Examination of the prize

question posed by the Academy

of Sciences in Berlin: What
progress has metaphysics made
since Leibniz and Wolff?

August Ludwig Huelsen

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lofophis way of thinking, nor other, more urgent investigations, in which
this idea was soon lost entirely. It was only in the summer of last year, when
I became acquainted with the new philosophical curse and through it, I
believe, gained complete stance on my standpoint, that I recalled the idea of
this examination and attempted to carry it out. External circumstances
prevented the earlier announcement, but this does not affect my intention in
any essential way. I at least did not want to allow the possible validity of my
investigation to be limited by any time given to me, but rather to define a
sphere for it from my own ability. To what extent I have succeeded in doing
this is not a question for me. The independent-thinking writer, who does not
look for his audience, just as it is, from

dern
dern as it should be, can therefore be in
reality is not the same, already ahead

He is only concerned with progressing towards

the ideal, which ideal he sees from his own
standpoint in the light of the inner

fchauet and by a feasible law the

rational beings. Here he must not hope to fully meet the expectations of
the judging crowd, and in general,
as it should be, to be understood. But one can still say that the explanations
are transfiguring. We have at least begun to breathe freely, and the calmer
spirit of examination, which is based on respect for reason and truth, will
now necessarily have to pass more and more into the way of thinking of
philosophers.
For those who will judge my writing, I would like to make the
following remark, which I consider important:

d
Whatever our weapons may be, it is necessary that there is
only one
Knowing to what extent something really is that
one thereby knows, consequently to what extent it relates to this
something as a fine object.

This applies, as for all knowledge, also to philosophical knowledge,

and therefore to philosophy as a science.

Philosophy, as such, is therefore a science in and through relation to its

object. Therefore this object is this specific object for us if philosophy is
really science for us.

I conclude from this that we cannot possibly will the object of philosophy
until we have actually

lich knowledge, that is: until philosophy really becomes willpower for us.
All the efforts of philosophers to raise philosophy to a science can therefore
also be summed up in this: to determine the object of philosophy as a
science. This object therefore only needs to be determined, and it itself must
therefore necessarily have been presupposed in all possible philosophy, as a
real curse of determination.
 Applied to the history of philosophy, this shows us the specific purpose
of the collective pursuit of philosophers in relation to one another.
Namely, there must be an agreement among them about the one and
necessary object of philosophy, and therefore an agreement to unite them
all into one.

If we assume this agreement to be hypothetical, the question of the

condition of its attainability necessarily arises, and consequently of what
we must do in order to

For the sake of agreement, first of all

have to.

We now find this condition

by dissecting our concept of the assumed understanding. It must be a

manifold brought to unity, and in such a way that this unity practically
emerges from the manifold itself. Accordingly, this manifold is the
condition of the specific content of the unity. Nothing must be thought of
and found as actual in the latter that is either not contained at all or only
partially contained in the former. An agreement of all philosophers to one,
thus presupposes as a necessary condition: the agreement of each to himself.
 Ab
out as one the agreement with

feel bad.

This reflection, applied to the opposing assessment, must necessarily

justify the efforts of every individual philosopher completely. It is quite
possible that he really did not understand some of the curses that already
existed. But nevertheless

it is necessary that, since he was only philosophizing, he also had to make

an effort to understand himself. Consequently, everyone was always on
the way to fulfilling in his part the condition under which a general
understanding is thought to be possible. More cannot be demanded of
anyone. We may well accommodate everyone with instruction; but for the
philosopher there is no forum externum, but everyone remains
here necessarily his own judge; and
Therefore justice is to each one before his own best will.

If I say this with a specific reference to my present work, then no one will
decide to make it public, but leave it to my conscience. If I have erred and
have not understood this or that, my opinion will still remain the same: for
the possible errors were considered truth to me, and I will certainly take
them back as soon as I know how to put something better in their place.
Even now, I readily admit, I am anything but satisfied with the presentation
of the whole. The execution has taught me, and after an interim
I can now present some things better and more precisely, and many others,
on the other hand, I cannot say at all. Whoever finds in this confession proof
of a still wavering system may be right for himself. But he would not have
judged me, for my philosophy is not a book, and I myself, I am aware of
this, will always strive to refine and perfect myself in my whole being, and
thus also in my knowledge.

Incidentally, it was only after I had finished my work that I learned that
the Academy had already decided on the prize and had awarded Mr.
Schwab, Abicht and Reinhold the respective prizes. I only mention this in
a few places in this examination, as it could not have had any further
influence on the paper itself. The prize winners

5
 I am now awaiting price publications, and if it is my

13

a purpose, and external circumstances do not hinder me, I will

immediately follow up with an examination of the same

9
Introduction.
 r5
3

The

The history of the development of human reason presents us with a truly

remarkable fact to this day: that human beings have always resisted nothing
more, and continue to resist nothing more today, than their own destiny,
which lies within them: the advancement towards perfection. If there has
ever been a conflict between reason and itself, and if it is the only one,
which has led people for thousands of years down paths of need and
distress, then the source of all of this lies solely in that fact of history. That
is why we lament, and that is why we hope. No peace will come on earth,
and no good will come to mankind, unless that source is first diverted.

They did not suspect this, the people who misunderstood

themselves. They longed for innocence and looked sadly upon
experience. They consulted reason and became doubters or sworn.

mer.

A2

But
 But even that fact is the experience of all times, and even now it still
laments one parting day after the other: it will not bring you down,
awakened and afflicted: it must raise you all the more to a manly courage
and confidence with the view of the future and the feeling of your strength.
You know the experience. Man, it testifies to this, if he is a man, his being
is also determined by nature to progress, and

he can be finer Not the lazy

mood cannot escape. and lost, - not the weak and oppressed, not the slave
and master, no - man in general cannot escape his destiny.

It is this sublime truth that this fact testifies to us, and it testifies all the
more clearly the more serious and emphatic the conflict of reason becomes.
This is how it had to be. This is what the one and eternal law of our minds
demands. In the conflict itself, if it is to remain conceivable, there must also
be its solution.
Therefore, man only comes into conflict with himself by wanting to
escape that which he cannot escape. If the latter were ever possible, it would
be a contradiction within a conflict, and the possibility of being able would
therefore be the impossibility of wanting.
That is what the Fatalists meant, and their conclusion is the opposite.
An eternally necessary law of our minds as a form of its activity.

ity, no possible will in us speaks for itself. No such necessary force of our
mind in its pure self-activity, no possible will in us, we say. The former tear
a horrifying, unavoidable fate as the last ring. We the reason, which itself in
its pure and
Reason striving to achieve eternal identity. This, in order to derive the
source of all human misery and to bring reason to peace with it, necessarily
means nothing other than to instruct man about his true destiny. He cannot
escape it, for it is his destiny, founded in his own reason, i.e. within
himself, and for this reason alone he needs to be instructed about it, so that
he no longer wants to escape it. Let this be spoken by all tongues that teach,
by all lips that open themselves, and on the streets and from the housetops!
that the spirit of persecution, malice and punishment will finally be more
and more eradicated, and humanity and gentleness will awaken in hearts.

How I hear your smiles, you small-minded and despondent ones, and
your deep sighs, you good-natured and noble ones. But do you see the days
that are coming, and do you, perfected ones, count the future generations in
order to base the statement: So it was, and so it will be? You look at
experience, and do not understand it. You hunt for the little man in it, and
do not find him. And you smile, and you sigh, O hunt him in

A3

Find
out for yourself, the better people, within you through research and
knowledge of your inner being, and then tell the whole world that people
will become better if they first know how to become better. We may not
want to rush ahead of our own steps. Each step that follows necessarily takes
us ahead of the one before. We can therefore only speed them up. But that is
why eternity is also tied to our steps, and we must therefore work to ensure
that what is to remain and be eternal comes and becomes what is to come
and become. In this way we look with confidence into the better future, for it
is our work and therefore as certain as our own selves. With strength and
prayer, or in leisurely and calm, he finds
Wanting to wait is childish and ridiculous. But reaching into the moments
of time with the powers of freedom and calling them through actions is the
way of man.

ren,

Instruction to mankind about their true destiny - this alone can be

promised as the fulfillment for our hearts. To the fulfillment that we, torn
free from the yoke of slavery, learn to feast on infinity in the free play of our
powers. One day, and even if it is too late, humanity must come to this, for
this is its destiny. Indeed, its opposition itself is everywhere only a striving
to grasp this destiny, and all opposition to reason is therefore only a struggle
of the same for agreement. There was therefore only one goal towards
which humanity aimed: and only one task which it had to solve.

was
definitely destined. This cursed them, and cursed them for a long time. But
the highest price of truth is to have won it, and the sons of freedom could
only be given freedom through it. Therefore there was a goal, and therefore
a fight. It was to raise man up! and raise him from infant to the dignity of
man. So error walked for a long time in the dark, and shielded his path with
the terrors of night. Only in the light of day did truth appear with the ray of
peace, and terrors fled, as did fear and conflict. This finally coming was
man's success, and to see and abolish it was an action: a moment of reason
for all reason in general. Oh, a blessed moment, from which onwards the
days of peace in the bright distance of the future must now follow easily and
beautifully in eternally happy succession like an echo of the harmonies of
our spirits. Where he, this swept, appeared to the inquiring self-thinker, and
through him to all of humanity, it was there that the material shell of the
heavenly truth first fell away like a morning mist.
 What man is and was and what he should be: these have certainly been
objects of philosophical investigation as long as philosophy has been
practiced. But they have never been completely familiar with the definite
distinction between the pure and the empirical, the imperatives of reason
and the commandments of devotion to the letter and the heart.

A4
Traditional. Only a few great men have, through the spontaneous activity of
their minds, occasionally broken through the barriers of chance and given
men laws of freedom. May this remain in the mouths of posterity, for they
were the lights that shone on the minds of the centuries and led men, even if
only from an infinite distance, nearer to the great day on which everything
will become one light and one clarity.

Man is therefore determined by his nature to progress, and his

resistance to this is only such progress. We find this confirmed above
all in the course of science. 9

The sciences, as such, are not the work of chance and mechanical
thinking, but rather products of freedom and self-activity in thinking. In
them, therefore, some kind of deeper understanding must have taken place
in time. If we abstract from their reality and consider them to be possible
through freedom, merely problematic, we come, retrospectively, to a point
in time when the activity of the self, which is productive in knowledge, and
free reflection, was not yet this activity. But freedom in general and free
reflection are not interchangeable, but rather two different spheres. If,
therefore, reflection was not yet free, as is necessary to assume,

the
the refusal had to be removed - this was certainly the case, but not a
determination through freedom, but a mere reflection, or rather a
representation in general. That point in time when we regard the sciences as
merely problematic is therefore the point of freedom and of mere
representation.

As a merely imaginative being, man is therefore not free, and is therefore

opposed to freedom. Therefore, viewed as a being, he is a purely natural
being. As imaginative, he is therefore also subject to objective
determinations, and is completely conditioned and necessary. In every
present moment he only appears through the preceding one, and his entire
existence is an eternal change in time: a coming into being and passing
away, both at the same time.

in a moment.

In this state of mere imagination, as a series of moments without unity

and connection, as a change of states without the state of the one
imagining, no will remains conceivable at all. Consciousness everywhere
lacks identity, and is therefore only a consciousness for a possible
intelligence.

If we reflect on this as a point in time when all knowledge is still

impossible because the ego is not yet the knowing one, and now regard the
sciences as merely problematic, then we must necessarily think of one
among them that
It is an expression of that through which the ego attains the will, through
which it becomes a knowing one, and consequently: a science of the
possibility of all knowledge. There is no arbitrariness here. Not wanting to
admit it would mean claiming that the ego can never become a knowing
one; thus claiming that every assertion contains a contradiction in itself, and
therefore the non-admission of real knowledge, and consequently also of a
science of the possibility of all will, contains an inconsistency. Every
objection therefore refutes itself just as clearly as that concept is clear and
obvious in itself. But one could want to give this contradiction back to us.

If we assume that all sciences are merely problematic and think of one of
them as the science of the possibility of all will, then this possibility can
necessarily only be explained by the fact that the science of it, as one of the
possible ones, is real. But all sciences are products of freedom and
therefore all are to be regarded as problematic at the point of mere
representation. Consequently, the science of the possibility of all would be
problematic and non-problematic at the same time, which contradicts itself.

We will be able to counter this contradiction. It necessarily falls away

through the single observation that it is only our reflection that brings that
point of mere advantage

tion
and with it the entire sciences as merely problematic. The science of the
possibility of all knowledge is therefore really problematic and non-
problematic at the same time. Problematic in relation to the imagining
subject of the assumed point: and non-problematic in relation to the present
positing of this point, consequently in relation to this our reflection. But it is
problematic insofar as an intelligence reflects the point of mere
representation, and therefore only problematic insofar as it is at the same
time not problematic, and therefore real. For any possible intelligence that
If something were merely thought, the science of the possibility of all
knowledge was never problematic, or what is more: it was never
possible in any other way than because it was real.

If the ego is now placed at this point of will, then intelligence is also
present with it, which reflects through itself the empirical path to science
that has been taken, and thereby marks a starting point for the whole career.
Therefore, the science of the possibility of all will, or science per se, could
only become real through a complete fiction, and therefore only through the
fact that its possibility was given by reality.

Let us now call this science, as the first of all sciences, or as willpower,
through which

che
che all human knowledge is a knowledge in general, and will become a
knowledge, philosophy;

There have always been only curses in it. But there were only curses
insofar as their possibility was asserted through reality, and consequently
each one was already a final and complete curse → the idea should at least
be considered science.

From this it follows without doubt that, as far as we can assume a will in
regression, we must also use it to make attempts at science; indeed, that the
first possible knowledge is already a first real attempt at science in general,
and consequently also
the first wiff was an immediate wiff. We will justify this conclusion.

All sciences in general have a beginning in time through reflection from

freedom. Even the first real knowledge was at some point a first will. This
point is to be determined. It should be a first in time, a point of free
reflection.

He

In free reflection, or in reflection through freedom, there is reflection

and freedom, and freedom not through reflection, but reflection through
freedom. This determines our subject. Freedom in general is only
conceivable as unconditional; consequently only as identity, without
change and without alteration. Mere reflection
Reflection, on the other hand, can only be thought of as completely
conditioned, and consequently only as a constant change, without unity
and identity. Whether reflection is free, or reflects freedom, then through
it a change acquires identity in time, that is, an existence through a unity
of time.

But freedom reflects means nothing other than it judges. For through
judging in general it is posited that something is free. If we therefore look at
our point as a first in time, then the judgment enters into it that something is
free in general. This judgment is completely free. For if it were not, then
reflection as a conditioned action would be in it, the whole action.
Consequently it would not be posited that something is free, but rather this
action, as a determination, would fall into the sphere of the representation
and would be determined, hence no judgment that something is there.

That first will to be determined is therefore a judgment, and a judgment

indeed that something is. Herein lies, according to the above conclusion, the
first curse to philosophy. In order to make this clear, we note the point in
time when all reflection is still a representation in general, still a mere
determination by an object. If freedom is now to intervene in the change
and reflect independently, thus making the judgment that something is, then
it necessarily takes into itself at this moment the mere representation
determined by the object. It therefore reflects through the representation,
but through the representation determined by the object.
Representation. Consequently, it reflects the object of the representation
through the representation. But if freedom reflects through the
representation, then the latter is also the law of reflection for it. But the
representation itself is determined by the object, and only through the
representation. Therefore, if freedom reflects the object of the
representation through the representation, i.e., it judges of this object as a
consequence of the representation that it exists, then it also necessarily
judges that it absolutely exists. For freedom determines the existence of
this object through the representation determined by the object.
Consequently, the law of reflection, or reflection as such, is only valid
through it, and the judgment of it is therefore necessarily nothing other
than AA, i.e. A is, because it is. *)
 With this we now stand at the limit of all human will and knowledge,
insofar as we wish to demonstrate its empirical origin.
*) It is clear from this that the proposition AA must originally necessarily
express the absolute being of A and hence existence. We abstracted from all
knowledge and thereby found in the regress the point of mere representation
for a possible intelligence. This reflection is a transcendental principle
through which the reality of A, as an I, is asserted absolutely and without
any further reason. It turns out, however, that through the original judgment
A=A, which we found in the regress, we only arrive at this reflection in
empirical progress, and that consequently the judgment A = A cannot be
thought of as originally merely formal.
want. That judgment is the first step, and this therefore necessarily
determines the entire empirical progress, up to the pure, original source of
all our will. Therefore, the beginning of philosophizing cannot be torn up or
down any further for any possible reason. We find ourselves in a chain, and
are therefore compelled to go back to the first link. This presents us with the
judgment that something is absolutely true. Its possibility is therefore given
by reality, and the judgment as a knowledge is therefore also an immediate
and complete will for the person making the judgment.

It is not possible to argue against this deduction from a higher standpoint.

We abstract from all knowledge in order to be able to posit a first one. The
question is therefore only whether we can really arrive at the knowledge that
we have wanted to anticipate for our purpose here, even through
representations and thus through consciousness alone.

We now know the first thing with which all human knowledge begins, in
time. Through this we also find the nature of the first philosophical ideas.
We may call every judgment, considered as such, a philosophical idea in
general. This is in the concept. A philosophical idea means nothing other
than a certain type of representation of
what is or should be. The truth or falsity of this depends entirely on the
judgment.

A = A2
 AA, or A is, because it is, we found to be the first of all judgments in
general. A is here simply posited, consequently posited in general. Hence
A = Hence AA, considered as a judgment, is judged absolutely thetically,
or A = A is a thetical judgment.

This is exactly how it is with the first philosophical phenomena. Their

form is also AA, and they are therefore all of a thetic nature.

In the thetic judgments, therefore, the reflective power of judgment began

its first career. It was here that the ability to simply determine something
developed. For all judgments concerned nothing more than the positing of
an object, hence its mere existence, as absolute being. But this absolute
positing has a twofold relationship. For any intelligence - as for our
reflection - there were necessarily so many and different absolutes, as a
diversity of objects. But for the judging itself there was still no such
diversity at all, but everywhere only one and the same object, namely
existence in general. But the power of judgement would never have been
able to make any further progress if an original multiplicity of objects had
not nevertheless existed. As the ability to posit something absolutely was
somewhat developed in the objects A, B, as an x in general, these were no
longer seen as a mere x as existence in general but as

Ax and Bx, and consequently with a distinction of the one from the other.
With this positing of the differences, the judgement immediately began its
second career, that of antithetical judgements, including the thetic ones.
 On this, its second path, the power of judgment undoubtedly achieved a
certain skill far more easily and sooner than on the preceding first. This is
clear from the relationship between the two. Originally, A and B were
merely and absolutely posited. But their mere positing as an x did not
exclude AA and BB, and consequently the characteristics A and B in x. This
at least was not the case for any intelligence other than the one making the
judgment. With greater skill in theoretical judgment, however, the power of
judgment became precisely that intelligence, which was the latter, therefore
A = A and B = B; consequently AB and B but B as well as A were simply
posited, and thus, insofar as A was posited, B was simply opposed to A. The
more certainty there was in A as A and in B as B, the more noticeable the
differences became, and the more certain the opposition. The ability to make
contrasts therefore necessarily developed with the greater skill in theoretical
judgment.

A.

There was still a third and final career for the power of judgement: that
of synthetic judgements. These judgements were by no means immediately
connected with the antithetical ones. For although no
 Antithesis without synthesis is possible: reflection from the theory
through the theory must therefore make the transition to mere antithesis. But
the synthetic judgment was brought about by the antithetical just as the
antithetical was by the thetic. For differences cannot be posited without
comparing the different things, and consequently they only occur in things
that are equal. In order to be able to judge B as opposite to A, both must
already be actually posited in one consciousness, and thus both must already
be synthetically connected. With greater skill in antithetical judgment than
the ability to counterpose, the power of judgment must therefore reflect
directly, through the antithetical judgment, on the equality of the opposites,
as on their being posited in one consciousness, and thus judge synthetically.
This action of synthesis, like that of thesis and antithesis, was original and
absolute. Here too, the judgement had no further law of reflection than mere
reflection through the equalization of itself. This is how it had to be if there
was to be a judgement at all. It is only a judgement insofar as reflection is
determined by freedom. Reflection is therefore unconditioned, and therefore
the judgement, as a judgement, is absolute and unconditioned in its entirety.

But with this, the power of judgement was completely exhausted in its
scope. For it is judged that something is, that something
not true, and that something is just something not true, consequently that it
is something true. Or in other words: it is compared, opposed and equated.
If everything opposite is equated, then there is necessarily nothing but
thephis. Through synthesis, therefore, reflection returns to thephis,
consequently to that from which it started, and with it the whole sphere of
judgments is exhausted and described.

With the power of synthesis, the power of judgement received its

full scope. The wealth that the antithetical judgements
was now overturned. Every synthesis fell back into the sphere of the
thesis, and so reflection expanded its area to the extent that it brought
unity and order out of chaos.
For a long time, however, the whole remained indisputably just chaos.
This was made necessary by the thetic judgments. According to them, all A
and B were posited simply and absolutely. The thetic judgment A = A or A
if because it is, therefore meant nothing other than: A is an I. It cannot be
imagined otherwise. The judgment was compelled to posit A absolutely, as
was strictly demonstrated above. A therefore had to contain that which it
was posited according to, namely an existence of consciousness.
Consequently, the I was transferred to A, and since the judgment was
absolute and the act of transferring was not a condition of A, A also
necessarily became an I outside of the I. B 2

Here
 This explains the fact of history that childish reason perfects everything
around it. This is how it had to be. The linguist and antiquarian will conduct
a mindless investigation if he does not observe this necessary law of our
minds.

It was therefore the thetic judgement that, through the transfer of the ego,
created persons from the latter opposed to this ego, from objects. These,
indeed, immediately passed over into the antithesis and synthesis, and in
this way families and relationships arose among them. But absolutes could
only form series existing for themselves, and could not themselves become
links in a chain. Thus there were no parts through a whole, but only a whole
through parts, consequently as many wholes as parts, and therefore in them
mere aggregation.

Through the thesis, antithesis and synthesis, the power of judgement was
exhausted in its capacity. It could therefore no longer accept any
determination in order to become a power of judgement at all. Only
intensive expansion remained. Therefore, its progress had to come from
itself, in the already determined capacity, that is, from judging in general.
Therefore, the first synthesis also necessarily contained the germ of all
subsequent systems. Each was a transformation of the diverse into unity.
Each thus gave consciousness more scope and content, and that was all that
was needed in order to

Syn
Synthesis also to bring order and unity into this content.

Originally, consciousness in every single judgment is only one

consciousness: in several and different ones, for any intelligence, it is
several and different. *) Through continued synthesis, intelligence arose,
which combines the several into one, now itself in consciousness, and
thereby also unity in the entire scope of judgments.
of consciousness. But unity of consciousness, as unity of judgments in
consciousness, is a fantasy unity, and this, despite the possible leaps and
inconsistencies, is necessarily a living link to philosophy, as the science of
the possibility of all knowledge. For if A was simply posited, as it had to
happen, then it was also posited as the explanatory ground of all
consciousness, and consequently the manifold in the unity of consciousness
had to be a series that related to A: as the conditioned to its condition as the
unconditioned.

But A was the unconditional insofar as it was absolutely defined as such.

From the point of view of mere consciousness, B and C could also define
it, and the power of judgement developed the same system. That this had to
happen is obvious.

B3

That is precisely why we cannot have any consciousness from our

earlier years, because there was no consciousness in those years.
can be strictly maintained, provided that there is a possible experience,
and consequently a representation in general. Only in freedom alone is
there the One and Absolute, the perfect identity. In nature and its laws,

on the other hand, an equally great diversity. But it was nature that
conceived man as an infant in her womb. *) She instilled nature in him with
her mother's milk and raised her ward for her purposes. From now on, be a
diversity! was her first utterance: and the minor became one. As an
imaginative being, as a mere natural being, there is no being, no
independence and identity in man. He comes and passes away in the stream
of time, and there is nothing in him that organizes and holds the vain
moments. He was not meant to be that, the son of freedom. Infinite power,
the power of freedom, strives for the fullness of divinity. This was to
emerge from him with omnipotence, and the command of nature was to be
destroyed by his striving. It was therefore freedom that intervened in the
change of ideas and brought about change. But this change and what it
brought about was not the work of freedom. Nature created it out of its
abundance of diversity and formed it on the basis of the

Type

*) It must be clear to everyone who has followed us up to this point that no

creation can be thought of here. We are only talking about a rational being
that is linked to its existence. An infinite task! and yet a task that must
necessarily be solved by reason.

species, in its part, the entire human race as a multifaceted entity. Thus, the
chain of representations, as judgements through freedom, was necessarily
different in different subjects, even in that which was not freedom. In each
one, therefore, the power of judgement had to find its own scope in its
intensive expansion.
In each one there was unity from his point of view, and in each one the
existence of the world in general was determined according to his own
laws of reflection.

With several curses in philosophy, several systems necessarily arose.

These were real, and were taken as real. There could therefore be no further
progress towards them, but only in them did the power of judgement retain
an infinite scope. But progress was not made in one system, but in each of
them. There was therefore not just one, but several infinities fighting for
infinity. We focus our attention on this fact and draw the following
important conclusion from it:

With the advance of several opposing systems in science, each one

necessarily strives to assert its claim to science to the exclusion of all
others: and this striving of all, as expressly directed towards one and the
same goal, towards science, is necessarily at the same time associated with
any one-sided advance in science.

B4
 like a progression to science in general. Both
are one and the same action. The collected
facts of the one-sided
The fact of the progress in science is at the same
time the fact of the real progress in science, and
as certain as that is, the other is just as certain.

In this way we obtain the most perfect unity in the collective and
absolutely only possible systems, which are opposed to each other. For they
all, as facts, give only one fact, and consequently the only thing we need in
order to await the end of all disputes with confidence. But in all of them, as
one fact, thought of as complete, there also lies the specific object of a
history of philosophy. Philosophy is only science through a complete curse.
It therefore happens through curses. Hence its history is necessarily nothing
other than:

The apt representation of the overall

progress of philosophizing reason to
philosophy as science; or: science
from emerging science.

