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vi Contents
CHAPTER 3: COMPATIBILISM: THE CASE FOR DETERMINISM

AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT
SENSE OF FREE WILL 504
3.1 DAVID HUME: Of Liberty and Necessity 504
3.2 HELEN BEEBEE: Compatibilism and the Ability
to Do Otherwise 510
CHAPTER 4: FREEDOM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 521

4.1 GALEN STRAWSON: Luck Swallows Everything 521
4.2 HARRY FRANKFURT: Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility 528
4.3 THOMAS NAGEL: Moral Luck 534
4.4 SUSAN WOLF: Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility 542
PART VI
Morality and Its Critics 553
CHAPTER 1: CHALLENGES TO MORALITY 561
1.1 JOEL FEINBERG: Psychological Egoism 561
1.2 PLATO: The Immoralist’s Challenge 574
1.3 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: Master and Slave Morality 580
1.4 RICHARD JOYCE: The Evolutionary Debunking of Morality 589
CHAPTER 2: PROPOSED STANDARDS OF RIGHT CONDUCT 597

2.1 RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU: Ethical Subjectivism 597
2.2 MARY MIDGLEY: Trying Out One’s New Sword 610
2.3 ARISTOTLE: Virtue and the Good Life 613
2.4 THOMAS HOBBES: Leviathan 622
2.5 PLATO: Euthyphro 628
2.6 IMMANUEL KANT: The Good Will and the Categorical Imperative 638
2.7 JOHN STUART MILL: Utilitarianism 645
2.8 W. D. ROSS: What Makes Right Acts Right? 660
2.9 HILDE LINDEMANN: What Is Feminist Ethics? 663
CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL PROBLEMS 670

3.1 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH: What Will Future Generations
Condemn Us For? 670
3.2 PETER SINGER: Famine, Affluence, and Morality 672
3.3 JOHN HARRIS: The Survival Lottery 678
3.4 JAMES RACHELS: Active and Passive Euthanasia 683
Copyright 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights,
some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially
affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Contents vii
3.5 MARY ANNE WARREN: On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion 687
3.6 DON MARQUIS: Why Abortion Is Immoral 696
CHAPTER 4: THE MEANING OF LIFE 702

4.1 EPICURUS: Letter to Menoeceus 702
4.2 RICHARD TAYLOR: The Meaning of Life 705
4.3 RICHARD KRAUT: Desire and the Human Good 711
4.4 LEO TOLSTOY: My Confession 720
4.5 SUSAN WOLF: Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the
Good Life 726
4.6 THOMAS NAGEL: The Absurd 739
GLOSSARY 747
Preface
g
P R E F A C E
ABOUT REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY

The conviction underlying this volume is that introducing the college student to
philosophy by means of a few representative problems examined in great detail is far
preferable to offering a “little bit of everything,” with each branch of philosophy, each
major “ism,” and each major historical period represented with scrupulous impartial-
ity, even though the articles may have little relevance to one another. Accordingly,
articles have been selected from both classical and contemporary sources on such
topics as religion, skepticism, mind, personal identity, freedom, responsibility, moral
duty, and the meaning of life. The problems that concern philosophers under these
headings are not mere idle riddles, but rather questions of vital interest to any reflec-
tive person. Each set of problems is plumbed in considerable depth in essays expressing
different, often opposing, views. The hope is that exposure to this argumentative give-
and-take will encourage students to take part in the process themselves, and through
this practice to develop their powers of philosophical reasoning.
NEW TO THIS EDITION

This new edition of Reason and Responsibility has been strengthened by the addition
of seventeen new selections. We have retained the policy of securing the very best
available English translations for foreign works. We have tried to strike a good balance
between classic works and relatively new material on these subjects of enduring philo-
sophical interest. Other than the introductory materials in Part I, each part of this
work has been updated and expanded.
New to The Text

• Part II, “Reason and Religious Belief,” now contains new translations of Anselm
and Gaunilo’s classic exchange on the ontological argument, as well as a new
translation of Aquinas’s “Five Ways.” It also includes two new works written
expressly for this edition of Reason & Responsibility. The first, by philosopher and
historian of science Michael Ruse, is a presentation and analysis of various im-
portant versions of the argument from design for God’s existence. The second, by
Lawrence A. Shapiro, sets out an extended critique of justified belief in miracles.
Michael Murray and Michael Rea also contribute a new entry to this Part; theirs is
a systematic presentation and sympathetic reconstruction of various theodicies and
defenses of God’s existence in the face of the problem of evil.
• Part III, “Human Knowledge: Its Ground and Limits,” is strengthened by the
addition of two new entries. The first is a wide-ranging exploration of skepticism,
offered by Robert Audi. The second is a lovely exploration of the value of truth,
true belief, and knowledge by distinguished philosopher Linda Zagzebski.
– viii –
Preface ix
• Part IV, “Mind and Its Place in Nature,” now includes a new defense of materi-
alism about the mind by David Papineau, and an intriguing discussion of survival
after death by Shelly Kagan, who argues that on many conceptions of personal
identity, post-mortem survival isn’t all it’s cracked up to be.
• Part V, “Determinism, Free Will and Responsibility,” contains three new selec-
tions. The first, by philosopher James Rachels, presents an engaging argument
that puts pressure on the idea that we ever make free choices. A second piece,
written especially for this edition of Reason & Responsibility, is Helen Beebee’s
effort to explain how we can make free choices, and ones for which we are morally
responsible, even if determinism is true. Also new in this section is an elegant piece
by Galen Strawson, who presents in a very accessible way the master argument
that he has been defending for many years now. That argument is designed to
show that we cannot be morally responsible for anything we ever do, since the
essential conditions of such responsibility can never be met.
• Part VI, “Morality and Its Critics,” contains seven new selections. The first, by
Mary Midgley, raises the problems for ethical relativism by means of an especially
forceful example: that of the samurai ethical code that requires the testing of a
new sword by using it to kill an innocent person. Kwame Anthony Appiah’s entry
invites us to reflect on what future generations will condemn us for, using this as a
test to identify flaws in conventional wisdom about what is right and wrong. Peter
Singer challenges us to give much more than we currently are doing to relieve the
suffering of the less fortunate. Mary Anne Warren’s influential defense of a pro-
choice position is now included here. Richard Taylor offers his view about the
meaning of life—namely, that even a Sisyphus, condemned to roll a huge rock up
a hill for eternity, can have a meaningful life if he is doing what he really wants to
do. Richard Kraut rejects this view, and offers an elegant presentation of the
reasons why getting what you want is not all it’s cracked up to be. Finally, Susan
Wolf offers the basics of her influential view regarding the meaning of life. The
bumper sticker: “when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.” On
her account, a life is meaningful to the extent that we are invested in and take
pleasure from activities and projects that are objectively valuable.
New Reason and Responsibility 16th Edition MindTap

