Njangang et al (2024) Natural Resources and Undernourishment in Developing. Is there a curse

Environmental and Resource Economics
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-024-00877-8
Natural Resources and Undernourishment in Developing

Countries? Is There a Curse?
Henri Njangang1 · Sosson Tadadjeu1,2 · Joseph Keneck‑Massil3
Accepted: 17 April 2024

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024
Abstract
Food security is a crucial issue for developing countries, with many populations suffering
from undernourishment. While numerous factors contribute to this issue, the role of natural
resources has been neglected. This paper, therefore, examines for the first time how natural
resource dependence affects the prevalence of undernourishment in developing countries.
Accounting for the effects of total rents and point resources, the results show that natu-
ral resource dependence explains the prevalence of undernourishment (including stunting
and low birth weight) ceteris paribus. Appraising the natural resources-undernourishment
nexus by geographical location suggests that the effect is more pronounced in sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia, and low- and lower-middle-income countries. Among the mechanisms
to explain this result, we identify control of corruption, democracy, internal conflicts,
income inequality, and agricultural investments as potential transmission channels through
which natural resources influence undernourishment.
Keywords Natural Resources · Undernourishment · Developing Countries
JEL Classification I15 · O11 · Q30
1 Introduction
The fight against hunger is a priority at the global level, as highlighted in the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and, more recently, the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). Through these initiatives, the United Nations campaigns for the eradication of
* Sosson Tadadjeu
stadadjeu@yahoo.fr
Henri Njangang
ndieupahenri@gmail.com
Joseph Keneck‑Massil
joseph.keneckmassil@gmail.com
1
LAREFA, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Dschang, Dschang, Cameroon
2
Development Research Department at African Development Bank, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire
3
CEREG, Department of Economics, University of Yaounde II, Yaounde, Cameroon
13
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H. Njangang et al.
hunger, improving nutrition conditions, and food security. However, after over two decades
of continuous decline, the number of people suffering from hunger and undernourishment
has been increasing since 2015, with over 821 million undernourished people in the world
in 2018 (WHO 2018). Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic’s consequences would result
in millions of new undernourished people in the short run, while in the long run, progress
towards SDG 2.1 may be completely reversed in most countries (Saccone 2021). The con-
sequences of food insecurity and undernourishment are a threat to political and economic
stability because they hinder economic development (Ogunniyi et al. 2020). Thus, it is
important to identify the factors explaining undernourishment in order to propose adequate
solutions to policymakers. In this paper, we analyse the effect of natural resource depend-
ence on undernourishment in developing countries.
For many years, researchers have provided evidence on the determinants of undernour-
ishment as a dimension of food security. Recent literature on the determinants of under-
nourishment from a macro perspective is sparse and fragmented. Several studies have
shown that economic growth (Harttgen et al. 2013; Soriano and Garrido 2016), access
to drinking water and sanitation (Smith and Haddad 2015), remittances (Azizi 2018),
and access to electricity (Candelise et al. 2021) are important for reducing undernourish-
ment. Other studies highlight the role of nutrition aid (Mary et al. 2018), cereal production
(Mughal and Fontan Sers 2020), trade openness (Marson et al. 2022), and investments in
health and education (Headey 2013). Anríquez et al. (2013) consider that rising food prices
worsen the nutritional status of populations, while Fontan Sers and Mughal (2019) find
the beneficial effects of agricultural spending on undernourishment. Despite this emerging
literature on the determinants of undernourishment, little attention has been paid to the role
of natural resource dependence.
Intuitively, there are good reasons to believe that natural resources could generate addi-
tional revenues to invest in the fight against undernourishment. However, some argue that
natural resource wealth increases the risk and duration of conflict, increases income ine-
quality, and lowers the quality of institutions, which the literature refers to as the “resource
curse” (Van der Ploeg 2011). For example, Liberia and the Congo Republic are resource-
rich countries, but they are also among the countries with the highest prevalence of under-
nourishment, at 38% and 31%, respectively, in 2020 (World Bank 2023). This suggests that
natural resources can paradoxically be a curse.
The seminal work on the resource curse by Sachs and Warner (1995) remains relevant.
Several authors argue that resource-exporting economies experience relatively low rates of
economic growth (Henry 2019; Sharma and Pal 2021), even though resource abundance
increases the wealth and purchasing power of a certain class of society (Holden 2013).
Several transmission channels for the resource curse have been studied. Two economic
mechanisms have been highlighted, namely, the Dutch disease and commodity price vola-
tility (Papyrakis 2017). Regarding political channels, a rich literature outlines the role of
poor quality of institutions, lack of democracy, conflict, and rent-seeking behaviour (Ross
2001). However, another series of studies has found evidence opposed to the resource curse
hypothesis (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; James 2015).1 At the crossroads of these two
1
Based on a meta-analysis of 605 estimates, Havranek et al. (2016) show that about 40% of empirical stud-
ies find a negative effect of resource dependence on long-term growth, 40% find no effect, and 20% find a
positive effect, showing uncertainty about the empirical relevance of the resource curse. Similarly, Dauvin
and Guerreiro (2017), in a meta-analysis of 1,419 estimates, show that while the resource curse is present in
developing countries, natural resources do not harm growth in developed countries. They conclude that the
quality of institutions is crucial to mitigating the resource curse.
13
Natural Resources and Undernourishment in Developing Countries?…
groups of works, a third paradigm shows that the effect of natural resources depends on the
quality of institutions (Sharma and Mishra 2022) or constitutional arrangements (Andersen
and Aslaksen 2008).
In the last decade, studies on the resource curse have extended to other development
outcomes, including income inequality (Carmignani 2013; Parcero and Papyrakis 2016),
financial development (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2014), health (Wigley 2017; Tadadjeu
et al. 2023a), export diversification (Djimeu and Omgba 2019), women’s political empow-
erment (Awoa et al. 2022), and innovation (Mhuru et al. 2022; Kamguia et al. 2022),
among others. Regarding human development, there is no consensus on the effect of natu-
ral resources on human development. Gylfason (2001) shows that natural resource depend-
ence is associated with reduced spending on education and lower schooling. This underin-
vestment in education leads to an insufficient accumulation of human capital and inhibits
long-term economic growth in oil-rich countries. Bulte et al. (2005) and Carmignani and
Avom (2010) corroborate this result, suggesting a negative effect of natural resources on
human development. Other studies indicate that the effect of natural resources on human
capital depends on the type of resources (Stijns 2006; Blanco and Grier 2012); the measure
in terms of abundance or dependence (Daniele 2011); the quality of institutions (Ebeke
et al. 2015); and globalisation (Sinha and Sengupta 2019).2
Despite this abundant literature on the natural resources–human development nexus,
very little attention has been paid to the relationship between natural resources and under-
nourishment. To the best of our knowledge, the only attempt in this direction is that of
Bulte et al. (2005), who examined the relationship between resource abundance and several
indicators of human welfare during a 2-year study period. We contribute to the literature
by offering one of the first studies linking natural resource dependence and undernourish-
ment. We therefore fill the knowledge gap regarding the extension of the famous resource
curse to undernourishment using data over the period 2001–2020, allowing us to estimate
the effect of natural resources over a longer period covering the MDG period and the five
first years of SDG. Second, for robustness, we also examine the effect of natural resource
dependence on child undernourishment. We are interested in stunting and low birth weight
because these two anthropometric indicators have been used to assess progress towards the
MDGs and, more recently, the SDGs. We therefore propose the first macroeconomic study
examining the effect of natural resources on child undernourishment. Third, Isham et al.
(2005) and Cockx and Francken (2016) stress the importance of considering the type of
natural resources. Thus, in this paper, besides total rents, we consider mineral, gas, forest,
oil, and coal rents. Moreover, this paper examines whether the effect of natural resources
on undernourishment differs according to geographical location. Very few studies adopt
a geographical perspective to study the effects of natural resources on development (Car-
mignani and Chowdhury 2012). The findings provide help to improve understanding of
the effects of natural resources on undernourishment in each subregion, as well as policy
implications. Finally, this study is the first to empirically test the transmission channels
through which natural resources influence undernourishment, particularly civil conflicts,
income inequality, democracy, control of corruption, and agricultural investment. A pre-
cise examination of these transmission channels also makes it possible to identify the poli-
cies that need to be put in place to speed up efforts to fight undernourishment and enable
resource-rich countries to break the resource curse.
2
See Mousavi and Clark (2021) for a systematic literature review.
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H. Njangang et al.
Four main results emerge from this study: We show that resource rent dependence, on
average, raises rates of undernourishment. Regarding child undernourishment, the effect
of natural resources is more pronounced on stunting, while geographically, the effect is
more pronounced in sub-Saharan African and South Asian countries. This study points out
that the resource curse is more of a result of a dependence on point resources. Finally,
we show that democracy, control of corruption, inequality, civil conflicts, and agricul-
ture expenditure are some of the transmission channels through which natural resources
increase undernourishment.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the potential causal
mechanisms, while Section 3 presents the data and the empirical approach. Section 4 pre-
sents and discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes with policy implications.
2 Potential Causal Mechanisms: How Does Natural Resource

