Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860

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Resources Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/resourpol

Critical mineral strategies in Australia: Industrial upgrading without

environmental or social upgrading
Lian Sinclair a, b, *, Neil M. Coe a
a
School of Geosciences, The University of Sydney, Australia
b
Mineral Policy Institute, Australia

A B S T R A C T

Australia is experiencing a rapid escalation in exploration for, and extraction and processing of, critical minerals. This new boom is driven by changing geopolitics
and global demand for low carbon technologies. This is arguably the biggest economic opportunity since the mining boom of the 2000s, driving the biggest
transformation of the extractive industries in Australia since the development of offshore gas in the 1970s. Against this backdrop, Australian governments at all levels
are implementing strategies to upgrade the domestic extraction and processing of critical minerals. In this paper we conduct a comparative analysis of 17 strategies
specifically targeting critical minerals – or the cognate categories of ‘strategic raw materials’ and ‘high-tech metals’. Based on a close reading and comparison of these
strategies, the analysis finds far more commonalities than differences. Together they chart an approach typified by the facilitation of trade and investment, efforts to
de-risk individual projects, and the streamlining of investment through regional hubs with common-infrastructure and planning. At the same time, they also exhibit
concerning similarities in terms of the limited attention paid to improving environmental and social regulation or First Nations’ rights. Instead, ‘ESG’ is presented as a
competitive advantage in global markets. This analysis is significant in identifying an emerging Australian mode of ‘green developmentalism’ that, while committing
significant public funds to developing the mineral processing industry in the context of decarbonisation, keeps private capital firmly in the centre of its vision. This
contrasts with more extensively studied modes of green developmentalism in other resource-rich countries.

1. Introduction
The global push for decarbonisation is creating conditions for new
developmental strategies around the world (Thurbon et al., 2023), with
countries rich in critical minerals embracing new rounds of extractive
led development. In June 2023, the Australian government released its
much-anticipated Critical Minerals Strategy 2023–2030 (2023). While
the strategy contained little by way of new funding or commitments, it
was the clearest and most comprehensive articulation of initiatives to
advance critical mineral exploration, extraction and processing in
Australia to date. Notably, over AU$3.5 billion in concessional loans1
were confirmed, mostly for mineral processing, underlining the Gov­
ernment’s commitment to downstream activities.2 The strategy esti­
mated that “Australia had 81 major critical minerals projects in the
pipeline as of December 2022, with an estimated value of between $30
billion and $42 billion” (DISR, 2023, p. 12). In October 2023 a further
$2bn was committed to the Critical Mineral Financing Facility by Prime
Minister Albanese while visiting the US President in Washington
(Albanese and King, 2023). This is especially significant given the
Government’s focus on reviewing and delaying or cancelling billions in
infrastructure funding to control inflation (Wright, 2023). Most of the
funding and many of these projects are in mineral processing, suggesting
a new direction for Australian resource development in the context of
the global transition to renewable energy and electric vehicles. And
although this strategy promotes Australia’s relatively high environ­
mental and social standards as a ‘competitive advantage’ over interna­
tional competitors, it lacks a vision of how these crucial policy areas can
be further improved.
The 2023 national strategy builds on over 15 such critical mineral
strategies that have been released since 2019 by state and Common­
wealth departments and agencies, contributing a combined $6.6 billion
dollars, a figure that does not include general funding of resource