Also new to this edition is MindTap for Reason and Responsibility. A fully online,
personalized learning experience built upon Cengage Learning content, MindTap
combines student learning tools—readings, multimedia, activities, and assessments—
into a singular Learning Path that guides students through their course.
In addition to offerings at the part and the book levels, each chapter contains an
array of activities related to the chapter content.
At the part and book-level:
• The KnowNOW! Philosophy Blog, accessible in the Part openers, provides a
succinct philosophical analysis of major news stories, along with multimedia and
discussion questions.
x Preface
• Questia, available at the book level, provides two additional primary source
readings for each chapter as well as access to Questia’s full online library and
research paper writing resources.
At the chapter level:
• A Reader’s Guide pertaining to each reading and that includes comprehension
questions and critical thinking questions
• A video followed by two reflection questions, to elicit further response from the
student on the topic broached in the chapter
• Aplia content and activities
• Essay questions on a selected reading
• Quizzing on a selected reading
MindTap gives students ample opportunities for improving comprehension and for
self-evaluation to prepare for exams, while also providing faculty and students alike a
clear way to measure and assess student progress. Faculty can use MindTap as a
turnkey solution or customized by adding YouTube videos, RSS feeds, or their own
documents directly within the eBook or within each chapter’s Learning Path. The
product can be used fully online with its interactive eBook for Reason and Responsi-
bility, or in conjunction with the printed text.
WHY, AND HOW TO, USE THIS TEXT

This volume currently contains eight major classics: three that are complete (Des-
cartes’ Meditations, and Plato’s Apology and Euthyphro); one that is presented in virtual
totality (Hume’s Dialogues); and four that appear in very substantial sections (Berke-
ley’s Principles, Hume’s Enquiry, Mill’s Utilitarianism, and Kant’s Groundwork). In
addition, there are shorter selections from eighteen more classic texts: those authored
by Anselm, Gaunilo, Aquinas, Clarke, Paley, Pascal, W.K. Clifford, William James,
Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Locke, Hume, Plato, Nietzsche, Aristotle, Hobbes,
Ross, and Epicurus. This book can be used to teach an introductory course based
solidly on a reading of these classics; more recent articles can be seen as a kind of
dividend. The book contains many articles by contemporary philosophers, including
eleven that are addressed specifically to beginning students and that were written
expressly for this book by William Rowe, Michael Ruse, Lawrence Shapiro, Wesley
Salmon, John Perry, Brie Gertler, Helen Beebee, Robert Kane, Richard Joyce, and
both editors.
There is no single “necessary and natural” order in which to read these materials.
The book begins with the philosophy of religion because many beginners are familiar
with its problems. But it is just as “natural” to begin with Part III, because the
question of our knowledge of God presupposes the question of the “grounds and
limits of human knowledge” generally. Similarly, there is no reason why one could
not begin with the mind-body problem (Part IV) or the problem of determinism and
free will (Part V). Indeed, many professors have said that they prefer to begin with
ethics (Part VI) and work their way toward the front of the book.
Preface xi
ACNOWLEDGMENTS
Many fine philosophers offered generous advice about how to improve this latest
edition of Reason and Responsibility. I’d like to thank Matthew Mangum, Palo Alto
College; Luca Ferrero, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee; Anthony Carreras, Lone
Star College, Kingwood; David Stegall, Clemson University; David Godden, Old
Dominion University; Ken Hochstetter, College of Southern Nevada; Daniel Mittag,
Albion College; Jacob Caton, Arkansas State University; and Senem Saner, California
State University, Bakersfield. And a special note of thanks to my research assistant, Ben
Schwan, who updated most of the online materials and helped to identify likely can-
didates for new selections in this edition—and did it all with efficiency and good cheer.
I welcome advice on how to improve the format and content of subsequent
editions of Reason & Responsibility. Those with such advice are very welcome to email
me at RussShaferlandau@gmail.com with their suggestions.
Russ Shafer-Landau
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
InJoel
Memoriam
Feinberg
g
J O E L F E I N B E R G
IN MEM ORI AM
JOEL FEINBERG (1926–2004) was a brilliant philosopher, certainly one of the most
important social and political philosophers of the last half century. He was also a very kind,
humble man. And he was an extremely conscientious teacher. The great care and prepa-
ration that he devoted to his teaching is evident here, in the plan and format of Reason &
Responsibility. Joel developed the first edition of this textbook nearly fifty years ago, dis-
satisfied with existing options, and intent on providing coverage of those areas of philoso-
phy that struck him as deeply important and deserving of every student’s careful study.
Most of you reading this will know Joel Feinberg only as the editor of a book
you’ve been assigned to read. If you have a chance, you ought to seek out one of the
many exciting works that Joel penned during his prolific career. He was a philosophi-
cal writer of rare talent. He wrote about things that matter, and did so in a way that
everyone could understand. He was clear, he was elegant, always ready with the telling
example, the well-chosen reference to literature or history, dropped into place with a
light touch. Open any one of his many books and read at random–you can’t help but
be impressed by the humanism, the clarity, the originality and, certainly, the wisdom
of the views that receive expression there.
Joel was also a man of great common sense and discernment. One of the most
desirable things in life is to have a person of integrity and genuinely sound judgment to
rely on for advice, companionship, and, if one is especially fortunate, for friendship. I was
lucky enough to study with him for five years, to write a dissertation under his direction,
and later to work with him as a collaborator on this book for just over decade prior to
his passing. His suggestions during our collaboration, both about substantive matters of
content and about the more mundane, practical matters of the publishing world, epito-
mized his practical wisdom. He was a man whose judgment you could trust.
Joel was curious, interested in the whole range of human experience, attentive to
relevant detail, appreciative of salient distinctions, a lover of taxonomies and, at the
same time, able to resist the pressure that such taxonomies impose–pressure to falsify
the phenomena and straitjacket it into categories that generate misunderstanding. It is
a very rare talent, to be so analytically minded and yet so broad in one’s outlook, to
appreciate system and yet to be sensitive to the fine detail that must constrain its
development. Joel possessed such talent, to a degree that was almost unrivalled. There
were very few in his league.
Joel died in 2004 after a long struggle with Parkinson’s disease and its complica-
tions. Though I have overseen this book in the decade since his death, his influence on
its contents remains very substantial. More generally, he left us a great and valuable
legacy, both personal and professional. It was a true honor to have known him, to have
learned from him, and to have counted him a friend.
R.S.L.
Chapel Hill 2016
– xii –
g
P A R T I
Introduction to the Nature and

Value of Philosophy
1. A Logic Lesson
JOEL FEINBERG
CORRECT AND INCORRECT support to their conclusion. They claim to prove
or demonstrate that their conclusion is true, that
REASONING
its truth necessarily follows from its premises so
Logic is the intellectual discipline that distin- that, if the premises are true (a matter to be in-
guishes correct from incorrect reasoning. Cor- vestigated independently), then the conclusion
rect rules of logic are indeed useful. It staggers must be true.
the imagination to picture a world in which they A deductive argument may have any num-
have no authority. But their utility derives from ber of premises, but we shall follow pedagogical
their correctness, not the other way around. custom and adopt, as our model of a standard
They are as clear models of objective truth, or deductive argument, one that has two premises
objective “correctness,” as any that we have. and a conclusion. When we say of a given argu-
ment that its premises are false, we shall mean
DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE simply that at least one of its premises is false.
An inductive argument is best defined sim-
REASONING
ply as a genuine argument that is not deductive.
As we shall soon see, the direct concern of logic The terms “valid” and “invalid” are normally
with “correct reasoning” is more precisely a con- applied to deductive arguments only. Inductive
cern with good and bad arguments. All argu- arguments are subject to different terms of
ments fall into one or the other of two basic evaluation, good-bad, strong-weak, and so on.
types: deductive and inductive. Unlike the terms of inductive evaluation
Deductive arguments claim not merely to (“highly probable,” “moderately probable,”
give support but to give conclusive or decisive “improbable,” etc.), the terms of deductive
Revised and edited by Russ Shafer-Landau.

