See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/233173619

The end of the Third World'?

Article in Third World Quarterly · June 1994

DOI: 10.1080/01436599408420379

CITATIONS READS
86 2,389

1 author:

Mark T. Berger
Naval Postgraduate School
93 PUBLICATIONS 1,239 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

The Crisis-of-Global-Modernity and the Fate of Humanity: From a World of Empires to a World of Sovereign Nation-States to a New 21st Century Glod Order? View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Mark T. Berger on 19 June 2016.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

THE END OF THE 'THIRD WORLD'?: INTERNATIONALISATION AND THE HISTORY OF
'DEVELOPMENT'*

Mark T. Berger
Introduction

The end of the Cold War has contributed to the dramatic globalisation of
market economics and electoral democracy. But, the significance of global
capitalism and the substance of the democratic transitions of the past few
years are subjects of considerable debate. Some observers continue to
emphasize that the end of the Cold War represents the triumph of liberalism
and it is only a matter of time before the former Soviet Bloc along with
the rest of the world (led by the 'Newly Industrialised Countries' of East
Asia) arrives at the capitalist prosperity and democratic stability
currently seen to prevail in North America, Western Europe and Japan._
Certainly the end of 'state socialism' in Eastern Europe and the former
USSR has made an important contribution in symbolic and substantive terms
to the demise of socialist development models generally and 'state
socialism' in the 'Third World' more particularly._ At the same time,
although the so-called Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore) are at the center of a major economic boom which is lifting them
out their 'Third World' status and shifting the axis of global political
economy to the Pacific Rim, the 'neo-liberal' governments of the rest of
Asia, the former Soviet Bloc, Latin America, Africa and Oceania are not
necessarily guiding their people to consumer capitalism and parliamentary
democracy. Democratic transitions, where they have taken place at all, have
often remained superficial, while neo-liberal economic policies have
stimulated economic growth without necessarily improving the quality of
life for the majority of the population. The acceleration of economic and
political globalisation which attended the end of the Cold War has
contributed more to the resurgence of ethnic and national conflicts than
it has to international peace and stability._ The social formations which
are emerging out of the ferment of Soviet collapse are not characterized
by democratic order and dynamic economic 'development', but by unstable
parliamentary-authoritarian governments, considerable dependence on the
IMF-World Bank and transnational capital, and growing 'ideological' and
even 'cultural' subordination to the United States and Western Europe.
While East Asia may be leaving the 'Third World' much of the former Soviet
Bloc can be said to have (re)joined the 'Third World'._

The rise of East Asia, the demise of the 'Second World' and the onset of
a new era of global capitalism, throws the problems associated with the
continued use of the term 'Third World' into sharp relief. The term (along
with the closely related concepts of 'developing countries', 'less
developed countries', 'underdeveloped countries', 'backward countries'
and the periphery) continues to be a central organizing concept in the
social sciences and the humanities generally, and in development studies
and development policy debates more specifically. In the last few years
a growing number of writers have sought to reinterpret the term the 'Third
World'. For example, Aijaz Ahmad has emphasized that the 'Third World' "does
not come to us as a mere descriptive category". He noted that it "carries
within it contradictory layers of meaning and political purpose"; however,
he still sought to differentiate the theoretical uses and abuses of the
term from its use in "common parlance" to describe "the so-called developing
countries, from Cuba to Saudi Arabia and from China to Chad"._ Marc Williams
has argued that the 'Third World' could undergo a "resurgence" around a
global environmental agenda. He is optimistic that "the movement toward
political pluralism in much of the Third World and the important role played
by NGOS in the environmental debate suggests that a re-vitalised Third World
coalition will reflect a set of priorities which has not been set
exclusively by the political Žlites"._ At the end of 1992 Vicky Randall
noted, in a review of two books which seek to 'rethink' the 'Third World',
that both works continued to "hold back from any explicit or sustained
questioning of the validity of talking about a 'Third World' as such". From
her perspective, however, the time has come to rethink the concept of a
'Third World' and she asks: "(c)an we justify still holding on to the term?"_

In an effort to map out fresh perspectives on change and 'development'

following the dramatic shift in the international order in the last few
years, this article will look at the problems associated with the term
'Third World'. A brief discussion of the emergence of the 'Third World'
will be followed by an examination of the various ways the term has been
deployed. Then the implications of the rise of the Asian Tigers and the
growing diversity within and between various countries and regions of the
'Third World' will be mentioned. And the existence and expansion of 'Third
World' conditions within the borders of the industrialized countries will
also be raised. The conceptual and cartographical challenge to the 'Third
World' represented by these changes, combined with the increasing
'internationalisation' (or globalisation) of elites and divisions of
labour, in the context of the ever greater movement of information, capital,
people and goods across borders, will then be discussed. 'Third World'
elites have emerged in the international arena claiming to speak for the
'Third World' at the same time as they are deeply implicated in the
prevailing international discourses and structures which work to manage
the 'Third World'. In this situation it will be argued that the idea of
a 'Third World' now serves primarily to generate both a dubious homogeneity
within its shifting boundaries and an analytically irrelevant distinction
between the 'Third World' (developing) on the one hand and the 'First World'
(developed) on the other hand. At the same time, an emerging approach to
'development' which privileges historical particularity, but also adopts
a global perspective, will be outlined insofar as it holds out the
possibility of overcoming many of the conceptual problems linked to the
use of the term 'Third World'.

Modernisation and Revolution in the 'Third World'

In the 1950s the 'Third World' referred to the growing number of non-aligned
nation-states which were reluctant to take sides in the Cold War. It was
increasingly deployed by governments and movements in the 'Third World'
and their sympathizers to generate unity and support in the face of the
political and economic power of the US and a handful of former colonial
powers. During the late 1950s and 1960s the term 'Third World' gained
popular currency as numerous European colonies in Asia and Africa gained
their political independence._ Although the Bandung Conference of 1955 has
come to be regarded as the event which gave birth to the 'Third World',
none of the ways in which the term has subsequently been used are easily
extrapolated from the meeting itself. Many of the governments in attendance
were already politically aligned with one of the two superpowers, most of
them were not seriously committed to an alternate economic route between
capitalism and socialism, no government from Latin America or Oceania
(where decolonization had not yet begun) was in attendance, and the
gathering did not encompass all of the Asian and African governments of
the day._ Following Bandung, 'Third Worldism', as it was articulated by
its main nationalist proponents, such as Nehru and Sukarno, meant that the
governments of the 'Third World' sought, at least rhetorically, to chart
a political and economic path between the liberal capitalism of the 'First
World' and the 'state socialism' of the 'Second World'. By the 1960s 'Third
Worldism' also had its Soviet and Chinese (Maoist) varieties. The former
incorporated those regimes in the 'Third World' which were formally allied
with the USSR and possessed substantial public sectors, despite their
sometimes highly repressive treatment of peasants and workers. This Moscow
oriented 'Third Worldism' sought to establish a broad front between the
'Second World' and the 'Third World' against the 'First World'. The Maoist
variant articulated a Peking oriented 'Third World', in which China was
part of the 'Third World', against the 'First World' of which the USSR was
perceived to be a part._ By the 1960s, many movements and governments in
the 'Third World' had forged an alliance with the New Left in the
industrialised countries of North America, Western Europe and Japan. And
the Vietnam War became exemplary of the wider struggle between US
imperialism and its allies on the one hand and the national liberation
struggles sweeping Latin America, Africa and Asia on the other hand._

The Vietnam War proved to be a watershed for 'Third Worldism' and an

important turning point for the US led effort to manage the 'Third World'.
The US had emerged from the Second World War as the dominant global economic
and politico-military power driven forward by an economic boom of
unprecedented proportions and an ideology of assertive anti-communist
globalism._ Connected to this was the dramatic growth of professional and
policy discourses on the 'Third World' which were profoundly shaped by what
became known as modernization theory. While governments and organizations
were deploying the term 'Third World' as part of an effort to stimulate
politico-diplomatic unity in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia
and Oceania, the 'Third World' also became central to North American and
Western European efforts to control those parts of the globe outside of
the Soviet Bloc. After 1945 modernization theory imposed an idealized
version of North American and Western European history on Latin America,
the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Oceania._ This approach, which remains
hegemonic at the popular and policy level, and in many academic circles,
postulated a modern and 'developed' North America and Western Europe, where
the problem of 'development' had been solved, in contrast to a 'traditional'
and 'underdeveloped' 'Third World'. As Arturo Escobar has argued "to
represent the Third World as 'underdeveloped' is less a statement about
'facts' than the setting up of a regime of truth through which the Third
World is inevitably known, intervened on, and managed"._ Over the past forty
years or more information and knowledge have been extracted from various
parts of the globe and filtered through an array of intellectual and policy
processes dominated by the so-called 'First World', the effect of which
has been to contribute to the managing of the 'Third World'.