Dependence Affect Undernourishment?
2.1 Direct Effect of Natural Resources on Undernourishment
In what follows, we set out arguments in support of the view that resource-poor countries
outperform their resource-rich counterparts when it comes to reducing undernourishment.
We assume that natural resource dependence has both a direct and indirect effect on under-
nourishment. The main argument in favour of this direct effect is based on the rentier state
theory, which equates rents with external income (Beblawi 1987). This theory starts from
the observation that so-called rentier states are generally authoritarian and links this to the
exogenous nature of natural resource revenues, as they come from income outside society.
We therefore argue that the type of income available to governments in resource-depend-
ent countries limits their incentive to improve the nutritional status of their populations.
Indeed, Ross (2001) argues that when a government derives an essential part of its revenue
from taxing its population, it will face the inevitable advent of a high demand for account-
ability. Conversely, when a state derives most of its revenues from natural resources, it
becomes “autonomous” from society; natural resources, by alleviating tax pressure, neu-
tralize the demand for accountability. Thus, thanks to the non-tax revenues available, the
governments of the so-called rentier states are not obliged to seek the benefits of growth
derived from improving the nutritional status of their populations. On the other hand, the
tax revenues on which resource-poor countries depend mean that they do have to seek the
growth benefits of improving the nutritional status of their populations. To sum up, reli-
ance on natural resources as a source of “unearned” state revenue reinforces state auton-
omy, leading to policies that do not prioritize the improvement of human capital, including
the nutritional status of populations.
2.2 Indirect Effect of Natural Resources on Undernourishment
According to the resource curse theory (see Van der Ploeg (2011) and Badeeb et al. (2017)),
it is possible to identify four transmission channels through which natural resources affect
undernourishment. On the one hand, a distinction is made between the political channels
relating to corruption, democracy, and internal conflicts. On the other hand, the economic
channel focuses on income inequality and agricultural investment.
13
2.2.1 Political Channel: Corruption, Democracy, and Political Instability
Corruption Channel Regarding the causal relationship between natural resources and
corruption, several authors rightly point out that resource dependence creates economic
opportunities as well as temptations for corrupt behaviors on the part of public officials
(Vicente 2010; Zhan 2017). The absence of checks and balances in resource-dependent
countries is seen as a likely channel to explain the squandering of resource rents, given
the often-ill-defined property rights associated with them (Arezki and Gylfason 2013).
Another explanation is linked to the entrenchment of rentier social groups. Indeed, fol-
lowing the discovery of resources, elites could sabotage the institutional reform process to
create conditions favourable to rent capture (Lashitew and Werker 2020). In their empirical
analysis, the authors provide evidence for these arguments and find that point resources
are negatively associated with various governance measures. Subsequently, Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2013) find that natural resource exports have a negative effect on gov-
ernance, such as the control of corruption. However, Sen (1982) suggests food insecurity
is closely associated with weak institutions or the inability of the state to adopt strategies
that guarantee the legal rights of its citizens. Njangang et al. (2024) find that countries with
higher levels of executive, legislative, and judicial corruption are associated with a higher
level of hunger. Ogunniyi et al. (2020) argue that control of corruption improves food and
nutrition security in sub-Saharan Africa. Given the deleterious effects of natural resources
on corruption, which affects nutrition, we postulate that resource dependence increases
undernourishment through its negative effects on corruption.
Democracy Channel Since the groundbreaking work of Ross (2001), an abundance of lit-
erature has shown that natural resource dependence is, on average, associated with weaker
democratic institutions (Aslaksen 2010). The most common argument to justify this result
is the “rentier effect". Indeed, the increase in non-tax revenues due to the importance of
extractive industry revenues allows autocrats to reduce taxation and mitigate demands for
greater accountability that would result from the imposition of higher taxes. Similarly, nat-
ural resource dependence encourages increased patronage spending, reducing latent pres-
sures for a strong demand for democracy (Ross 2001). Another explanation is that the gov-
ernment will use its largesse to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent
of the state and therefore likely to demand political rights (Ross 2001). However, a coun-
try’s political environment plays a fundamental role in promoting and sustaining progress
in eradicating hunger, mainly by strengthening political commitment to food security and
the right to food. Building on the landmark work of Sen (1982), several studies emphasize
that citizens can hold the governments of democratic countries to account through their
right to vote and their participation in public life (Burchi 2011; Rossignoli and Balestri
2018). Thus, multiparty democracies tend to mobilize more resources and define public
policies to prevent events such as famines. Rossignoli and Balestri (2018) share this view,
arguing that democratic institutions produce positive outcomes in terms of food security
due to electoral competition. In other words, democracy encourages public action that is
likely to converge towards a commitment against undernourishment and hunger. We can
therefore legitimately conclude that natural resource dependence positively affects under-
nourishment through its effects on democracy.
Conflict Channel Political instability, or the incidence of conflict, is the third political
channel through which natural resource dependence could increase undernourishment.
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H. Njangang et al.
Several authors have proposed different theoretical arguments to justify the effect of natural
resource wealth on the occurrence of civil conflict (Humphreys 2005; Faha 2021). Hum-
phreys (2005) identifies six mechanisms through which natural resource dependence fosters
conflict namely greedy rebels’ mechanism,3 greedy outsiders, grievance, feasibility, weak
states mechanism, and the parse networks mechanism. Furthermore, Ross (2006) estab-
lishes evidence that oil and other minerals promote conflict because they make independ-
ence more desirable for resource-rich regions. However, there is a large body of literature
on the adverse effects of conflict exposure on undernourishment (see Martin-Shields and
Stojetz (2019) for a literature review). It is established that children aged 0–5 years born in
areas affected by civil war suffer more from stunting than those born in other areas (Akresh
et al. 2012; Le and Nguyen 2020). Similarly, Gates et al. (2012) also show that a conflict
with 2,500 combat deaths leads to a 3.3% increase in the prevalence of undernourishment.
In sum, we postulate that, resource-rich countries are more likely to experience armed con-
flict, which leads to an increase in undernourishment, all other things being equal.
2.2.2 Economic Channels: Agricultural Investments and Income Inequality
Income Inequality Channel According to Carmignani and Avom (2010), relatively small
groups and elites frequently exploit and commercialise natural resources while neglecting
overall social development. Since the work of Leamer et al. (1999), emerging literature
confirms the intuition that natural resources increase income inequality.4 An expanding
resource sector can be linked to greater income inequality by inducing rent-seeking behav-
iour and disproportionately benefiting specific groups of individuals (Carmignani 2013).
Other authors suggest that resource-intensive economies are associated with lower capital
stocks, fewer workers with secondary education, and higher income inequality (Leamer
et al. 1999). It is also recognised that resource rents increase income inequality in ethni-
cally polarised societies (Fum and Hodler 2010). Subsequently, Carmignani (2013) shows
that resource abundance increases income inequality, and increased inequality reduces
human development. Similarly, unequal income distribution implies that a larger share of
the population has little means to invest in nutrition, resulting in a higher prevalence of
undernourishment. Palma et al. (2009) provide empirical support for this argument and
show that countries characterised by widespread poverty and high income inequality are
associated with a higher prevalence of undernourishment. Eini-Zinab et al. (2020) share
this view and show that countries with lower levels of income inequality experience a
more rapid decline in undernourishment. Consequently, it is possible to admit that natural
resources affect undernourishment by accentuating income inequality.
Agricultural Investments Channel We also assume that natural resource dependence can
hinder productive investments such as agriculture, leading to higher levels of undernourish-
ment. Examples of agricultural investment include investments that improve the quality of
the land, such as afforestation, but also the construction of various infrastructures, such as
wells and dams. Intuitively, it is expected that resource windfalls can increase the revenues
of governments, which can invest in agriculture to increase national production. However,
3
The most famous cases are the diamond-funded rebellions in Sierra Leone and Angola. Oil also offers
many financing opportunities for rebels, including extortion raids against oil companies.
4
See Sebri and Dachraoui (2021) for a meta-analysis.
13
based on rent-seeking theory, resource exploitation tends to lead to rent-seeking behavior

