COGITO ERGO SUM

MAGNA CARTA
MAINS 2023
PAPER II CRASH COURSE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS : LEC 10B

EXTENDED NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS
MAJOR POWERS
THEMATIC ISSUES

ATISH MATHUR OFFICIAL

 OFFICIAL SYLLABUS IR LECTURE PLAN

India and its neighbourhood- relations

Bilateral, regional and global groupings and Lecture 10 :
agreements involving India and/or affecting
India’s interests. Neighbourhood, Extended
Effect of policies and politics of developed Neighbourhood, Major Powers,
and developing countries on India’s interests, Focus Countries
Indian Diaspora Institutions & Agreements
Important International institutions, agencies Thematic Issues
and fora- their structure, mandate.
PYQs : 2013-2022
 G 20

1. Context
a. The G20 was formed in 1999 in the backdrop of the financial crisis of the late 1990s that hit East Asia and Southeast Asia in particular. Its aim was to secure global financial stability by
involving middle-income countries. Together, the G20 countries include 60 per cent of the world’s population, 80 per cent of global GDP, and 75 per cent of global trade.
b. The G20 has no permanent secretariat. The agenda and work are coordinated by representatives of the G20 countries, known as ‘Sherpas’, who work together with the finance ministers
and governors of the central banks
2. Why does G20 Matter?
a. Together, the nations of the G20 account for around 80 percent of global economic output, nearly 75 percent of global exports, and about 60 percent of the world’s population. These
figures have remained relatively stable while the corresponding rates for Group of Seven (G7) nations, a smaller group of advanced democracies, have shrunk, as larger emerging
markets take up a relatively greater share of the world’s economy.
3. India’s role in the G20
a. India wants its presidency to be “inclusive, ambitious, decisive, and action-oriented”. With that aim, it has decided to focus on six priorities
i. Green Development, Climate Finance and LiFE: Climate finance and technology, along with “ensuring just energy transitions for developing nations across the world”, are key
priority areas for India during its presidency.
ii. Accelerated, resilient and inclusive growth: India is concentrating on areas that can usher in structural transformation, such as promoting labour rights and secure labour welfare,
addressing the global skills gap and so on
iii. Accelerating progress on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): India has already had success in getting the G20 members, which includes 19 countries and the European Union,
on board with this goal.
iv. Technological Transformation and Digital Public Infrastructure: According to MEA, India will endorse a “human-centric approach to technology, and facilitate greater knowledge-
sharing in priority areas like digital public infrastructure, financial inclusion, and tech-enabled development in sectors ranging from agriculture to education”.
v. Multilateral Institutions for the 21st Century: India will push for a “more accountable, inclusive just, equitable and representative multipolar international system” that is capable of
addressing the concerns of this century.
vi. Women-led development: Not just women empowerment and representation, India will emphasise bringing women to leading positions to bolster socio-economic development.
4. Why is India’s presidency significant?
a. India assumed the G20 presidency in December last year and will continue to hold it till 30 November 2023
b. India steering the G20 agenda has come at a time when the world is making a post-COVID-19 recovery, while also facing challenges such as global economic stability, Russia’s war in
Ukraine, and heightening food and energy insecurity.
c. With India at the helm of G20, it has decided to focus on being a “voice” of the Global South.
d. As India aims to emerge as a prominent player on the global stage, G20 is providing the chance for the country to prove its mettle by not only raising international issues but also
offering solutions. The summit serves as a platform for India to showcase its growth and propose some of its models to the world as possible solutions.
 G 20