At the outset of the Cold War it was widely assumed in US government and
academic circles that poverty facilitated the spread of international
communism._ It was also assumed that modernization would bring an end to
poverty and undercut anti-capitalist revolution. In the 1950s and early
1960s modernization theory perceived a direct causal link between economic
growth, social change and democratization. It also assigned particular
importance to the emerging 'middle classes' which were expected to fulfil
both a restraining and a progressive function. Although it reflected
continuity with the British 'White Man's Burden', the French mission
civilisatrice, and the racism of the emerging US 'imperial state' before
1945, modernization theory was more secular and more systematic._ Like
these earlier approaches modernization theory was committed to a period
of tutelage and focused on the need for cultural transformation in order
for the 'Third World' to achieve modernity. Modernization theory emphasized
the 'totality' of change and saw modernization as a process, often called
'diffusion', which spread throughout a society affecting economics, the
type of government, social structure, values, religion and family
structure. Modernization theorists viewed 'underdevelopment' in the 'Third
World' as the result of internal shortcomings specific to the
'underdeveloped' societies in question. 'Underdevelopment' was seen as a
result of their pre-colonial rather than their colonial history. And
despite detailed and tightly focused scholarship the entire edifice of
post-war modernization theory rested on a homogeneous image of a 'Third
World' destined to follow the North American and Western European path.

By the late 1960s, however, the US led mission to modernize the 'Third World'
and guide it towards liberal capitalist democracy was increasingly
challenged by revolution and economic nationalism ('Third Worldism') in
Latin America, Africa and Asia , and by a concern in North America and
Western Europe with the limits of 'Western' power. Under these
circumstances distinct radical discourses on the 'Third World' emerged (as
part of the rise of, and often committed to, radical 'Third Worldism') to
challenge the dominant academic and policy discourses. Dependency theory
was at the center of the new radicalism. Dependency theory, as it came to
be understood in the 1960s, had developed out of Latin American
'historico-structuralism', which was initially associated with Raul
Prebisch and the United Nations's Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), and out of the North American marxism of Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran._
AndrŽ Gunder Frank, an economist who was educated at the University of
Chicago, emerged in the second half of the 1960s as one of the main conduits
for the entry of dependency theory into North America and Western Europe
and its diffusion around the globe. Walter Rodney was another important
figure whose career and work reflected the linkages between the dependency
debate in the Caribbean and Latin America and nationalist and radical
debates in Africa, at the same time as his overdetermined dependency model
was popularized in North America and Western Europe._ The overwhelming
emphasis on external factors which characterized the dependency approach
in this period and was linked to radical 'Third Worldism', contributed to
a homogenized understanding of the 'Third World' as much as modernization
theory did.

This was readily apparent in Frank's work. While he was clearly influenced
by Baran and the the ECLA theorists, his approach departed from the
reformism of Prebisch and was less historically grounded than the work of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Falleto._ Writers like Cardoso, now
Brazilian Finance Minister, were much more concerned with the analysis of
internal historical structures, rather than adopting a deterministic focus
on external factors._ In Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America,
which was published in 1967, Frank outlined the concept of 'the development
of underdevelopment', and articulated a model of historical development,
which directly linked 'underdevelopment' and economic stagnation to the
transfer of an economic surplus from the periphery to the industrialized
core. Following Baran, Frank made a dramatic break with classical marxism
asserting "that it is capitalism, both world and national, which produced
underdevelopment in the past and which still generates underdevelopment
in the present"._ Frank's work rose to particular prominence and his ideas
were produced and reproduced so widely that they emerged in the late 1960s
and early 1970s as the main radical interpretation, at least as it was
understood in North America and Western Europe.

By the second half of the 1970s dependency theory had peaked. Its demise
can be traced to its failure as revolutionary prophecy and the end of the
US war in Southeast Asia. Despite the Communist victory over Washington's
erstwhile Saigon based ally in 1975, by the late 1970s Vietnam represented
a major setback for socialist 'Third Worldism'. From the very beginning
the various types of 'Third Worldism' could not, and in most cases did not,
disguise the centrality of nationalism and national liberation to the
various struggles for social change in the 'Third World'. The wars between
Vietnam, Cambodia and China in the late 1970s were the culmination of years
of tension and fragmentation, and clearly reflected the way in which
nationalism had undermined 'Third Worldism' and socialist internationalism
more generally._ The rise of the 'Newly Industrialized Countries' in Latin
America (Mexico and Brazil) and East Asia, and the rise of OPEC also
contributed to both the fading of dependency theory and the failure of
radical 'Third Worldism'. At the same time, by the late 1970s, an emphasis
on the corruption and authoritarianism of many 'Third World' states,
shifted the blame for 'underdevelopment' back on to the 'Third World'.
Another important factor behind the 'fall' of radical 'Third Worldism' and
dependency theory was that by the mid-1970s the radical challenge had been
partially contained via the political accommodation of radical 'Third
Worldism' by various international organizations, such as the United
Nations and by the theoretical incorporation of important elements of the
dependency approach into the dominant liberal discourses._ The relative
decline of radical 'Third Worldism' and the demise of dependency theory
was followed by the emergence of a number of 'new' radical theoretical
approaches which built on and interact with dependency theory, and
contributed to the diffusion of radical ideas in the 1970s and 1980s.
Although the new radical approaches departed from the determinism
associated with classic dependency theory most of them facilitated the
continued circulation of the idea of a homogeneous 'Third World'.
By the 1970s a marxist dependency synthesis had begun to emerge that linked
historical materialism to the insights of dependency theory, placing
considerable emphasis on state and class structures in the 'periphery'.
Writers in this tradition accepted dependency theory's overall critique
of classical marxism: that is that the potential for independent capitalist
development is constrained by a dependent economic position in the
international economic order. At the same time, however, this tradition
also brings together revisionist arguments which emphasize the relative
potential for dependent capitalist development and the survival of
pre-capitalist modes of production, emphasizing that politics in the 'Third
World' still enjoy a certain degree of freedom from external pressures.
They focus then on local social structures, particularly the character and
degree of class formation, and the concerns and ambitions of different
social groups. Many writers in this tradition emphasize the colonial and
post-colonial state as the location in which the local ruling classes may
initially have taken form, and through which they seek to consolidate their
economic and socio-political dominance. This approach is also concerned
to determine to what degree the post-colonial state reflects the interests
of international capital and/ or local concerns._ But much of this work
has continued to rely implicitly on a homogeneous image of the 'Third World'
and a sharp distinction between industrialized North America, Western
Europe and Japan and the rest of the world.

In the 1970s, building on debates within marxism, the 'mode of production'

approach also rose to prominence as a response to dependency theory's
privileging of the market over relations of production. For example, in
a well-known debate, Ernesto Laclau challenged Frank's sweeping
characterization of Latin America as capitalist simply because it was part
of a world capitalist economy._ This approach emphasizes that some
pre-capitalist 'modes of production' in the periphery have proved highly
resilient to the expansion of capitalism and have not disappeared as
anticipated. The problem of 'underdevelopment' in the 'Third World' is the
result of a more protracted transition due to the fact that the processes
of modernization and urban industrialisation in the periphery are dependent
for a long time on pre-capitalist modes of production in the countryside
which have articulated with an externally imposed capitalist mode of
production. Although the 'mode of production' approach was important in
shifting the burden of explanation for 'underdevelopment' back towards
internal class structures and social formations, many of its proponents
tended to factor external forces out of their analysis, while they conflated
the 'capitalist mode of production' in the industrialized countries with
capitalism in the 'Third World'._ Although state and class approaches and
'modes of production' approaches shifted the emphasis away from
international market relations, they often fell back on the 'Third World'
as a category with some explanatory power rather than emphasizing the
particularity of social formations on the so-called 'periphery'.

While the state and class approach, and the 'mode of production' approach,
represented a significant challenge to dependency theory as it emerged in
the late 1960s, the eclipse of classic dependency theory cannot be
understood without reference to the work of Samir Amin and the world-system
theory of Immanuel Wallerstein. Although Amin, an Egyptian economic
historian whose work has focused primarily on Africa, is often located
within the world-system and unequal exchange school, his work as a whole
reflects a synthesis of 'modes of production' and a theory of 'unequal
exchange' with insights drawn from dependency and world-system theory._
While Amin's work was influential by the 1970s, Wallerstein's world-system
theory emerged as the most important single trend in radical social science.
Wallerstein was influenced by dependency theory and by the work of Fernand
Braudel and the Annales 'school'._ As Paul Buhle has suggested,
Wallerstein's first major book on world-system theory, which appeared in
1974, has, quite possibly been "the most influential single book of the
post-New Left era"._ By the time he published the first volume of The Modern
World-System Wallerstein was clearly articulating the view that social
change in the modern world could only be 'understood' within the framework
of the historical evolution of the modern world-system as a whole. And by
the end of the 1980s his central ideas continued to display considerable
continuity._