This is the point we have actually wanted to reach through everything

we have said so far. The aim is now apparent. It is the pure idea of a
history of philosophy. In order to understand this in its

T
To really stand out for its purity, we will try a closer development.
The object of all the history of philosophy is the progress of reason on its
way to science. But if it is reason which
progresses in general, and if willpower is its goal, then it must also find
itself a goal in this goal. But reason can only find itself a goal insofar as it
starts from itself and returns to itself; consequently insofar as it describes its
own sphere and defines itself as reason. Reason as reason is reason in its
pure and original essence, in what it is, in that it is reason. The concept of
progress does not correspond to this. It is empirical. Progressive reason is
therefore not pure reason, but empirical reason. Reason in general therefore
started from itself by entering the world of appearances. Consequently,
reason was already reason before there was an idea for it, and through idea
an experience and nature. But it was not this reason itself, this reason
independent of all experience. Nevertheless, it should be so. It should know
and recognize that it is reason, therefore know itself as self-active being,
whose nature is not ideation and diversity, but freedom and the highest
unity. Therefore it went out into the realm of consciousness in order to
return to itself and to find itself reason.

B5

Diefer
 The point of return of reason to itself is the point of science. In this,
reason has won its freedom, and the highest goal of its collective
advancement to itself is therefore the knowledge of itself, hence: SELF-
KNOWLEDGE! This is where their striving went, this is where the efforts
of thousands of years went. Man as a man, in the full feeling of his free
powers, in the consciousness of himself, was the great goal of all past ages.
With him begins a new epoch, the epoch of ideas, as eternally valid laws for
everything that can ever become real through reason.

Time, posited in itself as a goal, can be imagined as soon as this goal is

there. The progress of reason towards it itself as reason, is thus conceivable
as a completed progress. If the advancing reason is now empirical reason,
and its entire being is a progress in general, then its progress cannot be
fixed and determined by reason itself as the specific reason, but only by
pure reason as the determining reason. If the progress towards philosophy is
therefore to be examined and presented scientifically as a science, then the
investigation cannot be merely historical, but must necessarily be
philosophical and historical at the same time. This is therefore the condition
for any description of the history of philosophy. It must be science, and
therefore have internal coherence and certainty.

1
It must come out of the spirit of man alive. No one should dare to tell this
story and if he

the

Even if one is not brimming with learning in the letter, one cannot recall
the whole past, especially in the mirror of self-knowledge, and one does
not know how to find in oneself the first seeds of life, the ripened fruit of
freedom, the self-knowledge.
 The various curses that have been made up to now about the history of
philosophy must be refuted. It is in the nature of things that such a history,
as the history of progress towards science or towards freedom of reason, is
pragmatic. But historians have so far only been able to deny this; the
implementation has been impossible. There has not yet been philosophy as
a science, nor has reason itself progressed towards it. How the path to this
goal might wind its way was therefore necessarily unknown, and nothing
could be anticipated on this path. Of course, with every moment there was a
time that had passed, and therefore also the advances in science that
corresponded to it. But precisely for this reason the intelligence was still
lacking to reflect on these advances as just that, and to precisely determine
the moments of time as in all time of progress. A scientific investigation
that does not go from the whole into the parts contradicts itself, because it
has no object as an object. That was the case with history

that
of philosophy. Reason was still only striving for its idea, and what has
happened here must be completely forgotten.

But once philosophy has become a science,* there can hardly be a more
urgent need of time than to immediately write a history of it. Science
should not, as philosophy in its development does, merely spend its time
idle within the four walls of the scholar; rather, as the science of truth,
which has human action as its sole object, it should become a supreme law
for the will. Therefore it is in itself to bring it to the minds of men, or
more purely and precisely: it is a necessary striving of the liberated mind
through its activity to spread reason, and thus to raise man up to the high
ideal that hovers before him in the light of his inner being with ever-
increasing clarity and grandeur. He would have the letter and not the
science, who would consider them chosen for a few. No, the command of
reason to break every barrier and abolish every restriction lies only in the
infinite power of the
 Ver.

*) Science can never exist as a letter, for it is based solely on self-

knowledge and is nothing other than the living spirit in us in the necessary
relationship to itself. A note for those who, when they hear the words of
the text, might easily think of paragraphs and their authors.

Reason, and this effectiveness will and must succeed.

The will, therefore, must be introduced to the minds, and for this
introduction, I believe, the history of the developing human being will be, if
not the only, then certainly the most reliable means. Not everyone is equally
capable of raising themselves to the pure idea of science, and not everyone
thinks this is a mistake in their head. But if the mind, constrained and fixed
in a one-sided direction of thought, is to be released and free, then one
should only guide it to facts of freedom, to facts which it is already
compelled to recognize in general by its empirical means. But this is the
path the history of philosophy must really take. Its entire object consists
only of facts, the content of which, as a unity, is conflict in general. *) This
should be presented as completely solved, and the presentation should
therefore be continued up to the point where science enters, or reason
appears at peace with itself, and the conflict disappears. Thus, according to
this idea, history leads us through all the points of fucceffive progress, and
thus leads us through pure facts.

to

In

* The history of philosophy can have no other object than conflict in

general. This is precisely what the
continued striving of reason for philosophy as a science. perfected
dogmatism, since all systems, under the

In the

Princip
le of philosophy as a science,

This is necessary

agile, her gait is as confident as it is peaceful.

secure

through reflection according to the laws of science; and peacefully

through reflection on all conflict in general. It must lie completely and
absolutely outside the sphere of possible conflict. For every simple
assertion, every possible conflict, necessarily belongs to the scope of its
material, and can therefore only be the work of free reason that is in
agreement with itself.

From this relationship of philosophy and its history, our above idea is
formed, the first through

the

When the principle of the absolute object is reduced to one, the

opposition of reason reaches its highest point. But it is also destroyed by
itself in this moment. For when reason abolishes the transcendent point of
view and takes the highest seat through self-knowledge, the opposition
with it is also abolished. It is now reason as reason, thus in harmony with
itself, and thus equal to itself. In place of the opposition, therefore,
science now takes the place of the opposition, and the history of
philosophy has with it
This is no longer an object, is therefore completely closed, and is itself
science. But who does not see that this task is infinite? At no moment in
time is man, as an individual, a free man, and this therefore only exists for
us in the idea. It is precisely the same with science and its history. But the
idea is necessary. In it the infinite future lies before us, and all our striving is
aimed at its completion.

to prepare the latter is completely justified. We look at the whole, and

therefore at the necessary empirical condition. Here, of course, a history of
philosophy is only possible with the advent of philosophy as a science; but
in view of the circumstances of the time, this is also the actual introduction
to it. There is more to follow from this. If all resistance and opposition is
only a struggle for the power of ideas, for the freedom of reason, then it also
belongs entirely to the material of the history of philosophy, or to the
advances of reason to itself as reason. This path is necessary, and man must
take it. It would therefore be the most unforgivable inconsistency if an
independent thinker were to respond to the ridicule of the products of his
free self-activity with derision. Science could never justify such behavior,
for it would mean denying it and lowering itself below the dignity of the free
man. There is only one goal, and it is an idea as necessary as it is sublime
that in the great field of science there should only be science in general and
its history. The former shows us man in his hard-won freedom, while the
latter places him in a struggle with himself. Both are given to us in the idea
of freedom and infinite striving, and it is only this idea to which we will rise
at some point on the path of our empirical progress. The idea is there, and it
is there to create a

To
encompass the world: to order everything real in it and according to it.
 However, there are particularly great and important difficulties in
carrying out the idea of a history of philosophy. The point in time at which
science falls limits the empirical progress of reason towards it itself as
reason. This progress was necessary and, insofar as it was, could only be
limited by freedom. Now that it has been completed, freedom should go
through it once more through reflection and present it scientifically.

Was it

but a labyrinth of unfortunate errors in which reason has been entangled for
thousands of years; so there are necessarily dark and overgrown paths along
which free reflection must ascend to itself. Nowhere, indeed, has one
believed more firmly than in the area of history, as long as the facts were
facts. But no one suspected that the truth of the relationship, upon which
everything really depends, does not lie in facts at all, but requires judgment,
and that this very fact was for any intelligence, and therefore up to the time
of science itself only a historical object. All history in general necessarily
stands in the most precise relationship with man. Like man, so his history.
Whether he is still in the process of becoming, still progressing towards
himself; For him there is no history as true history, but only an intelligence
other than him could

Such
an intelligence is reason in its freedom. But it can only do so through
reflection of its empirical progress in general: consequently, only through
the fact that it must first bring unity and order into the chaos of the entire
past.

To accomplish this will undoubtedly require a particularly successful

development of diverse powers, a development that may not be entirely
possible in the next century. Nevertheless, we who boast of the fortunate
moment of science should at least examine its history, and
The question is therefore necessary: how can we undertake this with
success? Science itself must now teach us about this. A correct view of the
whole, in the idea of a history, is without doubt the first thing we need. This
cannot be based on experience, but rather on all real experience and must
rather be judged by it. Therefore it can only be drawn from a critical
consideration of empirical man in general, in relation to his purely rational
being, and such a consideration would therefore be the definite preparation
for every philosophical and historical investigation, with which we want to
make a history of philosophy possible for our descendants.
 With this we finally come to the precise and previously only introduced
examination of the actual subject of this work. The application of what has
been said so far will become clear. We refer to this also anyone to whom
we may have seemed too obscure or too far-reaching. We will not miss
our purpose, and this alone will justify us.

Examin
ation Examination

the

from the Academy of Sciences

to Berlin

prize question:

What progress has metaphysics made since Leibniz and Wolff?

Approx
 The

The famous Academy of Sciences in Berlin had already posed the prize
question for the year 1792 in the field of speculative philosophy:
What progress has metaphysics made since Leibniz and Wolff?
Of the few replies received at that time, none was considered worthy of
the prize, and the question was therefore repeated for the year 1795, with
the double prize being offered.

This phenomenon deserves our attention. Every attempt to bring about

peace in the sciences must necessarily interest the philosophical observer
for the sake of practical ends. But when finally that which has not been
possible for the powers of centuries is to be determined by a single result
before the eyes of the whole world, then that observer will not only have to
direct his gaze to this great refutation, but will necessarily first have to
examine with the utmost scrutiny the arrangements made for it.

The Academy's prize question is intended to be an attempt to

restore philosophical peace wherever possible.
This is in its concept. But the time at which it falls and the nature and
duration of its entire intention are such remarkable circumstances that the
incident must undoubtedly be of interest, if not for the history of philosophy
in general, at least for the present moment.

The reason therefore lies in the circumstances of the time: in the well-
known revolution which the critique of pure reason has spread over the
entire field of science. This revolution is still ongoing, and its manifestations
are certainly significant enough to leave nothing unchallenged and to put an
end to the annoying dispute. Every curse has so far only been oil on the fire.
The beautiful promises have not only not remained unfulfilled, but have all
too visibly divided the public into even more parties and thereby embroiled
them in even more violent disputes. Assertion against assertion appear in
one and the same form of decision, in the form of dogmatism, and therefore
stand against each other as all like stands against each other. Only in
moments of despair does the truth finally emerge, but a sad truth, since the
evil will and the unfound understanding now become a reason for explaining
mutual obstinacy. That is what theories are based on unshakable principles!
Theories which the letter of criticism produced and which surpass in
dogmatism everything which the history of philosophy can propose to us.
 The Academy had this state of affairs in mind when it asked for the prize.
As the responsible caretaker of the sciences, it ardently wished for the final
result of all this and therefore sought to make the question of the progress of
metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff a general matter for the learned public.
It can certainly be expected that both the public respect for the Academy,
combined with the reliance on its remarkable encouragement, and the
honestly held conviction that the interest of science can be increased by
voluntarily showing attention to the Academy, will persuade many thinkers
to take part. But it can also certainly be expected that, given the ongoing
philosophical dispute, a not insignificant number of independent thinkers
will regard the question of the progress of metaphysics as having been
decided long ago and will therefore consider an answer to it as useless as it
is superfluous.

In view of both expectations, and whatever else may take place, our prize
question therefore appears under certain circumstances, and the
philosophical observer who would have to give a pragmatic report on it
would therefore not be able to accept it as valid outright, but would
necessarily have to examine how it is able to assert itself with its demands in
the possible relationships. We will be more clear about this.

The Academy's prize question is prompted by the circumstances of the

time. According to this, it contains a specific requirement to which an
answer, and indeed an answer, must correspond just as precisely. It is
obvious, however, that a specific relationship must exist between the task
and the possible answer, a relationship according to which it cannot be
indifferent how the latter corresponds to the requirement of the former, and
how the latter in turn can set up such a requirement for the former. The
truth and correctness of this relationship, however, cannot be preceded by
the task actually given and the answer thought to be possible as a result;
rather, in order to be able to judge it with certainty, it requires its own
investigation, and
Therefore, the task of the Academy, for the sake of its justification, only
becomes a task in and of itself.

Of course, we can judge this differently, depending on whether

something is self-evident to us or not. We thought it necessary to examine
the prize question, and it would be beneficial for us to undertake it
ourselves. But if what we are going to ask is won in the struggle and is a
real gain, then it belongs to the common good of human reason, and it is
our duty to communicate it publicly.

to

The present paper is undertaken by us as an examination of the above

price question. Our aim is to describe the subject where possible

to
exhaust it entirely, and in this respect we thought it best to look at it from
the following two points of view.

Firstly: how the task in its external form, that is, as a prize question of
the academy, relates to itself and the possible answer: whether and how it
is as such suitable for the intended purpose or not.

Secondly: how the task, independent of any contingent relationship,

relates to itself and the possible answer: whether and how it, as this task, is
also a necessary task or not.
 From this division it is clear that we can only undertake the actual
examination in the second section. However, this is what the nature of the
matter requires, and our procedure is not arbitrary. Because ➡ If we deduct
from the task everything that belongs to the academy, it is obviously
assumed that in reality it still has a task that someone could very well find
and answer in their own way. The reverse is not the case. For if we take the
purely external form of the task and therefore the part of the academy for
itself, it is difficult to connect even the slightest meaning with that alone.
We will therefore also in the first section merely purify our task of the
accidental and in the

second, it is first presented as a necessary task. This will hopefully fully

justify our division, and we will now proceed directly to the first
consideration.

I.

What progress has metaphysics

made since Leibniz and Wolff?

Judged as a prize question by the Academy.

That the general conflict in the area of philosophy to date is directed

towards a general understanding is a fact that is just as necessary and
universally to be admitted as the conflict itself is. No one can dispute it,
because one cannot argue without at the same time wanting to elevate one's
conviction to universal validity. One may therefore ask: As certain as a
conflict is, it is just as certain that it should not be true; for it only exists in
general insofar as it does not exist. But if it only exists in general insofar as
it does not exist, then the necessity of not existing does not follow from its
existence, but is based on the practical purpose of the conflict. This
The aim is to produce a necessary and general agreement. But it is
practical, so the agreement must be achieved, and

the
The conflict can therefore only completely disappear through a complete
struggle. Accordingly, there is a conflict because there is a goal for
practical reason, and at the same time, for the sake of this goal, all conflict
must necessarily be eliminated, i.e. the goal must be achieved by us
precisely because it is a goal for us. If we were to think of it as achieved, a
necessary and general agreement would be the final refutation of the total
conflict of philosophizing reason. Let us now ask: What is this final
refutation? We have thus set the most definite and highest task for all
science, and consequently a task from which all possible tasks aimed at
understanding and scientific results must be derived and explained.

This is also the case with our present prize question. It reaches into a
period of the history of philosophy; it designates it precisely as this one and
no other, and now directs its demand at the possible result of the progress
contained in it,

But it cannot be assumed that the Academy also deduced its prize
question in this way, and thus made it subject to the condition of that
highest and general task. Such a deduction would have saved them from an
inconsistency which is now quite evident in their prize question.

1
The prize question was caused by the peace of Leibniz-Wolff's
philosophy, which was interrupted by the critique of reason, or by the now
generally prevailing conflict in speculative philosophy. Its demand,
however, is clearly this: to present the progress of metaphysics for Leibniz
and Wolff independently of all opposition, and to define a point from which
the sum of all the powers of reason summoned by Leibniz fall into a single
force, and the result of their efforts can therefore be regarded as a supreme
and universally necessary product. The task is not, however, given to a
secret committee, for such a committee does not take place in the realm of
the minds; rather, as was to be expected,
to the entire philosophical public. But it is precisely this public that gave rise
to the prize question through its renewed opposition or, what is just as
important, through its striving for general agreement. How can a demand be
made of it for a certain period of time which, in order to be valid, abolishes
precisely that which alone gave rise to the whole prize question and which
was indeed established as a fact? The task therefore falls back to where it
came from, consequently it abolishes itself, and its public presentation is
therefore a contradiction.

If the Academy therefore expects an answer from the disputing parties

that really corresponds to the prize question, then the

On
The task is also necessarily itself. But secondly, if it expects such an answer
as a result of the collective conflict, and consequently of agreement, then it
must necessarily turn with its prize question to the happier times of the
future, when this agreement will be real, and therefore also the prize
question together with the Academy, will be unnecessary. In both cases,
therefore, the public exhibition of the prize question is contradictory.

We have previously determined it as a necessary and generally admitted

fact that philosophical reason, through the conflict of all possible parties,
simultaneously pushes for the necessary end of the conflict, namely for the
final refutation of the conflict that has arisen; and that this push has its basis
in the necessary striving of our minds, in our practical reason. There is
absolutely no conceivable contradiction about this. The possible answer to
the prize question put to the entire philosophical public can therefore
achieve nothing more in the matter itself than what is already happening
and must happen on the path of the necessary striving of philosophical
reason: there will be continuing to argue until the arguing is brought to an
end by free man.

But as complex as the question of the Academy’s prize is in itself,

and as beneficial as it could be for many to rely on a precise answer
to it,

--

It would also be detrimental if the Academy were to crown any answer

given to it with its approval. This would not only not increase the benefit
of science,
promoted, but necessarily hindered; for it would mean nothing other than
sanctifying the letter of the book, which the independent-thinking scholar is
meant to destroy as the violent perpetrator of the spirit. This action of the
Academy, which after the example of 1792 is perhaps not yet to be feared,
would necessarily bring about a second contradiction; namely, in addition to
that of the public presentation of the prize question, also that of the purpose
intended by it. This latter contradiction would certainly be the worst, insofar
as we look at the consequences. Nothing could be decided about the truth of
the matter; for the question would only have been answered by the judgment
of the Academy, and thus also by the Academy itself. Such a judgment,
however, is a ruling of authority, which deters the spirit striving for freedom
into its own fields, and thereby necessarily hinders the progress of science.
If a contradiction should therefore take place, then it should remain as it is,
and the question of prizes should therefore stand or fall with the Academy.

We will now justify this preliminary judgement by a deeper

investigation.

The Academy's view is that the answer is decisive, that there is only
one answer. Such an answer
The requirement presupposes that there can be no dispute about it.
Nevertheless, it is only up to the society of scholars, and here it should be
decided, and indeed, according to the requirement, unanimously. But if we
leave this contradiction, then at least the necessary question arises: how can
a scholar be given a task at all? And whether I can reconcile it with the
practical concept of him? Experience cannot possibly be the judge of this.
For it is quite possible that all our previous work was pure school exercises.
But you do not need to think that any further. The actual existence of the
Academy could therefore not decide anything about this question. We must
draw from another source for this, and here we come to results to which the
If experience contradicts this, then things would necessarily have to be
different.

We will therefore first have to examine what the strict concept of a

scholar in general is, and consequently the concept of a learned society.
From this it will then be very easy to establish the relationship between
this society and an academy of sciences.

At first glance, it seems clear that an academy of sciences is not

conceivable other than in and with a society of scholars, and that it is
consequently also related to this, as the conditioned is related to its
condition.

as

as unconditional. Whether a community of scholars is to be regarded as

absolutely unconditional has not been asserted by this, but it follows that
the unconditional must be present in relation to every possible scientific
event, and therefore must be present wherever action is taken according to
ideas of ends.

Let us now look at the establishment of the Academy of Sciences. Its

high and sole mission is to observe the course of the sciences carefully, to
compare the various moments precisely, and to guide the progress of the
whole towards a single goal by pointing out current needs. It certainly
seems to want to fulfill this mission. But how it really fulfills it is
something its annals can tell posterity. For now we only ask: what are we to
understand by that whole over which the Academy, as its caretaker, is
concerned with its endless prize questions? Do the famous sciences have
any significance other than in relation to man in general? Are they not all
products of our free self-activity; and for that reason are they not
necessarily all based on a practical drive within us? Can they therefore
also be thought of in other ways than just in us, and must they not therefore,
when thought of as perfect, be the perfected human being himself? MAN,
then, would be the totality of the sciences and for this the Academy would
have

and

and every institution similar to it has assumed eternal guardianship? No,

certainly man

He himself is, so surely, to approach his high goal through himself. Here we
meet the determination of man in general. The scholar too must be a man,
he must be himself. Everything that may emerge from the fullness of our
self-activity must therefore necessarily be posited in man.

If we assume that the condition of a society of rational beings is freedom

in general, or that freedom is that by which such a being is in general a
rational, and consequently not bounded, but coordinated member of that
society; it follows that freedom must also be the condition by which the
scholar belongs to a society of scholars, and indeed to it as a self-active and
equal member. But the scholar is a learned business, and this business is
thinking, and therefore, by the above condition, free and self-active
thinking. If it is free thinking, then it must only have a relation to him, that
is, it must only be thinking insofar as he is the one who thinks, i.e. insofar as
he himself thinks; and self-thinking would therefore be the real business of
the scholar, as a mere scholar. *)

So
*) The scholar as a mere scholar, i.e. as an independent thinker, is
by no means a human being.

As much as this means, there is no reason to fear that any scholar will
protest against this demand. The contradiction should at least be just as clear
as the objection could be: for the concept is practical, that is, thinking is
based on our own activity, and the scholar must therefore think for himself,
as he must assert his independence against any interference. Therefore, no
one should think as someone else thinks; rather, everyone should think as he
must think in order to be himself, that is, he must think for himself.

If we apply this, it follows that for every scholar, independent thinking

Rather, learning belongs only to the determinations of mankind, and should

therefore, where it exists, be contained in mankind, that is, the scholar
should not be a scholar, but rather he should be a human being. According
to the practical concept of mankind, this is necessary. Man should be
himself, he should be a whole. This is also where the scholarly spirit lies. It
is therefore certain: if there are to be menkind, there must be no scholars,
but this name must disappear before that of mankind. But it is also certain
that man, in order to be able to correspond to the practical concept of him,
must know his determination. In this respect it is true that if a person wants
to be a human being, he must first of all develop the ability to will in
himself, and the scholar or independent thinker must therefore be the true
human being. But then the scholars must also strive only for the predicate
rational, and be ashamed in front of the human being in them of wanting to
be anything other than that.
think that this is the fixed point on which he can first connect his entire
scientific business, or must connect it in order to
to be able to regard it as one of his own. He follows
think: he should therefore not think of the sciences in any other way than
only in him and through him, and therefore have them as his work and his
property.

In itself, every thinker is necessarily a thinker of his own accord, insofar

as the act of thinking is to be explained. But for that very reason, each
thinker is only his own insofar as he freely and independently reflects on his
thinking and ascribes to himself this specific action. This reflection is higher
than mere thinking. It is the goal of reason in its progress towards the idea,
and thus lies somewhere on our path; but can only be achieved through a
variety of errors - chance throws us all, more favorably to some than to
others, into the chaotic diversity of the sciences. They are to become ours
through us: only through us can they maintain unity. Consequently, they do
not become real for us until they actually find their way within us. To make
them into our own world in a direct way can only be possible if this path is
available to us, and consequently if we, as minors, already find reason and
freedom within ourselves. But we only strive for this goal through the idea,
and up to this point humanity was completely left to the guidance of nature.
We are coming close to that.

into the sciences without even knowing how. The crudest curses pass for
perfect because they are given to us as such before we can examine them.
We are not yet worth anything because we have not yet found science.
Nevertheless, something must count for something and be worth something
for us. Since it is not the spirit that still slumbers deep within us, it is the
letter that stands outside of us. We must grasp this and gnaw at it until we
have enough strength within us to no longer determine our existence
through the letter of the letter, but through the freedom of our self-active
spirit. From then on, we only recognize as unfree what we carry within
ourselves through freedom. But we also recognize at the same time that
nothing outside of us should be beautiful that would not have to be
beautiful: consequently, that we can see everything real and everything
possible
in general, who call a world in general the unfree world and as such must
envelop us. This higher reflection leads us to a task that we could not have
had without thinking about our thinking, i.e. without thinking for ourselves.
The point is given to which we have to tie everything: we ourselves find it
in our pure being, and the task is therefore: to reach ourselves empirically in
this pure being. This task is not arbitrary, but as necessary as something.
There has never been another one for people, and could never be; rather,
they had to fulfill their destiny. But to become aware of it as a necessary
task

the,.
That was a specific goal that we had to achieve on our great journey.

As a purely rational being, man is nothing other than that he exists in

general, and hence his absolute freedom is a being in itself. As an empirical
being, on the other hand, he is nothing other than that he does not exist in
general, and hence he disappears in being. Nevertheless, through his
freedom he must accept this disappearance and thus posit it in himself. If it
is posited as a disappearance in him, then it is posited as a fucceffive being
in itself, consequently as a becoming, and his empirical character is
therefore a becoming of himself.