(Torvik 2002) and corruption, particularly in non-democratic countries (Bhattacharyya and
Hodler 2010). Higher levels of corruption in countries tend to reduce investment in produc-
tive sectors such as agriculture (Mogues 2015). Thus, Dorinet et al. (2021) show that natu-
ral resources negatively affect investment in agriculture only in non-democratic countries.
Specifically, natural resources do not alter the amount of investment devoted to agricul-
ture in democracies, as it is likely that in these countries, they do not increase corruption
as much as in autocracies. However, investment in agriculture through various direct and
indirect channels, in the short or long term, can improve food security and thus reduce
undernourishment (Kamenya et al. 2022). Indeed, investment in subsidies and inputs can
directly improve agricultural productivity, resulting in increased food production. This can
also indirectly improve nutrition, as surplus produce can be sold and the income used to
purchase other nutritious foods or pay for health services (McGovern et al. 2017; Kamenya
et al. 2022). To sum up, the negative effect of natural resources on agricultural investments
will cause higher rates of undernourishment.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data Description and Some Stylized Facts
This paper uses unbalanced panel data from 88 developing countries over the period
2001–2020. The periodicity under investigation is chosen according to data availability
constraints. A description of the study variables is provided below.
3.1.1 Dependent Variable
Our main dependent variable, the prevalence rate of undernourishment (PoU) represents
the percentage of the population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy
requirements continuously. This indicator is widely used in the literature on undernour-
ishment and food security (Fontan Sers and Mughal 2019; Mughal and Fontan Sers
2020). The FAO provides annual data and 3-year average data for PoU. Several stud-
ies have used 3-year averages, although there are a few studies using annual data (e.g.,
Mary et al. 2018; Candelise et al. 2021). Because the study period is relatively short,
we use annual data rather than averages. Figure 1 shows a decline in the prevalence of
undernourishment in all regions of the world between 2001 and 2020. In East Asia and
the Pacific, for example, undernourishment dropped significantly from 12% to around
4% during this period. However, undernourishment rates remained highest in sub-Saha-
ran Africa and South Asia. Moreover, these are the two regions of the world where
undernourishment has increased by more than 2% since 2018.
For robustness analysis, we analyse the effect of natural resources on child under-
nourishment. We measure child undernourishment by the prevalence of stunting,
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H. Njangang et al.
30.00
Prevalence of undernourishment (%
25.00
20.00
population)
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
Years
East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean Middle East & North Africa
North America South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Fig. 1 Trends in the prevalence of undernourishment in different regions of the world (2001–2020).
Source: authors’ construction from World Bank (2023)
North America
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
East Asia & Pacific
Middle East & North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00
2022 2000
Fig. 2 Distribution of stunting between different regions of the world (2000–2022). Source: authors’ con-
struction from World Bank (2023)
following Smith and Haddad (2015), and the prevalence of low birth weight for children
under five years of age as an anthropometric indicator.5 The prevalence of stunting is the
percentage of children under five years of age whose height at age is less than 2 standard
deviations from the median of the WHO growth standards (WHO 2020). Like the prev-
alence of undernourishment in the total population, there has also been a remarkable
5
As suggested by Smith and Haddad (2015), stunting has replaced low birth weight as the preferred meas-
ure of child undernourishment for setting and monitoring international targets. However, for a better appre-
ciation of the robustness of the results, we use both indicators.
13
Fig. 3 Relationship between natural resources and undernourishment. Source: authors’ construction
decline in stunting in all regions of the world (Fig. 2). Although child undernourishment
is still very high in some regions, the greatest progress has been made in South Asia,
where the prevalence of stunting has fallen from almost 50% in 2000 to around 31% in
2022, equaling that of sub-Saharan Africa. Low birth weight (LBW) prevalence is the
percentage of live births weighing less than 2,500 g out of total live births during the
same period (WHO 2020). Data for these different indicators is available in the WHO
(2020) database.
3.1.2 Main Explanatory Variable: Natural Resource Dependence
Several recent studies have used data on resource wealth, and others have used per capita
rents as indicators of natural resource abundance. However, in line with recent work by
Tadadjeu et al. (2023b), we argue that we need a variable capable of capturing the extent to
which political elites exhibit rent-seeking behaviour to examine the resource curse hypoth-
esis. As such, part of the literature argues in favour of a measure of rent-seeking when
examining said curse. Natural resource dependence provides a measure of this rent-seeking
behaviour, since the more dependent an economy is on its resources, the greater the likeli-
hood that political elites will engage in rent-seeking behaviour (Sachs and Warner 2001).
Van der Ploeg (2011) shares this view, pointing out that resource dependence leads to cor-
ruption and rent-seeking through exclusive licences to exploit and export resources by the
political elite and their acolytes in order to appropriate wealth and political power. Hence,
our main measure of natural resource dependence is the total natural resource rent as a per-
centage of GDP (total rents) from the World Development Indicator Tables (World Bank
2023). This indicator is the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, and forest rents as a
percentage of GDP. It is an indicator widely used in the resource curse literature because
of the availability of data over a large sample of countries and over a long period of time
(Henry 2019; Sharma and Pal 2021). For further analysis, distinguish between oil, gas,
13
H. Njangang et al.
minerals, and coal rent and diffuse resources (forest rent). Consistent with the main hypoth-
esis of this study, Fig. 3 shows a positive correlation between resource dependence and the
prevalence of undernourishment in countries. However, as correlation does not necessarily
mean causality, these relationships will be investigated empirically in Section 4.
To substantiate the relationship between natural resources and undernourishment and to
avoid variable omission bias, our baseline analysis controls for a subset of the contempora-
neous controls that were found to be important for undernourishment (Smith and Haddad
2015; Soriano and Garrido 2016): the log GDP per capita (income), access to drinking
water (water access), public health expenditure (health exp), and education. According to
the literature, higher income is associated with poverty reduction (Harttgen et al. 2013) and
therefore represents an indicator of the capacity of households to buy food, drinking water,
sanitation, and medical care. Similarly, improved access to safe drinking water reduces
undernourishment (Smith and Haddad 2015). In addition, investments in health help build
the capacity of health facilities to manage the medical complications related to undernour-
ishment. Soriano and Garrido (2016) consider that investments in health, education, and
access to drinking water are favourable factors in reducing undernourishment. Indeed, edu-
cation policies can improve nutrition if they improve knowledge about food production.
They also enable individuals to adopt healthier food hygiene and make the best nutritional
choices for their own health and that of their children. Consistent with previous work, we
expect a negative effect of income, access to drinking water, health expenditure, and educa-
tion on undernourishment.
3.1.3 Control Variables
For robustness, we use additional control variables, including remittances, cereal produc-
tion, access to sanitation, CO2 emissions, food prices, and official development assistance
(ODA). Remittances, cereal production, access to sanitation, and ODA are generally asso-
ciated with lower undernourishment (Azizi 2018; Mughal and Fontan Sers 2020). How-
ever, rising food prices and pollution are identified as factors increasing undernourishment
(Anríquez et al. 2013; Hasegawa et al. 2016). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all
the variables used and their respective sources, while Table 12 in the appendix summarises
the definition of study variables.
3.2 Model Specification and Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Model Specification
This paper investigates the effect of natural resources on undernourishment. Following Mary
et al. (2018) and Saccone (2021), we adopt a dynamic panel model specified in Eq. (1):
PoU i,t = α + 𝛽 1 PoU i,t−1 + 𝛽 2 Total rentsi,t + 𝛽 3 Xi,t + μ i + 𝜈 t + 𝜀 i,t (1)
where PoU i,t , stands for undernourishment and PoU i,t−1 is lag of our dependent variable.6
Total rentsi,t , is natural resource rents (% GDP), Xi,t is the vector of control variables 𝜀i,t is
the error term, 𝜇i is an unobserved country-specific effect, and vt is a time specific effect.
6
Our dependent variable the prevalence of undernourishment is persistent as their correlation with their
first lags is substantially higher (i.e., 0.992) than the rule of thumb threshold value of 0.8 considered for
establishing persistence.
13
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and data sources

Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Sources
Undernourishment variables
PoU (% pop.) 1,640 15.017 10.904 2.5 67.5 FAOSTAT
Stunting (% pop) 1,760 26.854 13.31 3.9 56.4 WHO (2020)
LBW (% pop) 1,035 12.644 5.037 4.534 35.459 WHO (2020)
Resource variables
Total rents (% GDP) 1,756 8.808 10.387 0.002 75.366 WDI
Oil_Gas prod. (ln) 1,330 7.79 7.753 0 19.185 Ross and Mahdavi (2015)
Coal (% GDP) 1,748 0.423 2.595 0 48.722 WDI
Forest (% GDP) 1,756 2.948 4.39 0 36.06 WDI
Mineral (% GDP) 1,756 1.104 2.513 0 24.834 WDI
Oil (% GDP) 1,752 3.683 9.005 0 65.158 WDI
Gas (% GDP) 1,732 0.669 2.89 0 55.009 WDI
Control variables
Income (ln) 1,745 7.578 0.933 5.542 9.561 WDI
Water access (% pop) 1,756 75.722 19.159 20.232 100 WDI
Education (years) 1,758 6.274 0.828 4 8 WDI
Health exp. (% GDP) 1,743 2.057 1.361 0.084 6.824 WDI
Remittances (% GDP) 1,659 4.879 6.15 0 50.102 WDI
Cereals prod. (ln) 1,755 14.177 2.803 1.386 20.242 WDI
Sanitation access (% pop) 1,753 55.243 29.839 3.095 99.411 WDI
CO2 emissions (metric tons 1,760 1.606 1.985 0.025 12.23 WDI
per cap.)
ODA (% GNI) 1,750 5.328 7.421 -0.643 92.141 WDI
Food price inflation (index) 1,692 8.861 22.025 -17.722 604.14 FAOSTAT
External instrument
Sub-soil assets (ln) 1,584 5.131 3.446 0 11.012 World Bank (2021)
Transmission channel variables
Control Corruption (index) 1,672 -0.602 0.542 -1.698 1.245 WGI
Polity2 (index) 1,591 2.832 5.567 -9 10 VDEM
Internal conflict (dummy) 1,760 0.155 0.362 0 1 UCDP/PRIO (2015)
Gini (index) 1,494 0.531 0.071 0.298 0.852 GCIP
Agricultural invest. (% GDP) 1,760 23.182 8.531 2 81.021 FAOSTAT
FAOSTAT, UCDP/PRIO, GCIP, WDI, WGI, WHO and VDEM denotes, Food Agriculture Organization,
Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo, Global Consumption and Income Project,
World Development Indicator, World Governance Indicators, World Health Organisation and Varieties of
Democracy, respectively
PoU, LBW, Inst. Vul. denotes prevalence of undernourishment, Low birth weight and institutional vulner-
ability, respectively
3.2.2 Empirical Strategy
Estimating Eq. (1) with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) has three inherent problems.
First, the presence of the lagged value of the dependent variable in the model puts our
model in the context of a dynamic panel model. In the presence of lagged dependent
13
H. Njangang et al.
variables, Nickell (1981) argues that while OLS estimators may be biassed upwards,
fixed effects may be biassed downwards. Additionally, as pointed out by Badeeb et al.
(2017), future studies on the resource curse should carefully address the issue of the
endogeneity of measures of natural resource dependence. From this perspective, it is
possible that there is reverse causality, i.e., the level of undernourishment affects natural
resource dependence. Theoretically, in the case of hunger, governments can accelerate
the production of natural resources to generate the fiscal revenues needed for invest-
ments in the food sector. Moreover, the current level of undernourishment, which is
still very high in low-income countries, may lead populations to put more pressure on
the government to meet their needs in terms of food. This pressure can therefore lead
governments to increase the production of natural resources in order to find sources of
financing. To address this shortcoming, this study applies two alternative econometric
strategies. First, we apply the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), initially pro-
posed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and later developed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998). Second, for robustness purposes, we adopt a two-stage
least squares instrumental variable approach (IV-2SLS), where natural resource rents
are instrumented by subsoil assets per capita.
The second difficulty is the potential bias associated with omitted variables. This
problem, in particular, is related to the possibility that relevant confounders are excluded
from the baseline model. This concern is usually addressed by incorporating several key
determinants of undernourishment or food security into the regression. In this paper, we
include four control variables in our baseline model to make sure that omitted variables
do not bias estimated results. To further minimize any bias that might result from the
omission of potential malnutrition factors, we added five control variables to the base
model as a robustness check.
The third source of endogeneity is the possibility of natural resource measuring
errors. Our baseline measure is based on total natural resource rent data, which has
been widely used in the literature on the resource curse. These data are exceptional
in their worldwide scope and cross-country comparability, although they do have
some limitations. On the one hand, because it is difficult to estimate extraction costs
precisely, employing resource rents rather than revenues may increase measurement
error (Lashitew and Werker 2020). On the other hand, merging data for more than a
dozen natural resource commodities may jeopardise data quality due to the difficulties
of obtaining internationally comparable data for output, pricing, and production costs
(Lange et al. 2018). Furthermore, the main measure of dependence on natural resources
is the ratio of rents to GDP, while the dependent variable is the undernourishment rate.
This implies that, all other things being equal, a country with a surprisingly low GDP
will have a high dependency ratio, but a low GDP will probably lead to higher under-
nourishment rates. This could lead to a spurious positive correlation between depend-
ence on natural resources and undernourishment without there being a resource curse.
To avoid these issues, researchers have instead used revenue or production statistics
for oil, which considerably outnumbers other resources in terms of its contribution to
global resource earnings (e.g., Dorinet et al. 2021; Katoka and Dostal 2022). In addition
to lowering measurement error, the usage of oil and gas is theoretically significant, with
scholars arguing that oil has an especially negative effect on institutions. As a result,
we follow Lashitew and Werker (2020) and utilise constant price oil and gas production
statistics from Ross and Mahdavi (2015) in robustness checks.
Several reasons motivated the choice of the GMM. In the literature, the GMM is fre-
quently used to solve econometric problems such as heteroscedasticity, endogeneity, and
13
overidentification. According to Baum et al. (2003), heteroscedasticity is an omnipresent