–1–
2 PART I • Introduction to the Nature and Value of Philosophy
evaluation, “valid” and “invalid,” are not subject definition”). Similarly, propositions that have
to degrees. A deductive argument is either the form of logical contradictions must be false;
wholly, unqualifiedly valid, or not valid at all. It they cannot be true. It cannot be true even of an
cannot be just “a little bit invalid.” Neither can it infinitely powerful deity that He both exists and
be the case that one argument can be more or does not exist at the same time. To assert a logi-
less valid than another. cal contradiction is to say something of the form
An inductive argument, then, is an argu- “p and not p,” and all statements of that form
ment whose conclusion is claimed to follow are necessarily false. A rational person may be-
from its premises, not with necessity, but only lieve p and another rational person might believe
with probability. One conclusion may be not p. But no rational person could believe both
rendered more probable than another, and p and not p.
therefore be a better or stronger inductive
argument. POSSIBLE TRUTH VALUE
COMBINATIONS
ARGUMENTS
When we do not know whether a given proposi-
An argument is a set of propositions, one of tion is true or false, it is convenient to say that we
which (the conclusion) is said to be true on the do not know its “truth value.” This is a useful
basis of the others (the premises). The conclu- term of art that enables us conveniently to pose
sion is often signaled in ordinary English by the some important questions about valid deductive
term “therefore.” In logic, the traditional sym- arguments. Various combinations of truth values
bol for “therefore” is a triangle of dots [\]. are possible. Each premise will have a truth
There are, however, many different ways of indi- value, and the conclusion will have a truth value,
cating which proposition is the conclusion: in both cases either true or false. The overall va-
“It follows from p that q,” “p, consequently lidity of the argument will vary, leading to a
q,” “because p is true, q is true,” “the reason larger combination of possibilities. It is essential
for q is p.” Premises are often said to be reasons to understand these combinations and examples
or evidence for their conclusions. Premises sup- of each. Do not forget that a valid argument can
port, imply, entail, or require their conclusion. have a false conclusion and an invalid argument
The nature of that support is precisely what the can have a true conclusion. Various other combi-
discipline of logic studies. nations are possible. The rules for determining
validity remain constant, but individual proposi-
LOGICAL NECESSITY VERSUS tions in premise or conclusion will be true or
PSYCHOLOGICAL CERTAINTY false depending on the facts. And sometimes
(in fact most times) the best way of determining
A person may stand in any number of possible the facts will be to go out and look at the world.
relations to a proposition. She can be absolutely Here are some samples of truth value com-
confident that p is true, having no trace of binations in the premises and conclusions of
doubt, reasonable or not. It is easy to confuse valid and invalid arguments.
this psychological certainty with logical necessity.
An argument of the form “If p then q; p; there- 1. True premises; true conclusion; valid
fore q” is valid quite independently of any belief argument:
that any person might have toward it. Given the All humans are mortal. (True)
truth of its premises, its conclusion must be true.
Feinberg is human. (True)
Even individual propositions, as we shall see
below, are sometimes necessarily true (when Therefore, Feinberg is mortal. (True)
they are “analytic,” or tautologies, or “true by (VALID)
JOEL FEINBERG • 1. A Logic Lesson 3
2. False premises; false conclusion; valid PREMISES CONCLUSION ARGUMENT

argument:
T T VALID
All mammals have wings. (False) T T INVALID
All reptiles are mammals. (False) F F VALID
Therefore, all reptiles have wings. (False) F F INVALID
(VALID) F T VALID
3. All true premises; true conclusion: invalid F F INVALID
argument: T F MUST BE
Chicago is north of Dallas. (True) INVALID
Feinberg is mortal. (True) Illustrations have been given of arguments in
Therefore, all birds have wings. (True) several of these categories. All combinations are
possible except one: An argument cannot have
(INVALID) true premises and a false conclusion and still be
4. All true premises; false conclusion; invalid valid. But a valid argument can go from false
argument. (By the very definition of “valid,” to false, from true to true, or from false to
arguments of this form cannot be valid.) true, and an invalid argument can be in any of
these categories, without restriction.
If Bill Gates owned all the gold in Fort
Knox, then he would be wealthy. (True)
Bill Gates does not own all the gold in
VALIDITY AND SOUNDNESS
Fort Knox. (True) A final bit of logical terminology will be useful.
Therefore Bill Gates is not wealthy. The philosophers who “do logic” never speak of
(False) statements or propositions as “valid” or “invalid.”
These evaluative terms apply to arguments, not to
(INVALID)
the propositions out of which arguments are con-
5. False premises; true conclusion; valid structed. Speaking very generally, valid arguments
argument: are logically correct arguments, having premises
and conclusions as their constituent parts.
All fish are mammals. (False)
A particular proposition is true or false de-
All whales are fish. (False) pending on what the facts happen to be. If you
Therefore, all whales are mammals. are trying to classify a given argument and you
(True) would like to know whether “some fish have
(VALID) wings” is T or F, you must look at books about
fish or otherwise consult biologists. Logic can
6. False premises; true conclusion; invalid only tell you whether a given set of premises
argument: has a certain relationship—logical validity—to
All dogs have wings. (False) the biological proposition.
Ideally, what we need if logic is to be practi-
All puppies have wings. (False)
cal are arguments that are both valid and have
Therefore, all puppies are dogs. (True) true premises. The conclusion of such an argu-
(INVALID) ment cannot be false. Logicians call such an ar-
In summary, a deductive argument may have any gument “sound.” We can thus define soundness
of the following truth and validity combinations: as validity plus truth (of the premises). One of
the most common ways in which philosophers is equivalent to

