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Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Ethics
Theory and
Contemporary Issues
Ninth Edition
Barbara MacKinnon
University of San Francisco, Professor of Philosophy, Emerita
Andrew Fiala
California State University, Fresno, Professor of Philosophy
Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States
Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, © 2018, 2015, 2012 Cengage Learning
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Print Number: 01 Print Year: 2016
Contents
Preface ix Ethics, Religion, and Divine

History of Ethics Time Line xiii Command Theory 25
Pluralism and the Golden Rule 28
The Problem of Evil and Free
Part One ETHICAL THEORY 1
Will 29
Secular Ethics and Toleration 31
—1— Ethics and Ethical Criticisms of Secularism and Global
Reasoning 1 Ethics 32
Why Study Ethics? 1 READING Euthyphro • Plato 35
What Is Ethics? 2 Letter to a Christian Nation • SAM
HARRIS 38
Ethical and Other Types
Religion and Truth • Mohandas K.
of Evaluation 3 Gandhi 39
Sociobiology and the Naturalistic
Fallacy 5 Review Exercises 42
Ethical Terms 6
Ethics and Reasons 7 —3— Ethical Relativism 44
Intuitionism, Emotivism,
Subjectivism, Objectivism 7 Descriptive versus Normative
Ethical Reasoning and Ethical Relativism 45
Arguments 9 Individual versus Cultural
The Structure of Ethical Reasoning Relativism 46
and Argument 9 Strong and Weak Relativism 47
Evaluating and Making Good Reasons Supporting Ethical
Arguments 10 Relativism 48
Ethical Theory 11 The Diversity of Moral Views 48
Types of Ethical Theory 12 Tolerance and
Can Ethics Be Taught? 13 Open-Mindedness 48
Moral Uncertainty 48
READING Ethical Judgments and Matters of Situational Differences 48
Fact • David Hume 14
Emotivism and Ethics • Are These Reasons
C. L. Stevenson 15 Convincing? 49
Review Exercises 19 The Diversity of Moral Views 49
Tolerance and
Open-Mindedness 50
—2— Religion and Global Moral Uncertainty 50
Ethics 20 Situational Differences 50
Is Relativism
Freedom, Cosmopolitanism, and the Self-Contradictory? 51
European Enlightenment 22 Moral Realism 52
Religion, Civic Life, and Civil Moral Pluralism 53
Disobedience 24
iii ❮❮
iv CONTENTS
READING Who’s to Judge? • Louis Pojman 55 —6— Deontological Ethics and

Relativism and Its Benefits • John Immanuel Kant 114
Lachs 62
Review Exercises 67 Deontology and the Ethics of
Duty 115
Immanuel Kant 117
—4— Egoism, Altruism, and the What Is the Right Motive? 117
Social Contract 68 What Is the Right Thing to Do? 118
Psychological Egoism 71 The Categorical Imperative 119
What Is Psychological Egoism? 71 The First Form 120
Is Psychological Egoism True? 72 The Second Form 121
Ethical Egoism 73 Evaluating Kant’s Moral
Theory 122
What Is Ethical Egoism? 73
Is Ethical Egoism a Good The Nature of Moral
Theory? 73 Obligation 122
The Social Contract 75 The Application of the Categorical
Imperative 122
The Moral Point of View 76 Duty 123
Why Be Moral? 77 Moral Equality and Impartiality 123
READING The Ring of Gyges • Plato 79 Perfect and Imperfect Duties 124
Self Love • Thomas Hobbes 85 Variations on Kant and
The Social Contract and Deontology 125
Altruism • Steven Pinker 88
READING Fundamental Principles of the
Review Exercises 92 Metaphysic of Morals • Immanuel
Kant 126
—5— Utilitarianism Review Exercises 137
and John Stuart Mill 93
Weighing Consequences 95 —7— Natural Law and Human
Historical Background 96 Rights 138
Jeremy Bentham and John Natural Law Theory 140
Stuart Mill 96 Historical Origins 141
The Principle of Utility 97 Evaluating Natural Law
Pleasure and Happiness 97 Theory 143
Calculating the Greatest Amount of Natural Rights 145
Happiness 98 Evaluating Natural Rights
Quantity versus Quality Theory 146
of Pleasure 100 Is There a Human Nature? 147
Evaluating Utilitarianism 101 READING On Natural Law • Thomas
Application of the Principle 101 Aquinas 149
Utilitarianism and Personal Second Treatise of Civil
Integrity 101 Government • John Locke 151
Ends and Means 102
Review Exercises 154
The Trolley Problem 102
Act and Rule Utilitarianism 103
“Proof” of the Theory 105 —8— Virtue Ethics 155
READING Utilitarianism • John Stuart Mill 107 Virtues and Everyday Life 156
Review Exercises 112 Aristotle 157
CONTENTS v
Virtue as a Mean 158 Combining the Types of

Nature, Human Nature, and the Euthanasia 213
Human Good 158 Making Moral Judgments About
Cross-Cultural and Contemporary Euthanasia 214
Virtue Ethics 160 The Moral Significance of
Evaluating Virtue Ethics 161 Voluntariness 214
READING The Nicomachean Active versus Passive
Ethics • Aristotle 163 Euthanasia 216
Review Exercises 170 READING The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia •
J. Gay-Williams 221
Active and Passive Euthanasia • James
—9— Feminist Thought and Rachels 224
the Ethics of Care 171 Review Exercises 228
Gender in Moral Reasoning and the Discussion Cases 230
Ethics of Care 174
Is There a Gender Difference in —11— Abortion 231
Morality? 176
The Source of Feminine Stages of Fetal Development 233
Morality 177 Methods of Abortion 235
Evaluating Gender-Specific Abortion and the Law 237
Approaches to Morality 178 Abortion: The Moral Question 240
Feminist Thought 179 Arguments That Do Not Depend
Evaluation of Feminist Thought on the Moral Status of the
and the Ethics of Care 181 Fetus 240
READING Caring • Nel Noddings 184 Utilitarian Reasoning 240
The Need for More Than Some Rights Arguments 241
Justice • Annette Baier 185 Arguments That Depend on
What Is Feminist Ethics? • Hilde the Moral Status of the
Lindemann 192
Fetus 242
Review Exercises 198 Method I 242
Method II 245
Part Two ETHICAL ISSUES 199 READING A Defense of Abortion • Judith Jarvis
Thomson 251
—10— Euthanasia 199 Why Abortion Is Immoral • Don
Marquis 252
Euthanasia for Infants The Value of Choice and the Choice
and the Disabled 201 to Value: Expanding the Discussion
Criteria for Death 203 About Fetal Life within Prochoice
Types of Euthanasia 206 Advocacy • Bertha Alvarez
Manninen 261
Active and Passive
Euthanasia 206 Review Exercises 275
Voluntary, Nonvoluntary, and Discussion Cases 276
Involuntary Euthanasia 207
Advance Directives 208
Physician-Assisted Suicide 209 —12— Sexual Morality 278
Pain Medication and Palliative
Sedation 211 Current Issues 280
Ordinary and Extraordinary Conceptual Problems: What Is and
Measures 212 Is Not Sexual 285
vi CONTENTS
Relevant Factual Matters 286 —14— Economic Justice 344

Sexual Morality and Ethical
Theories 287 Economic Inequality 346
Consequentialist or Utilitarian Poverty, Education, and Health
Considerations 287 Care 349
Non-consequentialist Conceptions of Social Justice 350
or Deontological Process Distributive Justice 352
Considerations 288 End-State Distributive
Natural Law Considerations 289 Justice 353
Same-Sex Marriage 291 Equal Opportunity 354
READING U.S. Supreme Court Decision June 26, Political and Economic
2015 • Obergefell v. Hodges 296 Theories 356
Law, Morality, and “Sexual Libertarianism 356
Orientation” • John Finnis 298 Capitalism 357
“It’s Not Natural” • John Corvino 306 Socialism 357
Review Exercises 307 Modern Liberalism 359
Discussion Cases 308 John Rawls’s Theory of Justice 360
Communitarianism 363
READING Justice as Fairness • John Rawls 367
Distributive Justice • Robert
—13— Equality and Nozick 368
Discrimination 309 Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal • Ayn
Rand 369
Discrimination 310
Evangelii Gaudium • Pope
Racial Discrimination 311 Francis 370
The Principle of Equality 316 Review Exercises 373
Justice 316 Discussion Cases 374
Social Benefits and Harms 316
Proof and Reality of
Difference 316 —15— Punishment
Relevant Differences 317 and the Death Penalty 375
Challenges to the Principle 318
The Nature of Legal
Current Issues and the Law 320 Punishment 377
Profiling 322 The Deterrence Argument 378
Hate Crimes 324 The Retributivist Argument 379
Affirmative Action and Preferential Punishment and
Treatment 325 Responsibility 381
Consequentialist Prisons 383
Considerations 326 Race 384
Non-consequentialist Restoration and Rehabilitation 385
Considerations 328
The Death Penalty 386
READING Five Faces of Oppression • Iris Marion
Legal Issues 386
Young 333
Exonerations 388
Racisms • Kwame Anthony
Racial Bias and Fairness 388
Appiah 334
Costs 389
White Privilege, Black Rights • Naomi
Deterrence Considerations 390
Zack 335
Retributivist Considerations 391
Review Exercises 342 Mercy and Restorative Justice 392
Discussion Cases 343 Humane Executions 394
CONTENTS vii
READING The New Jim Crow • Michelle Approaches to Animal Ethics 468
Alexander 400 Sentience, Equal Consideration,
Are Prisons Obsolete? • Angela Y. and Animal Welfare 469
Davis 401 Animal Rights 472
Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment
(1868) • John Stuart Mill 402 READING All Animals Are Equal • Peter
A Theory of Just Execution • Lloyd Singer 477
Steffen 406 The Case for Animal Rights • Tom
Regan 486
Review Exercises 415 Speciesism and the Idea of
Discussion Cases 416 Equality • Bonnie Steinbock 487
—16— Environmental Ethics 417 Discussion Cases 489
The Environment and Its

Value 419 —18— Biotechnology and
Anthropocentrism 420 Bioengineering 490
Cost–Benefit Analysis 421 Current Issues 492
Environmental Justice 422
Athletic and Cognitive
Ecocentrism 423 Enhancement 492
Deep Ecology 425 Stem Cell Research 493
Ecofeminism 426 Cloning 495
Genetic Engineering and Genetic
Current Issues 427
Screening 496
Climate Change 427 Genetically Modified Plants and
Ozone Depletion 431 Animals 499
Waste Disposal and
Pollution 431 Legal and Ethical Issues 500
Wilderness Preservation 433 Athletic and Cognitive
International Environmental Enhancement 501
Conventions 434 Stem Cell Research 502
Global Justice and the Tragedy of the Cloning 503
Commons 435 Genetic Engineering and Genetic
READING People or Penguins: The Case for Screening 506
Optimal Pollution • William F. Genetically Modified Organisms 509
Baxter 442 READING Transhumanist Declaration • Various
Deep Ecology • Bill Devall and George Authors 514
Sessions 443 Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls • Leon R.
Radical American Environmentalism Kass 515
and Wilderness Preservation: A Third In Defense of Posthuman
World Critique • Ramachandra Dignity • Nick Bostrom 525
Guha 449 Review Exercises 526
Review Exercises 455 Discussion Cases 527
Discussion Cases 456
—19— Violence and War 528
—17— Animal Ethics 457 Realism 531
Current Issues 460 Pacifism 533
Moral Vegetarianism 460 Just War Theory 534
Animal Experimentation 463 Jus ad Bellum 534
Endangered Species 466 Jus in Bello 536
viii CONTENTS
Current Issues 538 Justice 565