1. Impact of G20
a. Since its inception, the G20 has worked to encourage the formation of consensus on international issues. It played a key role in steering the world out of a global economic crisis in
2008-2010. Many experts credit the G20 with quick action
b. In 2008 and 2009, G20 nations agreed to spend $4 trillion to revive their economies, rejected trade barriers, and implemented far-reaching reforms to the financial system.
c. Since the economic crisis, the G20 has made commitments around issues that could be considered to fall under the “social agenda.” In 2014, in Brisbane, it pledged to reduce the gap
between men and women in the workforce by 25 per cent by 2025.
d. In 2017, in Hamburg, the G20 launched the “Compact with Africa” initiative, which aims to promote and improve private sector development and investment. The same year, 19
members vowed to uphold their commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate change, despite the then-US president Donald Trump’s announcement that his country would be
pulling out.
e. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the G20 undertook many measures to support economies and supply chains. It also lent its support to international organisations – the World Health
Organization (WHO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In March 2020, G20 nations committed to pumping more than $5 trillion into the global economy and contributing to the
WHO-led COVID-19 solidarity response fund. Moreover, the G20 countries agreed to ease the burden of debts by allowing the poorest countries to suspend repayment of official
bilateral credit.
f. At the 2021 Rome summit, countries agreed to curb emissions of methane and end public financing for most new coal power plants overseas. In 2022, Indonesia, the host country, also
agreed to close coal power plants in exchange for $20 billion in financing from high-income countries, including the United States.

Given the asymmetry in capabilities and resources, how India can leverage the G20 presidency and come out with a successful Leaders’ Declaration for building a shared global future is the
challenge. Meanwhile, India can offer lessons from its experiments and experiences. These include the promotion of nature-based solutions through traditional practices. It will be worth
observing how India will convert the expectations and challenges in front of it to reach a consensus on the various commitments agreed upon in various meetings held so far and come out
with a Leaders’ Declaration.
 Global South - India

1. Context : India hosted a two-day Voice of Global South Summit in a virtual format in January 2023. Today, the world is facing unprecedented crisis of 3Fs : Food, Fuel, and
Fertilisers with the most impact on Global South
a. Meaning
i. ‘Global North’ refers loosely to countries like the US, Canada, Europe, Russia, Australia and New Zealand, while ‘Global South’ includes countries in Asia, Africa and South
America
ii. Refers to various countries around the world that are sometimes described as “developing,” “less developed” or “underdeveloped.” Many of these countries – although by
no means all – are in the Southern Hemisphere, largely in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
iii. The term “Global South” is not geographical. In fact, the Global South’s two largest countries – China and India – lie entirely in the Northern Hemisphere.
iv. Countries in the Global South were mostly at the receiving end of imperialism and colonial rule, with African countries as perhaps the most visible example of this.
v. Given the imbalanced past relationship between many of the countries of the Global South and the Global North – both during the age of empire and the Cold War – it is
little wonder that today many opt not to be aligned with any one great power.
vi. By 2030 it is projected that three of the four largest economies will be from the Global South – with the order being China, India, the United States and Indonesia
vii. Already the GDP in terms of purchasing power of the the Global South-dominated BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – surpasses that of the Global
North’s G7 club
viii. “Voice of Global South Summit–2023” - in
2. The challenges before Global South
a. The great power rivalries impacting the decision-making process at the global level. For instance, the Ukraine war significantly affected the decision-making process at the
recently-concluded G-20 Foreign Ministers’ Summit
i. A November 2022 FAO study titled Responding to the Ukrainian Crisis: Leveraging Social Protection for Food Security and Nutrition stated: “If the conflict persists, the global
number of undernourished people could increase by 8 to 13 million people in 2022/23, with the most pronounced increases taking place in Asia-Pacific, followed sub-
Saharan Africa, and the Near East and North Africa.”
ii. This demonstrates that the countries of the Global South are the most vulnerable to Ukraine crisis. Along with the food crisis, the rise in energy costs and fertilizer prices
also pose a substantial challenge to the Global South. Hence there is a need to relook at how essential commodities can reach the Global South and there is a need for
securitisation of the supply chain for the Global South is paramount.
b. Need to carry out a reform in the multilateral decision-making processes.
c. The Global North is continuing its hegemonic practice of imposing normative idioms, thus disrupting the functioning and cohesiveness of the Global South. A good example is
the lack of consensus between Global North and Global South over the question of democracy, Responsibility to Protect, and agenda for climate governance.
d. In 2022, the price of a barrel of oil crossed over $100, resulting in the hardest hit countries being from the Global South. The depletion of energy supply to the Global South
countries affects other sectors of the economy.
3. Way Forward
a. It is only through such sustained engagement that they will be able to address their mutual suspicions and build trust.
 Global South - India