If we relate this to the highest and necessary task of man: to realize

himself empirically; thus to complete the becoming of himself to the point
of being; then this task necessarily applies to all time in general, that is, to
the whole empirical eternity that we have to actually experience. But now
also necessarily lie in that one and highest task all possible others, which in
the context of our becoming, which we do not yet find, must follow one
another just as necessarily as the moments of time themselves. There is
therefore no arbitrary task for us at any moment of our existence, but all are
necessary in a uniform progression.
 Man must find himself, or he must find a whole, in accordance with the
one and highest task, completely identical propositions. In order to be able
to be a whole, the perfected time, which therefore cannot be perfected, is
the necessary condition. Man is therefore not a present at any moment; but
he will be present in all, and must therefore strive to achieve it in everyone.
Therefore he needs the idea of the whole everywhere. For if he wants to
realize it, he must necessarily compare himself with it at every moment,
because he must be present in every moment. We will be clearer about this:
If the goal of our collective striving is infinite, then between it and every
present point there are necessarily infinitely many intermediate points, as
ever higher and higher stages of our progress. But each subsequent stage
must be determined by the present one: consequently it is not until we
actually reach it, or until we really progress; consequently each subsequent
stage is also necessarily none other than the infinite goal itself, or the whole
that we strive for. This goal remains attainable for us only in infinity.
Insofar as we therefore only strive to reach it, each present moment
becomes an intermediate stage, and thus a series of stages up to the infinite
arise through reality.
We intend to make this important material even more fruitful for our
purposes, namely by
a reflection on the necessary conditions of our collective progress.

We must assume as a fact that we really and generally progress

empirically in time or that there is a real experience for us. But we conclude
from the mere concept of progress that if we really progress, it can only
happen insofar as there is a goal for us and with it a necessary direction
towards it. Through all progress in general, something must be achieved:
thus an activity which, for the sake of what is to be achieved, must have a
striving force towards this something.
directed. The direction cannot therefore stop going in this direction until the
goal is reached, i.e. it lies entirely between the striving force and the goal.
Since the direction does not take place in any other way than insofar as there
is a goal, it cannot be in any other direction than a straight direction. If there
were several directions, there would also be several goals: and to reach a
goal by taking a detour necessarily means nothing other than reaching a
final goal by reaching several goals. *) - But our task is only one; we
therefore only have one goal, and for our entire striving therefore only one
direction: the straight direction towards infinity.

ren,

* Compare Fichte üb. d. B. d. WL p. 42. and the note therein.

 If we are now to determine any stage, it is either the present one or,
considered as the next, the infinite one. Any other stage is not conceivable.
For with every present and therefore real moment, we do not have an
infinite number of moments before us into which we must now pass
fucceffively, but it is pure infinity that we want to reach empirically through
the real moment, and only because we cannot do so do we advance further
with our curses, and on into infinity. →→ If the stage to be determined is
now the present one; We must necessarily lower the point that lies in infinity
to the present one, for how else could it be ours, since striving in general
leads in a straight direction to infinity, and thus only the infinite can be
completely ours? But this lowering of the infinite is nothing more than a
comparison of the present with the absolute, that is, an estimation of the real
against the ideal of all that is real, and thus an estimate of what has already
been achieved with what is still to be achieved, *)

Every

*) For the practical purposes of human reason, as objects of the will, no

difference can easily be greater and more important than that between pure
and empirical being. The common
Human understanding, which never rises above the facts of consciousness
in order to explain them as such, necessarily rises through its self-
deception in Be
 In order to be able to describe every present point, we must necessarily
consider it from the point of view of the infinite, because we must

ten,

D5

Judgment of experience reveals this difference, and therefore nothing more

can be expected of it for the advancement of the human race than what kind
nature brings about without its intervention. But up to now even our
philosophers have given so little definite an account of the relationship of
empirical being to the pure self-existence of reason that even those among
them who would like to see nothing less than a tribunal in the public. want
to calculate the one like the other according to solftia. An example of this
can be found, among others, in the Halle Annals of May 1795, where the
reviewer of Berger's work "The Matter of the Day" would rather suspect an
error in the calculation than admit that a thousand and ten thousand and
myriads times myriad years are equal negative quantities compared to the
existence of reason. The Critique of Pure Reason certainly gives Kantian
philosophers cause for such ill-considered judgments. In the
Transcendental Aesthetics, Kant claims that space and time are only forms
of our, i.e. our human, perception, and that there may well be other beings
that are not bound by such conditions. Up to now, all commentators of the
Critique (as recently Mr. Ben David in Vienna in his lectures) have
repeated this to the great man without the slightest hesitation, and in doing
so have completely misunderstood this essential and important difference.
But even through the Critique of Reason, Kant's assertion consistently takes
on the meaning that these assumed other beings are only one being, take
must determine it according to the idea of the whole, or what does every
present point fol

ly God, and therefore the ideal we are trying to realize,

This is not beyond the reason of each one, for it is a practical object, and
God is therefore only in this respect a different being from the one we
merely infinitely strive to absolutely. Rational beings other than me never
find an object of empirical consciousness, because a rational being is only
thought insofar as it thinks itself, and in its being thought it is all that thinks
(Critique of the V p. 404; Fichte's Lectures on the B. of the GP 25 ff., and
Schelling's "On the Ego" in the first paragraphs). Beings other than the Ego
therefore necessarily find non-egos, and therefore fall under objective
determinations, and consequently only in relation to an Ego. The
conditioned does not itself relate to the unconditioned, but the Ego, through
absolute self-existence, is necessarily the relating one. As long as the Ego
therefore places itself in relation to objects, and thus feels the same to them,
the Ego is a non-ego. If the self strives to realize itself, space and time also
find the necessary conditions of this fine striving. However, they not only
find it up to the goal that is eternally unattainable by us, but they also find it
necessarily the only possible ones. This is reliable because through our
freedom (through the self of reason) we know the goal of all possible
experience, and therefore determine all experience in general according to
such an unconditional law: Everything that is not-self posited outside the
self is necessarily contained in space, and only thereby has substance.
Everything that is not-self posited outside the self must exist outside the
self, and only thereby. Therefore it must be raised to being through the self-
activity of reason, and therefore become (in time) what it is not.

L
necessarily follows the infinite self, and only because it is not so does our
striving go to a higher one, and so on in infinity to the infinite self.

In our collective striving towards the infinite goal, therefore, no

arbitrariness is possible. Neither in the blind struggle with the
Power of nature, where we succumb to objects and are determined by
them. And also not in the struggle of awakened freedom with the opposing
nature, where we have thought of our task and now strive to tear the world
outside of us into ourselves according to an eternal law. Freedom once
took the direction of the infinite in order to bring forth the infinite in itself,
or itself as freedom, outside of itself. It thus entered into the condition of
never-ending time, where everything is necessary and determined insofar
as it is in a series.

But the necessity of a GIFT determined by the IDEA is at the same time
the necessity of its DISSOLUTION.

This proposition, which already seems so clear to me, will, after a brief
discussion, make it completely evident that at no moment of the time when
we are wrestling with the infinite world in order to raise it to ours, is there
any need to think of any arbitrary task. It must necessarily be.

promot
es directly and exclusively a relation to the one and highest task of all; but it
must thereby also justify its application to every other possible task.

We have set the one and highest task above: that man should reach
himself empirically in his pure essence, that is, in his freedom, and
consequently should experience himself equally in his freedom. This task is
the highest, because it simply requires quantity, the absolute totality of all
reality. Something higher is not conceivable, and if there are other tasks,
they must be included among them. But it is also necessary, and absolutely
necessary, because man simply and without any further
Reason He Himself must be pure. Not to be pure Himself necessarily
means to be pure nothing.

If that task is necessary, then, according to the assumption, its solution

must also be necessary, and we must therefore justify this. But the solution
must be necessary because of the task, and therefore the justification must
also lie in the latter, i.e. it must only be a task insofar as it is solved as
such. This can of course also be fully demonstrated by mere analysis.

To give up in general means to set something in such a way that

something else is set equal to it.

Th
erefore, through the solution of every task, something must become
something that in and with the task, as merely such, does not yet exist.
Hence, with every mere task, something must be present and something
must not be present, and through the solution, non-being must be made
equal to being, and consequently that which is not present must become
being. If our highest task is to realize the pure self empirically, then it
contains: 1) the pure self as a being simply and 2) something that is to be
made equal to the pure self or to being simply, consequently something that
is not self, and therefore is nothing for itself, but only is insofar as
something else, namely a self, exists, through which it exists, and thus
something opposite to the self. Accordingly, the necessary task lies in our
self: that it is everything from the outset. But it can also never be anything
other than self; for something else is not itself, consequently, insofar as it is,
through a self,
therefore a self is a self without any further condition. If there were
something that the self was not, then this non-being would also have to
abolish self-being: consequently everything must necessarily be self.

But there is something originally that is not our self, namely that
which is the opposite of all self. Consequently, our self could not
necessarily be self if everything did not belong to it.
Opposites in itself and thus made itself equal. So with the task:

under
to realize ourselves empirically as outside ourselves! also necessarily
involves dissolution, because we find ourselves compelled, for the sake of
ourselves, in order to be able to be ourselves, to equate everything that is
opposite to us.
But like the task, so is the solution..
'If everything that is opposite to the self were already equal to the self,
then this would also be opposite to the self and thus, according to the above,
not opposed to itself. Consequently, no task could then take place; for there
would no longer be anything that was not equal to the self and consequently
to itself. But if that which was originally opposite to the self is not equal to
the self, and therefore the original opposition is a negation in general, then
the task of empirically realizing the pure self is also an infinite task; for the
original in the opposition is independent of the self, and therefore it can
only lose this character in the eternal becoming to being, only in infinity.
Accordingly, man, as certainly as he is a man, must necessarily treat all
opposites as equal to himself; but he can only achieve it in infinity, and thus
the solution of his necessary task is as infinite as this task itself.

Here we have our above statement: that the necessity of a task in

general is simultaneously
the necessity of its solution is completely justified by the highest task. We
only note that the task is practical and therefore, as the highest, of the
highest importance. Man should be himself and all experience should
therefore be the pure mirror of his inner self.

But the above statement should be valid for all tasks, and only in this
way can it be fruitful for our purpose. We therefore have to justify it
further, and we will try to do so in the following:
 fo

If the one and highest task is of absolute scope, as we have just shown,
then necessarily every other task is not a task either, as long as it is not
included in that scope. But it cannot be included in the original, because
originally there is nothing more than the one and absolute, and therefore
pure, task. Therefore, if every other task is to take place, it must first be
placed in the scope of the highest task. But the necessity of the highest task
also immediately requires its resolution as a whole. Consequently, every
other task can only become possible through and with the resolution of the
highest. First of all, a note on this important proposition! We do not yet
want to think of how other tasks may be possible besides the highest. But
we want to be certain that absolutely no other task can take place, except
insofar as we can access it through the resolution of the highest.

com.
Here we have at least one highest condition for all our activity as a free self-
activity. Nothing is to be done except insofar as we intend the highest, and
therefore nothing is done if we do not really intend the highest, that is,
everything that was done without regard to our highest task must be
regarded as ineffective and as nothing, because it necessarily contradicts the
pure self, the FREEDOM of man. But it was itself a task: to grasp our task
and to present it as such. Only we did not give it to ourselves, but the
necessary course of action at the hand of nature led us to this point. In this
respect, what happened in this way is by no means random, but rather
belongs to a whole and must be explained by reason, just like everything
else.

If every other task, except the highest, becomes possible only through
the actual dissolution of the latter, then it would also be simply impossible
if the non-being, which is opposed to being, were to be realized in the very
instant that pure self-activity passes over to its opposite non-being; or in
order to reverse the instant that
of a moment in time, not to be misunderstood: if And since the Self is a
Self, a pure and free self-activity, through this infinite power everything
opposed to it would also be a Self at the same time. But precisely

therefo
re, ;

Therefore, because nothing is the opposite, and absolutely it is, self-activity

also encounters a material that absolutely opposes its own, absolute being.
Nevertheless, since self-activity certainly is, it must be self-active and
produce a self; therefore it must necessarily limit and condition the opposite
non-being through its absolute being and thus bring about a specific
something as a becoming to being. This does not mean that the highest task
is lost; but its solution is now subject to temporal conditions, since self-
activity can only strive to realize absolute being outside itself: thus, through
the striving, a mere becoming to being arises. But if the solution of the
absolute task is subject to time conditions, then we now also have the
definite possibility of several other tasks. The absolute task remains without
any restriction, but insofar as there is an unrestricted, absolute self-activity:
and it therefore shows weakness - the lack of independence and simplicity -
when one claims that an idea is only absolute in the abstract, but must be
restricted when applied to experience. That means completely destroying
oneself and one's self-activity and with it the idea. No. Reason cannot and
must not accept restrictions if reason is to be true; rather, as such, it must
necessarily abolish every restriction and be purely practical. But pure self-
activity as such has only an effect on its opposite in infinity.

ibility, purchase; it can therefore only remove the limits in infinity, although
it must strive to be absolute at every moment. If reason strives to realize its
ideal at every moment, and the product of each is nevertheless always only
something that is conditioned, then it is
at the same time also a certain something. If the striving of reason to solve
its highest task now goes into infinity, then through this striving, and thus
through the infinite resolution, we also receive an infinite series of certain
tasks, that is, the one and highest task is infinitely limited by the actual
resolution, as by the striving of reason to complete it in the moment, and so
every other task, except the highest, is also the highest in an infinite series of
conditions of its resolution. As a result, every task in the infinite progress
not only necessarily receives its certain place, but because it has this, and
therefore lies somewhere on the path of our eternal striving, it must also
necessarily be solved in its place: for it is only insofar as something happens
through which it becomes precisely and completely definitely possible. If its
resolution were really not possible; There would also be something that had
to be done first, and which, in order to be done, would require a specific
task. Only in this way, with constant unity of striving toward a whole, can
we actually progress toward the highest unity of this whole.

Now where the task of the Academy has its place in the series of all tasks,
where it must necessarily be answered, we will only learn this in the second
section. But there it will not be a task given from somewhere else, but rather
a task given by itself. As it stands now, its necessity cannot be demonstrated
at all. Where can peace with oneself also be given from outside? And how
can one be at peace with oneself if one is still in conflict with others? That is
something impossible. Whoever the others may be, they must nevertheless
find their law in every rational being, and therefore, just as what they
actually find, is also explained by each one, and consequently determined as
such and not otherwise. If one is in conflict with others, one is necessarily in
conflict with oneself as well; and such a state of affairs completely
contradicts the indispensable condition under which alone a task of reason
can necessarily take place and be solved. The prize question of the Academy
therefore retains no meaning in this respect. The conflict was its cause, and
the one that went so far beyond
beyond all opposition, is given back into the hands of the latter! It did not
belong here, and there was no reason for it here either, because opposition
can only produce opposition, and the prize question does not demand that.
But one could say that an answer corresponding to the prize question
cannot be found by the entire public, but only by a

one or a few scholars is expected, and that these one or these few are quite
likely to be completely at peace with themselves and therefore be able to
live in peace with the whole world. But that this is expected is precisely the
worst thing, and proof that one is defending one's purpose through injustice.
For if it is certain that the task is addressed to the entire public, then one
must at least be able to assume that the whole will take part in it. Now if the
answers are not one, but what they must be as a result of a conflict:
contradictory answers: what will happen to the purpose of the academy as a
result? It investigates, tests, and declares a person worthy of it to be a
Pancrat. What? And this one was not there before, at least not for the public,
and will it therefore be through an expert opinion? Is the public supposed to
believe that? Certainly, if it did, and many individuals will certainly do so;
then, to put it mildly, that would mean nothing other than deceiving.
However, it can also be shown that no scholar who could answer the prize
question as a rational task would solve it for the Academy. That would
contradict its purpose. No task can be given without first having set the one
and highest one. But giving or setting the highest one does not allow for the
slightest objective meaning. It cannot be said of it: here or there is here! For
it is only this task insofar as each person sets it to himself as such. It is the
 grad
ually a self-task that can never come from outside, that is, a task in which
the pure self of each one, or freedom in general, is viewed as an eternally
necessary law for everything possible and real, and in which and according
to which a world can therefore only be realized by ourselves.

To accomplish this task requires the self-knowledge of each one, and

consequently the self-thinker according to the above concept. If these are
only what we are to think of as a society of scholars, then it is not possible
that, in addition to the tasks that they find necessary in the course of their
self-active work, they could also have others that would really be tasks for
them. This, I say, is not possible. For here only that which is thought to be
necessary can be possible; and for the self-thinker, only that which he
himself thinks is necessary.

For the independent-thinking scholar, the question of the prize, as such,

has no significance. There is no argument against this from experience.
Even if a worthy man, who had made a contribution to the sciences, had
competed for the prize, one could only conclude that he had not been one,
but that he had made a mistake. The task of the Academy therefore remains
only for the contentious: for men and young men who have never thought
about their task.
and who therefore cannot think of the present day; but whose only calling is
to defend written laws and to spread them in letter form through the sayings
of famous men. Now it is possible that the question of price could be of
some use to them. But then it would also have to be of some use that they
remain what they really find forever, and that is incompatible with the
concept of a scholar. He should be an independent thinker, and where he is
not yet one, we must strive to work strongly on his independence; but
certainly not through institutes where maturity is decreed. The Academy and
all similar institutions are the work of an age that is returning to itself, itself
therefore. It is therefore certain that they have worked in it and have
promoted the progress of the human mind to its goal. But to enter this circle
and to have described it is one thing. We should therefore not crawl through
it once more, as soon as that takes place; but rather promote simplicity in a
better way and soar into a sphere where we can only return to ourselves
through infinity. Here the tasks of reason begin through free self-
determination, and with them the certain success of our striving. This is not
the case with the above-mentioned prize question of the Academy, and with
none of it at all. Where would their unity and necessary consequence be?
Rather, they all convince us that the Academy, as a moral perfonnance that
independently and freely determines its objects, is not ours.
which poses price questions; but that the objective world in its infinite
variety, and therefore reality as it is, determines the academy to deal with
precisely these and no other price questions. If such tasks are nevertheless
to have man as their goal, as is necessary, then they also litter him, as
much as depends on them, instead of raising him to unity, they only tear
him apart. They suppress his purity on reality, his unity and freedom, and
thus allow the trunk to wither, while at the same time demanding fruit
from the branches. This is not how free reason, which is in agreement with
itself, acts. It cannot double or simply make the products of its own
activity by setting a price.
to the cheap market wares of the coarser slander. The age that has been
granted a glimpse into the realm of free spirits should surely consider this a
disgrace. No, it should not be like that if the purpose of reason is only to
promote independent thinking and to educate immature people to freedom.
This must be asked, and asked with warmth, so that we finally feel it and
learn to be ashamed of selling ourselves to one another for a piece of silver,
because the spirit that passes over into words is inferior to us.

The culture of wills should be the common concern of scholars in

general: it should be promoted and brought to perfection by all of them. The
task is only one, and
the goal is infinite. If we are to approach this with necessary success and to
approach it together, then above all the scholars must be there, and thus be
what they must be. It would be impossible if they had not all already
achieved their great determination of knowledge, if they had not all already
grasped the one and final point as their goal, and had not all already united
on one and the same goal. Unity in striving is therefore also the sole
determination of the scholars in their relationship to one another. But if such
a society is to be realized only through freedom, then this can only happen
through the sciences. This leads us into a circle. The scholar must produce
science, and science must in turn produce the scholar. In order to break this
circle, we must remember what was presented in the introduction about the
advancement of reason to itself as reason. Science comes only through
curses, and this itself is therefore a complete curse. But once it has been
achieved through the path of necessary progress, it must also spread to all
through itself, and therefore through the individual who has become free,
since this individual grasps the whole in the idea and thinks of freedom.
Reason in its freedom now meets reason, for every free person is in
necessary interaction with all. Therefore, the only and true advancement of
the sciences is also only through free and self-sufficient science. 2.5

the
thinking men, and indeed from them through the unanimous direction of
their collective striving from one point and towards one point. Here,
however, it will be the necessary case that all independent thinkers meet
each other on their way, because the task of one is also the task of the other.
Nature continues to retain its influence. But everyone will strive to absorb
the individuality of all into themselves; and through this common struggle
for one goal, infinite tasks will necessarily arise for us, which have their
basis only in free interaction. But they all lie
in the sphere of each one, insofar as each one strives after that which lies
on the path of all to the infinite goal.
So much for our consideration of the above task as a prize question of the
Academy. Since its demand is directed at something necessary, namely an
answer corresponding to the prize question, we had to seek to find the
necessary in the question itself. We could not do that. Rather, we found the
demand to be contradictory to itself and therefore had to declare the whole
prize question to be a vain curse to bring about peace in the philosophical
world. In the following section we will rediscover it as a necessary task of
reason and, by posing it correctly, also provide its only possible solution.

1
 II.

What progress has metaphysics made since Leibniz and Wolff?

Judged as a necessary task of reason.

According to the above, we understand a necessary task of reason to be one

that takes its necessary and completely definite place somewhere on the
path of our free progress, and which must therefore also be solved at some
point through this progress as completely as necessary. We have not been
able to find any other tasks than these for the free activity of our minds in
relation to their purposes. If the task we are currently examining is therefore
to be judged as a necessary task of reason, then we now know the definite
path on which alone we can hope to find it. We have prepared sufficiently
for this through what we have said so far, and we can therefore go straight
to the investigation.

The question: What progress has metaphysics made since Leibnitz and
Wolff? we consider to be given, but quite unconcerned about how and
where

here

It is an object for possible reflection and therefore a material for the

judgement. What this material means and what purpose it has: whether it is
produced by freedom or merely caused from without; this is what must first
be determined through reflection.

Considered as a given material, our task is some action of the mind. As

such, we must first try to get to know it in order to determine the forum
where it must be examined,
 Metaphysics, progress, Leibniz, Wolff, and we, or the present moment,
find the specific manifold in the unity of the question. It is clear that the
former, metaphysics and progress, are here to be combined synthetically;
the former as pure speculative philosophy; the latter as a constant
magnitude in time; the one as thesis, the other as antithesis. The synthesis of
both is posited in the task as merely possible, but the possible synthesis is
precisely defined as such. If a progress of metaphysics were to take place at
all, Leibniz and Wolff would find the specific limits on the one side, and
we, or the present moment, on the other. If we reflect on this, our task,
considered as a mere action, consists in the specific requirement: to
determine the present state of metaphysics in relation to a previously

go

It is purely philosophical in its thesis, merely historical in its antithesis, and

philosophical and historical in its synthesis, and therefore belongs entirely
to the forum of the history of philosophy. Without doubt it also highlights
the most interesting period in this history, that from Leibniz and Wolff to
the present day: a period which no one in the whole past, not even the most
brilliant of Greek philosophy, can compare to in terms of the forces
deployed and the visible success achieved.

But the question is now: how can that period of time to be determined
actually be set through a consistent answer to our task? Whether and how
the task actually contains the meaning of a possible answer of this kind,
and whether the relationship between the theory and the antithesis is given
in it in such a way that a synthesis of the two will not contradict and cancel
each other out? As a result, our task, as we have already shown above, now
becomes a task for the first time, i.e. it requires a solution so that we can
approach its solution with certainty.
can, even before an examination in which we must deduce them
completely and thoroughly and thus demonstrate their validity or
invalidity.

Considered as a mere action of the mind, our task is first of all a mere
fact of consciousness. As such, we perceive it

from
where, from where, into reflection, in order to explain it as a fact and make
it comprehensible. We therefore require a supreme principle for it, which is
absolutely certain in this respect, and which grounds it as a task on the most
certain and makes it necessary. If we now assume this latter as given, then
with it we also posit the required principle; consequently, it must be possible
to find it by means of some operation, and this without doubt by means of
analysis.

The problem clearly contains a connection between several sentences. If

this connection is to have a reason, then there must be a connection with a
reason. If we separate what is connected, then - and it must be separated
because it is connected - then we necessarily obtain the parts that are
connected, and by reflecting on these we also obtain the reason for their
connection. We therefore break the problem down into its simplest parts. If
it were to be completely solved, then nothing would be found for its reality
other than connection; then it would also be dissolved and destroyed by the
dissolution.

But the analysis to be carried out cannot be arbitrary in itself. It is based

on something connected; consequently, it must also find a law in this,
according to which it can only really become an analysis. We therefore
distinguish first of all between a purely heuristic or popular method, and
between a critical

fchen.
 1

According to the former, we would divide our task into as many

propositions as could be found in a definable sense. According to the latter,
however, we must find only those propositions that have been brought into
unity through synthesis. In order to make the truth and reliability of the
critical procedure all the more clear, we will first give a dissection
according to the popular method, which will undoubtedly be contained in
the following section:
1) There is a metaphysics.
2) Metaphysics can make progress.
3) Metaphysics has already made progress.
4) Metaphysics may also have made progress since Leibniz and Wolff.
5) What progress has metaphysics made since Leibniz and Wolff?
Even the slightest reflection makes it clear that all of these propositions can
be reduced to one, namely the first, and must be reduced to it if the task is
not to be completely groundless. The whole investigation is therefore now
directed primarily at the proposition: There is a metaphysics! How far we
will succeed in this must be seen immediately.
The sentence: there is a metaphysics! contains the assertion of its
reality. One can say that

as an answer to the question: Is there a metaphysics? and this question,

as posed to a fact, is answered by the fact: Here is a metaphysics! So that
sentence is this fact.

But we must ask further: how do we recognize and know that something
like this is metaphysics? Is metaphysics possible at all? And how is it
possible? This question is obviously of a completely different content than
the first one. It wants to explain the fact and therefore requires a
Proof for the claimed reality. Such a proof cannot be provided by any
higher science: for metaphysics is to be the first of all sciences.
Consequently, it must assert its reality from itself and through itself.

ten.

If one then allows oneself to try to demonstrate the possibility of

metaphysics from some other source than merely by fact, then metaphysics,
as the first science, must immediately contradict itself. In it, the question of
whether and how it is possible does not arise at all, but its possibility must
be given by reality, and so it can only be said of it: there is a metaphysics!
This is also the opinion of the metaphysicians. They have never been able or
willing to prove the possibility of their science other than by a fact. But
since so many and so many all come from opposing points of view with the
assertion of a real metaphysics

ten;

ten; indeed the question about its possibility is quite natural and necessary.
One compels the other, since metaphysics can only be one science, and yet
in reality it appears to be the opposite of itself.