Terrorism 538 Rights 567
Targeted Killing and Drones 540 Practical Considerations 568
Weapons of Mass Global Inequality 568
Destruction 542 Levels of International Aid 569
War Crimes and Universal Human Causes of Global Poverty 570
Rights 544 Solutions and Progress 573
Torture 546
Globalization and Its Critics 573
READING Peace • Andrew Fitz-Gibbon 548
The Triumph of Just War Theory (and Economic Impacts 574
the Dangers of Success) • Michael Cultural Diversity 575
Walzer 554 READING The Singer Solution to World
Review Exercises 558 Poverty • Peter Singer 580
Living on a Lifeboat • Garrett
Hardin 584
—20— Global Justice and
Globalization 560
Moral Arguments About Global
GLOSSARY 593
Poverty 563
Self-Interest 565 INDEX 603
Preface
This ninth edition of Ethics: Theory and Contem- This edition offers expanded and continued cov-
porary Issues contains a substantial revision of the erage of the following topics: global (non-Western)
text and extensive update of the empirical mate- philosophy and religion, the prisoner’s dilemma
rial contained in the chapters focused on contem- and the tragedy of the commons, social justice and
porary issues. Andrew Fiala joined as coauthor on economic inequality, mass incarceration and decar
decar-
the eighth edition. In the ninth edition, we have ceration, restorative justice, environmental justice,
included new learning apparatus, especially tables biotechnology and bioengineering, gene editing,
that outline possible moral positions with regard vegetarianism and the ethics of hunting, circuses,
to the issues considered. As in past editions, each race and racism, pacifism, gay marriage, global pov-
chapter begins with a detailed, accessible intro- erty, LGBT and transgender issues, Black Lives Mat-
duction that prepares the student to read accom- ter, Syrian refugees, the precautionary principle, and
panying selections from important and influential climate change. This edition includes some famil-
philosophers. The book remains a comprehensive iar readings from previous editions and some new
introduction to ethics in theory and practice. It also additions. In some cases, older readings have been
continues to emphasize pedagogy through clear shortened to make room for new readings and short
summaries, engaging examples, and various study excerpts by a more diverse set of authors, includ-
tools—such as review exercises and discussion ing some emerging voices. New readings include:
cases. Each chapter begins with a list of learning John Lachs on relativism, Hilde Lindemann on femi-
objectives, and the book ends with an extensive nism, a new essay on abortion by Bertha Alvarez
glossary of key terms. Manninen, U.S. Supreme Court Obergefell Deci-
sion, Naomi Zack on Black Lives Matter, Iris Marion
ADDITIONS AND CHANGES Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression,” Pope Francis
Although the basic elements remain the same, this and Ayn Rand on economic issues, Michelle Alex-
new ninth edition includes the following additions ander on the New Jim Crow, Tom Regan on ani-
and changes from the eighth edition. Each chapter mal rights, the Transhumanist declaration, Andrew
in Part I has been revised to focus on readability. All Fitz-Gibbon on peace, and Garret Hardin on global
introductory and empirical material in each chapter poverty.
in Part II has been updated to incorporate the latest
information about contemporary issues and current Key Elements
affairs. These updates include recent statistics, rel- Each chapter of Ethics: Theory and Contempo-
evant cases, and contemporary examples. rary Issues contains an extended summary of key
ix ❮❮
x PREFACE
concepts and issues written in clear, accessible prose. Pedagogical Aids This text is designed as an acces-
These detailed summaries go beyond the short intro- sible, “user-friendly” introduction to ethics. To aid both
ductions found in most ethics anthologies to provide instructor and student, we have provided the following
students with a thorough grounding in the theory pedagogical aids:
and practical application of philosophical ethics.
As previously noted, these discussions have been
❯ a list of learning objectives at the beginning of
each chapter (new to this edition)
thoroughly updated to include detailed information
on current events, statistics, and political and cul-
❯ a real-life event, hypothetical dialogue, or
updated empirical data at the beginning of each
tural developments.
chapter
The theory chapters in Part I present detailed
❯ diagrams, subheadings, and boldface key terms
summaries of the theories and major concepts, posi-
and definitions that provide guideposts for read-
tions, and arguments. The contemporary issues
ers and organize the summary exposition
chapters in Part II include summaries of:
❯ study questions for each reading selection
❯ current social conditions and recent events, with ❯ review exercises at the end of each chapter that
special emphasis on their relevance to students’ can be used for exams and quizzes
lives ❯ a glossary of definitions of key terms (new to
❯ conceptual issues, such as how to define key this edition)
words and phrases (for example, cloning,
cloning ❯ discussion cases that follow each chapter in
terrorism, and distributive justice) Part II and provide opportunities for class or
❯ arguments and suggested ways to organize an group discussion
ethical analysis of each topic ❯ topics and resources for written assignments in
❯ tables outlining possible moral positions, linked the discussion cases
to normative theories and key authors. ❯ tables outlining moral positions (new to this
edition).
Throughout this text, we seek to engage read-
ers by posing challenging ethical questions and then A Digital Solution for Students and
offering a range of possible answers or explanations. Instructors:
The aim is to present more than one side of each issue MindTap for Philosophy for Ethics: Theory and
so that students can decide for themselves what posi- Contemporary Issues is a personalized, online
tion they will take. This also allows instructors more digital learning platform providing students with an
latitude to emphasize specific arguments and con- immersive learning experience that builds critical
cepts and to direct the students’ focus as they see fit. thinking skills. Through a carefully designed chapter-
Where possible throughout the text, the rela- based learning path, MindTap allows students to
tion of ethical theory to the practical issues is indi- easily identify the chapter’s learning objectives;
cated. For example, one pervasive distinction used draw connections and improve writing skills by
throughout the text is between consequentialist and completing essay assignments; read short, manage-
non-consequentialist considerations and arguments. able sections from the e-book; and test their content
The idea is that if students are able to first situate knowledge with critical thinking Aplia™ questions.
or categorize a philosophical reason or argument,
then they will be better able to evaluate it critically ❯ Chapter e-Book: Each chapter within MindTap
in their thinking and writing. Connections to related contains the narrative of the chapter, offering an
concepts and issues in other chapters are also high- easy to navigate online reading experience.
lighted throughout the text to help students note ❯ Chapter Quiz: Each chapter within MindTap
similarities and contrasts among various ethical ends with a summative Chapter Test covering
positions. the chapter’s learning objectives and ensuring
PREFACE xi
students are reading and understanding the ❯ Digital flash cards are premade for each chapter,
material presented. and students can make their own by adding
❯ Chapter Aplia Assignment: Each chapter images, descriptions, and more.
includes an Aplia assignment that provides auto-
MindTap gives students ample opportunities for
matically graded critical thinking assignments
improving comprehension and for self-evaluation to
with detailed, immediate feedback and expla-
prepare for exams, while also providing faculty and
nations on every question. Students can also
students alike a clear way to measure and assess
choose to see another set of related questions if
student progress. Faculty can use MindTap as a turn-
they did not earn all available points in their first
key solution or customize by adding YouTube videos,
attempt and want more practice.
RSS feeds, or their own documents directly within
❯ Ethics Simulations: Each chapter offers an
the e-book or within each chapter’s Learning Path.
interactive simulated ethical dilemma, allowing
MindTap goes well beyond an e-book and a home-
students to make decisions and see the implica-
work solution. It is truly a Personal Learning Experi-
tions of their choices.
ence that allows instructors to synchronize the reading
❯ Chapter Essay Question: Every chapter ends
with engaging assignments. To learn more, ask your
with essay prompts that ask students to explore
Cengage Learning sales representative to demo it for
and reflect on concepts from the chapter and
you—or go to www.Cengage.com/MindTap.
build writing and critical thinking faculties.
❯ KnowNOW! Philosophy Blog: The KnowNOW! Instructor’s Resources:
Philosophy Blog connects course concepts with
The Instructor’s Companion Site features an Instruc-
real-world events. Updated twice a week, the
tor’s Manual, PowerPoint Lecture Slides, and a
blog provides a succinct philosophical analysis of
robust Test Bank (Cengage Learning Testing pow-
major news stories, along with multimedia and
ered by Cognero).
discussion-starter questions.
The Instructor’s Manual provides useful sug-
MindTap also includes a variety of other tools that gestions for lectures and classroom activities, based
support philosophy teaching and learning: directly on the content in this book. Answers to
many review exercises or study questions are pro-
❯ The Philosophy Toolbox collects tutorials on vided, as well as questions for further thought.
using MindTap and researching and writing aca- The PowerPoint Lecture Slides offer a chapter-
demic papers, including citation information and by-chapter breakdown Cengage Learning Testing,
tools, that instructors can use to support students powered by Cognero, new to this edition, allows
in the writing process. instructors to author, edit, and manage Test Bank
❯ Questia allows professors and students to search content. Instructors can create multiple test versions
a database of thousands of peer-reviewed jour
jour- and instantly deliver them through their learning
nals, newspapers, magazines, and full-length management system right to the classroom.
books—all assets can be added to any relevant Interested instructors can find and access all this
chapter in MindTap, and students can content by adding the ninth edition of this book to
❯ Kaltura allows instructors to create and insert their bookshelf on Cengage.com.
inline video and audio into the MindTap platform.
❯ ReadSpeaker reads the text out loud to students IN SUMMARY
in a voice they can customize. We have sought to make this ninth edition of Ethics:
Ethics
❯ Note-taking and highlighting are organized in a Theory and Contemporary Issues the most compre-
central location that can be synced with Ever
Ever- hensive ethics text available. It combines theory
Note on any mobile device a student may have and issues, text and readings, as well as up-to-date
access to. empirical information about contemporary moral
xii PREFACE
problems. It is designed to be flexible, user-friendly, of South Carolina; Dusan Galic, College of DuPage;
current, pedagogically helpful, and balanced. Erin Anchustegu, Boise State University; Christina
Tomczak, Cedar Valley College; Susan Brown, Uni-
❯ The flexible structure of the text allows instruc- versity of West Florida; Philip Cronce, Chicago State
tors to emphasize only those theories and applied University; William Rodriguez, Bethune Cookman
ethical topics which best suit their courses. University; Robert Arp, Johnson County Community
❯ The text is user-friendly, while at the same time College; Jason Gooch, Yakima Valley Community
philosophically reliable. It employs pedagogical College; Jason Flato, Georgia Perimeter College; and
aids throughout and at the end of each chapter, Eric Severson, Seattle Pacific University.
and provides extensive examples from current Barbara MacKinnon especially wants to thank
events and trends. The exposition challenges the students in her classes at the University of San
students with stimulating questions and is Francisco. Over the years, they have contributed
interspersed with useful diagrams, charts, and greatly to this text by challenging her to keep up
headings. with the times and to make things more clear and
❯ The text not only provides up-to-date coverage more interesting. She also appreciates the support
of developments in the news and in scientific of her husband and fellow philosopher, Edward
journals but also on ethical issues as they are MacKinnon. She dedicates this book to her two
discussed in contemporary philosophy. wonderful daughters, Jennifer and Kathleen. Andrew
❯ It offers a balanced collection of readings, includ- Fiala is thankful for Barbara’s hard work throughout
ing both the ethical theories and contemporary the previous editions of this book and for the oppor-
sources on the issues. tunity to transform his classroom teaching experi-
❯ Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, ninth ence into a useful text for teaching ethics.
edition, is accompanied by a broad range of We also wish to acknowledge the many profes-
online and textual tools that amplify its teach- sional people from Cengage Learning and its ven-
ability and give instructors specific pedagogical dors who have worked on this edition, including:
tools for different learning styles. Debra Matteson, Product Manager; Adrienne Devlin,
Content Developer; Megan Garvey, Content Devel-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS opment Manager; Lauren MacLachlan, Production
We wish to thank the many people who have made Manager; Margaret Park Bridges, Senior Content
valuable suggestions for improving the ninth edi- Project Manager; Marissa Falco, Art Director; and
tion of the text, including Marie Gaudio-Zaccaria, Kritika Kaushik, Project Manager, at Cenveo Pub-
Georgia Perimeter College; K.C. Warble III, University lisher Services.
HISTORY OF ETHICS TIME LINE xiii
Ancient
500 B.C.E. 400 300 200 100 0 100 C.E. 200
Socrates Jesus
Sappho 469–399 Zeno ? 4 B.C.E.–C.E. 29 Plotinus
637–577 351–270 205–270
Plato Philo Judaeus
Buddha 427–347 20 B.C.E.–C.E. 40
557–477 Aristotle Sextus Empiricus
384–322 60–117
Confucius Marcus Aurelius
552–479 121–180
Medieval
C.E. 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300
Augustine Anselm Aquinas
345–400 1033–1109 1224–1274
Boethius
480–524 Abelard Scotus
Mohammed 1079–1142 1265–1308
570–632 Avicebron Ockham
1021–1058 1285–1347
Maimonides
1135–1204
Avicenna Averroes
980–1037 1126–1198
Modern
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
Bacon Locke Hume Kierkegaard Moore
1561–1626 1632–1704 1711–1776 1813–1851 1873–1958
Hobbes Leibniz Kant Marx Rawls
1588–1679 1646–1716 1724–1804 1818–1883 1921–2002
Spinoza Hegel Nietzsche Habermas