1. Reformed multilateral institutionalism and Global South

a. Critical issue that needs greater attention from the Global South's perspective is the need to reform the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) along with other multilateral
bodies to ensure equitable representation from the Global South.
b. The countries of the Global South have new aspirations and challenges. In this context, the Global South perspective has assumed importance. A classic case is a need to need
to reform UNSC by giving representation to rising powers like India, Japan, South Africa, and Brazil. Thus broadening the membership of the UNSC is an important step towards
democratising international relations. The crisis of multilateralism came to the fore when the Covid-19 Pandemic struck the global community.
c. The digitalisation of the global economy also offers new challenges to the Global South. The protectionist measures the Global North is pursuing despite the coming up of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) is also a cause of concern for the Global South. In this regard, the existing multilateral institutions like the G-77 and G-20, where the Global
South countries have fair representation, need to be revitalised to address global issues more democratically.
d. The concern of global multilateral bodies is to ensure equity in the global decision-making process rather than being hostage to the whims of the Global North. The impetus that
the Global South movement got from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and its policy of “positive neutrality” needs to be recrafted to ensure a better bargaining strategy with
the Global North in the conduct of international negotiation.
2. Need for an alternative approach to global normative order
a. Global South is confronting with in the global arena is the dialectic approach to normative issues like democracy, human rights, and the Responsibility to Protect.
i. Global North uses these normative idioms as a matrix to ensure its dominance over the Global South.
ii. It has been observed that though there are certain common principles which can be the basis of democracy but the usage of “democracy promotion” by the Global North
has been a geopolitical tool. The same can be evident from the Colour Revolution which shook the countries of the post-Soviet space along with the Arab Spring in West Asia
and North Africa. As studies suggest in both cases, Western-sponsored NGOs having ulterior goals played a pivotal role in ousting existing political elites.
iii. One of the causes of Ukraine War can be traced back to the pro-Western regime change in 2004 and the subsequent political chaos, including the Crimean crisis of 2014.
Hence the notion of democracy though has a universal appeal but has to be contextualised in socio-cultural and historical processes. The Global North’s double standard in
promoting and practicing democratic values has been subject to criticism. Like the concept of democracy, there is a need to look at the concepts of Human Rights and the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
iv. It has been observed that using R2P as a pretext, the Global North intervenes in different countries to achieve its narrower geopolitical goal. The Libyan crisis, along with the
recent Ukrainian crisis, is a classic example of this. The preponderance of the Western Liberal order in world politics and the subsequent weakening of the United Nations in
the decision-making domain has given primacy to R2P. Hence, reinterpreting the notion of R2P instead of looking at it from narrower Western prisms is the need of the hour.
b. The complexity of global geopolitics, along with the lack of consensus on normative norms at the global level, calls for dialogue between Global North and Global South. This
can be a step towards bringing out resiliency in global geopolitics. In this regard, India can play a significant role in evolving consensus and acting as a bridge between the two
blocs.
 Global South - India

