Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Resources Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/resourpol

Rich in the dark: Natural resources and energy poverty in

Sub-Saharan Africa
Bruno Emmanuel Ongo Nkoa a, Sosson Tadadjeu b, Henri Njangang c, *
a
CEREG, University of Yaounde 2 SOA, Cameroon
b
The Dschang School of Economics and Management, LAREFA, University of Dschang, Cameroon
c
Faculty of Economics and Management, LAREFA, University of Dschang, Cameroon

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

JEL classification: Despite the abundant resources with which Africa is endowed, this region of the world is also, paradoxically, the
O13 least enlightened, with a low rate of access to electricity and a high propensity to use fuels for cooking. Based on
O55 this paradoxical observation, this study proposes to analyse the effect of natural resources on energy poverty in a
P48
panel of 45 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1997–2018. Energy poverty is measured mainly by
Q43
access to electricity and the following results are established. First, natural resource-dependent countries in sub-
Keywords:
Saharan Africa are associated with greater energy poverty. Second, point resources (oil, gas and mineral rents)
Natural resources
Energy poverty
accentuate energy poverty, unlike diffuse resources (forest rents). However, we show that this situation is not
Democracy irreversible, as democracy, especially liberal, participatory and egalitarian democracies, mitigate the effect of
Sub-Saharan Africa natural resources on energy poverty.

1. Introduction
To say that Africa is a continent blessed by the “Gods” would in no
way be an exaggeration, because the latter holds under its soil almost all
types of natural resources1 (cobalt, platinum, aluminium, oil, gas, and
others). However, this region of the world is also, paradoxically, the
least enlightened, with a low rate of access to electricity and a high
propensity to use fuels for cooking. Based on this paradoxical observa­
tion, this study proposes to analyse for the first time the effect of natural
resources on energy poverty in sub-Saharan African countries. Energy
poverty reduction is regularly cited by international organizations as a
vital element in the fight against poverty (Barnes et al., 2011). Several
definitions and measures of energy poverty have been advanced in the
literature (see, Pachauri et al. (2004); Villalobos et al. (2021)). For
example, Day et al. (2016) consider energy poor households to be those
without access to clean and reliable energy. According to Pachauri et al.
(2004), energy poverty is a two-dimensional concept that considers
access on the one hand and consumption on the other. In this paper, we
define energy poverty in terms of access to electricity.
It is generally accepted that the availability of electrical power has a
substantial bearing on the lives of individuals. Education (Kumar and
Rauniyar, 2018; Khandker et al., 2012), income (Bridge et al., 2016),
health (Barron and Torero, 2017; Charlier and Legendre, 2022) and food
security (Candelise et al., 2021) are all areas that can benefit from
increased access to electricity. Access to electricity also influences pro­
ductivity (Alam et al., 2018), labor supply, and market wages, with
different outcomes for men and women depending on the context of the
study (Dinkelman, 2011). Both the Sustainable Development Goal 7
(SDG 7) and the American project Power Africa aim to expand the
number of countries in Africa that have access to electricity. The SDG 7
goal is to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all by the year 2030, while the American initiative Power
Africa aims to increase electrical connections across Africa. Access to
energy has seen a significant increase as a direct result of these initia­
tives. Electricity access on a global scale reached an all-time high of 90
percent in 2019, up from 73 percent in 2000 (IEA, 2020). The same
trend can be seen in the use of energy per person, which, according to
the Statistical Review of World Energy, nearly doubled between 1985
and 2019, growing from 2,000 kWh to 3,500 kWh overall. Despite this
progress, 771 million people lack electricity in 2019. Of all the
sub-regions, Sub-Saharan Africa remains the only region in the world
where the number of people without access to electricity increased

