The Abraham Accords in light of the Gaza conflict.

By
Szabó Ariel Endre

Budapest Corvinus Egyetem, Hungary

1. Introduction.

The coming of October 7th made many believe it was the funeral of the Abraham Accords,
that the break-through of some Arab states finally normalising relations with Israel in a
cooperation agreement was for nought and progress would be lost. To some extent, many had
good reasons for worry, and still do. The pillars holding up the Accords were undoubtedly
shaken and are currently put to the test. As of now (May of 2024), the half-year mark, the
hopeful but bumpy road towards regional peace has been jeopardised. The paper aims to give
a clear picture of where we currently stand on this road, and how the construction of the road
can continue with the deep canyon in its path, that is the conflict.

2. Methodology

This is the research methodology chapter, which entails explanations of how the research was
conducted, Also analysis of the status of the road towards peace and normalisation of
relations with Israel in the Levant and Gulf regions, and the Abraham Accords amidst our
current Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Research Question.

The questions awaiting answers are: will the Abraham Accords continue holding its ground,
and how are the Accords and the regional relations changing in light of the conflict?

The Research Method.

The relativist approach of the paper manifests in the acknowledgement and examination of
the diverse perspectives of the signatories, like the response of the Palestinians to the signings
and the powers’ involvement in the region. The research includes interpretations, mainly of
the Abraham Accords and of actions taken by the actors leading to constrained reactions of
other ones, all before, during and after, in the light of October 7th. Though the research is of a
qualitative nature, quantitative sources and data are also used. The type of research is both
descriptive as in summarising key aspects of the Accords and relations, and explanatory as in
examining and explaining the stabilising and destabilising factors of the region.

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Core Elements, Way of Showcasing.

The main actors are the decision makers such as Benjamin Netanyahu and leaders of other
signed countries such as Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, whose statements and
countries' opinions are discussed. The paper is divided into three sections A, B and C: A.
Discussion of the Abraham Accords, reasons for the signings and relations of the signatories
at the beginning of the normalisation and its status up until October 7th, using Meir
Ben-Shabbat’s and David Aaronson’s [The Abraham Accords, Two Years On: Impressive
Progress, Multiple Challenges, and Promising Potential] paper, published by the Institute for
National Security Studies (INSS). B. The reasons for the breaking point that is October 7th
and what it meant for the Accords, this section includes the reactions of not only the signed
but of the prospects for signing such as the Saudis. This section is granted the highest level of
attention, as there is much to uncover and it is where the answers to the research question lie.
Raw data for comparisons from primary sources such as the annual reports of the Abraham
Accords Peace Institute is used. C. Is the section for feasible predictions of the future of the
region based on research, and of the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which a soon
arriving end would benefit all.

3. Discussion of A, B and C.

A.1 The reasons for the birth of the Abraham Accords

The year is 2020, the year in which the seemingly never-ending refusal to open up,
‘non-forced’, diplomatic relations with Israel of the Arab states, has been reignited in the
form of a domino effect like shattering. The stubborn refusal mainly stemmed from the
ill-ruling of the English mandate of Palestine in 1948. This was then followed by wars and
efforts of peace-making (Zeidan, 2024). The efforts were never long-lasting or drastic,
regional enough, due to the Palestinians' unspoken right of veto in the formings of relations in
the region. (Szalai, 2024). The Abraham Accords began as the Trump administration’s new
advance in the promotion of the culture of peace, on this occasion among the three main
religions of the Middle East. The accords were signed between Israel and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. It is important to note that the first two

