PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION It is now more than fifteen years since the appearance of the first edition of this anthology. Its adoption at a wide variety of universities and colleges is testimony both to the revival of interest in the philosophy of religion done in an analytical fashion and to the felt need by many for an anthology collecting such material. The appearance of other anthologies with a similar approach is further evidence of these trends. A great deal of important work has been done in recent years. A lot of this new work appears in this second edition. Authors such as Robert Adams, William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and R. G. Swinburne (and their colleagues and students) have done much important work, and this edition contains many of their seminal essays. The approach is the same as in the first edition, but the level of sophistication is much higher as the current discussion has deepened our understanding of many traditional issues. This edition incorporates most of the topics of the first edition, but there has been some reorganization of the material. This edition contains signifi- cantly increased attention to the issue of faith and reason because of the extensive recent literature devoted to it. The section on prayer and ritual has been eliminated because, despite their importance in religious life, they have not attracted sufficient philosophical attention. Perhaps a third edition will reflect an improvement in the literature on these topics. Finally, the issue of verificationism, which still exercised some influence on the first edition, is now completely and thankfully dropped. Let me express my appreciation not only to the many faculty members who havesent me their reactions to the first edition in light of their experience with it in the classroom but also to those who contributed to the review of the’ current edition: Judith Barad, Indiana State University; Felnion John Davis, State University of New York, Albany; John Donnelly, University of San Diego; Richard M. Gale, University of Pittsburgh; Thomas V. Morris, University of Notre Dame; and Wesley Morriston, University of Colorado, Boulder. I would certainly appreciate receiving such comments from users of this edition as well. Finally, let me express special appreciation to Sarah V. Brakman for her special help in all aspects of the preparation of this edition. \ Scanned with CamScannerPREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION Traditionally, the philosophy of religion has been one of the central areas of philosophy. This is not surprizing. For throughout history people turned to the study of philosophy with the hope that it would shed light upon some i fundamental problems encountered in connection with their religious beliefs. In the twentieth century, however, philosophy of religion lost its traditional i centrality within Anglo-American philosophy. | What brought about this change? I think it can be attributed to several factors: (1) For centuries, a principal issue in traditional religious philosophy had been whether one could prove the truth or falsity of a variety of funda- mental doctrines (the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, etc.). During the forties and fifties, the verifiability theory of meaning convinced many philosophers that such religious claims are cognitively meaningless and therefore neither true or false. There remained, of course, conjectures as to what type of meaning these religious statements do have, but this question did not arouse much interest. And even when the verifiability theory of meaning was abandoned, many continued to neglect the philosophy of religion. (2) Another factor is that very few working philosophers in the analytic school have had a personal religious commitment. Consequently, with the exception of those fervent nonbelievers who were concerned with proselytizing for their cause (the most notable example being Bertrand Russell), the philosophy of religion was neglected because analytical philos- ophers simply took no interest in religious matters. All of this has changed in recent years. With the complete rejection of verificationism, the question of the truth and falsity of religious doctrines is now once more recognized as a legitimate question, and there is a growing number of analytical philosophers who have a real personal interest in theological issues and would like to apply to those issues the methods of the analytic school. Consequently, some very fine work in the philosophy of religion has been published in recent years. As one scans this literature, two things emerge very clearly. The first is that there is a real affinity between recent analytic work and much of the writings of medieval theologians and rationalist and empiricist philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: both groups are keenly con- cemed with the careful analysis of the meaning and implications of religious ia . | Scanned with CamScannerxii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION doctrines, and with the question of whether or not different doctrines are consistent with each other; both groups are very much involved in the careful elaboration and critical analysis of proofs of the truth and falsity of religious doctrines. The second is that it is impossible to do good work in the philos- ophy of religion without taking into account the important advances of recent years in metaphysical analysis, in the philosophy of logic, and in philosoph- ical psychology. Issues in the philosophy of religion tend to be intertwined with issues in all of these areas. There have been several recent attempts to collect the new analytic material in the philosophy of religion, but they all suffer from two main defects that make them unsuitable for classroom use. First, they fail to cover systematically the major issues in the philosophy of religion, but offer merely | a series of unrelated, unintegrated articles. Second, they fail to include some | of the traditional writings that serve as background for the recent analytic i discussions. This anthology, by the careful organization of materials and by | the juxtaposition of classical and contemporary discussions, tries to show the student the continuity of philosophical thinking that he may fail to perceive in other texts. Scanned with CamScannerPART ONE oo FAITH AND REASON Scanned with CamScannerPART INTRODUCTION AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Ever since religious-faith has confronted philosophical reasoning, believ- ers and nonbelievers have struggled with the question of what ought to be the relation between them. Reactions have ranged from total indiffer- ence toward one or the other (toward faith by some nonbelievers and toward reason by some believers) to a desire to bring the two into some constructive relation with each other. This first part of our book will explore these varying reactions. One classical-answer is presented in the first of our selections, drawn from the writings of St. Thomas» Aquinas: Aquinas lived in a world of Christian believers who were divided on their attitude toward the use of reason to study questions about God. His own view was that there were two st , those that are di d those that are not. He goes on to explain why it was important for God to reveal to those of faith both sets of truths, even though the former are also discoverable by reason, and why it is reasonable to believe in both sets of truths, even though only the former are discoverable by reason. At first glance, it would seem that a very similarapproach was adopted by John-Locke many centuries later in another classical discussion of this issue. He too distinguishes religi iefs that are discoverable by reason not: But his attitude toward the former is very different than Aquinas's attitude toward them. For Locke, faithand revela- ti nothing ibute when reason has spoken clearly on.a given issue, since we are always more certain of the reasoned conclusion than of any supposition that a true revelation has said otherwise. Aquinas, for reasons he explains, would surely disagree on this point. This difference between Aquinas and Locke, while of great significance, is overshadowed by their joint belief that the fundamental claims of western religion about God are establishable by reasoned proofs. We shall be exam- ining the validity of these proofs in the next part of this book, but as a matter of historical fact, those proofs on which Aquinas and Locke relied have been viewed with much greater skepticism by other authors, especially in the last two centuries. This has transformed the whole discussion, since the issue for many has now become the question of whether it is rational to believe in God. when reason can no longer establish his existence. Scanned with CamScannerPART INTRODUCTION AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 3 Already in the seventeenth century, Pascal had tried to argue that it was. still reasonable to hold to religious faith because, if you do anything else, you tun the risk of losing everything if you are wrong. The third selection, by R. G. Swinbume, critically evaluates Pascal’s approach, arguing that the ap- ae is appropriate but that Pascal’s conclusion does not follow because 