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ongoema@yahoo.fr (B.E. Ongo Nkoa), stadadjeu@yahoo.fr (S. Tadadjeu), ndieupahenri@gmail.com (H. Njangang).
1
The African continent holds nearly 60% of global platinum reserves, 55% of cobalt reserves and 45% of global aluminum reserves (Whalley and Weisbrod, 2012).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2022.103264
Received 24 August 2021; Received in revised form 13 August 2022; Accepted 19 December 2022
0301-4207/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al.
between 2000 and 2019, from 492.12 million to 589.46 million (see
Fig. 1). Moreover, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), just 49% of the popu­
lation has access to electricity (IEA, 2020). In this part of the world, only
32% of rural residents have access to electricity compared to 78% of
urban residents (IEA, 2020).
Increasingly, empirical studies seek to understand the determinants
of electricity access, highlighting the role of institutional quality (Ahl­
borg et al., 2015; Cummins and Gillanders, 2020); income (Zhang et al.,
2019); multinational firms; and foreign direct investment (D’Amelio
et al., 2016), income inequality (Dong and Hao, 2018), government
spending (Nguyen and Su, 2022), and other socio-economic factors such
as population growth, electricity price (Zaman et al., 2012; Ye et al.,
2018). In this study, we argue that the role of natural resources has been
under-analysed. In theory, mineral wealth, like other forms of wealth,
contributes favorably to a country’s development and economic pros­
perity. However, decades of research have shown that countries
dependent on natural resource exports expand rather slowly (Sachs and
Warner, 1995, 1999; Brückner, 2010; Henry, 2019; Sharma and Pal,
2021). This situation has been so widely observed that it has been
dubbed the “resource curse”, referring to the contradictory scenario in
which resource-rich countries perform worse economically than
resource-poor countries. While many studies acknowledge the resource
curse, others show that natural resources have a positive impact on
economic development (Smith, 2015; Arin and Braunfels, 2018; Jaimes
and Gerlagh, 2020). Natural resources’ impact on economic develop­
ment is also conditioned by institutions (Apergis and Payne, 2014).
From this perspective, dependence or abundance of natural resources
can become a blessing when institutions are at their best.
The resource curse hypothesis has been extended to other develop­
ment outcomes for nearly two decades, including health outcomes
(Wigley, 2017), entrepreneurship (Majbouri, 2016), happiness (Migna­
missi and Kuete, 2021), financial development (Bhattacharyya and
Hodler, 2014), income inequality (Kim et al., 2020), export diversifi­
cation (Djimeu and Omgba, 2019), allocation of aid (Couharde et al.,
2020) and many others. However, the effects of natural resources on
public goods such as health and education (Gylfason, 2001; Stijns,
2006), public capital and phone lines (Bhattacharyya and Collier, 2014),
access to drinking water and sanitation (Mazaheri, 2017; Tadadjeu et al.,
2022) and expenditures related to the supply of various public goods
Fig. 1. Number of people without access to electricity, for 2000, 2010 and
2019 (in millions). Source: Our world in data21
2
Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264
(Caselli and Michaels, 2013) are not well understood. Furthermore, the
vast majority of these studies have concentrated on the monetary
components of public goods, such as government expenditure, while
ignoring the quantitative dimension of public goods, such as the number
of individuals who have access to social services.3 Despite not focusing
on the effect of natural resources on access to electricity, Ahlborg et al.
(2015) and Magnani and Vaona (2016) employed a measure of natural
resources as a control variable in their models and observed a negative
effect on access to electricity. According to Ahmadov and Van der Borg
(2019), total natural resource rents increase renewable energy produc­
tion in the EU, unlike oil rents. Paradoxically, in 2019, resource-rich
countries like Liberia, Burkina Faso, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, have less than 25% of the population with access to electricity,
while resource-poor countries like Cabo Verde and Swaziland have over
80%. Can we legitimately think that natural resources wealth does not
promote access to electricity?
It has been argued in the literature that the poor quality of in­
stitutions leading to a lack of accountability in the management of
natural resource revenues constitutes one of the main causes of the
resource curse (Van der Ploeg, 2011; Badeeb et al., 2017). Bulte et al.
(2005) offered one of the first analyses of the role of the quality of in­
stitutions in the relationship between natural resources and human
well-being. These authors, although finding only limited evidence of a
direct effect of natural resources on human development, provide evi­
dence of an indirect link via institutional quality. Mehlum et al. (2006)
will offer an empirical study highlighting the beneficial role of in­
stitutions in the relationship between natural resources and economic
development. For the latter, as long as they have good institutions, all
countries rich in natural resources can benefit from the rent fallout.
Mehlum et al. (2006) show that the difference in growth performance
between resource-rich countries is mainly attributed to the way their
resource rents are distributed through institutional arrangements. Based
on this argument, this study aims to analyse the effect of natural re­
sources on energy poverty and also to examine the role of democracy in
the relationship between natural resources and energy poverty. On the
one hand, we postulate that the dependence of African countries on
natural resources, by increasing the likelihood of conflict, corruption,
and inequality, increases energy poverty. Similarly, resource-rich
countries are theoretically exposed to the adverse effects of commod­
ity price volatility and poor financial development, which also increase
energy poverty. On the other hand, we assume that democratic in­
stitutions guarantee a more efficient and transparent management of
natural resource revenues for the reduction of energy poverty. Based on
this argument, we formulate the following two hypotheses:
H1. African countries’ reliance on natural resources exacerbates en­
ergy poverty.
H2. Democracy mitigates the negative effects of natural resources on
energy poverty in Africa.
In an attempt to test these two hypotheses, this study contributes to
the natural resource curse literature in at least four ways. First, we look
at the impact of natural resources on electricity access in two di­
mensions: percentage of total population, and share of urban and rural
populations with access to electricity. This approach allows analyzing
the effect of natural resources on access to electricity by location and
determining whether urban or rural inhabitants are more affected by
resource rents. It also gives information on government priorities for
3
According to Banerjee et al. (2011), expenditure figures are not necessarily
appropriate indicators of how much a citizen receives and benefits from a
public service. Furthermore, quantitative rather than monetary measurements
of access to public goods are preferable since monetary measures can be
overstated in corrupt regimes where public spending on wages and construction
projects sometimes represents profits for privileged groups (Deacon, 2009;
Mazaheri, 2017).
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al.
enhancing domestic electricity access.4 To the authors’ knowledge, this
is the first study to investigate the impact of natural resources on access
to electricity, distinguishing between the total, urban and rural pop­
ulations. Second, we investigate the effect of natural resources on access
to electricity in terms of per capita consumption. This second approach
reinforces the robustness of our results insofar as a high rate of access to
electricity does not imply better consumption, especially in SSA, where
populations are linked to the grid but still face load shedding issues.
Third, as noted by Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) and Cockx and
Francken (2016), the impact of natural resources on development varies
according to the types of natural resources. So we propose the first study
on the impact of the types of natural resources (oil, gas, minerals, forest,
and coal) on electricity access. Four, we examine the influence of de­
mocracy on mitigating the direct relationship between natural resources
and electricity access, by the five categories of democracy proposed by
the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). Using V-Dem provides information
on which type of democracy reduces the impact of natural resources on
electricity access. No study has explored the influence of democracy on
the relationship between natural resources and electricity access.
To sum up, we find evidence in favor of the resource curse. Specif­
ically, we find that total resource rents have on average a negative effect
on access to electricity in SSA for both the total population and the urban
and rural populations. Also, resource rents reduce per capita electricity
consumption and access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking.
Unlike diffuse resources, only point resources have a detrimental in­
fluence on access to electricity. Finally, the results show that the
resource curse can be mitigated by democracy, particularly liberal,
participatory, and egalitarian democracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
theoretical framework, while Section 3 describes the data and empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5
concludes.
2. Theoretical framework
How do natural resources affect access to electricity? Based on the
literature surveys on the resource curse (see, Badeeb et al., 2017), we
identify two transmission channels explaining the effect of natural re­
sources on access to electricity, namely the political channels and the
economics channels.
2.1. Political channels
From a political standpoint, the two channels that are retained are
those of corruption and democracy, on the one hand, and conflicts or
civil wars, on the other hand. There is an abundant theoretical and
empirical literature showing the positive effect of resource dependence
on corruption (Arezki and Brückner, 2011; Zhan, 2017). Theoretically,
natural resource incomes allow patronage and rent-seeking, leading to
increased public corruption, talent misallocation from productive ac­
tivities, and wasteful public expenditures (Ebeke et al., 2015). In addi­
tion, natural resources lead to corruption and rent-seeking through
exclusive licensing of resources by the political elite, oligarchs and their
relatives to seize wealth and political power (Van der Ploeg, 2011).
Anthonsen et al. (2012) find that an increase in oil rents significantly
increases corruption and deteriorates political rights. Through an
experimental study carried out in Sao Tome and Principe, Vicente
(2010) shows that announcements of oil discoveries have led to a sig­
nificant increase in corruption, particularly through vote-buying.
Moreover, since Ross’s (2001) seminal work, several studies have
2
Accessible at https://ourworldindata.org/energy-overview.
4
It is necessary to understand the effect of natural resources on the priorities
of leaders because 40% of the population in SSA lives in rural areas and only 1/
3 of this population has access to electricity.
3
Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264
argued that natural resource wealth is negatively associated with de­
mocracy (Tsui, 2011; Cassidy, 2019). To explain this, Ross (2001)
evokes a so-called “rentier” effect of “repression” and “modernization”.5
In a recent study in Africa, Atangana (2019) argues that corruption,
weak rule of law, inefficient public administrations, poor regulation
quality and lack of voice and accountability are institutional and polit­
ical problems caused by natural resource dependence in Africa. How­
ever, theoretical and empirical research shows that corruption and
democracy determine access to electricity (Ahlborg et al., 2015; Imam
et al., 2019; Boräng et al., 2021). For example, Ahlborg et al. (2015) find
that democracy and the quality of institutions both have positive and
significant effects on per capita household electricity consumption in
Africa. Specially, democratic institutions that hold leaders accountable
offer incentives for them to give public goods such as energy (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006). Similarly, because free and transparent elections
allow citizens to replace leaders who fail to meet their expectations, and
because public good provision is likely to be included in the evaluation
of political leaders, the latter will be constrained to provide affordable
energy in order to be re-elected (Ahlborg et al., 2015). According to
Imam et al. (2019), corruption reduces the technical efficiency of the
electricity sector and stymies efforts to expand access to electricity and
raise national income. To sum up, natural resources, as a result of their
negative effects on corruption and democracy, obstruct access to
electricity.
Civil conflicts are the second political channel that explains how
natural resources affect access to electricity. Abundant literature shows
that the abundance or dependence on natural resources increases the
incidence of civil wars and incites violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;
Collier et al., 2009). Exploiting exogenous variations in global prices,
Berman et al. (2017) find a positive impact of mining on conflict at the
local level in Africa during the period 1997 to 2010. The authors
conclude that the historical rise in mineral prices could explain up to a
quarter of the average level of violence in African countries during this
period. To explain how natural resources lead to conflict, scholars cite
greed and grievances as reasons (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).6 The case
of “blood diamonds” in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Re­
public of Congo, represents a historical fact where civil war resulted in
part from the involvement of neighboring states interested in natural
resource exploitation. These conflicts and civil wars are obstacles to
electrification objectives. Indeed, the electric grid in countries ravaged
by war is frequently damaged or out of service due to a lack of main­
tenance. Conflicts are not just a major impediment to the state’s normal
operation. It is also typical for conflicting parties to try to cut off their
adversaries’ electrical supply by damaging their infrastructure (Ahlborg
et al., 2015). Therefore, the effect of natural resource dependence on
access to electricity would pass through its effect on internal conflicts or
on civil wars.
2.2. Economic channel
From an economic view, the volatizing character of resource prices,
such as those for oil, natural gas, and coal, is the transmission channel
we consider important in terms of the effect of natural resources on
5
The rentier effect contends that oil-rich governments use oil income rather
than taxes to fund public spending, thereby avoiding democratic responsibility,
whereas the repressive impact contends that oil wealth aids rulers in governing
by enhancing internal security (Ross, 2001). The modernization effect occurs
when oil rent delays modernization. But as a social force, modernization
(especially education) increases the demand for democracy.
6
The first is based on the notion that conflicts develop as a result of the elite’s
quest for power in order to obtain access to natural resources. Rather, the
grievance theory proposes that a segment of the population may feel robbed of
the rents generated by resource exploitation and hence take up arms (Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004).
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al.
access to electricity. Indeed, while natural resources provide develop­
ment potential, especially through revenue mobilisation (Ndikumana
and Abderrahim, 2010), it is widely accepted that natural resource
revenues are particularly volatile due to variations in their prices (Van
der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). Of course, uncertainty about resource
revenue inflows makes it difficult to conduct coherent macroeconomic
policy and public investment planning. According to Papyrakis (2017),
the high volatility of commodity prices “seems to be the quintessence of the
resource curse,” as it generates large fluctuations in real exchange rates
and reduced investment.7 This reduction in investment, in turn, reduces
access to electricity for populations regardless of their place of resi­
dence. To sum up, dependence on natural resources exposes countries to
the negative effects of price volatility, which in turn reduces access to
electricity.
The second economic channel is income inequality. An increasing
corpus of research shows that natural resources exacerbate income
inequality (Fum and Hodler, 2010; Carmignani, 2013; Farzanegan and
Krieger, 2019). Mineral rents are typically allocated inequitably within
countries, ethnic groupings, and geographical locations. Elites can also
transfer rents selectively and create patronage networks where only
leaders of politically significant groups benefit (Basedau and Lay, 2009).
This strategy allocates resource earnings to a tiny percentage of the
population, and access is offered depending on personal ties (Basedau
and Lay, 2009). Recent study suggests that income inequality contrib­
utes to rising energy poverty (Nguyen and Nasir, 2021). A recent study
by Dong and Hao (2018) found that income inequality reduces per
capita electricity consumption in China. In Sub-Saharan Africa, as Sar­
kodie and Adams (2020) find income inequality exacerbates poverty,
limiting impoverished households’ access to power. This shows that
income inequality exacerbates poverty, limiting poor households’ access
to electricity. Recent research by Nguyen and Nasir (2021) links rising
income inequality to rising energy poverty in developing nations,
particularly Asia. So, if natural resources promote inequality, and
inequality promotes energy poverty, we hypothesise that resource de­
pendency increases energy poverty by promoting inequality.
The third economic mechanism is financial development. Since the
work of Beck (2011) a large, though not consensual, literature suggests
that resource-rich countries have a less developed financial system than
their resource-poor counterparts. Indeed, Beck (2011) argues the exis­
tence of the “financial resource curse” hypothesis arguing that
resource-rich countries have a less developed financial system that
provides less lending to firms. This hypothesis is developed and
extended by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2014) who argue that high
resource revenues can be an adverse incentive for the ruling elite,
causing them to neglect contracting when political institutions are weak.
As a result, resource-rich countries with weak political institutions are
likely to be financially underdeveloped. Other studies in various con­
texts (Dogan et al. (2020) in developed countries, Yıldırım et al. (2020)
and Sun et al. (2020) in developing countries) confirm this hypothesis by
citing rent-seeking, low quality of institutions, and relatively low level of
human capital in resource-rich countries among other arguments. An
emerging literature also shows that financial development reduces en­
ergy poverty by providing funds to citizens to access electricity and
clean fuels (Magnani and Vaona, 2016; Zhang et al., 2019). Indeed,
financial development is a channel to support the development of
electricity production and transmission to bring electricity to more cit­
izens (Nguyen et al., 2021). With this in mind, Nguyen et al. (2021)
suggest that overall financial development has a significant positive
impact on clean fuel and technologies for cooking, access to electricity,
and electricity consumption per capita. In addition, the authors finds
that financial development has a negative impact on electric power
7
Cockx and Francken (2014, 2016) share this view and show that public
spending on health and education is lower in resource-dependent countries
because of large fluctuations in commodity prices.
4
Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264
transmission and distribution losses and renewable electricity output.
This result is also confirmed by Mohsin et al. (2022) who show that the
increase in energy poverty is in Latin America countries is attributed to
low levels of financial development.
3. Data and empirical strategy
3.1. Data
This paper uses unbalanced panel data for 45 sub-Saharan African
countries over the period 1997–2018. The study period and sample size
are determined according to data availability constraints. A description
of the study variables is provided below.
3.1.1. Dependent variables
Three indicators are used to assess the dependent variable. The first
measure is the proportion of the total population with access to elec­
tricity (Energy poverty I) from national grids (regardless of the level of
use). The second and third indicators are the percentage of the urban
(Energy poverty II), and rural population (Energy poverty III) with access
to electricity, respectively. We got this variable from the World Bank
(2021). We use these measures because they represent the proportion of
the total population, urban and, rural, with access to electricity. These
indicators therefore have a comparative advantage over other standard
measures8 because they provide information on the effectiveness of
government policies in providing electricity to the population according
to geographic location (urban and rural populations). Fig. 2 illustrates
the evolution of these three indicators in SSA over the period from 1998
to 2018. We see that the share of the total population with access to
electricity has evolved by 20%. However, progress is uneven according
to geographical location, since access to electricity increased by 11% in
urban areas and 21% in rural areas.
Given the recognized problems with the reliability of access rate
data, we follow Ahlborg et al. (2015), Imam et al. (2019) and Nguyen
and Nasir (2021) using the logarithm of annual household electricity
consumption per capita as a proxy for access (Energy poverty IV)9 and
access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (Energy poverty V) for
robustness. Data on household electricity consumption comes from the
Energy Statistics Database provided by the United Nations Statistics
Division Database. This alternative measure assesses whether con­
sumption levels have kept pace with population growth, or whether the
population with access to electricity is increasing its consumption over
time. It also measures how access to electricity translates into effective
use, rather than simply the availability of distribution infrastructure
(Ahlborg et al., 2015). If there are significant problems with supply
reliability (such as the frequent load shedding problems in SSA coun­
tries), this should have a negative effect on the level of consumption. In
addition, access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking reflects one
of the most important aspects of energy poverty; that of access to
modern energy services (Nguyen and Nasir, 2021; Nguyen and Su,
2022). Therefore, the use of our three main measures and two alterna­
tives measures adequately reflects both access and supply reliability.
8
Night-time satellite imagery has several drawbacks. Indeed, this measure
includes people without access to the electricity grid but residing in electrified
cities (Imam et al., 2019). As a result, its reliability as an indicator of access rate
is low because it only measures the stability of outdoor lights (Imam et al.,
2019), which can be a major problem in sub-Saharan African countries where
load shedding is frequent.
9
Access rate and electricity consumption were used in the recent work of
Dertinger and Hirth (2020). In addition, according to previous studies, we use
the logarithm of electricity consumption because it is expressed in
kilowatt-hours/hbt.
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Fig. 2. Trends in access to electricity in SSA for total, urban and rural populations.
Source: Construction by author