* Corresponding author. School of Geosciences, Madsen building (F09), The University of Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia.
E-mail address: lian.sinclair@sydney.edu.au (L. Sinclair).
1
Concessional loans are given by the government with terms more favourable than could be obtained in the market, for example with lower interest rates, longer
repayment terms, income-contingent repayments or less security or recourse. They are frequently made to achieve policy objectives and facilitate infant industries.
2
The $2bn Critical Minerals Facility administered by Export Finance Australia (EFA) was already committed by the previous government, $1bn from the $15bn
National Reconstruction Fund (NRF) was allocated to value-adding in resources, and $500m of the $3bn Northern Australia Infrastructure Fund (NAIF) was ear­
marked for critical mineral developments.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2024.104860
Received 10 October 2023; Received in revised form 12 February 2024; Accepted 19 February 2024
Available online 2 April 2024
0301-4207/© 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
L. Sinclair and N.M. Coe
exploration, tax breaks, or infrastructure provision.3 Each strategy has
been accompanied by plenty of opinion and think tank op-eds (Burton,
2023; Leary, 2023; Mackenzie, 2023). Hine, Gibson and Mayes provide a
short but insightful critique of the urgency of the frontier mentality
extractivism around critical minerals (2023). In turn, Burton et al.
(2024) offer a spatial analysis of critical minerals projects in Australia
that reveals a concerning overlap with several measures of
social-economic disadvantage, highlighting the risk to inequality if
government policy and industry practice do not alter. Hitherto, how­
ever, no detailed scholarly or comparative analysis of critical mineral
strategies in Australia exists. Accordingly, this paper addresses the
following questions:
• What roles are Australian governments taking in the development of
critical mineral projects?
• What are the key components and similarities in terms of where and
how funding is allocated across the strategies?
• How are environmental and social standards, regulations or legisla­
tion upheld or improved?
• How are Traditional Owners, First Nations people, or Indigenous
land and knowledge incorporated?
Interrogating the environmental, social, and First Nations credentials
of critical minerals strategies is important because significant social
conflicts challenge the social licence to operate of extractive industries.
Economic development comes at the cost of environmental and social
impacts. Water use, waste management (including radioactive waste
and heavy metals pollution) and labour practices are core challenges for
development in Australia (Wilson and Martinus, 2020). Ongoing con­
troversy and contestation over First Nations land, cultural heritage and
consent also present significant risk to the development of mines (NNTC,
2023; Norman, 2016). The danger is that despite Australia’s relatively
high environmental standards, without addressing long standing issues,
projects could be delayed or cancelled. Our results are significant in
highlighting that across states and commonwealth departments, not
enough is being done to foreground these social and environmental
risks.
This paper proceeds in four parts. The first briefly reviews the defi­
nition of critical minerals, their common usage, projected demand and
Australia’s geologic potential. The second utilises the growing literature
on ‘green-developmentalism’ to place Australia’s recent strategies in
their international context. Such work offers a comparative analysis of
resource rich states’ changing developmentalist strategies given the
global adjustments in economics and geopolitics deriving from the shift
to renewable energy and electrification. Green-developmentalist stra­
tegies are accompanied by new alliances of actors, ideological legiti­
mation and contestations over the benefits and impacts of new modes of
resource extraction. We argue that although Australian state institutions
have been characterised by increasingly regulatory approaches to gov­
erning, capacity and willingness to support and subsidise the resources
industry remains. Section three explains the methodology of selecting
and comparing the strategies.
3
The 17 are: Australian Critical Minerals Prospectus (Austrade, 2024), Crit­
ical Minerals Strategy (DISR, 2023), Critical Minerals Strategy (DISER, 2022),
Resources Technology and Critical Minerals Processing (DISER, 2021), Aus­
tralia’s Critical Minerals Strategy 2019 (Austrade, 2019), Supporting Australian
critical minerals projects (EFA, 2021), Industry and resources stream (CEFC,
2023), Critical minerals and high-tech metals strategy (NSW Government,
2021), Critical Minerals in the NT (NTGS, 2023), New economy minerals (QLD,
2020), Critical Minerals Prospectus (Department of Resources, 2022), Critical
Minerals Strategy (Department of Resources, 2023), 2022-23 budget (DEECA,
2022), Future Battery Industry Strategy (DJTSI, 2022, 2019a, 2019b), A Global
Battery and Critical Minerals Hub (DJTSI, 2022; 2023), Strategic research,
including critical minerals (Government of WA, 2022), and Sustainable Geo­
science Investments (McGowan and Johnston, 2023).
2
Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860
The fourth, and most substantial section discusses the results of the
comparison. It shows that across the 17 strategies there is a remarkable
similarity in terms of their vision and the funding mechanisms deployed,
as well as their omissions around environmental and social standards
and First Nations rights. In Australia, green-developmentalism is mani­
festing as governments facilitating downstream industrial upgrading by
de-risking projects around regional development hubs to attract private
investment. While this development model is certainly contested, and
conflicts between states, corporations and communities are emerging,
few improvements to environmental and social regulation or First Na­
tions’ rights are promised.
1. What are critical minerals?
It is important to emphasise that ‘critical minerals’ are a political-
economic construction, sharing few physical, chemical, or geological
properties. Geoscience Australia (2024) includes 30 commodities4 on its
critical minerals list, “selected by assessing Australia’s geological
endowment and potential with global technology needs.” Each country
maintains its own, slightly different list of minerals depending on their
own security, economic and political rationales. What is common is two
defining criteria (drawing in part on IRENA, 2023, p. 23; Srivastava and
Kumar, 2022, p. 5):
1) Minerals that are central to contemporary industries and technolo­
gies, including but not limited to:
a) Clean energy transitions – batteries and magnets for renewables
and electric vehicles (EVs)
b) Electronics
c) Advanced alloys for defence and aerospace
2) Minerals that have vulnerable supply chains. That vulnerability may
be caused by:
a) Geographic concentration of extraction or production
b) Control of extraction or processing by a few countries or
corporations
c) Production as a by-product of other metals
d) A lack of substitutes and recycling
Above all other technologies driving the critical mineral boom are
the permanent magnets and lithium-ion batteries required for renewable
energy and electric vehicles. This has led some authors to prefer the term
‘energy transition metals’ (e.g. Lèbre et al., 2020), which has more
emphasis on specific uses and less on supply chain vulnerability. The
NSW government, in its strategy, uses ‘critical minerals and high-tech
metals’. The most recent commonwealth government critical minerals
prospectus also lists six ‘strategic materials’ – aluminium, copper, nickel,
phosphorous, tin and zinc which are “important for the global transition
to net zero … but whose supply chains are not currently vulnerable
enough to be considered critical minerals” (Austrade, 2024, p. 11).
Regardless of the precise term used, it is more important to under­
stand the specific technologies driving demand for particular combina­
tions of commodities. By 2030, global demand for batteries could reach
2300–3700 GWh5 in installed capacity – driven, in large part, by massive
public funding. For instance, the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) pro­
vides US$369bn of investment in clean energy technology from 2022 to
2032, the Chinese government subsidises wind and solar installation by
about US$10bn per year and the EU has announced $6bn in public
funding for R&D across the battery value chain until 2031 while relaxing
4
High-purity alumina, antimony, arsenic, beryllium, bismuth, chromium,
cobalt, fluorine, gallium, germanium, graphite, hafnium, indium, lithium,
magnesium, manganese, molybdenum, niobium, platinum-group elements (6
elements), rare earth elements (17 related elements), rhenium, scandium, se­
lenium, silicon, tantalum, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, and zirconium.
5
Up from about 700GWh in 2022 (McKinsey, 2023).
L. Sinclair and N.M. Coe Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860