criticize one another is to concede that the other
If this airplane flies, then there is gas in
person’s argument is logically impeccable but to
its tank.
insist that some or all of her premises are false.
Propositions containing the “if…then…” re- Imagine yourself at the airport. You have been
lation are also commonly called “conditional very worried that your visiting friends’ plane is
statements” or “hypothetical statements.” The out of gas. You are convinced that gas in the
part of the compound normally following the tank is necessary if he is to fly home. When you
“if” is called the “antecedent.” The part following get to the airport, he climbs into the plane and
the “then” is called the “consequent.” A condi- takes off. You could say—would you not?—that
tional statement asserts that the truth of the ante- “There must have been gas in the tank. The fact
cedent is a guarantee, or “sufficient condition,” that the plane is flying is sufficient to show that
for the truth of the consequent: that if the ante- there was gas in the tank.”
cedent is true, then the consequent is true. In general, if p is a sufficient condition for q,
Another way of saying this is that the antecedent then q is a necessary condition for p. Note that p
“implies” or “entails” the consequent, or that the can be sufficient for q without also being neces-
consequent “follows” from the antecedent. sary for q. Heavy cigarette smoking may well be
sufficient to cause lung cancer, but it is not nec-
NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT essary, because nonsmokers sometimes get lung
cancer too. And p can be necessary for q without
CONDITIONS also being sufficient for q. Oxygen is a necessary
We can use concepts of necessary and sufficient condition for a fire, but is not, by itself, enough
conditions to relate propositions to one another. to create one.
Thus we can say such things as “if it rains any
more tonight, then the football field will be
muddy tomorrow at game time,” which means VALID DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT
that more rain will be sufficient to bring about FORMS: A SAMPLER
more mud; we could also say that “the light will
Determining the validity, or invalidity, of a de-
come on only if someone pulls the switch,”
ductive argument is a matter of form, not of
which means that pulling the switch is necessary
content. A number of well-studied logical pat-
for lighting the room. It is usually the case that
terns exhibit the forms of the leading categories
many conditions are necessary for some result; if
of deductive validity. Let us begin a brief sketch
these necessary conditions are all satisfied, then
of these formal patterns with those that have a
that will be sufficient to produce the result.
conditional statement as a premise.
There are many equivalent ways of saying
Strictly speaking, any set of propositions
that one thing is necessary for another. We
whose premises are simply irrelevant to its con-
sometimes speak of preconditions, requirements,
clusion is an invalid argument. So any argument
or prerequisites. Lawyers speak of necessary con-
properly symbolized as (p, q, therefore g) is in-
ditions as “but for conditions,” that is, condi-
valid. Whatever the truth values of p and q and
tions but for which an event to be explained
g, they have no logical bearing on one another.
would not have occurred. Sometimes lawyers re-
So if p is the proposition “All mammals are
sort to the ancient Latin expression, conditio sine
quadrupeds,” and q is the proposition “Some
qua non, “a condition without which not.”
millionaires are neurotic,” then p and q have
It should be noted carefully that if p is nec-
no relation to one another. They are not even
essary for q, then q is sufficient for p. Thus,
talking about the same thing. Then if g is the
An airplane flies only if there is gas in its proposition “Objects attract one another with a
tank. force that is directly proportional to their
masses,” we have an argument that consists of are), then it is logically necessary that the conclu-
three true propositions totally irrelevant to one sion is true too. If the conclusion is false, then it
another. The premises can give no support to the must be because one or more premise is false.
conclusion, so that if we interpret an argument A more revealing name for modus ponens is
as a claim that such support is given, that claim “the assertion of the antecedent.” An argument
must be rejected and the argument declared in- that qualifies for that description is always valid.
valid. It is the sort of argument commonly called Similarly, the argument whose traditional
a “non sequitur” (“not following”). Latin name is modus tollens employs a condi-
The more interesting fallacies (invalid argu- tional statement as a key premise and consists
ments) have component propositions whose truth in the denial of the consequent. Its form is:
values are indeed relevant to one another but
If p, then q
whose recognizable forms determine that the con-
clusion necessarily does not follow from the pre- Not q
mises. By contrast, some of the standard deductive Therefore, not p
argument forms are valid, guaranteeing that any
The alternative (English) name of this perfectly
actual argument that has that form is valid—if its
valid form is “denying the consequent.” All ac-
premises are true then its conclusion cannot be
tual arguments of this form must be valid.
false. Needless to say, it is important to learn
But now we come to the masquerade ball, at
how to recognize these forms and learn how to
which counterfeits for modus ponens and modus
distinguish at first sight the always valid ones from
tollens pose as valid arguments, though in fact
the fallacies, just as in mushroom hunting, it is
they are standard fallacies with standard names,
important to know how to distinguish the fatally
and always invalid. The names are given this time
poisonous specimens from the innocuous ones.
only in English, namely affirming the conse-
Let us begin, then, with a pair of standard
quent and denying the antecedent. The former
valid forms and the poisonous counterparts often
is rendered as follows:
confused with them. The first of these was given
the Latin name modus ponens by medieval logi- If p, then q
cians, a name still used. An argument has this q
form when its component propositions are re-
Therefore, p
lated as follows:
For example:
If p, then q
p If Gates owns all the gold in Fort Knox,
then he is rich.
Therefore, q
Gates is rich.
It is not difficult to see intuitively that this argu-
Therefore, Gates owns all the gold in
ment form is always valid. If an argument of this
Fort Knox.1
form has true premises, as is sometimes the case,
then the conclusion must be true. For example: Note that the example has true premises and a
false conclusion, and therefore must be invalid.
If this horse’s leg is broken, then he will
The second fallacious argument form men-
be mercifully shot.
tioned above is “denying the antecedent.” It can
This horse’s leg is broken. be formulated as follows:
Therefore, this horse will be mercifully
If p, then q
shot.
Not p
If the premises of this argument are true (as they
Therefore, not q
could easily be, depending on what the facts
For example— threatening force: “If you do not say what I