1632–1677 1770–1831 1844–1900 1929–
Rousseau
1712–1778 Mill Sartre Singer
1806–1873 1905–1979 b. 1946–
Gandhi Noddings
1869–1948 b. 1929–
Wollstonecraft
1759–1797 DeBeauvoir
1908–1986
Bentham James
1748–1832 1846–1910
Dewey
1859–1952
Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 1
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Describe the philosophical study of ethics. • Differentiate between instrumental and

• Discuss the difference between normative
•
intrinsic values.
Jack Hollingsworth/Photodisc/Getty Images

and descriptive claims. Distinguish consequentialist from
• Define key terms: intuitionism, emotivism,
objectivism, and subjectivism.
nonconsequentialist approaches to
ethics.
• Explain the difference between

metaethics and normative ethics.
• Use the distinctions among motives,
acts, and consequences to analyze
• Decide whether naturalistic explanations

of ethics commit the naturalistic fallacy.
ethical phenomena.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
WHY STUDY ETHICS?

It is clear that we often disagree about questions of value. Should same-sex marriage
be legal? Should women have abortions? Should drugs such as marijuana be legal-
ized? Should we torture terrorists in order to get information from them? Should we
eat animals or use them in medical experiments? These sorts of questions are sure to
expose divergent ideas about what is right or wrong.
Discussions of these sorts of questions often devolve into unreasonable name-
calling, foot-stomping, and other questionable argument styles. The philosophical
study of ethics aims to produce good arguments that provide reasonable support for
our opinions about practical topics. If someone says that abortion should (or should
not) be permitted, he or she needs to explain why this is so. It is not enough to say
that abortion should not be permitted because it is wrong or that women should be
allowed to choose abortion because it is wrong to limit women’s choices. To say
that these things are wrong is merely to reiterate that they should not be permitted.
Such an answer begs the question. Circular, question-begging arguments are falla-
cious. We need further argument and information to know why abortion is wrong
or why limiting free choice is wrong. We need a theory of what is right and wrong,
good or evil, justified, permissible, and unjustifiable, and we need to understand how
our theory applies in concrete cases. The first half of this text will discuss various
2 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
theories and concepts that can be used to help us basic ethical questions. In Chapter 2, we discuss the
avoid begging the question in debates about ethical world’s diverse religious traditions and ask whether
issues. The second half looks in detail at a number there is a set of common ethical ideas that is shared
of these issues. by these traditions. In this chapter, we clarify what
It is appropriate to wonder, at the outset, why we ethics is and how ethical reasoning should proceed.
need to do this. Why isn’t it sufficient to simply state
your opinion and assert that “x is wrong (or evil, WHAT IS ETHICS?
just, permissible, etc.)”? One answer to this ques- On the first day of an ethics class, we often ask stu-
tion is that such assertions do nothing to solve the dents to write one-paragraph answers to the ques-
deep conflicts of value that we find in our world. We tion, “What is ethics?”
know that people disagree about abortion, same- How would you answer? Over the years, there
sex marriage, animal rights, and other issues. If we have been significant differences of opinion among
are to make progress toward understanding each our students on this issue. Some have argued that
other, if we are to make progress toward establishing ethics is a highly personal thing, a matter of private
some consensus about these topics, then we have opinion. Others claim that our values come from
to understand why we think certain things are right family upbringing. Other students think that ethics
and others are wrong. We need to make arguments is a set of social principles, the codes of one’s soci-
and give reasons in order to work out our own con- ety or particular groups within it, such as medical
clusions about these issues and in order to explain or legal organizations. Some write that many people
our conclusions to others. get their ethical beliefs from their religion.
It is also insufficient to appeal to custom or One general conclusion can be drawn from these
authority in deriving our conclusions about moral students’ comments: We tend to think of ethics as
issues. While it may be appropriate for children to the set of values or principles held by individuals
simply obey their parents’ decisions, adults should or groups. I have my ethics and you have yours;
strive for more than conformity and obedience to groups—professional organizations and societies,
authority. Sometimes our parents and grandparents for example—have shared sets of values. We can
are wrong—or they disagree among themselves. study the various sets of values that people have.
Sometimes the law is wrong—or laws conflict. This could be done historically and sociologically.
And sometimes religious authorities are wrong—or Or we could take a psychological interest in deter-
authorities do not agree. To appeal to authority on mining how people form their values. But philosoph-
moral issues, we would first have to decide which ical ethics is a critical enterprise that asks whether
authority is to be trusted and believed. Which reli- any particular set of values or beliefs is better than
gion provides the best set of moral rules? Which set any other. We compare and evaluate sets of values
of laws in which country is to be followed? Even and beliefs, giving reasons for our evaluations. We
within the United States, there is currently a conflict ask questions such as, “Are there good reasons for
of laws with regard to some of these issues: some preferring one set of ethics over another?” In this
states have legalized medical marijuana or physi- text, we examine ethics from a critical or evaluative
cian assisted suicide, others have not. The world’s standpoint. This examination will help you come to
religions also disagree about a number of issues: a better understanding of your own values and the
for example, the status of women, the permissibil- values of others.
ity of abortion, and the question of whether war Ethics is a branch of philosophy. It is also called
is justifiable. And members of the same religion moral philosophy. In general, philosophy is a dis-
or denomination may disagree among themselves cipline or study in which we ask—and attempt to
about these issues. To begin resolving these con- answer—basic questions about key areas or sub-
flicts, we need critical philosophical inquiry into ject matters of human life and about pervasive and
Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 3
significant aspects of experience. Some philoso- Ethics, or moral philosophy, asks basic questions
phers, such as Plato and Kant, have tried to do this about the good life, about what is better and worse,
systematically by interrelating their philosophical about whether there is any objective right and wrong,
views in many areas. According to Alfred North and how we know it if there is.
Whitehead, “Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a One objective of ethics is to help us decide what
coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas is good or bad, better or worse. This is generally
in terms of which every element of our experience called normative ethics. Normative ethics defends
can be interpreted.” 1 Some contemporary philoso- a thesis about what is good, right, or just. Norma-
phers have given up on the goal of building a sys- tive ethics can be distinguished from metaethics.
tem of general ideas, arguing instead that we must Metaethical inquiry asks questions about the
work at problems piecemeal, focusing on one partic- nature of ethics, including the meaning of ethical
ular issue at a time. For instance, some philosophers terms and judgments. Questions about the relation
might analyze the meaning of the phrase to know, between philosophical ethics and religion—as we
while others might work on the morality of lying. discuss in Chapter 2—are metaethical. Theoretical
Some philosophers are optimistic about our ability to questions about ethical relativism—as discussed in
address these problems, while others are more skep- Chapter 3—are also metaethical. The other chapters
tical because they think that the way we analyze the in Part I are more properly designated as ethical
issues and the conclusions we draw will always be theory. These chapters present concrete normative
influenced by our background, culture, and habitual theories; they make claims about what is good or
ways of thinking. Most agree, however, that these evil, just or unjust.
problems are worth wondering about and caring From the mid 1930s until recently, metaeth-
about. ics predominated in English-speaking universities.
We can ask philosophical questions about many In doing metaethics, we often analyze the mean-
subjects. In the philosophical study of aesthetics, ing of ethical language. Instead of asking whether
philosophers ask basic or foundational questions the death penalty is morally justified, we would
about art and objects of beauty: what kinds of things ask what we meant in calling something “morally
do or should count as art (rocks arranged in a cer- justified” or “good” or “right.” We analyze ethical
tain way, for example)? Is what makes something language, ethical terms, and ethical statements to
an object of aesthetic interest its emotional expres- determine what they mean. In doing this, we func-
siveness, its peculiar formal nature, or its ability tion at a level removed from that implied by our
to reveal truths that cannot be described in other definition. It is for this reason that we call this other
ways? In the philosophy of science, philosophers type of ethics metaethics—
metaethics meta meaning “beyond.”
ask whether scientific knowledge gives us a picture Some of the discussions in this chapter are metaethi-
of reality as it is, whether progress exists in science, cal discussions—for example, the analysis of vari-
and whether the scientific method discloses truth. ous senses of “good.” As you will see, much can be
Philosophers of law seek to understand the nature learned from such discussions.
of law itself, the source of its authority, the nature
of legal interpretation, and the basis of legal respon- ETHICAL AND OTHER TYPES
sibility. In the philosophy of knowledge, called OF EVALUATION
epistemology, we try to answer questions about “That’s great!” “Now, this is what I call a delicious
what we can know of ourselves and our world, and meal!” “That play was wonderful!” All of these
what it means to know something rather than just to statements express approval of something. They do
believe it. In each area, philosophers ask basic ques- not tell us much about the meal or the play, but they
tions about the particular subject matter. This is also do imply that the speaker thought they were good.
true of moral philosophy. These are evaluative statements. Ethical statements
or judgments are also evaluative. They tell us what “That is a good knife” is an evaluative or nor-
the speaker believes is good or bad. They do not sim- mative statement. However, it does not mean that
ply describe the object of the judgment—for exam- the knife is morally good. In making ethical judg-
ple, as an action that occurred at a certain time or ments, we use terms such as good, bad, right,
that affected people in a certain way. They go further wrong, obligatory, and permissible. We talk about
and express a positive or negative regard for it. Of what we ought or ought not to do. These are evalu-
course, factual matters are relevant to moral evalua- ative terms. But not all evaluations are moral in
tion. For example, factual judgments about whether nature. We speak of a good knife without attribut-
capital punishment has a deterrent effect might be ing moral goodness to it. In so describing the knife,
relevant to our moral judgments about it. So also we are probably referring to its practical usefulness
would we want to know the facts about whether for cutting. Other evaluations refer to other systems
violence can ever bring about peace; this would of values. When people tell us that a law is legiti-
help us judge the morality of war. Because ethical mate or unconstitutional, that is a legal judgment.
judgments often rely on such empirical informa - When we read that two articles of clothing ought not
tion, ethics is often indebted to other disciplines such to be worn together, that is an aesthetic judgment.
as sociology, psychology, and history. Thus, we When religious leaders tell members of their com-
can distinguish between empirical or descriptive munities what they ought to do, that is a religious
claims, which state factual beliefs, and evaluative matter. When a community teaches people to bow
judgments, which state whether such facts are good before elders or use eating utensils in a certain way,
or bad, just or unjust, right or wrong. Evaluative that is a matter of custom. These various normative
judgments are also called normative judgments. or evaluative judgments appeal to practical, legal,
Moral judgments are evaluative because they “place aesthetic, religious, or customary norms for their
a value,” negative or positive, on some action or justification.
practice, such as capital punishment. How do other types of normative judgments
differ from moral judgments? Some philosophers
• Descriptive (empirical) judgment: Capital punish-
believe that it is a characteristic of moral “oughts”
ment acts (or does not act) as a deterrent.
in particular that they override other “oughts,” such
• Normative (moral) judgment: Capital punishment
as aesthetic ones. In other words, if we must choose
is justifiable (or unjustifiable).
between what is aesthetically pleasing and what is
We also evaluate people, saying that a person is morally right, then we ought to do what is morally
good or evil, just or unjust. Because these evalua- right. In this way, morality may also take prece-
tions also rely on beliefs in general about what is dence over the law and custom. The doctrine of civil
good or right, they are also normative. For example, disobedience relies on this belief, because it holds
the judgment that a person is a hero or a villain is that we may disobey certain laws for moral reasons.
based upon a normative theory about good or evil Although moral evaluations differ from other nor-
sorts of people. mative evaluations, this is not to say that there is no
Normative Judgments in Descriptive Judgments in
Ethics Law Aesthetics Religion Custom Sociology Psychology
relation between them. In fact, moral reasons often against simplistically deriving an ought from an is
form the basis for certain laws. But law—at least in Hume’s law. From this perspective, it is not logi-
the United States—results from a variety of political cal, for example, to base our ideas about how we
compromises. We don’t tend to look to the law for ought to behave from a factual account of how we
moral guidance. And we are reluctant to think that actually do behave. This logical mistake was called
we can “legislate morality,” as the saying goes. Of the naturalistic fallacy by G. E. Moore, an influ-
course, there is still an open debate about whether ential philosopher of the early twentieth century.
the law should enforce moral ideas in the context of Moore maintained that moral terms such as good
issues such as gay marriage or abortion. are names for nonempirical properties that cannot be
There may be moral reasons supporting legal reduced to some other natural thing. Moore claimed
arrangements—considerations of basic justice, for that to attempt to define good in terms of some mun-
example. Furthermore, the fit or harmony between dane or natural thing such as pleasure is to com-
forms and colors that ground some aesthetic judg- mit a version of this fallacy. The problem is that we
ments may be similar to the rightness or moral fit can ask whether pleasures are actually good. Just
between certain actions and certain situations or because we desire pleasure does not mean that it is
beings. Moreover, in some ethical systems, actions good to desire pleasure. As Moore suggested, there
are judged morally by their practical usefulness for is always an open question about whether what is
producing valued ends. For now, however, note that natural is also good.
ethics is not the only area in which we make norma- Now, not everyone agrees that appeals to nature
tive judgments. in ethics are fallacious. There are a variety of natu-
ralistic approaches to thinking about ethics. One
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE NATURALISTIC traditional approach to ethics is called natural law
FALLACY ethics (which we discuss in detail in Chapter 7).
The distinction between descriptive and norma- Natural law ethics focuses on human nature and
tive claims is a central issue for thinking about eth- derives ethical precepts from an account of what
ics. We often confuse these issues in our ordinary is natural for humans. Natural law ethicists may
thinking, in part because we think that what we argue, for example, that human body parts have
ordinarily do is what we ought to do. Many people natural functions and that by understanding these
are inclined to say that if something is natural to natural functions, we can figure out certain moral
us, then we ought to do it. For example, one might ideas about sexuality or reproduction. Opponents
argue that since eating meat is natural for us, we might argue that this commits the naturalistic fal-
ought to eat meat. But vegetarians will disagree. lacy, since there is no obvious moral content to be
Indeed, there is no necessary relation between what seen in the structure and function of our body parts.
is ethical and what is natural or customary. It is thus A more recent version of naturalism in ethics
not true that what is natural is always good. But focuses on evolutionary biology and cognitive sci-
people often make the mistake of confusing facts of ence. From this perspective, to understand morality,
nature and value judgments. Most of the time, we we need to understand the basic functions of our
are not attentive to the shift from facts to values, species, including the evolutionary reasons behind
the shift from is to ought. Consider an example used moral behavior. We also need to understand how
by the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, our brains function in order to explain how pleasure
who noticed that incest appears to be quite natural— works, why some people are psychopathic, and why
animals do it all the time. But human beings con- we struggle to balance egoistic and altruistic moti-
demn incest. If it is natural, why do we condemn it? vations. One version of this naturalism is known
Hume pointed out the problem of deriving an ought as sociobiology—an idea that was introduced by
from an is; philosophers after Hume named the rule the biologist E. O. Wilson. 2 “If the brain evolved
Dawkins’s idea is that our genes use our altruistic