If we now want to assert and defend our proposition: there is a

metaphysics!, we are necessarily driven to the metaphysical battlefield
by the question of the possibility of a metaphysics, and here we get into
a quandary, however we may explain ourselves.
 Thus, through the analysis we have just undertaken, we have indeed
arrived at the point on which the whole problem rests. But at the same time
we also realise how impossible it is to be able to decide on it without
conflict. We may affirm or deny, or even merely limit; it is one and the
same, for neither happens without a counter-argument. In this way, our
problem cannot be reduced to a necessary task of reason, but rather it falls
into the sphere of conflict because it has no solid basis, and will therefore be
declared absurd just as soon as we try to demonstrate that it is reasonable.

The famous Salomo Maimon in Berlin has really written in a fine

treatise: On the progress of philosophy, the dissection

our 1

our task according to the popular method. He could

not at least avoid the question: whether and how
metaphysics is possible? and for this reason alone he
considered the Academy's prize question not clever
enough.
But the change he made amounts to exactly the same
thing and is in no way justified. After he had once
addressed the question about the possibility of
metaphysics, it was indeed consistent not to answer the
prize question in the given form. But it is necessary
Mr. Maimon did nothing to put himself in this
embarrassment, and he thus laid the foundation of
the
The change made is reflected in the task. His entire
investigation is therefore nothing less than an answer
corresponding to the task; but is also one of the most
important
 to which the question is directed, ie the point from
which he judges the progress of philosophy, is not a
fixed and absolute point,
Hence, we must go beyond it, and Maimon's
standpoint also falls into the sphere of what is to be
judged.

But all this was done only by means of the analysis that was carried out.
It will be shown that this was entirely arbitrary and false, and therefore had
to be carried out in a completely different way. Of course, we have to
resolve our task into its possible components by means of analysis, because
that is in the concept. But this also means that the analysis can only be
carried out by means of

through a dissection, because its object is something connected. The

connection therefore necessarily gives the solution the rule according to
which it can only take place in this way and not otherwise. If this rule is
now its law, then the reason or lack of reason for our problem can be found
very easily (namely without any possible contradiction). This procedure in
the solution we call, for the sake of its principle, the critical procedure, and
the dissection that follows will undoubtedly justify it completely.

First of all, and for the entire investigation, we will focus on the
point of view that our task, considered as an action of the mind, is
definitely a QUESTION. So:

1) The task to be examined is, by its very nature, a question.

 If we now want to dissect the task and dissect it as a question, we will
necessarily only get the content parts of a question and absolutely no
sentences with other characteristics and definitions. Alfo:

2) The sentences obtained by analyzing our problem are only components

of a question in general.

But if the received sentences are only components of a question, they

also find themselves as such, through the

wha
t is appropriate for a question in general is determined; according to a rule, it
is determined according to which a question is a question in general, and
consequently according to number as a mutual relationship. Alfo:

3) The propositions obtained by analyzing our problem, as components of

a question in general, are also subject to the necessary rule of a question
in general in number and relationship.

If the task we have assumed is really a question, and the sentences we

have found are components of a question, then these, as such, are subject to
the necessary rule of a question; the analysis of our task therefore depends
first of all on the fact that we must first fully know the nature of a question
in order to be able to resolve it according to it and its laws.

Now every question in general is necessarily only possible, and only a

question, because it must be directed towards KNOWLEDGE in its
entirety. It is impossible to ever ask without wanting to know something,
and all real knowledge, or omniscience in general, necessarily excludes
all questioning.

However, this explanation should not have any other validity than that
of a mere fact of consciousness. The analytical path tolerates
no jump.

F2
Jump. Only further down will we be able to prove the assumption
rigorously.

But if every question is directed in its entirety to a knowledge, and is

only a question for that reason, then it is also necessarily completely
conditioned and determined by the manner and method of our knowledge,
by the nature and essence of it. In order to be able to firmly establish and
exhaust the investigation of the nature of a question in general, we must
necessarily first reflect on the nature and essence of our will, and establish
the necessary characteristics of it.

Here, too, we first assume as a mere fact of consciousness, and indeed

consciousness itself as this fact, and hence as the highest of all facts, that all
knowledge in general is knowledge only through and insofar as it is solely
and solely unwilling, and consequently consciousness is only a will of our
being, only a consciousness of our ego. By this we therefore explain all
knowledge, or consciousness in general, as a theoretical determination of
our ego. But this explanation, as a mere fact of consciousness, or as
consciousness itself, requires a further determination.

in

We only will something insofar as we find it, we know it. But we also
only know something insofar as our will has an object. The question now is
whether the I in and with its theoretical
retic determination, that is, does an ego exist at all as knowing? Whether
our being, as an ego, begins only in and with our knowing, or rather lies at
the basis of knowledge itself as a condition? If that were the case, it would
necessarily follow that the ego is also only a product of the object of
knowing, and thus only something brought about by something other than
the ego. Something other than the ego is not necessarily the ego, but
something else, and therefore a nothing in general. I,
 Our ego, in this case, would be explained accordingly; it would appear to
be effected by a non-ego, and therefore we would not know in what way
this is the case. But is there then also a non-ego? And how can and must we
explain it in order to bring our being onto a firm foundation? This
explanation would be the highest. However, whatever we may try, our
questions do not go any further. Either I or not I - every third remains
unthinkable. Everything possible and everything real that is not our ego is
therefore also not our ego, and consequently a non-ego. Let us now take the
ego as the product of the non-ego, and we cannot ask any further than this;
therefore the non-ego is also the absolutely highest, and therefore the one
beyond which we can no longer go. Insofar as it is that, everything else can
only be true because and insofar as it is conditioned by the unconditional
non-I. Everything else apart from the non-I is now necessarily not the non-I,
and therefore it is an I.
Our ego is not only conditioned by the non-ego, but is also the only thing
that is conditioned.

But if the non-I is the absolute and unconditioned, then it is not because
something else is, through which it is, for everything else is the conditioned,
but because and insofar as it is through nothing else, hence: because it is
ITSELF. Its completely determined character, as an absolute, is therefore
self-being, that is, a SELF, and consequently an I. If the non-I were
therefore the absolute, then it would only be such insofar as it is not, and its
entire absolute being would therefore be: absolute non-being. As a result,
the assumption that the absolute non-I is the original of the I is not only not
abolished, but it contradicts itself only in that all absolute being, that is, all
self-being, can only be an I. The I is therefore simply the absolute, and it
would not be conceivable otherwise. For every relation from the conditioned
to the unconditioned is impossible, insofar as the conditioned should be the
referring one, that is, from the negation of the ego one cannot, genetically,
come to a positing, and consequently the idea of an absolute outside of us
would be absolutely impossible if the only absolute reality were not within
ourselves.

If the absolute I is not something produced by the non-I, if it is also in a

fine theoretical determination, consequently as intelligence, only itself
a product of the absolute self - being. Our existence cannot therefore
originate from knowing, but must originate from doing. Therefore we
necessarily find in the self an activity which as such does not already know,
but is only actively involved in this.
 The pure character of the I is absolute self-being: for the absolute can be
nothing more than that it exists at all, because and insofar as it exists only
through itself. The I must therefore first assume the character of knowing.
But it is also certainly an I, and as such an absolute reality; it must also
certainly be nothing that should not be an I: therefore no negation that
should not be reality. As certainly as the I is only an I at all through absolute
self-being, just as certainly its opposite, absolute non-being, must also be
raised to the self-being of the I, to the being of all reality. Therefore, in
order to be able to be self, the I must be something that is not opposed to
itself through opposition, that is, it must be ABSOLUTELY ABSOLUTE
after all limitations through non-absoluteness,

If, therefore, the two spheres: Being and Non-Being are originally
opposed as absolutes, then, for the sake of Being, the absolute Non-Being
should not necessarily exist, but rather everything should be I. As certain as
the I is a self, the sphere of absolute Non-Being must also be realized
through it, and

All negation ceases because it becomes the I and is nothing but absolute
reality everywhere.

It is therefore in the pure nature of the ego, in its unconditional self-

being, to attribute its activity as an ego to itself. But absolute self-activity
cannot do this, for it already has this, because only through this does it
become an ego. There must therefore be another and yet at the same time
an activity of the ego, for this must be attributed to it. But an activity of the
ego and at the same time another, and therefore not of the ego, is an
activity of the ego and non-ego at the same time. We have to deduce this.
 The I as I is only such through unconditional self-being, i.e. through
absolute reality. All non-being therefore contradicts the pure being of the I
and must not exist if the I itself is to be absent. The I must therefore, if it is
necessarily a self, abolish all non-being through its self-activity, i.e.
through its being. But since non-being is absolutely nothing, it cannot, for
the sake of its absoluteness, be abolished by being, but only conditioned
and limited. The I must therefore pass from the sphere of its being into that
of non-being by simply confronting itself with a non-I as something that
confronts a world in general. In this way, its self-activity is not abolished
absolutely; it is only abolished and not abolished.

ben,
ben, that is, an activity arises which could not be absolutely or conditioned
in any other way than by the fact that an unconditional one is present. The
activity of the I and non-I at the same time is therefore a limited activity of
the I. The absolute activity of the I is abolished insofar as the I opposes a
non-I. But it is an activity of the I, and therefore not annihilated, but rather
reflected through the opposition. Hence the limited activity of the I is a
reflected activity in general,

If the I in its pure being is nothing but absolute self-being, and

everything possible and real is therefore necessarily a non-I because it is
something other than the I, then only these two spheres, that of the I and
the non-I, are absolutely possible. Consequently, no further activity of the I
remains conceivable than its pure and absolute, and its limited or reflected,
activity. All others must therefore necessarily be contained within the
scope of these two. If an activity of the I is to be attributed to the I so that
it can be an I for itself, then we have now found this more definitely.
It could not be absent because the ego must have had this originally in
order to be self. But every other activity is necessarily reflected activity;
therefore it is also this that must be attributed to the ego.

But nothing can be attributed to the ego as an utterance other than what it
attributes to itself. The act of utterance must therefore also be attributed to
it. It therefore asks itself how and through which action this happens?
Obviously not through the reflected activity, for that is precisely the object
of utterance. Consequently, we have no other option than the utterance. But
the utterance, as merely the utterance, does not have this determination at
all. We must therefore consider whether it cannot perhaps be derived from it
in relation to the reflected activity. We can already say from the foregoing
that the absolute activity of the ego would necessarily be destroyed by the
reflection of the non-ego if the ego did not nevertheless remain the absolute.
But it can obviously only remain the absolute insofar as it strives to restore
its reflected activity to self-activity, and consequently insofar as it regards it
as its own activity and reflects on it as such. In order to maintain its absolute
self-activity, the ego must actively reflect on its reflected activity,
incorporate it through reflection, and thereby become intelligence.
The reflected activity is as such completely determined and necessary;
for it is reflected, and as reflected is the condition of the possibility of the
ego as intelligence. But if there is an intelligence at all only through it, then
this action is necessarily also the condition of all our knowledge. Through
this we will now learn to fully understand its nature.

The
 The ego, which reflects self-actively on the reflected action as an object,
necessarily distinguishes two things in it. 1) The part of the ego and 2) the
part of the non-ego. The ego, the pure self-activity of the ego, and the
reflected one, separates it through a non-ego. Insofar as the activity of the
ego has been reflected, it is no longer pure, but has received a formation or
form through the non-ego, through which it is now determined and
necessary. But nothing more can be distinguished in the reflected activity,
and it is therefore completely exhausted by the two characteristics given.
The two characteristics discovered, however, find their inner and necessary
components, consequently they must be synthetically connected, and the
reflected activity is therefore a synthetic action.

Since originally nothing exists but the I, and through the I it is only
simply opposed to the I; since, consequently, the reflected activity is only
such because an activity of the I has been reflected, all the content of the
synthetic action is necessarily the activity of the I, and all the form of the
same activity of the non-I, both as internal and necessary components of
the action. From this, however, it follows that since the I and the non-I
occupy the absolute sphere of all being, in no synthetic action, whatever it
may be, can there ever be any other material than the activity of the I, the
self-activity, and any other form than the activity.
ity of the non-ego, the limitation of self-activity can occur,

If the synthetic action of the ego is the reflected activity which the ego
must attribute to itself through reflection for the sake of its self-activity,
then it does not attribute to itself the matter of the action, for this itself
always comes only from it, but rather the mere form of the same. But since
the form is only a component of the action, then the ego, by attributing the
entire action, becomes for the first time an ego for itself, that is, an
intelligence.
 The synthetic action consists of two necessary components that are united
in themselves; knowledge therefore also necessarily consists of just as many
and equally related components. The ego knows something about this action
that it is about to perform, and in fact it knows what is reflected from it. In
all knowledge there is therefore something that the ego knows and
something about which it knows this. The former is the form, the latter the
material of knowledge. The one is the activity of the ego: the other is the
activity of the non-ego. What the ego knows is the eternal limitation of itself
as its absolute being. But what it knows this about is eternally the infinite
and unconditioned being itself. It is therefore not only true that the ego
knows a lot about itself, but it knows everything about itself. But what it
knows about itself is precisely for that reason not the ego itself. It can only
become this in eternal approximation, namely if that

re

-4

en,
what the ego knows is at the same time that of which it knows it: if
therefore the idea of raising absolute negation to absolute reality, and
consequently all non-being in infinite becoming to absolute self-being, is
realized.

After this brief discussion of the nature of our will, we return to the
previously interrupted investigation of the nature of a question in general.
There we presented it as a mere fact of consciousness that all questions are
necessarily directed towards knowledge. We must now prove this and
therefore establish the conditions under which questions can be asked in
general.

One of the presuppositions here is that questioning is necessarily an

action of our ego; consequently, among the actions of the human mind, the
possible or the necessary must have its specific place somewhere, and can
therefore also be completely deduced. The path to this has already been
taken. We know of only two original types of action of the ego: one free and
one necessary, or one absolute and one reflected. But the ego in its pure
self-activity is the only unconditional, and consequently also the ultimate
explanatory basis of all its necessary actions, and freedom is therefore the
principle of necessity. For this reason, it is possible for the free and self-
active ego to act independently towards a necessary action.
to determine the action, that is, to give free self-activity a rule according to
which it is effective. The ego is then free in respect of the fact that it is acted
upon at all, but conditioned and necessary insofar as it is acted upon in this
way and not otherwise, that is, in a certain way. This gives rise to a third
and new type of action of the ego, a type of action which has its basis
neither in absolute self-activity nor in mere reflected action, but in both at
the same time. Since as an action it is absolutely unconditional and free, and
through the rule which it assumes intervenes in every necessary action of
our mind, consequently through this intervention also purchase
on the objective world; we can therefore rightly call it transcendental
freedom. *)

In these three types of action, the activity of the ego is completely

exhausted in its scope; so that a fourth, which might even expand this scope,
remains simply unthinkable. For the free and absolute self-activity of the
ego is opposed to the reflected self-activity. Both thus behave like thephis
and antithephis. They should therefore be equated. If they are really
equated, that is, if the reflection by the non-ego is equal to the absolute self-
activity of the ego,

hence

*) Schelling treats of this in more detail and in an extremely illuminating

and peculiar way in his excellent work: On the Self, etc., p. 187. fqq.
 1

hence not - I - I; everything is also in one, consequently the ideal of all our
striving is realized, and nothing more remains conceivable than absolute
self-activity reacting upon itself. If the equation of reflected activity with
unconditional and absolute activity is now mediated by transcendental
freedom, then this is the point at which both must meet, and the sphere of all
activity is thereby completely described.

This pre-memory will suffice to deduce the question precisely and

completely as an action of our ego.

Taken as a mere fact of consciousness, we require a rule of necessity for

it. The fact that it is actually asked undoubtedly has its sole reason in
transcendental freedom. Absolute freedom cannot contain this
determination; for a merely questioning I, whose whole being would
therefore be a question, contradicts itself, because there would be no
questioning. But if questioning as an action is a necessary and determinate
action, then it itself is either the highest necessary action, the reflected
activity, or it must allow itself to be determined by it. The former is not
possible, for we only know this action as one through the attribution of
which the I defines itself as an intelligence. This happens without any
further mediation by absolute theories, An.

tithe.

་
tithefis and synthesis, and so the act of asking does not occur at all in these
acts. But we go a step further and find what we are looking for. For if we
give freedom the law of reflected activity, or of reflection in general, and
thereby determine it to reflect independently, then two intimately united
special actions appear in this act, which we will immediately demonstrate
as question and answer to the specific.

The ego, in that it independently determines itself to free reflection, is

necessarily an intelligence for some intelligence, but itself it is not yet this
intelligence. It is to become this intelligence through free reflection, and
indeed by itself raising the whole act to consciousness as it came to
consciousness, and consequently completely explaining consciousness. In
this reflection two moments are expressed. Firstly, that freedom reflects on
the whole act as merely possible, which presents it as an action; and
secondly, that it reflects on it in actu, - i.e. as happening, and consequently
pragmatically presents it as a necessary action. The first is necessary
because freedom, as mere freedom, does not reflect at all; but must first be
determined for this purpose. But freedom can only be determined by itself.
If it determines itself to reflect, then this necessarily means nothing other
than that it gives itself up to the act of reflection.

on;
on; and that is the first moment. The second is necessary: because freedom,
as active according to the law of reflection, must also act in this way and not
otherwise. For since the reflection of the self through a non-self is at the
same time the object and law of reflecting freedom; freedom also
necessarily reflects in actu; which is the second moment.

The first moment in free reflection, as a merely abandoned action, we

call the problem of reflection; the second, on the other hand, as a
completed action, the refultat of reflection; but we will fully justify both
at the same time as question and answer.
 If now no free reflection is conceivable without question and answer, then
for both, from the necessary reflection of the self through the non-self, the
law must be derivable, according to which both, as actions, find actions
determined precisely in this way and not otherwise.

From the previous investigation into the inner nature of our will, it is
indisputably clear that no reflection is possible without The fis and Anti

thefis. For in order for the free and absolute self-activity of the ego to be
reflected, the ego must first confront itself with a world. The confrontation
of this is at the same time also the equalization, because what is confronted
with the ego can only be ego, or the ego is not ego,

I, fondern as folches destroyed and alfo

Not-I. In order to fully understand this, one must only reflect on the
reflected activity of the I in its two necessary components, the activity of the
I and that of the non-I; this shows quite clearly that no antithesis is possible
without synthesis, and no synthesis without antithesis. Thesis, antithesis and
synthesis taken together therefore give the refultat: Not. I I. From this it
follows at the same time that the act of asking does not depend on thesis, but
also
cannot be derived from the antithesis, nor from the synthesis alone, but that
these, taken together, belong to its essence. However, when examining the
question, we are not talking about reflection in general, but only about
reflection from freedom. Through this, what would have been the result of
the former, namely the non-I - I, becomes the first problem. But even just
the equality is a problem. Consequently, this does not concern the thesis and
antithesis at all, but only their connection: the synthesis. In every possible
question, the problematic is therefore the mere synthesis of the thesis and
antithesis, which are otherwise definitely the last, and through this we now
come to the last point of our deduction.

In

The act of asking questions is only a free action undertaken according

to the principles of reflection in general. Necessary reflection now occurs,
as an action, where a non-I is opposed to the self. Consequently,

Re
A certain The fis and Antithefis are reflected. This law is therefore
also the reflection is bound from freedom, and a question in general is
therefore not possible in any other way than through real theories and
antitheses, whose synthesis freedom merely regards as problematic and sets
itself up for determination. Here, therefore, in the system of human actions,
is the fixed and peculiar place of the question, which we have now fully
discussed. We can certainly consider any theories and antitheses
problematically, but never solve the two: the I and the non-I. A problem in
general only becomes possible through them, and from this it becomes clear
how the non-I I, in theoretical philosophy, can be a problem that can only be
fully solved by practical philosophy. Both, namely, the I and the non-I,
make, as an absoluta, a reflection possible, and find alpha itself the
foundation of the theory. Consequently, as they are practically opposed,
they can never be balanced theoretically either,

We have now determined the place in the system of human thought where
the question, as an act of free self-activity, has its firm and unchangeable
seat through the condition of reflection. Its concept now follows easily from
the discussion. It is, in fact, nothing other than the task of a synthesis,
completely determined by the thesis and antithesis. This synthesis is really
to be achieved through the answer.

Ga
ly given, and the antithefis are equated with the thefis alfo. Both, question
and answer, therefore make up the entire scope of free reflection, and here it
becomes clear how completely impossible it is to correctly pose and solve
any problem if the highest problem: the non-I, is not already correctly
grasped and solved by the idea.

Through reflected activity the ego becomes intelligence; and itself

intelligence, because it adds that activity to itself through freedom. All
reflection in general is therefore based on knowledge, and necessarily
brings about knowledge; indeed, the source of all real knowledge is
reflected activity itself. Now, according to the above investigation, if in all
will in general there is something that one knows and something from
which one knows it, and if knowledge is completely exhausted by both
characteristics, then both must also be the necessary and inner components
of free will.
reflection. For all real knowledge is nothing other than a refutation that
free reflection leads to as a result of an investigation. Therefore, according
to the inner components of knowledge, we will also define the nature of
our question more precisely. The question in general, as an act of free
reflection, is the task of knowledge; or, insofar as freedom is determined to
actual reflection through the question, a desire to know. Whoever asks
therefore wants to know something, and in every question, therefore, it
must necessarily be

com
e: 1) something that one wants to know; and 2) something that one wants to
know. Apart from these conditions, no question can arise, because they
belong to their inner being, and the question is therefore completely
exhausted by them.
To avoid any misunderstanding, here is a brief remark.
Above we have conditioned the question in its entire nature by
knowledge, and therefore had to determine its constituent parts according to
the constituent parts of knowledge. But at the same time all will is also
presented as a mere result of free reflection, and this therefore presupposes
that it must first be a problem, and therefore actual knowledge already
presupposes the question about its possibility. The opposite relationship
therefore seems to take place, and knowledge is conditioned by questioning.
But if we drop the difference between reflection in general and reflection
from freedom, then that contradiction is already removed. Reflection from
freedom is necessarily determined by a rule, namely insofar as reflection is.
What is therefore the requisite of necessary reflection, intelligence, must
also presuppose reflecting freedom, and it only tries to explain the same
result through its reflection. It may therefore only be noted that in the
process of necessary reflection no questioning takes place, but rather a will
to know, but that the whole act takes place without any will.
 So now we know the inner components of a question in general. Their
number is determined, their relationship to each other will also be
determined. We therefore reflect on the possible determinations.
If we express the question about its two components as follows: One
necessarily only asks about something of something - which is certainly its
correct expression; then the two relational words to and from already
indicate a characteristic difference between those two components, and
thereby also the particular peculiarity of each one. We make this clear in
the following.

Seriously: the something in the question that one wants to know is that
which one is asking about, and therefore something that can be determined.
If this can really be determined and, as something that can be determined,
therefore does not contain any contradiction, then it must also be something
that can be determined. What one is asking about must therefore necessarily
be defined as something that can be determined in a task for synthesis
determined by the thesis and antithesis. If this is not the case, then the
question itself is not determined either, and the uninformed listener will
therefore always accept an answer that will necessarily only leave him in his
embarrassment.

Secondly, the something in the question about which one wants to

know something simply cannot be

as

as that which one asks about and what one wants to know. It is rather the
opposite, and therefore that from which the whole question proceeds and on
which the whole question is based. But since
the same is not asked at all, nor can it be asked; therefore the answer can
no longer determine anything in it, and it cannot itself be defined as
something that can be determined in a definite way. Rather, since the
whole question only starts from this something and is based on it, it must
necessarily be the complete opposite of what is posited as being
determinable in a definite way, and therefore something that is simply
defined, and in what it is, thoroughly determined.

If this determines the nature of the two components of the question,

then their relationship to one another also follows from them. That which
is to be determined and determined can be made equal to that which is
absolutely and definitely posited by the answer. This therefore happens
through synthesis. Consequently, in the question, that which is to be
determined and determined is related to that which is absolutely
determined as the conditioned is to its condition as the unconditioned.

The original and highest synthesis is: Not. I I. Now, apart from the
spheres of the I and the non-I, there is absolutely no further conceivable
sphere; therefore, all possible synthesises must necessarily exist within the
scope of the highest

G4
highest, and be based in all its evidence on this highest. The highest
synthesis is therefore a condition for all the others; consequently it must also
give them a law according to which they can only become synthesises at all.
Let us therefore take the highest synthesis problematically, as free reflection
must of course do - and consequently as a question; therefore this must also
set up an eternally valid and firm rule for all possible questions, and thereby
condition and determine them all. The highest synthesis, taken
problematically, necessarily consists in: to set the absolute non-I with the
absolute I; therefore to raise non-being in general to the Daley I, or all
negation to reality. This task is infinite, but nevertheless necessary for all
our striving; hence in infinity a law that we must follow. This gives us the
following rule for every possible question:

In every question, the determined and simply posited belongs to the I, and
the assenting to the I belongs to the
ing non-I determinable.

The truth of this rule does not tolerate any contradiction, and not at all,
because all contradiction itself can and must be determined only according
to it. Its meaning is
quite clearly. The ego, namely, as that which exists through nothing else,
but exists because it exists itself, and consequently
If there is an I, the absolute certainty and all other certainties must
therefore necessarily be equal to it: consequently, everything that is to be
determined can only be posited as = I to be determined, because only in
this way can it be something that can be determined. *)

* In the common world, as well as in the learned world, there is hardly an

expression more common than the word reasonable. It is required as a
predicate of all human actions, and so unconditionally, that even the
unreasonable must be considered a reasonable unreasonable. Therefore,
everywhere one wants and wants to

ver.