3.1.2. Independent variable

Our main independent variable is the total natural resource rents as a
percentage of GDP (Total rents) derived from the World Bank (2021).
Natural resource rents are the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral, and
forest rents. We interpret this variable as a measure of resource depen­
dence rather than a measure of resource abundance.10 Following to
Carmignani and Avom (2010), we use the dependence on primary
commodity exports as an alternative measure for robustness needs
(Primary exports). As a percentage of total merchandise exports, this
variable is defined as the sum of exports of (i) agricultural raw materials,
(ii) food, (iii) fuels, and (iv) metals and minerals. We employ oil, gas,
forest, coal, and mineral rents, all represented as a % of GDP, to assess
the effect of different types of natural resources.
According to Figs. 3–5, there is a negative correlation between nat­
ural resources and the percentage of the entire population, urban pop­
ulation, and rural population who have access to electricity,

Fig. 4. Natural resources and Urban_Population with access to electricity.

respectively. This is consistent with the concept of a paradox of plenty.

In other words, when comparing resource-rich countries to resource-
poor countries, access rates to electricity are on average lower in
resource-rich countries. Due to the fact that correlation does not imply
causation, we shall give robust evidence to support this claim in Section
4.

3.1.3. Control variables

Fig. 3. Natural resources and Total_population with access to electricity.
10
See Badeeb et al. (2017) for a better distinction between abundance and
dependence on natural resources.
Consistent with the literature on the determinants of access to elec­
tricity, we used several control variables in this study (see, for example,
Zhang et al., 2019; Boräng et al., 2021; Nguyen and Su, 2022). First, we
retain four main control variables in our model. Economically, we
consider income per capita and expect a positive effect on access to
electricity (Zhang et al., 2019). We also take into account two social
determinants, namely the duration of secondary education and
employment in the industry. Consistent with the work of Narayan and
Smyth (2005), Zhang et al. (2019) and Nguea et al. (2022), we expect a
positive effect of these two determinants on access to electricity.
Geographically, we use the growth rate of the urban population. The
effect of urbanization is mixed in that it is difficult to increase access to
reliable and affordable energy when the population is spread over large

5
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Fig. 5. Natural resources and Rural_population with access to electricity.

areas. In addition, high urban concentration can create a demand for

Table 1
electricity that exceeds supply, especially in developing countries, and
Descriptive statistics.
lead to a lack of access. Second, for robustness, we use four additional
control variables, including foreign aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), Variables Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Dev.
ethnic fractionalization, and government final consumption. We expect
a negative effect of foreign aid, ethnic fractionalization, and government Access to electricity
consumption. In contrast, we expect a positive effect of FDI on access to Total_Population (Energy 895 34.889 24.102 1.054 100
poverty I)
electricity. Urban_Population (Energy 904 62.873 22.285 0.779 100
poverty II)
3.1.4. Democracy measures Rural_Population (Energy 790 20.424 22.569 0.019 100
In the literature, researchers generally use the Polity 2 index or poverty III)
Household access (ln) 855 4.962 1.412 1.575 8.587
Freedom House measures as indicators of democracy (Bhattacharyya
(Energy poverty IV)
and Hodler, 2014; Omgba, 2015). However, these measures have several Clean fuels and technologies 855 18.303 24.430 0.1 97.25
shortcomings, as identified by Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010). Fortu­ for cooking (Energy
nately, since 2010, several researchers have rigorously documented the poverty V)
characteristics of democracy known as Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM). Natural resources
Total rents 972 12.484 11.974 0.001 84.228
To examine the moderating role of types of democracy, we use (V-DEM Coal rents 972 0.122 0.563 0 7.869
in its version 8). Specifically, we use five indicators of democracy that Forest rents 976 6.119 6.114 0 40.426
offer distinct approaches to defining democracy (Coppedge et al., 2016): Mineral rents 976 2.036 4.802 0 46.624
Electoral, liberal, deliberative, participatory, egalitarian democracy. Gas rents 947 0.155 0.648 0 7.071
Oil rents 972 4.031 10.829 0 78.541
The principle of electoral democracy is to make leaders responsive to
Primary Export 744 68.734 29.161 1.189 99.998
citizens. This translates into electoral competition for the approval of the Control variables
electorate in circumstances where political organizations and civil so­ Income (ln) 976 7.033 0.989 5.233 9.929
ciety function freely, and elections are free and transparent. The liberal Secondary education 989 6.221 0.763 4 7
democratic emphasises preserving individual and minority rights from Employment in industry 990 12.907 8.077 1.505 43.114
Urbanization 990 3.812 1.560 − 0.244 15.713
state and majority tyranny. The democratic deliberative principle fo­ Foreign aid 960 8.981 9.193 − 0.250 92.141
cuses on how decisions are made in a society. In an egalitarian de­ Ethnic fractionalization 968 0.662 0.223 0 0.930
mocracy, individual rights and liberties are guaranteed to everyone, Foreign direct investment 976 4.385 8.450 0.703 103.3374
resources are fairly divided, and power is evenly distributed among (FDI)
Government consumption 898 14.498 6.646 0.912 62.133
demographics and socioeconomic status. These democratic indicators
Democracy
range from 0 to 1, with higher values signifying stronger democracy. Electoral_democracy 990 0.441 0.194 0.085 0.844
Table 1 summarizes the study’s variables. Liberal_democracy 990 0.302 0.193 0.011 0.770
Participatory_democracy 990 0.255 0.132 0.010 0.553
Deliberative_democracy 990 0.335 0.193 0.020 0.777
3.2. Empirical strategy Egalitarian_democracy 990 0.298 0.156 0.051 0.711

The aim of this study is to analyse the effect of natural resources on

Total rents is natural resources. X is the vector of control variables
access to electricity or energy poverty. We use two estimation tech­
including log of income, secondary education, employment in industry
niques. First, we apply the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to es­
and urban population growth, and εit is the error term.
timate equation (1). We follow Magnani and Vaona (2016) who analyse
Estimating the above equation could lead to inefficient estimates as
the socioeconomic determinants of electricity access in developing
the OLS suffer from omitted variables bias. Using OLS to estimate a
countries and specify the following model:
model with fixed effect would generate significant bias even when the
Accessit = α + λTotal rentsit + γXit + εit (1) number of year (T) becomes large. Furthermore, as Badeeb et al. (2017)
point out in their literature review of the resource curse, future research
Where Accessit is the rate of access to electricity for country i in year t.

6
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al.
on this puzzle must carefully address endogeneity concerns in measures
of natural resource dependence. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the
use of first differences of the variables to eliminate the fixed effects,
which is known as the Difference GMM. The estimated GMM model is
specified by equation (2).
Accessit = α + βAccessit− 1 + λTotal rentsit + γXit + μi + vt + εit
Where μi is an unobserved country-specific effect, vt is the time-specific
effect. Several reasons motivated the choice of the GMM model. In the
literature, the GMM is frequently used to solve econometric problems
such as endogeneity,11 over identification and validity. Second, it pro­
vides convergent and efficient unbiased estimators in the presence of
lagged variables. Third, it includes unobservable geographical factors
such as climate, access to the sea, and even heterogeneity of monetary
policy.
However, the difference GMM estimator has weak instrumentation
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). We use the system GMM estimator to reduce
the impact of weak instruments and enhance estimation efficiency
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). This estimator solves the endogeneity
problem by treating the model as a system of equations in first difference
and in levels. The endogenous regressors in the first difference equation
are instrumented with lags of their levels, while the endogenous re­
gressors in the level equation are instrumented with the lags of their first
difference (Bond et al., 2001). In the System GMM, even though the
levels of the explanatory variables are correlated with the country spe­
cific fixed-effect, the differences are not correlated. Another rationale
for utilising System GMM is that it is better for unbalanced panel data
than Difference GMM estimation, which has the flaw of accentuating
gaps (Roodman, 2009). While System GMM solves the above issues, one
drawback remains. The two-step GMM estimates standard errors that
are critically downward biased, despite being asymptotically more
efficient. However, applying the finite-sample correction to the two-step
covariance matrix established by Windmeijer (2005) allows us to
circumvent this difficulty.
Although the system GMM is robust in addressing the aforemen­
tioned endogeneity issues, it has a weakness in that it can generate too
many instruments, leading to over-fitting of endogenous variables and
weakening Hansen’s test of joint validity of instruments, and produce
biased estimates (Roodman, 2009). To address this problem, we limit
the number of lags. Accordingly, the instruments for the regressions are
lags of from t-1 to t-3 and we consider all explanatory variables as
potentially endogenous.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Baseline results
The baseline results are summarized in Table 2. The first three col­
umns of this table present the results of the pooled OLS estimates. The
resource rent coefficients are shown to be negative and statistically
11
We highlight the three main sources of endogeneity. First, a reverse cau­
sality may exist between natural resources and access to electricity. On the one
hand, African governments can accelerate the production of natural resources
to generate the fiscal revenues needed for finance investments in the energy
sector. On the other hand, the current level of access to electricity, which is still
very low in SSA, may lead populations to put more pressure on the government
to meet their needs in terms of access to these services. This pressure can
therefore lead governments to increase their dependence on natural resources
in order to find sources of financing. Second, measurement error. Access to
electricity data may have measurement errors, especially when we consider the
African country series. It is argued that the sources of errors in the data often
lead to overestimated access rates (Min, 2008). Third, omission bias. There are
omitted variables that are potential determinants of access to electricity and
that could therefore bias the results.
Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264
significant. We find that natural resources have a negative effect on
access to electricity for both the whole population and the urban and
rural populations. Especially, we find that an increase in natural
resource rents of 10 units leads on average, all else being equal, to a
decrease in the total urban and rural population with access to elec­
tricity of 2.95, 3.14, and 3.29 units respectively. The effect seems
(2)
slightly greater on the rural population. This result suggests that
resource-rich African countries do not use the resources they have effi­
ciently to improve access to electricity for their populations. Thus, the
corruption and weak democracy created by dependence on natural re­
sources do not promote access to electricity. Similarly, natural resources
favor internal conflicts and civil wars between ethnic groups or ruling
factions, as in the case of “blood diamonds”, which then limit the supply
of electricity through the destruction of electrical installations. The fact
that natural resources have a more detrimental effect on access to
electricity for rural populations in SSA may be explained by the fact that
the autocratic elites who manage natural resources do not rely suffi­
ciently on the votes of rural populations to be re-elected and therefore
have little incentive to provide them with public goods such as elec­
tricity. In addition, rural areas in SSA are characterized by their land­
locked nature, which increases the cost of generating and distributing
electricity in these areas. These high costs, coupled with corruption,
discourage autocratic leaders from providing electricity to rural areas.
When we look at the control variables, we find that per capita income
significantly increases access to electricity for the whole population and
urban and rural populations, respectively. Similarly, we find that sec­
ondary education also improves access to electricity. This result is
similar to Zhang et al. (2019) showing that investments in education can
also have a long-term impact on rural electrification. The coefficient
associated with employment in the industry is positive and significant
for access to electricity for total and rural populations. This result can be
put in perspective with those of Narayan and Smyth (2005) showing that
electricity consumption, employment and income are cointegrated and
that, in the long run, unidirectional causality runs from employment and
income to electricity consumption. Urban population growth does not
appear to be conducive to access to electricity. This is likely due to the
inadequacy of electricity supply to meet the ever-increasing demand in
urban areas in SSA.
Columns (4) to (6) show GMM estimations. The p-value indicates
that the serial correlation in the error terms is not second order. Coun­
tries outnumber instruments. The Hansen J test p-values confirm the
validity of the instruments employed in the two-step System GMM. So,
based on all the statistical tests, we can conclude that the estimated
models are adequately specified. The estimated coefficients of natural
resources are negative and statistically significant. This result confirms
the natural resource curse hypothesis in terms of access to electricity.
This result is contrary to Ahmadov and Van der Borg (2019) who show
that the abundance of natural resources can be conducive to renewable
energy production in the European Union.
4.2. Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our main results, we conduct in this sub­
section analyses using additional control variables, alternative sub­
sample and using alternative measures of the key variables, that is,
resource dependence and access to electricity. Overall, in all robustness
checks, we find a negative effect of natural resource dependence on
access to electricity.
4.2.1. Robustness to additional controls
First, we estimate our model by introducing four additional control
variables, including foreign direct investment, foreign aid, ethnic frac­
tionalization and government final consumption. The results summa­
rized in Table 3 show that natural resources keep a negative and
statistically significant effect on access to electricity. From column (1) to
column (6), we notice that the effect of natural resources remains more
7
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Table 2
Pooled OLS and system GMM results.
Dependent variables Energy poverty I Energy poverty II Energy poverty III Energy poverty I Energy poverty II Energy poverty III