problem in empirical studies, and a more efficient way to handle it is to use the GMM
estimator. Bazzi and Clemens (2013) argue that in the related literature, GMM is used to
gauge instrument strength. For Roodman (2009a), dynamic panel GMM may generate too
many instrument problems and therefore create a weak instrument bias. To solve this prob-
lem, the rule of thumb is that the number of instruments should be less than the number of
countries.
The GMM estimator is defined in two alternative versions: the difference GMM and the
system GMM. As proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), the difference GMM consists
of estimating the model equation in the first difference in order to control for the statisti-
cal unit-specific effect. However, the problem with this estimator is that it suffers from
weak instruments (Blundell and Bond 1998). To overcome this and increase the efficiency
of our estimates, we apply the two-step system GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) andBlundell and Bond (1998).7 The system GMM consists of estimating simulta-
neously the first difference equation and the level equation. The instruments for the first
difference regression are lagged endogenous level explanatory variables, and the instru-
ments for the level regression are lagged endogenous difference explanatory variables.8
While the system GMM solves the above problems, it has a weakness. Indeed, although
asymptotically more efficient, the two-step GMM generates standard error estimates that
tend to be strongly downward biased. However, this problem can be overcome by using
the finite sample correction of the covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005). In
addition, it is important to note that system-GMM can suffer from instrument proliferation
problems because it employs a larger set of instruments compared to difference-GMM. We
address this shortcoming by limiting the number of lags of endogenous variables.9 To test
the validity of the lagged variables as instruments, we perform Hansen’s over-identification
test, through which we check the validity of the instruments used, and the error autocor-
relation tests (AR(1) and AR(2)). We also apply a test for the consistency of our GMM
estimates by comparing the estimated coefficients of the lag of the dependent variable with
those obtained by the OLS and FE methods. It is well known that the GMM estimate of the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable must be greater than the fixed-effects estimate
and less than the corresponding OLS estimate (Bond et al. 2001).
Using the GMM estimator, although robust, is not a panacea. Indeed, a limitation of
this estimator is that lagged values of endogenous variables are sometimes weak instru-
ments (Blundell and Bond 1998; Bun and Windmeijer 2010). While this is true, correct-
ing for reverse causality bias by using lagged values of explanatory variables as instru-
ments is somewhat misleading. The use of many lags does not solve the problem of weak
instruments, which can lead to erroneous results (Bazzi and Clemens 2013). Indeed, as
Roodman (2009a) points out, the use of many lags in particular when the endogenous
explanatory variables are highly persistent can compromise the validity of the internal
instruments in the system GMM estimator. Furthermore, given that there is no perfect
7
This estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the difference GMM (Roodman 2009a).
8
All explanatory variables are considered as potentially endogenous.
9
We take lags of orders 2 through 4. We performed the estimations using the Stata module xtabond2 fol-
lowing Roodman (2009b). The choice of lags was based on the results of Arellano and Bond’s residual
autocorrelation tests. The latter reports an autocorrelation of order 1 for 𝜉i,t , which leads to considering the
lags from t-1 onwards.
13
H. Njangang et al.
Table 2 Baseline results

Dependent variable: PoU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PoU (t-1) 0.933*** 0.938*** 0.936*** 0.938*** 0.951***

(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015)
Total rents 0.015*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Income (ln) -1.083*** -1.136*** -1.120** -0.450
(0.347) (0.395) (0.470) (0.366)
Water access 0.007 0.009 -0.016
(0.032) (0.018) (0.022)
Education -1.119 -2.023**
(1.080) (0.869)
Health exp -0.147**
(0.063)
Constant 0.175 8.246*** 8.615*** 15.090* 17.330**
(0.127) (2.645) (3.219) (8.257) (6.886)
Observations 1,554 1,544 1,54 1,538 1,534
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 82 82 82 82 82
Number of instruments 41 30 34 35 40
AR (1) 0.093 0.046 0.052 0.019 0.026
AR (2) 0.151 0.210 0.106 0.170 0.263
Hansen OIR 0.144 0.180 0.305 0.820 0.719
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The coefficients are based
on the two-step GMM system estimation, using the finite sample correction of Windmeijer (2005). The size
of the instrument matrix is reduced (collapsing instruments). All explanatory variables are treated as poten-
tially endogenous. The lags of the explanatory variables are taken as an instrument for the difference equa-
tion, while the first differences of the explanatory variables are taken as an instrument for the level equation.
Thus, the estimated coefficients are valid. PoU is the prevalence of undernourishment
identification strategy, it is necessary to undertake an alternative estimation approach to

mitigate these plausible concerns about causal inference. Therefore, for robustness, we
instead employ the IV-2SLS approach by considering the subsoil assets per capita as the
“external source of variation” for natural resources. This empirical strategy would be able
to identify causal relationships. We offer a discussion of our identification strategy in Sec-
tion 4.2.4. The use of this external instrument should help mitigate the potential problems
of “instrument weakness” and reverse causality that often arise in GMM estimates.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline Results
Table 3 presents the results of the basic estimates. The consistency of the GMM estimators
depends on the validity of the assumption of no second-order serial correlation of the error
13
terms and the validity of the instruments. Hansen’s diagnostic test results do not reject the
validity of the instruments. Furthermore, the test results validate the lack of second-order
serial correlation. Hansen’s test of identification restrictions can seriously weaken and bias
Hansen’s test of identification, and so the rule of thumb is that the number of instruments
should be less than the number of countries (Roodman 2009a). The GMM system pre-
sented in Table 2 generated a maximum of 41 instruments, which is less than the number
of countries, so the regression results are free of instrument proliferation. Similarly, the
GMM coefficients for the lagged dependent variable are statistically significant at the 1%
level, well below 1. Therefore, it can be concluded that the results obtained are valid.
Regarding the estimated coefficients, in column (1), the relationship is tested without con-
trol variables; in columns (2)–(5), the control variables are included in the regression. Col-
umn (1) provides evidence of a positive and significant effect of natural resource dependence
on the prevalence of undernourishment. The coefficient associated with natural resource rent
is 0.015, with a magnitude suggesting that a 1% increase in natural resource rent over GDP
is associated, all other things being equal, with an increase in undernourishment of 0.014%
of the standard deviation.10 This result suggests that resource-dependent countries have, on
average, a higher prevalence of undernourishment than their non-resource-dependent coun-
terparts. This result may be justified by the fact that governments in resource-dependent
countries are less inclined to implement policies aimed at improving the nutritional status of
their populations, as the “unearned” income they derive from natural resources, by alleviat-
ing fiscal pressure, neutralises the demand for accountability. In addition, the high levels of
corruption and weak democracy that characterise resource-dependent countries compromise
investment in agriculture, as well as the various health policies likely to reduce undernour-
ishment. Moreover, rent-seeking behaviour facilitates access to natural resource revenues for
certain political elites, who may benefit from a disproportionate increase in their standard of
living to the detriment of other population groups who may suffer from famine and under-
nourishment. Finally, competition for resource rents can exacerbate existing tensions between
ruling factions or ethnic groups, leading to armed conflicts that can cause hunger, notably by
provoking massive population displacement, preventing agricultural production through the
destruction of agricultural assets, and disrupting food markets.
In column (2), we control for income per capita. It can be seen that the coefficient
associated with natural resources remains positive and significant, confirming the result
previously established in column (1). In column (3), we control for access to drink-
ing water. Introducing this variable into the regression leaves the sign and statistical
significance of the coefficient on natural resources unaffected. In addition, the coeffi-
cient associated with income has a negative and statistically significant sign. This is
consistent with the literature suggesting that an increase in income reduces undernour-
ishment (Haddad et al. 2003). Column (4) presents the results with the years of second-
ary education added to the list of control variables. In this specification, the coefficient
associated with natural resources remains positive and statistically significant. We also
find a negative and significant effect of access to drinking water on undernourishment.
This result is similar to findings by Smith and Haddad (2015) who show that access
to drinking water and sanitation reduces stunting. Education is negatively correlated
10
The standardised coefficients are calculated according to the following formula: 𝛽x = 𝛼x 𝜆x with 𝛽x , 𝛼x,𝜆x
𝜆
y
,𝜆y corresponding to the standardised coefficient, the initial estimated coefficient, the standard deviation of
the resource rent, and the standard deviation of the prevalence of undernourishment, respectively.
13
H. Njangang et al.
Table 3 Robustness according to the number of included lags