want you to say (or believe or do what I want
If Gates owns all the gold in Fort Knox,
you to believe or do, as the case may be), then
then he is rich.
I will beat the hell out of you,” is obviously not
Gates does not own all the gold in Fort an argument. If it were, I suppose it would have
Knox. to have the following form:
Therefore, Gates is not rich.
If you do not admit that p, then I will
There are various other forms of deductive argu- beat you up. (sole premise)
ment in which a crucial premise is a conditional Therefore, p.
statement (if p then q). For example, there is the
intuitively obvious valid form called the hypo- It may be that your threat gives me a good rea-
thetical syllogism. The name no doubt derives son for saying that I believe that p, but that is
from the prominent role played in it by hypo- quite another thing from saying that the credi-
thetical (that is, conditional) propositions. Argu- bility of your threat is evidence for p, or that it
ments of this type can be formulated thus— implies or entails or proves that p. In fact it is
wholly irrelevant to p. A person of ordinary pru-
If p, then q dence who is persuaded by fear of the threaten-
If q, then r er’s superior size, strength, and pugilistic
Therefore, if p, then r prowess may admit, at the moment the blows
begin, that he has just been given some “rea-
Note that all three component propositions are sons,” even some good reasons, for acting as de-
conditional. An example manded, though he has been given no reason
If Witherspoon wins the next primary that supports p, no reason for changing his belief
election, then he will win the nomination. to the one demanded, even if it were possible to
do so.
If Witherspoon wins the nomination,
Another set of “arguments” confusing per-
then he will win the presidential election.
suasive efficacy with validity bears the Latin
Therefore, if Witherspoon wins the next name argumentum ad miseracordium, and it is
primary election, then he will win the every bit as much an informal fallacy as the ar-
presidency. gumentum ad baculum. Consider the under-
Arguments of this form are always logically valid. graduate student in tears who complains to her
professor about the “unfairness” of her grade.
The grade of B in his course, she says, did not
INFORMAL FALLACIES do her justice. She deserved an A given the spe-
We can mean by the word “fallacy” any instance cial circumstances that she has applied to medical
of incorrect reasoning. That would include an school, and if she is not admitted, the disap-
enormous miscellany of reasoning errors that pointment will ruin her life and break her par-
have no particular form except that their premises ents’ hearts. Therefore she deserves an A, and her
are irrelevant to their conclusions. But some in- professor has the duty of changing her present
valid arguments have a clear, recognizable form, grade to an A. The word “Therefore” is the sign
easy to symbolize, that permits us to treat them as that a conclusion is about to be stated, and sup-
a particular standardized mistake. This group of ported by reasons stated in the premises. In ef-
“informal fallacies,” as they are sometimes called, fect the argument says: “You owe me an A,
includes, among many others, the following. because I and others will be disappointed and
The standard name argumentum ad heartbroken if you do not make the change
baculum is applied to an effort to persuade by I am begging you for.” The verdict: invalid!
SOME INDUCTIVE INFERENCES, fact that it is almost always used against the in-
cumbent candidate, holding him responsible for
GOOD AND BAD
what has happened “during his watch.” Did the
There are numerous tasks in life that require rea- Ohio River flood during his presidency? Then his
sonable persons to “give reasons for” rather than election or the policies he pursued must have
prove, demonstrate, or render certain. Law been the cause. It is enough to show that prices
courts are a familiar example. In the criminal on the stock market fell during his term of office
law, for instance, a defendant cannot be con- to show (allegedly with high probability) that his
victed unless the jury believes that she behaved policies caused the decline. Were we at peace
as charged and believes further that her guilt, before he assumed office and at war later? It
while neither logically necessary, nor psycholog- must be because his actions caused it. But in-
ically certain, is nevertheless supported by pretty cumbents can and do use this weak argument
strong evidence, so strong that it is “beyond a too. Are you better off now than you were under
reasonable doubt.” And yet the argument in the the previous president? If so, that shows that this
mind of the jury does not involve exclusive use of president’s policies have worked. Actually what
deduction. Inductive arguments, too, can carry facts of this sort “prove” is that the speaker’s
conviction. Instead of logical necessity, the in- inductive logic is not to be trusted.
ductive argument (by definition) purports to
show the probability of certain vital propositions
that would lead a reasonable person in the direc-
BEGGING THE QUESTION
tion of belief. In other branches of the law, the Medieval logicians, who wrote in Latin, had
required evidence is somewhat weaker but still their own fancy name for our next fallacy: a “pe-
strong, for example, reasons that are “clear and titio principii.” English speakers too have other
compelling” and conclusions that are “highly names for it—a “circular argument” and “beg-
probable,” “more probable than not,” or ging the question.” Technically, a circular argu-
“plausible.” ment can be defined as an argument that
Inductive arguments, however, are no more assumes in its premises the conclusion it claims
immune from mistakes, and although inductive to be proving. That procedure makes the reason-
mistakes are less commonly labeled “fallacies,” er’s task altogether too easy to do her any good.
they can be as destructive to the reasoning pro- She argues in a circle when she uses her premises
cesses as those mistakes that are called fallacies. to prove (or otherwise support) her conclusion,
A few samples will suffice. and uses her conclusion in the proof of one of
Inductive arguments play an important part her premises. The circularity fallacy brings to
in ascriptions of causation to events, in explana- mind the two persons, Mr. A and Ms. B, who
tions, predictions, and opinion surveys, among apply at a bank for a loan. First Mr. A asks for a
other things. Where inductive reasoning gives loan. The banker asks him if there is anyone who
us the opportunity to go right in these activities, can testify to his honesty and trustworthiness. At
it usually offers the opportunity to go wrong. that point Mr. A introduces his friend Ms. B to
Consider the famous argument post hoc ergo the banker. Ms. B then recommends Mr. A, de-
propter hoc (“after the fact, therefore because of claring him to be absolutely truthful and trust-
the fact”). One commits this mistake in reason- worthy. “Very good,” says the banker to Mr. A.
ing when one attributes the cause of a given “Your friend Ms. B has given us a very good
event to another event that came earlier, for testimonial in your behalf. Now all we need to
the sole apparent reason that it did come earlier. know is whether Ms. B is herself truthful and
This mistake is made so frequently in political trustworthy. Who can recommend her? “No
debates that one might almost call it the basic problem,” replies Mr. A. “I will recommend
argument of democratic politics, except for the her.” And so we have a circle. We learn that A
can be trusted on the authority of B, who can be now we have completed two arguments, one
trusted on the authority of A. proving p, our immediate objective, and the
In philosophy a circular argument often other proving q, which is a premise in the argu-
takes the same form. A conclusion is supported ment for p. But the argument for q uses p as a
on someone’s authority, and that authority is premise in its own proof. In order to show that p
derived logically from an argument one of is true, we have to assume that p is true!
whose tacit premises is the very proposition An interesting thing about circular argu-
that is meant to be proved. The standard exam- ments is that although they are fallacies in the
ple in logic texts is a particular kind of religious very broad sense of “mistaken reasoning,” they
fundamentalism. “We can know that God ex- are not fallacies in the narrow sense of
ists,” the argument proceeds, “because the bi- “invalidity.” In fact, a circular argument is actu-
ble tells us so.” “Yes, but how do you know that ally a valid argument in the logician’s technical
the bible is true?” asks the critic of this particu- sense of “valid.” Assuming itself in its own proof
lar argument. “No problem,” the proof-giver may make the circular argument a poor argu-
replies, “The bible must be true because it is ment, but no more an invalid one than any ar-
the word of God.” The proof-giver has begged gument of the form p, therefore p. An argument
the question. of this sort will not advance our knowledge.
Put more formally, an argument is offered to Begging the question is a bad way to reason.
prove p. A key premise in that argument is q. So
the argument at this point is q, therefore p. Let NOTE
us suppose that this is a valid argument, but that 1. I borrow this alluring example from Irving M.
we cannot tell whether it is sound until we learn Copi and Keith Burgess-Jackson, Informal Logic
whether its premise, q, is true. So we come up (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995)
with another valid argument: p, therefore q. So third edition, p. 55.
2. Apology
PLATO
Plato (427?–347 BCE) lived and taught in Athens. Most of his surviving works have the form
of fictitious dialogues between Socrates (who had been his teacher) and other Greek
contemporaries.
I do not know, men of Athens, how my accusers immediately proved wrong by the facts, when I
affected you; as for me, I was almost carried away show myself not to be an accomplished speaker
in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak. at all, that I thought was most shameless on their
And yet, hardly anything of what they said is part—unless indeed they call an accomplished
true. Of the many lies they told, one in particular speaker the man who speaks the truth. If they
surprised me, namely that you should be careful mean that, I would agree that I am an orator,
not to be deceived by an accomplished speaker but not after their manner, for indeed, as I say,
like me. That they were not ashamed to be practically nothing they said was true. From me
From Plato, Five Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Hackett 2002), pp. 2–18, 22–44. Reprinted by
permission of Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved.
PLATO • 2. Apology 9
you will hear the whole truth, though not, by to you at an age when you would most readily
Zeus, gentlemen, expressed in embroidered and believe them, some of you being children and
stylized phrases like theirs, but things spoken at adolescents, and they won their case by default,
random and expressed in the first words that as there was no defense.
come to mind, for I put my trust in the justice What is most absurd in all this is that one
of what I say, and let none of you expect any- cannot even know or mention their names unless
thing else. It would not be fitting at my age, as it one of them is a writer of comedies. Those who
might be for a young man, to toy with words maliciously and slanderously persuaded you—
when I appear before you. who also, when persuaded themselves then per-
One thing I do ask and beg of you, gentle- suaded others—all those are most difficult to
men: if you hear me making my defense in the deal with: one cannot bring one of them into
same kind of language as I am accustomed to use court or refute him; one must simply fight with
in the marketplace by the bankers’ tables, where shadows, as it were, in making one’s defense,
many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do and cross-examine when no one answers. I