Pooled OLS System-GMM

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Lag dependent variables 0.875*** 0.856*** 0.857***

(0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Total rents − 0.292*** − 0.314*** − 0.329*** − 0.053*** − 0.055*** − 0.118***
(0.049) (0.058) (0.045) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Income (ln) 19.69*** 15.43*** 8.412*** 3.014*** 3.048*** 3.064***
(0.631) (0.763) (0.566) (0.541) (0.725) (0.567)
Secondary education 6.993*** 7.612*** 1.437** 1.438*** 2.487*** 0.918***
(0.672) (0.805) (0.581) (0.449) (0.649) (0.276)
Employment in industry 0.145* − 0.146 0.152** − 0.006 − 0.025 0.016
(0.079) (0.095) (0.070) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022)
Urbanization − 1.570*** − 0.654 − 0.967*** − 0.406*** 0.160 − 0.551***
(0.361) (0.436) (0.351) (0.097) (0.097) (0.156)
Constant − 19.4*** − 24.35*** − 28.27*** − 22.497*** − 26.227*** − 20.203***
(6.623) (7.984) (5.875) (4.080) (5.606) (4.847)
Observations 886 895 781 842 851 720
Time effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.661 0.411 0.402
Adjusted R-squared 0.659 0.407 0.398
Number of countries 45 45 44
Number of instruments 40 40 41
AR(1) 0.042 0.000 0.014
AR(2) 0.494 0.962 0.973
Hansen OIR 0.474 0.376 0.561

Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty I, II and III denote access to electricity as a percentage of the total
population, urban and rural, respectively.

Table 3
Robustness checks using additional control.
Dependent variables Enery poverty I Energy poverty II Energy poverty III

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Lag dependent variables 0.985*** 0.993*** 0.905*** 0.883*** 0.824*** 0.893***

(0.004) (0.043) (0.046) (0.053) (0.078) (0.008)
Total rents − 0.008*** − 0.128*** − 0.089** − 0.180*** − 0.103*** − 0.085***
(0.003) (0.047) (0.038) (0.047) (0.031) (0.010)
Income (ln) 0.144* 5.349*** 3.082 2.774* 1.762* 0.836***
(0.085) (1.967) (2.054) (1.672) (0.951) (0.245)
Secondary education 0.104 1.845 1.283 0.185 0.787 0.603***
(0.213) (1.901) (1.960) (2.726) (0.717) (0.210)
Employment in industry 0.012* − 0.356 − 0.384 − 0.431 0.082 0.042
(0.006) (0.403) (0.325) (0.266) (0.140) (0.032)
Urbanization − 0.040 − 0.964 − 0.714* − 1.971** − 0.769 − 0.397
(0.029) (0.691) (0.423) (0.888) (1.358) (0.285)
Foreign aid − 0.041*** − 0.034 0.017 − 0.004 − 0.135* − 0.134***
(0.004) (0.023) (0.046) (0.030) (0.078) (0.023)
Ethnic fractionalization − 0.711* 7.916 0.899 13.894 − 1.121 − 1.221
(0.399) (10.853) (7.918) (15.138) (3.525) (0.842)
FDI 0.051 − 0.029 0.042***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.008)
Government consumption − 0.406** − 0.278 0.037
(0.188) (0.316) (0.042)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.048 − 37.794** − 14.308 − 1.383 − 7.992 − 3.568
(1.512) (18.595) (17.571) (19.849) (8.106) (2.731)
Observations 809 776 817 731 687 657
Number of countries 44 44 44 44 43 43
Number of instruments 43 18 32 26 41 41
AR(1) 0.043 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.019 0.000
AR(2) 0.508 0.946 0.929 0.745 0.987 0.263
Hansen OIR 0.406 0.257 0.732 0.729 0.266 0.266

Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty I, II and III denote access to electricity as a percentage of the total
population, urban and rural, respectively. FDI denotes foreign direct investment (% GDP).

8
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

important for the rural population. Our results are therefore robust to
the use of additional control variables. Regarding these additional
control variables, we find that foreign aid only reduces access to elec­
tricity for urban populations, while FDI increases access for rural pop­
ulations. This result is consistent with the recent findings of Nguea et al.
(2022) who find that while FDI and remittances improve access to
electricity in Africa, foreign aid reduces access. Contrary to Nguyen and
Su (2022), we find that the government spending does not favor access
to electricity for the total and urban populations.
4.2.2. Robustness to alternative subsample
Our sample includes 23 middle-income and 22 low-income coun­
tries. As a robustness check, we compare the effect of natural resources
on energy poverty across income levels. The estimation results are
summarized in Table 4. We find that the coefficient associated with
natural resources remains negative and statistically significant in both
samples. Specifically, an increase of 10 units in total natural resource
rents is, on average, associated with an increase in energy poverty of
0.63–1.46 units in middle-income countries. The effect is even larger in
low-income countries, where an increase in total rent of 10 units
translates on average into a reduction in access to electricity of
1.43–4.07. Therefore, our results are not influenced by country groups.
4.2.3. Robustness to alternative measure of natural resources
Second, as an alternative measure of natural resources, we estimate
our model using primary commodity exports. Table 5 summarizes the
results, showing that all primary commodity export coefficients are
negative and statistically significant. Specifically, access to electricity is
inversely correlated with dependency on primary commodity exports for
the total, urban, and rural populations. The effect of primary commodity
exports also remains more pronounced on rural populations’ access to
electricity. Our results are, therefore, robust to the use of an alternative
measure of natural resources.
4.2.4. Robustness to alternatives measures of energy poverty
Third, we test the robustness of our result by using the logarithm of
annual household electricity consumption per capita as a proxy for ac­
cess. The results in column (1) of Table A1 show that natural resources
have a significant negative effect on per capita electricity consumption.
However, we find that the effect is less significant compared to the
measure in terms of access rate. Column (2) shows the results where we
estimate the model by introducing additional control variables. Once
more, the coefficient associated with resource rents remains negatively
associated with household electricity consumption. Column (3) shows
the results where we estimate the model using primary commodity ex­
ports and, again, we find that resource dependence is negatively asso­
ciated with electricity consumption.
In Table A2, we present the estimation results when we use another
alternative measure of energy poverty, namely access to clean fuels and
technologies for cooking. Once again, we find that the coefficient asso­
ciated with natural resources has, on average, a negative effect on access
to clean fuels and technologies for cooking. This result remains robust to
the different specifications.
4.3. Further analyses
4.3.1. Do point resources and diffuse resources have different effects on
access to electricity?
Several authors have distinguished between point and diffuse re­
sources based on the concentration of production and income patterns.
According to Isham et al. (2005), only countries reliant on point re­
sources face “exacerbated economic and social divisions and diminished
institutional capacity.” Tadadjeu et al. (2020) support this viewpoint by
demonstrating that reliance on point resources such as gas and oil leads
to poor access to drinking water and sanitation when compared to
diffuse resources. Other authors, such as Bhattacharyya and Collier
(2014); Cockx and Francken (2016); and Yilanci et al. (2021) show that
the resource curse is mainly a consequence of point resources.
We are now investigating the effect of point and diffuse resources on
access to electricity. The results in columns (1) to (5) of Table 6 show the
effect of different rents on access to electricity for the whole population.
The results show that point resources (oil, coal, and gas) have a negative
effect on the share of the total population with access to electricity. On
the other hand, forest rent has a rather positive and significant effect.
Thus, according to the literature, only point resources hinder access to
electricity (Isham et al., 2005). When we consider the rural populations
with access to electricity (columns 1 to 5 of Table 7), we find similar
results, showing the negative effect of point resources as opposed to

Table 4
Heterogeneity according to income level.
Dependent variables Middle-income countries Low-income countries

Access of total pop. Access of urban pop. Access of rural pop. Access of total pop. Access of urban pop. Access of rural pop.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Lag dependent variables 0.937*** 0.861*** 0.948*** 0.818*** 0.970*** 0.394***

(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.043) (0.013) (0.026)
Total rents − 0.063*** − 0.074*** − 0.146*** − 0.143*** − 0.106*** − 0.407***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.040) (0.028) (0.038) (0.107)
Income (ln) 1.148* 2.057*** 1.231 2.204*** 0.260 2.920***
(0.575) (0.635) (0.983) (0.543) (0.613) (1.031)
Secondary education 0.719* 1.085* 1.920** − 0.166 0.306 − 0.694
(0.386) (0.557) (0.763) (0.548) (0.675) (1.066)
Employment in industry 0.017* − 0.030 0.032 0.154** − 0.023 0.059
(0.009) (0.042) (0.155) (0.060) (0.023) (0.125)
Urbanization − 0.076 0.279 − 0.212 − 0.701 − 0.748** − 0.213
(0.182) (0.315) (0.199) (0.485) (0.320) (0.314)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant − 8.341 − 10.811 − 17.170** − 6.335 3.551 − 4.332
(5.356) (7.129) (8.239) (6.292) (6.449) (11.292)
Observations 411 432 410 419 420 311
Number of countries 23 23 23 22 22 21
Number of instruments 22 22 21 21 18 20
AR(1) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.073 0.014 0.084
AR(2) 0.739 0.364 0.381 0.759 0.324 0.630
Hansen OIR 0.606 0.264 0.507 0.144 0.400 0.172

Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.