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signatories hold more significance for regional peace. The reasons for this are that Morocco
is far away politically and more importantly geographically, and Sudan, while sharing its
political far-being also has larger issues at hand amidst its civil war. As it is written in the
Accords, the agreements are the normalisation of relations leading to regional stability in
hopes of successful cooperation in mitigating risks of conflicts, the opening of economic
opportunities, and signatories sharing the reaping of its benefits (Abraham Accords, 2020).
These were the reasons viewed with a liberal lens, but by putting on its counterpart, the realist
lens, as suggested by Wassim Hamdi (2023) in his thesis, we can take notice of an interesting
theory taking form, the ‘balance of threat’ theory by Stephen M. Walt (1987). From what
threat, from whom are the signatory Arab countries afraid of? Iran. Specifically, the Iran
described by Ryszard Kapuściński (1985) in his book [Shah of Shahs], is the aftermath of the
Islamic revolution against its ‘West-sided’ leader Mohammed Reza. The new Islamic
Republic under Khomeini led a highly anti-western policy and was directly challenging the
United States in the field of influence in the region. Iran did so by sending the stinging breeze
of its Islamic Revolution across to other parts of the Muslim world. The leaders of the said
Arab countries are more lenient towards the ideas of the West. They see the rays of peace by
rather being closer to Israel and the US, than to Iran and its way of peace, turbulent and
dangerous. The historic divide between Sunni and Shia, Saudi and Iran, Islam also plays a
role in this way of thinking (Abdo, 2017).

A.2 Accomplishments of the Accords up to October 7th.

At the 2-year mark of the Accords, in 2022, suggested by the previously mentioned article of
Ben-Shabbat and David Aaronson, “Progress to date has been systematic and rapid, and the
overall picture is optimistic and promising.” (Ben-Shabbat & Aaronson, 2022, p.1). Several
regional projects focusing on energy, water and food, medicine and even education were
already on their way by this time, all of which were enhancing the way of living and were
foreshadowing the age of peace. Leaders and actors of diplomacy of each country had regular
official visits and went on to sign further cooperation agreements. As noted in the article, the
change in the head of administration of the US was not an issue, Biden’s administration kept
its optimism and motivation for reaching peace in the region. But as the continuation of the
quote goes, “At the same time, there is still a long way to go before the potential of the
Accords is fully realised.” (Ben-Shabbat & Aaronson, 2022, p.1). There was still much to do,

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nevertheless seeing that the Accords was moving on its intended trajectory was an enormous
victory to all of those yearning for the US, Israeli way of peace.

B.1 October 7th of 2023 and concept of settler colonialism, the deep canyon.

The Palestinian issue and its context in academia make the dismissal of ‘settler colonialism’
very difficult. When considering the Israeli-Palestinian case, it is important to understand
what the term means. Definition from the Legal Information Institute suggests that “The
concept of settler colonialism can be defined as a system of oppression based on genocide
and colonialism, that aims to displace a population of a nation (oftentimes indigenous people)
and replace it with a new settler population.” (Wex Definitions Team, 2022). As expressed by
Mohammed Fadel (2024), in his [Law Breaking, Law Making and International Law:
Palestine, Israel and the Foundations of International Law], the breaching of international law
occurs on both sides, but as he continues to argue, Israel’s law-breaking is more grief. It
directly goes against fundamental principles of the post-World Wars order, whilst Palestine’s
law-breaking is only the need for them to obtain the de jure right to independence. There is a
mistake in both of these citations, and they are the reason why the full condemnation of Israel
is not possible. Firstly, the settler colonialism definition fails to fully adhere to the case at
hand since the ‘sons of Israel’ are considered just as, and common argumentation of even
more, indigenous to the land. This could very well be a new form of settler colonialism, Israel
is ticking out all the other requirements for settler colonisation, even so, based on the old
definition it does not fill out the mold. Secondly, Fadel’s argumentation creates the illusion of
an innocent Palestine whose acts are justifiable for its fight for independence. Any paper that
chooses to not take account of the shortcomings of both sides or paints either as a martyr state
is fundamentally wrong. Both sides’ and outside of the conflict power’s influence, decisions
and intentions caused this newest chapter of the conflict, the deep canyon.

B.2 The influence the conflict had on the signatories and their opinion on it.

