consequences.
Severity and Likelihood Ratings and Risk Ranking
Hazard scenarios identified in the study are rated on both the severity of the consequence and the
likelihood of the scenario occurring, using the ranking systems shown in Tables 2 and 3,
respectively. The severity of the consequences is rated independently of the likelihood and, in
general, assuming failure of the safeguards. Consequences have been categorized in following
categories (CAT) in the HAZOP Worksheet:
P: Personnel
C: Community
E: Environmental Impact
F: Facility
The likelihood of the scenario is estimated qualitatively by the team, taking into consideration the
likelihood of the initiating event as well as the likelihood of success or failure of the identified
safeguards.
The risk ranking is an estimate of the risk level taking into consideration estimates of the severity
of the scenario and the likelihood of the scenario occurring. The risk ranking allows scenarios with
differing severity and likelihood to be compared using a common scale. For example, a
catastrophic scenario with a low likelihood of occurrence could have the same risk level as a less
severe scenario with a greater likelihood of occurring.
A Qualitative Risk Ranking Matrix is used to assign a risk level to a hazard scenario where the
severity and likelihood was rated. The Risk Ranking Matrix results in risk levels from (highest
risk) to (lowest risk). The risk levels help the team to determine the need for additional
recommendations and assists in prioritizing any recommendations made. Tables 2 and 3 provide
the Severity and Likelihood Ratings, respectively; the Qualitative Risk Ranking Matrix is provided
in Figure 2.
Recommendations
Recommendations include preliminary design or operating changes that reduce or eliminate causes
and/or consequences. Requests for additional information can also be recommended.
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Figure 1
HAZOP Process Flowchart
Begin
Begin Study
Study
Select Node
Define
DefineDesign
Design
Intention
Intention
Select
SelectParameter
Param eter
Select
SelectGuidew
Guideword,
ord,
Develop
Develop Deviation
Deviation
Identify
IdentifyAll
AllCauses
Causes
for
forDeviation
Deviation
Docum
Document
ent
Consequences
Consequencesfor
for
Each Cause
Each Cause
Document
DocumentSafeguards
Protection
for
forEach
Each Cause
Cause
Estimate
Estim ate Severity,
Severity,
Likelihood,
Likelihood,&& Risk
Riskfor
for
Each
Each Cause
Cause
Docum
Document
ent
Recomm
Recommendations/Responsibilities/
endations/Responsibilities/
Questions/Answers/Notes
Questions/Answers/Notes
Other Guidew ords?

Other Guidewords?
No
Other Param eters?

Other Parameters?
No
Other Nodes?
Other Nodes?
No
Study Com plete

Study Complete
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Table 1
HAZOP Deviation Matrix
DESIGN GUIDE WORD
PARAMETER MORE LESS NONE REVERSE PART OF AS WELL OTHER

AS THAN
FLOW HIGH FLOW LOW FLOW NO FLOW BACK WRONG ADDED WRONG
COMPONENT COMPONENT
FLOW AMOUNT
PRESSURE HIGH PRESS LOW PRESS VACUUM
TEMPERATURE HIGH TEMP LOW TEMP
AGITATION TOO MUCH TOO

LITTLE
LEVEL HIGH LEVEL LOW NO LEVEL
LEVEL
REACTION HIGH RATE LOW RATE NO DECOMPOSE INCOMPLETE SIDE WRONG
REACTION REACTION REACTION
TIME TOO MUCH TOO
LITTLE
STEP STEP LATE STEP MISSED BACK STEP PARTIAL EXTRA WRONG
EARLY STEP STEP ACTION ACTION
COMPOSITION HIGH CONC LOW CONC NONE EXTRA WRONG
COMPONENT COMPONENT
PHASE TOO MANY TOO FEW SINGLE INVERSION EMULSION
ADDITION TOO MUCH TOO

LITTLE
MIXING TOO MUCH TOO NONE
LITTLE
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Table 2
Definitions of Severity
RANKING DESCRIPTION
1 PERSONNEL - Fatality or permanently disabling injury; COMMUNITY - One
or more severe injuries; ENVIRONMENT - Significant release with serious
offsite impact and more likely than not to cause immediate or long-term health
effects, >$100,000 remediation fines; FACILITY - Major or total destruction of
process area(s) at an estimated cost greater than $10,000,000 or a significant
loss of production.
2 PERSONNEL - One or more severe injuries; COMMUNITY - One or more
injuries; ENVIRONMENT - Significant release with serious offsite impact, no
long-term impact, $100,000-$10,000 remediation fines; FACILITY - Major
damage to process area(s) at an estimated cost greater than $1,000,000 or some
loss of production.
3 PERSONNEL - Single injury, not severe, possible lost time; COMMUNITY -
Odor or noise annoyance complaint from the public; ENVIRONMENT -
Release that results in agency notification or permit violation, $10,000-$5,000
remediation fines; FACILITY - Some equipment damage at an estimated cost
greater than $100,000 and with minimal loss of production.
4 PERSONNEL - Minor injury, minor lost time; COMMUNITY - No injury,
hazard, or annoyance to public; ENVIRONMENT - Recordable event with no
agency notification or permit violation, $5,000-$1,000 remediation fines;
FACILITY - Minimal equipment damage at an estimated cost less than
$100,000 and with no loss of production.
5 PERSONNEL - No injury, no lost time; COMMUNITY - No injury, hazard, or
annoyance to public; ENVIRONMENT - Internal recordable spill; FACILITY -
Minimal equipment damage at an estimated cost less than $10,000 and with no
loss of production.
Table 3
Definitions of Likelihood
RANKING DESCRIPTION
A Potential of occurring more than once per year
B Potential of occurring once every year
C Potential of occurring once every one - five years
D Potential of occurring once every five-ten years
E Potential of occurring once in facility lifetime
F Practically Impossible
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Figure 2
Risk Ranking Matrix
LIKELIHOOD
A B C D E F
S
E 1 1 2 4 7 11 16
V
E
R 3 5 8 12 17 21
2
I
T
Y 6 9 13 18 22 25
3
4 10 14 19 23 26 28
5 15 20 24 27 29 30
NOTE: For this matrix, a Risk Ranking of “1” represents the highest severity and highest likelihood
possible.
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3.2 Review Team
Vijay Mandlik, Sr. Consultant, AcuTech Consulting Group, facilitated the HAZOP Study sessions.
Proceedings of the sessions were recorded on PHA-PRO® 8 Software. Mr. Mandlik is experienced
and trained in facilitating HAZOP Study. Galaxy provided the study team for the review sessions.
The responsibility of the team was to provide the appropriate expertise regarding the operations
conducted in Nebula Project. The personnel participating in the study are listed below:
First Name Last Name Company Title / Area of Expertise