Ask sensibly, A deep wisdom in human errors! Everywhere only one will
and striving reveals itself, only one and the same divine germ in us. But
the poor understanding has not presented it in many different ways.
If philosophy is a reflection from freedom, and therefore a questioning
and answering, then a conflict of reason would never have been possible if
all philosophy had always been reasonable. But for that to happen, one
would have had to know the moments of philosophy. It is certain that the
human mind can never err in its necessary actions. If it errs, then it is
freedom. But freedom cannot err either insofar as it acts according to some
assumed law; for this effectiveness is also necessary through the law. It can
therefore only err insofar as it determines itself to act in some way, for only
in that is its freedom. Consequently, the nature of our minds itself requires
that, despite all the opposition of philosophizing reason, the error can never
lie in the actual solution of its problem, i.e. never in the answer to its
questions.

1
 After the existence of a synthesis, the thesis cannot be further
determined, because one cannot ask about what one wants to know
something about. But this is, however,

one

the philosophers have so far completely overlooked this. All their care has
always been directed towards carrying out some existing task from scratch
and, where possible, completing this or that system in a fine presentation.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the misunderstood Kantian
philosophy. People want to instruct their opponents about the truth of the
critique of reason and try to bring more light and clarity to Kant's
presentation through commentaries and corrections of all kinds. That is
why the opposition had to become so complicated and fierce.

The knowledge of a system can never be contained in the presentation of

it, because this knowledge, regardless of which system one may be attached
to, is necessarily always I, for it is the I that thereby knows something. But
if that which one wants to know something about, and which in the task is
absolutely certain and must therefore be I, is not posited in the I, and
therefore in the non-I, then in the answer all agreement is impossible and no
synthesis is conceivable. Those who therefore still want to have to do with
things in themselves as realities can give no other account of their
knowledge than that they have received it through inspiration from the
absolute non-I. For in their problem they do not see the I as an absolute
condition, but the non-I. The non-I is therefore that which they want to
know something about, and which therefore must be linked to what they
want to know. Consequently, synthesis, as the actual knowledge, taken
logically, does not occur in its I, but

other
another question is possible. That which one wants to will something
becomes in this case that which one wants to know; only here too there
must necessarily be something absolutely certain about which one wants to
know it. Insofar as the theory itself is therefore a synthesis, what is simply
certain can always be posited conditionally: and from this it can be seen
that every possible question can be brought back, through regularly
continued analysis, to that which absolutely no further questions take place;
but rather from which all questions must simply proceed. For if what one
wants to will is at the same time something about which one wants to know
it, then the answer, as a condition of possibility, is already at the basis of
the question. Hence this is not a question, but what is being asked about
would already be the absolutely certain. But just as little is this absolute
will any answer. In order to be able to do so, it would have to presuppose
the question conditioned by it as its own condition. Accordingly, as
question and answer, they both cancel each other out completely, for the
reason that the unconditioned is not a synthetic unity, but absolute identity.

but in the non-I. The contradiction of reason can therefore only be removed
by learning to understand the problem of reason rationally, to ask rationally,
and consequently to recognize reason as reason, which is our pure self as
the unconditional and highest.
tivity, and therefore cannot be brought into the sphere of objects at all.

Suppose: A is the absolutely unconditioned, which therefore does not

exist because something else is, but exists because it is itself and therefore
an I; A therefore fills the sphere of all reality, and its opposite is absolute
non-A. A therefore ab absolute being, and non-A therefore absolute non-
being.

Suppose further: A, with the sign of equality (A —,), means the

questioning I; then it can ask FIRST: about its opposite, the absolute non
A; or SECOND: about itself, as the absolute A. A third is, insofar as we
only use the absolute, absolutely unthinkable, but the first is not possible.
For according to
absolute negation only allows one to ask to what extent one does not ask at
all. If the negation is something, then a B; then it is no longer absolute, but
rather something conditioned and actual, only if it is not something and all
non-being in this determination is therefore a relative being. But the second
is also not possible. For if we also tacitly give A the rule of reflection and
now we have nothing more than the two absolutes: being and non-being:
then it must make its being a question and consequently ask: Am I then? A
=) therefore asks about A, and the answer would therefore be: AA. But that
is not

Syn
 1

Synthefis, for it is precisely only that which is already absolutely posited in

the question and for the sake of the question, namely the identity of A,"À -
A. The what of the question is therefore equal to the what of; and the
question: Am I then? therefore means nothing other than: I am! because if I
were not, I could not ask. This does not contradict our highest task, for
according to this the non-I I must be posited, and in this there certainly lies
a synthesis. We must fixate on this point above all, and this is precisely the
place to make it completely clear to ourselves.

་་

Let us reflect on the relationship between the two absolutes: I and non-I,
more precisely; the act of ending the absolute non-I is obviously one and
the same as the act of ending the absolute I. The absoluteness of the one
would therefore necessarily be the absoluteness of the other; and the I could
therefore only ask about the absolute I insofar as it asks about the absolute
non-I, and vice versa, and thus only ask about both insofar as it does not ask
at all. This underlies

Let's dig even deeper.

The I is fused as the absolute, insofar as all reality is fused in it, and
nothing is therefore equal to it and opposed to it. Consequently, nothing,
taken in complete absoluteness, is the condition of the absolute being of
the I. But if this is the condition of the absoluteness of the I, then it is also
in general the form of its being, and that
I is therefore absolute only in this and no other form. If the I is constituted
as absolute reality insofar as it, conditioned by nothing, constitutes itself
through absolute self-activity, then it evidently constitutes itself as such
only insofar as it sets itself equal and opposite to nothing. Hence the
absolute positing of the I is at the same time an absolute opposing and
equalizing of the non-I. So! the absolute theory is at the same time an
absolute antithesis and synthesis, and all three are one and the same action
of the I, and are only distinguished by reflection.

But the I is only absolute reality insofar as nothing is opposed to it and

equal to it; therefore nothing is also contained in it, and the I consequently
cannot be an I in anything: i.e., nothing must be I, and therefore = all
reality, and therefore all reality must also necessarily be nothing.
Now this is not possible in any other way than insofar as the absolute non-
I is the absolute I; consequently insofar as the non-I is not a non-I and
therefore an I.

If nothing is opposed to and equated with the absolute I, then it is also

only absolute, equated, insofar as the absolute non-I opposed to it is equal to
the I, and is consequently realized as the I. The I and the non-I therefore
stand in the relationship of matter and form. Consequently, the I can only
find itself an I under the form of the non-I. If, in all

lem
J

For the will, the form is what one knows and the matter is what one
knows it about; so all knowledge of the ego is in its
Absoluteness is also absolutely absolute non-I, consequently nothing and
absolutely nothing. In order to know itself, the I must first realize itself in a
fine form, that is, all form must first become material. This is therefore the
highest of all tasks, an infinite and eternally unattainable task! But at the
same time, it is as necessary as it is infinite, because absolute being is only
possible by raising absolute non-being to being, and both therefore fall into
one sphere. In the I, however, lies the power for the Absolute, its eternal
freedom, and as certain as I am, so certain will I eternally strive towards the
Absolute. The infinite goal is: Non-I I! the Quan

C1

tivity per se, and therefore an absolute synthesis of two absolutely

opposites. Insofar as we only get there through a progress, every synthesis
is conditioned, because the antithesis conditions, namely some kind of
thing. But we also only get there through a progress, insofar as we define
the pure I as the unconditioned, which everything empirical must become
equal to.

&
 Now, for the first time, we have the complete premises for the actual
examination of our task. They had to be set up, because they came up on the
way of the investigation, and were therefore the condition for further
progress. The entire investigation, however, was prompted by the
assumption that our task was a question. If it really was, then the previously
set out definitions of a question also necessarily apply to it. It must therefore
be directed towards a knowledge in general, and must then contain
something that one wants to know. Secondly, something about which one
wants to know, and thirdly, the former must relate to the latter: how the
conditioned relates to its condition as the unconditioned, i.e. the one must be
something that agrees - something that can be determined, the other
something definite and
our task is to find the last. Or in short:
Question taken, there must be a task for synthesis determined by the
thesis and antithesis. Insofar as this is the case, then its requirement is: the
appropriate - determinable is in the answer equal to the absolutely
determined, and the answer therefore, according to the rule: I, an
unconditional categorical non. I, I, a

rifche answer.

Our task is: What progress has metaphysics made since Leibnitz and
Wolff? In this expression we shall now analyze it according to the laws of
a question. But this business is first and foremost a

Problem.
Problem. We must first know whether the task is really a question: and if
we want this, it must then necessarily be broken down.

Our task, as a question, is therefore a problem that we must first

pose and then solve. We therefore ask ourselves:
1) What do we want to know through our task? and

2) What do we want to know through fie?

What is absolutely posited in these questions is what we find ourselves,

the questioner, that is, some rational being; but what is determinable and
determinable is the task we are asking about, namely insofar as it is a real
question. If we therefore link the action as a question with our ego, then it
is also simultaneously explained as an action. We therefore reflect 1) What
do we want to will? Answer:

The progress of metaphysics by

Leibniz and Wolff.

And 2): how do we want to know these progresses? Answer:

Of the metaphysics inherent in the progreffus.

This division is completely correct, and our task, as the analysis

shows us, is really
a question. But the components discovered are not yet justified by this, but
rather they must first be explained synthetically in their necessity, and the
whole question therefore as necessary. First of all, however, we still have
to justify the analytical procedure, and we will explain this in the
following.

Seriously: what we want through our task, what is set as being

certain, must also be a possible answer
There must be something definable; it must be able to let itself be known.
But it would obviously not be able to let itself be known if there were not at
the same time something about which we can know it. Consequently, this is
the condition. If the what of the task consists in the progress of the
metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff, and if this is still problematic, then there
must necessarily be a metaphysics in the progress in order to be able to
know the possible (from this progress). There is therefore no need for the
latter, as long as the former is actual. For both, like the what to the what of,
are in the relationship of the conditioned to its condition as the
unconditioned. I

Secondly: that which we want to know something about through our task,
that which is absolutely and definitely posited, must also be determined by
the I for the possible answer; for it must be certain and consequently in the I.
If it were not so, and therefore not determined by the I, then there would
also be nothing.

en

about which we wanted to know something, and our task is therefore not a
question at all. But it is a question, and what is simply posited in it is also
the I, that is, the principle from which the task as a question proceeds and
on which it is therefore founded. We have determined this simply posited
through a correct analysis of the task: as the metaphysics that is in progress
in general. If we express this in a sentence, it cannot be called anything
other than: There is a metaphysics that is in actual progress; and that would
therefore be the basis of our entire task.
After the popular analysis we arrived at the basic statement: There IS a
metaphysics. But a metaphysics in general and a metaphysics in progress
are two entirely different statements. We found the latter, and insofar as
this method seems to be the more correct one, we must also find the
statement: There is a metaphysics! in ours. At least they must not be
opposed to each other, because we would otherwise get into a new
conflict.
 Let us first assume that the main point of our task is really: There is a
metaphysics: the second point could therefore be called nothing other than:
There is a metaphysics. Let us therefore call the first point A; the task
would therefore be: to find AA. But that is not a

Task. Because A, as the absolutely posited, is simply absolutely posited

because it is equal to itself, and therefore A = A must be. We explain this
more precisely:

If the main thesis of our task is: There is a metaphysics! then the absolute
being of metaphysics necessarily means metaphysics as absolute and
complete; and this would certainly require the law of a question. But then
the question: What progress has this complete science made since Leibniz
and Wolff? would also necessarily have no meaning at all; for nothing more
can be known about it than that it is the complete metaphysics. Since it
must now be posited as such in our task, then what we want to know would
obviously also necessarily be what we want to know about. The answer
would therefore already be at the basis of the question, and both would
therefore cancel each other out as question and answer.

However, we have only demonstrated this contradiction in our problem

indirectly by assuming the main fact: there is a metaphysics. Therefore,
nothing follows from this for the correctness of our proposition, but we must
justify it by a direct proof.

Our task, taken in its unity, where its components are already set as valid
and are no longer reflected upon, contains

without
without doubt not the slightest ambiguity. We are talking about progress in
metaphysics and no other, so that it cannot be asked at the same time: what
progress has the Academy of Sciences in Berlin made since Leibniz and
Wolff? In this respect, then, we have a completely specific task. This
specificity can only come from the intimate connection between the parts,
and therefore only from their relationship, as the relationship of the
conditioned to its condition as the unconditioned. If, therefore, our task
does not speak of mere and indeterminate, not of these and those possible
progresses, but of definite progresses in metaphysics, then we will
necessarily only find those progresses insofar as a metaphysics is posited in
the progress. This, therefore, is the unconditioned and the condition for the
former. If we remove the condition, the conditional disappears by itself.

It has undoubtedly been believed that if there were no metaphysics, there

could be no
Make progress. However, it is undisputed
We know that if there is a metaphysics, it cannot make any progress, that is,
if the metaphysics really exists, it cannot be further developed. But if there
is no metaphysics, it can certainly make progress; for what does not exist
can become, and therefore be in the process of progressing towards being.
We do not expect any independent thinker to accuse us of taking the matter
too strictly. Strictness comes from laws, H 3

and
 1

and where they rule, there is no arbitrariness,

As surely as our task presents the progress of metaphysics since Leibniz

and Wolff as what we want to know, it also presents the metaphysics
contained in the progress as what we want to know. Anyone who wanted to
separate the two for a moment would have neither metaphysics nor its
progress, for he could not regard either of them as existing.

The proposition: There is a metaphysics in progress! should therefore be

found in our task as the completely definite and absolutely determined, and
therefore the proposition on which the whole is founded. Therefore, if our
investigation is to succeed, there can be absolutely no contradiction about it;
rather, all contradiction itself, as something to be explained, only falls
within its sphere. Let us reflect on the second proposition as on what is our
task; then we have certainly made our main point completely certain - at
least for a certain period of time. For we find the progress of metaphysics
from Leibniz and Wolff what corresponds to the task, and consequently
what we want to achieve; then this entire period is also the conditioned, and
no objection can be raised against our main point on this basis. Not alfo
through the Critique of Pure Reason,

1
1
not through the theory of imagination, the theory of thought, and whatever
other theory may still exist: what comes from these all belongs to our task,
just as it already is a task, and therefore cannot shake its foundations. In the
actual determination of progress, and thus in the answer to our question, we
may perhaps come to the critique of reason; but for this very reason this and
everything that may have been philosophized in this period belongs entirely
to what we want to know.

The matter is also self-evident as soon as we hold on to the point of view

we have set out above. The point of view, namely: that the task absolutely
belongs to the forum of the history of philosophy. For it is clear that our
subject is practical. We only need to reflect on what is really happening,
and so nothing can happen that does not necessarily belong to our task. We
are now coming closer to our goal,

If we want to know what progress metaphysics has made since Leibniz

and Wolff, then this obviously means nothing other than what progress
metaphysics may have made from then until now. This is the point
towards which the whole question is directed, and for the sake of
determination and establishment it can therefore only be undertaken.
Therefore, our task is a task necessary through reason; its necessity must be
determined by some present moment. Such a moment would therefore be
the goal for the required progress. The answer would have to go up to it, and
since it is synthetic, the synthesis would only be complete where its object
ceases to be practical, where it no longer happens, but where reflection on
what has happened occurs.

The task therefore definitely requires us to give a definite account of the

current state of metaphysics, and to say decisively and with apodictic
certainty: This is it! Supposing that at this point we found metaphysics
under a completely different name (whether this is so or not obviously
depends not on observation, but on the object to be observed in its
progress), our task would still be completely correct, since we would have
to abstract for it from the entire period from Leibniz up to us. Its
justification therefore belongs to a completely different point in time, and
to one in which the critique of the history of philosophy alone had to be
determined. In our ascent we really reached the point where we could say:
There is a metaphysics! d, i. a metaphysics as science; we would, the
According to the above investigation, we must ask of him: This is the goal
of reason to itself,
itself as reason, and our question would now not be: What has metaphysics
done, but rather: What progress has reason made up to this point? The
answer would necessarily be: It has become reason: for this already contains
the theoretical or scientific point of view. Then the entire conflict of reason,
from ancient times up to the present moment, would be what we wanted to
know, and hence this would be the whole and only object of the history of
philosophy. Let us now reflect on the relationship between the two
components of a question: that of the conditioned to its condition as the
unconditioned; it is clear that in the question: What progress has reason
made up to the final self-knowledge? Reason in general, or our pure self,
were posited as the unconditioned, and its progresses, or empirical reason,
as the conditioned; the former, therefore, as the absolutely determined, and
determined by itself; the latter, however, as the determining, and
determinable only in relation to the unconditioned. Therefore, if this
question were to be answered, then a deathly silence would necessarily have
to rest on the past for the entire investigation, and therefore for the history of
philosophy in general. For whatever might be philosophized would
necessarily belong only to what we wanted to know.

Insofar as the striving of reason in general is an inherently

necessary striving,

because, by virtue of its freedom, it must be absolutely outside itself as well

as within itself; therefore its striving for knowledge is also a necessary
striving. Reason has the purpose of being reason, that is, of determining
itself as reason, and therefore of willing that it be reason. Under this
necessary striving, every moment is
therefore determined to give an account of our scientific state, so that it is a
definite knowledge, that is, an unconditional one. But each moment is at the
same time only determined to the extent that we can give an account of it,
and thus to the extent that reflection is already present in us. In this way, our
task of the progresses of metaphysics according to Leibniz and Wolff can be
deduced as a necessary task of reason, and their correct formulation will
then necessarily also be the correct determination of their true and only
possible solution. The fact that it is precisely the progresses of metaphysics
that we are to make into a task can no longer seem strange to us after what
has been said above. We still have to examine again what we perhaps
already presuppose. Metaphysics aims to be the first of the sciences, the
pure speculative philosophy: the science of that on which everything must
rest as if on its final and unshakable foundation. Therefore it is also called
the science of the first grounds of knowledge. If there is any certainty and
strength in our will, it should grant us this: it should therefore be just as
important for

en

ge as the first science. But even about this there is still no end to the
dispute to this day. Everyone makes different claims from a different
point of view, and amidst such contradictory assertions, metaphysics
hovers only between being and non-being.

However, the challenge to us remains indispensable: to try to see whether

we cannot finally make a correct estimate and bring any progress under one
and a specific point of view. This challenge awaits only the important
moment when reason, having advanced to free reflection, sees theoretically
what it is practical, and where it must therefore be in a position to set up a
refutation, over whose validity and truth no contradiction remains possible.
 So far, our investigation concerned the analysis of our task. The main
point was to avoid the question: whether and how metaphysics is possible at
all? We actually avoided it by not even coming to the proposition: There is a
metaphysics, but only to the proposition: There is a metaphysics that is in
progress! We also defended this by using its place in the question against all
interventions from the period of Leibniz up to us, since it is not something
that can be asked about here. But by doing this we have not justified the task
itself at all, and even less seen it as a necessary one.

who
presented a flexible task of reason. We only know in general how a task
determined by thesis and antithesis can be synthesised. Whether it is really
so? is not something that any analysis teaches us, but only its synthesis leads
us there, as an action of our minds, which we must therefore undertake for
our purpose.

If it is certain that we are in some way making progress towards science,

that we only want to know something, or at least believe we know it, then it
is also necessary to determine this progress and in this way to define
knowledge as something indefinite. We should therefore only be convinced
of the proposition: There is a metaphysics that is in progress; then the task
would also be necessary: to continually determine metaphysics in its
progress and thus to ask at the present time: this is the point where we stand
with this will. But of course it is everyone's conviction to know something:
for even the skeptic must want to really know nothing, or his unwillingness
is also groundless. Therefore, everyone, in the same proportion as he is
occupied with the sciences, would also be required to give an account of the
state of these sciences and to say at a glance: this is the one and solid basis
on which I stand and survey the whole in its specific parts. For reason in
general, it would therefore be a
noth
necessary task to reach this point as soon as this action is already a free
action, and thus a point has been reached for it which it cannot reach itself,
but which it will only reach at some point by way of necessary progress.

Thus philosophizing reason only advances to ever higher levels by

gradual progress. At any given moment it is necessarily at some level, and
some intelligence outside of us would also know this level. But it would
only know it by comparing two moments of our knowledge with each other
and relating both, through reflection, to an absolute. Now, just as certain as
any knowledge in us is determined by this intelligence, just as certain is this
will itself to lead us to the intelligence, and thus be determined by ourselves
and I therefore be determined.

If the present stage, as this one and no other, is only determinable in time
and only exists in and with a moment in time, then it can only be mediated
by another stage, determined in time. This other stage, already determined
in time, would therefore have to be posited as a past time with the
characteristic of our temporal existence and through its moment in time.
Accordingly, some specific past point in time would be the principle.
zip for the present one to be determined. This seems to lead us inevitably
into a circle. The action of determining a present point in time always
requires that some past point in time has already been posited as
determined. For if b is posited, then, in all time, its place is only that insofar
as a immediately precedes it and determines the point b. For every point in
time b to be determined at present, a is therefore the definitely past point in
time, because b is only directly related to a, but only indirectly related to
every x through a. Where we must necessarily arrive on this path will
become clear further below.

Now we have our task: to give an account of our present scientific state,
to determine according to the relationship of the moments of time a and b, if
b is the appropriate one, and therefore what we want to will; we must
therefore also abstract from all present will, insofar as it bears the
characteristic of time. Through this abstraction, precisely what we must
have comes into being, namely free reflection, which, because it is absolute,
extends over all time. With this reflection, we go back to what has
happened. We will what we want and for what purpose we want it. It is our
will that we want to determine. As a certain knowledge, its reliability must
therefore be based on a supreme knowledge, or our

1
Knowledge in general is to be a self-determined knowledge. Our reflection
therefore encounters the history of the highest will, and finds it as such: the
history of philosophy; in this, however, metaphysics as the science of the
first grounds of knowledge. Here it must necessarily stop, and in it,
according to the determination of time, discover an epoch: an epoch,
however, which, viewed as a point in time, borders on the present, and to
which this is related as b is to a, or as the conditioned is to its condition as
the unconditioned. From this point in time a, reflection is to proceed to b;
and consequently investigate: what kind of progress is thereby made in b, if
it is the metaphysics which is reflected in a; so the task of breaking b cannot
involve anything other than setting b in relation to a, and consequently
breaking the progress of metaphysics from a to b into b. The task, taken as a
question, would therefore be: What progress has metaphysics made since its
last epoch up to the present moment? If no progress could be found, the
present moment would not be b either, but would be a. Here two cases
remain possible. Firstly: the point in time b can follow a at some point, or
secondly: it is impossible at all. In the first case, metaphysics would have to
be set in the progress for a, and a would therefore itself only be a relative
point, that is, one that could only be determined from somewhere else. In the
second case, however,

would

Metaphysics would be a perfect science, and point a would therefore be an

absolute point, i.e. one that would be valid for all time, and consequently
would have to contain within itself as a point in time the empirical progress
possible with regard to metaphysics. In this case, the definite result would
be that the task would cancel itself out and not be a question, because what
one wants to know is already posited as that about which one wants to
know, or in short: because there is a progression from being to being.
 However, nothing more can follow from this than that, for the sake of
the possible result, we would have to pose our problem merely
hypothetically: If a progress were to take place, what would it be? and so
the problem would therefore retain its validity.

In order to set point a, our reflection turns to the history of philosophy. In

the introduction above we called this a science of the advancement of
philosophical reason to science in general. But this immediately leads us to
several difficulties. For, first of all, this explanation speaks of the
advancement of reason in general, and therefore of what humanity as a
whole has done to produce science. That they must have done this is a
necessary assumption, for there is no such thing as a finite being.

fondern

Man is among men, and can never be thought of in any other way.
Humanity is therefore only conceivable through the intervention of the
activity of each individual in the activity of all; and each individual,
therefore, who does not fill his place through mere quantity in space, must
have a share in the progress of the whole, because the whole is only a whole
through the relationship of its parts. But how can the moments of progress
in history be noted as advances in general human reason? History can do
this in no other way than by placing the general in the concrete. Thus, in the
final stages of developing reason in general, it shows us individual great
men who, in the time of the advancement of reason in general, find the
specific characteristics of progress. In itself, this is against the purpose of
reason. For beings, with the determination of a free reason, do nothing other
than this, they want to be rational beings, and progress in general should
therefore be a constant and uniform progress for all. But it is precisely this
way of being that makes diversity necessary. We only strive eternally for
the One Reason, for unity with
of diversity in the struggle. Here, therefore, with the benefit of nature, the
stronger often comes first, and in some respects marks the succession of
stages in the path of universal human reason. This benefit, however,
benefits everyone, and it is enough if any
The level of reason in general is only empirically determined by one
person. We all have one and the same goal, and to reach it we need one and
the same time, namely time in general. Thinking of the goal, there could
necessarily have been only one succession of stages for all of us, and one
could only have done what the other did. Therefore it is no humiliation for
humanity if in experience it is only represented by individuals. No, what
they were and did is the elevation and glorification of humanity in general.
We all want and will get there through freedom, for there is an equal
abundance of power that resides in all of us and that only develops under
different directions and obstacles. But they too must disappear, for every
battle with them is just another victory for reason. Thanks to the men who
are paving the way for us. As far as they went before us, we followed them
on bright plains, and refreshed ourselves with the scent of the roses where
the thorns had broken away.

We have now removed the difficulty that history can only present the
general in the concrete, contrary to the purpose of reason. But secondly,
another one shows itself to us, which might perhaps be more problematic
for our purpose. Our century, namely and initially bordering on it, includes
several great independent thinkers who, in very different ways and in a
peculiar way,

fight, which has promoted philosophy to science. To want to single out

only one of these for our fight seems as unfair to the rest as it is to the will.
We take one independent thinker from our point of view, but another sets
the other; and so we both define the present standpoint, which is
nevertheless required as a unity, from completely different points of view.
In this way, however, our proposition: There is a metaphysics in progress!
which we want to set up and determine for the purpose of a point in time b,
in a, would not even allow itself to be justified hypothetically.
Certainly, if this proposition contained the slightest unity due to the
increasing standpoint, and any other assertion could contradict it in the
slightest. Here it will therefore be a matter of establishing this proposition
as a fact of history by a single independent thinker, regardless of the
standpoint taken, and thus doing our task as a necessary task of reason.