1. India’s approach to Global South

a. India’s rich history as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and its economic and geopolitical clout in global politics are propelling New Delhi to play a greater role in global
geopolitics. Assuming the position of G-20 Presidency in 2022-23 is a testimony to this.
b. At the same time, being the leader of the Global South, India provides a voice to the Global South Movement. Whether on the question of climate change, energy transition,
taking a stand on normative issues or protecting the Global South's interest, India played a proactive role in international forums over the years. The rise of India, as both
scholars and policymakers argue, “disrupted” the status-quo nature of international relations, especially in the aftermath of the post-1991. By giving voice to the Global South
countries, India helped in bringing out an alternative narrative to global geopolitics.
i. In this context, India is the forerunner in global and sustainable energy transitions. At various climate Summits, India resisted the onslaught from the Global North and
protected the interest of the Global South be it on the question of climate financing, limiting the emission norms, or highlighting the Global North’s responsibility as the
historical polluter.
c. The issue of ensuring equity and climate justice along with access to technology, to also democratising energy governance in the global arena, have been some of the core
concerns of India over the years. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that India has been the key player in the global energy transition discourses over the years. Some of the
significant contributions to the arena of energy transition framework are International Solar Alliance and the push to hydrogen-based fuel. Over the years, India provided
technical assistance to the countries of the Global South in harnessing solar energy and hydrogen-based fuel.
d. India’s approach to global energy security as well as energy transition was aptly highlighted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the G-20 Summit in Bali in November 2022
where he underlined the need for “stability in the energy market”. He further highlighted the need for “time-bound and affordable finance and sustainable supply of technology
to developing countries is essential for inclusive energy transition”. The observation is aptly relevant for Global South as it is confronting multiple challenges in the context of
the energy transition.
e. Similarly, India’s approach to democratising international relations and reforming the United Nations has been consistent with the demand of the Global South over the years.
Reforming the United Nations and broadening the UN Security Council’s permanent membership are some of the constant demands India has raised over the years.
i. India’s approach to reforming United Nations and democratising multilateralism was outlined in Norms: New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System, a policy paper
published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 2022. The paper outlined the need to reform multilateral forums and stated that reformed multilateralism “is a must for the
post-Covid-19 era”.
ii. Paper further outlined five key pillars of India’s approach to reform the multilateral forums. These pillars are "(1) Samman (Respect); (2) Sambvad (Dialogue); (3) Sahyog
(Cooperation); (4) Shanti (Peace) (5) Samriddhi (Prosperity)."
f. Democratising the international institutions, as well as the five pillars of democracy as enunciated in the above-mentioned policy paper, reflects in the normative ethos of G-20
under India’s presidency. The mottos of G-20, which India is chairing, is based on “One Earth, One Family, One Future” — rooted in the Indian ethos of “vasudhaiva
kutumbakam”— and “Sustainable Peace”. Hence India’s approach provides a guiding light to the Global South movement.
g. India rejects the imposition of democracy from above as the Euro-Atlantic system pursues. On the other hand, India strongly emphasizes the socio, economic-cultural context,
and institutional dimensions in the functioning of democracy.
i. From the Syrian crisis to the current Ukrainian crisis, India supported the policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs of a country by external powers. India consistently
advocates that the Ukrainian crisis can be resolved through dialogue between Russia and Ukraine rather than through third-party intervention.
 India-Australia

1. Context
a. Shared values of pluralistic, Westminster-style democracies, Commonwealth traditions, expanding economic engagement, and increasing high-level interaction.
b. Several common traits, including strong, vibrant, secular, and multicultural democracies, a free press, an independent judicial system, and English language, serve as the
foundation for closer co-operation and multifaceted interaction between the two countries.
c. The end of the Cold War and beginning of India’s economic reforms in 1991 provided the impetus for the development of closer ties between the two nations. The ever-
increasing numbers of Indian students travelling to Australia for higher education, and the growing tourism and sporting links, have played a significant role in strengthening
bilateral relations.
d. With the passage of time, ties evolved in the direction of a strategic relationship, alongside the existing economic engagement. In recent years, the relationship has charted a
new trajectory of transformational growth. With greater convergence of views on issues such as international terrorism, and a shared commitment to a rules-based order in the
Indo-Pacific region, the two democracies have taken their cooperation to plurilateral formats, including the Quad (with the United States and Japan).
e. Bilateral trade amounts to USD 116.36 billion in 2021
2. China factor
a. Ties between Australia and China were strained after Canberra in 2018 banned Chinese telecom firm Huawei from the 5G network. Later, it called for an inquiry into the origins
of Covid-19, and slammed China’s human rights record in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. China responded by imposing trade barriers on Australian exports, and by cutting off all
ministerial contact.
b. India has been facing an aggressive Chinese military along the border. New Delhi and Canberra have been assessing the Chinese challenge since 2013.
3. Wide cooperation
a. Economic cooperation: The Economic Cooperation Trade Agreement (ECTA) — the first free trade agreement signed by India with a developed country in a decade — entered
into force in December 2022, and has resulted in an immediate reduction of duty to zero on 96% of Indian exports to Australia in value (that is 98% of the tariff lines) and zero
duty on 85% of Australia’s exports (in value) to India. Bilateral trade was US$ 27.5 billion in 2021; with ECTA, there is potential for it to reach around US$ 50 billion in five years.
b. People-to-people ties: India is one of the top sources of skilled immigrants to Australia. As per the 2021 Census, around 9.76 lakh people in Australia reported their ancestry as
Indian origin, making them the second largest group of overseas-born residents in Australia. To celebrate India@75, the Australian government illuminated more than 40
buildings across the country, and Prime Minister Albanese issued a personal video message.
c. Education: The Mechanism for Mutual Recognition of Educational Qualifications (MREQ) was signed on March 2 this year. This will facilitate mobility of students between India
and Australia. Deakin University and University of Wollongong are planning to open campuses in India. More than 1 lakh Indian students are pursuing higher education degrees
in Australian universities, making Indian students the second largest cohort of foreign students in Australia.
d. Defence cooperation: The 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue was held in September 2021, and the Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Australia visited in June 2022. The
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) was concluded during the Virtual Summit in June 2020, and the two militaries held several joint exercises in 2022. Australia will host
military operations with India, Japan, and the US in the “Malabar” exercises off the coast of Perth in August, and has invited India to join the Talisman Sabre exercises later this
year.
e. Clean energy: The countries signed a Letter of Intent on New and Renewable Energy in February 2022 which provides for cooperation towards bringing down the cost of
renewable energy technologies, especially ultra low-cost solar and clean hydrogen. During the Virtual Summit in March 2022, India announced matching funds of AUD 10 million
for Pacific Island Countries under Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) and of AUD 10 million for Pacific Island Countries under International Solar Alliance (ISA).
 India-France