Vijay Mandlik Acutech Consulting PHA, PSM, Safety Studies, Risk
Assessment
Avinash Shinde Galaxy Surfactants Head - SHE - Instrumentation
Ajinkya Sajanikar Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Officer NPT
Yogesh Sankhe Galaxy Surfactants Manager, HSE
Shrivardhan Nuval Galaxy Surfactants Manager, Projects
Nikhil Parit Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Officer, Projects
Vinayak Mali Galaxy Surfactants Manager, NPT - Instrumentation
Suraj Ghadge Galaxy Surfactants Officer, NPT

Sumedh Devi Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Officer, Process Safety
Ramesh Gothal Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Officer, NPT - Instrumentation
Smruti Thakur Galaxy Surfactants CET, NPT
Abhijit Pawar Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Executive, Conversion
Bharat Parab Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Manager, Innovation
Dilip Mhatre Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Manager, Innovation
Jaydeep Thakur Galaxy Surfactants Executive, Quality
Samir Joshi Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Officer, Quality
Sarang Waghanna Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Officer, Innovation
Devendra Mhatre Galaxy Surfactants Executive, Conversion
Maruti Pawar Galaxy Surfactants Manager, NPT
Chandrakant Bhande Galaxy Surfactants Officer, NPT
Nikhil Shinde Galaxy Surfactants CET, NPT
Prasad Sahu Galaxy Surfactants Sr. Officer, Innovation
Kamlesh Barai Galaxy Surfactants Manager, Innovation
Ganesh Wagh Galaxy Surfactants Executive, Innovation
Akshay Patkar Galaxy Surfactants Officer, NPT - Instrumentation
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4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations identified during a HAZOP Study generally have one of three purposes. They
are:
 To further reduce the probability of occurrence of an incident; or,

 In the event an incident was to occur, to reduce the consequences; and,
 To ensure the current risk level is not exceeded
Recommendations were identified during the Hazop Study to reduce the risks associated with the
processes or operations reviewed.
It is highly recommended to consider following aspects related to Process Safety information:
 P&IDs must include all the components installed in the plant (major equipment,
instruments, special items like strainers, gas detectors etc., alarms & interlocks, design data
of major equipment, set points of PSVs and burst pressures of Rupture Disks, etc.
 Vendor P&IDs to be embedded in Galaxy P&ID template and issued for conducting Hazop
Studies for future projects.
 Alarm & Interlock lists must be prepared consisting of set points, actions to be taken on
activation and final element acted upon by the interlock. Interlock numbers must
correspond to the numbers mentioned in the P&IDs.
 A ‘Cause & Effect’ Matrix to be prepared indicating initiating instruments, parameter

settings and final instruments. This matrix to be kept available with operations personnel.
 PFDs must be prepared consisting of Stream numbers, Stream compositions, Process

Parameters for each stream, Process Flow Rates.
 A ‘Technology Transfer Document’ must be prepared consisting of Process Description,

Process Safety Testing data, Material and Energy Balance, Corrosion Testing Data, Lab,
Kilo Lab and Pilot Plant Batches Data and forwarded to design team.
12
APPENDICES
Appendix A - Node Descriptions
Node Descriptions – CCTG
Nodes Type Design Conditions/Parameters Drawings Equipment ID

1. CCA Unloading Atm. Storage 35T1.G, SS304, 35 KL P90-TF35-04-001, Rev. 2 35T1.G
Tank Unloading of CCA from isotanker (20 KL) using
centrifugal pump 35P1.G (40m3/Hr.)
2. CCA Charging Pump 35P2.G, SS304, 15m3/Hr., 35 m Head P90-TF35-04-001, Rev. 2 35P2.G
transfer Transfer of 4598 Kg. CCA to 91R1.G through P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3
FT91.1.G (mass flow meter) to empty reactor.
3. Glycerine Charging Drum 91R1.G, SS304, 7 KL P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3 91R1.G, 84WV.2G
charging Glycerine (752 Kg.) drum unloading under vacuum
using water ring vacuum pump
4. Catalyst Charging Charging 91R1.G, SS304, 7 KL P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3 91R1.G, 91V4.G
hopper Charging of 6 Kg. liquid catalyst (50% aq. solution) (charging vessel)
5. Esterification, Fatty Acid Recycle and Water Removal SS Reactor 91R1.G, SS304, 7 KL P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3 91R1.G, 91V1.G,
Heat the mass to 170oC in 5 hrs., water formed in 91E1.G, 91P1.G,
reaction will be condensed and collected in 91V1.G, 91P2.G, 91E2.G
fatty acid will be recycled to 91R1.G after layer
separation in receiver, by 91P2.G after every 1-2
Hrs. Add catalyst in lots (in 4 installments). After 1st
installment, apply vacuum through water ring
vacuum pump. Take sample from 91R1.G through
sampling point on recirculation line of 91P1.G. If
analysis is acceptable, start fatty acid recovery
under full vacuum and collect it in 91V1.G. Take
sample, if analysis is acceptable, cool the mass to
75-80oC. Wash the reaction mass in 91R1.G.
6. Sodium Bicarbonate Charging for Washing and moisture Recovery SS reactor 91R1.G, SS304, 7 KL P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3 91R1.G, 91V3.G
91V3.G, PP FRP,0.6 KL
Cool reaction mass in 91R1.G to 75-80oC by
circulating through 91E2.G via 91P1.G using cooling
water.
Prepare Sodium Bi Carbonate solution in 91V3.G.
Water (480 L) charging through FT91.2.G and add
sodium bicarbonate (48 Kg.), add to 91R1.G through
91P5.G for washing, stir for 2 Hrs., settle for 1 Hr.
separate the layers, collect wash water in IBC. Give
3 washes to reduce acid value to <0.1. Remove
moisture by heating reaction mass upto 110oC
applying vacuum upto 0.5 Torr. Cool to 40-50oC.
7. Filtration through Sparkler Filter Sparkler Filter 91F1.G, SS316, 24 in. dia, 6.6 m2, P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3 91F1.G, 91F2.G
Circulate the reaction mass through sparkler filter to
remove haziness, pack clear product through
91F1.G and 91F2.G.
8. Fatty acid recovery from wash water Vessel 91V3.G P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3 91V3.G
Charge wash water, add HCL 20-30 Kg., stir for 30
min. separate water and fatty acid layer
Appendix B - Hazop Recommendations
Hazop Recommendations – CCTG
Recommendations (HAZOP)
Risk Risk
Ranking Ranking Responsibility
Place(s) Used Before
After Risk
Risk
Reduction
Reduction
1. Prepare SOP/BMR for unloading of CCA tanker, Consequences: 14 19 Devendra Mhatre
mention PPEs to be used for unloading. 1.1.2.1 14
2. Include periodic cleaning of bucket filter in ITPM Consequences: 14 23 Devendra Mhatre
procedure. 1.1.2.2 14
3. Include in tanker unloading SOP/BMR to monitor Consequences: 14 26 Devendra Mhatre
35P1.G discharge pressure during tanker 1.1.2.2, 1.6.1.1 14
unloading.
20 24
4. Include in SOP/BMR, supervisor check to ensure Consequences: 14 19 Devendra Mhatre
correct tanker has been connected for unloading. 1.3.1.1
5. Include fire in CCA tank farm in Emergency Consequences: 2 16 Yogesh Sankhe
Response Plan and impart training. 1.5.1.1
6. Include in SOP/BMR to check the vent is open Consequences: 9 13 Devendra Mhatre
before unloading is started. 1.4.2.1
7. Provide curbed area with containment for CCA Consequences: 9 18 Nikhil Parit
tanker unloading. 1.4.2.1
8. Develop 'Hose Management System' to maintain Consequences: 9 18 Shrivardhan Nuval & Avinash Shinde
hoses mechanical integrity. (RRF 100) 1.10.1.1
9. Develop SOP for sampling of CCA isotanker - Consequences: 14 19 Devendra Mhatre
include PPEs, tools to be used, method of 1.12.1.1
sampling.
10. Ensure that dyke drain valves are kept blinded, Consequences: 14 26 Nikhil Parit
perform tank farm inspection using a checklist. 2.1.1.1
(RRF 10)
11. Include in SOP/BMR to monitor 35P2.G discharge Consequences: 20 24 Devendra Mhatre
pressure during operation. 2.1.4.1
12. Provide flange guards on all flanges in CCA Consequences: 9 18 Nikhil Parit
unloading line. 1.10.2.1
13. Include piping in ITPM procedure to periodically Consequences: 9 18 Shrivardhan Nuval & Avinash Shinde
check the flanges and condition of gaskets, pipe 2.10.1.1
thickness testing, corrosion monitoring etc.
14. Provide High level switch LSH91.1.G to close KV Consequences: 9 13 Nikhil Parit
91.2.G on CCA line and stop CCA pump 2.7.1.1
15. Ensure Drum color coding, type of drum, drum Consequences: 5 8 Devendra Mhatre
labeling is in place to avoid charging of wrong 3.11.1.1
material.
16. Develop SOP to include supervisor check to Consequences: 5 12 Devendra Mhatre