Wallerstein's project rests on the assumption that a particular country's

internal development may only be 'understood' with reference to the
position it occupies, or the role it plays, in the modern world-system as
a whole. World-system theorists trace the historical development of
capitalism, by focusing on the emergence and functioning of an
international market comprised of three levels, the periphery,
semi-periphery and the core. Inequality emerges and is maintained as a
systemic characteristic because different regions within the world-system
produce commodities for exchange using different labor control systems.
The economic stagnation of the periphery, and the continued, and even
expanding gap, between it and the core of the world-economy, flows from
the privileged position held by core nations because of the historical terms
under which they initially entered the world-economy. Although Wallerstein
has highlighted the heuristic character of world-system theory, the
emphasis on international economic relations has left world-system
theorists open to charges of economic determinism. The conception of power
used by world-system theorists, sees power located in the structure of the
international economy itself, particularly in the upper levels of the
international order, in contrast to more orthodox marxist conceptions which
see power as flowing from class relationships and state structures. As a
result world-system theory tends to represent change as a function of elite
decision-making, or of the system itself, rather than holding out class
struggle or nation-state interactions and initiatives as agents of change.
The world-system model has contributed to the standardization of
historically particular relationships and socio-economic structures in the
'Third World'. Ultimately world-system theory, as reflected in
Wallerstein's own work and in the work of writers such as L. S. Stavrianos
and Daniel Chirot, finds the key to the history of the 'Third World' in
its relationship to an expanding world-system centered on Europe and North
America and later Japan._

Liberal Reformism, Neo-liberalism and the East Asian Miracle

While changes in the post-war order stimulated the emergence and the
diffusion of radical approaches, modernization theory continued to spread
at the same time as it underwent considerable revision. An early shift was
the rise of 'military modernization' theory and the emergence of a 'politics
of order' approach._ This approach questioned the view that there was a
connection between 'underdevelopment' and instability. Its exponents
argued that it was the attempt to modernize in the 'Third World', rather
than "the absence of modernity", which resulted in political instability.
According to Samuel Huntington, for example, 'Third World' instability had
to be understood as primarily a result of the "gap between aspirations and
expectations", which flowed from the dramatic expansion of "aspirations"
in the initial stages of "modernization". From his perspective the
"traditional polity" was "suffering from the absence of power", and the
"problem" was "not to seize power but to make power, to mobilize groups
into politics and to organize their participation in politics", and this
had to be done from the top down._ This approach emphasized the important
stabilizing role of the military and a strong state._ By the late 1960s
conservative developmentalism had also found a possible source of stability
in 'traditional' political and social institutions._ Some of this work
provided a degree of intellectual legitimacy for 'Third World'
dictatorships._ And much of this work also continued to homogenize the
'Third World' and contribute to the overall efforts to manage economic and
political change in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania.

At the same time a more liberal trend had emerged by the early 1970s which
built on the 'politics of order' approach, but was also influenced by and
incorporated radical perspectives on the 'Third World'. This was part of
the wider shift in the late 1960s and 1970s towards greater influence at
the UN by 'Third World' governments, the call for a New International
Economic Order (NIEO) and the apparent recognition in North America and
Western Europe that the North-South conflict was more important than the
East-West conflict. This liberal managerialism was reformist and
envisioned improving North-South relations without having to make major
structural changes. The shift in the 1970s, from the East-West conflict
and the containment of communism, to the North-South conflict and the
management of revolution, was partially reflected in the policies adopted
by the Carter administration in its first two years in office. Carter, as
well as Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as his National Security Advisor,
and a number of other members of the Carter administration, were members
of the Trilateral Commission, which was founded in 1973 by prominent North
American, Western European and Japanese academics, politicians and
corporate heads. According to Brzezinski, one of the organizations
co-founders, the Trilateral Commission saw US relations with Japan and
Western Europe as the "strategic hard core for both global stability and
progress"._ The major goal of the Trilateral Commission was to develop a
cohesive and semi-permanent alliance which embraced the world's major
capitalist governments in order to promote stability and order and protect
their interests._ In the case of the 'Third World', Trilateralism advocated
and sought accommodation rather than confrontation. It sought to encourage
a limited amount of reform in order to maintain long term stability. By
the end of the 1970s the Brandt Commission and its North-South report had
emerged as a major initiative and a key document by which the elites of
the industrial nation-states attempted to to manage the 'Third World'._
At the same time the initiatives associated with the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) and the liberal managerialism embodied by the
Trilateral Commission, the early Carter administration and the Brandt
Report, were under serious challenge by the end of the 1970s from a powerful
'neo-liberal' approach to 'development' associated with the ascendancy in
the early 1980s of 'conservative' governments in North America and Western
Europe. Although the 'conservatism' of the early 1980s dismissed many of
the ideas associated with liberal managerialism and modernization theory,
the ÔconservativeÕ revival still rested on the earlier diffusionist ideas
that North American and Western European economic expansion was primarily
beneficial and that economic growth tended to undermine any need for
policies aimed at the redistribution of wealth. This 'free-market'
counter-revolution emphasized supply-side economics and recommended that
'Third World' governments follow the North American and Western European
lead and privatize public companies, as well as curb the regulation of
prices and wages and economic activity generally._ These 'recommendations'
were backed up by North American and West European power over the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the context of the
new found leverage provided by the Debt Crisis and the international
economic recession of the early 1980s. This situation also weakened the
impact of the United Nations and related organizations such as the
International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), where 'Third World' views had gained weight in the 1970s. The
central prescription for the 'Third World' that flowed from 'free market'
ideology was that 'underdevelopment' was caused by excessive state
involvement in the economy. However, North American and Western European
assumptions about economic behavior are often irrelevant even in North
America and Western Europe. During the 1980s the mechanical application
of free-market economics to the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America
and Oceania, where markets are still fragmented, information is often
limited and significant aspects of economic exchange are still outside the
money economy, could not be expected to have, and has not had, a beneficial
impact for the majority of the population._

Despite the dubious social legacy of neo-liberal economic policies in Latin

America, Africa, Asia and Oceania by the beginning of the 1990s, the
widespread failure of 'state socialism' has generally enhanced the power
of liberal ideas about economic development and social change in the 'Third
World'. At the same time the notion of a 'Third World' in sharp contrast
to the 'First World', which emerged during the Cold War, has remained a
central element of social science and policy discourses in the 1990s. The
concept of the 'Third World' continues to be used across a whole range of
disciplines which can be found in a variety of institutional settings, all
of which, have the 'Third World' (and 'development' and 'underdevelopment')
as their targets. Most of the disciplines and organizations concerned with
the study of, and the generation of policies related to, the 'Third World'
continue to be shaped by a set of assumptions that flow from a conception
of history as a linear progression from a condition of political and
economic 'underdevelopment' and 'tradition', to a state of liberal
democratic industrialism and modernity. The 'Third World' and its history
has been created and understood primarily in terms of the failure of the
countries of Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania to become idealized
versions of the industrial democracies of North America and Western Europe.
More broadly, economic and political liberalism (modernization theory) has
continued to provide the most influential set of assumptions about the
'Third World'. And within liberal discourses the concept of the 'Third
World' and the 'First World'-'Third World' dichotomy continues to encourage
a homogenized understanding of a large part of the globe.

The East Asian 'miracle' provides a particularly good example of the way
in which the 'Third World' has been managed and homogenized over the course
of the Cold War. The dramatic rise of a number of East Asian countries since
World War II has resulted in the growing expectation that we are on the
threshold of the "Pacific Century"._ The 'Newly Industrialised Countries'
of East Asia have undergone profound economic changes and it is very
difficult to continue to evaluate their economies, politics and societies
as part of the 'Third World'._ But rather than seeing the East Asian
'success' as evidence that the 'Third World' is far too homogeneous a
concept, history is ignored and the 'lessons' of East Asian
industrialisation are regularly held out as readily transferable
throughout the rest of the 'Third World'. The East Asian 'miracle' is now
the central theme in a wide range of development literature which has sought
to universalize the 'lessons' from East Asia. A key approach to East Asian
development, as exemplified by the World Bank and the related literature,
has been to point to East Asian success as evidence of the global
applicability of liberal economic policies._ According to one unrepentant
'free trade' advocate "such success as Asia now enjoys is the result of
unremitting hard work, an unquenchable spirit of enterprise, and sound
economic policies"._ The famous novelist and one-time Peruvian
presidential hopeful Mario Vargas Llosa, insists that East Asian 'success'
has demonstrated that liberalism "is the only recipe" for the 'Third
World'._ In the context of the enthusiastic response to the rise of East
Asia there has been a tendency to conflate 'export-oriented'
industrialisation with 'free-trade'; however, aside from Hong Kong, the
governments of the East Asian NICs have played a far more interventionist
and protectionist role in economic development than the liberal economic
development model suggests. Because the central goal of the various East
Asian NICs has been export success, their governments have, among other
things, manipulated interest rates and credit channels, made major
concessions to foreign investors--in the case of Singapore
particularly--and intervened in the labour market to keep workers' wages
below market rates. The importance of state intervention in East Asian
development actually challenges neo-liberalism and has given rise to
considerable literature and debate on East Asian and 'Third World'
development._ However, most of the discussion of the applicability of the
East Asian model to the rest of the 'Third World' has failed to go beyond
the debates over the role of state intervention, the relationship between
economic development and political democracy, and the role of liberal
economic policies. There has been far less work which seeks to address the
'problem' in a way that focuses on the historically specific experience
of East Asia in contrast to other parts of the 'Third World'.