1) Pascal fai kei 7 : the possibility that one might lose eternal ascal failed to consider At the end of his article, Professor Swinburne raises the issue of the morality of holding religious beliefs without adequate evidence. This theme play central role in the nineteenth-century debate between William Clifford and William James about the morality of holding religious beliefs if reasoned arguments could not prove whether or not God existed. Clifford argued that holding such beliefs (either in the existence or nonexistence of God) is immoral because it contributes to credulity, the great enemy of human Progress, and that only agnosticism is appropriate in that setting. James claimed that there are at least some circumstances (circumstances in which ‘we face what he called living, forced, and momentous options) in which we are entitled to form theistic or atheistic beliefs even though adequate evidence for such beliefs is not available. The twentieth century has seen major attempts to defend theistic faith against the challenge of the lack of reasoned proofs for the existence of God. ‘One of these derives from Kierkegaard’s arguments against objective reason- ing in religion, one derives from Wittgenstein’s views about groundless beliefs and ways of life, and one derives from objections of reformed theolo- gians to natural theology. The last three selections in this part of the book- present and /or evaluate these challenges. In his essay, Robert Adams distinguishes and critically evaluates three arguments (which he attributes to Soren Kierkegaard) against the desirability of reasoning objectively in support of religious faith. Professor Adams rejects one of the arguments. He feels that the other two might indeed work if ane accepts certain conceptions of religiousness, but that those conceptions ofa although appealing, are not ones which heis prepared to accept {na tantalizing footnote at the end of the paper, he raises the possibility that these arguments might be modified to employ less extreme conceptions of religiousness. Kierkegaard’s point of departure, according to Adams, is his conception of the nature of religious faith. Wittengstein’s point of departure, according to Norman Malcolm, is his reflections on the need for framework principles which form a system in which questions of justification and proof can be raised. Framework principles cannot themselves be justified, and their accep- tance constitutes growing into a way of living, thinking, and talking. Malcolm suggests that religion should be viewed as one such form of life, that belief in God is part of its framework principles, and that attempts to justify that belief rationally are therefore inappropriate. Scanned with CamScanner. PART ONE FAITH AND REASON In his essay, Alvin Plantinga calls attention to the fact that ever since John Calvin, Reformed theologians have argued against the appropriateness of natural theology as an attempt to prove the existence of God. Plantinga | interprets them to be asserting that rational belief systems should include as | part of their basic beliefs a belief in God which is just as properly basic as. ' self-evident beliefs or beliefs which are evident to the senses. In this way, says | Plantinga, the Reformed theologian can still see his belief in the existence of God as a belief supported by reason. There are naturally many issues raised by these last essays. They call upon us to assess the relation between the desire that certain beliefs are true and the reasonableness of believing them to be true and to reexamine our understanding of the very nature of reason. There is no doubt, how- ever, that they have greatly added to the discussion of the relation between reason and belief. ‘ Students interested in pursuing these issues further will find a great deal of literature devoted to these questions. Anthony Kenny’s Faith and Reason (Columbia University Press, 1983) and Richard Swinburne’s Faith and Reason (Oxford University Press, 1981) are good discussions of the classical and contemporary issues, while the first part of Robert Audi and William Wainright’s Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment (Cornell Uni- versity Press, 1986) and the whole of Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Faith and Rationality (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) are devoted to contributions to the contemporary debate. Those books, and the material cited in them, will enable students to continue their study of these important issues. Scanned with CamScannerST. THOMAS AQUINAS Different Ways of Knowing About God CHAPTER III. ON THE WAY IN WHICH DIVINE TRUTH IS TO BE MADE KNOWN, (1) The way of making truth known is not always the same, and, as the Philosopher has very well said, “it belongs to an educated man to seek such certitude in each thing as the nature of that thing allows.”! The remark is also introduced by Boethius.? But, since such is the case, we must first show what ‘way is open to usin order that wemay make known the truth which is our object. (2) Thereisa i > ability of the human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also'is’ Such are that God exists, that He is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philoso- phers, guided by the light of the natural reason. (3) That there are certain truths about God that totally surpass man’s ability appears with the greatest evidence. Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being (for according to Aristotle “what a thing is” is the principle of demonstration), it is necessary that the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the way in which we know what belongs to it. Hence, if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example, that of a stone or of a triangle, no intelligible characteristic belonging to that thing surpasses the grasp of the human reason. But this does not happen to us in the case of God. For the human intellect is not able to reach a comprehension of the divine substance through its natural power. For, according to its manner of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the senses for the origin of knowledge; From On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by Anton C. Pegis. Copyright © 1955 by Doubleday, a division of Bantam, Doubleday, Dell Publishing Company, Inc, Reprinted by permission of the publisher. lAristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1,3 (1094b 24), 2Boethius, De Trinitate, I, (PL, 64, col. 1250). 3aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 3 (90b 31). a Scanned with CamScanner6 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. Now, sensible things cannot lead the human intellect to the point of seeing in them the nature of the divine substance; for sensible things are effects that fall short of the power of their cause. Yet, beginning with sensible things, our intellect is led to the point of knowing about God that He exists, and other such characteristics that must be attributed to the First Principle. There are, consequently, some intelligible truths about God that are open to the human reason; but there are others that absolutely surpass its power. (4) We may easily see the same point from the gradation of intellects. Consider the case of two persons of whom one has a more penetrating grasp ofa thing by his intellect than does the other. He who has the superior intellect understands many things that the other cannot grasp at all. Such is the case with a very simple person who cannot at all grasp the subtle speculations of philosophy. But the intellect of an angel surpasses the human intellect much more than the intellect of the greatest philosopher surpasses the intellect of the most uncultivated simple person; for the distance between the best philosopher and a simple person is contained within the limits of the human species, which the angelic intellect surpasses. For the angel knows God on the basis of a more noble effect than does man; and this by as much as the substance of an angel, through which the angel in his natural knowledge is led to the knowledge of God, is nobler than sensible things and even than the soul itself, through which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. The divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect is in its capacity equal to its substance, and therefore it understands fully what it is, including all its intelligible attributes. But by his natural knowledge the angel does not know what God is, since the substance itself of the angel, through which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect that is not equal to the power ofits cause. Hence, the angel is not able, by means of his natural knowledge, to grasp all the things that God understands in Himself; nor is the human reason suffi- cient to grasp all the things that the angel understands through his own natural power. Just as, therefore, it would be the height of folly for a simple person to assert that what a philosopher proposes is false on the ground that he himself cannot understand it, so (and even more so) it.is the acme of si inis investigated by reason. (5) The same thing, moreover, appears quite clearly from the defect that we experience every day in our knowledge of things. We do not know a great many of the properties of sensible