Two-step system GMM Two-step system GMM Two-step

(2 lags) (3 lags) system GMM
(4 lags)
(1) (2) (3)
PoU (t-1) 0.911*** 0.836*** 0.874***

(0.022) (0.020) (0.012)
Total rents 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.018***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
Income (ln) -0.737* -0.343 -0.252
(0.390) (0.353) (0.267)
Water access 0.031 -0.044* -0.031**
(0.027) (0.024) (0.015)
Education -1.933*** -2.229*** -1.736***
(0.595) (0.483) (0.426)
Health exp -0.131** -0.009 0.023
(0.053) (0.055) (0.052)
Constant 16.311*** 21.836*** 16.407***
(5.222) (4.407) (4.107)
Observations 1,449 1,367 1,285
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 82 82 82
Number of instruments 42 35 37
AR (1) 0.025 0.050 0.068
AR (2) 0.656 0.498 0.663
Hansen OIR 0.399 0.244 0.441
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. PoU is the prevalence of
undernourishment
with undernourishment. This is consistent with Headey (2013), suggesting that educa-
tion contributes to the reduction of undernourishment. In column (5), health expendi-
ture is listed as a control variable. Reassuringly, the coefficient associated with natural
resources remains positive and statistically significant at the conventional level. We find
that public health expenditure reduces undernourishment (Headey 2013).
We perform a test to show that the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent
variable on the right-hand side yields the appropriate value, which should be between
those from the pooled OLS and fixed effect estimates. Indeed, both pooled OLS and
fixed-effects techniques confirm the validity of implementing the ex-post system GMM
estimator by examining the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. According to
Bond et al. (2001), the GMM estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent vari-
able should be higher than the fixed effects estimate and lower than the corresponding
OLS estimate. As can be seen in Table 13 in the appendix, the coefficients on the lagged
dependent variable fall within the appropriate range, confirming the accuracy of our
baseline GMM estimates.
13
4.2 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we present the results of various robustness checks to confirm our
previous results. First, we test the robustness of our GMM results to changes in the
number of lags included. Second, we introduce additional control variables; third, we
use alternative measures of natural resources and undernourishment. Finally, we use an
alternative estimation procedure to address the reverse causality concerns.
4.2.1 Sensitivity of Results to the Number of Lags Included
One might think that the significance of our baseline results depends on the number
of lags used for the internal instruments. The number of delays considered in SGMM
framework can indeed affect the significance of the results significantly. To prove the
reliability of the results, we re-estimate the baseline model, modifying the number of
lags in the GMM specification. As explained in Section 3.2, in our benchmark GMM
estimation, we use a restricted set of “internal” instruments by including 2-4th order
lags as instruments for the endogenous variables in the first difference and level dif-
ference equations. In Table 3, we present the results of the GMM with different lags in
the instrument set (lags of order 2, 3 and 4). In each specification, we remarkably find
that the coefficient associated with natural resources remains positive and statistically
significant. Thus, when using the second-, third-, and four-order lags of the explanatory
variables as instruments, the results are not affected by the number of lags included.
4.2.2 Robustness to Additional Covariates
We attempt to further minimize any bias that might result from the omission of poten-
tial undernourishment factors by gradually including five additional control variables
in the base model, namely remittances, cereal production, access to sanitation, CO2
emissions, foreign aid, and the food price inflation. The results of this approach are
summarized in Table 4. When we successively introduce each of these control varia-
bles, we find that the coefficient associated with natural resources dependence remains
positive and statistically significant from column (1) to column (6). This confirms the
resources curse in terms of undernourishment in developing countries. Regarding these
different additional control variables, we find overall that each of them shows signs
consistent with the literature (Hasegawa et al. 2016; Azizi 2018; Mary et al. 2020;
Mughal and Fontan Sers 2020).
4.2.3 Robustness to Alternative Measures of Key Variables
We tested the robustness of the results by using alternative measures of natural resource
dependence and undernourishment. The results of the estimates are summarized in Table 5.
In column (1), we use an alternative measure of natural resource dependence. We use the
logarithm of oil and gas production from Ross and Mahdavi (2015). The results show that
higher production on oil and gas is positively and significantly associated with under-
nourishment. In columns (2) and (3), we estimate the effect of total natural resource rent
dependence on stunting and low-birth weight, respectively. We find that the coefficients
associated with total resource rent are positive and statistically significant. This suggests
13
H. Njangang et al.
Table 4 Results including additional control

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PoU (t-1) 0.722*** 0.757*** 0.755*** 0.929*** 0.935*** 0.924***

(0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Total rents 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.018***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Income (ln) -2.121*** -1.475*** -1.794*** -0.454** -0.830** -0.127
(0.750) (0.519) (0.454) (0.208) (0.338) (0.311)
Water access -0.078** -0.082*** -0.045 -0.049*** -0.039*** -0.057***
(0.038) (0.028) (0.050) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Education -0.323 0.100 -0.667 -1.023*** -1.057*** -0.966***
(1.234) (0.182) (0.713) (0.279) (0.297) (0.310)
Health exp 0.023 0.094 -0.017 -0.034 0.037 0.037
(0.070) (0.062) (0.047) (0.057) (0.062) (0.053)
Remittances -0.191** -0.055 0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002
(0.078) (0.047) (0.037) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021)
Cereals prod. (ln) -0.238*** -0.133** -0.124*** -0.143** -0.110**
(0.089) (0.058) (0.047) (0.057) (0.044)
Access to sanitation -0.012 -0.034** -0.023 -0.051***
(0.037) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
CO2 emissions 0.082 0.092 -0.026
(0.073) (0.083) (0.093)
ODA -0.049** -0.021*
(0.019) (0.011)
Food price inflation 0.008***
(0.002)
Constant 28.811*** 23.627*** 27.051*** 10.100*** 13.503*** 7.388**
(9.732) (3.894) (6.544) (2.360) (3.831) (3.417)
Observations 1,454 1,453 1,450 1,440 1,437 1,416
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 80 80 80 80 80 79
Number of instruments 33 40 42 51 49 53
AR (1) 0.027 0.088 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.012
AR (2) 0.564 0.520 0.694 0.284 0.295 0.267
Hansen OIR 0.498 0.223 0.266 0.518 0.548 0.503
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. PoU and ODA denotes the
prevalence of undernourishment and official development assistance
that in resource-dependent countries, children are more stunted and underweight compared
to children in non-rent-dependent countries. When we compare the two undernourishment
indicators, we find that total resource rent has on average a larger effect on stunting. When
we compare the effect of natural resources on the different indicators of undernourishment
used in this study, we find that the curse is more pronounced on stunting.
13
Table 5 Results of alternative Alternative Child undernourishment

measure of resource dependence resources
and undernourishment measure
Dependent variables PoU Stunting LBW
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variables (t-1) 0.931*** 0.933*** 0.991***