and other behaviors to spread themselves. Thus,
when we cooperate within groups that share a
genetic endowment, we help to preserve the group
and help to disseminate our shared genetic char-
acteristics, often in competition with rival genetic
groups.4
In discussing sociobiology and interpreting bio-
logical evidence, we must be careful, however, not
to anthropomorphize.5 When we look at the natu-
ral world, we often interpret it in anthropomorphic
terms, seeing in animals and even in genes them-
selves the motivations and interests that human
beings have. In other words, we must be careful that
our value judgments do not cloud or confuse our
description of the facts.
While the naturalistic approach of sociobiology
Jeannette Katzir Photog/Shutterstock.com
is provocative and insightful, we might still worry

that it commits the naturalistic fallacy. Just because
altruistic behavior is natural and useful in the evo-
lutionary struggle for survival does not mean that
it is good, just, or right. To see this, let us return
to Hume’s example of incest. Incest might be useful
as a method for disseminating our genetic material—
so long as the negative problems associated with
Does animal behavior provide a guide for human inbreeding are minimized. We do inbreed animals in
ethical behavior? this way in order to select for desirable traits. But
it is still appropriate to ask whether incest is mor
mor-
ally permissible for human beings—the question of
by natural selection, even the capacities to select ought might not be settled by what is.
particular esthetic judgments and religious beliefs
must have arisen by the same mechanistic process,” ETHICAL TERMS
Wilson explained. 3 The basic idea of sociobiology You might have wondered what the difference is
is that human behaviors result from the pressures between calling something “right” and calling it
of natural selection. Understanding human moral- “good.” Consider the ethical meaning for these
ity involves understanding the adaptive advantage terms. Right and wrong usually apply to actions, as
of certain behaviors, which can be studied by com- in “You did the right thing,” or “That is the wrong
paring human behaviors with the behavior of other thing to do.” These terms prescribe things for us to
social animals—from insects to chimpanzees. do or not to do. On the other hand, when we say
Sociobiology attempts to understand altruism, for that something is morally good, we may not explic-
example, in terms of evolutionary processes. From itly recommend doing it. However, we do recom-
this perspective, altruistic concern develops through mend that it be positively regarded. Thus, we say
natural selection because altruistic animals will things such as “Peace is good, and distress is bad.”
help each other survive. Biologist Richard Dawkins It is also interesting that with “right” and “wrong”
explains a related idea in terms of “the selfish gene.” there seems to be no in-between; it is either one or
the other. However, with “good” and “bad” there is of making good judgments. Sometimes this is surely
room for degrees, and some things are thought to be true, as when we are overcome by anger, jealousy,
better or worse than others. or fear and cannot think clearly. Biases and preju-
Other ethical terms require careful consideration. dice may stem from such strong feelings. We think
For example, when we say that something “ought” prejudice is wrong because it prevents us from judg-
or “ought not” to be done, there is a sense of ing rightly. But emotions can often aid good deci-
urgency and obligation. We can refrain from doing sion making. We may, for example, simply feel the
what we ought to do, but the obligation is still there. injustice of a certain situation or the wrongness of
On the other hand, there are certain actions that we someone’s suffering. Furthermore, our caring about
think are permissible but that we are not obligated some issue or person may, in fact, direct us to more
to do. Thus, one may think that there is no obliga- carefully examine the ethical issues involved. How-
tion to help someone in trouble, though it is “mor- ever, some explanation of why we hold a certain
ally permissible” (i.e., not wrong) to do so and even moral position is still required. Simply to say “X
“praiseworthy” to do so in some cases. Somewhat is just wrong” without explanation, or to merely
more specific ethical terms include just and unjust express strong feelings or convictions about “X,” is
and virtuous and vicious. not sufficient.
To a certain extent, which set of terms we use
depends on the particular overall ethical viewpoint INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM,
or theory we adopt. This will become clearer as we SUBJECTIVISM, OBJECTIVISM
discuss and analyze the various ethical theories in Philosophers differ on how we know what is
this first part of the text. good. They also differ on the question of whether
moral judgments refer to something objective or
ETHICS AND REASONS whether they are reports of subjective opinions or
When we evaluate something as right or wrong, dispositions.
good or bad, we appeal to certain norms or rea- To say that something is good is often thought
sons. If I say that affirmative action is unjustified, I to be different from saying that something is yel-
should give reasons for this conclusion; it will not be low or heavy. The latter two qualities are empirical,
acceptable for me to respond that this is merely the known by our senses. However, good or goodness
way I feel. If I have some intuitive negative response is held to be a nonempirical property, said by some
to preferential treatment forms of affirmative action, to be knowable through intuition. A position known
then I will be expected to delve deeper to determine as intuitionism claims that our ideas about ethics
whether there are reasons for this attitude. Perhaps I rest upon some sort of intuitive knowledge of ethi-
have experienced the bad results of such programs. cal truths. This view is associated with G. E. Moore,
Or I may believe that giving preference in hiring whom we discussed earlier. 6 Another philoso-
or school admissions on the basis of race or sex is pher, W. D. Ross, thinks that we have a variety of
unfair. In either case, I will be expected to push the “crystal-clear intuitions” about basic values. These
matter further and explain why it is unfair or even intuitions are clear and distinct beliefs about ethics,
what constitutes fairness and unfairness. which Ross explains using an analogy with mathe-
Reason-giving is essential in philosophical eth- matics: just as we see or intuit the self-evident truth
ics. However, this does not mean that making ethi- of “2 + 2 = 4,” we also see or intuit ethical truths:
cal judgments is and must be purely rational. We for example, that we have a duty to keep our prom-
might be tempted to think that good moral judg- ises. As Ross explains,
ments require us to be objective and not let our feel- Both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain
ings, or emotions, enter into our decision making. crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that
Yet this assumes that feelings always get in the way we can know about the nature of numbers and the
nature of duty . . . we do not read off our knowledge of One worry, however, is that our emotions and
particular branches of duty from a single ideal of the feelings of sympathy or disgust are variable and rel-
good life, but build up our ideal of the good life from ative. Our own emotional responses vary depending
intuitions into the particular branches of duty.7 upon our moods and these responses vary among
A very important question is whether our intu- and between individuals. Emotional responses are
itions point toward some objective moral facts in the relative to culture and even to the subjective dis-
world or whether they are reports of something sub- positions of individuals. Indeed, our own feelings
jective. A significant problem for intuitionism is that change over time and are not reliable or sufficient
people’s moral intuitions seem to differ. Unlike the gauges of what is going on in the external world.
crystal-clear intuitions of mathematics—which are The worry here is that our emotions merely express
shared by all of us—the intuitions of ethics are not internal or subjective responses to things and that
apparently shared by everyone. they do not connect us to an objective and stable
Another view, sometimes called emotivism, source of value.
maintains that when we say something is good, we Other moral theories aim for more objective
are showing our approval of it and recommending it sources for morality. From this standpoint, there
to others rather than describing it. This view is asso- must be objective reasons that ground our subjec-
ciated with the work of twentieth-century philoso- tive and emotional responses to things. Instead
phers such as A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. But it of saying that the things we desire are good, an
has deeper roots in a theory of the moral sentiments, objectivist about ethics will argue that we ought to
such as we find in eighteenth-century philosophers desire things that are good—with an emphasis on
Adam Smith and David Hume. Hume maintains, for the goodness of the thing-in-itself apart from our
example, that reason is “the slave of the passions,” subjective responses. The ancient Greek philosopher
by which he means that the ends or goals we pursue Plato was an objectivist in this sense. Objectivists
are determined by our emotions, passions, and sen- hold that values have an objective reality—that they
timents. Adam Smith maintains that human beings are objects available for knowledge—as opposed
are motivated by the experience of pity, compassion, to subjectivists, who claim that value judgments
and sympathy for other human beings. For Smith, merely express subjective opinion. Plato argues that
ethics develops out of natural sympathy toward one there is some concept or idea called “the Good” and
another, experienced by social beings like ourselves. that we can compare our subjective moral opinions
Emotivism offers an explanation of moral knowl- about morality with this objective standard. Those
edge that is subjective, with moral judgments resting who want to ground morality in God are objectivists,
upon subjective experience. One version of emotiv- as are those who defend some form of natural law
ism makes ethical judgments akin to expressions of ethics, which focuses on essential or objective fea-
approval or disapproval. In this view, to say “murder tures of bodies and their functions. Interestingly, the
is wrong” is to express something like “murder— approach of sociobiology tends not to be objectivist
yuck!” Similarly, to say “courageous self-sacrifice is in this sense. Although the sociobiologist bases her
good” is to express something like “self-sacrifice— study of morality on objective facts in the world, the
yay!” One contemporary author, Leon Kass, whom sociobiologist does not think that moral judgments
we study in Chapter 18, argues that there is wisdom represent moral facts. Instead, as Michael Ruse
in our experiences of disgust and repugnance—that puts it,
our emotional reactions to things reveal deep moral Objective ethics, in the sense of something written on
insight. Kass focuses especially on the “yuck factor” tablets of stone (or engraven on God’s heart) external
that many feel about advanced biotechnologies such to us, has to go. The only reasonable thing that we, as
as cloning. sociobiologists, can say is that morality is something
biology makes us believe in, so that we will further The Structure of Ethical Reasoning
our evolutionary ends.8 and Argument
One of the issues introduced in Ruse’s rejection To be able to reason well in ethics you need to under
under-
of objectivity in ethics is the distinction between stand what constitutes a good argument. We can do
intrinsic and instrumental goods. Instrumental this by looking at an argument’s basic structure.
goods are things that are useful as instruments or This is the structure not only of ethical arguments
tools—we value them as means toward some other about what is good or right but also of arguments
end. Intrinsic goods are things that have value in about what is the case or what is true.
themselves or for their own sake. For example, we Suppose you are standing on the shore and a perper-
might say that life is an intrinsic good and funda- son in the water calls out for help. Should you try to
mentally valuable. But food is an instrumental good rescue that person? You may or may not be able to
because it is a means or tool that is used to sup- swim. You may or may not be sure you could rescue
port life. From Ruse’s perspective, morality itself is the person. In this case, however, there is no time
merely an instrumental good that is used by evolu- for reasoning, as you would have to act promptly.
tion for other purposes. Morality is, from this perper- On the other hand, if this were an imaginary case,
spective, simply a tool that helps the human species you would have to think through the reasons for
to survive. The selfish gene hypothesis of Richard and against trying to rescue the person. You might
Dawkins understands individual human beings conclude that if you could actually rescue the perper-
instrumentally, as carriers of genetic information: son, then you ought to try to do it. Your reasoning
“We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly might go as follows:
programmed to serve the selfish molecules known
as genes.” 9 This runs counter to our usual moral Every human life is valuable.
view, which holds that human beings have intrinsic Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life
or inherent value. The idea that some things have should be attempted.
My swimming out to rescue this person has a good
intrinsic value is an idea that is common to a variety
chance of saving his life.
of approaches that claim that ethics is objective. The
Therefore, I ought to do so.
intrinsic value of a thing is supposed to be an objec-
tive fact about that thing, which has no relation to
Or you might conclude that you could not save this
our subjective response to that thing. Claims about
person, and your reasoning might go like this:
intrinsic value show up in arguments about human
rights and about the environment. Do human
beings, ecosystems, or species have intrinsic value, Every human life is valuable.
Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life
or is the value of these things contained within our
should be attempted.
subjective responses and in their instrumental uses?
In this case, there is no chance of saving this life
This question shows us that the metaethical theories because I cannot swim.
are connected to important practical issues. Thus, I am not obligated to try to save him (although,
if others are around who can help, I might be
ETHICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTS obligated to try to get them to help).
It is important to know how to reason well in think-
ing or speaking about ethical matters. This is helpful Some structure like this is implicit in any ethi-
not only in trying to determine what to think about cal argument, although some are longer and more
controversial ethical matters but also in arguing for complex chains than the simple form given here.
something you believe is right and in critically eval- One can recognize the reasons in an argument by
uating positions held by others. their introduction through key words such as since,
because, and given that. The conclusion often con- what lying actually is. Must it be verbal? Must one
tains terms such as thus and therefore. The reasons have an intent to deceive? What is deceit itself?
supporting the conclusion are called premises. In a Other conceptual issues central to ethical arguments
sound argument, the premises are true and the con- may involve questions such as, “What constitutes a
clusion follows from them. In the case presented ear
ear- ‘person’?” (in arguments over abortion, for exam-
lier, then, we want to know whether you can save ple) and “What is ‘cruel and unusual punishment’?”
this person and also whether his life is valuable. We (in death penalty arguments, for example). Some-
also need to know whether the conclusion actually times, differences of opinion about an ethical issue
follows from the premises. In the case of the earlier are a matter of differences not in values but in the
examples, it does. If you say you ought to do what meaning of the terms used.
will save a life and you can do it, then you ought to Ethical arguments often also rely on factual
do it. However, there may be other principles that claims. In our example, we might want to know
would need to be brought into the argument, such whether it was actually true that you could save
as whether and why one is always obligated to save the drowning person. In arguments about the death
someone else’s life when one can. penalty, we may want to know whether such pun-
To know under what conditions a conclusion ishment is a deterrent. In such a case, we need
actually follows from the premises, we would need to know what scientific studies have found and
to analyze arguments in much greater detail than whether the studies themselves were well grounded.
we can do here. Suffice it to say, however, that the To have adequate factual grounding, we will want to
connection is a logical connection—in other words, seek out a range of reliable sources of information
it must make rational sense. You can improve your and be open-minded. The chapters in Part II of this
ability to reason well in ethics first by being able to book include factual material that is relevant to ethi-
pick out the reasons and the conclusion in an argu- cal decisions about the topics under consideration.
ment. Only then can you subject them to critical It is important to be clear about the distinction
examination in ways we suggest here. between facts and values when dealing with moral
conflict and disagreement. We need to ask whether
Evaluating and Making Good Arguments we disagree about the values involved, about the
Ethical reasoning can be done well or done poorly. concepts and terms we are employing, or about the
Ethical arguments can be constructed well or con- facts connected to the case.
structed poorly. A good argument is a sound argu- There are various ways in which reasoning can
ment. It has a valid form in which the conclusion go wrong or be fallacious. We began this chapter by
actually follows from the premises, and the prem- considering the fallacy of begging the question
ises or reasons given for the conclusion are true. An or circular argument. Such reasoning draws on
argument is poorly constructed when it is fallacious the argument’s conclusion to support its premises,
or when the reasons on which it is based are not as in “abortion is wrong because it is immoral.”
true or are uncertain. An ethical argument always Another familiar problem of argumentation is the
involves some claim about values—for example, ad hominem fallacy. In this fallacy, people say
that saving a life is good. These value-based claims something like, “That can’t be right because just
must be established through some theory of values. look who is saying it.” They look at the source of the
Part I of this book examines different theories that opinion rather than the reasons given for it. You can
help establish basic values. find out more about these and other fallacies from
Ethical arguments also involve conceptual and almost any textbook in logic or critical thinking.
factual matters. Conceptual matters are those that You also can improve your understanding of ethi-
relate to the meaning of terms or concepts. For cal arguments by making note of a particular type of
example, in a case of lying, we would want to know reasoning that is often used in ethics: arguments
from analogy. In this type of argument, one com-