things, and in most cases we are not able to discover fully the natures of those properties that we apprehend by the sense. Much more is it the case, therefore, that the human reason is not equal to the task of investigating all the intelligible characteristics of that most excellent substance. Scanned with CamScannerAQUINAS, Different Ways of Knowing About God 7 ) (6) The remark of Aristotle likewise agrees with this conclusion. Hesays that “our intellect is related to the prime beings, which are most evident in their nature, as the eye of an owl is related to the sun.” (7) Sacred Scripture also gives testimony to this truth. We read in Job: “Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly?” (11:7). And again: “Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge” (Job 36:26). And St. Paul: “We know in part” (1 Cor. 13:9). (8) We should not, therefore, immediately reject as false, following the opinion of the Manicheans and many unbelievers, everything that is said about God even though it cannot be investigated by reason. CHAPTER IV. THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT GOD TO WHICH THE NATURAL REASON REACHES IS FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF (1) Since, therefore, there exists a twofold truth concerning the divine being, ‘one to which the inquiry of the reason can reach, the other which surpasses the whole ability of the human reason, itis fitting that both of these truths be proposed to man divinely for belief. This point must first be shown concern- ing the truth that is open to the inquiry of the reason; otherwise, it might perhaps seem to someone that, since such a truth can be known by the reason, it was uselessly given to men through a supernatural inspiration as an object of belief. (2) Yet, if this truth were left solely as a matter of inquiry for the human of G o e ledge of God. For there are three reasons why most men are cut off from the fruit of diligent inquiry which is the discovery of truth. Some do not have the physical disposition for such work: As a result, there are many who are naturally not fitted to pursue knowledge; and so, however much they tried, they would be unable to reach the highest level of human knowledge which consists in knowing God. Others are for some men must devote themselves to taking care of temporal matters. Such men would not be able to give so much time to the leisure of contemplative inquiry as to reach the highest peak at which human investigation can arrive, namely, the knowledge of God. Finally, there are some who are cut off by indolence. In order to know the things that the reason can investigate concerning God, a knowledge of many things must already be possessed. For almost all of philosophy is directed towards the knowledge of God, and that is why metaphysics, which deals with divine things, is the last part of philosophy to be learned. This means that we are able to arrive at the inquiry concerning the aforementioned truth only on the basis of a great deal of labor spent in study. 4Aristotle, Metaphysics, la, 1 (993b 9). é Scanned with CamScanner8 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON Now, those who wish to undergo such a labor for the mere love of knowledge are few, even though God has inserted into the minds of men a natural appetite for knowledge. time: The reasons are several. There is the profundity of this truth, which the human intellect is made capable of grasping by natural inquiry only after a long training. Then, there are many things that must be presupposed, as we have said. There is also the fact that, in youth, when the soul is swayed by the various movements of the passions, it is not in a suitable state for the knowledge of such lofty truth. On the contrary, “one becomes wise and knowing in repose,” as it is said in the Physics.5 The result is this. If the only way open to us for the knowledge of God were solely that of the reason, the human race would remain in the blackest shadows of ignorance. For then the knowledge of God, which especially renders men perfect and good, would come to be possessed only by a few, and these few would require a great deal of time in order to reach it. : (5) The third awkward effect is this. The investigation of the human reason for the most part has falsity present within it, and this is due partly to the weakness of our intellect in judgment, and partly to the admixture of images. The result is that many, remaining ignorant of the power of demon- stration, would hold in doubt those things that have been most truly demon- strated. This would be particularly the case since they see that, among those who are reputed to be wise men, each one teaches his own brand of doctrine. Furthermore, with the many truths that are demonstrated, there sometimes is mingled something that is false, which is not demonstrated but rather asserted on the basis of some probable or sophistical argument, which yet has the credit of being a demonstration. That is why it was necessary that the unshakeable certitude and pure truth concerning divine things should be presented to men by way of faith.$ (6) Beneficially, therefore, did the divine Mercy provide that it should instruct us to hold by faith even those truths that the human reason is able to investigate. In this way, all men would easily be able to have a share in the knowledge of God, and this without uncertainty and error. (7) Hence it is written: “Henceforward you walk notas also the Gentiles walkin the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened” (Eph. 4:17-18). And again: “All thy children shall be taught of the Lord” (Isa. 54:13). “Aristotle, Physics, VIL, 3 (247b 9). “although St. Thomas does not name Maimonides or his Guide for the Perplexed (Dux neutrorumn), there are evident points of contact between the Catholic and the Jewish theologian. (On the reasons for revelation given here, on our knowledge of God, on creation and the eternity of the world, and on Aristotelianism in general, St. Thomas has Maimonides in mind both to agree and to disagree with him. By way of background for SCG, I the reader can usefully consult the references to Maimonides in E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New ook 1955) mp, 649-65). Scanned with CamScannerAQUINAS, Different Ways of Knowing About God 9 { CHAPTER V. THAT THE TRUTHS THE HUMAN REASON IS NOT ABLE TO INVESTIGATE ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF (1) Now, perhaps some will think that men should not be asked to believe what the reason is not adequate to investigate, since the divine Wisdom Provides in the case of each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary for man to receive from God as objects of belief even those truths that are above the human reason. (2) No one tends with desire and zeal towards something that is not already known to him, But, as we shall examine later on in this work, men are ordained by the divine Providence towards a higher good than human fragility can experience in the present life.” That is why it was necessary for the human mind to be called to something higher than the human reason here and now can reach, so that it would thus learn to desire something .and. with. zeal tend towards something that surpasses the whole state of the present life. This belongs especially to the Christian religion, which in a unique way promises spiritual and eternal goods. And so there are many things proposed to men in it that transcend human sense. The Old Law, on the other hand, whose Promises were of a temporal character, contained very few proposals that transcended the inquiry of the human reason. Following this same direction, the philosophers them- selves, in order that they might lead men from the pleasure of sensible things to virtue, were concerned to show that there were in existence other goods of a higher nature than these things of sense, and that those who gave themselves to the active or contemplative virtues would find much sweeter enjoyment in the taste of these higher goods. (3) It is also necessary that such truth be proposed to men for belief so” that ‘or then only do we know God truly when we believe Him to be above everything that it is possible for man to think about Him; for, as we have shown the divine substance surpasses the natural knowledge of which man is capable. Hence, by the fact that some things about God are proposed to man that surpass his reason, j there is strengthened in man the view that God is something above what he j can think. | (4) Another benefit that comes from the revelation to men of truths that exceed the reason is the curbing of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who have such a presumptuous opinion of their own ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of everything; 3 I mean to say that, in their estimation, everything is true that seems to them So, and everything is false that does not. So that the human mind, therefore, might be freed from this presumption and come to a humble inquiry after 7SCG, Il, ch. 48. SSee above. ch 2 Scanned with CamScanner10 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON truth, it was necessary that some things should be proposed to man by God. that would completely surpass his intellect. (6) Astill further benefit may also be seen in what Aristotle says in the Ethics? There was a certain Simonides who exhorted people to put aside the knowledge of divine things and to apply their talents to human occupations. He said that “he who is a man should know human things, and he who is mortal, things that are mortal.” Against Simonides Aristotle says that “man should draw himself towards what is immortal and divine as much as he can.” And so he says in the De animalibus that, although what we know of the higher substances is very little, yet that little is loved and desired more than all the knowledge that we have about less noble substances." He also says in the De caelo et mundo that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be given even a modest and merely plausible solution, he who hears this experiences intense joy."' From all these considerations it is clear that even the most imperfect knowledge about the most noble realities brings the greatest perfection to the soul. Therefore, although the human reason cannot grasp fully the truths that are above it, yet, if it somehow holds these truths at least by faith, it acquires great perfection for itself. (6) Therefore it is written: “For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men” (Ecclus. 