The importance of various long term historical factors specific to East

Asia do come out in the more historically oriented literature, which can
be divided into three categories. First there are those studies which
emphasize that the East Asian Tigers all share a cultural history
characterized by an emphasis on high education levels, a highly motivated
population, a 'strong state', and an 'effective' bureaucracy--all of which
have been traced back to a common Confucian heritage._ Second, and also
of great importance in explaining South Korean and Taiwanese success, is
the region's colonial history (this is also important in a very different
way for Hong Kong and Singapore). Before 1945 Korea (North and South),
Taiwan and Manchuria, formed the core of the Japanese colonial empire, which
had important consequences for post-1945 industrial development._ The
third historical factor which needs to be emphasized, but is often glossed
over, is that East Asia was a major arena of the Cold War after 1945. This
ensured South Korea and Taiwan received sustained US military and economic
aid, and capital as well as privileged access to the North American market
at a time of steady growth in demand. It also resulted in the implementation
of land reforms, under US auspices, which contributed to economic growth
and industrialisation. This is in contrast to those areas of the 'Third
World' that have had a more episodic, less intense position, or have played
a less 'successful' role, in US Cold War national security policy._ A focus
on East Asia's historical particularity, in the context of global trends,
challenges the ahistorical assumptions on which much of the thinking about
economic development in the 'Third World' is based and problematises the
whole notion of a 'Third World'.

'Internationalisation' and Historical Specificity

While an historical approach to the rise of East Asia calls into question
prevailing conceptions of a 'Third World', the existence, and even the
expansion, of 'Third World' conditions within the borders of the so-called
'First World' further undermines the notion of a 'Third World'. The
'internal colonialism' which has characterized the history of the United
States and Australia, for example, has consigned native Americans and
Australian aborigines to circumstances which mirror the conditions in which
the rural and urban poor of 'Third World' countries live. Mike Davis's
recent history of Los Angeles seriously qualifies any attempt to view the
US as simply a 'First World' country. For African-Americans and Chicanos,
and recent arrivals from Latin America, life in Southern California is
little different from the urban poverty south of the Rio Grande._ At the
same time countries like South Africa have always presented a particular
problem for anyone attempting to talk about a 'Third World'. In South Africa
the white minority enjoys a standard of living comparable to any other
industrialized country, while the black majority lives in 'Third World'
conditions._ The concept of 'internal colonialism' or related approaches
have also been applied to parts of Latin America in order to highlight the
way in which in a number of countries a Europeanized elite continues to
occupy a position of power and privilege in sharp contrast to the indigenous
inhabitants and/or the descendants of African slaves._

In a wider sense this conceptual difficulty points to the

'internationalisation' of class structure as ruling elites in the 'Third
World' and the 'First World' become increasingly integrated. The
governments and elites of Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and
Oceania have been incorporated into the global political-economic order
on favourable terms at the same time as they enthusiastically claim to speak
for the rural and urban poor of the 'Third World' who have clearly not been
incorporated into the current international order on favourable terms. In
Latin America, and elsewhere, certain sectors of the elite are
economically, socially and culturally oriented towards North America and
Western Europe, where they have bank accounts, maintain business links,
own homes and send their children to school. Globalisation has meant the
increasingly tight interlocking of transnational capital and 'national'
capitalist classes. Over the past decade or more, the Debt Crisis, "the
generalized economic recession" and IMF backed 'structural adjustment',
has contributed to greater concentration of income, high rates of
unemployment, widespread poverty and the marginalization of a growing
number of rural and urban poor around the globe. As Jorge Nef has emphasized,
for much of Latin America, "the state has become the receiver and
debt-collector of a bankrupt economy on behalf of transnational creditors".
In this situation 'nation-states' have been drawn into service by
interlocking national and global elites._ It is worth noting that in
contrast to the "great modern theories of social emancipation--for
democratic rights, for socialist revolution, for liberation of women;
indeed anti-colonial nationalism itself", 'Third Worldism' as a political
project, and the 'Third World' as a category, has usually denoted a
collection of 'states' already implicated in the retention of power and
in a whole array of exploitative and accumulative practices._

The solution to the problems generated by the concept of the 'Third World'
is not to find a new label, but to dispense with the term. There is already
important work being done which has begun to foreshadow ways of moving
beyond the concept of the 'Third World'. Although this work has,
predictably, had less impact on development economics and development
policy debates, it provides the basis for a theoretically informed
historical perspective on 'development' which is global. While some of this
work has also sought to universalize its conclusions by reference to the
'Third World', there are a growing number of approaches which in different
ways seek to privilege the specific over the systemic, and have emerged
out of important debates in the humanities and the social sciences over
the past decade or so._ Dissatisfaction with the elite-oriented focus of
much of the work on India, for example, has given rise to Subaltern Studies.
Informed by Gramscian, and later post-structural theory, Subaltern
approaches have focused on the peasantry and workers with particular
concern to delineate structures and techniques of domination, strategies
of resistance and the historical particularity and role of culture and
religion._ Their concern to restore the subaltern classes to history, and
provide the intellectual underpinning for a less elite-oriented politics,
intersects with the growing amount of work by historical anthropologists
coming out of the modes of production and world-system debates of the 1970s
and 1980s. These scholars have drawn attention to the way in which the
expanding world economy has neither historically nor currently levelled
'pre-capitalist' structures and discourses to the degree that many of the
earlier theoretical models implied._
In the case of Latin America, for example, the work of Steve J. Stern, which
has grown out of efforts to synthesize a 'modes of production' approach
with Wallerstein's world-system model has resulted in an important attempt
to emphasize both historical particularity and global political economy.
From his perspective the central dynamics of Latin American history since
the colonial era have been the various approaches and popular resistance
strategies of the inhabitants, the interests of mercantile and political
elites whose "centers of gravity" were in the Americas, and the
world-system._ The overall methodological concerns apparent in Stern's
work intersect with the emphasis on the longue durŽe in the work of
Jean-Fran•ois Bayart, which attempts to historicize 'states' in Africa,
rejects the state-society dichotomy and argues that colonial and
post-colonial 'states' should be seen as historically rooted in particular
social formations rather than regarded as alien institutions._ This overall
concern with the strategies of resistance pursued by the peasantry and
subaltern classes, and the historicity of 'states', needs to be meshed with
an approach which breaks down the North-South dichotomy. One of the central
problems with the development discourses is the way they have treated
'development' in the 'developed' world as a problem that has been solved.
There are a growing number of development theorists who emphasize the need
to move beyond North America and Europe as implicit models and address
'development' as a historical and political question that is still common
to all parts of the globe._

Conclusion

The 'Third World' began as a loose political alliance ('non-alignment')

between nation-states in the context of US-Soviet rivalry after World War
Two. At least one tendency had evolved by the 1960s into a revolutionary
ideology committed to movements of national liberation on three continents.
At the same time the 'Third World' rapidly came to be more than a description
of governmental coalitions and/or allied revolutionary movements in the
context of the Cold War. The apparent gulf between the industrialized
nation-states (where 'development' was understood to no longer be a
problem) and the rest of the world in the 1950s suggested that a
distinguishing characteristic of 'Third World' countries was a shared
'underdevelopment'. The term the 'Third World' increasingly came to be
central to North American and Western European analysis of
politico-economic and social change in the rest of the world. The idea of
a 'Third World' now serves an important function in terms of the
'management' of the global political economy and allows for the
homogenisation of the history of diverse parts of the world. What began
in the 1950s as an attempt to forge a political and diplomatic alliance
ostensibly outside of the capitalist and socialist 'camps' has now become
an all encompassing category reducing the governments, economies and
societies of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania to a set of variables
distinct from and inferior to the 'First World'. For many of those concerned
with economic development a relatively homogeneous 'Third World' continues
to exist. And this 'Third World' is still evaluated in terms of its ability
or lack of ability to advance towards a degree and type of economic
development similar to the 'First World'. The economic problems of the
'Third World' continue to be understood primarily as technical problems
that can be overcome by the right mix of advice, investment, aid and liberal
reforms. Economic development in the 'Third World' is seen primarily as
a technical or policy problem rather than a historico-political problem.
The information and knowledge about the 'Third World' which has built up
over the course of the Cold War has been obtained, transmitted and organized
by a whole series of processes of information accumulation and
dissemination aimed at managing the 'Third World'. This situation, along
with the wider difficulties associated with the continued use of the term
'Third World', can be alleviated by an approach which locates the politics
of 'development' in both historically particular and global processes.

*I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Catherine Waldby (Macquarie

University Sydney Australia) and Claire Slatter (University of the South
Pacific Suva Fiji) who commented on an earlier version of this article.
Of course, any errors of fact or interpretation, remain the sole
responsibility of the author.

