British Journal for the History of Philosophy

ISSN: 0960-8788 (Print) 1469-3526 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbjh20

Socrates and Philosophical Practice

Travis Butler

To cite this article: Travis Butler (2015) Socrates and Philosophical Practice, British Journal for the
History of Philosophy, 23:5, 821-842, DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2015.1044887

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1044887

Published online: 18 Jun 2015.

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British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2015
Vol. 23, No. 5, 821–842, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1044887

A RTICLE

SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE1

Travis Butler

Interpreters of the Phaedo often cite the Pythagorean context of the

dialogue as a source of influence on the demanding conception of
philosophy defended therein. Sandra Peterson offers a striking
account of that influence: the Pythagorean sympathies of Socrates’s
interlocutors lead him to defend a conception of philosophy that
captures their commitments, but that he himself rejects. Call this the
Strong Influence Thesis (SIT). Peterson defends SIT by attempting to
demonstrate a mismatch between the conception of philosophy
espoused by Socrates in the Apology and ‘true philosophy’ as
described in the Phaedo. Assessing this defence thus requires a
detailed examination of both sides of the comparison. This paper
undertakes that task. I argue that when the beliefs and norms that
define both philosophical lives are correctly understood, the
appearance of a significant mismatch fades away. The life of true
philosophy realizes the Apology ideal of caring most about wisdom,
truth, and the best possible state of the soul.

KEYWORDS: Plato; Phaedo; philosophy; Pythagoreanism; asceticism

Practising philosophy in the right way is perhaps the central normative

notion in Plato’s Phaedo. Those who practise philosophy in the right way
are eligible for wisdom, happiness, and the best afterlife (69c6–d2); those
who fail to do so are destined for ethical ruin (83d4–e3). Paradoxically,
however, the account of correct philosophical practice defended in the
Phaedo seems to locate Socrates in the latter camp rather than the former.
That is, Socrates seems not to count as a true philosopher according to the
account of philosophical practice defended in the Phaedo.
To this paradox Sandra Peterson offers a striking solution (Peterson,
Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato, 166–95).2 The account
of correct philosophical practice defended in the Phaedo ultimately
1
Thanks to Annemarie Butler, Rusty Jones, Keith McPartland, and Ravi Sharma. Special
thanks to anonymous referees for this journal for helpful and challenging comments.

© 2015 BSHP
822 TRAVIS BUTLER

belongs not to Socrates but to his interlocutors, influenced as they are by

Pythagoreanism.3 It is thus no surprise that Socrates fails to satisfy the rel-
evant criteria for being a philosopher since they are criteria that he in fact
rejects. On Peterson’s view, Socrates’s role in the Phaedo is not the unfami-
liar one of dogmatic defender of esoteric metaphysical views about the soul
and invisible essences; rather it is the familiar one of midwife to the interlo-
cutors and subsequent examiner of the resulting ideas. Even in the Phaedo,
Socrates remains committed to his own conception of philosophy as exam-
ination. The somewhat other-worldly combination of asceticism and extreme
intellectualism defended in the Phaedo is the Pythagoreanism of the interlo-
cutors unearthed and then refined in discussion with Socrates.
The first-order explanation of the presence of the somewhat other-worldly
conception of philosophy in the Phaedo is thus that it belongs to the inter-
locutors, and Socrates is doing what Socrates does: revealing the commit-
ments of his companions and subjecting them to examination. The meta-
level explanation is that Plato is deeply sceptical of the truth of any such
views and so he is urging his readers to think along with Socrates in order
to discover how problematic such a conception of philosophy really is
(Peterson, Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato, 6–12, 163–
5, 233).
Although the Pythagorean context of the Phaedo is a familiar theme in the
secondary literature, Peterson offers an uncommonly clear account of how
that context influences the dialogue and the doctrines expressed therein.4
Specifically, Peterson defends what I will call the Strong Influence Thesis
(SIT):