All the leaders of the Arab world were pressured and called to action by their people, as
shown by the [Arab Public Opinion about Israel's War on Gaza] (Arab Center Washington
DC, 2024). This was the deepest cut for regional peace ever since the birth of the Accords,
the ‘political cost’ of the signed and not yet signed Arab states' cooperation with Israel has
risen exponentially, although the strategic reasonings, like the previously mentioned balance

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of threat, remained unchanged (Szalai, 2024). There are numerous important reasons as to
why the world was not a witness to immediate rescissions by the Accords signatories, two
basic ones follow this: Firstly, The important line in the Israel-Bahrain agreement, which is
similarly stated in the other ones, of signatories “recognizing each State's right to sovereignty
and to live in peace and security, and continuing the efforts to achieve a just, comprehensive,
and enduring resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Abraham Accords, 2020, p. 1).
The conflict is swinging far on the opposite side of finding a resolution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite this, it is the line of recognising each state’s right to
sovereignty and security that those in favour of the peace-wanting can cling onto and keep
the Accords alive, unbreached. Secondly, the acts of Hamas have caused an alarm in the eyes
of the anti-Islam radicalisation Arab leaders. Not just for the reasons of the terror attack, but
the following destabilisation it has caused in the region. It became clear that Iran is revisionist
in terms of wanting to continue its fight for influence against the US and spread radical Islam
around the Muslim world even if that costs chaos (Szalai, 2024).

B.3 Current ground where the Accords stands.

According to the [AAPI-Annual

Report-Executive Summary] in the
Table illustrating cumulative total trade
between Israel and signatory countries
in USD millions (Abraham Accords
Peace Institute, 2023:p.5), the rate of
growth in trade between Israel and the
signed countries did receive a blow,
nonetheless, despite the conflict, is still
managed to surpass last years
cumulative total trade. The report also
mentions that despite October 7th, the
leaders of the countries are sticking to their commitment to the agreements. A highly
anticipated ally, the Saudi's anti-Iran standpoint is clear. Proof of this is Reema bint Bandar
Al Saud ambassador to the US’ statement in response to calling for Saudi to join the Accords
at the 2024 World Economic Forum in Davos: “peace and prosperity, not
normalisation”(Abbas, 2024) clarifying Saudi position on normalisation with Israel while

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also declaring it intentions of wanting peace. Considering this part of the paper, the Accords
will continue its trajectory, and relations between Israel and the signatories were put to the
test by the conflict, yet instead of weakening it, it strengthened it, granting both the outline of
the opposing sides to be and the interests each state possesses to be more clear.

C. Feasible solutions to the conflict and predictions of the future given Egypt.

Just like Saudi, Egypt is a very important prospect for signing, just as Ofir Winter, Morr Link
and Adam Sharon (2023) mention its indisputable role in the future development for peace of
the region. Egypt’s goals and needs towards Israel are similar to other not-yet-signed Sunni
Muslim countries. This is the reason for its example of visions of the future of Gaza, having
the ability to grant a bigger picture of a feasible future. To foster collaboration between Israel
and Egypt concerning the future of the Gaza Strip, both nations must craft a cohesive
strategic blueprint that bridges their differences. There's a need for Gaza to embrace the
concept of demilitarisation and engage in confidence-building measures with Israel. This
entails discontinuing provocative rhetoric in the media, revamping educational materials, and
terminating financial support to terrorists and their families. These actions also align with the
Biden administration's vision of Gaza, not just with Sunni Muslim states. If Egypt wants to
oppose granting the Israeli military unrestricted access to Gaza, as it most likely will, it
should propose alternative solutions for ensuring Israel's security and actively partake in their
execution. Furthermore, Egypt should reaffirm its commitment to the military provisions
outlined in the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. (Winter & Link & Sharon, 2023)

4. Conclusion

October 7th was regarded as the ‘Day of Judgement’ of the Arab-Israeli normalisation by the
world, because of the shockwaves the events have caused and are currently still causing. But
what this research aims to give as an answer to us is, that these shockwaves, the deep canyon,
instead of getting in the way of the building of good relations, halting the construction,
instead gave an incentive for the signed countries to unite against a common ‘threat’ or at
least stay allied with Israel, begin a joint construction of a bridge across the canyon. The
takeaway conclusion is, that what we are facing is temporary in the grand scheme of things

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and this might just be the first 21st-century practical, empirical step for the peace the land
deserves.

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Strömbom, L., & Persson, A. (2023). The two-state impasse in

Israel/Palestine–The EU caught between egalitarian norms and expansionist realpolitik.
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