According to history, the man who, as an independent thinker, first made

an epoch for us is Leibnitz. It would lead us too far from our path to justify
this claim critically. However, it is impossible to arrive at Leibnitz through
Wolf, because for our purpose we are looking for a productive genius who
is free and self-active, and without relying on any external material.

to
be allowed to fill his sphere. Wolf was not such a man. His standpoint can
only be described by a circle that falls within the circle that Leibniz drew
around himself; and so it is with all the other men who made a contribution
to philosophy up to the founding of it as a science. Our task is therefore:
What progress has metaphysics made since Leibniz up to us?
In this way we have the above task again in essence. The same
determination of its components remains, and what we want to do protects
us as our fundamental principle, as what we know, against all interventions
from the period from Leibniz to us. But we have to pinpoint this proposition
to the point in time that Leibniz occupies in the history of philosophy. Here,
therefore, everyone will undoubtedly step forward and demand justification
from us, because our proposition must have absolute validity, it must be
knowledge in the strict sense of the word.
 From the way in which we want to determine the present point in time
b through this knowledge, it can certainly be assumed that the standpoint
taken by Leibniz can also be determined in the same way. Our proposition
is to be regarded as a refutation of history. We will therefore use it in
connection with the two

ten,
ten, and consequently can be lifted out of the task itself and used in another
question as the appropriate one, and therefore as what we want. This would
set up a new time period, namely in order to determine a, a point in time x,
as bordering on a. But from this it is clear that x, as a moment in time, can
also only be determined by another, and so on into infinity, and
consequently as a moment in time cannot be absolutely determined by a
moment in time. The task of determining the progress of metaphysics in b
through a would therefore contradict itself in its requirement if what is
simply determined in it were only something determined in time. One can
well assume that everyone who honestly deals with the sciences will also
strive to advance them. But if philosophers, in their endeavours, had always
asked themselves: How could they really hope to advance the wills from any
point in time? It would be certain that they would not advance them any
further as sciences.
This is based on an unavoidable but remarkable deception of reason. The
question, namely, how do we proceed? necessarily presupposes that we
must have at least reached the point in time that we can pose this question.
With this question we therefore already find some real, but not determined
by us, scientific material, and accordingly we identify a specific moment in
time.

(
completely undetermined. If we now determine all further advances in this
way, these too must necessarily remain completely undetermined. The
question: how do we get further? must therefore at some point be: how do
we begin? This beginning could not be placed in time, where only the
relative takes place, but would have to be set beyond all time, that is, time
itself would have to be conditioned and determined as time in general. In
order to be able to set up our proposition: there is a metaphysics in progress!
from the standpoint taken by Leibniz as a result of history that must have
absolute certainty, we must pose the question: what progress has
metaphysics made up to Leibniz? In this way we define the entire possible
empirical regress as conditioned by reason, and reason as the unconditioned.
The fact that metaphysics only received this name through Aritotle can
certainly not be of any consequence here. We define it in general insofar as
it exists through reason. If it is to be the first and highest science, then its
object must also be contained in the first scientific attempt of reason. But by
raising ourselves above all time and defining the condition for it, the
unconditional itself, we also find ourselves at the same time above all
progress. It can neither be said here: there is a metaphysics, nor: there is a
progress in progress.

.`befin
located metaphyfics.

But the sciences

In general, there are only products of free reflection: and free reflection is
only such insofar as freedom in general assumes this determination. Every
possible product of it must necessarily be a problem for it. If we therefore
want to link metaphysics to the absolute standpoint of reason, we first
make it problematic, and here the question arises: How is metaphysics
possible at all? We have already noted that this is not a problem.
Determination in time. Nor can we take any issue with the fact that reason,
in order to be able to ask this question, had to have already made many
attempts in time. We take a beginning and therefore reflect the reflection of
reason in such a beginning, and thus the necessary meaning that this
reflection must have for an intelligence. The original task of reason: how is
metaphysics possible? is resolved in time. We therefore expect the fact here:
there is a metaphysics. This does not involve us in any conflict. For,
according to our definition, no conflict could yet take place over the
question: how is metaphysics possible?, since it is absolutely determined as
original. The whole discussion in the period up to Leibniz is precisely what
we want to know, namely, for our purposes, the specific refutation of the
same. Our reflection therefore remains directed towards this.

We lay the question "how is metaphysics possible at all?" at the basis of

all scientific curses of reason, and it is thus, as this question, posed even
before reason actually goes about its practical solution. Hence metaphysics
can only be given through the real curses d, i, only as a fact,

Leibniz, who first made an epoch in philosophy, tried in a new and

peculiar way to raise philosophy to the level of will; or, in relation to
metaphysics, to prove the possibility of it by means of a fact. If we now call
his system philosophy and thereby imagine an idea that lies at the basis of
all the curses in philosophy as realized, then all independent thinkers of his
time, as well as those of the whole past, necessarily appear in their
representatives in order to assert their claim to the same science until one
party or the other is convinced. For the assertion: this system is philosophy!
does not mean that there can be other, equally true, systems besides it.
and founded, systems; but they must necessarily be the only true
philosophy; and therefore everyone who sets up a philosophical system
of doctrine must also do so with the requirement that it should be
science. Leibnitz certainly does this, precisely by creating a system that
is really different from all other systems.

differ

sets up a different system. But that is exactly what all other independent
thinkers do, and they do it only for the reason that no single system can be
valid if all the others are valid at the same time, that is, everyone tries to
assert his system against all the others. This creates a necessary conflict
between them all. If one system is therefore rejected, then all the others are
also opposed to it. But they are all originally posited insofar as each is a
system for itself; therefore, all are also posited insofar as any one is posited
that actually exists in a certain period of time. If we have now taken our
standpoint in Leibniz, and he posited it because he first of all makes an
epoch in philosophy for us; then with him all the other independent thinkers
who belong to the period of time determined by us are posited at the same
time. In this way, even if we only describe our standpoint through a single
independent thinker, we can still arrive at a result that must have
universality. But in order to determine this, we cannot simply join any of
the contending parties, because what may emerge from all of them is
precisely what we want to know. We cannot therefore decide, but we must
observe what is actually decided. If we therefore only reflect on what
happens, we must necessarily call every system, in accordance with its
requirements, philosophy: but each one with the exclusion of all the others;
consequently all under one and the same
ben requirement. Therefore, we, as observers, have to define philosophy
as a science by all, because it is actually practiced by all.

In this way we now obtain as a decided fact the conflict in general,

and as an explanation for it: the united striving of all independent
thinkers to elevate philosophy to the status of a science.

"In order to unite divided parties, one should first start from what they
agree on." Divided parties, however, can only agree that they do not really
agree, and therefore that they are divided. If they are divided among
themselves by the fact that each of them claims philosophy as a science
from a different point of view, then they are absolutely and necessarily
united in the fact that philosophy must be a science. In this way, the striving
of all becomes a common striving of reason in general. If something is
actually done about it and therefore through the striving, then this fact must
be found, and indeed, for the sake of the necessary agreement, a absolutely
certain and completely determined facts. Here nothing that has happened
can be undone. Our reflection affects the whole and wants to present it as a
unity through a fact. If we wanted to

If we
were to single out any system and call it philosophy, we would be doing
something completely unnecessary and superfluous. Because we have to put
every system into conflict, this is already happening anyway. We cannot
therefore ask enough questions in favor of each system, but rather
everything that can be asked for it must be asked. In this way, therefore,
according to absolutely undeniable facts, every philosophical system must
be found for every science. But since each one only exists through conflict,
and therefore only through progress, conflict is also the one and absolutely
definite fact of emerging science: a fact about which the
The parties in dispute must necessarily agree as long as they are actually
and certainly in dispute, because they only dispute insofar as that fact takes
place.

In order not to misunderstand this, we must never lose sight of the point
of view that we reflect the conflict and therefore explain it as a fact. We
want to make this very clear in the following:

We have found the conflict to be a fact and can only explain it by

saying that it is the continuous striving of philosophizing reason for
understanding. If an understanding were ever to be real, then the conflict
would necessarily have preceded it. This seems to contradict itself.

chen

chen. For if through conflict only conflict is possible everywhere, and an

agreement is therefore only possible then, firstly, an agreement is also
absolutely impossible, and our hopes, which we look forward to so
courageously despite all the conflict, are nothing but empty phantoms.
Secondly, however, conflict, as a striving of reason towards agreement, is
contradictory in itself and completely void, and therefore, for the sake of its
own inner possibility, it cannot precede a possible agreement.

This conclusion is strict, and it is just as true. But the fact that it is so
gives our hopes the most sufficient fulfillment. For if the conflict contradicts
itself, then it necessarily cancels itself out and is not a conflict. But a
conflict can only be a conflict if its absolute contradiction, an agreement, is
simply real. Consequently, because it has completely occurred as a conflict,
and the facts therefore, which
sphere, would be declared as necessary by reason, and thus presented as a
unity. This unity would certainly be an agreement, and indeed, since the
contradiction, in its entirety, would be precisely that, not an agreement
through contradiction, but an agreement through itself, and therefore,
what we fear, an agreement per se.

With
out doubt, this is the only possible form of resolution of the
great problem: about the possibility of an agreement in philosophy. None of
the previous systems has been able to solve this problem, because none of
them has yet risen above all contradiction by asking the question: how is a
contradiction even possible? Kant did indeed base his critiques on this
reflection, but it was so unspecific that he did not remain faithful to it. Even
less so Reinhold. Rather, he explicitly claims that the previous systems of
philosophy are half true and half false; that is, true insofar as they are
consistent with his theory of
agree with one another
and falsely oppose one
another.

in fo fernfie derConsequently he claims

it only through a conflict, and the theory of the imagination therefore solves
the problem of the possibility of an agreement in philosophy so little that,
notwithstanding its great merit, it only belongs to the scope of the conflict
and must therefore be explained here again.

If reason now has to explain the conflict as necessary from itself, and
therefore in this reflection for it as agreement, then there is no other
difference between the reflection of the conflict and the actual conflict
than that reason in the former, as merely theoretical, knows it completely
definitely that and how there is conflict in the latter, however, as
 mere
ly practical, which still first produces the object of reflection. In real
conflict, therefore, the reflection of reason on its own product, i.e.
theoretical reason, or theory itself as a science, is not yet possible. But just
as little conflict remains in the real reflection of conflict . conceivable.
There is therefore no absolute conflict, but only a relative one, for it ceases
to be a conflict as soon as it is declared.

By this we hope to have justified the assertion that the disputing parties
must necessarily and absolutely agree on the fact by which the conflict is
explained as a common striving for agreement, and philosophy in general
as a science in the making. Let us now reflect further on the fact that the
requirement of each of the disputing systems expresses quite
unambiguously under what conditions philosophy can exist at all. There
must be absolutely nothing to oppose it, for as the highest will it must have
absolute unity as a strict necessity. Therefore it has always been the highest
and most important thing to have a solid basis for everything in our will,
and only such a basis in order to be able to present it as a will in one and
the same necessary way. This will alone was called a well-founded will.
The reasons for

main

In general, this is the case when they find the ultimate reasons. All
philosophical systems therefore had to argue in their opposition about the
ultimate reasons of all will, or at least come back to them. A will based on
ultimate reasons was a specific and complete knowledge, and such
knowledge was called cognition. Therefore, the ultimate reasons of all
knowledge in general were at the same time the ultimate reasons.
Grounds of knowledge, and the science of these is called: science of the
ultimate grounds of knowledge. Here the history of philosophy shows us
who among the numerous admirers of these grounds was the real
independent thinker. Some of the so-called schools spread out before all
the others and had numerous followers, without for a long time counting
even a single independent thinker among them. *)

All

* In philosophy as a science alone there can never be any other admirers

than independent thinkers, because it is only through each one for each one,
that is, only through the free and rational self of each one, a science in
general. One either understands it completely, and makes the infinite task
into the subtle one, or one does not understand it at all. The latter has also
been claimed of the critique of reason. But it is certain that this too can only
be understood if, as Reinhold first pointed out to us, one grasps its deep
spirit under a unity. Therefore there were still few Reinholds, Schultzs,
Becks and Mellins among Kant's students, while the anti-Kantians can
present more than one Iakobi, Eberhard and Maafs as outstanding
independent thinkers.
All real conflict has always been able to take place only over the ultimate
grounds of knowledge. For this very reason it had to become more violent as
one penetrated further into these. The changeable in space and time could
not be a final ground of the will. One soon recognized nothing in this but
accidents that arise in the flow of time and disappear against one another as
they arise. Originally, as we showed in the introduction, one did indeed
reduce all sensory phenomena. But with the perception of the changeable,
one necessarily also created an army of complete primal things, and
subordinated these too to a supreme one. Hence the deities of the Greeks.
Every spring has its nymph, every haystack has its sylph. One therefore
sought something independent of the change of things, and in the figurative
as an abstract mode of representation, therefore, a Being in Itself. Here one
was, on the way of the empirical
The advance of reason to itself, necessarily only in the objective world. In
order to establish a being in itself, one must necessarily cross the boundaries
of the physical and penetrate into the invisible realm beyond it, that is, into
the metaphysical. At least, only Aritotle could have called the will of this
invisible or superfinite metaphysics with full reason. If we use this name for
the science of the first, or in the analytical sense, final grounds of
knowledge, then every originator of a system must necessarily
system, or any independent thinker in general, to pose the problem: how is
metaphysics, as a science, possible? He could only demonstrate it by means
of a curse, and certainly everyone has also wanted to prove the possibility of
metaphysics only through reality. *) But while one of them was publicly
asserting its reality, another was already countering him with the same
assertion. They therefore came into conflict. Let us now look at the idea of
science, which both want to have realized; then we must rightly ask: how is
a conflict between them possible? Why does not each one gladly let the
other assert the same thing? For if metaphysics is a science according to the
belief of one, then every other belief, where the same is asserted, must
necessarily also establish the same science, and thus in principle and in what
can be concluded from it, there really is no other belief that is the opposite
of that one. But here the same relationship arises that we previously
established as a conflict between philosophical systems in general. We
therefore come here to the absolutely necessary result: There is a

Meta

* For this reason it is contradictory to try to prove the impossibility of

metaphysics by any kind of curse. Mr. Feuerbach makes the same
contradiction in his treatise on the impossibility of a first foundation in
philosophy (Philosophical Journal of Niethammer, 1795).
Metaphysics in the making is a metaphysics in progress! For every
independent thinker who answered the question about the possibility of
metaphysics with a fact also wanted to have realized the idea of a
metaphysics through his answer. This is what all the originators of
metaphysical systems did. Each of them therefore established the fact: there
is a metaphysics! But according to all of them, metaphysics is only one and
the same science. However, this one and the same science only takes place
among all through conflict, and therefore only through the efforts of all to
raise it to a science.

We have now completely deduced the main theorem of our problem and
can assert with confidence that no objection can be raised against it. For
since we made the theorem independent of the entire period of time
extended by Leibniz up to us by the second question, and in the same way,
through a further question, set it to be determined as the what of an
absolute what, it necessarily became for us a mere and pure fact of history
which has unconditional validity insofar as it simply cannot be disputed.

In a detailed answer to our task, the result presented could easily be

defined even more precisely; by
conflicting metaphysical points of view would be reduced to a single
one. From this

It
then became clear that for all of them there has always been only one object
of investigation. All independent thinkers have never investigated anything
other than being in itself. Insofar as they all started from the objective,
nothing remained to them other than the thing in itself, the absolute non-self.
This is what they have in common. This clearly reveals that the reason for
the whole conflict lies solely in the judgment about being in itself, or about
being-in-itself, and that the conflict would therefore not be resolved in the
least even if the whole world wanted to unite in the system of a single
independent thinker. The fact of agreement is therefore not decisive at all,
but can be quite coincidental. If it is founded in the system, then with its
progress it must, in practical terms, also necessarily come from itself. If it is
but not; therefore there is no other means that an honest independent
thinker can allow himself to use to spread his system than to think for
himself. Authority and power must necessarily delay the progress of
philosophizing reason towards its goal. As long as philosophy is still in
progress, it is only the power of judgment that actually advances. The freer
it remains, the sooner it must advance to its goal. The history of philosophy
also testifies to this. Only by doing this, after often long intervals, did a
single independent thinker rise up by breaking away from the common
practice.

K2

and became the legislator. If philosophers had always been consistent in the
objective point of view of their philosophy, then the power of judgement
could never have progressed a step further. For if they had once seen the
absolute as reality in the non-ego, then they would now also have to
do not philosophize at all, but entrust their collective affairs to the one who
was established as the creator or father of all things. No system is therefore
in fact so consistent as the papacy of all times and places: and none, on the
other hand, is so inconsistent as that of Spinoza, who will therefore remain
the hero of the entire history of philosophy.

Erit

Now we finally come to the second proposition of our task, to what we

want to do, namely the progress of metaphysics from Leibniz up to us.
When we have determined this as what is appropriate and at the same time
as what is determinable, our task will turn out to be a necessary task of
reason.

The point to which the task is directed by its second proposition is quite
definite: the present standpoint of metaphysics. The demand is therefore
directed to the finite result of philosophizing reason at its present
standpoint, which lies beyond all contradiction; for what we will follows

dem

to what we already know, through synthesis. If we now reflect on the fact

previously established, on metaphysics in progress, then this sets out for us
quite definitely the goal that philosophizing reason must at some point reach
on the way of its progress, namely metaphysics as a science. As long as this
goal has not yet been actually reached, in general nothing more than
progress towards it, i.e. only conflict, can take place. But if that is the case,
then for that very reason the goal of the progress cannot yet be considered as
such.
to be definitely entered into and recognized. To recognize it as a goal and
to actually find oneself at the goal must therefore necessarily be one and
the same. For as long as we only progress towards it, we are also only
striving for science everywhere. Even then there is still no will for us, but
only conflict. To be in agreement about the goal and to actually find
oneself at the goal is therefore absolutely one and the same. This is already
in the concept. The idea that this or that is the goal of philosophizing reason
must at least be a reflection. But this must not necessarily come from any
of the conflicting systems. Therefore, if it were real, it would have to
belong only to the science that has been achieved.
From this it follows irrefutably that our task cannot be answered
without opposition

K3
could be achieved if the present standpoint taken were also a mere point of
progress towards science: and that consequently it simply cannot be
answered by any philosopher who is attached to any of the systems involved
in the conflict, because where there is conflict, there cannot necessarily be
agreement. The whole task would therefore have to remain unfinished until
the goal of philosophizing reason: philosophy as a science, has actually been
achieved.

We have seen how we were able to set up the main proposition of our
task as a fact which, because it includes all the contradictions of the given
period of time, cannot be contradicted. We should not expect anything like
this for our second proposition if we could not set up an absolute point here
too. For access is now free, and all thinkers and speakers from Leibniz to
the present moment, who were previously subject to an ingratum otium, are
thus granted the right to speak. Of course, they will not testify to the
progress: only the thinkers themselves can do that. But the result must apply
to both, and therefore we need an absolute point.
 Our task does not yet appear to be a necessary task of reason. We
only know that it can only be accomplished under the assumption

Answe
r: that the present moment is the point of science. It is therefore conditioned
by this presupposition. In order to demonstrate its necessity, we must
actually determine the present moment as a point of science and thereby
indicate the place where the task belongs.

We found the above-stated fact of reason's striving for metaphysics as a

science through the various opposing assertions that metaphysics is real.
None, we believe, could be valid if all the others were valid at the same
time. But all wanted to be valid with each other, and each in turn with all.
This gave us the generally agreed assertion that metaphysics should be valid
as a science. Now there is obviously not the slightest contradiction in the
mere assertion that metaphysics is real. For if it were real, then it would
certainly be real. So there is also no contradiction in everyone claiming
something: metaphysics is real, for everyone would thereby only be
claiming one and the same thing. But if every assertion that metaphysics is
real was made with the necessary requirement that it should also be valid as
a science; We therefore also know when and how that assertion can assert
itself as such. Obviously, when every possible philosophy with the
requirement of will either necessarily
 With

the same one, or one which will necessarily be subordinate to the other. In
the first case, there would be no difference, and therefore no opposition. In
the second, however, the subordinate philosophy would have to be derived
from the one and highest science; consequently, it would be conditioned by
it and therefore absolutely non-volitional. If, however, it were conditioned,
then the task would also be to make it equal to the one and highest science,
so that through science itself, every possible philosophical system would
have to be brought back to science itself, thus becoming equal to science
itself and consequently one and the same highest science. But if philosophy
is real as a science, then it is necessarily real: therefore also only science in
that all possible philosophical systems must be reduced to it. Consequently,
as a science, there would be no single system opposed to it, but it would be
the only one and absolute system. All the others could only indicate the
development of the sciences, and science would consequently have to be
the goal of all progress of philosophizing reason: the definite and absolutely
indisputable result of its collective philosophical pursuit.

Here we see the specific and unique character of philosophy as

willpower. Nothing can or must be opposed to it.

fine.
It follows that it must describe the absolute sphere of all knowledge, and
therefore neither possible nor actual knowledge, and consequently only
non-knowledge, in the absolute sense of the word, can be opposed to it.

From this we can already see how the required progress from Leibniz to
us must be able to be determined precisely and completely by philosophy as
a science, if we really reached this point. Science itself is only the final
result of all previous research into its possibility, and its possibility is
therefore necessarily given by reality. It therefore concludes the entire
empirical progress of reason to itself as reason, through a fact through
which that which was previously only in the process of becoming is now.
But only advancing reason reached this final point as its goal. Therefore
reason must also attribute its progress to itself as its own. If freedom is
given to science by the law, in order to reflect the progress towards science,
and thus to determine the final stages of this scientifically, then it can
proceed with complete certainty, for its law dictates the realm of all human
will. This also resolves the paradox of how, in our task, what we want to
will can be equated with what we want to will it from. This is something of
which
 1

that we know. But we could not know it at all if we had not determined it
ourselves through the outcome. Thus we come back in a circle to our point,
which of course must also be true if it is to be absolute. Through this circle
that free reflection goes, all philosophical systems that it finds in it are
necessarily under the same protection of science. For what is there, it finds
in the process of becoming. Reflection therefore philosophizes with all
systems at the same time at every moment of its circle, that is, all find one
in it, and therefore no conflict is possible within it. In order to be able to
observe the progress of reason towards science, the observer must
necessarily have already adopted the standpoint of science. Then it is
impossible to be prevented by anyone's objections from setting up a
generally acceptable and absolutely necessary plea. This certainly seems to
be a lot to say, since everyone should be free to think differently. But
thinking differently is a necessary part of the sphere of all thinking; if this is
absolutely posited by thinking for oneself, and this is certainly the case
because everyone who thinks necessarily thinks for themselves, either for
themselves or in the reflection of another - then one cannot think differently
than what is posited by the sphere of all thinking. How could the whole
process not necessarily have to be posited if the goal is really there? But
how could
 1

How could this progress ever be achieved if the determining factor lay in
the progress? To avoid any misunderstanding, we would like to point out
that when it is said that the present point in time is the point in time of
philosophy as a science, it is not at all demanded that this science should
necessarily already be generally understood. No, anyone who is still on the
way to it is not yet at the goal. Science can only meet him halfway, and this
is done by working on the history of philosophy. The meaning of those
words, that the present point in time is the point in time of science, is
therefore only tacit: that the point in time to which advancing reason must
one day necessarily reach is now empirically actually given. It is enough
that it is in general a point that necessarily lies on the path to the infinite
goal. Therefore it is not only attributed to the independent thinker who
describes it empirically, but to human reason in general. The only question
now is whether it has actually occurred, and how can we be certain of it?

All investigations of philosophizing reason have always been aimed at

nothing other than being in itself. This was necessary be c a us e
everything that is not in itself is therefore only in something else and
consequently only an accident of this other. If the self-being is now sought,
this means nothing other than the search

The seeker was chased, and she chased herself.

Reason alfo fuch

With the blink of an eye

Since it was found, the firm and absolute basis was finally discovered
through which all knowledge is science. But since all knowledge proceeds
from self-existence, philosophy can only be a science for everyone through
each person. Whether it has therefore really come about in time cannot be
determined by anyone else, but only by oneself. However, one fact must be
given, for the presupposition is that science must lie somewhere on the path
of our progress. This fact is the scientific theory of Professor Fichte in its
inception.

According to the concept that we have established throughout this entire

work of philosophy as a science, it makes absolutely no difference whether
Fichte or Caius, or whoever it may be, is named as the originator. It is only
science by each one for each one; hence only science in general insofar as
every rational being is thought of as an originator. The rational being,
however, cannot be thought of as an originator other than insofar as it thinks
of itself as an originator; consequently, everyone who creates science is an
originator of it. This necessarily eliminates all so-called scholasticism as a
ridiculous pedantry; for one simply cannot belong to any party in
philosophy as a science, because it is for one

It
therefore gives an absolute standpoint and therefore describes the sphere of
all human will, that is, the science of the possibility of all knowledge, the
absolute place in which and through which every will can be given a definite
place. Wherever the point of science falls, the actual creation of all
knowledge necessarily begins.
 Everything depended on giving a decisive answer to the question of the
possibility of metaphysics. This could only be done by reversing the
principles. Up to now, the ego has been thrown into the objective world and
the ego has therefore been destroyed. The science of knowledge, on the
other hand, shows that everything outside the ego, including necessarily
non-ego, and taken absolutely as such, is simply nothing. This nothing is
opposed to the ego insofar as the ego is the absolute self. If there is
originally no other reality than the reality of the ego, and everything else is
simply nothing, then something can never come from this nothing without
it receiving its reality from the absolute ego, and therefore as something
through the ego, for the ego and for the ego. As soon as one understands
this idea purely and correctly, the transcendent point of view must
necessarily be lost from our judgments. For this nothing more is required
than the determination: a self-sufficient

tota
l1

to seek a healthy and free being! to seek nothing but what one is
through reason and can be with reason. *)

The science of science, as a science of the possibility of all knowledge,

makes itself liable to derive all possible systems from their fundamental
principles and to set them up in the most complete way; and thus to answer
everyone freely and confidently. From this at least so much follows that
those independent thinkers who cannot explain the science of science from
their system do not make a secret of the fact that they really do not
understand it; they also declare by this that their system contains no
explanatory basis for the science of science and consequently does not
extend beyond it for any time. Insofar as the science of science makes the
rational self of everyone the condition of all philosophizing, it has
sufficiently explained where every misunderstanding about it is to be
sought, and it itself cannot therefore enter into any disputes without
inconsistency. It is
 but

*) As long as people find so little in this way, their noblest impulse

necessarily demands the opposite, namely to gain as much as possible from
others. Hence the desire for ribbons, titles and honors, and the petty conceit
of advantages that have been bestowed upon us from without. All this has
its basis in a wrong way of thinking, and this again lies in the course of
time. We cannot be angry with people for finding this, but we must
encourage them to learn the virtues.
but it is not necessary for that reason to recognize the doctrine of science, or
even to make no claim to reason. No, it is only necessary for rational beings
to honor the truth and to call our current knowledge our best knowledge
with honest conviction, and consequently not to try to force it on others
who may well mean it just as honestly. That is all that the doctrine of
science demands, and where such a feeling takes place, its spirit will
certainly prove itself fruitful.