3:25). Again, “So the things that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God. But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit” (I Cor. 2:11, 10). CHAPTER VI. THAT TO GIVE ASSENT TO THE TRUTHS OF FAITH IS NOT FOOLISHNESS EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE ABOVE REASON (1) Those who place their faith in this truth, however, “for which the human reason offers no experimental evidence,” do not believe foolishly, as though “following artificial fables” (II Peter 1:16). For these “secrets of divine Wis- dom” (Job 11:6) the divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned te reveal to men. It reveals its own presence, as well as the truth of its teaching and inspiration, by fitting arguments; and in order to confirm those truths that exceed natural knowledge, it gives visible manifestation to works that surpass the ability of all nature. Thus, there are the wonderful cures of illnesses, there is the raising of the dead, and the wonderful immuta- tion in the heavenly bodies; and what is more wonderful, there is the Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 7 (1177b 31). i ‘Aristotle, De partibus animalium, 1, 5 (644b 32). MAfistotle, De caelo et mundo, I, 12 (291b 26). Ms. Gregory, Homiliae in evangelia, I, hom. 26, i (PL, 76, col. 1197). Scanned with CamScannerAQUINAS, Different Ways of Knowing About God n inspiration given to human minds, so that simple and untutored persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, come to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom and the readiest eloquence. When these arguments were examined, through the efficacy of the above-mentioned proof, and not the violent assault of arms or the promise of pleasures, and (what is most wonderful of all) in the midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an innumer- able throng of people, both simple and most learned, flocked to the Christian faith. In this faith there are truths preached that surpass every human intellect; the pleasures of the flesh are curbed; it is taught that the things of the world should be spurned. Now, for the minds of mortal men to assent to these things is the greatest of miracles, just as it is a manifest work of divine inspiration that, spurning visible things, men should seek only what is invisible. Now, that this has happened neither without preparation nor by chance, but as a result of the disposition of God, is clear from the fact that through many pronouncements of the ancient prophets God had foretold that He would do this. The books of these prophets are held in veneration among us Christians, since they give witness to our faith. (2) The manner of this confirmation is touched on by St. Paul: “Which,” that is, human salvation, “having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that hear Him: God also bearing them witness of signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost” (Heb. 2:3-4). (3) This wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the clearest witness of the signs given in the past; so that it is not necessary that they should be further repeated, since they appear most clearly in their effect. For it would be truly more wonderful than all signs if the world had been led by simple and humble men to believe such lofty truths, to accomplish such difficult actions, and to have such high hopes. Yet it is also a fact that, even in our own time, God does not cease to work miracles through His saints for the confirmation of the faith. (4) On the other hand, those who founded sects committed to erroneous doctrines proceeded in a way that is opposite to this. The point is clear in the case of Mohammed. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His teaching also contained precepts that were in conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure. In all this, as is not unexpected, he was obeyed by carnal men. As for proofs of the truth of his doctrine, he brought forward only such as could be grasped by the natural ability of anyone with a very modest wisdom. Indeed, the truths that he taught he mingled with many fables and with doctrines of the greatest falsity. He did not bring forth any signs produced in a supernatural way, which alone fittingly gives witness to divine inspiration; for a visible action that can be only divine reveals an invisibly inspired teacher of truth. On the contrary, Mohammed said that he was sent in the power of his arms—which are signs not lacking even to robbers and Scanned with CamScannerBR PART ONE FAITH AND REASON tyrants. What is more, no wise men, men trained in things divine and human, believed in him from the beginning. Those who believed in him were brutal men and desert wanderers, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching, through whose numbers Mohammed forced others to become his followers by the violence of his arms. Nor do divine pronouncements on the part of preceding prophets offer him any witness. On the contrary, he perverts almost all the testimonies of the Old and New Testaments by making them into fabrications of his own, as can be seen by anyone who examines his law. It was, therefore, ashrewd decision on his part to forbid his followers to read the Old and New Testaments, lest these books convict him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly. JOHN LOCKE Falth and Reason 1. It has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own, nor testimony of other men, to bottom our reason upon. From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reason; the want whereof many possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion. 2. Lfind every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly: and where it fails them they cry out, it is matter of faith, and above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has any thing to do. ‘Reason therefore here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas. which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz. by sensation or reflection. From John Locke, An Essay Concerning Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. XVII. Scanned with CamScannerLOCKE, Faith and Reason B Faithyon the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made. leductions’of reason; but upon. the.credit. of the proposer, as “coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call revelation. 3, First then I say, that no man inspired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas, which they had not before from sensation or reflection, For whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or any other signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds; and it is by the custom of using them for signs, that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before. For words seen or heard recall to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to be signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs, which cannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea at all. ‘Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapt up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the description he can make to others of that place is only this, that there are such things, “as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.” And supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, a species of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be such nobody can deny) which had six senses; and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense; he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men those ideas, imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour by the sounds of words into a man, who, having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of seeing, For our simple ideas then, which are the foundation and sole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation; I say, traditional revelation, in distinction to original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impression, which is made immediately by God, on themind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another. 