1. Context
a. 25th Anniversary of the Strategic Partnership between France and India
b. India and France released a roadmap “Horizon 2047” to advance bilateral cooperation over the next 25 years, which will mark 100 years of India’s independence and 50 years of
the India-France strategic partnership. This futuristic vision is only likely to catapult the relationship to greater heights.
2. Partnership for security, sovereignty
a. Defence: Continuation of the cooperation on fighter jets and submarines, following the timely delivery of the 36 Rafale jets for the IAF and the success of the P75 programme
(six Scorpene submarines).
b. Space: Scientific and commercial partnership is being enhanced through several agreements between France’s CNES and India’s ISRO, notably concerning reusable launchers;
finalization of the joint Earth observation satellite, TRISHNA; the first phase of the constellation of maritime surveillance satellites in the Indian Ocean; and the protection of
Indo-French satellites in orbit against the risk of collision.
c. Civil nuclear energy: Both sides welcomed progress on the 6-EPR power plant project in Jaitapur. They decided to launch a cooperation programme on small modular reactors
and advanced modular reactors.
d. Indo-Pacific: Adoption of a roadmap for joint actions in the Indo-Pacific, covering all aspects of our comprehensive strategy for the region. Work on finalising an Indo-French
development fund for third countries, which will enable joint financing of sustainable development projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
e. Counter-terrorism: Strengthening of cooperation between France’s GIGN and India’s National Security Guard.
f. Critical technology: Strengthening of cooperation on cutting-edge digital technology, particularly on supercomputing, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and quantum
computing. Announcement of an agreement between Atos and the Ministry of Earth Sciences of India for the supply of supercomputers worth over Rs 920 crore.
g. Civil aviation: Signing of technical and safety agreements in the field of civil aviation, towards supporting the expansion of routes between France and India, and the growth of
the Indian civil aviation market
3. Partnership for the planet, global issues
a. Plastic pollution: Commitment of France and India for the adoption of an international treaty to put an end to plastic pollution throughout the entire life cycle of plastic
products.
b. Health: Signing of a Letter of Intent on health and medicine, to structure cooperation in hospitals, medical research, digital technology, biotechnology, public health and
combating micro-bacterial resistance as part of the One Health approach.
c. Blue economy: Launch of a partnership between l’lnstitut français de recherche pour l’exploitation de la mer (IFREMER – French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea)
and India’s National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT) on ocean research, under the roadmap on Blue Economy and Ocean Governance adopted by France and India in 2022.
d. Financing the energy transition: Announcement of Rs 923 crore in financing from the French Development Agency for the second phase of India’s flagship sustainable cities
programme “CITIIS 2.0”, in partnership with the European Union and KFW of Germany. Announcement of Rs 246 crore in financing from Proparco for the South Asia Growth
Fund (SAGF III), which will invest in companies promoting energy efficiency, clean energy, and optimization of natural resources in the region. Announcement of a Rs 164-crore
financing from Proparco with Satya Microcapital for giving women in rural India access to microfinance.
e. Decarbonised hydrogen: Announcement of a partnership between McPhy and L&T on manufacturing electrolyzers in India, under the Indo-French roadmap for decarbonised
hydrogen adopted in 2022.
 India-France