The purpose of our present investigation requires us to take our given

standpoint as clearly as possible. It is in itself. But it must also be judged
and accepted as such. For this we need a further consideration of the
science of knowledge in order to put the point of view in a clear light, from
which alone it must be judged in order not to be completely misunderstood.
As a science of the possibility of all will, it does not allow any examination
from even higher principles than those it itself establishes. But if it is given
to us in experience as a fact, then it is at least conditioned and must
therefore also be explainable. It can only be a fact through an action of the
human mind. We would therefore have explained it if we had

Action has been proven. No further preparation is required for this. All
knowledge is subtle, necessarily synthetic in nature. Abstract
we therefore of all real knowledge; thus the task of knowledge, free
reflection, arises, i.e. the absolute thefis and antithefis. The science of
knowledge, in any existing representation, also becomes problematic. So
we currently take the
Fichte's representation. By reflecting on it we repeat the actual act and
consequently bring the action into consciousness. It is clear that absolutely
nothing further is possible; for insofar as we abstract from the given
representation, we abstract from the actual consciousness of it.
Consequently, the task is to explain this specific consciousness, that is, to
reflect on the action and raise it to consciousness.

From the reflection on Fichte's theory of the will, it is now clear that the
author has clearly demonstrated two aims in his presentation of it. Firstly,
to pose the problem of philosophy as a science to independent thinkers of
his time and of all future times, and secondly, to also partly solve it. He has
done the former insofar as he grounds the theory of knowledge on the free
self-activity of every rational being; but the latter insofar as he wanted to
assert his own rationality just as legitimately. There is undoubtedly no
presumption in this. Considered as an action, it is the mere expression of
what everyone necessarily concedes to everyone.

fobald
"

as soon as everyone respects reason in everyone.

Science, as a product of this
reason, is first of all a declaration against any
interference with the free activity of reason. But if it
now concerns, according to its content,
knowledge, and wants to find the science of the
possibility of all knowledge; that explanation
against any interference with the freedom of reason,
and at the same time a declaration that the science
of science simply does not accept a single letter.
Therefore, what Fichte presents to us is
 nor the science of science, according to its spirit; but
only the instrument for free and rational beings to
undertake the same free reflection on themselves,
and thereby to first put the spirit into the given
representation. No one else may proceed differently.
For as far as someone exercises the freedom of
reason, he must also grant the same freedom to all
rational beings. This procedure is therefore the only
possible one,
falls into experience, is conditioned by reason.
Consequently there is no philosophy as a science,
except only in the minds of rational beings, that is,
only by each one for each one, and a philosophical
dogmatics, in an objective sense, is therefore not at
all conceivable as a science.

What

But if philosophy is a science only through each person for each

person, then it is also as such absolute and unconditional. It only exists
insofar as it exists; consequently its possibility must be given by reality.
 On this point, the author of the Wissenschaftslehre has been
misunderstood. But it is impossible to penetrate into the spirit of the
same without at the same time being convinced of the truth of this
proposition. For our purpose, therefore, we must focus our investigation
primarily on him.

From the above deduction of reflection from freedom, according to its

two components: asking and answering, we have come to know this whole
action as the action of philosophizing. Philosophizing therefore consists
quite definitely in giving up the problem and solving the problem. Now if
philosophy is a science and problematic for our reflection, it must
nevertheless, according to the above deduction, be precisely and completely
defined as a problem. But it is also the science of the possibility of all will,
which is science itself. Consequently, taken problematically, it cannot have
a higher problem above itself, but rather it must be the highest of all
problems, the problem per se.

Now before the ego, or freedom, determines itself to reflect, reflection is

still mere representation, and the representing ego is therefore completely
determined and necessary, and therefore not-ego. But the ego can only be
non-ego insofar as the non-ego is ego and consequently an ego. Thus the
ego, by virtue of its being, must attribute representation to itself, and
thereby the non-ego.
I deduce. As the ego relates the reflected activity to itself, it must
necessarily repeat the act of representation and consequently imagine it, that
is, in order to be able to reflect independently, it must determine reflection
in its necessity and therefore establish the conditions under which reflection
is precisely this and no other action. This makes representation problematic
and the task is therefore quite definitely to explain how a real consciousness
is possible, and thus to deduce consciousness. If we should not now
anticipate what is still required to be proven, then the explanation cannot be
based on anything determined by consciousness.
So here freedom as a reflective power of judgement has absolutely no law
which it could base its reflection on as certain and reliable. It must therefore
make concessions. If it succeeds in reflecting as it should happen according
to the necessary but as yet unknown law of reflection in general, and thus in
reflecting the actual act of reflection, then the reflection must necessarily
separate consciousness, and thus consciousness from consciousness. If this
was problematic, then the solution also makes it possible through reality,
i.e. the premillennia are raised to consciousness, the result of which is
consciousness itself. If reflection now includes in its result the entire actions
of the human mind through which the ego becomes intelligence, and
consequently the actions through which knowledge in general becomes
actual, then the reflection must also be based on the fact that it is not
possible to act in the first place.

L2
is; so too is the refultat, which necessarily understands those actions as
plausible or pragmatic, and therefore as their consequence or logical, a
science of the possibility of all knowledge in general, and therefore
nothing other than a science of science. Common sense, which always
proceeds only from the reality that the philosopher has to explain, will not
be able to find its way out of this circle. The reason for this lies in
consciousness itself, because this only becomes possible through theory
and antithesis; and thus that which underlies all consciousness cannot itself
be conscious.

But if philosophy is only a science through each and every one for each
and every one, and therefore only in the living mind of each and every one,
then it is also perfectly clear what we have to think of it and what the author
of the Science of Knowledge has also expressed clearly enough. Philosophy
is, namely, nothing more than the reflection of a rational being about itself,
the definite and complete explanation of its own existence. This reflection
cannot and must not have its basis in anything else; insofar as its possibility
is given by reality and is therefore absolute, it is also the free and rational
human being himself, who knows himself in this freedom and rationality.
Understood in this way, the concern that in the world we are
There is nothing left for philosophy, as a perfected science, to do. We have
not done anything up to that point, for we were not there yet. With the
knowledge of ourselves we are therefore only given the task of what we will
have to do throughout all eternity: consequently, only through philosophy
are we enabled to really begin. And are we then to remain children forever
and not finally take over the guardianship of ourselves? But what a sublime
purpose philosophy has in this explanation cannot be overlooked for a
moment. Through it, namely, man now appears in harmony with himself;
expressed according to a formula: AA. In this harmony he is thus beyond all
opposition and recognizes himself as the bearer of the entire universe.
Therefore, nothing is opposed to philosophy as a science. But because
nothing is opposed to it, nothing is equal to it either. Consequently, it is
only something in the proportion that something outside of it becomes real
through it; thus, only something insofar as it becomes a practical law for the
self-activity of our mind. All science must be judged according to this.
Someone who wanted to boast of it without demonstrating it in his actions
would thereby prove that he really has no science. But man in his freedom
can only have it as a law, and where this was not the case, then he was not
the one who acted.
If that is the purpose of philosophy as a science, then it is also the
purpose of every human being. Everyone must become free and come to
self-knowledge. What is presented to us in books is never philosophy, and
never science, but only one of the many means that freedom attempts to
use to awaken the living human being and to make itself visible. Science in
spirit is the eternal light that shines out into infinity and must therefore
illuminate for us even the darkest paths of pleasure, so that we can say: this
is the progress of the human race.

Enough of that for our purposes now. Through the Science of Knowledge
we have determined the present time as the point of philosophy as a science
and have explained it sufficiently. Our above task on the progress of
metaphysics from Leibniz to
to us, is therefore not only to be solved; it must necessarily be solved.
Reason as reason can absolutely do nothing other than to go back into the
past and to discover itself. Only in this way does it obtain its definite
standpoint, for it learns to understand man, how he came through all the
stages of his development to the final existence. The task is therefore a
necessary task of reason. But as such it only understands a certain part of
history. Consequently, it is conditioned by its relationship to the whole.
The

My
point of view must first be established and therefore already be a proof of
investigation before we can proceed further. This is at least necessary for the
presentation of the whole. Free reflection can of course lift out any part from
this whole, which it grasps through the idea, and treat it separately. But the
boundaries of these parts must nevertheless be clearly noted so that one does
not overlook the place they occupy in the system. In this way the author will
deal with the era of critical philosophy, convinced that a faithful
presentation of it will first of all contribute to lifting us ever more out of the
half-dark into the light of day and to leaving behind a character that has
never proved itself so powerful and detrimental as precisely in the period of
the so-called critical philosophy.

1
 Attachment.

Some remarks
on the writings of Mr. Magifter Beck in Halle: The only possible standpoint
from which critical philosophy must be judged.

(Riga at Hartknoch 1796.).

"Whether the processing of knowledge that belongs to the business of

reason follows the proper course of science or not can soon be judged from
the result."

If one applies these remarkable words from the preface to the Critique of
Pure Reason to the history of critical philosophy itself, nothing is more
obvious than that the admirers of criticism have simply overlooked that
which contains a loud call for further investigation. In this respect, despite
the innumerable critical curses, this has actually done nothing for science,
and the history of critical philosophy can therefore only very casually
present those curses as mere negations.

She
must

But at the same time it must be demonstrated by real evidence that the
Kantians' procedure was a mere error, and therefore it was also an error that
these men wanted to lay claim to the name of critical philosophers.

Such a real curse would also be found in the history of critical

philosophy by the one who takes the criticism of the Roman Catholic
Church to a higher,
would bring back its own principle, and thus the assertion that science
exists would actually be justified by a scientific treatment. In this way at
least the sure goal of science lies, as long as the independent thinker does
not deny the condition of his procedure, the convention.

It is a necessary presupposition for reason, insofar as it philosophizes,

that our will, as will, has a reason for something. If it had no reason, that is,
nothing would be a reason; then there would be nothing about which we
would know anything, and we would therefore know nothing of nothing,
and thus our knowledge itself would be a negation. With the
presupposition of that reason, it is at the same time presupposed that it is
not arbitrary in itself, but rather some ultimate and therefore only possible
and necessary reason. A final and only possible reason for our knowledge
must simply be such, for there can be no other reason for its reality apart
from it. Even the recognition of its,
as one of these, must be founded in it, and for that very reason must also
occur at some point as necessary. Therefore, if we posit a possible observer
for a moment, then all rational finite beings must stand on one and the same
necessary standpoint, insofar as one and the same final explanatory reason
for their only possible states is presupposed in all of them. In the mind of
this observer, we therefore really all stand on one and the same unique
possible standpoint, and therefore there can be no diversity in us, insofar as
several and different observers are posited.

With the predefinition of that final and only possible basis of our
knowledge, it is now predefined, firstly, that the knowledge of truth must
necessarily unite us all on one and the same standpoint of rational beings in
general, because then the law of our reflection would be one and the same
for all of us; and secondly, that this knowledge will also occur for all of us
at some point as necessary, because it cannot occur in any other way than
insofar as it is founded on that final and only possible basis, and
consequently must also occur with the presupposition of such a basis. Now
we find different assumptions in the actual recognition of the only possible
standpoint that must be predefined as necessary; therefore this difference
can only have its reason in our original.
have parts, that is, only in the fact that we observe differently, and it itself,
the necessary standpoint, must therefore be one and the same, regardless of
our judgment. But if the difference lies in our judgments, and if, however
certain we are in general only philosophizing, unification in the truth is our
goal, then we have no other possible way for this unification than
correction of our judgments, and thus mutual communication and
instruction in our will. We can all err: we must accept that. But we all also
want the truth, so certainly we only seek science.
There is a truth that is above all error, namely that we believe in truth and
that we can be wrong. Once we have thought about this clearly, we are
necessarily united by our feelings, and a purely voluntary interest is then a
point of contact for all of us that we cannot miss. Should and must the
scholars now judge each other? The form of the judgement lies in their
common purpose, and if this form has only really been observed, there can
no longer be any talk of different systems and standpoints.

The above-mentioned work of Mr. M. Beck in Halle announces itself by

its title as a further attempt to determine the only possible standpoint for
philosophy as a science. I have only read this excellent work after

len
of my previous examination, and since it was already in the press, as I would
otherwise have known how to use some of Mr. Beck's critical advice.
Nevertheless, with regard to our judgment, we are by no means on the same
standpoint, and I freely admit that Mr. Beck has not yet convinced me of the
untenability of my own, and therefore of my possible error. This
circumstance, and the direct relationship of Mr. B.'s writing to the result of
my investigation, give me sufficient reason to make a few comments here
about Mr. B.'s only possible standpoint. In doing so, I am also considering
the importance of the subject, as my own judgment in the quality of a
judgment, and I would like to be well understood on this point.

Without doubt, Mr. Beck is the first and only commentator on Kant's
writings to date who at least considers the critique of reason from its true
standpoint, the one taken by Kant himself, and who has fully understood
the critique in this respect.
has. I now abstract from whether this standpoint may be sufficient for
myself to understand the Kantian system of his 、 I am trying to judge
correctly in view of the time when Kant wrote, and I am looking for a high
point from the text before me in order to be able to follow the thread of my
remarks. If the

The
point demanded by Mr. B. has actually been given; my main objection has
also been taken away at the same time, and the author will therefore soon be
in a position to judge whether the entire examination is on the right or wrong
side.

According to the title, the work is intended to be the only possible

standpoint for judging critical philosophy in general. In this definition of
the whole I place the required highest point, and from this my judgment
must therefore start.

If one reflects first on this determination of the whole as a given form,

through which a whole is determined and expressed in this way and not
otherwise according to its content, then, assuming that the content should
also have determined its form, one cannot judge otherwise than that Mr. B.
will present us in his writing a point of view from which the critical system,
as a system, must be completely surveyed at a glance. One therefore
expects unity, and since the given point of view is the only possible one,
unity in this respect is absolute. This lies in the concept of the given form,
and that judgment is therefore considered to be merely analytical, that is,
merely in relation to what is actually given. Does this have hypothetical
validity for reflection, so that it must be said: if the content has really
determined its form, then this is also true
Out of
Expression; the judgment also applies that one should not expect any other
content to justify the form than that determined by it, otherwise the title
would be empty and the content would remain completely undetermined.

My main concern lies in this reflection. I will content myself with

merely going through it here, since a more detailed discussion can only
take place elsewhere and would not be possible here due to lack of time.

The whole of the text is divided into four sections. Whether and how the
author's idea has provided results is not disclosed here, because there is no
definite derivation of it from principles. Therefore, no definite challenge can
be taken from the outset, but this is only possible through the review of the
parts, and consequently through their aggregation into a whole.

Zen.

Science necessarily goes the other way, first defining an absolute

sphere and then determining every possible other sphere.

The first section deals with the difficulties of penetrating the mind of
criticism and is the introduction to the following sections. Once one has
taken the challenge of finding the only possible standpoint for judging
critical philosophy, one does not understand why the first section does not
deal rather with the difficulties of penetrating the mind of criticism.
critical philosophy. That the two are one and the same for the author
cannot be assumed in advance, as it can actually be found in the text
itself. But it is certain that this first section is written with a truly critical
spirit and must therefore justify the attentive reader's expectations. The
main difficulty of penetrating the spirit of criticism is presented by the
author in
the common or discursive way of imagining the philosophy of to-date,
which makes it impossible to understand the real meaning of a
transcendental philosophy, since its principle, the original idea, has
already been passed over. The author sets out this principle here only for
the sake of explanation, and only the following section deals with the
actual investigation of it.

I am in complete agreement with the author that the real difficulty of

penetrating the spirit of criticism has its roots solely in the discursive way
of thinking of philosophers, and that one will therefore never understand
this spirit until one has gained a complete insight into the original way of
thinking. But this very insight is nothing other than the system of critical
philosophy. If the author wanted to shed complete light on these
difficulties, then it would undoubtedly have to be shown first: what is to be
understood by spirit and letter. This would have shown that

one
one can only penetrate mind with spirit. This has so far been so little the
case in the study of criticism; it can be asserted that the blame for this falls
no less on the author of criticism himself than on the living public. On the
public: insofar as it was the first to absorb and absorb critical spirit, and
therefore had to be educated for criticism through criticism. On Kant, on the
other hand: insofar as he in no way met criticism with his spirit, but rather
concealed it behind a letter. The elaboration of this would therefore have
made an investigation into the spirit and letter of criticism and the
relationship between it and the reading public necessary. The question here
is not to what extent such an approach would not correspond to Mr. B.'s
purpose, but to what extent the subject would have required such an
approach, and I believe I have made this clear.

The second section explains the title of the book. The heading here is:
Presentation of the transcendental of our knowledge, as the true standpoint
from which the critique of pure reason must be judged: and the first section
follows immediately with the heading: the highest fundamental principle of
philosophy is the power to originally precede

place.

Here, therefore, as a result of the above expectation, we find ourselves

led to the only possible standpoint of philosophy, and it now requires
reflection to convince ourselves of this.

Given the challenge: Only possible standpoint! the examining teacher

would only be able to find his expectations satisfied insofar as he could
establish the original idea or the objective-synthetic unity of consciousness
for the critical
System would really be set up as a highest point, through which this
system would both receive its form and its material; and secondly: to
what extent this point would actually have a perfect position in and
through itself, and thus would be the only possible absolute point in
relation to the system.

But here the first thing that comes to mind is that Mr. B. has
immediately placed us in a special position through his professorship and
has given us the instruction to examine the whole system from one of its
parts, namely the theoretical one. If one now wants to assume, in order not
to anticipate his judgment, that the author will make the whole system
visible to us from this point, then one should necessarily have learned by
now how a very basic principle of philosophy is found and how it is
established as such with complete assurance of its certainty. It is clear that
this reminder

the mere method is all that is needed, and the power of the professor is not
even involved. But even here, abstracted for a moment from all the content
of our knowledge and considered with complete rigor, can it ever be of no
consequence to science whether one asks: here is the only possible principle
for all philosophy; or: here is a principle that fully meets the necessary
requirements of a highest principle? The latter presupposes that one had a
specific purpose in establishing such a principle, according to which purpose
the principle to be found could only be the highest insofar as the purpose
itself made itself completely justified, and therefore through its absolute
certainty what was presupposed in its establishment now received complete
certainty. If the antecedent were absolutely certain under a condition, such
as the proposition AA, i.e. if A is true, then A is true, then the absolute
certainty is necessarily found when the condition or the explanatory ground
of A is found. For since A is the general expression for everything
conditioned, its explanatory ground can only be the unconditional, and
consequently
that which alone takes place apart from the conditioned. Here there is
therefore justification and complete guarantee of the certainty of a
fundamental principle as the highest principle for all philosophy.

If the former is accepted, it is obviously a mere assertion that

something

fbadly
presupposes it as the highest principle and then proves its correctness from
what is presupposed. In this way, however, we get into an unavoidable
conflict. For since what is asserted is supposed to be valid by itself and yet
there is some specific A or B (something that is asserted), then one has not
reflected at all on the relationship between it and the assertor, and it is
therefore only impossible that anything other than A could be the highest
principle insofar as A is asserted; consequently, one can certainly
demonstrate from A that no other principle is possible. But that something
else cannot be asserted does not depend on A at all, for A is itself only
something that was asserted. If it happens now - and empirically speaking,
we find sufficient evidence for this

Where then lies the formal difference between several and different
identical assertions? It is not at all conceivable. For if several highest
principles appear as mere assertions, then this also lies in the fact that they
find something common to all of them, i.e. the form of all is absolute.
Which of them should therefore have the primacy with more right and
exclusively? I think: all and none. For if the form of all is absolute, then the
only thing left to distinguish them is the material difference. But this is
necessarily determined by the fact that all are equal, so that only a view of
subordination can decide on the advantage of one over all the others.
But who is to decide when every proposition asserts itself as absolute
through its form, and everything except what has been previously stated
can be claimed, because it is already stated as correct against all claims? It
was certainly a great and wonderful deception that philosophers only ever
justified their fundamental principles through application and yet laid the
validity of them completely at the foundation..... For since everyone did it,
everyone necessarily remained on his absolute standpoint through
continued opposition.

In order to make the matter completely clear, I admit that all of those
fundamental principles can be brought under a common highest fact, under
what is originally a fact in general, and that all parties that have been in
dispute up to that point can actually agree on this one fact as the highest
principle for all philosophy, and that this principle is the power to represent
originally, and what should follow from this for the validity of this
principle? Whether the sphere of this one and highest fact can contain all
possible others is out of the question, for this concerns the matter of every
fundamental principle, where only the curse of subordination decides. But
the question is whether the assertion of this one fact, as the highest
fundamental principle, makes the assertion of all the others possible and
includes them: and this shows that this assumption is something quite
wrong.

derfin
 This

which contains something like this, because it is obviously and necessarily

one and the same action of our mind, namely a positing of A or B, and
positing or asserting, cannot be determined by the original representation,
because then there would be, first of all, no positing of the same as the
highest fundamental principle, but only a law, because the action would be
conditioned; and secondly, it would be quite impossible for any other
assertion to have taken place, nor could it ever take place, because the last
would necessarily have to contain the original representation, against which
I am already making an objection through my present investigation. In
terms of the assertion, therefore, the original representation is absolutely
nothing more than any A and B, and therefore it is completely the same
whether A, or B, or both and even more, are asserted as the highest
fundamental principles. I make this even clearer for the sake of the
importance of the subject:

If several highest fundamental principles are all original by virtue of their

mere positing as such fundamental principles, and consequently as mere
assertions, then they all, as such, are also originally opposed to one another.
But things that are originally opposed can never be united by themselves,
but only by a third outside of them. If, therefore, one of two things that
were originally opposed were to accidentally fall away, the other would still
remain in conflict with itself.

It

A and B were originally opposites, and both are therefore opposites in

their absolute form. If therefore AA and BB, then each necessarily
excludes the other, and neither can be considered supreme if the other is
also supreme. But both are originally opposed by their form; therefore the
other is also superior to each other only because
opposed, because each is posited itself. So: A is not opposed to B by A, and
B not to A by B; but A is opposed to B by B, and B to A by A. Accordingly,
each is only opposed insofar as it is posited, and consequently in itself
opposed, that is, contradictory. But the law of A and B lies in the fact that
both are asserted absolutely as the highest fundamental principles;
consequently the contradiction of both lies in them as mere assertions, and
this can therefore only be removed if neither of them is posited. This applies
to all possible facts, whether they are original or only derived, for the
procedure in asserting is one and the same; if one and the same mere appeal
to common human understanding, because here every justification consists
precisely in the appeal, there is no other criterion of certainty for the
proposition asserted in each case than the objective belief, where one cannot
admit, merely as a consequence of what is assumed, how well something
other than what is assumed could be true,
My above reminder against Mr. Beck's postulate must now be
completely clear in its relation

fine,
fine. I had to completely disregard whether the given document consisted in
the original idea or in something else; for I was only reflecting on the
manner and time of the assertion, where the asserted could be any A or B.

If Mr. B. wanted to refer us to the critique of V. to justify his thesis, his

cause would not have gained in the slightest by doing so. For since he does
not impose the Kantian circle on us to derive the understanding from general
logic, he must refer us directly to the deduction of the categories themselves.
But then we are directly and immediately on the same standpoint, and my
memory retains its full validity. Kant carries out his critical work by
assuming in general that there is a human understanding, but by no means
follows up on where he gets it from, rather letting it rest on itself through the
act of original apperception, and consequently asserting it as absolute. Now
Mr. B. also does this.
and this is how all philosophers who laid down first principles proceeded
up to Fichte. But there should be no misunderstanding here. I am not
speaking of criticism in what it really is, but rather what it would be if one
wanted to abstract from its spirit and grasp the mere letter. In the former
respect it is science, but not in the latter. To want to lay a foundation for it
is therefore a mere misunderstanding; but to separate the letter from it.

M4

To
isolate and expose their poison is the business of a scientific theory, and
absolutely necessary for complete insight into criticism.

It is very probable to me that Mr. B., thanks to his professorship, will be

firmly convinced that every objection against him can only arise from a
discursive way of imagining things and is therefore only a proof of how far
and completely his point of view has not yet been grasped. But in this he is
no different from any of his predecessors, who may well have meant the
truth honestly and yet were still wrong. We find evidence of this in the
history of our day and such examples could well serve us not to make a
claim to infallibility outright, if this were not already clear to us for higher
reasons.