_The most well known exponent of this view is probably Francis Fukuyama,
a RAND consultant and former US State Department employee, who suggested
in 1989 that the end of the Cold War might be the "end of history". In a
now famous article he characterized the waning of the conflict between
Washington and Moscow as the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution
and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form
of human government". He emphasized that the liberal "victory" was still
unfinished, and it had occurred mainly "in the realm of ideas or
consciousness". The process was "as yet incomplete in the real or material
world". According to Fukuyama's scenario, much of the 'Third World' is still
"mired in history" and will be "a terrain of conflict for many years to
come". At the same time he was confident that economic and political
liberalism would "govern the material world in the long run". F
Fukuyama,"The End of History?" The National Interest 16 (8), 1989, pp. 3-4,
15. See also F Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1992. Z Brzezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of
Communism in the Twentieth Century New York: Macmillan, 1990. J Muravchik,
Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny Washington: American
Enterprise Institute, 1991. R Nixon, Seize the Moment: America's Challenge
in a One-Superpower World New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. For a variety
of critical views on the end of the Cold War see G Arrighi, "Marxist Century,
American Century: The Making and Remaking of the World Labour Movement"
New Left Review 179, 1990. R Blackburn, "Fin de Siecle: Socialism After
the Crash" New Left Review 185, 1991. These articles are both reprinted
in After the Fall: The Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism,
R Blackburn (ed), London: Verso, 1991. A Callinicos, The Revenge of History:
Marxism and the Eastern European Revolutions Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
I Wallerstein, "The Collapse of Liberalism" in Socialist Register 1992:
New World Order?, R Miliband and L Panitch (eds), London: Merlin Press,
1992. S P Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (3),
1993.

_See C Clapham, "The Collapse of Socialist Development in the Third World"

Third World Quarterly: Journal of Emerging Areas 13 (1), 1992. The entire
issue is devoted to "Rethinking Socialism". Also see E Altvater, The Future
of the Market: An Essay on the Regulation of Money and Nature after the
Collapse of 'Actually Existing Socialism' London: Verso, 1993.

_B Anderson, "The Last Empires: The New World Disorder" New Left Review
193, 1992.

_I Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing

World-System Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp 10, 14. K
Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1992, pp 252-253.

_A Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures London: Verso, 1992,

pp 307-308.

_M Williams, "Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: The Role of the

Environmental Agenda" Third World Quarterly: Journal of Emerging Areas 14
(1), 1993, p 28.

_V Randall, "Third World: Rejected or Rediscovered?" Third World Quarterly:

Journal of Emerging Areas 13 (4), 1992, p 730. See Rethinking Third World
Politics, J Manor (ed), London: Longman, 1991. Rethinking the Third World,
R Galli (ed), New York: Crane Russack, 1992.

_L Wolf-Phillips, "Why 'Third World'?: Origin, Definition and Usage" Third

World Quarterly: Journal of Emerging Areas 9 (4), 1987.

_For a thorough analysis of the Bandung Conference, particularly the role

and rhetoric of Jawaharlal Nehru ("undoubtedly the main luminary at the
Conference"), see Ahmad, op cit pp 293-304. For a critique of India's
foreign policy which emphasises that a commitment to 'Third Worldism' has
not meshed easily with the imperatives of post-1947 Indian political
economy see S Dutt, India and the Third World: Altruism or Hegemony? London:
Zed Press, 1984. A clear articulation of Bandung as the moment of arrival
for the 'Third World' can be found in a recent book by Theodore H. Von Laue
in which he argues that "(t)he Bandung Conference of April 1955 marked a
milestone in the evolution of postwar globalism. It established the
developing countries, aligned and nonaligned, as a force to be counted in
world affairs". T H Von Laue, The World Revolution of Westernization: The
Twentieth Century in Global Perspective New York: Oxford University Press,
1987, p 239.

_Ahmad, op cit, pp 304-308.

_G Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,

1978, p 24. N Miller and R Aya, "Preface" in National Liberation: Revolution
in the Third World, N Miller and R Aya, (eds), New York: Free Press, 1971.
It has been argued that the New Left's attempt to identify with, and distill
a whole range of 'Third World' struggles into, a radical 'Third Worldism'
helped to detach the movement from its domestic roots in North America and
Western Europe. N Young, An Infantile Disorder?: The Crisis and Decline
of the New Left London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, pp 103, 133, 158-159,
163-164, 179, 183-188, 256-259.
_G Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy
1945-1980 New York: Pantheon, 1988.

_For recent overviews of the history of modernization theory and

development theory generally see A Y So, Social Change and Development:
Modernization, Dependency and World-System Theories Newbury Park: Sage,
1990. C Ramirez-Faria, The Origins of Economic Inequality Between Nations:
A Critique of Western Theories of Development and Underdevelopment London:
Unwin Hyman, 1991. R Peet, Global Capitalism: Theories of Societal
Development London: Routledge, 1991.

_A Escobar, "Culture, Economics and Politics in Latin American Social

Movements Theory and Research" in The Making of Social Movements in Latin
America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy, A Escobar and S E Alvarez (eds),
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p 62. See also A Escobar, "Discourse and
Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of His Work to the
Third World" Alternatives 10, 1984-1985. A Escobar, "Power and Visibility:
Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World" Cultural
Anthropology 3 (4), 1988.

_G Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations New York:
Pantheon, 1968, vol. II, pp 791-798. R A Packenham, Liberal America and
the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social
Science Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, pp 52-53.

_M Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science Technology and Ideologies

of Wester Dominance Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, pp 402-403,
411-415. For a discussion of the relationship between Cold War development
theory and pre-1945 ideas about Latin America which relates to wider
thinking about Africa, Asia and Oceania see M T Berger, "Civilising the
South: the US Rise to Hegemony in the Americas and the Roots of 'Latin
American Studies' 1898-1945" Bulletin of Latin American Research 12 (1)
1993. Also see M T Berger, Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies,
Inter-American Relations and the History of 'Development' 1898-1990
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming.

_R Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal

Problems New York: United Nations, 1950. P A Baran, The Political Economy
of Growth New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957. On dependency theory see
Joseph L. Love, "The Origins of Dependency Analysis" Journal of Latin
American Studies 22 (1), 1990. C Kay, Latin American Theories of Development
and Underdevelopment New York: Routledge, 1989, pp 1-57, 125-162. R A
Packenham, The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in
Development Studies Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.

_W Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa London: Bogle-L'Ouverture

Publications, 1972. See F E Mallon, "Dialogues Among the Fragments:
Retrospect and Prospect" in F Cooper, F E Mallon, A F Isaacman, W Roseberry
and S J Stern, Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor and the
Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1993, p 382.
_F H Cardoso and E Falleto, Dependencia y desarrollo en AmŽrica Latina
MŽxico: Siglo XXI, 1969. T Halperin-Donghi, "'Dependency Theory' and Latin
American Historiography" Latin American Research Review 17 (1), 1982, p
116.

_F H Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States"

Latin American Research Review 12 (3), 1977, pp 12-13.

_A G Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical

Studies of Chile and Brazil New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967, p. xi.
See also A G Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution-Essays
on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1969. A G Frank, Lumpen-Bourgeoisie,
Lumpen-Development: Dependence, Class and Politics in Latin America New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. Frank's most famous essay is probably
A G Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment" which originally appeared
in Monthly Review in September 1966, was reprinted in Latin America:
Underdevelopment or Revolution in 1969, and again in Imperialism and
Underdevelopment: A Reader, R I Rhodes (ed), New York: Monthly Review Press,
1970 and again in an abridged form in J D Cockcroft, A G Frank and D L Johnson,
Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy Garden
City: Doubleday, 1972.

_G Evans and K Rowley, Red Brotherhood At War: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos
Since 1975 London: Verso, second edition revised 1990. It was the failure
of marxist internationalism in Indo-China that provided the impetus for
Benedict Anderson's influential book. B Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism London: Verso, 1983,
pp. 1-2. See also B Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origins and Spread of Nationalism London: Verso, second revised and
extended edition 1992.

_Key examples of liberal analysis informed by dependency theory include

P Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and
Foreign Capital in Brazil Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. S
Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly
Industrializing Countries Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

_V Randall and R Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment: A

Critical Introduction to Third World Politics London: Macmillan, 1985, pp
137-138. Works in this tradition might include A K Bagchi, The Political
Economy of Development Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. J
Larrain, Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism and Development
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. J Petras and M Morley, US Hegemony Under
Siege: Class, Politics and Development in Latin America London: Verso,
1990.

_E Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America" New Left Review 67,
1971. reprinted in E Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory London:
Verso, 1979, pp 15-50. (In a postscript Laclau extends his critique to
Wallerstein's work.) A particularly orthodox marxist perspective also
emerged to challenge dependency theory. See B Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer
of Capitalism London: Verso, 1980. Also see G Kay, Development and
Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis London: Macmillan, 1975.