ensure correct drums are taken for unloading. 3.11.1.1
17. Impart training on SOP and material identification Consequences: 5 17 Abhijit Pawar
to operations personnel. 3.11.1.1
18. Perform dispersion analysis for release of Consequences: 2 4 Nikhil Parit
Phosphine from 91R1.G vent to determine the 4.2.1.1, 4.5.1.1, 2 4
exposure concentration. 5.9.1.1
2 4
19. Evaluate the scrubber required for Phosphine. Consequences: 2 7 Nikhil Parit & Ajinkya Sajanikar
4.2.1.1, 4.5.1.1, 2 7
5.9.1.1
2 7
20. Explore the possibility of alternative safer option Consequences: 2 16 Dr. Bharat Parab
of catalyst. (RRF 100) 4.2.1.1, 4.5.1.1, 2 16
5.9.1.1
2 16
21. Ensure carbouy color coding, carbouy labeling is Consequences: 5 8 Devendra Mhatre
Risk Risk
After Risk
Risk
Reduction
Reduction
in place to avoid charging of wrong material. 4.3.1.1, 4.17.1.1 9 18
22. Develop SOP to include supervisor check to Consequences: 5 12 Devendra Mhatre

ensure correct carbouys are taken for unloading. 4.3.1.1
23. Provide control mechanism on nitrogen line to Consequences: 2 4 Nikhil Parit & Ajinkya Sajanikar
maintain positive inert atmosphere in 91R1.G. 4.13.1.1, 5.14.1.1 2 4
24. Provide KV on catalyst charging pot with an Consequences: 2 7 Nikhil Parit
interlock to open only if nitrogen pressure is 4.13.1.1
available in reactor.
25. Provide intrinsically safe instruments for 91R1.G Consequences: 2 11 Nikhil Parit
and 91V1.G 4.13.1.1, 5.14.1.1 2 7
26. Provide nitrogen to 91V4.G to avoid air ingress Consequences: 2 16 Nikhil Parit
during catalyst charging. 4.13.1.1
27. Develop SOP for catalyst charging using PPEs. Consequences: 14 19 Devendra Mhatre
4.15.1.1
28. Provide dedicated storage and strict control on Consequences: 9 22 Devendra Mhatre
usage of handling of hydrogen peroxide. Do not 4.17.1.1
keep loose material in plant.
29. Provide interlock on low cooling water supply Consequences: 5 8 Nikhil Parit
pressure to stop heating of 91R1.G by closing 5.16.1.1
TV91.1.G.
30. Provide RTD in vapor line at upstream of vacuum Consequences: 5 12 Nikhil Parit
trap with an interlock to stop heating of 91R1.G by 5.16.1.1
closing TV91.1.G.
31. Perform periodic cleaning of strainer in cooling Consequences: 5 17 Devendra Mhatre
water inlet line to 91E1.G 5.16.1.1
32. Include in BMR to ensure that IBC is replaced Consequences: 14 19 Devendra Mhatre
after every two batches to prevent overfilling. 5.7.1.1
33. Perform leak testing of overhead set-up using Consequences: 4 11 Devendra Mhatre and Vinayak Mali
nitrogen pressure 1 Kg/cm2 (recommended 5.15.1.1
previously) before starting batch. Include this in
BMR and recipe. (RRF 100)
34. Perform periodic inspection and replacement of Consequences: 4 16 Devendra Mhatre
gaskets. 5.15.1.1
35. Provide interlock to close thermic fluid line Consequences: 14 19 Nikhil Parit
TV91.1.G on stoppage of 91R1.G agitator. 5.10.1.1
36. Ensure minimum flanges, metallic gaskets, non- Consequences: 4 11 Nikhil Parit
soaking type insulation, high temperature 5.15.2.1
seamless piping and fittings, Sch 80 piping, 100%
radiography, stress analysis, thermal expansion
joints, hot bolting and tightening for thermic fluid
lines. (RRF 100)
37. Perform periodic inspection of piping, gaskets, Consequences: 4 16 Nikhil Parit
replacement of gaskets to ensure mechanical 5.15.2.1
integrity.
38. Evaluate the need for Thermal Relief Valve on Consequences: 20 27 Nikhil Parit
utility side of all heat exchangers. 5.15.3.1
39. Include in SOP and recipe to ensure inertisation is Consequences: 2 11 Devendra Mhatre
done before addition of catalyst. 5.14.1.1
40. Evaluate to provide double valved sampling Consequences: 5 12 Nikhil Parit
system either from reactor top or from bottom to 5.17.1.1
avoid operation of circulation system.
41. Provide blind flange to MV91034. Consequences: 14 19 Nikhil Parit
5.3.3.1
42. Ensure bags labeling is in place to avoid charging Consequences: 14 19 Devendra Mhatre
of wrong material. 6.3.1.1
43. Provide interlock to open KV91.5.G for filtration Consequences: Nikhil Parit
Risk Risk
After Risk
Risk
Reduction
Reduction
only if 91R1.G temperature is below 50oC 7.7.1.1
44. Provide interlock to prevent opening of KV91.5.G Consequences: 5 17 Nikhil Parit
if 91R1.G temperature TT91.1.G is more than 5.17.1.1
50oC.
45. Perform leak test after maintenance work on Consequences: Devendra Mhatre
sparkler filter. 7.8.1.1
46. Provide line of compatible MOC for 91V3.G. Consequences: 14 19 Nikhil Parit
8.1.1.1
Appendix C - Hazop Worksheets
HAZOP Worksheet - CCTG
Node: 1. CCA Unloading
Drawing: P90-TF35-04-001, Rev. 2
Type: Atm. Storage Tank