4. Secondly, I say, that the same truths may be discovered, and conveyed down from revelation, which are discoverable to us by reason, and by those ideas we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all things of this kind, there is little need or use of revelation, God having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of Scanned with CamScanner14 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON our own ideas, will always be certainer to.us than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have, that this revela- tion came at first from God, can never be so sure, as the knowledge we have from the clear and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas; v. g. if it were revealed some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was revealed; but that would never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact, knowable by our senses; v. g. the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation: and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater assurance than that of his senses that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses inspired; but he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ that book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses. 5. In propositions then, whose certainty is built upon the clear percep- tion of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, attained either by imme- diate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations, we need not the assistance of revelation, as neces- sary to gain our assent, and introduce them into our minds. Because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of any thing, unless where God immediately reveals it to us: and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or over-rule plain knowledge; or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For since no evidence of our faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge: v. g. the ideas of one body, and one place, do so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition, that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive not ourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly, that we understand it right; can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no: proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge.Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatso- ever: and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no I Scanned with CamScannerLOCKE, Faith and Reason 15 measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident, and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent, under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of* icts‘our knowledge. Because though faith be founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us; yet ‘we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge: since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful Author of our being, which, if received for true, must overtum all the principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us; render all our faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our understandings; and put a man in a condition, wherein he will have less light, less conduct, than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of any thing to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its own reason, it can never havea ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have. 6. Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself: but to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others, which by the tradition of writings, or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them; reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing else; faith, as we use the word, (called commonly divine faith) has to do with no propositions but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that Ido not see how those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith, can say, that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine inspiration; unless it be revealed, that that proposition, or all in that book, was commu- nicated by divine i inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing or not _ book to. be of divine authority.can never be wut matter of reason; and such as I mustcome to an assent to only-by the use of my reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that which is cor Sean itself: it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that, to itself appears unreasonable. In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above-mentioned, reason is the proper judge; and revelation, though it may in consenting, with it confirm its. Scanned with CamScanner16 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith; which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason. 7.But, thirdly, there being many things, wherein we have véry imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose parts, present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state; and that the dead shall rise, and live again: these, and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith with which reason has directly nothing to do. 8. But since God in giving us the light of reason has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination; revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason. Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony; which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err; and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is deliv- ered. Indeed, if any thing shall be thought revelation which is contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province: since a man can never have so certain a knowledge, that a proposition, which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is delivered; as he has, that the contrary is true: and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it, without examination, as a matter of faith. 9. First, ition i: led, of whose truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions, cannot judge; that is purely matter of faith, and above reason. ‘Secondly, all propositions, whereof the mind, by the use of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge from naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still, that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of its own reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelation ought to determine our assent even against probability. For where the principles of reason have not evidenced a Scanned with CamScannerLOCKE, Faith and Reason 7 proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth, and ground of assent, may determine: and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because reason, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination, where reason came short; and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay. 10. Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any vio- lence or hindrance to reason; which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved, by new discoveries of truth coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed, is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it, This is the proper object of faith; but whether it bea divine i , 3 which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no evi- dence that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words we Teceive it, and in the sense we understand it, so clear and so certain as that of the principles of reason: and therefore nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine revelation ought to over-rule all our opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received with full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes not away the landmarks of knowledge; this shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us. 11, If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed. For to this crying up of faith, in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide man- Kind. For men having been principled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense, and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange opinions, and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational and more senseless than beasts themselves. “Credo, quia impossibile est”; I believe, becauise it is impossible, might in a good man pass for a sally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by. Scanned with CamScannerR. G. SWINBURNE" The Christian Wager On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It ic often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Chris- tian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability ofits truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. The Christian is a man who believes a series of propositions (accepts the Christian theological system as basically correct) and tries to act in a certain way (sets himself to live the Christian life). Several recent theolo- gians have claimed that the Christian is a man who enters into a personal relationship with Christ, not a man who accepts a series of propositions. Now indeed there is more to faith than mere belief-that (“Thou believest that God is one; Thou doest well: The devils also believe and shudder.” James 2.19). But, as Professor Price painstakingly pointed out*—belief “in” always presupposes belief “that.” Belief in God presupposes the belief that He exists. A man who believes in the God of the Christians must—of logical necessity—believe that a being with the defining properties of the God of the Christians exists. A man who claims to believe in God may indeed mean much more by his claim than that he believes that God exists; he will often mean that he puts his confidence in God to help in life’s difficulties. But to put one’s confidence in a person is something one does. Putting one’s confidence in God is among the many actions to which the Christian is committed. The man who makes no effort to do any of these actions, to lead the Christian life, cannot be described as a Christian, whatever his beliefs. So the Christian is a man who believes a series of propositions and tries to act in a certain way. From Religious Studies 4 (1969): 217-28. Reprinted with the permission of Cam- bridge University Press and Richard G. Swinburne. 