pares familiar examples with the issue being disputed. Ethical Theory
If the two cases are similar in relevant ways, then
whatever one concludes about the first familiar case
one should also conclude about the disputed case.
For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (as discussed Ethical Principle
in Chapter 11) once asked whether it would be ethi-
cally acceptable to “unplug” someone who had been
attached to you and who was using your kidneys
to save his life. If you say that you are justified in Ethical Judgment
unplugging, then a pregnant woman is also justified
in doing the same with regard to her fetus. The reader
is prompted to critically examine such an argument
by asking whether or not the two cases were similar We can think of the diagram as a ladder. In prac-
in relevant ways—that is, whether the analogy fits. tice, we can start at the ladder’s top or bottom. At the
Finally, we should note that giving reasons to top, at the level of theory, we can start by clarifying
justify a conclusion is also not the same as giving for ourselves what we think are basic ethical values.
an explanation for why one believes something. We then move downward to the level of principles
A woman might explain that she does not sup- generated from the theory. The next step is to apply
port euthanasia because that was the way she was these principles to concrete cases. We can also start
brought up or that she is opposed to the death pen- at the bottom of the ladder, facing a particular ethical
alty because she cannot stand to see someone die. choice or dilemma. We can work our way back up the
To justify such beliefs, one would need rather to give ladder, thinking through the principles and theories
reasons that show not why one does, in fact, believe that implicitly guide our concrete decisions. Ultimately
something but why one should believe it. Nor are and ideally, we come to a basic justification, or the
rationalizations justifying reasons. They are usually elements of what would be an ethical theory. If we
reasons given after the fact that are not one’s true look at the actual practice of thinking people as they
reasons. Rationalizations are usually excuses, used develop their ethical views over time, the movement
to explain away bad behavior. These false reasons is probably in both directions. We use concrete cases
are given to make us look better to others or our- to reform our basic ethical views, and we use the basic
selves. To argue well about ethical matters, we need ethical views to throw light on concrete cases.
to examine and give reasons that support the con- An example of this movement in both directions
clusions we draw. would be if we start with the belief that pleasure
is the ultimate value and then find that applying
ETHICAL THEORY this value in practice leads us to do things that are
Good reasoning in ethics usually involves either contrary to common moral sense or that are repug-
implicit or explicit reference to an ethical theory. An nant to us and others. We may then be forced to
ethical theory is a systematic exposition of a par par-- look again and possibly alter our views about the
ticular view about what is the nature and basis of moral significance of pleasure. Or we may change
good or right. The theory provides reasons or norms our views about the rightness or wrongness of some
for judging acts to be right or wrong; it provides a particular act or practice on the basis of our theo-
justification for these norms. These norms can then retical reflections. Obviously, this sketch of moral
be used as a guide for action. We can diagram the reasoning is quite simplified. Feminists and others
relationship between ethical theories and moral deci- have criticized this model of ethical reasoning, partly
sion making as follows. because it claims that ethics is governed by general
principles that are supposedly applicable to all ethi- That was good because it helped Jim develop his
cal situations. Does this form of reasoning give due self-esteem—or it was bad because it caused Jim
consideration to the particularities of individual, to believe things about himself that were not true.
concrete cases? Can we really make a general judg- (Consequences)
ment about the value of truthfulness or courage that
will help us know what to do in particular cases in Although we generally think that a person’s motive
which these issues play a role? is relevant to the overall moral judgment about his
or her action, we tend to think that it reflects primar
primar-
TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY ily on our moral evaluation of the person. We also
In Part I of this book, we consider the following types have good reasons to think that the results of actions
of moral theory: egoism and contractarianism, utili-
utili matter morally. Those theories that base moral judg-
tarianism, deontological ethics, natural law, virtue ments on consequences are called consequentialist
ethics,, and feminist ethics. These theories differ in or sometimes teleological moral theories (from the
terms of what they say we should look at in mak- Greek root telos, meaning “goal” or “end”). Those
ing moral judgments about actions or practices. For theories that hold that actions can be right or wrong
example, does it matter morally that I tried to do the regardless of their consequences are called noncon-
right thing or that I had a good motive? Surely it sequentialist or deontological theories (from the
must make some moral difference, we think. But sup- Greek root deon, meaning “duty”).
pose that in acting with good motives I violate some- One moral theory we will examine is utilitari-
one’s rights. Does this make the action a bad action? anism. It provides us with an example of a conse-
We would probably be inclined to say yes. Suppose, quentialist moral theory in which we judge whether
however, that in violating someone’s rights, I am an action is better than alternatives by its actual or
able to bring about a great good. Does this justify the expected results or consequences; actions are then
violation of rights? Some theories judge actions in judged in terms of the promotion of human hap-
terms of their motive, some in terms of the character piness. Kant’s moral theory, which we will also
or nature of the act itself, and others in terms of the examine, provides us with an example of a non-
consequences of the actions or practices. consequentialist theory, according to which acts are
We often appeal to one of these types of reason. judged right or wrong independently of their conse-
Take a situation in which I lie to a person, Jim. We quences; in particular, acts are judged by whether
can make the following judgments about this action. they conform to requirements of rationality and
Note the different types of reasons given for the human dignity. The other ethical theories that we
judgments. will examine stress human nature as the source of
what is right and wrong. Some elements of these
theories are deontological and some teleological. So,
also, some teleological theories are consequentialist
Motive Act Consequences
in that they advise us to produce some good. But if
the good is an ideal, such as virtue or self-realization,
then such theories differ from consequentialist the-
ories such as utilitarianism. As anyone who has
That was good because you intended to make Jim
tried to put some order to the many ethical theories
happy by telling him a white lie—or it was bad
knows, no theory completely and easily fits one clas-
because you meant to deceive him and do him harm.
(Motive) sification, even those given here. Feminist theories
That was good because it is good to make people of care provide yet another way of determining what
happy—or it was bad because it is always wrong to one ought to do (see Chapter 9). In Part II of this
tell a lie. (Act) text, we will examine several concrete ethical issues.
As we do so, we will note how various ethical theo- Most moral philosophers think that a course on
ries analyze the problems from different perspectives ethics is ethically useful. It should help students
and sometimes reach different conclusions about understand the nature of ethical problems and help
what is morally right or wrong, better or worse. them think critically about ethical matters by pro-
viding conceptual tools and skills. It should enable
CAN ETHICS BE TAUGHT? them to form and critically analyze ethical argu-
It would be interesting to know just why some col- ments. It is up to the individual, however, to use
lege and university programs require their students these skills to reason about ethical matters. A study
to take a course in ethics. Does this requirement of ethics should also lead students to respect oppos-
stem from a belief that a course in ethics or moral ing views because it requires them to analyze care-
philosophy can actually make people good? fully the arguments that support views contrary to
When asked whether ethics can be taught, stu- their own. It also provides opportunities to consider
dents have given a variety of answers. “If it can’t be the reasonableness of at least some viewpoints that
taught, then why are we taking this class?” a stu- they may not have considered.
dent wondered. Another student responded, “Look In this opening chapter, we have learned some-
at the behavior of certain corporate executives who thing about what the philosophical study of ethics
have been found guilty of criminal conduct. They is. We have considered a few metaethical issues. We
surely haven’t learned proper ethical values.” Still have provided a description of ethical reasoning and
others disagreed with both views. Although certain arguments. We have briefly considered the nature of
ideals or types of knowledge can be taught, ethical ethical theories and the role they play in ethical rea-
behavior cannot be taught because it is a matter of soning. We will examine these theories more care-
individual choice, they said. fully in the chapters to come, and we will see how
The ancient Greek philosopher Plato thought that they might help us analyze and come to conclusions
ethics could be taught. He argues that “All evil is about particular ethical issues.
ignorance.” In other words, we do what is wrong The reading selections for this chapter come from
because we do not know or believe it is wrong; and David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, first pub-
if we truly believe that something is right, we should lished in 1739, and from C. L. Stevenson, a philoso-
necessarily do it. Now, we are free to disagree with pher associated with the Anglo-American tradition
Plato by appealing to our own experience. If I know in twentieth-century philosophy. The excerpt from
that I should not have that second piece of pie, does Hume discusses the problem of deriving normative
this mean that I will not eat it? Ever? Plato might claims from descriptive claims, the problem of deriv-
attempt to convince us that he is right by examining ing an ought from an is, with a particular focus on
or clarifying what he means by the phrase to know. the question of the morality of incest. Stevenson dis-
If we were really convinced with our whole heart cusses the difficulty of connecting ethics and natural
and mind that something is wrong, then we might science, while also outlining an emotivist approach
be highly likely (if not determined) not to do it. to understanding ethical terms.
However, whether ethics courses should attempt to
convince students of such things is surely debatable. NOTES
Another aspect of the problem of teaching ethics
concerns the problem of motivation. If one knows 1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality
something to be the right thing to do, does there still (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 4.
remain the question of why we should do it? One 2. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis
way to motivate people to be ethical may be to show (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
them that it is in their own best interest to do the 3. E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA:
right thing. Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 2.
4. See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: 6. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethics (Buffalo, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1989). Prometheus, 1903).
5. See Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of 7. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford:
Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 144–45.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 8. Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?
Also see Morton Hunt, The Compassionate Beast: (New York: Springer, 1985), p. 237.
What Science Is Discovering about the Human 9. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th
Side of Humankind (New York: William Morrow, Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford University
1990). Press, 2006), p. xxi.
R E A D I N G
Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact*
DAV I D H U M E
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Hume employ the fact of animal incest to advance his argument that morality does not consist merely
of “matters of fact” and that morality is not merely an “object of reason”?
2. Explain Hume’s idea that morality is a matter of feelings and sentiments.
3. Why does Hume have a problem with deducing an ought from an is?
I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human

species is criminal, and why the very same
action, and the same relations in animals have
or praise: But still this discovery supposes a separate
being in these moral distinctions, and a being, which
depends only on the will and appetite, and which,
not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity? If both in thought and reality, may be distinguished
it be answered, that this action is innocent in ani- from the reason. Animals are susceptible of the same
mals, because they have not reason sufficient to relations, with respect to each other, as the human
discover its turpitude; but that man, being endowed species, and therefore would also be susceptible of
with that faculty which ought to restrain him to his the same morality, if the essence of morality con-
duty, the same action instantly becomes criminal to sisted in these relations. Their want of a sufficient
him; should this be said, I would reply, that this is degree of reason may hinder them from perceiv-
evidently arguing in a circle. For before reason can ing the duties and obligations of morality, but can
perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and never hinder these duties from existing; since they
consequently is independent of the decisions of our must antecedently exist, in order to their being per
per-
reason, and is their object more properly than their ceived. Reason must find them, and can never pro-
effect. According to this system, then, every animal, duce them. This argument deserves to be weighed,
that has sense, and appetite, and will; that is, every as being, in my opinion, entirely decisive.
animal must be susceptible of all the same virtues
and vices, for which we ascribe praise and blame
From David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, (1739; Project
to human creatures. All the difference is, that our Gutenberg, 2010), bk. III, pt. 1, sec. 1, http://www.gutenberg.org/
superior reason may serve to discover the vice or files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm
virtue, and by that means may augment the blame *Title supplied by the editor.
Nor does this reasoning only prove, that moral- regarded as a considerable advancement of the specu-
ity consists not in any relations, that are the objects lative sciences; though, like that too, it has little or no
of science; but if examined, will prove with equal influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or
certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, concern us more, than our own sentiments of plea-
which can be discovered by the understanding. This sure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to
is the second part of our argument; and if it can be virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be req-
made evident, we may conclude, that morality is uisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour.
not an object of reason. But can there be any dif dif- I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an
ficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not mat- observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some
ters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? importance. In every system of morality, which I have
Take any action allowed to be vicious: Willful mur- hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the
der, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way
you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or
which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, makes observations concerning human affairs; when
you find only certain passions, motives, volitions of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of
and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,
case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you I meet with no proposition that is not connected with
consider the object. You never can find it, till you an ought, or an ought not. This change is impercep-
turn your reflection into your own breast, and find tible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as
a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, this ought, or ought not, expresses some new rela-
towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it tion or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be
is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in your- observed and explained; and at the same time that
self, not in the object. So that when you pronounce a reason should be given, for what seems altogether
any action or character to be vicious, you mean noth- inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduc-
ing, but that from the constitution of your nature you tion from others, which are entirely different from it.
have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the con- But as authors do not commonly use this precaution,
templation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and
compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert
according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that
objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this dis- the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely
covery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
R E A D I N G
Emotivism and Ethics
C. L. STEVENSON
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. What does Stevenson mean when he says that ethical terms are not (or not simply) descriptive?
2. How does the example of stealing illustrate Stevenson’s understanding of the meaning of ethical terms?
3. What does he mean by the “emotive meaning” of ethical terms?
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Charles Dexter Ward
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Title: The case of Charles Dexter Ward
Author: H. P. Lovecraft
Release date: May 5, 2024 [eBook #73547]
Language: English
Original publication: New York, NY: Weird Tales, 1941
Credits: Greg Weeks, Mary Meehan and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CASE

OF CHARLES DEXTER WARD ***
The Case of Charles Dexter
Ward
By H. P. LOVECRAFT
[Transcriber's Note: This etext was produced from