Equipment ID: 35T1.G
Design Conditions/Parameters: 35T1.G, SS304, 35 KL
Unloading of CCA from isotanker (20 KL) using centrifugal pump 35P1.G (40m3/Hr.)
Matrix Matrix
Deviation Causes Consequences CAT Safeguards Matrix
Resp
S L RR S L RR S L RR
No / Less Flow 1. No flow of CCA during 1. Process delay
tanker unloading - due to
malfunctioning of pump -
mechanical failure
2. No flow of CCA during 1. Dry running of pump P 4 B 14 1. None 1. Prepare Devend 4 C 19
tanker unloading - due to 35P1.G - possible damage SOP/BMR for ra
choking of bucket filter of mechanical seal - unloading of Mhatre
35F1.G moderate spill of CCA, CCA tanker,
personnel injury on skin mention PPEs
contact to be used for
unloading.
2. Dry running of pump E 4 B 14 1. Pump is provided 4 C 19 2. Include Devend 4 D 23
35P1.G - possible damage in dyke to prevent periodic ra
of mechanical seal - spread of CCA cleaning of Mhatre
moderate spill of CCA - - spill. bucket filter in
possible carryover of CCA ITPM
to storm water drain - procedure.
environmental hazard - soil 3. Include in Devend 4 E 26
contamination, aqua toxicity tanker ra
unloading Mhatre
SOP/BMR to
monitor
35P1.G
discharge
pressure
during tanker
unloading.
More Flow 1. No credible cause
Misdirected/ Reverse Flow 1. Unloading of wrong material 1. Other materials handled in F 4 B 14 1. None 4. Include in Devend 4 C 19
in CCA Tank - human error isotanker at site are SOP/BMR, ra
compatible with CCA- no supervisor Mhatre
vigorous reaction is check to
expected - impact on ensure correct
product quality due to tanker has
contamination of CCA been
Matrix Matrix
Resp
connected for
unloading.
Less Pressure 1. Same as 'Low Flow' in this
node.
2. Low pressure in isotanker if 1. Possible mechanical E 3 B 9 1. None 6. Include in Devend 3 C 13
vent is not provided during damage of isotanker due to SOP/BMR to ra
unloading - human error collapse under vacuum - check the vent Mhatre
possible spillage of CCA - is open before
possible carryover of CCA unloading is
to storm water drain - started.
environmental hazard - soil 7. Provide curbed Nikhil 3 D 18
contamination, aqua toxicity area with Parit
containment
for CCA tanker
unloading.
More Pressure 1. More pressure due to 1. Overpressurisation of tank if P 1 B 2 1. Tank is provided 1 E 11 5. Include fire in Yogesh 1 F 16
external fire around 35T1.G heated above 330oC (B.P.), with open vent (3 CCA tank farm Sankhe
possible tank rupture, in.) without in Emergency
personnel injury, fatality isolation valve. Response Plan
(RRF 1000). and impart
2. Fire-fighting 1 F 16 training.
system is provided
for external cooling
- foam dispenser is
provided for
extinguishing fire
involving CCA.
(RRF 10)
Less Level 1. Low level in isotanker - due 1. Dry running of 35P1.G - F 5 B 20 3. Include in Devend 5 C 24
to isotanker emptying - mechanical damage of seal tanker ra
human error - unloading - downtime unloading Mhatre
operation not monitored SOP/BMR to
monitor
35P1.G
discharge
pressure
during tanker
unloading.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
More Level 1. Excess unloading of 1. Overfilling of tank, spillage P 3 B 9 1. High level switch 3 C 13
isotanker in 35T1.G - human of CCA through high vent - LS 35.1.G with an
error personnel injury due to skin inter lock to stop
contact 35P1.G on high
level.
2. LT35.1.G is 3 D 18
provided with high
level interlock to
stop 35P1.G.
3. Occupancy around 3 E 22
tank is low.
Less Temperature 1. No credible cause
More Temperature 1. Discussed in 'High pressure'
scenario
Leakage 1. Hose / flange leak during 1. CCA spill, personnel injury P 3 B 9 1. None 8. Develop 'Hose Shrivar 3 D 18
tanker unloading on skin contact, medical Management dhan
treatment System' to Nuval &
maintain hoses Avinash
mechanical Shinde
integrity. (RRF
100)
2. Flange leak due to gasket 1. CCA spill, personnel injury P 3 B 9 1. None 12. Provide Nikhil 3 D 18
failure on skin contact, medical flange guards Parit
treatment on all flanges
in CCA
unloading
line.
Previous Accident 1. Taloja site - Incident related 1. Personnel exposure to P 5 B 20 1. Tanker auditing 5 C 24
to leakage of tanker isolation DMAPA, no injury had has been
master valve had taken occurred incorporated to
place, cause moderate spill ensure supply in
of DMAPA appropriate
tankers with no
leaks.
Sampling 1. Sampling will be done from 1. Possible exposure to CCA, P 4 B 14 1. None 9. Develop SOP Devend 4 C 19
isotanker before unloading personnel injury for sampling of ra
Matrix Matrix
Resp
CCA isotanker Mhatre
- include
PPEs, tools to
be used,
method of
sampling.
Node: 2. CCA Charging