not be surprised or create a disturbance on that want you to realize too that my accusers are of
account. The position is this: This is my first ap- two kinds: those who have accused me recently,
pearance in a lawcourt, at the age of seventy; I and the old ones I mention; and to think that I
am therefore simply a stranger to the manner of must first defend myself against the latter, for
speaking here. Just as if I were really a stranger, you have also heard their accusations first, and
you would certainly excuse me if I spoke in that to a much greater extent than the more recent.
dialect and manner in which I had been brought Very well then, men of Athens. I must surely
up, so too my present request seems a just one, defend myself and attempt to uproot from your
for you to pay no attention to my manner of minds in so short a time the slander that has
speech—be it better or worse—but to concen- resided there so long. I wish this may happen,
trate your attention on whether what I say is just if it is in any way better for you and me, and
or not, for the excellence of a judge lies in this, as that my defense may be successful, but I think
that of a speaker lies in telling the truth. this is very difficult and I am fully aware of how
It is right for me, gentlemen, to defend my- difficult it is. Even so, let the matter proceed as
self first against the first lying accusations made the god may wish, but I must obey the law and
against me and my first accusers, and then make my defense.
against the later accusations and the later accu- Let us then take up the case from its begin-
sers. There have been many who have accused ning. What is the accusation from which arose the
me to you for many years now, and none of their slander in which Meletus trusted when he wrote
accusations are true. These I fear much more out the charge against me? What did they say
than I fear Anytus and his friends, though they when they slandered me? I must, as if they were
too are formidable. These earlier ones, however, my actual prosecutors, read the affidavit they
are more so, gentlemen; they got hold of most of would have sworn. It goes something like this:
you from childhood, persuaded you and accused Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing in that he busies
me quite falsely, saying that there is a man called himself studying things in the sky and below the
Socrates, a wise man, a student of all things in earth; he makes the worse into the stronger argu-
the sky and below the earth, who makes the ment, and he teaches these same things to others.
worse argument the stronger. Those who spread You have seen this yourself in the comedy of Aris-
that rumor, gentlemen, are my dangerous accu- tophanes, a Socrates swinging about there, saying
sers, for their hearers believe that those who he was walking on air and talking a lot of other
study these things do not even believe in the nonsense about things of which I know nothing
gods. Moreover, these accusers are numerous, at all. I do not speak in contempt of such knowl-
and have been at it a long time; also, they spoke edge, if someone is wise in these things—lest
Meletus bring more cases against me—but, gen- surely if you did not busy yourself with some-
tlemen, I have no part in it, and on this point I thing out of the common, all these rumors and
call upon the majority of you as witnesses. I think talk would not have arisen unless you did some-
it right that all those of you who have heard me thing other than most people. Tell us what it is,
conversing, and many of you have, should tell that we may not speak inadvisedly about you.”
each other if any one of you has ever heard me Anyone who says that seems to be right, and I
discussing such subjects to any extent at all. From will try to show you what has caused this reputa-
this you will learn that the other things said about tion and slander. Listen then. Perhaps some of
me by the majority are of the same kind. you will think I am jesting, but be sure that all
Not one of them is true. And if you have that I shall say is true. What has caused my rep-
heard from anyone that I undertake to teach utation is none other than a certain kind of wis-
people and charge a fee for it, that is not true dom. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom,
either. Yet I think it a fine thing to be able to perhaps. It may be that I really possess this, while
teach people as Gorgias of Leontini does, and those whom I mentioned just now are wise with
Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. Each of a wisdom more than human; else I cannot ex-
these men can go to any city and persuade the plain it, for I certainly do not possess it, and
young, who can keep company with any one of whoever says I do is lying and speaks to slander
their own fellow citizens they want without pay- me. Do not create a disturbance, gentlemen,
ing, to leave the company of these, to join with even if you think I am boasting, for the story I
themselves, pay them a fee, and be grateful to shall tell does not’ originate with me, but I will
them besides. Indeed, I learned that there is an- refer you to a trustworthy source. I shall call
other wise man from Paros who is visiting us, for upon the god at Delphi as witness to the exis-
I met a man who has spent more money on tence and nature of my wisdom, if it be such.
sophists than everybody else put together, Cal- You know Chaerephon. He was my friend
lias, the son of Hipponicus. So I asked him—he from youth, and the friend of most of you, as
has two sons—“Callias,” I said, “if your sons he shared your exile and your return. You surely
were colts or calves, we could find and engage know the kind of man he was, how impulsive in
a supervisor for them who would make them any course of action. He went to Delphi at one
excel in their proper qualities, some horse time and ventured to ask the oracle—as I say,
breeder or farmer. Now since they are men, gentlemen, do not create a disturbance—he
whom do you have in mind to supervise them? asked if any man was wiser than I, and the Pyth-
Who is an expert in this kind of excellence, the ian replied that no one was wiser. Chaerephon is
human and social kind? I think you must have dead, but his brother will testify to you about
given thought to this since you have sons. Is this.
there such a person,” I asked, “or is there Consider that I tell you this because I would
not?” “Certainly there is,” he said. “Who is inform you about the origin of the slander.
he?” I asked. “What is his name, where is he When I heard of this reply I asked myself:
from? And what is his fee?” “His name, Socrates, “Whatever does the god mean? What is his rid-
is Evenus, he comes from Paros, and his fee is dle? I am very conscious that I am not wise at all;
five minas.” I thought Evenus a happy man, if he what then does he mean by saying that I am the
really possesses this art, and teaches for so mod- wisest? For surely he does not lie; it is not legiti-
erate a fee. Certainly I would pride and preen mate for him to do so.” For a long time I was at
myself if I had this knowledge, but I do not a loss as to his meaning; then I very reluctantly
have it, gentlemen. turned to some such investigation as this; I went
One of you might perhaps interrupt me and to one of those reputed wise, thinking that there,
say: “But Socrates, what is your occupation? if anywhere, I could refute the oracle and say to
From where have these slanders come? For it: “This man is wiser than I, but you said I was.”
PLATO • 2. Apology 11
Then, when I examined this man—there is no but by some inborn talent and by inspiration,
need for me to tell you his name, he was one like seers and prophets who also say many fine
of our public men—my experience was some- things without any understanding of what they
thing like this: I thought that he appeared wise say. The poets seemed to me to have had a simi-
to many people and especially to himself, but he lar experience. At the same time I saw that, be-
was not. I then tried to show him that he cause of their poetry, they thought themselves
thought himself wise, but that he was not. As a very wise men in other respects, which they
result he came to dislike me, and so did many of were not. So there again I withdrew, thinking
the bystanders. So I withdrew and thought to that I had the same advantage over them as I
myself: “I am wiser than this man; it is likely had over the politicians.
that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, Finally I went to the craftsmen, for I was
but he thinks he knows something when he conscious of knowing practically nothing, and I
does not, whereas when I do not know, neither knew that I would find that they had knowledge
do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than of many fine things. In this I was not mistaken;
he to this small extent, that I do not think I they knew things I did not know, and to that
know what I do not know.” After this I ap- extent they were wiser than I. But, men of
proached another man, one of those thought Athens, the good craftsmen seemed to me to
to be wiser than he, and I thought the same have the same fault as the poets: each of them,
thing, and so I came to be disliked both by because of his success at his craft, thought him-
him and by many others. self very wise in other most important pursuits,
After that I proceeded systematically. I real- and this error of theirs overshadowed the wis-
ized, to my sorrow and alarm, that I was getting dom they had, so that I asked myself, on behalf
unpopular, but I thought that I must attach the of the oracle, whether I should prefer to be as I
greatest importance to the god’s oracle, so I am, with neither their wisdom nor their igno-
must go to all those who had any reputation rance, or to have both. The answer I gave myself
for knowledge to examine its meaning. And by and the oracle was that it was to my advantage to
the dog, men of Athens—for I must tell you the be as I am.
truth—I experienced something like this: In my As a result of this investigation, men of
investigation in the service of the god I found Athens, I acquired much unpopularity, of a
that those who had the highest reputation were kind that is hard to deal with and is a heavy bur-
nearly the most deficient, while those who were den; many slanders came from these people and
thought to be inferior were more knowledge- a reputation for wisdom, for in each case the
able. I must give you an account of my journey- bystanders thought that I myself possessed the
ings as if they were labors I had undertaken to wisdom that I proved that my interlocutor did
prove the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, not have. What is probable, gentlemen, is that in
I went to the poets, the writers of tragedies and fact the god is wise and that his oracular response
dithyrambs and the others, intending in their meant that human wisdom is worth little or
case to catch myself being more ignorant than nothing, and that when he says this man, So-
they. So I took up those poems with which crates, he is using my name as an example, as if
they seemed to have taken most trouble and he said: “This man among you, mortals, is wisest
asked them what they meant, in order that I who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom
might at the same time learn something from is worthless.” So even now I continue this inves-
them. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentle- tigation as the god bade me—and I go around
men, but I must. Almost all the bystanders seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I
might have explained the poems better than think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come
their authors could. I soon realized that poets to the assistance of the god and show him that
do not compose their poems with knowledge, he is not wise. Because of this occupation, I do
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as likely to bring about what's wanted as all the anger and
bitterness of a strike?"
"Well—that's for another time. You've got to decide now