(0.022) (0.017) (0.004)
Oil_Gas prod. (ln) 0.027***
(0.010)
Total rents 0.016*** 0.011*
(0.004) (0.006)
Income (ln) -0.156 -0.803** -0.033
(0.588) (0.373) (0.024)
Water access -0.123*** -0.076*** -0.004**
(0.040) (0.016) (0.002)
Education -2.624*** -0.033 -0.024*
(0.615) (0.194) (0.014)
Health exp -0.011 -0.093* -0.018*
(0.082) (0.056) (0.011)
Constant 24.787*** 0.577 -0.035
(6.492) (3.124) (0.187)
Observations 1,144 1,640 957
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
AR (1) 0.097 0.000 0.071
AR (2) 0.634 0.000 0.189
Hansen OIR 0.655 0.247 0.707
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in
parenthesis. PoU and LBW denotes the prevalence of undernourish-
ment and Low birth weight, respectively
4.2.4 Robustness to Alternative Estimation Strategy: IV‑2SLS Estimates
So far, we have attempted to assuage endogeneity concerns by using lags of explanatory varia-
bles as the instrument for the difference equation and first differences of explanatory variables
as the instrument for the level equation. While this approach is robust, it is not a panacea for
addressing reverse causality concerns in the relationship between natural resources and under-
nourishment. The best way to deal with the problem of possible reverse causality is to use
external instruments through an instrumental variable (IV-2SLS) approach. This is only pos-
sible if an exogenous instrument is found that changes over time and across countries.
To resolve the simultaneity bias, an appropriate identification strategy is therefore necessary.
The exogeneity condition requires that our instrument influence the prevalence of undernourish-
ment exclusively by having an effect on natural resource dependence, conditional on a compre-
hensive set of control variables. In this study, we follow previous research and instrument natural
resource dependence using the subsoil natural capital stock by applying IV-2SLS (Bhattacharyya
13
H. Njangang et al.
and Collier 2014; Lashitew and Werker 2020). Natural resource stocks measure the net present
value of natural resources under the ground, in constant 2014 U.S. dollars (Lange et al. 2018).
Unlike Lashitew and Werker (2020), who use two measures of resource stocks per capita, one
for oil and gas and one for minerals and coal, we use an instrument that represents the lag of
the sum of these resource stock measures (sub-soil assets). In addition, although these previous
studies use subsoil assets as an instrument for total natural resource rents, they use them in a
cross-section framework. However, we use recent data from the World Bank (2021) that provides
panel data for subsoil assets, which allows for taking account of years and countries fixed-effects.
This measure is a strong predictor of natural resource revenues, while being relatively less cor-
related with other economic outcomes, such as undernourishment. According to some authors
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; Lashitew and Werker 2020), the motivation for this approach is
not so much that natural resource stocks are purely exogenous, but that they are much less likely
than other alternatives to reflect unmeasured underlying structural conditions. Brunnschweiler
and Bulte (2008) argue that natural capital stocks are likely to be sufficiently exogenous since
mineral deposits have been fairly well explored and estimated because of their substantial eco-
nomic value and also because of the significant involvement of large multinational firms with
similar technological access. As Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) and Carmignani (2013)
suggest, whether a country has natural resources in the ground remains essentially random.
Even with the most sophisticated technologies, a rapidly developing nation’s output of natural
resources will stay zero if its subsurface is devoid of resources. This study therefore argues that it
is very unlikely that the natural resource stocks in year t-1 in each country are directly correlated
with the prevalence of undernourishment observed in year t.
Table 6 presents the results of the IV-2SLS estimations. Column (1) summarizes the results
of our benchmark model. The first stage is presented in panel B, and the second stage in panel
A. The first stage suggests a highly significant relationship between the subsoil assets and the
natural resource dependence of a country over time, supporting the validity of our instrument.
With regard to instrument relevance, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is used to test
for weak instruments. This statistic is above 10, indicating no problem of weak identification.
Moreover, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is carried out to test for under-identification
(Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The p-value of this test is lower than 10%, so we reject the null
hypothesis of under-identification. Following Andrews et al. (2019), we also report identifica-
tion-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals. Accordingly, none of these bound estimates
includes zero, thereby offering efficient estimates regardless of the strength of the instrumental
variable in the first-stage regression. Overall, the instrumental variable estimates are unlikely
to be confounded by weak instrument bias. Regarding the estimated coefficient of our variable
of interest, we find that it still has a positive and statistically significant effect on undernourish-
ment. This result therefore supports the hypothesis that natural resources have a causal impact
on undernourishment. From column (2) to column (5), we repeat all the previous robustness
tests and, unsurprisingly, find that our results remain remarkably similar.
4.3 Do Different Types of Natural Resources Have Different Effects

on Undernourishment?
Several authors argue that the type of natural resources matters in the validity of the
resource curse hypothesis (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013; Mousavi and Clark
2021). The literature thus distinguishes between point resources and diffuse resources
based on the concentration of production patterns and income. Point resources are
extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base and include oil, minerals, and
13
Table 6 Results of the IV-2SLS estimates
Panel A. Second-stage estimates PoU PoU PoU Stunting LBW

Dependent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total rents 1.013*** 1.392*** 0.506*** 0.119*
(0.262) (0.359) (0.084) (0.063)
Oil Gas prod (ln) 0.927***
(0.261)
Panel B. First-stage estimates Total rents Total rents Oil Gas prod (ln) Total rents Total rents
Dependent variables:
Sub-soil assets (ln) 0.278*** 0.194*** 0.170*** 0.143*** 0.101***
(0.060) (0.037) (0.031) (0.012) (0.024)
Panel C: Additional informations
Baseline control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional control No Yes No No No
Country and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,452 1,342 1,213 1,524 1,026

R-squared 0.431 0.785 0.398 0.540 0.102
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 21.737 27.344 29.576 139.053 16.921
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM P-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals [0.849, 1.985] [1.005, 2.221] [0.625, 1.603] [0.375, 0.669] [0.025, 0.313]
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimated coefficients of baseline controls and additional controls are omitted to conserve space.
We reject the null of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test should be based on Stock-Yogo critical values (16.38). Anderson-Rubin identification-robust confidence intervals are
the bound estimates of the effect of natural resources, regardless of the strength of the instrument (Andrews et al. 2019). PoU is the prevalence of undernourishment
13
H. Njangang et al.
Table 7 Effects of different resources types on undernourishment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PoU (t-1) 0.968*** 0.953*** 0.936*** 0.940*** 0.939***

(0.034) (0.031) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Coal 0.093***
(0.030)
Oil 0.122***
(0.046)
Mineral 0.020**
(0.010)
Gas -0.036**
(0.016)
Forest 0.058**
(0.025)
Constant 23.648* 22.125 17.561*** 18.528*** -7.919*
(12.941) (14.614) (4.964) (4.827) (4.517)
Observations 1,526 1,531 1,534 1,534 1,511
Times FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of instruments 44 40 37 35 30
AR (1) 0.000 0.003 0.024 0.023 0.022
AR (2) 0.761 0.124 0.553 0.704 0.836
Hansen OIR 0.482 0.520 0.243 0.176 0.139
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. PoU is the prevalence of
undernourishment
plantations (Bulte et al. 2005). The fact that these resources are spatially concentrated
implies that they can be protected and controlled at a relatively modest cost. Diffuse
resources are rather spatially dispersed and include more agricultural or forest products.
The literature argues that point resources can increase inequalities, facilitate the appro-
priation of income from resources and maintain corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler
2010). In the same vein, Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) have highlighted a negative
effect of natural resources on the provision of public capital in the case of point resources,
but not in the case of agricultural and forestry resources.
We decompose our measure of total resource rent into its five components. The results
are summarized in Table 7. We find a positive and significant effect of point resources such
as oil, minerals, and coal rents on undernourishment. A comparative analysis illustrates
that the coefficient on coal rent is the most important from a quantitative point of view.
These results are consistent with the literature establishing the adverse effects of point
resources on development outcomes (Cockx and Francken 2016).
13
Table 8 Role of geographic location and income levels
Sub-regions Income levels

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PoU (t-1) 0.978*** 0.949*** 0.959*** 0.943*** 0.936*** 0.696*** 0.960*** 0.935*** 0.983***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
Total rents 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.074** 0.037*** 0.067*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.027***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.030) (0.008) (0.021) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Total rents × SSA 0.030***
(0.008)
Total rents × MENA -0.004
(0.006)
Total rents × LAC -0.023*
(0.012)
Total rents × ECA -0.086**
(0.035)
Total rents × SA 0.518**