1. Partnership for people

a. Student mobility: New target of welcoming 30,000 Indian students in France by 2030. Issuance of a 5-year short-stay Schengen visa for Indian students with a Master’s degree
who have studied at a university in France. Announcement by France of a significant increase in the resources of the Campus France network in India. Creation of international
classes to facilitate the integration of non-French-speaking Indian students into the French higher education system. Signing of two MoUs between the Institut Polytechnique
de Paris (IPP), and IIT Delhi and IIT Madras.
b. Diplomatic and consular network: Announcement of the opening of a Consulate General of India in Marseille and a Bureau de France in Hyderabad.
c. Culture: Announcement of France’s selection as India’s partner for the establishment of a major new National Museum in New Delhi. Announcement of an agreement between
France Médias Monde and Prasar Bharati for the exchange of audio-visual content and the co-production of programmes on areas such as culture, education, science, and
sports.
d. Research: France and India will increase funding of the Indo-French Centre for the Promotion of Advanced Research (IFCPAR/CEFIPRA) in order to fund new projects together.
e. Sports: Signing of a Letter of Intent to structure cooperation in this field, particularly in view of major upcoming sporting events.
f. Civil society: Objective of doubling the number of solidarity and civic service international volunteers in India and France by 2025.
2. The pursuit of strategic autonomy
a. France has traditionally followed an independent policy towards India—after India became a nuclear weapons state in 1998, France was the first Western country to talk to India
despite sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and others. The same year, India signed its first ever Strategic Partnership with France
b. This affinity between the two countries, and France’s cognisance of India’s right and need to exercise its own choices, has removed potential friction points such as differing
positions on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
3. Potential
a. However, in a relationship that continues to be dominated by security issues, trade has remained a laggard. This is in stark contrast to India’s ties with Germany, where
economics forms the bulk of the partnership. The figures are telling—France is only India’s 11th largest foreign investor and in 2022, bilateral trade stood at US$15.8 billion,
increasing consistently year on year, but still remaining below potential. Bilateral trade with Germany, on the other hand, stood at almost US$30 billion in the same year. The
CEO forum held during this visit with business heads from both sides was part of an effort to address this lag. Yet it is through the conclusion of an EU-India Free Trade
Agreement that the maximum trade potential between India and France could be unlocked.
4. Conclusion
a. Even before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, France had replaced Russia as India’s best friend. Perhaps, what is most special about this relationship is its deep-rooted trust and lack
of baggage
 India-Japan

1. Context
a. PM Visit
b. Japan was the second country – the first being the US – with which India set up a 2+2 ministerial dialogue in 2019, creating a framework for the external affairs and defence
ministers of both countries to meet annually.
c. Japan’s $75 billion plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), to work with countries in the region on avoiding debt traps, building infrastructure, and enhancing maritime and
air security
d. As India and Japan hold two important global events in 2023, the G-20 summit in India and the G-7 summit in Japan
e. Japan is amongst India’s most prominent strategic partners today in terms of progress across security, economic development, and status – the three priorities of Indian
foreign policy as espoused by the current government
2. Issues
a. Trade: India-Japan trade remains just a quarter of trade with China; Limited Success of CEPA; entry barrier for Indian companies and products.
b. Different interests: India's exit from REP was disappointing from Japan's view.
c. Common ground: India and Japan relation is developing in backdrop of rising China but not because of mutual grounds of development such as- trade, science & technology
cooperation etc.
d. Difference on Cross-border Data Flow: While India is looking at data localization, under Osaka Track' Japan proposed standardization of cross-border data flow.
e. Pending projects: Flagship bullet train project between Ahmedabad and Mumbai is still a work-in-progress with land acquisition still not complete.
3. Way Forward
a. Despite their recent differences over the Russian invasion of Ukraine (that is, India’s hesitation to condemn Russia), shared concerns over China drive the India-Japan
relationship and this is unlikely to change in the near future. Both sides, therefore, agree to disagree on some issues to preserve their bilateral progress – the benefits of which
extend to their trilateral and quadrilateral networks.
 IPEF & India