1] am most grateful to G. Wallace and C. J. F. Williams for their helpful criticisms of an ‘earlier version of this paper. 244, H. Price, “Belief ‘In’ arid Belief “That.” Religious Studies, 1965, Vol I, pp. 5-27. ‘SWIM jud; the expe ratic the - prot be tl bilit calc acce is th Scanned with CamScannerSWINBURNE, The Christian Wager 19 \ The rational man is the man who pursues a policy if and only if he judges that the expected gain or mathematical expectation from it exceeds the expected gain (positive or negative) {rom not pursuing the policy. (If the expected gains from pursuing or not pursuing the policy are equal, the rational man may do either) The expected gain from a policy is the sum of the values of each possible outcome of the policy, each multiplied by the probability of that outcome. The probability of some outcome O of a policy is the probability of the existence of that state of affairs under which O will be the outcome of the policy. The rational man will thus evaluate the proba- bilities of the existence of the different states and the value of each outcome, calculate the expected gain from pursuing or not pursuing a policy and act accordingly. Now let us suppose to start with, to simplify the picture, that the only considerations relevant are prudential ones. In that case the rational man is the prudent man, the man who pursues his long-term self-interest. Then the value of an outcome of a policy will be the amount of happiness which it brings to the agent. The rational man will seek to pursue those policies which will maximize his happiness. Let me give a trivial example to illustrate the above points for those unfamiliar with the terms. A man is deciding between two policies—to bet £1 that Eclipse will win the Derby, or not to bet. There are two possible states of affairs—Eclipse will win, Eclipse will not win. After careful study of the form book, the man estimates the probability that Eclipse will win as 0.2 and so the probability that he will not win as 0.8. The odds offered by bookies are6-1. Hence if the man bets there are two distinct outcomes—if Eclipse wins, he gains £6; if Eclipse loses, he loses £1. If the man does not bet, the two outcomes are identical—he neither gains nor loses. Now if the value of the outcome for him is measured by their monetary value, then the expected gain of betting is £6 x 0.2- £1 x 0.8 = £0.4, and the expected gain of not betting is £0 x 0.2- £0x 0.8= £0. Hence the man ought to bet. Of course the value of the outcomes may not be measured by their monetary value—the loss of the £1 may be as undesirable a loss as the win of £6 is a desirable gain. In that case we can represent the gain and loss both by one unit of value. In that case the expected gain of betting will be1x0.2-1x0.8=-0.6, and the expected gain of not betting, as before, 0. Hence in that case the rational man will not bet. : Now it is well known that Pascal’s claim that the rational man will become a Christian represented the rational man as choosing between the policies of becoming or not becoming a Christian in this kind of way. Let us then examine the point and say “God is,” or “He is not.” But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here.... A game is being played...heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? 38, Pascal, Pensées. No. 233. Scanned with CamScanner20 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON If you bet on God and win, you win “an infinity of infinitely happy life”#* whereas if you bet on God and lose, you lose a mere finite amount. If you bet ‘on no God, or, which amounts to the same thing, refuse to bet openly, then, if you win, you gain a mere finite amount, mere temporary happiness, whereas if you lose, you obtain “an eternity of miseries.”$ Hence you ought to bet on God. Our proposition is of infinite force: when there is the finite to stake ina game where there are equal risks of gain and loss, and the infinite to gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths this is one.6 There is a lot wrong with Pascal’s argument, and it is instructive to consider exactly what. I shall ignore, to begin with, the obvious theological objection that God does not consign to eternal Hell those who die non-Chris- tians for no fault of their own. It will later appear that any mistake in describing the fate of non-Christians if the Christian theological system is true, does not necessarily upset the argument. First, Pascal. has. stated the alternative states misleadingly. If the alternatives are meant to be “there is a Christian God” and “there is no after-life,” then Pascal has ignored other possible states of affairs—e.g. “There is a god who consigns Christians to eternal Hell and non-Chris- tians to eternal Heaven.” Alternatively, Pascal may have intended his alternative states to be simply “There is a Christian God” and “There is not a Christian God.” But in that case it is unclear what are the outcomes and so the gains and losses on the second alternative of the two policies— Heaven remains a possible outcome for Christian or non-Christian even on this alternative. Now clearly we can represent the alternative states as two or many or infinite. Yet perhaps the most useful way to represent them is threefold: (A) The God of the Christian exists. (B) There is no after-life. (©) There is an after-life but no Christian God. The outcomes of the two alternative policies, becoming or not becoming, Christian, are then as Pascal stated them for alternatives A and B; but there are a variety of possible outcomes under the third alternative, and we cannot ‘Did,, loc. cit. SWbid., No. 195. 6B. Pascal, Pensées, No. 233. 7This point has been well made by (e.g.) Antony Flew. See his God and Philosophy (London, 1966), 9.9 et seq. Scanned with CamScannerSWINBURNE, The Christian Wager 21 say much definite about them. The outcomes under the alternative policies, however we evaluate them numerically, will be as follows: A B c (1) Becoming Christian life Christian life Christian life Christian of worship of worship of worship and service and service and service followed by followed by? eternal Heaven @) Notbecoming Worldly life Worldly life Worldly life Christian followed by followed by? eternal Hell We willindicate by A, the value (positive or negative) of the outcome of policy (1) under state of affairs A, and so on. Asecond fault in Pascal’s argument is this. Pascal assumed that all men. in the same way as he the various outcomes. But in fact, rightly or wrongly men will put very different values from each other on the different outcomes. Life in the Christian Heaven appeals to some more than others, and the life of worldly bliss enjoyed by the non-believer also appeals to some more than others. Further of course some men (e.g. the rich) have more opportunity than others to profit from the license of unbelief and so will have a gayer time in consequence. Likewise the Christian religion may demand more sacrifices of some (e.g. the rich) than of others. The different courses of action bring different gains to the twentieth-century business man and the negro in the Ghetto. Thirdly Pascal supposes (by his remarks “There are equal risks of gain and loss” and “Reason can decide nothing here”) that the probabilities of his two alternative states are equal. This claim is, to say the least, arguable. Most of natural theology is devoted to arguing about it. But his argument does not depend on this claim. All we need is some estimate of the probability of alternative states to get the argument off the ground, and, as will be seen, we can reach Pascal's conclusion without having his estimate of probabilities. } Now the rational action for a man will be determined by his estimates of the respective probabilities of the three alternative states and his evaluation of the outcomes under them. The difficulty is that we do not.know what our fate will be, after death, if the alternative C be true. Nevertheless men may ascribe probabilities to the other alternative states and evaluate the possible outcomes in such a way that they can judge that one policy would be the best, even if they cannot estimate by how much the best. Thus they may ascribe a probability of zero to alternative C—in which case evaluation of gains and losses under it makes no difference to the calculation. Or, more likely, their Scanned