(0.252)
Total rents × EAP -0.082
(0.123)
Total rents × LIC 0.026**
(0.010)
Total rents × LMIC 0.018*
(0.010)
Total rents × UMIC -0.012*
(0.007)
Baseline control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
13
Table 8 (continued)
Sub-regions Income levels
13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 4.355*** 5.854*** 4.001*** 10.933 10.465*** 45.399*** 4.322*** 8.911*** 3.881**
(1.460) (1.299) (1.196) (7.371) (3.653) (11.867) (1.553) (2.631) (1.754)
Observations 1,531 1,531 1,533 1,534 1,531 1,534 1,532 1,534 1,531
Number of countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Number of instruments 39 39 46 30 36 38 46 46 46
AR (1) 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.087 0.003 0.004 0.039 0.009 0.017
AR (2) 0.482 0.559 0.121 0.380 0.830 0.163 0.645 0.924 0.256
Hansen OIR 0.127 0.135 0.336 0.170 0.118 0.235 0.317 0.372 0.321
Total net effect 0.042 na -0.004 -0.012 0.555 na 0.044 0.040 0.015
Joint test significance 21.63*** na 35.96*** 6.20** 28.67*** na 39.64*** 29.76*** 53.84***
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. PoU is the prevalence of undernourishment. SSA, MENA, LAC, ECA, SA, EAP, LIC, LMIC
and UMIC denote Sub-Sahara Africa, Middle East and Nord Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia, South-Asia, East-Asia and Pacific, Low-income
countries, Lower Middle-Income Countries and Upper Middle-Income Countries. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of
the net effects and/or threshold is not significant
H. Njangang et al.
4.4 Can Geographic Location and Income Levels Matter?
Our sample is composed of developing countries from different sub-regions with different economic
and political profiles. This leads us to examine the effect of natural resources on undernourishment
according to geographic location and income levels. We construct interaction variables between nat-
ural resources and dichotomous indicators, taking a value equal to 1 if the country belongs to a sub-
region or income level and 0 if not. A significant coefficient of the interaction variable would suggest
that natural resources affect undernourishment differently in this group of countries.
The results in Table 8 suggest that resource rent-dependent countries have on average a higher
undernourishment rates than their non-dependent counterparts. When looking at sub-regional
effects, natural resource dependence has more pronounced effects in sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia. Thus, natural resource dependence further increases undernourishment in sub-Saha-
ran Africa and South Asia. However, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and those in
Europe and Central Asia can use the rentier wealth at their disposal to reduce undernourishment.
Specifically, the net effect in columns (3) (0.19–0.023 = -0.004) and (4) (0.074–0.086 = -0.012)
is negative. This result aligns with Carmignani and Chowdhury (2012) who take the same
approach and show that natural resources have a negative effect on institutional quality only
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Similarly, these authors show that natural resources are a much
greater impediment to human capital accumulation in SSA. Columns (7) to (9) summarize the
results of the analyses according to income levels. We find that dependence on natural resources
is associated with higher rates of undernourishment in low- and lower-middle-income countries.
However, natural resources are negatively associated with undernourishment in upper-middle-
income countries. This may be justified by the fact that these low-income countries are character-
ized by poorer institutional quality than their upper-middle-income counterparts, who are better
able to use natural resource revenues to reduce undernourishment.
4.5 Empirical Analysis of Transmission Channels
We now empirically test the transmission mechanisms discussed in Section 2 to identify the
channels through which natural resource dependence increases undernourishment. Accord-
ing to the literature (Carmignani and Avom 2010; Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2014), we use
a structural model of two equations. In the first equation, we estimate the effect of natural
resources on undernourishment by successively including a variable measuring (i) control
of corruption, (ii) democracy (Policy 2), (iii) income inequality (Gini index), (iv) internal
conflict, (v) agricultural investment,11 and (vi) a set of control variables. If transmission
channels are correct, the coefficient associated with natural resources should lose magni-
tude after introducing each mediation variable. In a second equation, natural resource rent-
dependence should have a positive coefficient in the regression associated with inequality,
conflict, or, alternatively, a negative effect on agricultural expenditure, control of corrup-
tion, and democracy. We formalise these two steps through the following models:
PoU i,t = α + 𝛽1 PoU i,t−1 + 𝛽 2 Total_rentsi,t + 𝛽3 Xi,t + 𝛽4 Zi,t + μi + 𝜈t + 𝜀i,t (2)
11
We use agricultural gross fixed capital formation as a proxy for agricultural investment. It is defined as
the fixed assets of the economy and net changes in the level of inventories. This measure represents a good
proxy for investment in agriculture because this measure the annual flows of physical investment in the
agricultural sector. This measure is regularly used by the FAO to assess investment trends in agriculture
(see FAO (2023)).
13
H. Njangang et al.
Table 9 Effects of mechanisms

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PoU (t-1) 0.951*** 0.969*** 0.979*** 0.942*** 0.914*** 0.983***

(0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Total rents 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.013***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Control of Corruption -0.317**
(0.161)
Polity2 -0.029**
(0.014)
Internal Conflicts 0.247**
(0.106)
Gini 4.406**
(1.774)
Agricultural invest -0.010***
(0.004)
Baseline control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 17.330** 7.771** 12.622*** 6.128*** 2.474 -0.970
(6.886) (3.462) (1.433) (1.423) (2.624) (0.863)
Observations 1,534 1,454 1,369 1,534 1,312 1,531
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 82 82 75 82 79 82
Number of instruments 40 42 51 53 50 53
AR (1) 0.026 0.033 0.021 0.078 0.095 0.000
AR (2) 0.263 0.518 0.572 0.318 0.290 0.560
Hansen OIR 0.719 0.130 0.185 0.540 0.249 0.614
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. PoU is the prevalence of
undernourishment
Zi,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Zi,t−1 + 𝛽2 Total rentsi,t + 𝛽3 X i,t + 𝜇i + vt + 𝜀i,t (3)

Here Z alternatively represents each mediation variable. The other parameters have the
same meaning as in Eq. (1). The main feature of the system of Eqs. (2) and (3) is that natu-
ral resources affect undernourishment by acting on each mediation variable (Z vector).12
The results of the effects of mechanisms are reported in Table 9, where column (1) pre-
sents the baseline results for comparison. In all specifications from column (2) to column
(6), the coefficient associated with natural resources remains positive and statically sig-
nificant, but lose magnitude. However, we observe from columns (2), (3) and (6), control
12
This system of equations is estimated by two-step GMM. However, in Eq. (3), where Zi,t is a dichot-
omous indicator, we use a logit regression with robust standard errors. Studies on the impact of natural
resources on the occurrence of conflict address endogeneity issues by delaying the explanatory variables
so that the values of the explanatory variables in the previous year explain the onset of conflict in a year
(Bodea et al. 2016). We adopt this approach by using lagged values for the explanatory variables.
13
Table 10 Effects of natural resources on mechanisms

Dependent vari- Control of corrup- Democracy Agricultural invest Gini index Internal conflict
ables: tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variables (t-1) 0.965*** 0.766*** 0.716*** 0.618***

(0.017) (0.026) (0.022) (0.039)
Total rents -0.002*** -0.017*** -0.112*** 0.001*** 0.013**
(0.001) (0.006) (0.020) (0.000) (0.006)
Constant -0.872*** 7.996*** -6.300 0.326*** 2.938***
(0.307) (2.951) (7.730) (0.066) (0.814)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,554 1,475 1,640 1,398 1,653
Number of countries 88 81 88 84
Number instruments 35 37 43 52
AR (1) 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000
AR (2) 0.730 0.379 0.647 0.600
Hansen OIR 0.722 0.276 0.264 0.388
Pseudo R2 0.022
Wald chi2 (5) 38.26
Log pseudolikeli- -696.714
hood
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. In column (5), we use a
logit regression with robust standard errors
of corruption, democracy and agricultural investment have negative and significant coef-
ficients. In columns (4), and (5) the coefficient associated with income inequality and inter-
nal conflict has a positive and significant effect on undernourishment. Thus, the positive
effect of natural resources on undernourishment can be attributable to the low level of con-
trol of corruption, democracy and agricultural investment. This result can also be explained
by the occurrence of internal conflicts and high levels of income inequality in resource-
dependent countries.
The results of Eq. (3) are reported in Table 10. The coefficient associated with natural
resource dependence is negative and significant in each specification (column (1)-(3)). This
suggests that natural resources reduce control of corruption, democracy, and the agricul-
tural investments. However, natural resources are rather increased on average income ine-
quality and the probability of internal conflicts. In sum, these results allow us to conclude
that natural resource dependence is associated with a greater prevalence of undernourish-
ment due to their effects on the control of corruption, democracy, income inequality, agri-
cultural investment and internal conflict.
4.6 The Moderating Effect of Corruption Control
This study goes beyond mediation analysis and looks at the moderating role of corrup-
tion control. The aim is to find out whether corruption control is a moderator and whether
being a less corrupt country weakens the effects of dependence on natural resources on
13
H. Njangang et al.
Table 11 Impact of natural Dependent variable: PoU

resources, and corruption on
undernourishment (1) (2) (3)
PoU (t-1) 0.951*** 0.721*** 0.788***

(0.015) (0.025) (0.019)
Total rents 0.025*** 0.021** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
CC -1.774* 0.110
(1.034) (0.228)
Total rents*CC -0.011*
(0.006)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 17.330** 35.390*** 21.134***
(6.886) (11.394) (5.695)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,534 1,534 1,534
AR(1) 0.0261 0.0086 0.0029
AR(2) 0.263 0.814 0.634
Hansen OIR 0.719 0.380 0.122
*
p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. Robust standard errors reported in
parenthesis
malnutrition. This analysis is motivated by literature that provides empirical evidence that
institutional quality mitigates the natural resource curse (Mehlum et al. 2006). The results
of this estimation are presented in Table 11 in the appendix. Column (1) of Table 11 pre-
sents the results of our basic model for comparison purposes. Column (2) adds the variable
corruption control (CC) as an additional covariate, while column (3) adds both the variable
corruption control (CC) and its interaction with natural resource dependence to capture the
moderating effect of corruption control.
The results in column (1) of Table 4 show a positive association between dependence on
natural resources and malnutrition in developing countries. In column (2), the coefficient
on the CC variable is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that being a less cor-
rupt country is associated with a lower probability of having a malnourished population.
This finding is consistent with recent data on the relationship between institutional quality
and food security (Ogunniyi et al. 2020). In column (3), the coefficient of the interaction
term is negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that better control of
corruption contributes to mitigating the adverse effects of natural resource dependence on
malnutrition in developing countries.
13
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The resource curse hypothesis has given rise to a wealth of literature, although no consen-
sus has been reached. In recent years, several research directions have emerged to address
the effects of natural resources on various variables of human development outcomes.
It is from this perspective that this paper analyses the effect of natural resources on the
prevalence of undernourishment in a sample of 88 developing countries. Using the two-
step GMM, we find a positive effect of total natural resource rent dependence on under-
nourishment. This result suggests that resource-dependent countries fail to effectively use
the rented wealth at their disposal to curb undernourishment. Furthermore, we find that
dependence on point resources is associated with higher rates of undernourishment. The
results of analyses by geographic location show that natural resource dependence fur-
ther increases undernourishment in sub-Saharan African and South Asian countries, but
decreases it in Latin American and European or Central Asian countries. An examination
of the transmission channels advocates that natural resource dependence increases under-
nourishment through poor institutional quality, income inequality, the occurrence of con-
flict, and a low level of agricultural investment.
The positive effect of natural resources on undernourishment is a major challenge fac-
ing developing countries. The results of this study have several implications. First, good
institutions contribute towards reducing undernourishment by promoting the effectiveness
of nutritional policies, diminishing income inequality, and reducing social tensions, which
are sources of conflict. We encourage governments in developing countries, particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, to make greater efforts to improve the quality of insti-
tutions. Indeed, greater democratic accountability, better political competition, and, above
all, better control of corruption will give leaders in resource-dependent countries a greater
incentive to use their rentier wealth to implement public policies aimed at achieving SDG
2.1. Similarly, more democratic institutions would also guarantee greater political stability
and a more equitable distribution of natural resource revenues across all social strata in
low- and lower-middle-income countries. We suggest allocating a fraction of the natural
resource rents to the agricultural sector to improve access to food of sufficient quality and
quantity, thereby accelerating the achievement of the SDGs of eradicating hunger, ensuring
food security, improving nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture. Similarly, to put
an end to child undernourishment, particularly stunting, increased health investment from
extractive industry revenues would also help build the capacity of health facilities to better
manage the medical complications associated with child undernourishment.
The results of this study also offer several avenues for future research. Following on
from this study, future research can explore the potential effect of natural resources on
other dimensions of food security, notably availability and stability. Further work may
also examine the moderating role of political leader education in the relationship between
natural resources and food security, or comparative studies between resource abundance
and resource dependence. In addition, case studies in selected countries in South Asia and
sub-Saharan Africa would also be relevant for an in-depth analysis of the effect of natural
resources on child undernourishment at the micro level.
13
H. Njangang et al.
Appendix
Table 12 Definitions of the study variables