9
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Table 5
Robustness checks using an alternative measure of resources dependence.
Dependent variables Energy poverty I Energy poverty II Energy poverty III

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Lag dependent variables 0.946*** 0.990*** 0.938*** 0.873*** 0.954*** 0.902***

(0.015) (0.033) (0.022) (0.060) (0.010) (0.023)
Primary exports − 0.009*** − 0.029** − 0.044** − 0.050** − 0.008*** − 0.096***
(0.004) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025) (0.002) (0.033)
Income (ln) − 1.610 1.320 1.169**
(1.394) (0.934) (0.441)
Secondary education − 1.157 0.899* 1.076**
(0.767) (0.505) (0.478)
Employment in industry 0.121** − 0.052 0.058
(0.062) (0.048) (0.050)
Urbanization − 0.041 − 0.016 0.734
(0.115) (0.253) (0.487)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.620*** 20.652 8.187*** − 1.168 2.333*** − 8.776**
(0.739) (12.906) (2.666) (5.338) (0.325) (4.090)
Observations 646 646 653 630 573 571
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40
Number of instruments 26 27 26 36 25 30
AR(1) 0.091 0.096 0.002 0.004 0.036 0.045
AR(2) 0.535 0.556 0.429 0.537 0.943 0.925
Hansen OIR 0.309 0.424 0.286 0.683 0.214 0.635

Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty I, II and III denote access to electricity as a percentage of the total
population, urban and rural, respectively.

Table 6
Effects of different resources on access to electricity of total population.
Dependent variable: Energy poverty I

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Lag dependent variable 0.892*** 0.903*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.940***

(0.013) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018)
Oil − 0.089***
(0.009)
Forest 0.042***
(0.012)
Coal − 0.166***
(0.033)
Gas − 0.126***
(0.032)
Mineral − 0.002
(0.018)
Income (ln) 2.845*** 2.554*** 0.644*** 0.719*** 1.170***
(0.378) (0.382) (0.142) (0.140) (0.410)
Secondary education 1.503*** 0.613*** 0.115 0.168 0.985
(0.384) (0.157) (0.112) (0.117) (0.598)
Employment in industry 0.012 0.023 0.026** 0.010 0.060*
(0.029) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.034)
Urbanization − 0.227** − 0.098** − 0.094*** − 0.110*** − 0.115
(0.085) (0.046) (0.026) (0.030) (0.095)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant − 23.38*** − 17.26*** − 2.781** − 3.389*** − 11.51*
(3.295) (2.202) (1.040) (1.094) (5.710)
Observations 842 841 841 816 842
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 45
Number of instruments 40 42 37 37 30
AR(1) 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.038
AR(2) 0.481 0.499 0.493 0.480 0.493
Hansen OIR 0.402 0.253 0.383 0.449 0.222

Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty I denotes the percentage of the total population with access to
electricity.

diffuse resources. We also find similar results regarding access for urban
populations (columns 6 to 10 of Table 7). When we compare the results
by location, we find that coal, natural gas, and mineral rents reduce
access to electricity more in rural areas. This confirms that rural pop­
ulations suffer more from the resource curse in terms of access to elec­
tricity. This result remains robust using electricity consumption (see
columns 4 to 8 of Table A1) and access to clean fuels and technologies
for cooking (see columns 4 to 8 of Table A2).
4.3.2. Can democracy lift the resource curse?
The role of political institutions is essential in defining the effects of
mining activities, not only through the definition of rules and their
implementation, but also through their role in redistributing mining
rents. Thus, several studies show that the quality of institutions or de

10
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Table 7
Effects of different resource rents on access to electricity of rural and urban populations.
Dependent variables Energy povety III Energy poverty II

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

Lag dependent variable 0.868*** 0.850*** 0.947*** 0.885*** 0.955*** 0.868*** 0.986*** 0.964*** 0.874*** 0.873***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.028) (0.009) (0.017) (0.007) (0.039) (0.017) (0.013)
Oil − 0.110*** − 0.108***
(0.011) (0.010)
Forest 0.208*** 0.193***
(0.034) (0.034)
Coal − 0.249** − 1.541**
(0.095) (0.755)
Gas 0.518 − 0.719***
(0.344) (0.118)
Mineral 0.127 − 0.067***
(0.103) (0.017)
Income (ln) 2.598*** 4.764*** − 0.153 1.148** 0.377* 2.222*** 2.652*** 1.771 0.942 2.356***
(0.480) (0.572) (0.619) (0.556) (0.214) (0.405) (0.295) (1.288) (0.592) (0.677)
Secondary education 3.117*** 3.175*** − 0.947** 0.594 0.164 − 1.090 1.652*** − 2.163 0.272* 0.259
(0.607) (0.551) (0.429) (0.457) (0.257) (0.655) (0.368) (1.756) (0.151) (0.311)
Employment in industry − 0.005 − 0.022 0.034 0.002 0.041* 0.047 − 0.017 − 0.011 0.099** 0.057**
(0.022) (0.016) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) (0.020) (0.097) (0.040) (0.027)
Urbanization 0.058 0.273** 0.068 − 0.472** 0.160 − 0.218*** − 0.091* − 0.242 − 0.827*** − 0.506***
(0.108) (0.104) (0.202) (0.207) (0.151) (0.074) (0.053) (0.595) (0.111) (0.105)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant − 4.792 − 27.97*** 4.266 − 2.949 − 13.43** − 27.97*** − 24.69*** 10.81** − 1.6480 − 0.9889
(3.593) (2.363) (15.34) (3.922) (5.417) (4.335) (6.014) (5.364) (4.8093) (2.1415)
Observations 721 668 721 700 720 851 851 851 825 850
Number of countries 44 44 44 44 44 45 45 45 45 45
Number of instruments 40 41 22 35 41 40 40 22 42 41
AR(1) 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
AR(2) 0.954 0.996 0.973 0.954 0.962 0.991 0.954 0.935 0.986 0.991
Hansen OIR 0.423 0.306 0.316 0.161 0.362 0.305 0.517 0.673 0.175 0.185

Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty II and III denote access to electricity as a percentage of urban and
rural population, respectively.

Table 8
Natural resources, access to electricity and electoral, liberal and participatory democracy.
Dependent variables Energy Energy Energy Energy Energy Energy Energy Energy Energy
poverty I poverty II poverty III poverty I poverty II poverty III poverty I poverty II poverty III

Electoral democracy Liberal democracy Participatory democracy

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Lag dependent variables 0.872*** 0.639*** 0.780*** 0.846*** 0.855*** 0.805*** 0.860*** 0.849*** 0.866***
(0.042) (0.025) (0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.063) (0.020) (0.019) (0.012)
Total rents − 0.155*** − 0.197** − 0.223*** − 0.048** − 0.081*** − 0.317*** − 0.063** − 0.046** − 0.150***
(0.040) (0.096) (0.047) (0.019) (0.020) (0.105) (0.026) (0.022) (0.035)
Type of democracy 0.797 − 7.125 0.594 3.529** 4.320** − 6.350 4.348** 9.269*** − 2.189
(2.413) (4.885) (2.599) (1.624) (1.782) (11.171) (2.012) (1.921) (4.113)
Total rents × Type of 0.234* 0.312 0.369*** 0.163*** 0.464*** 1.226** 0.202* 0.285** 0.930***
democracy
(0.126) (0.230) (0.135) (0.058) (0.112) (0.460) (0.119) (0.106) (0.214)
Income (ln) 4.371*** 4.259*** 2.917*** 3.245*** 1.658*** 4.651** 2.692*** 1.536*** − 0.869
(1.571) (0.826) (0.712) (0.255) (0.318) (2.162) (0.333) (0.341) (0.603)
Secondary education 0.578 0.546 0.820 1.367*** 0.949** 1.767 1.410*** 0.630* 0.672
(0.643) (1.505) (0.536) (0.233) (0.377) (1.077) (0.316) (0.328) (0.465)
Employment in industry − 0.111 0.077 0.099* − 0.010 − 0.045 − 0.134 0.006 − 0.049 0.449***
(0.103) (0.074) (0.053) (0.016) (0.042) (0.275) (0.021) (0.033) (0.133)
Urbanization − 0.234 − 0.313* − 2.749*** − 0.530*** − 0.186*** − 3.331*** − 0.403*** − 0.030 − 2.649***
(0.325) (0.167) (0.364) (0.136) (0.059) (0.642) (0.089) (0.056) (0.337)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant − 26.32** − 4.962 − 11.32* − 23.85*** − 7.475** − 23.64 − 21.18*** − 5.740* 9.111**
(9.917) (11.02) (6.667) (2.287) (3.021) (17.44) (3.010) (3.067) (4.281)
Observations 815 851 720 814 823 720 842 823 720
Number of countries 45 45 44 45 45 44 45 45 44
Number of instruments 28 36 37 44 43 25 44 43 33
AR(1) 0.033 0.000 0.011 0.039 0.000 0.005 0.038 0.000 0.012
AR(2) 0.496 0.895 0.950 0.508 0.986 0.981 0.494 0.979 0.956
Hansen OIR 0.212 0.128 0.203 0.581 0.322 0.114 0.529 0.277 0.209
Democracy thresholds 0.662 na 0.604 0.294 0.174 0.258 0.312 0.160 0.161
Number of countries 9 na 9 21 30 23 13 32 32
above the threshold

Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty I, II and III denote access to electricity as a percentage of the total
population, urban and rural, respectively. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of the threshold is not significant.