restrictions on member states subsidising battery and EV industries Table 1

(Accenture, 2023, p. 8). Selected critical/strategic minerals and their uses.6
Permanent magnets are made from rare earth elements, while cur­ Element Critical Uses
rent lithium-ion battery technologies require graphite anodes and according to
cathodes made from combinations of metals, including nickel, cobalt, …
manganese, aluminium and iron phosphate (Dominish et al., 2021; High Purity Alumina (HPA) AUS, USA, EU 99.99% pure Al2O3 coats
Klinger, 2018). The International Energy Agency estimates that to stay the separator between
within 1.65 ◦ C of warming, the annual deployment of renewable energy lithium-ion battery
cathodes and anodes
infrastructure needs to treble by 2040, while electric vehicle sales Cobalt (Co) AUS, USA, EU, Li-ion battery cathodes
should increase by a factor of 25 (IEA, p. 25). This translates into a Japan, India, Steel and light weight
required increase in production of rare earth elements by a factor of ROK, UK alloys
seven, nickel by 19, cobalt by 21, graphite by 25 and lithium production Sm–Co magnets
Graphite AUS, USA, EU, Li-ion battery anodes
would need to increase by 42 times (IEA, p. 9). Other economists project
Japan, India,
global shortages of lithium by 2030, cobalt by 2026 and graphite by ROK, UK
2025; indeed, battery-grade nickel is already in short supply as it is Lithium (Li) AUS, USA, EU, Li-ion batteries
affected by Russia’s war and the associated sanctions (Accenture, 2023, Japan, India, Ceramics
p. 9). ROK, UK
Manganese (Mn) AUS, EU, Steel
It is important to note that the IEA and similar demand projections India, ROK Li-ion cathodes
have been challenged by academics and NGOs (Dunlap and Marin, 2022; Rare Earth Neodymium AUS, USA, EU, Nd magnets are the most
Fletcher et al., 2023). Total metal demand could be reduced significantly Elements (Nd) Japan, India, powerful magnets by
through better urban planning, reduced car dependency, smaller vehicle (REE) ROK, UK weight and used
15 extensively in wind
batteries, and design for recycling. Indeed with better policy support,
elements, turbines and EV motors
recycling could reduce new metal demand by 25–55% (Dominish et al., including: NiMH batteries (hybrid
2021). Another report estimates that total lithium demand in vehicles)
car-dependent countries like the USA could be reduced by up to 74% Samarium (Sm) Sm–Co magnets are almost
with better public transport, higher urban density and smaller average as powerful as Nd magnets
but can withstand higher
cars (Riofrancos et al., 2023, p. 39). However, even if this ambitious
temperatures
demand reduction was achieved, lithium demand would still increase 11 Dysprosium Can be substituted for up to
times. (Dy) 6% of Nd in magnets to
Table 1 shows the six critical minerals that are used in lithium-ion increase temperature
tolerance
batteries or permanent magnets and therefore most significant for the
Praseodymium Combined with Nd to
global energy transition, along with their most key uses, and where they (Pr) increase the power of
are considered ‘critical’. The six critical minerals include ‘rare earth magnets.
elements’ – actually a set of 17 elements, four of which are significant for NiMH batteries for hybrid
their use in the powerful lightweight permanent magnets used in electric electric vehicles
Nickel (Ni) ‘Strategic’ Used in cathodes of lithium
motors and turbines. Table 1 also includes nickel and copper, which are
according to ion batteries
not usually considered ‘critical’ because they do not meet the second of AUS and EU Aerospace superalloys
the two above criteria, i.e. vulnerable supply chains, but are increasingly Copper (Cu) ‘Strategic’ Electricity transmission
considered as strategic raw materials (by the EU), high-tech metals according to Electromagnets in turbines
AUS and EU and motors
(NSW government), energy transition minerals, or other similar desig­
Solar PV
nations given they are central to the global energy transition (Accenture,
2023; EC, 2023; IEA; NSW Government, 2021; Skirrow et al., 2013).
Australia is rich in most of these minerals. According to Geoscience
Australia, in 2021 Australia produced 53% of the world’s lithium, was 6
Adapted from Geoscience Australia (Geoscience Australia, 2024; Skirrow
the fourth biggest producer of rare earths, boasted 23% of the world’s et al., 2013).
nickel resources and 20% of cobalt resources (Hughes et al., 2023, p.
15). Since 2015, Australia’s share of global critical mineral production
funding of upstream and downstream critical mineral activities. Concern
has doubled to 18% (IEA, 2023, p. 193). Shi et al. (2023, 5) put this in an
from the US Department of Defense increased after an incident in 2010,
historical context, arguing that, compared to other resource rich coun­
during which China briefly embargoed shipments of REE to Japan,
tries, Australia, Canada and Finland have “progressively developed their
triggering security concerns in Tokyo and Washington that REE could be
economies with mineral rents based on a good regulatory performance”
used as a foreign affairs ‘weapon’ (He, 2018, p. 243; Wilson, 2018).
(Shi et al., 2023, p. 5) while also maintaining higher environmental
Political scientists point to the energy transition and a securitisation
standards and less corruption than other top critical mineral producing
of supply chains as the dual drivers of resurgent industrial policy (Nem
countries.
Singh, 2021). In the USA and EU, Riofrancos (2023) has diagnosed a
‘Security-Sustainability nexus’ driving onshoring and friend-shoring, in
2. Green-developmentalism(s)
the context of which environmental and social standards are seen as a
competitive advantage:
Referring to the global renewable energy transition in the broadest
terms, Thurbon and colleagues (2012, p. 222) argue that “the global US and EU policy makers see sustainable and ethical production as
green shift creates the conditions for a developmental-environmental “the West’s” last hope to resume its manufacturing prowess – the one
response amongst national authorities” led by China and South Korea terrain on which its manufacturers can outperform China (Rio­
in geostrategic rivalry with the USA and each other. Indeed, the boom in francos, 2023, p. 31).
critical minerals has seen a resurgence of industrial policy around the
While US, EU and Japanese strategies are mostly motivated by securing
world, including in the heartlands of neoliberalism (Thibeault et al.,
supply of critical minerals for strategic technology and manufacturing,
2023). He (2018, p. 242) traces the roots of this back to the Obama
the strategies of resource rich countries focus on the economic
administration’s clean energy policies, which triggered modest R&D