The Pythagorean sympathies of Socrates’s interlocutors affect the philosophi-

cal content of the Phaedo in the strong sense that those sympathies lead
Socrates to advance a Pythagorean conception of philosophical practice that
he himself rejects.5

2
In addition to Peterson, Christopher Rowe (Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing, 111–
21) argues that the conception of philosophy defended in the Phaedo is substantively affected
by the Pythagorean context of the dialogue. Rowe takes Socrates and Plato to be more sym-
pathetic to the views of the true philosophers than does Peterson, but he argues that Pythagor-
eanism affects the substance to an extent that requires Socrates to distance himself from it.
This view seems to differ from Rowe (Plato, Phaedo, 6–7).
3
I set aside the possibility that it was Socrates himself who was influenced by Pythagoreanism.
For some discussion of this possibility, see Broackes, ‘ΑΥΤΟΣ ΚΑΘ’ ΑΥΤΟΝ in the Clouds’
and Rashed, ‘Aristophanes and the Socrates of the Phaedo’.
4
For a general discussion of Pythagorean themes in the dialogue, see Kahn, Pythagoras and
the Pythagoreans, 48–62. Part of the context is the setting of the outer frame of the dialogue.
Phaedo is in Phlius, recounting the story of Socrates’s death to Echecrates, a Pythagorean. For
discussion of the importance of Phlius to Pythagoreanism, see Notomi, ‘Socrates in the
Phaedo’, 55–7. For discussion of the interlocutors, see note 6 below.
5
Note that SIT is very different from the thesis that Plato appropriates and transforms Orphic
and Pythagorean images and doctrines in the Phaedo. This modest and plausible thesis is
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 823

According to the SIT, then, Socrates is not merely couching his own view in
Pythagorean-friendly language. The claim instead is that the conception of
philosophy defended in the Phaedo belongs to the interlocutors, and it is suf-
ficiently at odds with Socrates’s conception that he must reject it (Peterson,
Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato, 166, 190–1).6 Plato’s
ultimate goal in having Socrates expound this conception of philosophy at
such length is to encourage the reader to focus a critical eye on it, noting
the many gaps and weaknesses in the arguments that support it. SIT pre-
serves the image of Socrates as the epistemically modest gadfly, interested
primarily in examining the commitments of others.
On Peterson’s view, the identity and character of this Socrates – the epis-
temically modest gadfly who always begins from the knowledge-claims of
others – is decisively established in the Apology and maintained throughout
the dialogues. In defending SIT, then, Peterson argues that the conception of
philosophy and the philosophical life that we see Socrates espousing in the
Apology and exemplifying in the dialogues is simply inconsistent with the
conception of the life of true philosophy as described in the Phaedo.
Because of the depth of the inconsistency and the centrality of the views
of the interlocutors to Socratic examinations generally, we are justified in
inferring that the life of true philosophy is a Pythagorean life that Socrates
not only eschews but rejects as misguided.
The defence of SIT thus does not depend on claims about the historical or
‘real’ Socrates, but rather on the claim of inconsistency between Socratic
philosophy as described in the Apology and performed in the dialogues
and true philosophy as defined in the Phaedo.7 Critically assessing this
defence thus requires detailed examination of both sides of the comparison.
This is the task undertaken in the next three sections, with special focus
on philosophical beliefs in Section 1, and life-defining norms in Sections
2 and 3.
Before turning to consider the beliefs of the true philosopher, however, it
will be useful to draw attention to one respect in which Peterson’s account of
the Socrates of the Apology is misleading. As suggested above, Peterson

defended by a number of authors, including Edmonds, Myths of the Underworld Journey,