Drawing: P90-TF35-04-001, Rev. 2; P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3
Type: Pump transfer
Equipment ID: 35P2.G
Design Conditions/Parameters: 35P2.G, SS304, 15m3/Hr., 35 m Head
Transfer of 4598 Kg. CCA to 91R1.G through FT91.1.G (mass flow meter) to empty reactor.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
No / Less Flow 1. No flow of CCA to 91R1.G - 1. 35P2.G will run in dead E 4 B 14 1. 35P2.G is provided 4 C 19 10. Ensure that Nikhil 4 E 26
due to malfunction of head condition - possible in dyke for dyke drain Parit
KV91.2.G - stuck closed mechanical seal damage - containment. (RRF valves are
moderate spill of CCA - 10). kept blinded,
environmental hazard 2. Interlock is 4 D 23 perform tank
provided to stop farm
35P2.G on low inspection
flow indicated by using a
FT91.1.G with a checklist.
timer of two min. (RRF 10)
2. No / low flow of CCA to 1. Process delay
91R1.G - recirculation valve
kept open - human error
3. No flow of CCA to 91R1.G - 1. Process delay
malfunction of 35P2.G
4. No flow of CCA to 91R1.G - 1. 35P2.G will run dry F 5 B 20 1. None 11. Include in Devend 5 C 24
Type: Pump transfer
Matrix Matrix
Resp
blockage of 35F2.G condition - possible SOP/BMR to ra
mechanical seal damage - monitor Mhatre
property loss 35P2.G
discharge
pressure
during
operation.
Misdirected/ Reverse Flow 1. No credible cause -
dedicated line is provided
Less Pressure 1. Discussed in 'Low flow'
More Pressure 1. No credible cause
Less Level 1. Low level in 35T1.G - due to 1. Dry running of pump P 4 B 14 1. Low level interlock 4 C 19
transfer of material - human 35P2.G - possible damage is provided on
error of mechanical seal - LT35.1.G to stop
moderate spill of CCA, 35P2.G.
personnel injury on skin
contact
More Level 1. More level in 91R1.G - due 1. Possible overfilling of P 3 B 9 1. None 14. Provide High Nikhil 3 C 13
to malfunction of FT91.1.G - 91R1.G - CCA spill from level switch Parit
reading less flow than actual high vent, personnel injury LSH91.1.G to
close KV
91.2.G on
CCA line and
stop CCA
pump
More Temperature 1. Discussed in 'High pressure'
in Node 1.
Leakage 1. Flange leak due to gasket 1. CCA spill, personnel injury P 3 B 9 1. All flanges will be 3 C 13 13. Include piping Shrivar 3 D 18
failure on skin contact, medical provided with in ITPM dhan
treatment flange guards to procedure to Nuval &
prevent splash. periodically Avinash
check the Shinde
flanges and
Type: Pump transfer
Matrix Matrix
Resp
condition of
gaskets, pipe
thickness
testing,
corrosion
monitoring
etc.
Node: 3. Glycerine Charging

Drawing: P90-CG91-04-001, Rev. 3
Type: Drum charging
Equipment ID: 91R1.G, 84WV.2G
Design Conditions/Parameters: 91R1.G, SS304, 7 KL
Glycerine (752 Kg.) drum unloading under vacuum using water ring vacuum pump
Matrix Matrix
Resp
No / Less Flow 1. No flow of glycerine transfer 1. Process delay
from drum to 91R1.G - due
to loss of vacuum
2. No flow of glycerine transfer 1. Process delay
from drum to 91R1.G -
malfunction of KV91.10 -
stuck closed
More Qty 1. Excess charging of glycerine 1. Impact on product quality
- due to human error
Less qty 1. Less charging of glycerine - 1. Impact on product quality
due to human error and yield
Misdirected/ Reverse Flow 1. Reverse flow of water from 1. Process delay, impact on
vacuum pump - due to quality
sudden stoppage of pump in
Type: Drum charging
Matrix Matrix
Resp
case of power failure
Less Pressure 1. No credible cause -
equipment is designed for
full vacuum
Less Level 1. No consequence
More Level 1. No new scenario -
Discussed in 'Node 2'
More Temperature 1. No credible cause
Wrong Composition 1. Charging of wrong material 1. Impact on process safety P 2 B 5 1. 15. Ensure Drum Devend 2 C 8
instead of drum color coding, ra
type of drum, Mhatre
drum labeling
is in place to
avoid
charging of
wrong
material.
16. Develop SOP Devend 2 D 12

to include ra
supervisor Mhatre
check to
ensure
correct drums
are taken for
unloading.
17. Impart Abhijit 2 E 17
training on Pawar
SOP and
material
identification
to operations
personnel.
Type: Drum charging
Matrix Matrix
Resp
Leakage 1. Hose / Flange leak during 1. Air ingress to 91R1.G - F.P.
glycerine charging under of Glycerine and CCA is
vacuum above 135oC - no
possibility of formation of
flammable mixture at
ambient temperature
Equipment Layout 1. Adequate space has been
provided for temporary drum
storage before unloading
Node: 4. Catalyst Charging

Type: Charging hopper
Equipment ID: 91R1.G, 91V4.G (charging vessel)
Charging of 6 Kg. liquid catalyst (50% aq. solution)
Matrix Matrix
Resp
No / Less qty 1. Less qty due to Human error 1. Process delay
in dispensing
More qty 1. More qty due to Human error 1. Higher reaction rate - no P 1 B 2 1. None 18. Perform Nikhil 1 C 4
in dispensing significant consequence as dispersion Parit
the reaction is endothermic analysis for
- further, excess catalyst will release of
get decomposed when Phosphine
heated above 108oC - from 91R1.G
formation of phosphine - vent to
highly flammable and toxic determine the
material (IDLH: 50 PPM, exposure
TLV-TWA: 0.05 PPM) - concentration
acute toxicity, fatality .
Matrix Matrix
Resp
19. Evaluate the Nikhil 1 D 7
scrubber Parit &
required for Ajinkya
Phosphine. Sajanik
ar
20. Explore the Dr. 1 F 16
possibility of Bharat
alternative Parab
safer option
of catalyst.
(RRF 100)
Misdirected/ Reverse Flow 1. Charging of wrong material 1. Process safety incident, P 2 B 5 21. Ensure Devend 2 C 8
personnel injury carbouy color ra
coding, Mhatre
carbouy
labeling is in
place to avoid
charging of
wrong
material.
22. Develop SOP Devend 2 D 12