3
L. Sinclair and N.M. Coe
opportunity of extraction and value-adding (Wilson and Martinus,
2020).
A ‘green-developmentalism’ literature has emerged in the Americas
that examines how resource rich nations can harness mineral wealth for
sustainable development. This builds on political-economic studies of
resource nationalism and neo-extractivism in ‘pink-tide’, ‘post-neolib­
eral’ populist regimes in South America that have promoted extractive
led development as a means to fund ambitious social programs (Rio­
francos, 2020; Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014). This is a largely compara­
tive literature that seeks to determine the most effective government
strategies. An overly resource nationalist approach to developmentalism
that prohibits foreign corporate involvement, as in Bolivia (Obaya,
2021) and Mexico (Marmolejo Cervantes and Garduño-Rivera, 2022),
can stall development if technical know-how and capital are not readily
available domestically, while an overly liberalised approach, as in
Argentina, may leave governments without the power to coordinate
activities or implement strategies to develop linkages (Obaya et al.,
2021). Chile (Barandiarán, 2019) has seemingly enjoyed the most suc­
cess in developing domestic industries, with government strategies
focusing on incentivising and coordinating coalitions between
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private domestic firms and interna­
tional capital (cf. Irarrazaval and Carrasco, 2023). Different approaches
and outcomes across Central and South America have been explained by
variations in political ideologies, the strength of domestic corporations,
foreign investment patterns and domestic contestation (Nem Singh,
2021; Sanchez-Lopez, 2023).
Outside of the Americas, Indonesia has been singled out as a model of
a developmental state based on successfully stimulating nickel smelting
and refining through resource nationalist policies (Schröder and Iwa­
saki, 2023). Indonesia’s ‘success’ can be put down to the powerful alli­
ance of domestic extractive conglomerates, politicians and Chinese and
South Korean capital. Relatedly, the African Union and African Devel­
opment Bank are attempting to lead stronger coordination of African
states for downstream processing in the context of competing European
and Chinese capital (Müller, 2023).
In contrast to the interventionist green developmental state, Gabor
diagnoses a global shift towards a ‘development as de-risking paradigm’,
which highlights strategies designed “to reorient the institutional
mechanisms of the state towards protecting the political order of
financial capitalism against climate justice movements and Green New
Deal initiatives” (2021, p. 431). Financial de-risking, according to Gabor
(2021, p. 434), “captures a range of public subsidies and guarantees
including direct grants, tax relief or debt-based instruments (preferential
credit, loan guarantees, first-loss equity tranches in private equity funds,
green bonds)”. This language is significant because the Australian gov­
ernment strategies specifically name ‘de-risking’ investment in critical
minerals as an objective.
It is important to note that extractive developmental strategies based
on interventionist or de-risking state strategies – even ‘green’ ones –
have uneven and often deleterious effects on those already marginalised
or subordinated within mining regions, which may also generate resis­
tance to individual mining projects as well as extractivism in general
(Kingsbury and Wilkinson, 2023). There is an important literature on the
social and environmental harm caused by the current rapid expansion of
critical mineral extraction, mostly focused on local mine-site impacts
(Agusdinata et al., 2018; Ali et al., 2017; Lèbre et al., 2020). This has
often been centrally-focused on the most egregious and controversial
examples, like human-rights abuses surrounding cobalt mining in the
DRC (Siddharth, 2023), the environmental devastation of nickel mining
and refining in Indonesia (Rushdi et al., 2021), and water use in the
Atacama desert in South America (Blair et al., 2023). Such studies have
lead some authors to call for gaps in the global governance of mining to
be closed (Kramarz et al., 2021). Resistance to extractive development
by affected communities and NGOs can then also shape development
pathways.
4
Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860
2.1. How does green-developmentalism manifest in Australia?
It is common understanding that since the 1980s Australian state
institutions have steadily relinquished the capacity and willingness to
pursue “transformative economic and social projects” (Thurbon et al.,
2023, p. 190), as part of a wider shift towards becoming a ‘neoliberal’ or
a ‘regulatory’ state (Jayasuriya, 2007). As elsewhere, however, it is
important not to fetishise neoliberalism in Australia. As Chodor and
Hameiri (2023, p. 31) point out “Australia’s shift to regulatory statehood
has been uneven across policy domains and geographically” as a result
of “struggles between social groups seeking to entrench their prefer­
ences, empower themselves and/or their allies, and direct resources
towards favoured entities and goals.” Indeed, the mining industry is a
prime example of social group with entrenched interests and ability to
access state resources (Maher, 2022).
Hine et al. (2023) point to how the new extractivist ‘rush’ for critical
mineral exploration and extraction in Australia embodies a longstanding
frontier mentality. To be sure, in relation to the resources industry,
governments at all levels, especially in WA and Qld, have long shown an
appetite to selectively de-risk investments for private capital through
targeted subsidies, tax exemptions, infrastructure provision and occa­
sionally by taking equity stakes in major projects (Brueckner et al., 2014;
Edwards, 2020; Phillimore, 2014). The forms that developmentalism
takes in Australia are thus still determined by entrenched interests,
foremost the domestic oligarchs and multinational mining corporations
who wield disproportionate political power (Edwards, 2020). Because
these actors favour full private ownership, profit maximization and
minimal environmental regulation, we would not expect to see the types
of resource nationalism or SOE involvement that exist in Indonesia or
Chile (until there is a major realignment of political power). The only
concessions made to paying tax or environmental regulation are the
result of oppositional politics temporarily undermining the legitimacy of
the mining companies. The following analysis indeed examines how far
the state is willing to go to support mining industry profitability from the
new boom in critical minerals versus upgrading environmental and so­
cial standards and First Nations’ rights.
Many authors still assume that Australia is exporting raw minerals
and eschewing industrial policy, as was the case during the previous
mining boom (Fletcher et al., 2023; Hine et al., 2023; Mackenzie, 2023).
However, a combination of government strategies and international
capital are driving substantial expansions in refining battery grade
lithium hydroxide, nickel sulphate and separating rare earth oxides in
moves towards exporting value-added products.7 Further downstream,
planned plants to produce cathode and anode active material for lithium
batteries, and R&D into battery production funded by government and
private capital, show interest in further value-adding. The next section
presents our detailed analysis of government strategies before drawing
some conclusions about how green-developmentalism manifests in
Australia.
3. Methodology
The methodology used to produce the analysis in this paper started
with locating all the available critical mineral strategies of each state or
territory government and commonwealth department.8 Only those that
7
Western Australia alone aims to produce 10% of global lithium hydroxide
by 2024 and 20% by 2028, battery grade nickel sulphate is produced at BHP’s
Nickel West refinery and two new rare earth facilities could see Australia sec­
ond only to China in processed rare earth elements (DJTSI, 2022, p. 2).
8
To locate these documents, we searched Google for the terms ‘critical
minerals’, ‘energy transition minerals’ and ‘battery metals’ and each state and
the Commonwealth to find all relevant government agencies’ websites and then
located strategy documents. Our first search was on 03/03/2023 and final
search on 09/02/2024.
L. Sinclair and N.M. Coe
specifically target critical minerals – or the cognate ‘strategic raw ma­
terials’, ‘high-tech metals’ and ‘battery industry’ – were included in our
analysis. Budget announcements that specifically identified critical
minerals were also incorporated. More general strategies to develop or
support mineral exploration, extractive industries or industrial infra­
structure were not included, however. For example, exploration incen­
tive schemes have not been included unless they specifically targeted
critical mineral exploration. Where initiatives specified critical minerals
as one of several target areas, only the specific funding directed towards
critical mineral projects was included.
Public infrastructure including transmission lines, roads etc. was not
included, even where that stated purpose is for critical minerals mining,
as those roads will be used by other motorists and would generate in­
consistencies in counting because only rarely is infrastructure funding
linked to specific private developments. Each strategy was then read
closely, and notes taken on three main questions:
1. What funding commitments are contained in the strategy/
announcement/initiative?
2. What environmental and social standards are mentioned in the
strategy?
3. What consideration is given to First Nations’ land, consultation,
consent, rights or Indigenous knowledge?
The notes on each strategy were then examined for similarities and
differences and broader patterns. Overall, the strategies were very
similar, showing remarkable consistency between jurisdictions. The
following section presents the results of this comparative analysis.
4. Analysis: selective upgrading
It is remarkable how similar and consistent the strategies are across
the jurisdictions, with each employing similar rhetoric and funding
mechanisms, ‘de-risking’ projects, promoting ‘ESG credentials’ as a
competitive advantage, and looking to facilitate private led-
development around regional hubs. They are also remarkably similar
in their exclusion of environmental and social concerns and consider­
ation of First Nations. A summary of the comparison is presented in
Table 2, and Table 3 summarises funding by type and source. The three
sub-sections below provide detailed insights into, first, the commonal­
ities across the development strategies and second, the problematic gaps
and omissions.
4.1. Facilitating investment, financial de-risking
Australia’s first critical minerals strategy was released by the Trade
and Investment Commission (Austrade) in 2019. The main role for
government articulated in that first strategy was facilitating connections
between Australian mining companies and overseas investors and
buyers: “Austrade is the Government’s lead agency on international
investment promotion. An offshore network covers 83 offices and in­
cludes staff working directly on resources and energy investment
attraction and trade services” (2019). This tactic of using government
networks as international interlocutors has remained one of the main­
stays of the strategies at the Commonwealth as well as the state level.
The WA Government’s 2023 strategy, for instance, boasts “17 interna­
tional investment and trade offices … across 6 regions” ready to “pro­
vide support and information for investors and buyers worldwide”
(DJTSI, 2022, p. 5).
Policy has quickly moved beyond the need for promotion,
networking and facilitation, however, and in 2021, a dedicated Critical
Minerals Office was established within the Commonwealth Department
of Industry to coordinate policy development and a $200 million Critical
Minerals Accelerator grant program. A $2 billion Critical Minerals Fa­
cility (since expanded to $4bn) administered by Export Finance
Australia (EFA) was also established to provide debt financing. The
5
Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860
grant program was aimed at new sources of supply, i.e. projects at the
early and mid-stages of development, while the debt financing was
designed to “help projects overcome market barriers such as commodity
price volatility. This will make them more attractive to private capital
investment” (DISER, 2022, p. 16).
An example of this is a loan agreement from EFA for $200 million for
Australian Strategic Materials (ASM) to develop their Dubbo rare earths
and zirconia mine, with the execution of the loan conditional on ASM
securing private investment and signing offtake agreements (Woodall,
2021). Another example is a joint offer from EFA, Korea Trade Insurance
Corporation (K-Sure) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States
(EXIM) for an $300 million loan to Liontown Resources to develop their
Kathleen Valley lithium mine, conditional on finalising offtake agree­
ments with Tesla, Ford and LG (Ottaviano, 2023). These conditional
loans signal to private firms support from the government(s), and share
any risk of default between public and private actors. It is also common
for various government sources of finance to share risk. For example,
Pilbara minerals, which operates the lucrative Pilgangoora lithium mine
in WA, received two $125m loans from the Northern Australia Infra­
structure Fund (NAIF) and Export Finance Australia (EFA) and another
$50m loan from the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) (King,
2022).
The largest single beneficiary of any strategy so far is Iluka Re­
source’s Rare Earths refinery at Eneabba, WA, which received a $1.25bn
long-dated non-recourse loan from EFA (Morrison et al., 2022). While
this loan is not conditional on attracting further private investment or
signing offtake agreements, the refinery is designed to process rare earth
bearing minerals from third parties, becoming “a strategic hub for the
downstream processing of Australia’s rare earth resources” (Iluka, 2022)
and thus de-risking upstream investment in mineral sand and rare earth
mines around Australia. The US-led push to develop rare earth supply
chains may also have been a motivating factor in the condition-less loan
to Iluka (Thibeault et al., 2023).
The various R&D and grant programs contained within the strategies
are likewise targeted at de-risking investments to facilitate private in­
vestment. According to the CEO of the Northern Australia Infrastructure
Facility (NAIF):
A key hurdle for both debt and equity investors is the perceived
technical risk associated with critical minerals projects. To mitigate
this risk and attract more capital into the sector, proponents need to
consider building large scale demonstration plants to minimise scale-
up risk and show that the technology works. This obviously comes at
a cost, however the government sector is prepared to assist. For
example, Alpha HPA [high purity alumina] received a $15.1m fed­
eral grant under the Critical Minerals Accelerator Initiative to build a
demonstration plant (Doyle, 2023).
The largest single grant was $119.6m from the Modern
Manufacturing Initiative (MMI) to Pure Battery Technologies to build a
Nickel and Cobalt battery material refinery in WA, to turn battery grade
metals into active cathode material (PBT, 2022).
As with debt financing, R&D funding is also designed to facilitate
further funding from industry, universities and other government
agencies. The Future Battery Industry Cooperative Research Centre (FBI
CRC) was initially funded with $6m from the WA Government and $25m
from the Commonwealth Department of Industry’s CRC program,
leveraging a further $125m of ‘cash and in kind’ contributions from
university and industry partners. Another $50.5m research centre
announced in the Commonwealth’s 2022 strategy brings together and
leverages the existing expertise of Geoscience Australia, the Common­
wealth Science and Industry Research Organisation (CSIRO) and Aus­
tralia’s Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) to
support industry (DISER, 2022, p. 17).
Although the total dollar amounts invested may appear under­
whelming compared with the massive spending in the US, the EU, and
China, the active involvement of governments in R&D, de-risking and
L. Sinclair and N.M. Coe Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860