_P F KlarŽn, "Lost Promise: Explaining Latin American Underdevelopment"

in Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin America, P F KlarŽn
and T J Bossert (eds), Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, pp 24-25. See A
Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy" New Left Review 107,
1978. J G Taylor, From Modernization to Modes of Production: A Critique
of Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment London: Macmillan,
1983.

_D F Ruccio and L H Simon, "Perspectives on Underdevelopment: Frank, the

Modes of Production School and Amin" in The Political Economy of Development
and Underdevelopment , C K Wilber and K P Jameson (eds), New York:
McGraw-Hill, fifth edition 1992, pp 138-143. S Amin, Accumulation on a World
Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment Sussex: Harverster
Press, 1974. S Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations
of Peripheral Capitalism New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. S Amin,
Imperialism and Unequal Development New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.

_The influence was a two way affair insofar as volume three of Braudel's
Civilization and Capitalism drew heavily on Wallerstein's 'modern
world-system'. Peter Burke, The French Historical Revolution: The Annales
School 1929-1989 Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, p 50. See F Braudel, The
Structures of Everyday Life: Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century
Volume 1 New York: Harper and Row, 1981. F Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce:
Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century Volume 2 New York: Harper
and Row, 1982. F Braudel, The Perspective of the World: Civilization and
Capitalism 15th-18th Century Volume 3 New York: Harper and Row, 1984, pp
69-70.

_P Buhle, Marxism in the USA: From 1870 to the Present Day London: Verso,
1987, p 265.

_C Ragin and D Chirot, "The World System of Immanuel Wallerstein: Sociology

and Politics as History" in Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, Theda
Skocpol (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp 284-290. I
Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century New York:
Academic Press, 1974. I Wallerstein, The Modern World System II:
Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1750
New York: Academic Press, 1980. I Wallerstein, The Modern World-System III:
The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy
1730s-1840s New York: Academic Press, 1989.

_L S Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age New York: William
Morrow, 1981. D Chirot, Social Change in the Twentieth Century New York:
Brace, Harcourt and Jovanovich, 1977. D Chirot, Social Change in the Modern
Era New York: Brace, Harcourt and Jovanovich, 1986.

_J J. Johnson (ed), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. M Janowitz, The Military in
the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

_S P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1968, pp 41-45, 52-56, 144-145.

_See A Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

_See, for example, C W Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin

America: The Governing of Restless Nations Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1967.

_According to Howard Wiarda "(m)ost Western social science, with its

favoritism toward democratic and civilian government, treats coups as
aberrations--irregular, dysfunctional, and unconstitutional--thus
ignoring their normality, regularity, workability often
legal-constitutional basis, the reasons for them, their functional
similarity to elections, and the fact the former may be no more comic opera
than the latter. Our antimilitary bias, however, often prevents us from
seeing these events neutrally and scientifically". H J Wiarda,
Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World?
Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1985, p 31. Also see H J Wiarda,
Critical Elections and Critical Coups: State, Society and the Military in
the Processes of Latin American Development Athens: Ohio University Center
for International Studies, 1979.

_Z Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security

Advisor 1977-1981 London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983, p 289.

_S Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission Cambrdige:

Cambridge University Press, 1990.

_W Brandt, North-South: A Programme for Survival-Report of the Independent

Commission on International Development Issues London: Pan, 1980.

_The most famous exponent of 'conservative' development economics is

probably P. T Bauer. See P T Bauer, Equality, the Third World, and Economic
Delusion Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. P T Bauer, Reality and
Rhetoric: Studies in the Economics of Development London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1984.

_See M P Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World London: Longman,

fourth edition, 1989, pp 82-84. For a recent analysis of the ability of
the World Bank to influence the economic policies of 'Third World'
governments which emphasizes the significant constraints on policy-based
lending and the divergent experiences that flow from the gap between the
theory and the practice of 'structural adjustment' see P Mosley, J Harrigan
and J Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending Volume
1 Analysis and Policy Proposals London: Routledge, 1991. P Mosley, J
Harrigan and J Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending
Volume 2 Case Studies London: Routledge, 1991.

_M Borthwick, (with contributions by selected scholars), Pacific Century:

The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

_Already at the beginning of the Cold War there was considerable economic
diversity in the 'Third World' and throughout the Cold War era the diversity
has increased. If the World Bank's new technique for the calculation of
national wealth, described as "purchasing-power parity" is taken into
consideration China is ranked as the world's second largest economy
(according to the IMF using the same technique it is third) with India fifth,
Brazil ninth and Mexico eleventh, while just before its breakup the USSR
would have probably ranked fourth on this scale. A Swardson, "Are the Right
Seven at the Summit?" Guardian Weekly July 11 1993, p 16. A number of
oil-rich states, in the Middle East especially, although not industrialised
have risen to positions of financial and political prominence in the
international order. Saudi Arabia with a per capita GNP of over 6,000
dollars US by the late 1980s hardly seems to belong in the same category
as Bolivia with a per capita GNP of less than 600 dollars US a year, or
Zaire with a per capita GNP of around 150 US dollars a year. Third World
Guide 91/92 Montevideo: Instituto del Tercer Mundo, 1990, pp 232, 493, 577.
In fact, economic and quality of life indicators for Sub-Saharan Africa
as a whole suggest that throughout much of the region there has been no
improvement over the past thirty years and in many cases considerable
decline.

_See, for example, B Belassa, The Newly Industrializing Countries in the

World Economy New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. World Bank, Korea's
Experience with the Development of Trade and Industry: Lessons for Latin
America Washington: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1988.
M Porter, The Competitve Advantage of Nations London: Macmillan, 1990. S
Schlossstein, Asia's New Little Dragons: The Dynamic Emergence of
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1991. W
McCord, The Dawn of the Pacific Century: Implications for Three Worlds of
Development New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1991. World Bank, The East
Asian Miracle Washington: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank,
1993.

_M Thatcher, "The Triumph of Trade" Far Eastern Economic Review 2 September

1993, p 23.

_M Vargas Llosa, "A Novelist in the Corridors of Power" Independent Monthly

September 1993, p 19.

_For a good summary of the East Asian development literature see J Henderson
and R P Applebaum, "Situating the State in the East Asian Development
Process" in J Henderson and R P Applebaum, eds., State and Development in
the Asian Pacific Rim Newbury Park: Sage, 1992.

_See for example, R Hofheinz Jr., and K E Calder, The Eastasia Edge New
York: Harper and Row, 1982. Linked to the emphasis on 'culture' there have
been reductionist explanations which find in Confucianism the same kind
of dynamism that was earlier attributed to Protestantism's role in the "Rise
of the West". C H Chung, J M Shepard and M J Dollinger, "Max Weber Revisited:
Some Lessons from East Asian Capitalistic Development" Asia Pacific Journal
of Management 6 (2), 1987. Weber's thesis has also undergone a certain
amount of revival in relation to Western Europe. See Daniel Chirot, "The
Rise of the West" American Sociological Review 50 (2), 1985.

_See for example, B Cumings, "The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea"

in The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945, R H Myers and M R Peattie (eds),
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. U Menzel, "The Newly
Industrializing Countries of East Asia: Imperialist Continuity or A Case
of Catching Up?" in Imperialism and After: Continuities and
Discontinuities, W J Mommsen and J Osterhammel (eds), London: Allen and
Unwin, 1986. C J Eckert, Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the
Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism 1876-1945 Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1990.

_This point is emphasized in W Bello and S Rosenfeld, Dragons in Distress:

Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis San Francisco: Institute for Food and
Development Policy, 1990, pp. 4-5.

_M Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles London:

Verso, 1990.

_H Wolpe, "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case" in

Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America
and Africa, I Oxaal, T Barnett and D Booth (eds), London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1975.

_G Urban and J Sherzer, "Introduction: Indians, Nation-States and Culture"

in Nation-States and Indians in Latin America, G Urban and J Sherzer (eds),
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991.

_J Nef, "'Normalization', Popular Struggles and the Receiver State" in

Latin America, Its Problems and Its Promise: A Multidisciplinary
Introduction, J Knippers Black (ed), Boulder: Westview Press, second
edition 1991, p 199. On the 'internationalisation' of class structure in
Latin America also see J Petras and M Morley, Latin America in the Time
of Cholera: Electoral Politics, Market Economics and Permanent Crisis
London: Routledge, 1992, p 2.

_Ahmad, op cit, p 292.

_J MacKenzie, "A Second Wind From the Third World" in After the End of
History, A Ryan (ed), London: Collins and Brown, 1992.

_R Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India" in

Selected Subaltern Studies, R Guha and G Chakravorty Spivak (eds), New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988. G Chakravorty Spivak, "Subaltern Studies:
Deconstructing Historiography" in In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural
Politics, G Chakravorty Spivak (ed), New York: Routledge, 1988. G Prakash,
"Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Indian
Historiography Is Good to Think" in Colonialism and Culture, Nicholas B.
Dirks (ed), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.