with CamScanner22 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON scale of values may be such that they can say this much about the gains and losses under alternative C—that C, cannot exceed A, since Heaven is for them the highest possible bliss, that C, can only exceed A, by an infinitesimal amountsince the maximum gain from life after death, if policy (2) be followed in state of affairs C, can at best only equal that obtained if policy (1) be followed in state of affairs A, and that the very slight difference in happiness on Earth can make very very little difference to the eternal balance sheet. ‘Once we have in this way assessed the probabilities of alternative states and the values of possible outcomes, we can work out expected gain under the two policies. The expected gain under policy (1)—becoming Christian will be PCA)A, + P(B)B, + P(C)C, where P(A) is the probability that A is true, etc. If this exceeds the expected gain under policy (2) PUAYA, + POB)B, + P(C)C, ‘we ought to become Christian; otherwise not. Our estimates will depend on how desirable we consider the different outcomes. If we have Pascal's stan- dards, our evaluation can be represented as follows: 0 1SC,S-1 1sC,s-1 =1 B,= 1 B= A These standards are Pascal's, since for him the ratio of worldly gains and losses to gains in the life to come, if there is one, is of finite to infinite. It is more convenient for the purposes of my calculation to measure Pascal’s comparative evaluations on a scale on which A, = 1, B, = 0, etc., rather than one on which A, = ~, B, = some finite number. However, Pascal’s standards are not everyone's, and someone else might evaluate the alternatives as follows: B, =~ 0.0005 1sC,<-1 B, = + 0.0005 1sC,s-1 Then on this estimate of probabilities P(A) =0.1; P(B) = 0.85; P(C) = 0.05, policy (1) ought to be followed. Yet on this estimate P(A) = 0.0001, P(B) = 0.99985, P(C) = 0.00005, policy (2) ought to be followed. On some estimates of probability, it will be unclear which is the rational policy because of the uncertainty of gains and losses, if C be true. In such circumstances, we ought to divide alternative C up into different possible states—e.g. Ca (After- life rewards distributed according to Hindu scheme), Cb (Christians go to Hell, non-Christians cease to exist), etc—in such a way that we can ascribe Scanned with CamScannerSWINBURNE, The Christian Wager 23 values and probabilities, so as to get a clear indication of the best policy. I conclude that Pascal's system of evaluating whether the man concerned with his long-term interests ought to become a Christian is perfectly workable, but it does not necessarily yield Pascal's results. ‘Two points must now be made to tidy up the argument so far. First, Pascal's supposition that every'man who dies a non-Christian goes, ifthe Christian God exists, to eternal Hell, would be denied by most Christians. Many Christians would say that only the culpable non-Christian goes to eternal Hell for his beliefs, whereas the man who was a non-Christian because the Christian alternative was never presented to him or because he mistak- enly judged it irrational to become Christian would not go to Hell for his beliefs. However, if this is the fate of the non-Christian under alternative (A), calculations of the best policy based on this supposition will be the same as those based on the original supposition. For the investigator is a man to whom the Christian alternative has been presented and who must assume that he has not made a mistake in his calculations—hence it is irrelevant what happens to the man to whom the Christian alternative has not been presented or to the man who unintentionally miscalculates, But not all Christians believe that anyone will go to Hell. Some Christians would say that the culpable non-Christian merely ceases to exist—this supposition means that A,= B,. This supposition may make a different policy the best one—on some estimates of value and probability. Some few Christians would maintain the rather unbiblical view that all men go to Heaven eventually—the man who follows policy (1) simply goes there sooner. On most estimates of probability and evaluations of outcomes on this supposition policy (2) would seem to come out the best. Further of course most Christians today think of Hell, not as the mediaeval place of literal fiery torment, but merely as a state of separation from God. In so far as different suppositions about the fate of the non-Christian on alternative (A) make a difference to what is the best policy, the alternative must be subdivided and probabilities and values ascribed to Aa (Christians go to eternal Heaven; non-Christians to eternal Hell), Ab (Christians go to eternal Heaven; non-Christians cease to exist) etc. The second relevant point is this. A man who decides to become a Christian does not merely decide to act in a certain way but decides to hold certain beliefs. The convert may not have held, when wondering whether or not to become a Christian, that the Christian theological system was probably true, but in becoming a Christian he must now adopt this view. Is it logically possible for him to do so? Can a man adopt a belief? Certain philosophers from Hume’ onwards have held that our beliefs are not subject to our control. If they are right, it cannot be rational for us to decide to become Christians, unless we are already convinced of the truth of the Christian theological system, for it cannot be rational for us to do what is not logically possible. ‘David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix, p. 624 in the edition edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888). Scanned with CamScanner24 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON Now.there.may-be something odd about.the sugges! 5, But there seems nothing odd about the sugges- tion thata man could decide to take certain action which had the known effect of inducing some belief.” A man might, for instance adopt Pascal's own programme—take holy water, have masses said, etc.!° Or he might say prayers; or he might just think hard about certain kinds of evidence for his proposition. Having considered the difficulty, I shall nevertheless in future, to avoid the cumbersome phrase, often speak of choosing or deciding to believe, rather than of choosing or deciding to take steps with the known effect of inducing a belief. The former expressions are now meant to be mere definitional substitutes for the latter. So then if the rational man is the prudent man, whether or not he becomes a Christian i i i \es and how he assigns probabilitic alternative states. Now although we shall shortly have to think of the rational man as a less selfish person, the account so far does elucidate two features of Christian apologetic which have been ignored by most philos- ophers of religion. The first is that the Christian preacher to the unconverted is often i i Christian. religion tobe true, but with’ expounding what it teaches and the new relationship to God and his fellows which the Christian believes that he and only he will enjoy now and hereafter. Anextreme form of this kind of preaching, more fashionable in the past than now, was the sermon which contrasted the joys of Heaven with the pains of Hell, and exhorted men to pursue the good life lest they find themselves in Hell forever after death. Another form of such preaching is the sermon which tells of the joy of Christians on Earth and contrasts it with the dreariness of the non-Christian life on Earth. Many sophisticated philosophers of religion would pour scorn on preaching of this kind. What matters, they would urge, is not what the Christian system offers or threatens, but whether or not it is true, and if the preacher is not prepared to produce evidence to show this, his talk is mere rhetoric. If my argument is correct, such philosophers would not be sophisticated enough, What the preacher has been trying to do is to persuade men of the desirability of what the Christian religion offers here and hereafter, and thereby to show it to be rational for men to gamble all to gain it. In so far as the preacher makes men give a higher value to A, and a Tower value to A,, then for fixed P(A), he makes it more rational for men to become Christian. The more desirable is Heaven and the less desirable is Hell the more sensible it is to risk much to get to Heaven and avoid Hell, for any given probability that the Christian system is true. Further, in telling of the joy of the Christian life and the dreariness of the non-Christian life on Earth 9gee H. H. Price, “Belief and Will,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1954, 28, pp. 1-26, who develops this point at length. "Ipid., No. 233. Scanned with CamScannerSWINBURNE, The Christian Wager 25 the preacher is presenting an immensely powerful argument for becoming Christian. For he is claiming not merely that A, vastly exceeds A,, but that B, somewhat exceeds B,, If he accepts that argument then (if we ignore for a moment the alternative (C), however low he estimates P(A) and however high he estimates P(B),) the rational man will become Christian, The improb- ability of the truth of the Christian theological system would be quite irrele- vant, for the rewards of being Christian exceed the rewards of not being Christian whether or