Table 2
Comparison of government critical mineral strategies and initiatives.
Government Department/ Strategy/initiative New money committed ESG First Nations
Agency

Commonwealth DISRa Australian Critical Confirms the $2bn expansion of ‘Boasts robust ESG standards’ Mentions existing legal obligations
(Cth) Minerals Prospectus the Critical Minerals Facility of individual projects and to consult
(Austrade, 2024) managed by EFA industry overall.
Mentions Australian
participation in the
International Organisation for
Standardisation
Critical Minerals $500m from Northern Australia Mentions EPBC Act reform, Mentions Free Prior Informed
Strategy (2023) Infrastructure Fund (NAIF) decarbonising mining, Consent and benefit sharing
$1bn from National rehabilitation.
Reconstruction Fundb ‘ESG credentials’ enable access
$57.1m for international to global markets
partnerships
Critical Minerals $100m Critical Minerals ‘ESG standards’ as a No mention
Strategy (2022) Development Programc competitive advantage
$50.5m Research facility
$3m for blockchain certification
Resources Technology $274.4m from Modern ESG credentials for market No mention
and Critical Minerals Manufacturing Initiative advantage and contemplates
Processing (DISER, ‘Resources & Technology & certification
2021) Critical Minerals Processing’
stream
Australia’s Critical $25m in Commonwealth funding ‘Environmental standards’ as a No mention
Minerals Strategy for the Future Batteries Industry competitive advantage
2019; Austrade (2019) CRC
$19.5m from NAIF to Pilbara
minerals
Export Finance Supporting Australian $2bn Critical Minerals Facility Equator Principles apply No mention
Australia (EFA)d critical minerals
projects (2021)
Clean Energy Industry and resources $57.8m in finance for lithium Ethical investing No mention
Finance stream (2023)e extraction and processing so far
Corporation
(CEFC)

New South Wales Mining, Critical minerals and $130m activation fund ’World-class ESG credentials’ No mention
(NSW) Exploration, high-tech metals
Geoscience strategy (2021)

Northern Northern Critical Minerals in the No new $. Only existing ESG credentials as a Case study of two mines owned by
Territory (NT) Territory NT (2023) geoscience initiatives. competitive advantage Traditional Owners.
Geological Survey No FPIC.