159–220; Morgan, ‘Voice of Authority’, 76; Rowe, Plato, Phaedo, 117; and Sedley, ‘Drama-
tis Personae of Plato’s Phaedo’, 12–13.
6
Whether it is true that the interlocutors in the Phaedo are Pythagoreans is an open question.
The only character in the Phaedo who is clearly a Pythagorean is Echecrates, but he is not an
interlocutor; he is present in the outer frame of the dialogue only. It is possible that Simmias
and Cebes, and perhaps even Phaedo are Pythagoreans in the loose sense that they are inter-
ested in some Pythagorean ideas, but there is also evidence that they are all Socratics. The
issue is not as neat as SIT would seem to need it to be. For further discussion, see Notomi,
‘Socrates in the Phaedo’, 55–7; Horky, Plato and Pythagoreanism, 167–99; and Sedley, ‘Dra-
matis Personae of Plato’s Phaedo’, 8–22.
7
Because Peterson takes the character of Socrates to be relatively consistent throughout the
dialogues, it will be appropriate to consider evidence from dialogues outside of the
Apology and Phaedo where especially pertinent.
824 TRAVIS BUTLER

emphasizes the epistemic modesty of this Socrates, and his insistence that his
examinations always begin from the knowledge-claims of others. She makes
a good case for treating Socrates’s disavowals of knowledge as sincere and
for doubting that any of his apparent claims to knowledge in the Apology are
inconsistent with his epistemic modesty (Peterson, Socrates and Philosophy
in the Dialogues of Plato, 42–58).
The problem arises, however, in Peterson’s move from Socrates’s episte-
mic modesty to his alleged assertoric modesty – his putative reluctance to
make assertions in his own person about important and controversial
ethical matters. Peterson’s account of the Socrates of the Apology and the
dialogues includes the striking claim that he is not responsible for any asser-
tions about such matters in the examinations that make up those dialogues
(Peterson, Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato, 11). Presum-
ably, the implicit line of reasoning here is that if Socrates were to make asser-
tions about important ethical matters in his own person, this would be in
tension with his sincere epistemic modesty.
But there is compelling evidence, even within the Apology alone, that
Socrates rejects this kind of connection between knowledge and assertion.
In the Apology, Socrates makes a number of confident assertions about
important and highly controversial ethical matters. Among these are the
assertions that a good man cannot be harmed by a worse (30c8–31d1),
that wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of the soul are more valuable
than wealth and other externals (30a7–b2), and that discussing virtue every-
day is the greatest good (38a1–6). It seems clear that Socrates would disavow
knowledge of all of these claims, but he nevertheless asserts them all in his
own person, confidently and without hedging.
What this implies is that the Socrates of the Apology does not hold that
epistemic modesty is inconsistent with assertoric boldness about important
ethical matters. As we might say, Socrates rejects the view that knowledge
is the norm of assertion in these areas. Socrates’s epistemic modesty thus
provides no general reason for doubting that assertions he makes in the
context of examinations are truly his, since he combines epistemic
modesty and assertoric boldness in the Apology.8
While it is true that the Socrates of the Apology is an epistemically modest
gadfly, then, his epistemic modesty does not preclude him from making con-
fident assertions about value, virtue, and how best to live. The assertoric
boldness of the Socrates of the Phaedo is thus a point of continuity with
the Socrates of the Apology. The burden of the defence of SIT therefore
depends on showing that the content of Socrates’s assertions about philos-
ophy in the Phaedo is so at odds with the substance of his conception of phil-
osophy in the Apology that we must view those assertions as really belonging

8
For excellent discussion of Socratic ignorance and its implications, see McPartland, ‘Socratic
Ignorance and Types of Knowledge’, 94–135.
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 825

to the interlocutors. The mere fact that Socrates makes assertions in the
Phaedo can cut no ice for SIT.
To begin to assess whether this burden about the content of Socrates’s
assertions is met, let us turn now to consider the beliefs of the true philoso-
pher in the Phaedo.