not the Christian theological system is true. This result could be upset by taking alternative C into account, only if—given an after-life but no Christian God—the evidence was that the Christian was less likely to have a happy after-life than was the non-Christian. But, if we ignore this possibility, then, if the preacher can convince men that B, exceeds B,, probabilities are irrelevant and the rational man will straightway become Christian. The humanist is of course perfectly entitled to counter these arguments by pointing out how even Heaven might pall (viz, that A, is not very large after all) and by describing the pleasure of his own worldly society. The second feature of Christian apologetic on which our account sheds light is this. In so far as Christians have attempted to show the truth of their system, they have often been very much concerned to show how much more likely it is to be true than any other religious system, but not so concerned to» show. that it is more likely to be true than any non-religious system. My analysis brings out why this is so. Non-religious systems limit the duration of human life to life in this world, and hence the gains and losses of following any religious or non-religious policy are, if a non-religious system be true, very small compared with the gains and losses if the Christian system be true. Hence a non-religious system would have to be very much more probable than the Christian system for it to be rational to adopt it. Whereas rival religious systems offer their own eternal rewards and penalties and so, iftheir probability is anywhere near that of the Christian system, it will be in no way clear which it is rational to adopt. Hence it is important to the Christian preacher to show that their probability is not in that region. If P(C) exceeds P(A) and C, considerably exceeds C,, then the policy of becoming a Christian may be the irrational policy—even if the joys of Christian life in the present exceed the joys of non-Christian life. For P(A) = 0.05, P(B) = 0.85, P(C) = 0.1, A,=+1,4,=-1,B, =B, C, =~ 0.6, C, = +06, the non-Christian policy will be the rational one. Now, true, in fact P(C) covers many alternatives, on only some of which will the Christian be less well rewarded than the non-Chris- tian, but these alternatives together must be shown to havea low probability, since the rewards and punishments will have a high positive or negative value in the regions respectively of A, and A,. For this reason the Christian must show that Muhammad is no true prophet, and the Book of Mormon no true gospel. From earliest times Christians have been very much concerned to substantiate this kind of claim. Yet, of course, there is more to religion than prudence. Moral consid- erations enter into our picture in two crucial ways. First the goals which we Scanned with CamScanner46 PART ONE FAITH AND REASON ought to seek are not merely those which we judge to be to our long-term advantage, not what we want, but what we ought to want for ourselves as welt as for others. The preacher preaching the relative merits of the different systems tells men not merely that they will enjoy, say, Heaven but that life there will alone have meaning and purpose and that it is man’s duty to seek such an existence for himself. But introducing morality into the ends does not disturb our calculus. We can use the same calculus to calculate the morally good as to calculate the long-term advantage. Yet although intro- ducing morality into the ends may not upset the form of the calculus, it may make quite a difference to its matter. If we are concerned only with selfish advantage, there may well be some gain in living the non-Christian life. But the preacher may be able to persuade us that there is no moral good in it, and that the only life worth living is the life of Christian service here and hereafter. In that case we would hold that, however small the probability that the Christian theological system is true, we ought to become Christian. On the other hand the humanist preacher may be able to convince us that the Christian ideal of preserving oneself for a life hereafter, albeit a life of service, is not a worthy one. In that case we would hold that, whatever the possible selfish gain from doing so, we ought not to become Christian. Yet, if on the contrary, the evidence shows that the Christian system is probably true, then it shows that all deductive consequences of that system are probably true. One of these is that itis the duty of men to become Christian. However, considerations so far adduced suggest that it could be our duty to become Christian, even when the evidence suggests that the Christian theological system is probably false. The other moral consideration which enters into our picture is perhaps the most crucial. It is this. We have seen that the Christian is one who believes certain propositions and lives out a certain kind of life. To decide to become a Christian involves—if we do not already believe them—deciding to take steps which would result in believing certain propositions. But even ifa man can choose to believe, ought he to do so? highly immoral to choose to believe propositions (viz. to regard the evidence as supporting those propositions) when the evidence is now known not to . It would seem like lying to oneself. Others may be concerned with the fact that unless one is prepared to sacrifice one’s beliefs in the service of the good, one is only half-committed to its pursuit. I do not wish to consider this moral issue in detail, but only to point out the consequences of different views about it. If a man claimed that there was nothing immoral in inducing in oneself any beliefs at all, not supported by present evidence,” then the position is as I haveso far outlined itin this paper. The joys of Heaven (or the moral desirability of attempting to obtain them) and the horrors of Hell (or the moral wickedness of allowing oneself to risk obtaining them) Tippy adopts this view in the paper referred to in note 9. Scanned with CamScannerSWINBURNE, The Christian Wager 27 provide reasons for inducing oneself to believe what seems on the evidence improbable. Many however would consider it morally wrong to induce oneself to believe what seems improbable. Yet these might hold a weaker position, that there is nothing immoral in choosing to believe one of two exhaustive alternatives between which we cannot decide by rational assess- ment of the evidence. By this I do not mean choosing to believe something with—by agreed standards of estimating probability—a probability of half; but choosing to believe something with—by one method of estimating prob- ability—a probability of more than half, and—by another method of estimat- ing—a probability of less than half, vyhen it seems equally legitimate to use either method of estimating probability. There are certain paradigm cases of events having on certain evidence certain numerical probabilities, and of events and theories being on certain evidence more probable than other events and theories. It is clear what is the probability relative to certain evidence of throwing two heads in a row or three sixes with three dice. But itis not always clear how we are to extrapolate standards of estimating probability from such simple cases to more compli- cated ones and on one way, one method of estimating probability, some theory T may have a probability of more than half, and on another way less than half. Yet both methods may appear equally natural ways of extrapolat- ing from the paradigm cases. What ought one to do here? On one view one ought to average out the results given by the different methods. But there may be many methods, and the average result for the probability of theories and events from all methods may be all too often near to a half. To average the results yielded by all possible methods might seem no less arbitrary than to decide to adopt one method of estimating probability, and thereby reach definite conclusions on matters previously unsettled. Such a decision would not be a decision to go against the evidence, but, at most, a decision to go beyond it. Yet such a decision would lead one to adopt beliefs previously not held. A man who felt it immoral to induce in himself beliefs not warranted by the evidence might well not feel it immoral to adopt one method of estimating probability rather than another, and this on g.ounds of which beliefs it would lead him to adopt. Now the position in metaphysics may well be that there are various methods of estimating the probability of metaphysical theories and they are equally natural extrapolations from paradigm cases of ascribing probability to events and simpler theories. On one natural way of extrapolating from paradigm cases the evidence may indicate that the Christian theological system is probably true and on another way the evidence may indicate that the system is probably false; yet there be no rational grounds for choosing between the ways of assessing probability obtained by extrapolation from paradigm cases. In such circumstances a man might hold that it wes not immoral to choose a method of estimating probability. Hence, he would hold, it would not be immoral to choose a method which led to certain assessments of probability rather than others. Scanned with CamScanner