Weird Tales May, July 1941
Extensive research did not uncover any evidence that
the U.S. copyright on this publication was renewed.]
Here is THE CASE OF CHARLES DEXTER WARD—the last, and
many think the best, the most exciting—of all H. P. Lovecraft's
superb weird fantasies.
Discovered after years of difficult search—and pieced together with
as much careful patience as Charles Ward puts into his terrifying
researches in the story—August Derleth and Donald Wandrei at long
last had all the scattered pages of Lovecraft's novel complete.
The manuscript, gathered over the course of many years from attics,
forgotten strong boxes and old bureaus, is published now—in Weird
Tales.
In it you are going to read again of Cthulhu and the fearful
Necronomicon; in these pages you will also find a perfect wealth of
new thrills. In Charles Ward you will read ... but why go on, when
you're just raring to get ahead with the story?
So just turn the page—and on with the show!
The essential Saltes of Animals may be so prepared and preserved,

that an ingenious Man may have the whole Ark of Noah in his owne
Studie and raise the fine shape of an Animal out of its Ashes at his
Pleasure; and by the lyke method from the essential Saltes of
humane Dust, a Philosopher may, without any criminal Necromancy,
call up the Shape of any dead Ancestour from the Dust whereinto his
Bodie has been incinerated.
BORELLUS.
CONTENTS
1. A Result and a Prologue
2. An Antecedent and a Horror
3. A Search and an Evocation
4. A Mutation and a Madness
5. A Nightmare and a Cataclysm
1. A Result and a Prologue
From a private hospital for the insane near Providence, Rhode
Island, there recently disappeared an exceedingly singular person.
He bore the name of Charles Dexter Ward, and was placed under
restraint most reluctantly by his grieving father.
The patient seemed oddly older than his twenty-six years would
warrant; his face had taken on a subtle cast which only the very
aged usually acquire. While his organic processes showed a certain
queerness of proportion which nothing in medical experience can
parallel. Respiration and heart action had a baffling lack of symmetry,
the voice was lost, so that no sounds above a whisper were
possible, digestion was incredibly prolonged and minimized. The
skin had a morbid chill and dryness, and the cellular structure of the
tissue seemed exaggeratedly coarse and loosely-knit. Even a large
olive birthmark on his right hip had disappeared, whilst there had
formed on his chest a very peculiar mole or blackish spot of which no
trace existed before.
Psychologically, too, Charles Ward was unique. His madness held
no affinity to any sort recorded in even the latest and most
exhaustive of treatises, and was conjoined to a mental force which
would have made him a genius or a leader had it not been twisted
into strange and grotesque forms.
Only Dr. Willett, who brought Charles Ward into the world and
watched his growth of body and mind ever since, seemed frightened
at the thought of his future freedom. He had had a terrible
experience and had made a terrible discovery which he dared not
reveal to his skeptical colleagues. Willett, indeed, presents a minor
mystery all his own in his connection with the case. He was the last
to see the patient before his flight, and emerged from that final
conversation in a state of mixed horror and relief which several
recalled when Ward's escape became known three hours later. That
escape itself is one of the unsolved wonders of Dr. Waite's hospital.
A window open above a sheer drop of sixty feet could hardly explain
it, yet after that talk with Willett the youth was undeniably gone.
He had found Ward in his room, but shortly after his departure the
attendants knocked in vain. When they opened the door the patient
was not there, and all they found was the open window with a chill
April breeze blowing in a cloud of fine bluish-gray dust that almost
choked them. True, the dogs had howled some time before; but that
was while Willett was still present, and they had caught nothing and
shown no disturbance later on. Ward's father was told at once over
the telephone, but he seemed more saddened than surprised. By the
time Dr. Waite called in person, Dr. Willett had been talking with him,
and both disavowed any knowledge or complicity in the escape. Only
from certain closely confidential friends of Willett and the senior
Ward have any clues been gained, and even these are too wildly
fantastic for general credence. The one fact which remains is that up
to the present time no trace of the missing madman has been
unearthed.
Charles Ward was an antiquarian from infancy, no doubt gaining his

taste from the venerable town around him, and from the relics of the
past which filled every corner of his parent's old mansion in Prospect
Street on the crest of the hill. With the years his devotion to ancient
things increased; so that history, genealogy, and the study of
Colonial architecture, furniture, and craftsmanship at length crowded
everything else from his sphere of interests. These tastes are
important to remember in considering his madness. One would have
fancied the patient literally transferred to a former age through some
obscure sort of auto-hypnosis. The odd thing was that Ward seemed
no longer interested in the antiquities he knew so well. He had, it
appears, lost his regard for them through sheer familiarity; and all his
final efforts were obviously bent toward mastering those common
facts of the modern world which had been so totally and
unmistakably expunged from his brain. His whole program of reading
and conversation was determined by a frantic wish to imbibe such
knowledge of his own life and of the ordinary practical and cultural
background of the twentieth century as ought to have been his by
virtue of his birth in 1902 and his education in the schools of our own
time. Alienists are of the dominant opinion that the escaped patient is
"lying low" in some humble and unexacting position till his stock of
modern information can be brought up to the normal.
The beginning of Ward's madness is a matter of dispute among
alienists. Dr. Lyman, the eminent Boston authority, places it in 1919
or 1920, during the boy's last year at the Moses Brown School, when
he suddenly turned from the study of the past to the study of the
occult, and refused to qualify for college on the ground that he had
individual researches of much greater importance to make.
It is, broadly speaking, undeniable that the winter of 1919-20 saw a
great change in Ward; whereby he abruptly dropped his general
antiquarian pursuits and embarked on a desperate delving into
occult subjects both at home and abroad, varied only by this
strangely persistent search for his fore-father's grave.
From this opinion, however, Dr. Willett substantially dissents, basing
his verdict on his close and continuous knowledge of the patient, and
on certain frightful investigations and discoveries which he made
toward the last.
Those investigations and discoveries have left their mark upon him;
so that his voice trembles when he tells them, and his hand trembles
when he tries to write of them.
The true madness, he is certain, came with a later change; after the
Curwen portrait and the ancient papers had been unearthed; after a
trip to strange foreign places had been made, and some terrible
invocations chanted under strange and secret circumstances; after
certain answers to these invocations had been plainly indicated, and
a frantic letter penned under agonizing and inexplicable conditions;
after the wave of vampirism and the ominous Pawtuxet gossip; and
after the patient's memory commenced to exclude contemporary
images whilst his voice failed and his physical aspect underwent the
subtle modification so many subsequently noticed.
It was only about this time, Willett points out with much acuteness,
that the nightmare qualities became indubitably linked with Ward,
and the doctor feels shudderingly sure that enough solid evidence
exists to sustain the youth's claim regarding his crucial discovery.
There were the mysteries and coincidences of the Orne and
Hutchinson letters, and the problem of the Curwen penmanship and
of what the detectives brought to light about Dr. Allen; these things,
and the terrible message in mediaeval minuscules found in Willett's
pocket when he gained consciousness after his shocking
experience.
And most conclusive of all, there are the two hideous results which
the doctor obtained from a certain pair of formulae during his final
investigations; results which virtually proved the authenticity of the
papers and of their monstrous implications at the same time that
those papers were borne for ever from human knowledge.
One must look back at Charles Ward's earlier life as at something

belonging as much to the past as the antiquities he loved so keenly.
His home was a great Georgian mansion atop the well-nigh
precipitous hill that rises just east of the river, and from the rear
windows of its rambling wings he could look dizzily out over all the
clustered spires, domes, roofs and skyscraper summits of the lower
town to the purple hills of the countryside beyond. Here he was born,
and from the lovely classic porch of the double-bayed brick façade
his nurse had first wheeled him in his carriage; past the little white