to include ra
supervisor Mhatre
check to
ensure
correct
carbouys are
taken for
unloading.
Less Temperature 1. Less temperature during 1. Process delay
second, third or fourth lot of
catalyst charging - due to
low temp of thermic fluid
More Temperature 1. High temperature during 1. Catalyst will get P 1 B 2 1. None 18. Perform Nikhil 1 C 4
second, third or fourth lot of decomposed when heated dispersion Parit
catalyst charging - due to above 108oC - formation of analysis for
high temp of thermic fluid phosphine - highly release of
Matrix Matrix
Resp
flammable and toxic Phosphine
material (IDLH: 50 PPM, from 91R1.G
TLV-TWA: 0.05 PPM) - vent to
acute toxicity, fatality determine the
exposure
concentration
.
scrubber Parit &
Phosphine. Sajanik
ar
alternative Parab
safer option
of catalyst.
(RRF 100)
No / Less Agitation 1. Malfunction of agitator 1. Process delay
during catalyst charging
More Agitation 1. No credible cause
No / Less Reaction 1. Less reaction in case of
basisity in reactor - after the
batch, reactor is washed
three times, which will take
away the alkalinity
More Reaction 1. No new scenario
Less Concentration 1. No new scenario
More Concentration 1. No new scenario
Wrong Composition 1. No new scenario
No/Less Step 1. Inertisation step before 1. Formation of flammable P 1 B 2 23. Provide Nikhil 1 C 4
catalyst charging not mixture in reactor when control Parit &
performed - human error catalyst is added, due to mechanism Ajinkya
formation of Phosphine - on nitrogen Sajanik
possible internal fire, line to ar
Matrix Matrix
Resp
explosion, equipment maintain
rupture, fatality positive inert
atmosphere
in 91R1.G.
24. Provide KV Nikhil 1 D 7
on catalyst Parit
charging pot
with an
interlock to
open only if
nitrogen
pressure is
available in
reactor.
25. Provide Nikhil 1 E 11
intrinsically Parit
safe
instruments
for 91R1.G
and 91V1.G
26. Provide Nikhil 1 F 16
nitrogen to Parit
91V4.G to
avoid air
ingress
during
catalyst
charging.
Corrosion / Erosion 1. All materials are compatible
Leakage / spillage 1. Leak / spill of catalyst during 1. Possible exposure to P 4 B 14 1. Suitable platform 27. Develop SOP Devend 4 C 19
charging form 91V4.G catalyst - corrosive to skin, will be provided for for catalyst ra
personnel injury catalyst charging. charging Mhatre
using PPEs.
Utility Failure 1. Loss of thermic fluid heating 1. Process delay
to 91R1.G - due to
malfunction of thermic fluid
circulation pump
Matrix Matrix
Resp
2. Loss of thermic fluid heating 1. Process delay
to 91R1.G - due to
malfunction of TCV91.1 -
stuck closed
Previous Accident 1. Violent reaction of catalyst 1. Personnel injury P 3 B 9 21. Ensure Devend 3 D 18
with hydrogen peroxide carbouy color ra
causing rupture of the coding, Mhatre
carbouy - Operator had carbouy
inadvertently mixed catalyst labeling is in
in hydrogen peroxide place to avoid
carbouy while handling loose charging of
material wrong
material.
28. Provide Devend 3 E 22

dedicated ra
storage and Mhatre
strict control
on usage of
handling of
hydrogen
peroxide. Do
not keep
loose
material in
plant.
Node: 5. Esterification, Fatty Acid Recycle and Water Removal

Type: SS Reactor
Equipment ID: 91R1.G, 91V1.G, 91E1.G, 91P1.G, 91P2.G, 91E2.G
Heat the mass to 170oC in 5 hrs., water formed in reaction will be condensed and collected in 91V1.G, fatty acid will be recycled to 91R1.G after layer separation in receiver, by 91P2.G after
every 1-2 Hrs. Add catalyst in lots (in 4 installments). After 1st installment, apply vacuum through water ring vacuum pump. Take sample from 91R1.G through sampling point on recirculation
line of 91P1.G. If analysis is acceptable, start fatty acid recovery under full vacuum and collect it in 91V1.G. Take sample, if analysis is acceptable, cool the mass to 75-80oC. Wash the reaction
mass in 91R1.G.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
No / Less Flow 1. Low flow of water transfer 1. Process delay
from 91V1.G - due to
2. Low flow of fatty acid recycle 1. Impact on product quality
from 91V1.G - due to