1. Context
a. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) was launched jointly by the US and other partner countries of the Indo-Pacific region
b. The 14 IPEF partners represent 40 per cent of global GDP and 28 per cent of global goods and services trade.
c. It seeks to strengthen economic partnership among participating countries with the objective of enhancing resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness
and competitiveness in the region
d. The IPEF framework is structured around four pillars relating to Trade (Pillar I); Supply Chains (Pillar II); Clean Economy (Pillar III); and Fair Economy (Pillar IV). India has joined
Pillars II to IV of IPEF while it had opted out from Pillar-I in September last year and now has an observer status in Pillar-I.
e. The IPEF is commonly seen as the Biden regime’s attempt to challenge China’s rising influence over South and Southeast Asian countries. Through the IPEF, the US wants to
expand its economic leadership in the region and promote its economic and foreign policy interests. By forming alliances with member countries towards building supply chains
and regional connectivity in the physical and digital spheres, the US wants to strengthen its status as an Indo-Pacific economic power.
2. India's Stand & Reasons
a. India is not in a position to join the trade pillar as its components, such as framing of high-standard rules on digital economy, including cross-border data flows and data
localisation, and labour and environment issues, are highly sensitive for it. New Delhi is in the process of consolidating its domestic policies on digital economy and focused on
data protection. Engaging with other nations, including the US, at this stage could be detrimental to domestic policymaking.
b. As far as stronger labour and environment legislation goes, India has always maintained that there are separate forums for these issues, such as the ILO and the UN.
c. In the talks under the IPEF pillars related to supply chains, clean energy, and fair economy, India is participating with an open mind. However, while it is willing to help build
trusted supply chains and promote clean energy and check corruption, it intends to oppose any mandatory commitments on labour and environment standards.
d. It is good to fast-track ongoing negotiations, but India does not want to be rushed into hasty decisions.
e. India also has to weigh what it is getting out of the IPEF. With the US keeping out tariff cuts from the negotiations, it remains to be seen how the deal is made attractive enough
for other members.
 SCO - India

1. Context
a. Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which was attended by China’s President Xi Jinping, Russia’s President
Vladimir Putin, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
b. The SCO was founded in Shanghai in 2001 by the Presidents of Russia, China, the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India attended at the leadership level for the
first time in 2009, and became a full member, along with Pakistan, in 2017.
i. Iran joined as a member this time, and the process is underway to grant SCO membership to Belarus.
2. SCO Summit
a. With the theme of its SCO chairmanship being “Secure SCO,” India has been underlining that regional security in its northern frontier continues to be a matter of priority for a nation
that has increasingly global aspirations.
b. In the New Delhi Declaration issued at the end of the leaders’ summit, India refused to sign off on the paragraph supporting Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India had refused to sign
on a similar formulation in the Samarkand Declaration of 2022 as well. India has always opposed the BRI, because the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is part of the Initiative,
violates India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
c. India also did not sign off on the SCO Economic Development Strategy, which had Beijing’s imprint.
d. India’s hosting of the SCO summit is seen as a sign of its strategic autonomy, which New Delhi guards zealously. The fact that the SCO summit took place so soon after the PM’s visit to
the US, is seen as a key marker of New Delhi’s diplomatic position in the context of the Ukraine war and the US-China polarisation.
3. India's Interests & Position
a. In 2017, India joined SCO as a full-time member after 12 years of observer status. Russia was keen to have India in the SCO to counterbalance China’s hegemonic dominance and
belligerent pursuits in Eurasia
b. With a constructivist agenda, New Delhi’s membership lent SCO a democratic character, otherwise packed with authoritarian leaders
c. SCO became an additional platform for India to pursue its geostrategic and geoeconomic interests in Eurasia based on centuries-old civilisational, spiritual, and cultural connections
d. SCO has been a sound platform for India to revive its ancient ties with central Asia. Central Asian Republics (CARs), which share a civilisational bond with India, have responded keenly,
recognising New Delhi as a reliable partner to diversify their strategic interests.
e. CARs admitted New Delhi into the Ashgabat Agreement, allowing India access to connectivity networks to facilitate trade and commercial with Eurasia, and also shown a lot of interest
in the India-led INSTC and Chabahar connectivity projects
f. India also used SCO to raise the issue of Chinese ingress and its belligerence in its neighbourhood. New Delhi has stressed “respect for territorial integrity” under the SCO’s “Shanghai
Spirit”
g. India has successfully exposed Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism in Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir, which has hampered connectivity, security and economic development of
the SCO region.
h. On the other hand, India has used SCO to highlight terrorism as a root cause for the lack of regional peace, security and prosperity. The SCO charter revolves around the “three evils” of
separatism, extremism, and terrorism, but Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a foreign policy tool with the help of China has neutralised SCO’s potency to effectively tackle these threats
4. Way Forward
a. While continuing its SCO membership, India must prioritise strengthening the India-central Asia dialogue to develop mutually-beneficial and meaningful cooperation with CARs for
increased regional security, connectivity, trade, and cultural ties.
 Indo-US