farmhouse of two hundred years before that the town had long ago
overtaken, and on toward the stately colleges along the shady,
sumptuous street, whose old square brick mansions and smaller
wooden houses with narrow, heavy-columned Doric porches
dreamed solid and exclusive amidst their generous yards and
gardens.
He had been wheeled, too, along sleepy Congdon Street, one tier
lower down on the steep hill, and with all its eastern houses on high
terraces. The small wooden houses averaged a greater age here, for
it was up this hill that the growing town had climbed. One of the
child's first memories is of the great westward sea of hazy roofs and
domes and steeples and far hills which he saw one winter afternoon
from that great railed embankment, all violet and mystic against a
fevered, apocalyptic sunset of reds and golds and purples and
curious greens. The vast marble dome of the State House stood out
in massive silhouette, its crowning statue haloed fantastically by a
break in one of the tinted stratus clouds that barred the flaming sky.
When he was larger his famous walks began; first with his
impatiently dragged nurse and then alone in dreamy meditation. One
may picture him yet as he was in those days; tall, slim, and blond,
with studious eyes and a slight stoop, dressed somewhat carelessly,
and giving a dominant impression of harmless awkwardness rather
than attractiveness.
He would seek for vivid contrasts; spending half a walk in the
crumbling colonial regions northwest of his home, where the hill
drops to the lower eminence of Stampers Hill with its ghetto and
Negro quarter clustering round the place where the Boston
stagecoach used to start before the Revolution, and the other half in
the gracious southerly realm about George, Benevolent, Power, and
Williams Streets, where the old slope holds unchanged the fine
estates and bits of walled garden and steep green lane in which so
many fragrant memories linger.
Dr. Willett is certain that, up to this ill-omened winter of first change,
Charles Ward's antiquarianism was free from every trace of the
morbid. Graveyards held for him no particular attraction beyond their
quaintness and historic value, and of anything like violence or
savage instinct he was utterly devoid. Then, by insidious degrees,
there appeared to develop a curious sequel to one of his
genealogical triumphs of the year before; when he had discovered
among his maternal ancestors a certain very long-lived man named
Joseph Curwen, who had come from Salem in March of 1692, and
about whom a whispered series of highly peculiar and disquieting
stories clustered.
Ward's great-great-grandfather Welcome Potter had in 1785 married
a certain "Ann Tillinghast, daughter to Mrs. Eliza, daughter to Capt.
James Tillinghast," of whose paternity the family had preserved no
trace. Late in 1918, whilst examining a volume of original town
records in manuscript, the young genealogist encountered an entry
describing a legal change of name, by which in 1772 a Mrs. Eliza
Curwen, widow of Joseph Curwen, resumed, along with her seven-
year-old daughter Ann, her maiden name of Tillinghast; on the
ground "that her Husband's name was become a public Reproach by
Reason of what was knowne after his Decease; the which confirming
antient common Rumour, tho' not to be credited by a loyall Wife till
so proven as to be wholely past Doubting." This entry came to light
upon the accidental separation of two leaves which had been
carefully pasted together and treated as one by a labored revision of
the page numbers.
It was at once clear to Charles Ward that he had indeed discovered
a hitherto unknown great-great-great-grandfather. Having discovered
his own relationship to this apparently "hushed-up" character, he at
once proceeded to hunt out as systematically as possible whatever
he might find concerning him. In this excited quest he eventually
succeeded beyond his highest expectations, for old letters, diaries
and sheaves of unpublished memoirs in cobwebbed Providence
garrets and elsewhere yielded many illuminating passages which
their writers had not thought it worth their while to destroy. One
important sidelight came from a point as remote as New York, where
some Rhode Island colonial correspondence was stored in the
Museum at Fraunces' Tavern. The really crucial thing, though, and
what in Dr. Willett's opinion formed the definite source of Ward's
undoing, was the matter found in August, 1919, behind the panelling
of the crumbling house in Olney Court. It was that, beyond a doubt,
which opened up those black vistas whose end was deeper than the
pit.
2. An Antecedent and a Horror
Joseph Curwen, as revealed by the rambling legends embodied in
what Ward heard and unearthed, was a very astonishing, enigmatic,
obscurely horrible individual. He had fled from Salem to Providence
—that universal haven of the odd, the free, and the dissenting—at
the beginning of the great witchcraft panic; being in fear of
accusation because of his solitary ways and queer chemical or
alchemical experiments. He was a colorless-looking man of about
thirty, and was soon found qualified to become a freeman of
Providence; thereafter buying a home lot just north of Gregory
Dexter's at about the foot of Olney Street. His house was built on
Stampers Hill west of the Town Street, in what later became Olney
Court; and in 1761 he replaced this with a larger one, on the same
site, which is still standing.
Now the first odd thing about Joseph Curwen was that he did not
seem to grow much older than he had been on his arrival. He
engaged in shipping enterprises, purchased wharfage near Mile-End
Cove, helped rebuild the Great Bridge in 1713, and in 1723 was one
of the founders of the Congregational Church on the hill; but always
did he retain the nondescript aspect of a man not greatly over thirty
or thirty-five. As the decades mounted up, this singular quality began
to excite wide notice; but Curwen always explained it by saying that
he came of hardy forefathers, and practiced a simplicity of living
which did not wear him out. How such simplicity could be reconciled
with the inexplicable comings and goings of the secretive merchant,
and with the queer gleamings of his windows at all hours of night,
was not very clear to the townsfolk; and they were prone to assign
other reasons for his continued youth and longevity. It was held, for
the most part, that Curwen's incessant mixings and boilings of
chemicals had much to do with his condition. At length, when over
fifty years had passed since the stranger's advent, and without
producing more than five years' apparent change in his face and
physique, the people began to whisper more darkly; and to meet
more than halfway that desire for isolation which he had always
shown.
Private letters and diaries of the period reveal, too, a multitude of
other reasons why Joseph Curwen was marvelled at, feared, and
finally shunned like a plague. His passion for graveyards, in which he
was glimpsed at all hours and under all conditions, was notorious;
though no one had witnessed any deed on his part which could
actually be termed ghoulish. On the Pawtuxet Road he had a farm,
at which he generally lived during the summer, and to which he
would frequently be seen riding at various odd times of the day or
night. Here his only visible servants, farmers, and caretakers were a
sullen pair of aged Narragansett Indians; the husband dumb and
curiously scarred, and the wife of a very repulsive cast of
countenance, probably due to a mixture of Negro blood. In the lean-
to of this house was the laboratory where most of the chemical
experiments were conducted. Curious porters and teamers who
delivered bottles, bags or boxes at the small rear door would
exchange accounts of the fantastic flasks, crucibles, alembics, and
furnaces they saw in the low-shelved room; and prophesied in
whispers that the close-mouthed "chymist"—by which they meant
alchemist—would not be long in finding the Philosopher's Stone. The
nearest neighbors to this farm—the Fenners, a quarter of a mile
away—had still queerer things to tell of certain sounds which they
insisted came from the Curwen place in the night. There were cries,
they said, and sustained howlings; and they did not like the large
number of livestock which thronged the pastures. Then, too, there
was something very obnoxious about a certain great stone
outbuilding with only high narrow slits for windows.
Great Bridge idlers likewise had much to say of Curwen's town
house in Olney Court; not so much the fine new one built in 1761,
when the man must have been nearly a century old, but the first low
gambrel-roofed one with the windowless attic and shingled sides,
whose timbers he took the peculiar precaution of burning after its
demolition. Here there was less mystery, it is true; but the hours at
which lights were seen, the secretiveness of the two swarthy
foreigners who comprised the only manservants, the hideous
indistinct mumbling of the incredibly aged French housekeeper, the
large amounts of food seen to enter a door within which only four
persons lived, and the quality of certain voices often heard in muffled
conversation at highly unseasonable times, all combined with what
was known of the Pawtuxet farm to give the place a bad name.
In choicer circles, too, the Curwen home was by no means