Misdirected/ Reverse Flow 1. Mis directed flow of fatty acid 1. Impact on product quality
towards IBC - due to human due to non-availability of
error fatty acid recycle
2. Mis directed flow of water 1. Process delay
towards 91R1.G - due to
human error
3. Mis directed flow of hot 1. Spill of hot reaction mass, P 4 B 14 41. Provide blind Nikhil 4 C 19
reaction mass towards drum personnel injury flange to Parit
filling - human error in MV91034.
operation
Less Pressure 1. Low pressure during initial 1. Impact on product quality F 4 B 14 1. Provision is made 4 C 19
water recovery - human and yield to recycle fatty
error - inadvertent vacuum acid collected in
application 91V1.G
More Pressure 1. High pressure during 1. Process delay - reaction
reaction (loss of vacuum) - rate will decrease
due to malfunction of
vacuum pump
Less Level 1. No credible cause
More Level 1. Excess transfer of water / 1. Overfilling of IBC, spillage in P 4 B 14 32. Include in Devend 4 C 19
fatty acid from 91V1.G to plant, floor may become BMR to ra
IBC - due to human error slippery due to fatty acid ensure that Mhatre
spill, tripping hazard, IBC is
personnel injury replaced after
every two
batches to
prevent
overfilling.
Less Temperature 1. Low temperature in 91R1.G 1. Process delay
- due to malfunction of
thermic fluid system
Type: SS Reactor
mass in 91R1.G.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
More Temperature 1. High temperature during 1. Catalyst will get P 1 B 2 1. None 18. Perform Nikhil 1 C 4
second, third or fourth lot of decomposed when heated dispersion Parit
catalyst charging - due to above 108oC - formation of analysis for
high temp of thermic fluid Phosphine - highly release of
flammable and toxic Phosphine
material (IDLH: 50 PPM, from 91R1.G
TLV-TWA: 0.05 PPM) - vent to
acute toxicity, fatality determine the
exposure
concentration
.
scrubber Parit &
Phosphine. Sajanik
ar
alternative Parab
safer option
of catalyst.
(RRF 100)
No / Less Agitation 1. Loss of agitation during 1. Process delay - possible F 4 B 14 35. Provide Nikhil 4 C 19
esterification - due to localised heating in 91R1.G interlock to Parit
malfunction of agitator - impact on quality close thermic
fluid line
TV91.1.G on
stoppage of
91R1.G
agitator.
More Agitation 1. No credible cause
No / Less Reaction 1. No new scenarios
More Reaction 1. No new scenarios
Type: SS Reactor
mass in 91R1.G.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
No/Less Step 1. Inertisation step not 1. Formation of flammable 1 B 2 23. Provide Nikhil 1 C 4
performed for 91R1.G - mixture in reactor when control Parit &
human error catalyst is added, due to mechanism Ajinkya
formation of Phosphine - on nitrogen Sajanik
possible internal fire, line to ar
explosion, equipment maintain
rupture, fatality positive inert
atmosphere
in 91R1.G.
25. Provide Nikhil 1 D 7
intrinsically Parit
safe
instruments
for 91R1.G
and 91V1.G
39. Include in Devend 1 E 11
SOP and ra
recipe to Mhatre
ensure
inertisation is
done before
addition of
catalyst.
Leakage 1. Flange leakage in 91R1.G 1. Possible release of P 1 C 4 33. Perform leak Devend 1 E 11
overhead set-up - due to uncondensed vapors testing of ra
gasket failure containing phospine (toxic overhead set- Mhatre
and flammable material) - up using and
personnel injury, fatality nitrogen Vinayak
(TLV: 0.05 PPM, IDLH: 50 pressure 1 Mali
PPM) Kg/cm2
(recommende
d previously)
before
starting
batch.
Include this in
Type: SS Reactor
mass in 91R1.G.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
BMR and
recipe. (RRF
100)
34. Perform Devend 1 F 16
periodic ra
inspection Mhatre
and
replacement
of gaskets.
2. Leakage in thermic fluid 1. Loss of containment of P 1 C 4 36. Ensure Nikhil 1 E 11
circulation line - due to thermic fluid at high minimum Parit
gasket failure temperature - possible flanges,
external fire, personnel metallic
injury, fatality gaskets, non-
soaking type
insulation,
high
temperature
seamless
piping and
fittings, Sch
80 piping,
100%
radiography,
stress
analysis,
thermal
expansion
joints, hot
bolting and
tightening for
thermic fluid
lines. (RRF
100)
37. Perform Nikhil 1 F 16
periodic Parit
Type: SS Reactor
mass in 91R1.G.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
inspection of
piping,
gaskets,
replacement
of gaskets to
ensure
mechanical
integrity.
3. Leakage of tubes in 91E1.G 1. Mechanical damage of heat F 5 B 20 1. Interlock (1B) is 5 C 24 38. Evaluate the Nikhil 5 D 27
/ 91E2.G - due to thermal exchanger, water ingress to provided, if need for Parit
expansion in case of process - plant down time KV91.6.G or Thermal
blockage of utility side KV91.7.G on utility Relief Valve
side of 91E2.G get on utility side
closed, then close of all heat
KV91.4.G to exchangers.
prevent blocked
case on utility side.
Utility Failure 1. Low flow of cooling water to 1. Vapors from 91R1.G will not P 2 B 5 29. Provide Nikhil 2 C 8
91E1.G - due to malfunction get condensed, possible interlock on Parit
of utility release of uncondensed low cooling
fatty acid from high vent to water supply
atmosphere - personnel pressure to
injury on skin contact stop heating
of 91R1.G by
closing
TV91.1.G.
30. Provide RTD Nikhil 2 D 12
in vapor line Parit
at upstream
of vacuum
trap with an
interlock to
stop heating
of 91R1.G by
closing
TV91.1.G.
Type: SS Reactor
mass in 91R1.G.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
31. Perform Devend 2 E 17
periodic ra
cleaning of Mhatre
strainer in
cooling water
inlet line to
91E1.G
Sampling 1. Sampling of reaction mass 1. Possible leakage during P 2 B 5 1. Closed sampling 2 C 8 40. Evaluate to Nikhil 2 D 12
at 170oC sampling leading to valve with bottle is provide Parit
personnel injury considered. double valved
sampling
system either
from reactor
top or from
bottom to
avoid
operation of
circulation
system.
44. Provide Nikhil 2 E 17
interlock to Parit
prevent
opening of
KV91.5.G if
91R1.G
temperature
TT91.1.G is
more than
50oC.
Node: 6. Sodium Bicarbonate Charging for Washing and moisture Recovery

Type: SS reactor
Equipment ID: 91R1.G, 91V3.G
Cool reaction mass in 91R1.G to 75-80oC by circulating through 91E2.G via 91P1.G using cooling water.
Prepare Sodium Bi Carbonate solution in 91V3.G. Water (480 L) charging through FT91.2.G and add sodium bicarbonate (48 Kg.), add to 91R1.G through 91P5.G for washing, stir for 2 Hrs.,
settle for 1 Hr. separate the layers, collect wash water in IBC. Give 3 washes to reduce acid value to <0.1. Remove moisture by heating reaction mass upto 110oC applying vacuum upto 0.5
Torr. Cool to 40-50oC.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
Less Qty 1. Less charge of sodium 1. Ineffective washing -
bicarbonate - human error process delay
2. Less charging of water - due 1. Ineffective washing -
to malfunction of FT91.2.G process delay
More Qty 1. Excess charge of sodium 1. Effluent generation - no
bicarbonate - human error process safety impact
2. Excess charging of water - 1. Effluent generation - no

due to malfunction of process safety impact
FT91.2.G
Misdirected/ Reverse Flow 1. Charging of wrong material - 1. Impact on quality F 4 B 14 1. 42. Ensure bags Devend 4 C 19
human error labeling is in ra
place to avoid Mhatre
charging of
wrong
material.
2. Inadvertent charging of HCl 1. Process delay - excess