_An important pioneering work is E Wolf, Europe and the People Without
History Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. See also W
Roseberry, Anthropologies and Histories: Essays in Culture, History and
Political Economy New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989. The
emergence of, and growing interest in, the new social movements is also
linked to a renewed concern with historical particularity in the context
of global processes. A Escobar, "Reflections on Development: Grassroots
Approaches and Alternative Politics in the Third World" Futures 24 (5),
1992. A Escobar, "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought,
Development and Social Movements" Social Text 10 (2-3), 1992. A Escobar
and S E Alvarez, "Introduction: Theory and Protest in Latin America Today"
in op cit, Escobar and Alvarez (eds).

_S J Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism and the World-System in the Perspective

of Latin America and the Caribbean" American Historical Review 93 (4), 1988
reprinted in Cooper, Mallon, Isaacman, Roseberry and Stern, op cit, p 55.

_J F Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly London: Longman,
1993. J F Bayart, "Finishing with the Idea of the Third World: The Concept
of Political Trajectory" in Rethinking Third World Politics, James Manor
(ed), London: Longman, 1991 There are now a number of historical approaches
to state formation which parallel Bayart's overall concerns. For example
see B Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in
Comparative Historical Perspective" Journal of Asian Studies 42 (2), 1983.
reprinted in B Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures
in Indonesia Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. B Anderson, "Cacique
Democracy and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams" New Left Review 169,
1988.

_See, for example, D Senghaas, The European Experience: A Historical

Critique of Development Theory Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1985. B
Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds London: Longmans, 1990.

The Emergence and Management ofThe Maintenance of the 'Third World' and
the East Asian 'Miracle'

Introduction: Globalisation and the 'Third World': The Rise and Fall of
the 'Third World'