Queensland (Qld) State New economy minerals $4.8m to re-examine old tailings ESG for stable investments No mention
development (2020) $13.8m exploration
Department of Critical Minerals $100m via Queensland ESG mitigates investment risk No mention
Resources Prospectus (2022) Investment Corporation
$150m for common user
infrastructure
$22.6m for exploration
Critical Minerals $5m for battery industry strategy ESG as investor requirement Acknowledgement of country only
Strategy (2023) development and competitive advantage
$5m for mine tailings exploration $1m for promoting ESG with
$1m for promoting ESG industry awards events and
$8m for circular economy R&D research

Victoria (Vic) Earth Resourcesf 2022-23 budget (2022) $7.4m critical mineral exploration No mention No mention
and development

Western Australia DJTSIg Future Battery Industry $6m for CRC FBI Bid Contemplates certification of No mention
(WA) Strategy (DJTSI, 2022, ‘ESG credentials’ to create a
2019a, 2019b) market advantage.
A Global Battery and $13.2m for Kwinana P-CAM As competitive advantage. Also References an Aboriginal
Critical Minerals Hub facility references $120m program to Empowerment Unit within the
(DJTSI, 2022; 2023) $13m for midstream facilities streamline and accelerate Department of Mines Industry
from WA’s Investment Attraction approvals Regulation and Safety
Fund
$763,000 for R&D from the
Investment Attraction Fund
Minerals Research Strategic research, $6m in state budget 2022-23 No mention No mention
Institute WA including critical
minerals (2022)
Geological survey Sustainable $40m in state budget 2023-24 No mention No mention
of WA Geoscience package to accelerate critical
Investments mineral discoveries
(McGowan and
Johnston, 2023)

6
L. Sinclair and N.M. Coe Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860

a
Department of Industry, Science and Research, formerly DISER and DIIS.
b
The Commonwealth Government’s national reconstruction fund includes $1bn for ‘value-add in resources’ which is included because the government has
confirmed this will specifically target critical minerals, while the $3bn for ‘Renewables and low emission technologies’ is not counted. Once further guidance on the
NRF is announced, these inclusions and exclusions could be revised.
c
The Critical Minerals Development Fund was initially called the Critical Minerals Accelerator Program and allocated $50 of an announced $200m. After the 2022
election the ALP government renamed the program and allocated another $50m.
d
Australia’s export credit agency which provides “financial expertise and solutions to support Australian businesses across a range of sectors including lithium,
cobalt and other rare earth elements” (EFA, 2021, p. 1).
e
The Clean Energy Finance Corporation’s industry and resources stream funds hard to abate industrial sectors, including both the development of minerals that
contribute to low-carbon technologies (e.g. lithium mining) and funds renewable energy generation at remote mine sites. Only the former loans were included in this
comparison.
f
Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action.
g
Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation.

facilitation of private investment in downstream processing has the although it has been criticised for greenwashing natural gas processing
potential to transform the industry from the export of raw ores to do­ (Gibson, 2022). Queensland’s most recent strategy commits $150m for a
mestic value-adding. It is much less common for governments of any “multiuser critical minerals demonstration facility in Townsville”
level in Australia to take a direct equity stake in resource projects. (Doyle, 2023). Townsville is the closest port and industrial centre to
Queensland’s Northwest Minerals province, an area rich in nickel, cobalt
and copper mines and deposits. As in NSW, the Queensland strategy
4.2. Regional hubs justifies the investment in hubs through the efficiencies derived from
co-location, infrastructure provision and streamlined approvals pro­
Another common theme across the strategies is the identification and cesses. Significantly, Queensland’s hub approach also argues there are
promotion of regional hubs. ‘Regional hubs’ are a policy to drive benefits of regional environmental and social baseline assessments and
development in rural or regional areas near clusters of critical mineral potential for bioregional planning under the commonwealth Environ­
mines to facilitate processing and export by co-locating infrastructure mental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act)
and concentrating investment. The NSW strategy, for example, promises (Department of Resources, 2023, p. 12). Such an approach to biore­
to create a ‘Critical Minerals Hub’ in Central West NSW to process gional planning could help to coordinate consultation and management
minerals extracted in the central and far west of the state (NSW Gov­ of cumulative environmental and social impacts of the industry and
ernment, 2021, p. 18). The hub will be near or within the Parkes Special creates more opportunities for establishing social license than the NSW
Activation Precinct and Central West Renewable Energy Zone where approach.
there is existing and planned infrastructure development. The rationale Taken together, there is a remarkable degree of consistency across
behind the hub model of development is to “activate benefits of the government strategies at all levels, with the common elements being
collaboration across the critical minerals supply chain” (2021, p. 2). The facilitating trade and investment, de-risking individual projects, and
relatively central location of Parkes within NSW potentially allows streamlining private investment through regional hubs with common-
various ores, for example nickel-cobalt from several proposed and infrastructure and planning. The strategies thus embody a very Austra­
existing mines in the west and central west of NSW, to be collected, lian mode of developmentalism, where the state acts as a facilitator of
processed and refined before export. The benefits, however, supposedly private capital but does not take direct ownership or control of strategic
go beyond collective infrastructure provision: “The Parkes SAP can offer projects. However, just as governments are sharing financial risk with
streamlined pathways for certain types of development … with private investors, they are also creating, or at best ignoring social and
fast-tracked approvals for complying development, environmental ap­ environmental risks.
provals and a dedicated concierge to support business” (2021, p. 15). By
emphasising this streamlined approach to assessment, the immediate
practical benefit to developers is reduced scrutiny of environmental 4.3. Environment and social issues, and First Nations neglect
impacts. The concomitant risk of such a streamlined approach is that
reducing opportunities for public consultation will diminish the chances Despite the detailed strategies and resources that have been dedi­
of establishing and maintaining a social license to operate. cated to facilitating and attracting investment to developing critical
While the NSW strategy’s hub concept is the most elaborated, other minerals across Australia, at the same time the strategies all share some
states propose similar concepts. The Northern Territory’s ‘middle-arm’ common omissions. The two significant omissions discussed here – First
development outside Darwin Port promises to concentrate and stream­ Nations rights and environmental and social standards or regulation –
line ‘sustainable’ infrastructure close to export ports (DITT, n.d.), are particularly surprising given the widespread awareness of the
importance of social license and community consultation.
Table 3 Of the seventeen strategies, twelve do not even mention terms ‘First
Total critical mineral funding by state.a Nations’, ‘Aboriginal’, ‘Torres Strait Islander’ or ‘Indigenous’ and one
Government Grants Loan R&D & Common Totals includes an acknowledgement of country but then makes no further
Facilities infrastructure mention. Three connect to existing empowerment programs. For
C’wealth $431.5m $5577.3m $78.5m $6087.3m example, the WA Government’s strategy references a pre-existing
NSW $130m $130m $14.6m scheme “to ensure developments in Western Australia’s re­
NT – – – – sources industry deliver improved outcomes for Aboriginal people” and
Qld $100m $210.2m $310.2m
the ‘Aboriginal Empowerment Unit’ within the Department of Mines,
SA – – – –
Vic $7.4m $7.4m Industry and Regulation (a different department from the one imple­
WA $26.2m $46.8m $73m menting the strategy) (DJTSI, 2022, p. 11). So, while industrial policy
Totals $587.7m $5684.7m $335.5m $6607.9m and funding is tailored to critical minerals, consideration of First Nations
a
Three main types of funding for critical mineral projects were identified: contributions remains generic.
grants given to companies to facilitate development of projects; concessional The exception is the Commonwealth’s latest strategy, which offers a
loans; and investment in public or shared infrastructure, including research and significant improvement in rhetoric. It includes the phrase ‘free, prior
development funding. and informed consent’ (FPIC) – a core outcome of the United Nations’