11
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

mocracy mitigates the negative effect of natural resources on different

development outcomes, such as growth, financial development, or ac­
cess to drinking water and sanitation (Apergis et payne, 2014; Bhatta­
charyya and Hodler, 2014; Tadadjeu et al., 2020). Institutions have a
key role in the effects of natural resources, as they determine the amount
to which political incentives are incorporated into policy results (Rob­
inson et al., 2006). Thus, natural resources will benefit countries with
policies that encourage state accountability and competency. Without
such structures, countries may face a resource curse. Cabrales and Hauk
(2011) consider that, as politicians are self-interested actors, they would
prefer to capture the benefits of resource wealth. However, political
pressure forces them to redistribute at least part of these benefits to the
electorate. This redistribution can take the form of direct transfers or a
subsidy for investment in human capital, which has positive spillover
effects on the entire population. We contribute to this literature by
examining the extent to which types of democracy mitigate the resource
curse. We distinguish the five indicators of democracy proposed by
V-DEM. Institutional theories emphasize the role of political institutions
in creating different incentives for democratic and autocratic leaders to
provide public goods and services (Lake and Baum, 2001). Democratic
institutions have been found to affect the provision of reliable electricity
(Boräng et al., 2021). Indeed, some empirical studies show that elec­
tricity supply affects citizen’s evaluation of political leaders in de­
mocracies, which in turn affects political leader’s campaign strategies
(Baskaran et al., 2015). We assume that the democratic institutions by
which a country’s leaders are held accountable to its citizens give them
an incentive to provide the latter with public goods such as electricity. In
sum, each type of democracy (electoral, egalitarian, deliberative,
participatory, and liberal) can mitigate the resource curse in terms of
access to electricity. We test this hypothesis by estimating the following
model:
Accessit = α + β0 Accessit− 1 + β1 Total rentsit + β2 Democracyit
(3)
+ β3 (Total rents × Democracy)it + γXit + μi + vt + εit
With Democracy denotes electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative
and egalitarian democracy alternately.
The results summarized in Table 8 examine the role of electoral,
liberal, and participatory democracy. Regarding electoral democracy,
we find that the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and sig­
nificant for access to electricity for the total and rural population. Thus,
electoral democracy mitigates the effect of natural resources on access to
electricity only for urban and rural populations. For liberal democracy
and participatory democracy, the interaction term is positive and sig­
nificant in different models (columns 4 to 9). These results, therefore,
suggest that liberal and participatory democracy matters in the rela­
tionship between natural resources and access to electricity to the extent
that it moderates the resource curse for both the total population and
urban and rural populations. In column (4), for example, the corre­
sponding threshold at which the unconditional negative effect becomes
positive is 0.294 (0.0480/0.163). In addition, 21 countries in the sample
are above this threshold. Therefore, more than half of the African
countries need to improve their level of democracy in order to make
better use of natural resource revenues to reduce energy poverty. This
computation of the corresponding threshold is consistent with recent
interactive regression literature (Njangang et al., 2022). Figures A1a,
A1b, and A1c in the Appendix present the marginal effects of electoral,
liberal, and participatory democracy, respectively. For low levels of
electoral, liberal, and participatory democracy, natural resources reduce
access to electricity. However, Figure A1b shows that above the median
and 80th decile of the liberal democracy distribution, the effect of nat­
ural resources becomes positive and significant. Similarly, the effect of
natural resources on electricity access for urban and rural populations
(energy poverty II and III, respectively) is also positive and significant

Table 9
Natural resources, access to electricity and deliberative and egalitarian democracy.
Dependent variables Energy poverty I Energy poverty II Energy poverty III Energy poverty I Energy poverty II Energy poverty III

Deliberative democracy Egalitarian democracy

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Lag dependent variables 0.733*** 0.852*** 0.773*** 0.891*** 0.843*** 0.799***

(0.143) (0.011) (0.063) (0.017) (0.022) (0.059)
Total rents − 0.273** − 0.064*** − 0.318* − 0.105*** − 0.091** − 0.367**
(0.137) (0.018) (0.181) (0.012) (0.034) (0.141)
Type of democracy − 9.673 4.508** 3.455 1.674 4.943 3.524
(7.991) (1.893) (12.029) (1.974) (3.264) (12.639)
Total rents × Type of democracy 0.660 0.268*** 0.933 0.346*** 0.427*** 1.649***
(0.465) (0.077) (0.624) (0.065) (0.158) (0.549)
Income (ln) 7.834* 1.460*** 5.377** 3.914*** 2.696*** 3.512*
(4.194) (0.281) (2.202) (0.575) (0.761) (1.814)
Secondary education − 2.123 1.138*** 1.470 0.520 0.777 1.445
(3.005) (0.420) (1.328) (0.367) (0.537) (0.979)
Employment in industry − 0.146 0.026 − 0.311 − 0.077 − 0.064 − 0.160
(0.122) (0.031) (0.323) (0.046) (0.052) (0.246)
Urbanization − 0.527 − 0.155*** − 3.663*** − 0.185* − 0.087 − 3.977***
(0.594) (0.031) (0.752) (0.107) (0.076) (0.750)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant − 22.99 − 8.096*** − 26.00 9.197 − 18.09*** − 14.48
(24.44) (2.878) (16.94) (7.423) (4.930) (14.95)
Observations 842 851 720 814 850 720
Number of countries 45 45 44 45 45 44
Number of instruments 43 43 25 21 43 28
AR(1) 0.057 0.000 0.004 0.042 0.000 0.005
AR(2) 0.495 0.887 0.995 0.730 0.178 0.155
Hansen OIR 0.259 0.270 0.167 0.473 0.950 0.892
Democracy thresholds na 0.238 na 0.303 0.213 0.222
Number of countries above the threshold na 28 21 21 30 30

Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty I, II and III denote access to electricity as a percentage of the total
population, urban and rural, respectively. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of the threshold is not significant.

12
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al.
for countries above the median of the participatory democracy
distribution.
The results in Table 9 examine the moderating role of deliberative
and egalitarian democracy. We find in column (2) that deliberative
democracy moderates the negative effect of natural resources on the
urban population. The corresponding threshold is 0.238. In columns (4)
to (6), we find that egalitarian democracy mitigates the negative effect
of natural resources on access to electricity for both the whole popula­
tion and for urban and rural populations. Through Figure A1e in the
Appendix, we also note that the effect of natural resources on the various
measures of access to electricity is positive and significant above the
70th decile of the egalitarian democracy distribution. Egalitarian de­
mocracy, by promoting an equal distribution of resources among
different social groups, is an effective mechanism to mitigate the nega­
tive effects of natural resources on access to electricity.
We test the robustness of these previous results using electricity
consumption. The results in Table A3 in the Appendix suggest that lib­
eral, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy mitigates
the negative effect of natural resources on per capita electricity con­
sumption. A participatory democracy, by promoting the active partici­
pation of citizens in electoral processes, forces political leaders to
improve the electricity consumption of the population in order to in­
crease their chances of being re-elected. This in turn mitigates the curse
of natural resources. Similarly, by protecting the rights of individuals
and minorities, a liberal democracy moderates the negative effects of
natural resources on households’ electricity consumption. Similar re­
sults are also obtained using access to clean fuels and technologies for
cooking (see Table A4 in Appendix).
5. Conclusion, policy implications, and future research
directions
Researchers have argued for over two decades that natural resources
do not always promote economic development because governments use
resource rents to appease dissent and reduce demand for democratic
accountability. This paper analyses the effect of natural resources on
access to electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Consistent with the resource
curse hypothesis, we find robust evidence of a negative effect of natural
resources on the rate of access to electricity for the total, urban and rural
populations. We also find a negative effect of natural resources on per
capita electricity consumption. Furthermore, our results show that this
resource curse on the government’s electricity supply priorities is
mainly due to dependence on point resources such as gas, oil, and coal
rents. However, we show that the effect of natural resources on access to
electricity depends on the nature of the relationship between the leaders
and society. Specifically, liberal, participatory and egalitarian de­
mocracies, mitigate the resource curse.
These results suggest that the way of thinking about the redistribu­
tion of resource rents in Sub-Saharan Africa needs to be refined. The
mere presence of natural resources wealth does not necessarily mean
that the government will automatically and actively invest in public
goods such as access to electricity. Our results show the relevance of the
argument that to achieve ambitious electricity access targets (SDG
7.1.1), Sub-Saharan Africa needs additional and stronger policies. Three
policy implications are drawn from our analysis. First, we suggest allo­
cating a share of resource rents to the building of hydroelectric dams and
thermal power plants. To narrow the access gap between rural and
urban populations, efforts in this direction will need to focus more on
13
Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264
rural communities. In addition, a fraction of the natural resource reve­
nues could also be used for investments in electric power transmission to
facilitate the redistribution of energy in urban and rural areas. These
investments should also be accompanied by public policies that promote
the maintenance and renovation of existing national power grids to limit
power outages that represent a significant loss to industries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Second, we encourage African governments to make
greater efforts to build democratic institutions. Although some countries
have made efforts in this direction, several other countries, especially
those rich in natural resources, are still lagging, failing to guarantee the
rights of their citizens or a more transparent electoral process. With
greater liberal, participatory and egalitarian democracy, political
leaders in African resource-rich countries will be more inclined to use
resources revenue to address basic requirements such as access to
quality electricity. Third, in order to limit the negative effects of com­
modity price volatility, structural reforms for better export diversifica­
tion are strongly encouraged. To achieve this, policymakers should
improve human capital and promote entrepreneurship through in­
vestments in vocational training. In the long run, these reforms could
generate more tax revenue, making governments less dependent on
revenues from the extractive sector.
This study lays the groundwork for further work that could be done
to achieve SDG 7. As a continuation of this research, it would be inter­
esting to examine the moderating role of implementing recent and
current public policies such as the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) in linking natural resources and energy poverty. Simi­
larly, the acceleration of the decentralization process in several coun­
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa also opens another avenue for future
research to determine whether decentralization reduces the negative
effect of natural resources on access to electricity. A second perspective
would be to extend the problem of energy poverty to energy efficiency.
Thus, it will be necessary to understand whether oil dependence or
abundance improves or reduces energy efficiency. Similarly, while ac­
cess to electricity is important, it would also be interesting to understand
whether natural resource revenues improve the quality of electricity
supply in developing countries.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Bruno Emmanuel Ongo Nkoa: Supervision, Writing – review &
editing. Sosson Tadadjeu: Data, Methodology, Conceptualization,
Formal analysis. Henri Njangang: Writing – original draft, Methodol­
ogy, Supervision, and Corresponding.
Declaration of competing interest
We have no conflicts of interest to declare.
Data availability
Data will be made available on request.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank the editor and the anonymous referees for
their comments and suggestions, which substantially improved the
earlier version of this article.
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Appendix
Table A1
Robustness checks using electricity consumption per capita (alternative measure of energy poverty)

Dependent variable: Energy poverty IV

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Lag Energy poverty IV 0.840*** 0.913*** 0.012** 0.558*** 0.929*** 0.825*** 0.928*** 0.945***
(0.070) (0.038) (0.006) (0.116) (0.066) (0.050) (0.018) (0.019)
Total rents − 0.004** − 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001)
Primary Export − 0.006**
(0.002)
Oil − 0.005*
(0.003)
Forest 0.008*
(0.005)
Coal 0.0236
(0.0400)
Gas 0.0187
(0.0250)
Mineral − 0.002**
(0.001)
Baseline control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional control No Yes No No No No No No
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant − 0.0617 − 0.472 − 0.496 0.103 − 0.759 − 0.424 0.00865 802
(0.651) (0.556) (2.954) (0.848) (0.908) (0.647) (0.604) 45
Observations 707 675 582 797 757 755 731 802
Number of countries 45 43 40 45 45 45 45 45
Number of instruments 26 40 21 39 33 15 22 26
AR(1) 0.024 0.023 0.064 0.057 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.010
AR(2) 0.248 0.190 0.653 0.171 0.208 0.172 0.176 0.178
Hansen OIR 0.189 0.341 0.425 0.368 0.232 0.578 0.299 0.412
Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty IV denote electricity consumption per capita.