1. THE BELIEFS OF THE TRUE PHILOSOPHER

The beliefs on which Peterson’s arguments focus are attributed by Socrates

to true philosophers in a passage (66b1–d7) which I will call the ‘initial diag-
nosis’. In this passage, Socrates presents his initial account of what true phi-
losophers believe and what they say to each other. These beliefs amount to a
diagnosis of the embodied human condition, and it is unstintingly negative.
The initial diagnosis passage portrays the body as an insuperable obstacle to
the pursuit of the philosopher’s twin goals of wisdom and truth.
To construct the belief-based arguments, Peterson mines the initial diag-
nosis passage for beliefs of the true philosophers that seem to conflict with
beliefs that can plausibly be attributed to the Socrates of the Apology and
the dialogues. To take two examples, philosophers are said to believe that
the body makes it impossible to think (66c2–5), while Socrates obviously
believes that thought is possible, and true philosophers are said to believe
that desire compels us to acquire money (66c7–d1), while Socrates was
clearly poor and uninterested in money (Peterson, Socrates and Philosophy
in the Dialogues of Plato, 191–2).
To summarize, then, the initial diagnosis passage reveals a mismatch
between true philosophy and Socrates because true philosophers believe
(B1) that the body makes thought impossible, and (B2) bodily desire
compels us to acquire money, while it is clear that Socrates rejects both
B1 and B2.
One immediate concern about Peterson’s arguments in this area is that
they may prove too much. If B1 and B2 are interpreted in such a way that
no one who believes that thought is possible and that the desire for money
can be resisted can also believe them, then not only will Socrates be
unable to hold B1 and B2, but Pythagoreans will be unable as well. Pytha-
goreans, no less than Socrates, took thought to be possible and demonstrated
indifference towards wealth and externals.9
Peterson’s belief-based arguments thus do not serve her ultimate interpret-
ative aims very well, since the beliefs of the true philosophers (as Peterson
interprets them) do not belong to the interlocutors any more than to Socrates.
The source of this difficulty is that Peterson interprets the initial diagnosis
passage in isolation from its immediate sequel (hereafter ‘the remedy
9
It is thought that vegetarianism, simplicity, various levels of purity, and study were common
to most Pythagorean ways of life. See Cornelli, In Search of Pythagoreanism, 82.
826 TRAVIS BUTLER

passage’), in which Socrates introduces a remedy for the problems identified

in the initial diagnosis passage: refraining from association with the body as
much as possible (67a3–6). Those who refrain in this way will be closest to
knowledge, though the remedy passage remains pessimistic about reaching
full knowledge by seeing the truth while still embodied and biologically
alive (66e4–67a2, 68b2–3).
When the diagnosis passage is viewed in the context provided by the
remedy passage, then, its clear meaning is that the inability to think about
anything successfully and the compulsion to acquire money characterize
embodied human life in the absence of the remedy. But true philosophers
also believe that by refraining from association with the body they can mini-
mize though not eradicate its interference and approach their ultimate goals
of wisdom and truth.
Still, Peterson might respond by arguing that even when B1 and B2 are
understood in the context provided by the remedy passage, they embody
views that are sufficiently at odds with Socrates’s life and clear commitments
to justify the conclusion that those views are not his. To develop this
response, Peterson might argue that because Socrates does not live according
to the proposed remedy of avoiding bodily things as far as possible, he is a
non-philosopher by the relevant standard, and so B1 and B2 should be true of
him in their full, unqualified meaning. This response introduces issues that
are directly related to Peterson’s primary argument discussed in Section 2.
Setting it aside for the moment, it is worth considering whether B1 and B2
state positions that are so at odds with clear Socratic doctrine that they must
be attributed to someone else. With respect to B1, it is likely that two differ-
ent claims are intended: (B1a) serious thought is impossible for those who
associate with the body and reject philosophy; (B1b) ultimately successful
thought (i.e. pure wisdom) is impossible for embodied thinkers, including
philosophers.
Quite similar claims to B1a and B1b are expressed by Socrates in the
Apology. After Socrates claims that he will never cease to practise philos-
ophy, he gives an example of the kind of question that his philosophical
practice leads him to ask of his fellow citizens:

(T1) Are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, repu-
tation, and honors as possible, while you do not care nor give thought to
wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?
(29d8-e3)