7
L. Sinclair and N.M. Coe Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860

Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People that Australia has refused Australia has world-leading environmental, social and governance
to implement (Lingard et al., 2021). The strategy also states that, where (ESG) credentials with a reputation as a resources sector operating to
they hold “freehold Aboriginal land … Traditional Owners have the the highest standards. Australia can further leverage its ESG cre­
right to refuse consent or ‘veto’ any land access use proposals” (DISR, dentials to create market advantage for Australian firms over the
2023, p. 28). Although this strategy provides no implementing guide­ next decade. Business development and marketing is required to
lines or exploration of the implication of FPIC or veto rights, this shift in build Australia’s reputation in these areas and establish a viable
rhetoric towards recognising First Nation’s rights and positioning them market which is prepared to pay a premium for products sourced
as equal stakeholders is significant. As with the WA strategy, the Com­ from ethical production jurisdictions (DISER, 2021, p. 14).
monwealth’s also mentions other reform processes currently underway,
From a close reading of each of these strategies, it seems that all gov­
including co-design of national cultural heritage protection as part of the
ernments are content to rest on Australia’s established reputation
EPBC Act reforms (DISR, 2023, pp. 29–30).
without making further improvements. The only innovation contem­
Such reform is urgently needed, as each state’s Aboriginal Cultural
plated is certification or traceability of minerals, perhaps utilising
Heritage laws “accord unequivocal priority to developers, especially for
blockchain technology (DISER, 2021; DJTSI, 2022). Queensland’s
major projects such as mining” (Lingard et al., 2021, p. 110). Permits to
strategy is the only one to commit money ($1m) for ‘ESG excellence’ but
destroy Aboriginal Cultural Heritage are routinely granted without
this is for organising events to better demonstrate ESG credentials, an
consultation, as was the case with the Juukan Gorge disaster in Western
annual award and sharing research (Department of Resources, 2023, p.
Australia which led to multiple inquiries and senior Rio Tinto executives
18). Certification, it seems, is as much about bottling and promoting
losing their jobs (Nagar, 2021). The PKKP Aboriginal Corporation – the
Australia’s reputation as it is about engendering change.
Traditional Owners of the Juukan Gorge site – emphasised that change
While Australian environmental standards may be higher than those
was needed to protect cultural heritage “first of all, gaining our free,
of some other countries, there are well documented long-standing con­
prior and informed consent” (2023). Although inquiries led to a new
cerns with extractive industries in Australia. These include: mine closure
Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act in WA which improved Traditional
and rehabilitation including acid mine drainage (Mudd, 2021); social,
Owner’s rights and increased sanctions for destroying heritage, the WA
environmental and political mining legacies (Roche et al., 2021);
Government announced the new Act would be repealed weeks after it
radioactive and heavy metals waste, including from rare earth refining
took effect following opposition by farmers and pastoralists (Bourke,
(Weng et al., 2016); abandoned mines (Pepper et al., 2021); and the
2023).
biodiversity and extinction crisis. A new mining boom is an opportunity
The ‘Key Actions’ in the Commonwealth’s strategy for achieving
to address these issues holistically, before they generate (more) irrepa­
‘First Nations engagement and benefit sharing’ all involve vague com­
rable damage. Furthermore, it is well documented that social impacts,
mitments to consider best-practice, establish roundtables and consult
conflict and risk translate into industry costs (Franks et al., 2014; Kemp
groups (DISR, 2023, p. 31). This is in stark contrast to the commitments
et al., 2016).
of funding for industry development, where consultations have already
The Commonwealth’s latest strategy reiterates commitments to Na­
happened, decisions been made, and guidelines released. This means
tional Environmental Standards within the Environmental Protection
that projects will be going ahead before there are clear guidelines about
and Biodiversity Conservation Act reform process, for decarbonising
how FPIC should be implemented, undermining the ’prior’ in FPIC, and
mining, and participation in international standard setting (DISR, 2023,
potentially leading to social license contestations and repeats of the
pp. 30–36). However, as with the rhetoric about First Nations, no firm
Juukan Gorge disaster. Recent struggles over extractive projects around
commitments are made. In fact, the strategy underscores the govern­
the country show how ignoring or rushing FPIC processes can result in
ment’s commitment to ‘streamlining’ environmental approvals or
resistance and opposition from Traditional Owners and allies (Norman,
ensuring they are “fast, efficient and certain” (DISR, 2023, p. 36), rather
2016; Woodley, 2019). Indeed, prominent First Nations representative
than ‘rigorous, thorough and well-funded’.
organisations like the National Native Title Council and First Nations
This is concerning, especially when taken together with the state
Clean Energy Network are strong in arguing that “There is no net-zero
governments’ stated intentions of streamlining approvals through
economy without First Nations policy change” (NNTC, 2023; Knee­
regional hubs. The rigour of environmental assessment processes has
bone, 2023).
been continually undermined with the justification of ‘streamlining’
It is a similar case with environmental and social standards more
processes, including by the use of environmental offsets and backloading
generally. It is interesting to note that all of these strategies since 2020
conditions. Backloading is a process of approving projects with impacts
adopt the phrase ‘environmental, social and governance (ESG) creden­
on biodiversity first and negotiating ‘offsets’ at a later date, and is
tials’ rather than regulation, when regulation is typically the remit of
contributing to extinction and biodiversity crises across the continent
governments, while ESG credentials have been more associated as in­
(Evans, 2023).
vestment or risk assessment criteria (O’Neill, n.d.). While this could
Some politicians or the authors of the strategies may of course argue
indicate a financialisation of government attitudes towards environment
that dedicated critical mineral strategies are not the proper place to
and social standards, we should not jump to conclusions before exam­
detail improvements in environmental standards, consultation with
ining the commitments (or lack thereof) made in each strategy.
communities, in Aboriginal Cultural Heritage management, or free prior
Of the seventeen, three do not even mention ESG, two apply existing
informed consent processes. They may well point out other processes
standards to critical mineral loans, while twelve sell Australia’s high
underway designed to address longstanding issues with the environ­
environmental and social standards as a competitive advantage that will
mental and social impacts of resource extraction. However, the new
make our exports more competitive on a global scale – Queensland also
green-developmentalism is justified specifically on the grounds of
acknowledges the role of ESG in controlling investors’ risk. For example,
solving the climate crisis, and therefore the ethical legitimation risks
the Commonwealth Government’s 2023 Critical Minerals Strategy states
being undermined if projects fall short of community expectations.
that:
Environment and climate NGOs are already campaigning specifically on
Our robust ESG credentials, underpinned by state and federal legis­ the impacts of critical minerals, internationally and in Australia (Church
lative frameworks, mean we offer more sustainable and ethical and Crawford, 2018; Fletcher et al., 2023; Gibson, 2022; Podwinski and
critical minerals than many of our competitors (DISR, 2023, p. 12). Gibson, 2023).
Furthermore, as mentioned in the Queensland Government’s strat­
while their National Manufacturing Roadmap states
egy, the regional development model presents an opportunity to
implement best practice bioregional planning and cumulative effects