Table A2
Robustness checks using access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (alternative measure of energy poverty)

Dependent variable: Energy poverty V

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Lag Energy poverty V 0.976*** 0.959*** 0.968*** 0.992*** 0.976*** 0.965*** 0.980*** 0.988***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009)
Total rents − 0.066** − 0.002**
(0.030) (0.001)
Primary Export − 0.019**
(0.007)
Oil − 0.006
(0.016)
Forest 0.006**
(0.003)
Coal − 0.024***
(0.008)
Gas − 0.472*
(0.248)
Mineral − 0.062**
(0.025)
Baseline control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional control No Yes No No No No No No
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant − 2.704 − 0.410 − 7.108 0.353 1.478 0.393 − 6.287 − 5.527*
(4.471) (0.965) (4.379) (3.671) (1.810) (1.987) (4.289) (3.123)
Observations 799 676 620 799 803 799 774 803
Number of countries 45 43 41 45 45 45 45 45
Number of instruments 16 38 24 16 35 30 19 19
AR(1) 0.062 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.014
AR(2) 0.230 0.403 0.126 0.126 0.145 0.114 0.472 0.634
Hansen OIR 0.764 0.185 0.400 0.254 0.325 0.217 0.248 0.176
Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty V denote access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (%
population).

14
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Table A3
Natural resources, electricity consumption per capita and types of democracy

Dependent variable: Energy poverty IV

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Lag Energy poverty IV 0.662*** 0.613*** 0.596*** 0.651*** 0.688***

(0.034) (0.063) (0.060) (0.035) (0.026)
Total rents − 0.004** − 0.004** − 0.006** − 0.005*** − 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Electoral democracy − 0.082
(0.098)
Total rents × Electoral democracy 0.007
(0.004)
Liberal democracy 0.209*
(0.126)
Total rents × Liberal democracy 0.016***
(0.006)
Participatory democracy 0.011
(0.155)
Total rents × Participatory democracy 0.027***
(0.010)
Deliberative democracy 0.236*
(0.120)
Total rents × Deliberative democracy 0.015**
(0.006)
Egalitarian democracy 0.180
(0.131)
Total rents × Egalitarian democracy 0.015***
(0.005)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant − 0.607** − 0.124 0.140 0.276 − 0.188
(0.284) (0.423) (0.381) (0.488) (0.249)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 752 707 707 707 707
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 45
Number of instruments 28 28 28 31 28
AR(1) 0.024 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.017
AR(2) 0.171 0.159 0.169 0.149 0.154
Hansen OIR 0.115 0.178 0.155 0.446 0.184
Democracy thresholds na 0.25 0.22 0.33 0.27
Number of countries above the threshold na 23 25 22 23
Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty IV denote electricity consumption per capita. na: not applicable
because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of the threshold is not significant.

Table A4
Natural resources, access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking and types of democracy

Dependent variable: Energy poverty V

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Lag Energy poverty V 0.988*** 0.992*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.983***

(0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.015)
Total rents − 0.068** − 0.034** − 0.052*** − 0.035*** − 0.077***
(0.032) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.027)
Electoral democracy 0.027
(1.649)
Total rents × Electoral democracy 0.130*
(0.069)
Liberal democracy 0.876
(1.378)
Total rents × Liberal democracy 0.087
(0.057)
Participatory democracy 0.127
(0.755)
Total rents × Participatory democracy 0.151***
(0.057)
Deliberative democracy 1.852**
(0.726)
Total rents × Deliberative democracy 0.061**
(0.025)
Egalitarian democracy 1.108
(2.528)
Total rents × Egalitarian democracy 0.238**
(0.115)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(continued on next page)

15
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Table A4 (continued )
Dependent variable: Energy poverty V

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Constant − 2.274 0.757 − 2.624** − 1.068 − 4.547
(2.922) (2.162) (1.039) (1.382) (3.085)
Observations 799 799 799 799 799
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 45
Number of instruments 22 30 37 37 22
AR(1) 0.019 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.023
AR(2) 0.177 0.308 0.145 0.269 0.629
Hansen OIR 0.566 0.792 0.843 0.914 0.510
Democracy thresholds 0.523 na 0.344 0.574 0.323
Number of countries above the threshold 15 na 11 7 17
Notes: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Energy poverty V denote access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (%
population). na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of the threshold is not significant.

Figure A1aMarginal Effects (Electoral democracy).

Figure A1bMarginal Effects (Liberal democracy).

16
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Figure A1cMarginal Effects (Participatory democracy).

Figure A1dMarginal Effects (Deliberative democracy).

17
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al. Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264

Figure A1eMarginal Effects (Egalitarian democracy).

References Bridge, B.A., Adhikari, D., Fontenla, M., 2016. Household-level effects of electricity on
income. Energy Econ. 58, 222–228.
Brückner, M., 2010. Natural resource dependence, non-tradables, and economic growth.
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
J. Comp. Econ. 38 (4), 461–471.
Cambridge University Press.
Bulte, E.H., Damania, R., Deacon, R.T., 2005. Resource intensity, institutions, and
Ahlborg, H., Boräng, F., Jagers, S.C., Söderholm, P., 2015. Provision of electricity to
development. World Dev. 33 (7), 1029–1044.
African households: the importance of democracy and institutional quality. Energy
Cabrales, A., Hauk, E., 2011. The quality of political institutions and the curse of natural
Pol. 87, 125–135.
resources. Econ. J. 121 (551), 58–88.
Ahmadov, A.K., van der Borg, C., 2019. Do natural resources impede renewable energy
Candelise, C., Saccone, D., Vallino, E., 2021. An empirical assessment of the effects of
production in the EU? A mixed-methods analysis. Energy Pol. 126, 361–369.
electricity access on food security. World Dev. 141, 105390.
Alam, M.S., Miah, M.D., Hammoudeh, S., Tiwari, A.K., 2018. The nexus between access
Carmignani, F., 2013. Development outcomes, resource abundance, and the transmission
to electricity and labour productivity in developing countries. Energy Pol. 122,
through inequality. Resour. Energy Econ. 35 (3), 412–428.
715–726.
Carmignani, F., Avom, D., 2010. The social development effects of primary commodity
Anthonsen, M., Löfgren, Å., Nilsson, K., Westerlund, J., 2012. Effects of rent dependency
export dependence. Ecol. Econ. 70 (2), 317–330.
on quality of government. Econ. Govern. 13 (2), 145–168.
Caselli, F., Michaels, G., 2013. Do oil windfalls improve living standards? Evidence from
Apergis, N., Payne, J.E., 2014. The oil curse, institutional quality, and growth in MENA
Brazil. Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ. 5 (1), 208–238.
countries: evidence from time-varying cointegration. Energy Econ. 46, 1–9.
Cassidy, T., 2019. The long-run effects of oil wealth on development: evidence from
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo
petroleum geology. Econ. J. 129 (623), 2745–2778.
evidence and an application to employment equations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 58 (2),
Charlier, D., Legendre, B., 2022. Fuel poverty and health: a shared agenda for policy.
277–297.
Rev. Écon. Polit. 132 (2), 245–272.
Arezki, R., Brückner, M., 2011. Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: evidence from
Cockx, L., Francken, N., 2014. Extending the concept of the resource curse: natural
panel data regressions. Eur. Econ. Rev. 55 (7), 955–963.
resources and public spending on health. Ecol. Econ. 108, 136–149.
Arin, K.P., Braunfels, E., 2018. The resource curse revisited: a Bayesian model averaging
Cockx, L., Francken, N., 2016. Natural resources: a curse on education spending? Energy
approach. Energy Econ. 70, 170–178.
Pol. 92, 394–408.
Atangana, O.H., 2019. Natural resources curse: a reality in Africa. Resour. Pol. 63,
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 56 (4),
101406.
563–595.
Badeeb, R.A., Lean, H.H., Clark, J., 2017. The evolution of the natural resource curse
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., Rohner, D., 2009. Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and
thesis: a critical literature survey. Resour. Pol. 51, 123–134.
civil war. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 61 (1), 1–27.
Banerjee, A.V., Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., 2011. Poor economics: a radical rethinking of the
Coppedge, M., Lindberg, S., Skaaning, S.E., Teorell, J., 2016. Measuring high level
way to fight global poverty. NewYork: Public Affairs.
democratic principles using the V-Dem data. Int. Polit. Sci. Rev. 37 (5), 580–593.
Barnes, D.F., Khandker, S.R., Samad, H.A., 2011. Energy poverty in rural Bangladesh.
Couharde, C., Karanfil, F., Kilama, E.G., Omgba, L.D., 2020. The role of oil in the
Energy Pol. 39 (2), 894–904.
allocation of foreign aid: the case of the G7 donors. J. Comp. Econ. 48 (2), 363–383.
Barron, M., Torero, M., 2017. Household electrification and indoor air pollution.
Cummins, M., Gillanders, R., 2020. Greasing the turbines? Corruption and access to
J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 86, 81–92.
electricity in Africa. Energy Pol. 137, 111188.
Basedau, M., Lay, J., 2009. Resource curse or rentier peace? The ambiguous effects of oil
D’Amelio, M., Garrone, P., Piscitello, L., 2016. Can multinational enterprises light up
wealth and oil dependence on violent conflict. J. Peace Res. 46 (6), 757–776.
developing countries?: evidences from the access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa.
Baskaran, T., Min, B., Uppal, Y., 2015. Election cycles and electricity provision: evidence
World Dev. 88, 12–32.
from a quasi-experiment with Indian special elections. J. Publ. Econ. 126, 64–73.
Day, R., Walker, G., Simcock, N., 2016. Conceptualising energy use and energy poverty
Beck, T., 2011. Finance and Oil: Is There a Resource Curse in Financial Development?
using a capabilities framework. Energy Pol. 93, 255–264.
European Banking Center Discussion Paper, 2011-004.
Deacon, R.T., 2009. Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy. Publ.
Berman, N., Couttenier, M., Rohner, D., Thoenig, M., 2017. This mine is mine! How
Choice 139 (1-2), 241–262.
minerals fuel conflicts in Africa. Am. Econ. Rev. 107 (6), 1564–1610.
Dertinger, A., Hirth, L., 2020. Reforming the electric power industry in developing
Bhattacharyya, S., Collier, P., 2014. Public capital in resource rich economies: is there a
economies evidence on efficiency and electricity access outcomes. Energy Pol. 139,
curse? Oxf. Econ. Pap. 66 (1), 1–24.
111348.
Bhattacharyya, S., Hodler, R., 2014. Do natural resource revenues hinder financial
Dinkelman, T., 2011. The effects of rural electrification on employment: new evidence
development? The role of political institutions. World Dev. 57, 101–113.
from South Africa. Am. Econ. Rev. 101 (7), 3078–3108.
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel
Djimeu, E.W., Omgba, L.D., 2019. Oil windfalls and export diversification in oil-
data models. J. Econom. 87 (1), 115–143.
producing countries: evidence from oil booms. Energy Econ. 78, 494–507.
Bond, S.R., Hoeffler, A., Temple, J.R., 2001. GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth
Dogan, E., Altinoz, B., Tzeremes, P., 2020. The analysis of ‘Financial Resource
Models. Available at: SSRN 290522.
Curse’hypothesis for developed countries: evidence from asymmetric effects with
Boräng, F., Jagers, S.C., Povitkina, M., 2021. Light of democracy and corruption:
quantile regression. Resour. Pol. 68, 101773.
institutional determinants of electricity provision. Energy J. 42 (2).