undiscussed; for as the newcomer had gradually worked into the
church and trading life of the town, he had naturally made
acquaintances of the better sort, whose company and conversation
he was well fitted by education to enjoy.
His birth was known to be good, since the Curwens or Carwens of
Salem needed no introduction in New England. It developed that
Joseph Curwen had traveled much in very early life, living for a time
in England and making at least two voyages to the Orient; and his
speech, when he deigned to use it, was that of a learned and
cultivated Englishman. There seemed to lurk in his bearing some
cryptic, sardonic arrogance, as if he had come to find all human
beings dull through having moved among stranger and more potent
entities.
In 1746 Mr. John Merritt, an elderly English gentleman of literary and
scientific leanings, came from Newport to the town which was so
rapidly overtaking it in standing, and built a fine country seat on the
Neck in what is now the heart of the best residence section where he
lived in considerable style and comfort. Hearing of Curwen as the
owner of the best library in Providence, Mr. Merritt early paid him a
call, and was more cordially received than most other callers at the
house had been. Curwen suggested a visit to the farmhouse and
laboratory whither he had never invited anyone before; and the two
drove out at once in Mr. Merritt's coach.
Mr. Merritt maintained that the titles of the books in the special library
of thaumaturgical, alchemical, and theological subjects which
Curwen kept in a front room were alone sufficient to inspire him with
a lasting loathing. This bizarre collection, besides a host of standard
works which Mr. Merritt was not too alarmed to envy, embraced
nearly all the cabalists, demonologists, and magicians known to
man; and was a treasure-house of lore in the doubtful realms of
alchemy and astrology. Hermes Trismegistus in Mesnard's edition,
the Turba Philosophorum, Geber's Liber Investigationis, and
Artephous' Key of Wisdom all were there; with the cabalistic Zohar,
Peter Jammy's set of Albertus Magnus, Raymond Lully's Ars Magna
et Ultima in Zetzner's edition, Roger Bacon's Thesaurus Chemicus,
Fludd's Clavis Alchimiae, and Trithemius' De Lapide Philosophico
crowding them close. Mediaeval Jews and Arabs were represented
in profusion, and Mr. Merritt turned pale when, upon taking down a
fine volume conspicuously labeled as the Qunoon-e-Islam, he found
it was in truth the forbidden Necronomicon of the mad Arab Abdul Al-
hazred, of which he had heard such monstrous things whispered
some years previously after the exposure of nameless rites at the
strange little fishing village of Kingsport, in the Province of the
Massachusetts-Bay.
But the worthy gentleman owned himself most impalpably disquieted
by a mere minor detail. On the huge mahogany table there lay face
downward a badly worn copy of Borellus, bearing many cryptical
marginalia and interlineations in Curwen's hand.
The book was open at about its middle, and one paragraph
displayed such thick and tremulous pen-strokes beneath the lines of
mystic black-letters that the visitor could not resist scanning it
through. He recalled it to the end of his days, writing it down from
memory in his diary and once trying to recite it to his close friend Dr.
Checkley, till he saw how greatly it disturbed that urbane rector. It
read:
The essential Saltes of Animals may be so prepared and preserved,
that an ingenious Man may have the whole Ark of Noah in his owne
Studie, and raise the fine Shape of an Animal out of its Ashes at his
Pleasure; and by the lyke Method from the essential Saltes of
humane Dust, a Philosopher may, without any criminal Necromancy,
call up the Shape of any dead Ancestour from the Dust whereinto his
Bodie has been incinerated.
It was near the docks along the southerly part of the Town Street,
however, that the worst things were muttered about Joseph Curwen.
Sailors are superstitious folk; and all made strange furtive signs of
protection when they saw the slim, deceptively young-looking figure
with its yellow hair and slight stoop entering the Curwen warehouse
in Doubloon Street or talking with captains and supercargos on the
long quay where the Curwen ships rode restlessly. Curwen's own
clerks and captains hated and feared him, and all his sailors were
mongrel riff-raff from Martinique, St. Eustatius, Havana, or Port
Royal. It was, in a way, the frequency with which these sailors were
replaced, which inspired the acutest and most tangible part of the
fear in which the old man was held, and in time it became
exceedingly difficult for Curwen to keep his oddly assorted hands.
By 1760 Joseph Curwen was virtually an outcast, suspected of
vague horrors and daemoniac alliances which seemed all the more
menacing because they could not be named, understood, or even
proved to exist.
Meanwhile the merchant's worldly affairs were prospering. He had a
virtual monopoly of the town's trade in saltpetre, black pepper, and
cinnamon, and easily led any other one shipping establishment save
the Browns in his importation of brassware, indigo, cotton, woollens,
salt, rigging, iron, paper and English goods of every kind. Curwen
was, in fact, one of the prime exporters of the Colony.
The sight of this strange, pallid man, hardly middle-aged in aspect

yet certainly not less than a full century old, seeking at last to
emerge from a cloud of fright and detestation too vague to pin down
or analyze, was at once a pathetic, a dramatic, and a contemptible
thing. Such is the power of wealth and of surface gestures, however,
that there came indeed a slight abatement in the visible aversion
displayed toward him; especially after the rapid disappearances of
his sailors abruptly ceased. He must likewise have begun to practice
an extreme care and secrecy in his graveyard expeditions, for he
was never again caught at such wanderings; whilst the rumors of
uncanny sounds and maneuvers at his Pawtuxet farm diminished in
proportion.
But the effect of all this belated mending was necessarily slight.
Curwen continued to be avoided and distrusted, as indeed the one
fact of his continued air of youth at a great age would have been
enough to warrant; and he could see that in the end his fortunes
would be likely to suffer. So about this time the crafty scholar hit
upon a last desperate expedient to regain his footing in the
community. Hitherto a complete hermit, he now determined to
contract an advantageous marriage; securing as a bride some lady
whose unquestioned position would make all ostracism of his home
impossible. It may be that he also had deeper reasons for wishing an
alliance; reasons so far outside the known cosmic sphere that only
papers found a century and a half after his death caused anyone to
suspect them; but of this nothing certain can ever be learned.
Naturally he was aware of the horror and indignation with which any
ordinary courtship of his would be received, hence looked about for
some likely candidate upon whose parents he might exert a suitable
pressure. Such candidates, he found, were not at all easy to
discover; since he had very particular requirements in the way of
beauty, accomplishments, and social security. At length his survey
narrowed down to the household of one of his best and oldest ship-
captains, a widower of high birth and unblemished standing named
Dutie Tillinghast, whose only daughter Eliza seemed dowered with
every conceivable advantage save prospects as an heiress. Captain
Tillinghast was completely under the domination of Curwen; and
consented, after a terrible interview in his cupolaed house on
Power's Lane hill, to sanction the blasphemous alliance.

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Ethics: Theory and Contemporary

Issues 9th Edition Barbara Mackinnon -

(eBook PDF) Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues 8th

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Ethics theory and contemporary issues Ninth Edition

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Printed in the United States of America

Preface ix Ethics, Religion, and Divine

READING Who’s to Judge? • Louis Pojman 55 —6— Deontological Ethics and

Virtue as a Mean 158 Combining the Types of

Relevant Factual Matters 286 —14— Economic Justice 344

The Environment and Its

Current Issues 538 Justice 565

Spinoza Hegel Nietzsche Habermas

• Describe the philosophical study of ethics. • Differentiate between instrumental and

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• Explain the difference between

• Decide whether naturalistic explanations

For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.

WHY STUDY ETHICS?

Normative Judgments in Descriptive Judgments in

Ethics Law Aesthetics Religion Custom Sociology Psychology

Dawkins’s idea is that our genes use our altruistic

is provocative and insightful, we might still worry

from analogy. In this type of argument, one com-

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I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human

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Title: The case of Charles Dexter Ward

Release date: May 5, 2024 [eBook #73547]

Original publication: New York, NY: Weird Tales, 1941

Credits: Greg Weeks, Mary Meehan and the Online Distributed

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CASE

[Transcriber's Note: This etext was produced from

The essential Saltes of Animals may be so prepared and preserved,

Charles Ward was an antiquarian from infancy, no doubt gaining his

One must look back at Charles Ward's earlier life as at something

In choicer circles, too, the Curwen home was by no means

The sight of this strange, pallid man, hardly middle-aged in aspect

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