1. Context
a. PM Visit : Joint Statement
b. Suspicion to hostility, grievances of the past to the futures of tomorrow, it has taken the United States (US) and India three-quarters of a century to build a robust economic-strategic
relationship
c. From visas and semiconductors to aircraft engines and space exploration, more than the number it is the textures of deals, economically sensitive and strategically critical, that have
come together in a grand climax of slowly-rising mutual confidence between the world’s two largest democracies. These coincide as the US de-risks itself from China and seeks a
partner with scale and trust.
2. Strategic underpinnings
a. The Quad began as a broad partnership after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, but gained strategic heft after the four-country grouping, which has Australia and Japan alongside India
and the US, was repurposed in 2017, primarily as a counter to China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean rim, and as a forum for redoubling focus on the Indo-Pacific region
b. The I2U2, a grouping of India, Israel, the US and the United Arab Emirates, is focused on joint investments and new initiatives in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food
security
c. New US-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies.
d. The most important is the possibility of India getting aligned for a more central role in the global electronics supply chain — especially the possibility of potential convergence among
the chip manufacturing incentive scheme launched by India and other governments around the world.
e. There is a commitment to mainstream India’s $10 billion incentives by dovetailing component manufacturing projects from established foreign chip firms and industry leaders, as
opposed to just marginal players that have shown interest in India’s scheme so far.
f. There is also the possibility of India benefiting from a further realignment of the regional collaborative effort being fostered by the US, which aims to diversify the sourcing supply base
for semiconductor chips and avoid duplication of efforts, government officials said.
g. Cooperation in areas such as armoured vehicles, ammunition, and air combat could include a deal for India, the world’s largest arms importer, to manufacture under licence GE’s F414
turbofan jet engine to power the indigenous Tejas Mk2 light combat aircraft that is under development.
3. Conflicts
a. Among the outstanding trade issues that require resolution are visa delays and the revoking of India’s trade benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) programme in
2019. The US has complained about India’s trade policy being overly protectionist, especially with regard to entry barriers for foreign investment and unsteady legal rules. India has
been raising tariffs over the last few years, reversing an earlier policy of lowering tariffs that endured for decades.
b. The seeming contradiction in India being a key partner of the US even as it ramps up procurement of discounted crude oil from Russia (which is now almost half of India’s total crude
imports, with state-owned oil utilities buying more Russian oil than private companies) needs to be resolved. The US has looked the other way so far — even as G-7 countries slapped
price caps on Russian oil products to restrict Moscow’s access to funds for its war on Ukraine, while still maintaining an incentive for the country to supply to the global market
c. New Delhi will likely be nudged to join the trade pillar of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). From Washington’s perspective, there is no political appetite for a full-
scale free trade agreement (FTA) with India in Congress at this moment, and it sees the IPEF as a more practical substitute for bilateral deals. (The Trade Policy Forum Working Group on
Resilient Trade launched in January 2023 is seen as a primer for an FTA.)
d. There is growing disquiet within sections of the Union government over India not finding an entry into the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a US-led partnership to secure supply
chains of critical minerals that is aimed at reducing dependency on China. The partnership, which was floated last year, has now been expanded to include a new member, Italy (along
with the 11 founding countries and the European Union).