for the present. An offer has come, meeting you half-way.
Seems to me, we ought to go the other half to meet 'em. As
friend Stuckey says, that's a tolerable fair ending to a
struggle, each side yielding half."
"Any way, I'm meaning to be at work again next week.

I'd have been sooner, if it wasn't for a lame arm. I hope to
see all of you at work too."
CHAPTER XIV.
HOW IT ALL ENDED.
WHILE the men's meeting went on, Martha and the

children still sat in the dim firelight. Millie and Bobbie were
asleep, leaning against their mother's knee; and Martha, in
a kind of half-dream, had forgotten the passing of time. It
was beyond the little ones' hour for bed, and she had not
noted the fact.
Somebody came in with a light step, and Sarah

Holdfast's pleasant voice asked, "Why, Mrs. Stevens, is this
the way you spend your evening?"
Martha sat slowly more upright, wearing a dazed look.
"O dear, I'm tired," she said. "I didn't know it was so
late."
"And the children up still?"
"They were so cold, I made a bit more fire, and they

didn't seem to want to leave it. I must have been near
asleep too," Martha gasped listlessly. "Well, I've got to wake
'em now."
"Wait a minute. I'll light your candle. I've got a loaf of

bread here, and some butter and a jug of milk. Poor thing!"
as a faint cry escaped Martha. "You're so hungry, aren't
you? There's a basket of food come from Mr. Hughes, and I
knew John would want you to have a share. Don't you stir
yet."
Martha did not move. She sat motionless, staring down

at the little head on her arm.
Mrs. Holdfast had already lighted the candle, and pulled

down the blind.
"Why, you're as white as a sheet, you poor thing!" she

said, stirring quickly about. "There! Give the children
something to eat before they go to bed. And it's plain you
want it too. Well, my husband's in hopes the strike will soon
be over; and I'm sure I hope the same. It's been a hard
time for you all. I'll tell you what—a cup of tea will do you
more good than anything. Haven't got any? Never mind, I'll
put the kettle on to boil, and get a pinch in from next door."
Martha had not answered save by silence.
She looked strangely pale, and the dazed expression in

her eyes had increased. The little child on her knee lay
motionless, and when Mrs. Holdfast came near, Martha
shielded the tiny face from observation.
"He's off—sound!" she said hoarsely.
"Well, let him be a few minutes," said Sarah cheerfully.

"Don't you get up yet. I'm sure you're not fit. Now, Millie,
Bobbie—wake up, wake up."
She aroused the two drowsy children; and Bobbie at

once broke into fretting sobs. "I'm so hungry! I'm so
hungry!" he wailed.
Martha made no response at all, but Sarah took him to

the table, and Bobbie's pitiful face changed into smiles at
the sight of bread and butter. When he and Millie were
supplied, Sarah hastened away for the "pinch of tea."
On her return, she found Martha still in the same

position, passive and white as an image, only with a
bewildered wildness in her eyes. There was again the
shielding motion of both hands to hide baby Harry's face.
Mrs. Holdfast noticed it now, and wondered, but said
nothing till the tea was ready. Then she poured out a cup,
hot and strong, and brought it with a goodly slice of bread
and butter to Martha's side.
"That'll do you good," she said. "And you'll let me see to
Harry, won't you? It's time he should have something."
"No, he's sound—sound;" repeated Martha in a hollow

voice.
"Baby Harry hasn't eaten nothing all day," said Millie.
"Then he oughtn't to wait, I'm sure. Give him to me."
Martha did not resist when Sarah lifted the child from
her lap, only her eyes followed him with a strange gaze, and
Mrs. Holdfast's own face changed; for the little fair head fell
helplessly, and the long lashes lay upon cheeks of waxen
whiteness.
Sarah checked the cry which rose to her lips. She

turned to the fire, away from Martha.
"He don't wake up, not even for your taking him," said
Millie. "He must be dreadful sleepy."
"He is—very sound," Mrs. Holdfast answered in

trembling tones, as she pressed the tiny cold form more
closely in her arms.
"Give him back to me!" demanded Martha hoarsely.
"No, my dear—take your tea first," said Mrs. Holdfast.

"I'll lay him in his cot—just for—"
"No, no—give him to me! I won't have him laid—laid out

—nowhere!" cried Martha, in a voice of sharp anguish. "Give
my baby back to me!"
"I'll hold him for you. Just a minute or two. You take
your tea and bread and butter. You must eat, you know."
Martha obeyed silently, rapidly. It was almost more than
Sarah had ventured to hope. Tea and bread and butter alike
vanished, and a faint tinge of colour came to Martha's lips.
She was able now to stand up, with outstretched hands.
"Not yet," insisted Mrs. Holdfast. "You just put Millie and
Bobbie to bed, and I'll see to him. Yes, do, my dear—it's
best for you. Take them," pleaded the good woman.
Martha yielded again. She hurried the two children

away, and saw them both in bed. Undressing did not take
long, but Sarah was busy also during her short absence.
Harry's little cot had been much in the kitchen of late.