8
L. Sinclair and N.M. Coe
assessment. Regional planning, collaborative governance, and cumula­
tive impact assessment in Australia are policy tools most often used in
relation to mine closure, but their benefits would be even greater in
ensuring community consent during the initial stages of developing
mineral provinces (Sinclair et al., 2022).
5. Conclusions
The global transition to clean energy is opening up new possibilities
for ‘green-developmentalism’ in resource rich countries. Indeed, a
reconfiguration of development around sustainability and a broader
range of beneficiaries is an enticing proposition. However, the risk is
that green-developmentalism entails new ideological legitimation of the
same old extractive actors and practices. Australia is already a world
leader in extracting minerals, including many of the minerals most in
demand to decarbonise the global economy. Australian government
strategies at the state and commonwealth levels are squarely aimed at
building on this geological luck through attracting private investment by
funding early- and mid-stage developments, financial de-risking for
projects with export potential, streamlining approvals, and capitalising
on Australia’s relatively high ‘ESG’ standards. More significantly – and
unlike in previous commodity booms – the majority of funding in critical
mineral strategies seeks to promote industrial upgrading, i.e. creating
more onshore mineral processing through refineries and plants based in
Australia. Further R&D and pilot programs are underway for potentially
extending the ‘downstreaming’ of production to cathode active material
and cell manufacture.
A specific variant of green-developmentalism, based on partnerships
with private and foreign investors through financial de-risking is man­
ifesting in Australia, against the backdrop of a global green shift that has
created the conditions for a revival of industrial policy. To be sure, the
strategies remain modest compared to the developmentalism of Chile or
the resource nationalism of Indonesia, where both states take direct
control of resource projects via large state-owned enterprises. The
Australian approach, by contrast, places private capital firmly in control
of development. In addition, Australian critical minerals projects will
likely benefit from US friend-shoring subsidies under the IRA and pro­
curement under the Defence Production Act. The US alliance also injects
a securitised approach to rare earths, even as the primary motivation of
Australian governments is economic opportunity. Significantly, these
findings demonstrate that green-developmentalism is a global phe­
nomenon, not limited to the resource rich countries of Latin America,
but one that manifests differently in different countries according to the
availability (or not) of specific commodities, the interests of entrenched
political-economic actors and historically contingent ideologies of
development.
At the same time, there is seemingly a once-in-a-generation chance
for governments, industry and communities, through regional planning,
to improve the environmental and social standards associated with
mineral extraction and processing, central to which would be enacting
free prior informed consent of First Nations communities. An ambitious
approach to regional planning of critical mineral processing hubs would
help secure a social licence for the industry for the coming decades and
minimise the risks posed by environmental and social conflicts.
Improving environmental and social outcomes alongside industrial
production would also further enhance any export dividends deriving
from relatively ethical reputation. The significance of the comparative
analysis in this paper is showing that, currently at least, this opportunity
is largely being passed up by governments around Australia.
As of February 2024, the WA and NSW governments are undergoing
public consultation to create revised strategies, and the SA government
is developing their first critical minerals strategy. This is a fast-moving
policy space, but early indications are that only incremental improve­
ments will be made to environmental and social standards, while sup­
port for new projects increases.
One final point to make is that this was a desktop review of publicly
9
Resources Policy 91 (2024) 104860
available government strategies. While great care was taken to trian­
gulate sources of data and cross check sources against all available in­
formation, publicly available information will always be limited and is
best treated as a starting point for analysis. There may be more action
planned than has been announced – or the written strategies may be
exaggerations of real activities. The next stage is on-the-ground and in
person conversations with policymakers, industry and communities to
understand how these strategies materialise and/or are contested on the
ground.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Lian Sinclair: Writing – original draft, Project administration,
Methodology, Investigation, Conceptualization. Neil M. Coe: Writing –
review & editing, Supervision, Project administration, Funding acqui­
sition, Conceptualization.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the handling editor at Resources Policy and
the anonymous reviewer for their constructive comments. We would
also like to thank Susan Park (Sydney Environment Institute) for the
invitation to present our preliminary results at a Critical Minerals
Symposium, held at The University of Sydney on September 21, 2023,
Jubilee Australia for the invitation to present the results to a group of
civil society organisations on October 3, 2023, AusIMM for the oppor­
tunity to present at their Critical Minerals Conference, Perth on
November 21, 2023, and all participants at each of these fora for their
comments and constructive feedback. This research was funded by the
Faculty of Science, The University of Sydney.
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