Variables Definitions
PoU Percentage of the population whose habitual food consumption is insufficient to

provide the dietary energy levels that are required to maintain a normal active and
healthy life
Stunting Percentage of children under 5 whose height for age is more than two standard
deviations below the median of the international reference population aged
0–59 months
LBW Underweight (% of births) represents newborns weighing less than 2,500 g
Resource variables
Total rents Sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents (%
GDP)
Oil_Gas prod. (ln) This variable is calculated by deducting extraction costs from the total value of a
country’s oil and natural gas production
Coal Coal rents (%GDP)
Forest Forest rents (%GDP)
Mineral Mineral rents (%GDP)
Oil Oil rents (%GDP)
Gas Natural gas rents (%GDP)
Control variables
Income (ln) GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population
Water access The percentage of people using at least basic water services
Education Secondary duration refers to the number of grades (years) in secondary school
Health exp Public expenditure on health from domestic sources as a share of the economy as
measured by GDP
Remittances Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees
(% GDP)
Cereals prod. (ln) Production data on cereals relate to crops harvested for dry grain only (metric tons)
Sanitation access The percentage of people using at least basic sanitation services
CO2 emissions Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and
the manufacture of cement (metric tons per capita)
ODA Net official development assistance is disbursement flows (% GNI)
Food Price inflation Inflation measured by Food Consumer price index (CPI) is defined as the change
in the prices of a basket of goods and services that are typically purchased by
specific groups of households
External instrument
Sub-soil assets (ln) Subsoil assets: minerals (constant 2018 US$) and coal on the one hand, and subsoil
assets oil and gas on the other hand
Transmission channel variables
Control of corruption Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain
Polity 2 index Democracy index (-10; + 10)
Internal conflict Intrastate conflict
Gini The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or con-
sumption among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a
perfectly equal distribution
Agricultural investment Share of gross fixed capital formation in agriculture, forestry and fishing (% GDP)
PoU, LBW denotes prevalence of undernourishment and Low birth weight, respectively
13
Table 13 Assessing the consistency of system GMM estimators
Pooled OLS System GMM Fixed-effect

(1) (2) (3)
PoU (t-1) 0.981*** 0.933*** 0.919***

(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
PoU (t-1) 0.983*** 0.938*** 0.922***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.013)
PoU (t-1) 0.983*** 0.936*** 0.935***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.014)
PoU (t-1) 0.981*** 0.938*** 0.934***
(0.006) (0.019) (0.014)
PoU (t-1) 0.978*** 0.951*** 0.936***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.014)
Column (2) reports the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable in each specification according to the results presented in Table 2
13
H. Njangang et al.
1213Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to the Editor and two anonymous reviewers of this jour-
nal for very insightful comments and suggestions of great benefit to the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
Declarations
Competing Interests The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal
relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
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Environmental and Resource Economics

Natural Resources and Undernourishment in Developing

Henri Njangang1 · Sosson Tadadjeu1,2 · Joseph Keneck‑Massil3

Accepted: 17 April 2024

Keywords Natural Resources · Undernourishment · Developing Countries

JEL Classification I15 · O11 · Q30

2 Potential Causal Mechanisms: How Does Natural Resource

2.1 Direct Effect of Natural Resources on Undernourishment

2.2 Indirect Effect of Natural Resources on Undernourishment

2.2.1 Political Channel: Corruption, Democracy, and Political Instability

2.2.2 Economic Channels: Agricultural Investments and Income Inequality

based on rent-seeking theory, resource exploitation tends to lead to rent-seeking behavior

3 Data and Empirical Strategy

3.1 Data Description and Some Stylized Facts

Europe & Central Asia

Latin America & Caribbean

East Asia & Pacific

Middle East & North Africa

0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00

3.1.2 Main Explanatory Variable: Natural Resource Dependence

3.2 Model Specification and Empirical Strategy

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and data sources

overidentification. According to Baum et al. (2003), heteroscedasticity is an omnipresent

Table 2 Baseline results

PoU (t-1) 0.933*** 0.938*** 0.936*** 0.938*** 0.951***

identification strategy, it is necessary to undertake an alternative estimation approach to

Table 3 Robustness according to the number of included lags

Two-step system GMM Two-step system GMM Two-step

PoU (t-1) 0.911*** 0.836*** 0.874***

4.2.1 Sensitivity of Results to the Number of Lags Included

4.2.2 Robustness to Additional Covariates

4.2.3 Robustness to Alternative Measures of Key Variables

Table 4 Results including additional control

PoU (t-1) 0.722*** 0.757*** 0.755*** 0.929*** 0.935*** 0.924***

Table 5 Results of alternative Alternative Child undernourishment

Dep. variables (t-1) 0.931*** 0.933*** 0.991***

4.2.4 Robustness to Alternative Estimation Strategy: IV‑2SLS Estimates

4.3 Do Different Types of Natural Resources Have Different Effects

Panel A. Second-stage estimates PoU PoU PoU Stunting LBW

Observations 1,452 1,342 1,213 1,524 1,026

Table 7 Effects of different resources types on undernourishment

PoU (t-1) 0.968*** 0.953*** 0.936*** 0.940*** 0.939***

Sub-regions Income levels

Total rents × SA 0.518**

Sub-regions Income levels

4.4 Can Geographic Location and Income Levels Matter?

4.5 Empirical Analysis of Transmission Channels

Table 9 Effects of mechanisms

PoU (t-1) 0.951*** 0.969*** 0.979*** 0.942*** 0.914*** 0.983***

Zi,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Zi,t−1 + 𝛽2 Total rentsi,t + 𝛽3 X i,t + 𝜇i + vt + 𝜀i,t (3)

Table 10 Effects of natural resources on mechanisms

Dep. Variables (t-1) 0.965*** 0.766*** 0.716*** 0.618***

4.6 The Moderating Effect of Corruption Control

Table 11 Impact of natural Dependent variable: PoU

PoU (t-1) 0.951*** 0.721*** 0.788***

5 Conclusion and Policy Implications

Table 12 Definitions of the study variables

PoU Percentage of the population whose habitual food consumption is insufficient to

Pooled OLS System GMM Fixed-effect

2 Potential Causal Mechanisms: How Does Natural Resource

2.1 Direct Effect of Natural Resources on Undernourishment

2.2 Indirect Effect of Natural Resources on Undernourishment

2.2.1 Political Channel: Corruption, Democracy, and Political Instability

2.2.2 Economic Channels: Agricultural Investments and Income Inequality

3 Data and Empirical Strategy

3.1 Data Description and Some Stylized Facts

3.1.2 Main Explanatory Variable: Natural Resource Dependence

3.2 Model Specification and Empirical Strategy

PoU (t-1) 0.933* 0.938* 0.936* 0.938* 0.951***

PoU (t-1) 0.911* 0.836* 0.874***

4.2.1 Sensitivity of Results to the Number of Lags Included

4.2.2 Robustness to Additional Covariates

4.2.3 Robustness to Alternative Measures of Key Variables

PoU (t-1) 0.722* 0.757* 0.755* 0.929* 0.935* 0.924*

Dep. variables (t-1) 0.931* 0.933* 0.991***

4.2.4 Robustness to Alternative Estimation Strategy: IV‑2SLS Estimates

4.3 Do Different Types of Natural Resources Have Different Effects

PoU (t-1) 0.968* 0.953* 0.936* 0.940* 0.939***

4.4 Can Geographic Location and Income Levels Matter?

4.5 Empirical Analysis of Transmission Channels

PoU (t-1) 0.951* 0.969* 0.979* 0.942* 0.914* 0.983*

Dep. Variables (t-1) 0.965* 0.766* 0.716* 0.618*

4.6 The Moderating Effect of Corruption Control

PoU (t-1) 0.951* 0.721* 0.788***

5 Conclusion and Policy Implications

PoU (t-1) 0.981* 0.933* 0.919***