My first objection to Mr. Beck's thesis is that it appears as a mere

assertion in the quality of a supreme principle for all philosophy and
therefore completely contradicts itself in its subtle form. If the teacher is not
only to absorb what is given but to evaluate it through examination, he must
also know what must be required and achieved in the task of a supreme
principle in order to be able to examine the postulate put forward according
to a certain law. I am well aware that this seems to contain no less of a
contradiction. For where, one might ask, did the examining reader get the
idea?
 around

then
the law of his reflection? Shouldn't it also be based on an assertion? The first
fundamental principle of philosophy must therefore be proven, and to prove
such a thing is a clear contradiction. Anyone who wanted to object to me
would have asked exactly what I would say. Of course the first fundamental
principle can only be proven by a contradiction. But that is why this is the
only possible form of proof, and that must be shown. If the contradiction is
clear, it is only clear because it is recognized as such, and it therefore ceases
to be a contradiction. A further investigation of this is not appropriate here. I
am only making a general remark. As long as we look at the matter purely
logically, we will not get one step further with our fundamental principles
and, through them, with the sciences. Anyone who simply thinks that a first
fundamental principle of philosophy can only be proved by a contradiction
and therefore uses the pretense of asserting it outright is certainly far from
actually establishing such a principle. He has already bypassed the only
possible form of proof and asserts of his proposition what others assert of
theirs in the same way, but in order not to offend anyone's right to their own
reason; the history of philosophy can teach us how wills among people have
generally made progress. Obviously not through an individual, but through
the interaction of all. With this necessary community of rational

In this way, it is the task of each individual to absorb the benefit of all in
order to actually bring about the purpose of interaction, unity. In order to do
this, each individual must necessarily make himself receptive to the
influence of all the others. But
All should be receptive to the influence of all; influence, as a free activity, is
also the end, and receptivity only the means. Through the latter, everyone
should therefore only seek to expand his free power of influence, and
therefore in no way merely absorb it into himself, but rather regulate what
he absorbs according to the law of his free activity, or it will not exist for
him at all. Let us assume, then, that Mr. B.'s professorship is the highest
principle for all philosophy in general; therefore, not only must it not
abolish the free examination of this in everyone, but rather it must only seek
to promote it; otherwise it would contradict the law of the interaction of
rational beings and therefore could not be established for reason at all. It is
therefore assumed, and with the necessary agreement of all, that free
examination is a necessary requirement, and that any supremely given
principle must therefore not only correspond to this requirement, but must
also completely justify it. It is therefore assumed, with the necessary
agreement of all, that one can only appreciate the truth, if there should be
such a thing at all, if one maintains the standpoint of free examination. The
law of this test

Now
, no one can necessarily get fung fung from outside, because he has to test it
in order to be able to accept it as true. He must therefore know it in himself
and recognize that it originally belongs to him, or until then refrain from all
testing. Here lies the fine line between spirit and letter. No independent
thinker who understands himself will accept the truth objectively, but will
condition it through the free testing of each person. But precisely by doing
so he will also meet everyone who knows how to test freely with the spirit
of truth. I express the law of free testing for myself in the following
sentence: Every object of reflection must be judged according to the
relationship of the conditioned to its condition as the unconditioned.

Only under the protection of this law is there a reason for me, and may I
grant myself such a reason. The presupposition is therefore that objectively
nothing absolute can be given to me, because it would
that it would necessarily abolish my free examination, and could not
possibly be admitted into my consciousness.

But if the law established is to be absolutely necessary for free judgment,

then a supreme principle of philosophy, by reducing the whole of our
knowledge to it, can be nothing other than the unconditional, and therefore
can never be an objective principle.
For the objective necessarily stands in the relationship of the conditioned to
its condition as the unconditioned, or it is absolutely nothing for free
reflection, and only as such does it become an absolute object.

Suppose, then, that the original conception is the highest principle for all
philosophy; it cannot be linked to anything else and cannot be predicated of
anything else, but rather everything must have its final, tenable point in it,
or it is not the highest. This is also Mr. Beck's opinion, because the area of
everything understandable begins with this principle, and beyond it the
empty nothingness begins. But let us not assume with the author that
which gives the original idea its true meaning; according to the law of a free
examination it must immediately become apparent that the promising
professorship of Mr. B. leads us to a completely inconsistent and self-
destructive idealism.

For: if the originally synthetic unity of consciousness is to be really

defined and equated with itself as A = A, in order to be able to say at all:
there is, or - there is, such a unity of consciousness: then it is to be given
reality as a primal representation; then necessarily, for the sake of identity,
all reality in it will also have this primal
Real ideas. Nothing else is conceivable, for nothing else should be possible.
But assuming this, then nothing could be said of it at all; it is, but the real
could only be explained as an idea, and the existence of an objective world
would therefore not have the slightest meaning for us. But this reveals the
most complete contradiction, and the idealism defined in this way is
destroyed by itself. For how can we explain it fully? If it must not at least be
asserted of the original idea that it is such, then we have no further possible
thought left of it, and it is complete negation. I am waiting for an objection
here. But I do not yet want to be understood from the standpoint of the
original idea. Please hear me further on this.

If all reality is caught in the original imagination as such an imagination,

and this imagination is the highest, then the ego in self-consciousness is
necessarily only a product of the original imagination. It cannot therefore be
said of this ego that it is itself and that it has a free activity; rather, it is
necessarily something determinate. It exists because something else exists
through which it exists. It is therefore not for itself and not self at all, but a
mere object. But where is the determining element if the ego is the
determinate? And what is to explain, then, that the original imagination is
actually something like this? From its point of view,
From its own reality, whether original or discursive, nothing more than a
representation and never a being can be derived, either directly or indirectly.
But how is the representation itself to be determined, and thus how is
consciousness possible at all? One must see that it remains completely
unthinkable in this assumption. For we have a specific but not a determining
self; and therefore WHAT is posited, but nothing is posited WHAT is to be
explained. Consequently, the positing of the former is also a contradiction
and no consciousness is possible. But this contradicts the factual aspect of
consciousness, and consequently the original representation, taken as the
highest principle of philosophy, is in contradiction with itself, and even in
this quality cancels itself out.

From this examination, if it appears to be well founded, it must be

completely clear where the real error in Mr. B.'s assertion is to be found,
namely simply in the fact that the sharp-witted man did not give a strict
account of the action of the synthesis, but rather completely ignored it. He
took the action without having posited an agent. But if the agent in the
synthesis is only posited by the synthesis itself, then it is also posited only
as its product, and consequently not a reason for explaining the action,
which is nevertheless sought and required as necessary. The agent must
therefore absolutely be prior to all synthesis, i.e. by

no synthesis, and therefore only as its own product, that is, as absolute
self-activity. This gives us the definition of the pure I, which through itself
is only for itself and is equal to itself. In fact, there is still no
consciousness in this I, because all consciousness requires counteraction.
But precisely
Therefore the pure I is not determined by any consciousness, and is not an
object at all, but through absolute opposition is itself only the ultimate
ground of all consciousness,

If one takes the explanation which Mr. Beck gives in his work on page
137 of philosophy as a science, it is surprising that he did not immediately
take hold of the higher standpoint. He states explicitly: "The original
imagination is the object of philosophy as science." This is precisely what
the science of science shows, which wants to be nothing other than the
explanation of the original consciousness, that is, the idea of the idea. But if
the original imagination is the object of philosophy, and this therefore, as
will, is supposed to be a reflection of its object, that is, to systematically
represent those actions that make up the original imagination, then this
reflection cannot be considered a product of the original imagination, for
this is supposed to be an object. Where does Mr. Beck get the activity of
reflecting on his object? And how can such an activity reflect at all?

It
It would be completely inexplicable if it were to be explained from the
original, original idea. For then the philosopher would have to find a
machine that behaves in a merely passive manner instead of the highest self-
activity, and the wills would therefore be only mere products of mechanical
thinking that grow on us just like mushrooms grow out of the earth. I will
give another remarkable example of this. Mr. B. presents his highest
principle of philosophy, the original idea, as a proposition, and repeatedly
emphasizes that the reader must place himself in the only indicated position
of the original idea. There is far more to this requirement of the author than
is expressed by the mere original idea. To take that standpoint can
understandably mean nothing other than making the original representation
the object of one's reflection. This reflection

the reflection of the philosopher must necessarily, if it is to be true and to

hit its point exactly, correspond to the original representation as its object.
Therefore this reflection cannot be the original representation itself, for the
philosopher already assumes this to be necessary for every rational being.
Through the required reflection, the act of the original representation must
therefore only be repeated in a lawful manner, and this reflection is only
philosophy in general. From this it must be clear that since the reflection of
the philosopher has the original representation as its necessary object,

this object can in no way be the principle of philosophy. All attempts in

philosophy are only aimed at reflecting the original idea in a true and
correct way. Therefore, the reflection
which corresponds perfectly to its object, the final refutation of all curses,
and hence the science of the ways of acting, whereby the objectively
synthetic unity of consciousness is such, that is, a science of the possibility
of all will, or a theory of will. Mr. Beck's demand therefore consists in
laying the law of this representation as the exact basis for reflection on the
original representation. But the demand is also quite definitely directed at
freedom, for to demand the original representation itself is something
contradictory, and just as much as if I were demanding the circulation of
blood from someone. To take the standpoint of the original representation
means nothing other than to give freedom the law of the original
representation in order to reflect this action independently. But freedom
gives itself nothing, rather it itself must be the determining factor. Freedom
must therefore determine itself to reflect the original representation. This is
absolutely impossible if there is no relationship at all between the original
representation and freedom, and indeed not the relationship of the
conditioned to its condition as the unconditioned. Reflection must therefore
first be directed towards this relationship. But then N is already

not
The original representation is no longer an absolute, but completely
determined and necessary and therefore not a principle of philosophy, as it
is presented as such.
Mr. B. had therefore not given any thought to his requirement to place
himself in the position of the original representation, since otherwise he
would have realized that the original representation does not explain itself at
all, but requires a reason for explanation. According to his view, he sees
himself as a product of the original representation, along with his entire
philosophy. If that were really the case, then his requirement would be
completely inappropriate and contradictory to itself. Now one must turn it
around: because such a requirement is necessary, that view is contradictory
and inappropriate to itself.
Nevertheless, Mr. B.'s curse must be judged no less in the same way as
V.'s criticism. Consequently, on the one hand as what it really is, and on
the other hand as what it would be if one were to deviate from the higher
presuppositions. The latter is only done for the benefit of the former, and
thus is merely a correction of an error in the judgment. The former,
however, concerns the writing as a product of free self-activity, without
which it would not exist at all, however much Mr. B. might object to it.
And judged in this way, I confess with sincere conviction that from the
entire epoch of criticism,
t

Philosophy to science

which icP

In terms of its spirit, as a mere idea, no single work of philosophical

diligence is known that follows the critique of the right wing as the curse of
Mr. B. It is quite indisputable that the study of the critique of reason will
take a more desirable direction through it and will therefore be of great
success for philosophy as a science. Given the author's excellent insight, it
would have been desirable if he had taken up the task of criticism & how to
find synthetic judgments a priori.
possible? further than Kant did. For this question obviously aims at an
explanation of the action of synthesis. The real synthesis is therefore by no
means the highest principle of philosophy, but without doubt that on which
its unity is founded. Kant certainly laid the foundation for this, but he did
not carry it out. He finds it particularly advantageous to have brought such
different questions as: how is pure mathematics, how is pure natural science,
and how is metaphysics as science possible? under the common scientific
formula: how are synthetic judgments a priori possible? But it is surprising
that so many commentators have not noticed the obvious circle in this. For
there is no question of a supreme synthesis in general in the solution, and
those particular questions could therefore not yet be raised, let alone
answered. In the deduction of the categories, the task of the possibility of
synthetic judgments a priori,

a completely different turn of events. Kant first asserts the possibility of

being replaced by reality by setting up the original apperception as a
principle. Nevertheless, this very apperception again becomes the object of
a very profound investigation, which could not have taken place at all if
Kant had not sought to explain the alleged objectively synthetic unity of
consciousness from a higher principle which is now tacitly laid down as the
basis.

Mr. Beck does indeed, according to his assurance, and I am firmly

convinced of it, respect the efforts of those philosophers who have
endeavored to lay a foundation for the critique of V., but nevertheless calls
their efforts a blatant deception, because they completely miss the true goal
of the critique. I only note here that the theory of science is not to be such a
foundation, but that Fichte, who draws from the same source as Kant, from
a source that still seems to be a secret to most Kantians, only brings to light
what Kant in the depths of his investigations, partly actually worked on,
and partly therefore the spirit of the critique
but only proved.

tics is the science of science, or those, like

As Fichte puts it, critical idealism in practice.

Mr.
Beck's accusation on pages 136 and 169 also does not apply to
Theory of Science. He claims that those philosophers with their alleged
foundations wanted to reduce the philosophies of critical philosophy to
facts, and among the principles that were attempted to do so he names that
of the ego, as a fact from which all philosophy should spring. But that this
is an error on Mr. B.'s part, the theory of will, as a fact, could easily have
taught him. Not only does the ego not contain facts, but through it all facts,
as the highest principle, are claimed and shown to be completely void. I
only note this because of the error; for I have no need to justify the theory
of science itself. It will justify itself, and where it is misunderstood, will
gradually open up knowledge. Only in this way does it have its
determination; it will only be accepted through self-knowledge, and
therefore does not present itself objectively to anyone, as must those
theories that can only gain entry through conflict.

What may have led Mr. Beck to the above judgment was undoubtedly
the theory of imagination, which he could completely overlook from his
point of view. But I would have wished that he had made a similar attack
on Maimonides' skepticism, for these,
I am convinced that he would not move with his pamphlet, because Maimon
intervenes precisely where Kant's anticipation begins. But Mr. B. does not
do justice to the theory of the VV either. For even if Reinhold took a step
back from the critique of reason through his inclination towards Loke, this
still only concerns the implementation of his idea. In the assessment, this
must be regarded as the spirit of the theory, and the implementation, on the
other hand, as the mere letter. I do not ask this in the least in favor of the
worthy man, but hope to prove it elsewhere as absolutely necessary. Several
years of studying Reinhold's writings have enabled me to see them very
clearly from the point of view indicated, and to justify the given distinction
in the most precise way. Herein lies the principle for all history of
philosophy. Philosophy as science is the pure self-knowledge within us.
This, examined in its empirical development, gives us the spirit of all times
and individual self-thinkers. Reinhold understood this more sharply than
any of the Kantians of his period. He grasped the concept of a system and
applied it to the critique of reason. Then it dawned on him what still seems
to be clear only to a few, that this is not philosophy as science. This clear
insight led him to condemnation and the genius of philosophy could not lead
him any better than by applying it to

The

wh
ich led to the theory of consciousness. Reinhold demanded unity, and
thereby brought a new spirit into the study of criticism. From the first
appearance of his theory onwards, all the reviews that have become known
to me have been against him. But not a single reviewer has penetrated into
the true idea of it. The review of the foundation (ALZ April 1792) makes
excellent objections to the principle of consciousness, and yet he does not
even seem to have suspected what a system actually is. Rather, he considers
systematic unity to be one-sidedness, saying among other things: "It might
seem questionable if
whether it might not perhaps bring a new one-sidedness, and thus new
disputes, into philosophy if one were to abandon the path outlined by Kant
and to adhere exclusively to a single fundamental principle." This is what
they believed
for, of course, most Kantians agree with him. But that is why logic,
metaphysics, morality, natural law, aesthetics, psychology and the history of
philosophy, all of which have been worked on with great zeal according to
Kantian principles and which, in their view, have their value, are all
buildings that were not only not built on the basis of criticism, but were also
erected in the Kantian atmosphere. That cannot be said of Reinhold. He did
not appeal to the critique of reason, but went his own way, and if he was
wrong here, then his error was certainly for the truth and the real N4

Geif

The spirit of science has had far more benefit than all of those airy curses
mentioned. I testify by my example, and I can do this without immodesty
by virtue of my reason, that after Kant's doctrine of the highest good first
made me more attentive to the critique of the V., it was the theory that
directed my demands and thereby first made me take a glimpse into the
actual critical system. The justification of the theory of the V. against Mr.
Beck's accusation, however, does not concern the letter of the theory,
which has so far only been kept in mind, but rather the effective purpose
that Reinhold set for himself in it, and which is not presented very clearly
and purely.

I come back once again to Mr. Beck’s writing,

After the author has dissected the Poftulat in the second section: to
present it originally, entirely in the spirit of the critique of reason, he moves
on to the assessment of critical philosophy in the third. This method
still corresponds completely to the expectation given at the beginning. A
highest point must be established, and from this the critical system as a
whole can be viewed. But the teacher who has always followed Mr. B. with
that challenge will find himself unexpectedly surprised here in the third
paragraph. Now comes the assessment of the Critique of Practical Reason,

and

and without the slightest transition the author presents us with a second,
only possible standpoint, practical freedom, which he honestly admits
cannot be reduced to the original conception. This is undoubtedly to pass
judgment on the previous statement itself and to accept it as such. For what
sense can it have: only possible standpoint! if, in addition to the former,
another, equally original, must be assumed in order to perceive something
from the latter that cannot be overlooked from the former. I ask Mr. B. how
he came to both of these completely separate and detached standpoints?
Where is the eye that sees both? For if this is not demonstrated, then the
assertion has not the slightest basis: I will explain myself on this more
clearly.

Mr. B. clearly presents us with his two propositions an original duality in

the human mind. He gives each proposition separately and explains each
separately. But there is not the slightest evidence of us being able to think
of both in general. This could not have been a question for Mr. B. either, if
each of the two principles were to be founded in itself and a supreme one.
But the deception is incredible. For, of course: once that theoretical
principle was established supremely, then for practical freedom nothing
could be other than its mere imaginability and in no possible way
 No. 5

How can their reality be proven? Mr. B. would have had to come to this
point if he had been consistent, and therefore should not have allowed any
freedom according to his theory, and therefore no practical part of
philosophy at all. But if he nevertheless promotes practical freedom and
thereby creates an original duality in us, then he also creates it in a
contradictory way. For whatever nature this duality may have, once it is
asserted, it must necessarily also be thought, and indeed thought in the same
completeness and clarity as the assertion dependent on it is to be valid. If the
required unity is not to float in the air, but to have some solid and tenable
point, then it must take place either outside of us in a reason, or in our own,
in ourselves. The former explains nothing to us. For since reflection requires
that such an original duality exists in us, and this reflection is nevertheless
carried out outside of us, we cannot have the slightest idea of the duality
reflected in us in this way. We must therefore necessarily find the unity in
ourselves and define it as an original one, if this is to be explained. The fact
that there is no logical reason to be thought of here is already in the
requirement of the condition. Where would we even get the idea?
just a logical unity. If it is complete; if it is

also

no longer logical, but rather all reality is only contained in it. If it is

conditioned, like the proposition AA, i.e. if A is, then A is: then we have to
explain the expression of their unity and derive it consequently. Only in this
way do we arrive at the true transcendental standpoint for all philosophy.
The absolute I, or the identity of being, does not yet give us this standpoint.
With it, all reality is indeed posited, but
Nothing is opposed to it, and consequently all reality is nothing for
consciousness, i.e. there is no consciousness at all, because no reflection
takes place. The expression I am, in the absolute sense, is therefore only
valid as a task insofar as nothing is opposed to the ego, and consequently
must be equal to it and therefore be ego. No human being can say 'I am!'
with absolute identity, but when he says it, he thinks of it only as the
absolutely necessary explanatory reason for his striving, and therefore only
in the flight of time can he grasp his pure being. The science of science calls
the standpoint of the absolute ego the ideal one. The opposite of this is the
real or objective standpoint. Let us remain on this one; Again, all reality is
outside of us, and therefore for the conscious mind the ego is nothing, that
is, there is no consciousness at all possible, because nothing can be
conscious. The theory of will shows, through a complete dissection of the
original idea, as a fact in general, how the reflected ego, by virtue of its own
lawfulness,

throu
gh its freedom it must necessarily strive beyond the opposing point of
reflection, and reflection must include itself. Through this a consciousness
arises, and through further reflection on the same: an awareness of reflection
through a non-ego and of the opposing ego. This happens through
transcendental imagination and is an act of pure self-activity, as is at the
same time the transcendental standpoint that is increasing for all philosophy.

Mr. B., once he had correctly defined the object of philosophy, would
have reliably arrived at this point of view if he had reflected for just a
moment on the relationship between philosophy and its object and had thus
become clearly conscious of his free reflection. But from his practical point
of view one only fully realizes that he was far from giving a proper account
of his theoretical paper. His entire commentary therefore does not extend
further than the criticism of V. The
I do not consider the assessment of the criticism of the UK and practical
reason to be an explanatory extract, but, viewed by myself, to be
completely incomprehensible.

In
his book On Freedom, the author claims that it is only practical,
i.e. according to him: the practical ought. But this explanation is completely
false and is based on the error that practical reason and the practical ought
are identical. This assumption is common to all Kantians, which is why the
greatest confusion of concepts still prevails here. The practical ought is
proclaimed by Mr. Beck as a fact and is thus set up as the highest principle
for the critique of practical reason. But I can very well ask how such a fact
is even possible? And it is precisely the critical philosopher who must raise
this question. If the answer is: it is absolutely possible, then the fact is also
simultaneously abolished, because an absolute ought is not an ought at all,
but every ought only takes place in relation, which the fact also expresses.
The facts themselves do not explain how there could be any striving of
reason at all. But to dismiss such questions with a document would very
easily show a certain haste, for not only is there nothing absurd in them, but
the nature of the matter makes them necessary.

At the
I find the doctrine of the highest good, as the basis for our belief in God
and immortality, to be the most literal and least thought of. What Mr. BS
298. says about this is a very
incomprehensible expression of a undoubtedly truly fitting feeling. But
this cannot be a criticism of the

practical reason. Here, sharp and definite concepts must take place, and
therefore belief in God and immortality is a necessary belief, as it certainly
is, for appeals to a properly good way of thinking are no argument for it, but
it must be shown that no human being, whoever he may be, can act for a
moment without this belief. But for morality, it is of the greatest importance
to know what one ought to believe in a reasonable way; and here, above all,
one should make people aware of their practical purposes. To think of the
duration of one's life as extending beyond the limits of one's earthly life, and
therefore to believe in a God: this is usually no more a question than to
believe that one will henceforth hold an eternal feast with the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. What and how much, one might ask, is an
earthly life? According to the common conception, 60 to 70 years, full of
effort and work.

But
both should be eliminated from the philosophical investigation of God and
immortality. The theory gives us

only a moment, and only from this moment, as present, does knowledge
take place. Let us now look for a next second moment: what is the basis of
our demand and the confidence with which we approach it?
The answer can only be given in practical terms. There is no present
moment without my striving beyond it, for only in this respect is there
consciousness at all. As surely as I am a rational being, a second moment
must be celebrated. But if we set the highest practical goal of our striving
here, as surely as I am a rational being, I must also celebrate an eternity
with every second moment, for I must act according to eternal principles if
I want to act in accordance with that goal at all. The empirical
phenomenon which we call death therefore has no meaning at all in the
pure concept of our immortality. Once we have given the will its task,
there is no death on our path from then on, and fearing it is just as
important as fearing progress towards perfection. The physically good
person therefore needs the conviction of God and immortality now, in this

genb
likke, for he wants to act now, and at this very moment, for eternity. To
make the matter clear with an example, this would also have happened with
the first man, as soon as we give him reflection on himself, and yet he could
not have had the slightest idea of what we call death. Now let us look at the
highest purpose of our actions; there we find nothing of the agreement
between happiness and moral worthiness, but happiness already lies as a
necessity in our will, and the highest object of our striving is reason itself.
Insofar as it is this, and is itself therefore a task, perfection also lies in
infinity in its practical being. To think of one's task and to absorb infinity
into oneself are therefore completely identical. But from this one can see
that, for practical purposes, people need better enlightenment about nothing
more than about their belief in God and immortality.
can only live in us and therefore emerge from our being through deed and
action. This cannot happen if its objects are still thought of as objects on us.
Then it is
necessarily either a superstition or an unbelief and in both cases an error

thum.
1

thum. As a living faith, the belief in God and immortality is only one belief,
for there is no goal without direction, and no direction without a goal. In
this respect it has only one expression, and that is the living expression.
Myself according to all possible determinations of free self-activity,

Mr. Beck has completely missed this challenge to the doctrine of the
highest good through the idea of a correspondence between happiness and
moral worthiness, and in general he did not have the spirit of criticism in
mind in this investigation. The further justification of this accusation lies
outside the scope of the present examination, since it was only my
intention to carry out the main challenge mentioned above. This has now
been done, and has been completely accomplished by me precisely
comparing the two postulates with the requirements of a highest principle
in general, and thus sufficiently showing the contradiction of the content of
the entire text with its given form: "One. only possible standpoint!" What I
said I said frankly and

said it myself. For I do not need a curtain to communicate my convictions,

and to appeal to books will only be the end of my philosophy. Anyone who
does not think this way thinks differently about the truth, and in my opinion
he does not think at all. I have already shown Mr. Beck my sincere respect,
and I conclude my remarks with a renewed assurance of the same. We can
both be wrong, but we cannot be wrong in that we do not want to be wrong.
If everyone has said this first, then there is no longer any real conflict,
because we base it on the unity of our striving, and judge each other
according to the idea of a general
Human reason, which is thought of as problematic for this purpose and is
practically required. Wherever we act solely independently, the unity of our
reason must also be revealed. Experience can already confirm this. For in
the writings of independent thinkers, the human spirit has borne witness to
itself and has become a fact of the age. For a long time, however, one could
hardly perceive this spirit in the directions of human activity and its
products; for it is self-acting.

muls
had to be created from it first, and therefore no one yet suspected the work
that was being prepared for the future. But time has beckoned, and its
command to mankind has become loud through action. Who can fail to
recognize this, who does not want to turn his face away from the great scene
of the struggling forces? All the facts lead to only one thing: that reason
should assert its rights and become the legislator for the will. That was the
goal of mankind that he finally achieved. Man has grasped it, and now only
seeks peace on the ruins of prejudice and superstition. He cannot fail to do
that, for his word will live in him and his light
travel spread wherever he speaks. Those who still surrender their will to
chance and who have never seen man except with the eyes of their body,
may consider it madness and deception. For long enough the authority has
performed miracles and known how to forge man's minds to the letter.
Now it will cease, and cease like a will-o'-the-wisp that, consuming itself,
goes out within itself. Yes, one can say it,

It must give way to the truth; the truth which, brought about with
omnipotence, fears no ambush and respects no opposing force, which only
calls forth the eternal, and what it strikes down, it also destroys for ever.
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