F J Hinkelammert, "The Crisis of Socialism and the Third World" Monthly

Review 45 (3), 1993.and Western
F J Hinkelammert, "The Crisis of Socialism and the Third World" Monthly
Review 45 (3), 1993.and Globalisation
 borders, will then be discussed.
ly implicated in the prevailing_______T___U___r___s___u___}___________
___
___B___p__ Ù___±___²__
¸__
¹___ø___ù___™___š___.___/___________B___a___“___®___¯___&___'__!ó__!ô_
_#}__#~__$ï__$ð__'¡__'¢__)¯__)°__+y__+z__-^__-s__-ï__-ð__55__56__68__7
l__7m__8”__9m__9n__:2__:3__:7__:g__<{__<|__@±__@²__Cô__Cõ__F„__K2__K3_
_MŒ__M__MŽ__Oº__Q;__Q<__Tü__Tý__V___V___VÅ__VÆ__Vô__W
__X/__X0__`d__`e__`g__`¤__aßþúþ÷ô_ôð_ð_ô_ôð_ð_ì_ð_ð_ô_ô÷ôðôðôðôðôðôèôð
ôèôåôðôèô_ì_ôèôèô÷ôèôðôðô_ðôèô_ôèôìôðôèô÷ôèôðô÷ô_____À______R_______B_
______J____________€______
______€_Z__aß__aà__e___e
__ee__ef__eø__eù__fX__fY__fZ__j¸__j¹__lÂ__lÃ__m¢__m£__n¤__n¯__oI_
_oJ__s¸__s¹__x¾__x¿__• ’__•“__€à__€á__³__´__‚Ç__„7__„8__„ø__„ù__…»__…
¼__‰H__‰I________Ž__Ž__‘-__‘.__’6__’7__’j__•Ç__•È__—___—___˜S__˜T_
_™___šŒ__›Œ__žO__žP__žj__ __ ___ __
__£8__£9__¤Ù__¤Ú__¦õ__¦ö__©J__©K__©¬__©¸__ªÙ__ªÚ__M__N__P__[__-
\__±´__µv__¶}__¶~__·o__·p__·qüùüùüùüùöüù_óüóüóðóüùüùìùé_ü_ü_óåóüóüóåóå
óåóåó_ä_ü_ü_ü_ù_ùüù_üùä_ü_ü_ü_ü_ã_ü_ü_ä_ù_ù_óù____________À_€__R______
€______R______€________________________J____X__·q__·r__¸-
__¸®__¼@__¼L__¼O__¼p__¼…__¼¡__¼¶__¼Ù__¼ù__½ __½S__½|__½-
__½è__¾(__¾L__¾Š__¾ð__¾ÿ__¿C__¿R__¿ƒ__¿Ç__¿þ__ÀB__À•__Àº__Á&__Á5__ÁD__
ÁE__ÁF__Á•__ÁÀ__Â___—__®__¯__Âæ__Âõ__Ã___Ã___Ã___Ã___ÃQ__Ô__ÿ__Ãü
__Ãý__Ãþ__Ä __Ä/__ÄR__ÄS__ı__Äâ__Ä÷__Äø__Å,__Å\__Åv__Å•__ż__ÅÖ__Æ___Æ
__ÆK__Æ`__Æ{__Ɖ__ÆŠ__Æ‹__Ç4__Ç5__Ç;__È___È5__ÈO__ÉÊ__Ê___ÊN__ÊO__ÊP__
Êk__Êl__Êm__Êy__Ê–üùõòïòìéìòïòìéìéìéìùìéìéìéìéìéìéìùõùæùæùõìéìùõùæùæù_
õùæùõùæùõùæùæùæùõòïæòùõòùæùæùòïòùõòùõòï__€_____€___________€__________
__J_____________
____[__Ê–__Êâ__Ë___ÌH__̆__Ìå__Ìæ__Ìç__Ìð__Í4__ÍN__ÍO__ÍP__Í__ͺ__Î
__Î8__ί__ÎÒ__Ï___Ï___Ï___Ï
__Ï!__ψ__ÏÙ__Ðœ__Ш__Ñ___Ñ0__Ñ>__Ñ?__Ñ@__ÑJ__Ñ}__Ѽ__Ò___ÒV__ÒW__ÒX__
Ò`__Ò¶__Ô&__ÔI__Ôl__ÔÜ__Õ___Õ___Õ___Õ___Õc__Ս__Õ®__Ö#__ÖD__ÖZ__Ö•__ÖÒ
__×___×F__×G__×H__×R__×r__Ø,__Ø™__ØÐ__ØÑ__Øì__Ù___Ù{__Ù™__Ù¯__Ù°__Ù±__
Ùú__Ú___Ú1__Ú2__Ú3__Ú>__Ú–__ÚØ__ÛK__Û}__ÛÔ__Üo__Ü}__Ü¢__ÜÐ__Üæüùüùüöòü
ùüöîüëèëèëèëüöòüùüùüùüöîüùüùüöòüùüùüùüöîüùüùüùüùüùüöòöåöåöîüùüùüöîüùüö
îüùüùüùüùüùü_____€_____€____________Z_______J____________€___________Z
__Üæ__Ý___Ý“__ÝÕ__Ýô__Ýõ__Ýö__Þ
__ÞI__ß___ßM__ß•__ßË__à___à___à
__àW__à±__àé__áC__ál__ám__án__áˆ__áÞ__â6__âZ__â“__âÓ__âô__ã
__ãT__ãh__ãi__ãj__ãk__ã¡__ã°__ãÒ__ãù__äÅ__äç__å
__åA__å[__å\__å]__å§__åâ__æj__æy__æ‘__æú__ç___ç___ç___ç…__ç¾__è"__èm__
è–__èå__é___é7__é^__é___é`__é¨__éÃ__ê___êD__êy__êÐ__êü__ëJ__ëv__ëÊ__ëõ
__ëö__ë÷__ì___ì0__ìM__ìN__ìO__ì¶__ìß__í=__í³__íã__îI__îy__îãüùüùöòùüùü
ùüùöòïìïìïöòïìïìïìïùüùïöèùüùüùüùüùöèùüùüùüùöòùüùüùüùüùöòùüùüùüùüùüù_èù
üùöèùüùüùüùü__Z______€____________J__________________€_____\__îã__ï___
ï___ï___ï___ï?__ïj__ï__ïË__ïê__ð___ð___ð___ð0__ðd__ðž__ðø__ñ%__ñ&__ñ'
__ñ7__ñ\__ñŸ__ñ __ñ¡__ñ°__ñé__ò___ò___ò___ò8__òˆ__ò¶__ò·__ò¸__ôÒ__õ___
õb__õ×__ö___ö___ö___ö(__öo__öž__öŸ__ö __ö¨__ö×__÷___÷___÷
__÷___÷•__÷“__÷”__÷•__÷ý__ø-__ød__ø¡__øÉ__øÊ__øË__øÛ__ù___ú‰__úæ__û!__
ûm__û‡__ûˆ__û‰__ûÁ__ûö__ü___ü___þy__þ‰___N___e___†___‡___¤___Ý___
___a___°___Ó___ýüùõùòùòùòù_õüïüïüùõüïüùõüïüùõüïüùõüïüïüùõìéìùõìéì
ùõüïüùõüïüïüùåüïüïüïüùõùòùõùòùòùáìéìéìéì___Z_______Z______€___________
€_____€______J__________________Y___ý___R___u___• ___Ì___õ___________\_
__]___^______œ___µ___¶___·___í___________________Ý___
___&___'___(___Y___j__ Ô__ ö___‹___§___¶___·___¸__ ___ +__ í__
$__
v__
Õ__
___
___
___
:__
s__
¼__
½__
¾__
Ç__
û__
___
___
\__
°__
___
___
O__
y__
Â__
Ã___
___V___ï_______e___ƒ___„___…___†______ž___Ó___ë___________b___|_
______F___}___ì_______K___M___N___v___›___â___0___
üùöóöùüùöïùüù_ïùüù_ëùüùöëùüùüùüùöëùüùüùüùöëùüùöïöóöïöóöïöóöïèåèöóöèöïö
ïöóöïöóöóöùüùöïöóöóö_____€____________Z_______J______€________________
_€_____Z___
___u___|___í___ø___a___g___ƒ___…___†___ô_______X___^___g___h___t___¢__
_____:___C___[___ƒ___Á___1___@___M___N___l___±___â___
___"___#___$___C___D___{___|___ƒ___„___…___”___˜___·___ß___à___á_
__â___ä___å___æ___è___ê_______&___'___5___:___;___<___=___C___G___O___
P___R___T___p______‘___Ÿ___¤___¥___¦___§___-
___±___¾___¿üùüùüùüöòöïöïöòöïöïöïöïöïöòöïöïö__ìììììì_ëëëë_ë_ë__öööööïö
ööööö__öööööïööööööë__________________________________________________
_______________________€_€_____€______J____________€___________O______
_V___W___f___s___t__
º__
»___0___1___`___a___“___”__#•__#€__*ß__*à__1•__1–__8h__8i__=x__=y__Eæ_
_Eç__L __L
__Rv__Rw__X2__X3__`f__`g__`¤__`¥__g___g___oK__oL__xÀ__xÁ__• ’__•“__‹1__
‹2__’6__’7__’i__’j__˜U__˜V__ __
__¦÷__¦ø__O__P__[__\__·p__·q__¸¬__¸__ÁD__ÁE__Â-
__®__Ã___Ã___Ãü__Ãý__ÄQ__ÄRùòòëëäëäëÝëëëäëäëäëäëäëäëäëäëäëäëëëäëäëäëÖ
ëäëäëëëäëäëäëäëëëäÏÈÁºÁºÁºÁºÁºÁ____ö__________à__ö__!À______à__ö__!À__
____à_____________h_____!À______à_____!À______à_____________à_____!À__
____à_____!À______à_____!À______àI__ÄR__Äö__Ä÷__Æ___Æ___Ɖ__ÆŠ__ÊN__ÊO
__Êk__Êl__Ìå__Ìæ__ÍN__ÍO__Ï___Ï
__Ñ>__Ñ?__ÒV__ÒW__Õ___Õ___×F__×G__ØÏ__ØÐ__Ù¯__Ù°__Ú1__Ú2__Ýô__Ýõ__à___
à___ál__ám__ãi__ãj__å[__å\__ç___ç___é^__é___ëõ__ëö__ìM__ìN__ï___ï___ð_
__ð___ñ%__ñ&__ñŸ__ñ __ò___ò___ò¶__ò·__ö___ö___öž__öŸ__÷___÷___÷“__÷”__
øÉ__øÊ__û‡__ûˆ__ü___ü____…___†___\___]___µ___¶___________&___'ùòùòùòëò
ùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòåßùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùòùò
ùòùòùò_______________________ö__!À____à__ö________à_____________à__ö__
!À______à__ö__________àT___'___¶___·__
___
___
¼__
½__
___
___
___
___
Á__
Â___„___…___œ______________L___M___„___…___f___g___L___M___"___#___$_
__…___†___à___á___â___ã___ä___å___æ___P___¿õêßÔßÔÍÆÍÆÍÆÍÆÍÆÍÆÍÆÍÆÍÆÍÆÍ
ÁºÁ³Á³Á³³ÁÁÁÁ_________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________!À______à_____________h____________ö__!
À______à__ö__________à_
ö__!À______à____ ¨___
ö__________à____ ¨___
___!À______à____ ¨___
___________à____ ¨__(___Y_______________Normal + Palatino
12_Academic_para1_para2_cent6_para7_cent8_para9_para23_>ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
_______________________________________________–ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
_________________7__x__x____"________________à
___________à
_________________________`__à
___________\_ ____________`_û
___________„____ó_ô___ö____________________Þ___Þ_Þ_Þ_Þ_Þ
Þ_Þ_______ð___ù__ __ §__
ç___ˆ_______•______
â__"l__#Þ__&__(ž__*h__,Þ__4$__6[__8\__9!__;j__? __Bã__J!__L{__P*__Së_
_Tñ__U´__W____S__`Ó__cü__dY__dì__eM__k¶__l–__n=__r¬__w²__•Ô__€§__ƒ+__ƒ
ì__„¯__ˆ<__Œ
__ƒ__!__”²__•ë__—>__:__žò__¢#__£Ä__¥à__¨5__©Ä__¬@___£_________
______________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________<__ Ô__
ž__
ò__
í__
B__
ç___ö___z___?___\___Ö___?_______/___G______
7__!À__" __#"__&å__(ö__*]__,Z__.L__0___2O__4æ__5>__7õ__9
__:___:•__; __;§__? __?__?ö__@„__Aº__Dx__E __Jv__MM__M¦__N
__O___Q§__Sõ__T__U___Uñ__V²__Xu__X•__Y
__[=__^u___W__b=__c___c_______________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________;__
í___\___/__!R__(W__/^__6·__=@__Cü__L5__S{__Y
__a3__c___ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________
ÿÿ___ ____ÿÿ________ÿÿ___ ____ÿÿ___
____ÿÿ___
____ÿÿ___
____ÿÿ___
____ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ____
____ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ______€_ÿÿ____]×€_ÿÿ____
V%€_ÿÿ____O¶€_ÿÿ____Hã€_ÿÿ____AÀ€_ÿÿ____:»€_ÿÿ___
3´€_ÿÿ___!,[€_ÿÿ___"%Ò€_ÿÿ___#__€_ÿÿ___$_Ý€_ÿÿ___%_—€_ÿÿ___&
_€_ÿÿ___'_ß__ÿÿ___(_________£@_ÿÿÿÿ_______y__
Ÿ_______;__#‹__*ï__2/__9˜__@³__Gò__O;__V€__]__d¼__kõ__sD__z©__‚
__‰·__•É__—A__žô__¥ã__¬F__³ __¶•__¶•__¶•__¶•__¶•__¶•__¶•__¶•__¶•__¶•__
¶•__¶•__¶•___£__ÿÿ_____0__ÿÿ_____€__ÿÿ_____0__ÿÿ_____3__ÿÿ_____C__ÿÿ__
___•__ÿÿ___ _(__ÿÿ_____Ï__ÿÿ___ _"__ÿÿ___
____ÿÿ___
_*__ÿÿ___
 _¡__ÿÿ___
_¨__ÿÿ_____R__ÿÿ_____J__ÿÿ_____p__ÿÿ_____Ý__ÿÿ________ÿÿ_____n__ÿÿ____
_a__ÿÿ____
³__ÿÿ________ÿÿ________ÿÿ_____3P_ÿÿ_____î@_ÿÿ______R_ÿÿ______B_ÿÿ_____
_R_ÿÿ______B_ÿÿ______R_ÿÿ______B_ÿÿ___
__R_ÿÿ___!__B_ÿÿ___"__R_ÿÿ___#__B_ÿÿ___$__R_ÿÿ___%__B_ÿÿ___&__R_ÿÿ___'
_________/___0___P___V__‘+__¬C__¬D__¬E__¬F__¬z__¶Ž___£__!À____!À____!À
____!À__@_!À____!À____!À____!À____!À____!À___$!À______________aß__·q__
Ê–__Üæ__îã___ý___
___¿_Ž___‘_’_“_”_•______ÄR___'___¿_–_—_˜___________H_P_____ð_€ÿÜÿì_ô
_”___(_ü__ý__•_ _____à___ _
_____/þ_______________________________________________________________
=à/Ð_ __ ____ÐN_______@______P__
-:ImageWriter_
_____(___K_þ_(___µ__€_____É__É__€_€___É______ü___________/___>___B_
__a___ú___P___o___V___W___Ž___•___–___—__‘+__‘8__«®__«¶__¬C__¬D__¬F__¬
P__¬x__¶Ž__¶__Á,__Á.__Á0__ÁL__Ál__Ám__Á{__Á€__Á__Á‚__Áƒ__Á‰__ÁŠ__ÁŽ_
_Â-___¢___£€____________T_______…__€____”__€____˜_______r_______
__€____$_______€__€____C__€____D__€____{__€____|__€____ƒ______`£__€___
_±______’M__€____G______¬Ã_______à_______â__€___P__€____·______-
Z_______¾__
___·q__ ____P__ ____R__ ____T__ ____p__ ____•__ ____‘__ ____Ÿ__ ____¤_
_ ____¥__ ____¦__ ____§__ ___Â___ ______ ___Â___
___®_______#________________________________

View publication stats