18
B.E. Ongo Nkoa et al.
Dong, X.Y., Hao, Y., 2018. Would income inequality affect electricity consumption?
Evidence from China. Energy 142, 215–227.
Ebeke, C., Omgba, L.D., Laajaj, R., 2015. Oil, governance and the (mis) allocation of
talent in developing countries. J. Dev. Econ. 114, 126–141.
Farzanegan, M.R., Krieger, T., 2019. Oil booms and inequality in Iran. Rev. Dev. Econ. 23
(2), 830–859.
Fum, R.M., Hodler, R., 2010. Natural resources and income inequality: the role of ethnic
divisions. Econ. Lett. 107 (3), 360–363.
Gylfason, T., 2001. Natural resources, education, and economic development. Eur. Econ.
Rev. 45 (4-6), 847–859.
Henry, A., 2019. Transmission channels of the resource curse in Africa: a time
perspective. Econ. Modell. 82, 13–20.
IEA, 2020. World Energy Outlook 2020. IEA, Paris. https://www.iea.org/reports/wo
rld-energy-outlook-2020.
Imam, M.I., Jamasb, T., Llorca, M., 2019. Sector reforms and institutional corruption:
evidence from electricity industry in Sub-Saharan Africa. Energy Pol. 129, 532–545.
Isham, J., Woolcock, M., Pritchett, L., Busby, G., 2005. The varieties of resource
experience: natural resource export structures and the political economy of
economic growth. World Bank Econ. Rev. 19 (2), 141–174.
Jaimes, R., Gerlagh, R., 2020. Resource-richness and economic growth in contemporary
US. Energy Econ. 89, 104810.
Khandker, S.R., Barnes, D.F., Samad, H.A., 2012. The welfare impacts of rural
electrification in Bangladesh. Energy J. 33 (1).
Kim, D.H., Chen, T.C., Lin, S.C., 2020. Does oil drive income inequality? New panel
evidence. Struct. Change Econ. Dynam. 55, 137–152.
Kumar, S., Rauniyar, G., 2018. The impact of rural electrification on income and
education: evidence from Bhutan. Rev. Dev. Econ. 22 (3), 1146–1165.
Lake, D.A., Baum, M.A., 2001. The invisible hand of democracy: political control and the
provision of public services. Comp. Polit. Stud. 34 (6), 587–621.
Magnani, N., Vaona, A., 2016. Access to electricity and socio-economic characteristics:
panel data evidence at the country level. Energy 103, 447–455.
Majbouri, M., 2016. Oil and entrepreneurship. Energy Pol. 94, 10–15.
Mazaheri, N., 2017. Oil, dissent, and distribution. World Dev. 99, 186–202.
Mehlum, H., Moene, K., Torvik, R., 2006. Institutions and the resource curse. Econ. J.
116 (508), 1–20.
Mignamissi, D., Kuete, Y.F.M., 2021. Resource rents and happiness on a global
perspective: the resource curse revisited. Resour. Pol. 71, 101994.
Min, B., 2008. Democracy and light: electoral accountability and the provision of public
goods. In: Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
Mohsin, M., Taghizadeh-Hesary, F., Shahbaz, M., 2022. Nexus between financial
development and energy poverty in Latin America. Energy Pol. 165, 112925.
Narayan, P.K., Smyth, R., 2005. Electricity consumption, employment and real income in
Australia evidence from multivariate Granger causality tests. Energy Pol. 33 (9),
1109–1116.
Ndikumana, L., Abderrahim, K., 2010. Revenue Mobilization in African Countries: does
natural resource endowment matter? Afr. Dev. Rev. 22 (3), 351–365.
Nguea, S.M., Kaguendo, U.V.E., Noumba, I., 2022. Are growth effects of foreign capital
significant for increasing access to electricity in Africa? Energy Pol. 168, 113129.
Nguyen, C.P., Nasir, M.A., 2021. An inquiry into the nexus between energy poverty and
income inequality in the light of global evidence. Energy Econ. 99, 105289.
Nguyen, C.P., Su, T.D., 2022. The influences of government spending on energy poverty:
evidence from developing countries. Energy 238, 121785.
Nguyen, C.P., Su, T.D., Bui, T.D., Dang, V.T.B., Nguyen, B.Q., 2021. Financial
development and energy poverty: global evidence. Environ. Sci. Pollut. Control Ser.
28 (26), 35188–35225.
Njangang, H., Asongu, S.A., Tadadjeu, S., Nounamo, Y., Kamguia, B., 2022. Governance
in mitigating the effect of oil wealth on wealth inequality: a cross-country analysis of
policy thresholds. Resour. Pol. 76, 102561.
Omgba, L.D., 2015. Why do some oil-producing countries succeed in democracy while
others fail? World Dev. 76, 180–189.
Oskarsson, S., Ottosen, E., 2010. Does oil still hinder democracy? J. Dev. Stud. 46 (6),
1067–1083.
Pachauri, S., Mueller, A., Kemmler, A., Spreng, D., 2004. On measuring energy poverty in
Indian households. World Dev. 32 (12), 2083–2104.
19
Resources Policy 80 (2023) 103264
Papyrakis, E., 2017. The resource curse-what have we learned from two decades of
intensive research: introduction to the special issue. J. Dev. Stud. 53 (2), 175–185.
Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R., Verdier, T., 2006. Political foundations of the resource curse.
J. Dev. Econ. 79 (2), 447–468.
Roodman, D., 2009. A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxf. Bull. Econ. Stat.
71 (1), 135–158.
Ross, M.L., 2001. Does oil hinder democracy? World Polit. 325–361.
Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M., 1995. Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth
(No. W5398). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M., 1999. The big push, natural resource booms and growth.
J. Dev. Econ. 59 (1), 43–76.
Sarkodie, S.A., Adams, S., 2020. Electricity access, human development index,
governance and income inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Energy Rep. 6, 455–466.
Sharma, C., Pal, D., 2021. Revisiting resource curse puzzle: new evidence from
heterogeneous panel analysis. Appl. Econ. 53 (8), 897–912.
Smith, B., 2015. The resource curse exorcised: evidence from a panel of countries. J. Dev.
Econ. 116, 57–73.
Stijns, J.P., 2006. Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation. World
Dev. 34 (6), 1060–1083.
Sun, Y., Ak, A., Serener, B., Xiong, D., 2020. Natural resource abundance and financial
development: a case study of emerging seven (E− 7) economies. Resour. Pol. 67,
101660.
Tadadjeu, S., Njangang, H., Ningaye, P., Nourou, M., 2020. Linking natural resource
dependence and access to water and sanitation in African countries. Resour. Pol. 69,
101880.
Tadadjeu, S., Njangang, H., Ningaye, P., Nourou, M., 2022. Oil dependence and access to
water and sanitation in African countries: does the extractive industries transparency
initiative matter? Afr. Dev. Rev. 34 (1), 54–67.
Tsui, K.K., 2011. More oil, less democracy: evidence from worldwide crude oil
discoveries. Econ. J. 121 (551), 89–115.
Van der Ploeg, F., 2011. Natural resources: curse or blessing? J. Econ. Lit. 49 (2),
366–420.
Van der Ploeg, F., Poelhekke, S., 2009. Volatility and the natural resource curse. Oxf.
Econ. Pap. 61 (4), 727–760.
Vicente, P.C., 2010. Does oil corrupt? Evidence from a natural experiment in West Africa.
J. Dev. Econ. 92 (1), 28–38.
Villalobos, C., Chávez, C., Uribe, A., 2021. Energy poverty measures and the
identification of the energy poor: a comparison between the utilitarian and
capability-based approaches in Chile. Energy Pol. 152, 112146.
Whalley, J., Weisbrod, A., 2012. The contribution of Chinese FDI to Africa’s pre crisis
growth surge. Global Econ. J. 12 (4).
Wigley, S., 2017. The resource curse and child mortality, 1961–2011. Soc. Sci. Med. 176,
142–148.
Windmeijer, F., 2005. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-
step GMM estimators. J. Econom. 126 (1), 25–51.
World Bank, 2021. World development indicators. Available at: https://databank.
worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators.
Ye, Y., Koch, S.F., Zhang, J., 2018. Determinants of household electricity consumption in
South Africa. Energy Econ. 75, 120–133.
Yilanci, V., Aslan, M., Ozgur, O., 2021. Disaggregated analysis of the curse of natural
resources in most natural resource-abundant countries. Resour. Pol. 71, 102017.
Yıldırım, S., Gedikli, A., Erdoğan, S., Yıldırım, D.Ç., 2020. Natural resources rents-
financial development nexus: evidence from sixteen developing countries. Resour.
Pol. 68, 101705.
Zaman, K., Khan, M.M., Ahmad, M., Rustam, R., 2012. Determinants of electricity
consumption function in Pakistan: old wine in a new bottle. Energy Pol. 50,
623–634.
Zhan, J.V., 2017. Do natural resources breed corruption? Evidence from China. Environ.
Resour. Econ. 66 (2), 237–259.
Zhang, T., Shi, X., Zhang, D., Xiao, J., 2019. Socio-economic development and electricity
access in developing economies: a long-run model averaging approach. Energy Pol.
132, 223–231.