He had slept away most of the day, often, in his growing
weakness. When Martha returned, still with half-wild, half-
dreamy eyes, she found Mrs. Holdfast standing beside the
cot, and within lay Harry, prepared as if for the night. He
had his little night-dress on, and the calm white baby-face
rested peacefully on the pillow. The lips, just parted, were
rigid in repose, and one wee waxen hand was crossed over
the other.
"You've put him to bed," said Martha's hollow voice.
"Yes, my dear; I've put him to bed," said Sarah

pityingly.
Martha came nearer, and gasped for breath, gazing

upon the fair little image. Then her eyes went with
passionate appeal to Sarah's.
"Poor thing!" murmured Sarah.

She hung over the cot, sobbing wildly.
"You think I don't know! But I do!" said Martha bitterly.

"I do! I do! He's murdered! If ever anybody was murdered,
it's my—" and then she broke into a bitter wail—"O my
baby! My baby Harry!"
She hung over the cot, sobbing wildly, and Sarah's arm
came round her in support.
"He'll never be hungry again," she whispered. "Think of

that, my dear; and don't you want him back. There 'll be no
strikes up there. He's got to the end of all the trouble. Don't
you go and say that to your husband when he comes.
Stevens 'll have enough to bear!"
Enough indeed! There was not one of his children whom

Stevens loved as he loved baby Harry.
An hour later he returned, light-footed and eager with

the news which, he felt sure, would gladden Martha's heart.
The door was flung open, and he entered briskly.
"I say, Martha, it's all right! We've settled to accept the
masters' proposals, and I'll be off to work to-morrow
morning. It's all right. Just as you wanted."
A gesture from Mrs. Holdfast checked Roger. She was

present still, having persuaded a neighbour to stay with her
own little ones for a time.
Martha sat beside the cot, dropping hot quiet tears at

intervals, and the desolate look of the mother's eyes, lifted
to his, Stevens would not soon forget.
"Too late now!" she whispered.
Roger's glance went from her to the small face on the

pillow—the face of his own little Harry, the child who till
lately had never failed to greet him with a joyous spring,
and cry of "Dadda." Harry had always been the father's
especial pet. Even of late, when the child was too weak to
spring or cry out, the tiny face had always brightened at the
sound of Roger's voice.
It did not brighten now; yet that was no look of

common sleep. Roger knew the difference.
"You don't say—What's the matter? Why don't you give
him something, eh? Letting him lie there! And the room as
cold—! What d'you want for him, Martha? Tell me, sharp,
and I'll get it. I can now; we're going to work again, and it'll
be all right."
Martha's tears fell faster, and a sound like a sob crept

into Roger's rough voice.
"No use," Martha said brokenly; "the strike's done it at

last. It's killed him—our baby Harry!"
"He's better off. He'll never know trouble again," said

Mrs. Holdfast. "Don't you go and want him back again too
much—both of you. He's out of it all now!"
"If I'd known! Why didn't somebody tell me?"

demanded Stevens, hoarsely. "I'd have done—anything—if
I'd known!"
Sobs came hard and thick from the father's heart. But
no sounds of grief could bring back the household darling;
no wailing could reach him on that distant shore which he
had reached. He was "out of it all now," indeed! The better
for little Harry!
So the strike was at an end; and Peter Pope, finding his

services no longer required, betook himself elsewhere.
There were some who counted that the working-men of

the place owed him much, seeing that by dint of the strike
he had won for them an increase of seven and a half per
cent. on their wages.
There were others who held that the same increase
would have come, probably as soon, without the pressure
exerted by the strike.
There were very many who found that the said increase
of wages would by no means suffice to repay them for the
heavy losses they had suffered through the strike.
There were not a few who maintained that the trade of

the town, and its consequent prosperity, had received
lasting injury from the strike.
On the whole it may be safely said, that if the strike had

done some possible good, it had also done a considerable
amount of positive harm. It may be hoped that the working-
men of the town, having learnt wisdom from a success
which involved more of loss than of solid gain, would be
long before they embarked in another such enterprise.
THE END.
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in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy

(eBook PDF) Ethics Introduced: Readings in Moral

(eBook PDF) Philosophy: History and Readings 9th

(eBook PDF) Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary

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CHAPTER 3: COMPATIBILISM: THE CASE FOR DETERMINISM

CHAPTER 4: FREEDOM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 521

CHAPTER 2: PROPOSED STANDARDS OF RIGHT CONDUCT 597

CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL PROBLEMS 670

CHAPTER 4: THE MEANING OF LIFE 702

ABOUT REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY

NEW TO THIS EDITION

New to The Text

New Reason and Responsibility 16th Edition MindTap

WHY, AND HOW TO, USE THIS TEXT

Introduction to the Nature and

Revised and edited by Russ Shafer-Landau.

2. False premises; false conclusion; valid PREMISES CONCLUSION ARGUMENT

the most common ways in which philosophers is equivalent to

For example— threatening force: “If you do not say what I

"Well—that's for another time. You've got to decide now

"Any way, I'm meaning to be at work again next week.

WHILE the men's meeting went on, Martha and the

Somebody came in with a light step, and Sarah

Martha sat slowly more upright, wearing a dazed look.

"And the children up still?"

"They were so cold, I made a bit more fire, and they

"Wait a minute. I'll light your candle. I've got a loaf of

Martha did not move. She sat motionless, staring down

Mrs. Holdfast had already lighted the candle, and pulled

"Why, you're as white as a sheet, you poor thing!" she

Martha had not answered save by silence.

She looked strangely pale, and the dazed expression in

"He's off—sound!" she said hoarsely.

"Well, let him be a few minutes," said Sarah cheerfully.

She aroused the two drowsy children; and Bobbie at

Martha made no response at all, but Sarah took him to

On her return, she found Martha still in the same

"No, he's sound—sound;" repeated Martha in a hollow

"Baby Harry hasn't eaten nothing all day," said Millie.

"Then he oughtn't to wait, I'm sure. Give him to me."

Sarah checked the cry which rose to her lips. She

"He is—very sound," Mrs. Holdfast answered in

"Give him back to me!" demanded Martha hoarsely.

"No, my dear—take your tea first," said Mrs. Holdfast.

"No, no—give him to me! I won't have him laid—laid out

Martha yielded again. She hurried the two children

Harry's little cot had been much in the kitchen of late.

"You've put him to bed," said Martha's hollow voice.

"Yes, my dear; I've put him to bed," said Sarah

Martha came nearer, and gasped for breath, gazing

"Poor thing!" murmured Sarah.

"You think I don't know! But I do!" said Martha bitterly.

"He'll never be hungry again," she whispered. "Think of

Enough indeed! There was not one of his children whom

An hour later he returned, light-footed and eager with

A gesture from Mrs. Holdfast checked Roger. She was

Martha sat beside the cot, dropping hot quiet tears at

"Too late now!" she whispered.