to 91V3.G - this vessel is water washing of product
used for acid washing of will be required to reduce
wash water periodically - acid value
human error
Less Pressure 1. No credible cause
More Pressure 1. Marginal increase if pressure 1. Marginal pressure increase 5 B 20 1. 91P5.G is
in 91R1.G due to fast - vent of 91R1.G will be designed to add
addition of sodium kept open - no impact sod. bicarbonate
bicarbonate solution - solution in 1 Hr.
human error
Less Level 1. No new scenario
More Level 1. No new scenario
Less Temperature 1.
More Temperature 1. High temperature in 91R1.G 1. Rapid reaction of mass with 5 B 20 1. Interlock (1D) is 5 C 24
before sodium bicarbonate sod. bicarbonate solution - provided to open
addition - due to human fast liberation of CO2 - KV91.11.G only if
error marginal increase in TT91.G is less
Node: 6. Sodium Bicarbonate Charging for Washing and moisture Recovery
Type: SS reactor
Equipment ID: 91R1.G, 91V3.G
Cool reaction mass in 91R1.G to 75-80oC by circulating through 91E2.G via 91P1.G using cooling water.
Prepare Sodium Bi Carbonate solution in 91V3.G. Water (480 L) charging through FT91.2.G and add sodium bicarbonate (48 Kg.), add to 91R1.G through 91P5.G for washing, stir for 2 Hrs.,
settle for 1 Hr. separate the layers, collect wash water in IBC. Give 3 washes to reduce acid value to <0.1. Remove moisture by heating reaction mass upto 110oC applying vacuum upto 0.5
Torr. Cool to 40-50oC.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
pressure than 80oC
No / Less Agitation 1. Loss of agitation during 1. Ineffective washing -
washing - due to malfunction process delay
of agitator
More Agitation 1. High RPM of agitator may 1. Marginal pressure increase 5 B 20 1. VFD is provided to 5 C 24
release CO2 at higher rate - vent of 91R1.G will be control the RPM
kept open - no impact depending on CO2
liberation rate.
Less Concentration 1. No new scenario
More Concentration 1. No new scenario
Leakage 1. Leakage of sod. bicarbonate 1. Spillage of sod. bicarbonate P 4 B 14 1. Work permit 4 C 19
solution due to mechanical solution. possible exposure, system is in place
damage of PP FRP vessel - skin irritation to perform risk
due to maintenance work in assessment before
the vicinity starting any work
in plant.
Utility Failure 1. Cooling water failure drying 1. Process delay as reaction
washing step mass cooling before
washing will not happen
Equipment Layout 1. Suitable platform will be
provided for charging sod.
bicarbonate bags.
Node: 7. Filtration through Sparkler Filter

Type: Sparkler Filter
Equipment ID: 91F1.G, 91F2.G
Design Conditions/Parameters: 91F1.G, SS316, 24 in. dia, 6.6 m2,
Circulate the reaction mass through sparkler filter to remove haziness, pack clear product through 91F1.G and 91F2.G.
Matrix Matrix
Resp
No / Less Flow 1. No flow of product through 1. Process delay
sparkler filter - due to
2. No flow of product through 1. Process delay
sparkler filter - due to
malfunction of KV91.5.G -
stuck closed
3. Low flow through sparkler 1. Process delay

filter due to blockage of filter
elements
Misdirected/ Reverse Flow 1. Mis directed flow of product 1. Possible choking of filter
towards cartridge filter cartridge - process delay
91F2.G - human error -
valve lined up before
filtration through sparkler
filter is complete
Less Pressure 1. Same as less flow
More Temperature 1. High temperature product - 1. No significant 43. Provide Nikhil
due to human error - mass consequences interlock to Parit
not cooled before starting open
filtration KV91.5.G for
filtration only
if 91R1.G
temperature
is below
50oC
Leakage 1. Leakage of sparkler filter - 1. Product spillage - material 45. Perform leak Devend
due to human error in fitting loss test after ra
the plates maintenance Mhatre
work on
sparkler filter.
Previous Accident 1. Leakage of filter plates - no
new scenario
Equipment Layout 1. Adequate space is provided
for sparkler filter
maintenance
Sampling 1. Sampling of product during 1. Possible spillage during P 5 B 20 1. Double valved 5 C 24
filtration sampling - product loss arrangement is
given for sampling
Node: 8. Fatty acid recovery from wash water
Type: Vessel
Equipment ID: 91V3.G
Design Conditions/Parameters: 91V3.G
Charge wash water, add HCL 20-30 Kg., stir for 30 min. separate water and fatty acid layer
Matrix Matrix
Resp
Corrosion 1. Corrosion of SS-304 line 1. Corrosion of the line, P 4 B 14 46. Provide line Nikhil 4 C 19
provided at bottom of leakage, personnel injury of compatible Parit
91V3.G - due to HCl MOC for
91V3.G.
Appendix D - Noded P&IDs

HAZOP Study Report - Galaxy- CCTG

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REPORT

Galaxy Surfactants Ltd.

AcuTech Consulting Private Limited

1.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

Appendix A: Node Descriptions

Figure 1 HAZOP Process Flowchart ............................................................................................. 7

Table 1 HAZOP Deviation Matrix............................................................................................... 8

Following products were studied using Hazop Methodology:

HAZOP is one of the methodologies identified as a universally acceptable Process Hazard

Following products were studied using Hazop Methodology:

2.0 PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The objectives of the HAZOP study are to:

3.0 STUDY APPROACH

This study was conducted in several stages, including:

 Preparation for the HAZOP Study;

3.1 HAZOP Methodology

The guideword HAZOP technique is a means of systematically reviewing a process to identify

worksheets: Deviation, Causes, Consequences, Safeguards, Severity, Likelihood, Risk Ranking,

A "deviation" is an excursion in operating conditions outside the normal range. It is derived by

Cause: pump seal leak to surroundings

Severity and Likelihood Ratings and Risk Ranking

Other Guidew ords?

Other Param eters?

Study Com plete

DESIGN GUIDE WORD

PARAMETER MORE LESS NONE REVERSE PART OF AS WELL OTHER

TEMPERATURE HIGH TEMP LOW TEMP

AGITATION TOO MUCH TOO

PHASE TOO MANY TOO FEW SINGLE INVERSION EMULSION

ADDITION TOO MUCH TOO

3.2 Review Team

First Name Last Name Company Title / Area of Expertise

Suraj Ghadge Galaxy Surfactants Officer, NPT

 To further reduce the probability of occurrence of an incident; or,

It is highly recommended to consider following aspects related to Process Safety information:

 A ‘Cause & Effect’ Matrix to be prepared indicating initiating instruments, parameter

 PFDs must be prepared consisting of Stream numbers, Stream compositions, Process

 A ‘Technology Transfer Document’ must be prepared consisting of Process Description,

Nodes Type Design Conditions/Parameters Drawings Equipment ID

16. Develop SOP to include supervisor check to Consequences: 5 12 Devendra Mhatre

22. Develop SOP to include supervisor check to Consequences: 5 12 Devendra Mhatre

Node: 2. CCA Charging

Node: 3. Glycerine Charging

16. Develop SOP Devend 2 D 12

Node: 4. Catalyst Charging

22. Develop SOP Devend 2 D 12

28. Provide Devend 3 E 22

Node: 5. Esterification, Fatty Acid Recycle and Water Removal

More Flow 1. No credible cause

Node: 6. Sodium Bicarbonate Charging for Washing and moisture Recovery

2. Excess charging of water - 1. Effluent generation - no

2. Inadvertent charging of HCl 1. Process delay - excess

Node: 7. Filtration through Sparkler Filter

3. Low flow through sparkler 1. Process delay

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