In this passage, Socrates claims not merely that his fellow citizens do not
care about wisdom and truth, but also that they do not even think about
them at all, in part because of their concern for and pursuit of wealth, repu-
tation, and honours. In the broader context of the initial diagnosis passage in
the Phaedo, it is clear that Socrates explains the truth of B1a by reference to
the presence of desires and needs in the soul. Desires and needs fill the soul
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 827

with bodily nonsense, so that successful thinking about other things is not
possible (66c2–5). As in the Apology passage above, the desire for wealth
and other externals is singled out as especially distracting.
On balance, then, the claim expressed in B1a is not plausibly seen as so
distant from Socrates’s own views that SIT is required to explain it. Socrates
claims in the Apology that people who reject philosophy and the care of their
souls simply pay no attention to wisdom and truth because they are entirely
occupied with concern for and pursuit of externals. This claim is of a piece
with B1a as expressed in the Phaedo – the body keeps us busy with its
desires and needs so that successful thought about other things is not poss-
ible. Although it is not often noted, the opposition between care for the body
and care for the soul is present in the Apology as well (30a7–b2).10
With respect to B1b, it is true that at least in the diagnosis/remedy passage
of the Phaedo, Socrates seems to endorse the claim that the best kind of
wisdom is possible only after death. Even in these passages, however, the
claim is qualified in two different ways. He claims that it is likely that
wisdom is attained only after death (66e1), and he leaves it open that we
cannot attain it even then (66e6). So the core claim in the Phaedo is that it
is likely that embodied philosophers cannot attain pure wisdom while
alive, and it is possible though not certain that they can do so after death.
While this claim is perhaps out of step with some dialogues, it is consistent
with the view that Socrates expresses in his own person in the Apology.
Socrates there famously claims that it is likely that no one knows anything
worthwhile, and that any wisdom he possesses is human wisdom regarding
his own epistemic limitations (23a5–b3).11 Moreover, while he does not
explicitly assert in the Apology that we might come to possess the best
kind of wisdom after death, he does introduce the possibility that he can
enjoy the most extraordinary happiness after death by continuing to practise
philosophy (41a1–c7). In both the Apology and the Phaedo, then, Socrates is
quite sceptical about the possibility of embodied humans coming to possess
the best kind of wisdom, and he leaves open the possibilities that they can
possess a better state after death, or simply live and die without ever reaching
the goal.
Let this much suffice for discussion of B1a and B1b. B2 is the claim that
bodily desire compels us to acquire money. Recall that Peterson argues that
this is not Socrates’s view, since Socrates was well aware (from his own
case) that it is possible for human beings not to be concerned with money
at all. I have already argued that this would prove too much, since the
10
This is discussed well by Notomi (‘Socrates in the Phaedo’, 62–3).
11
It is true that wisdom is defined very differently in the Phaedo, as the experience (pathēma)
of the soul when it is in contact with the intelligible objects (79d1–7). Similar conceptions of
wisdom can be found in the Symposium (211a5–212a7) and Phaedrus (247c3–e6) as well. It is
possible that this conception is the product of Pythagorean influence, though these dialogues
have very different contexts and interlocutors. It is also possible that it is a Platonic con-
ception, with or without Pythagorean influence.
828 TRAVIS BUTLER

Pythagoreans were similarly well aware that some people are indifferent to
money, so B2 could not be their view either. But more can be said here.
Firstly, the claim that we are compelled to acquire wealth occurs in the
initial diagnosis passage – the passage that characterizes human life in the
absence of the remedy provided by philosophy. The meaning of the claim
is thus that those who freely associate with the body and do not have the
proper disdain for wealth and externals will find themselves compelled to
acquire more and more, leading to the full occupation of their time and atten-
tion and perhaps even conflict with others. But these effects can be mitigated
somewhat by embracing the remedy of philosophical practice.
Secondly, the opposition between the desire for wealth and the love of
wisdom is a point of similarity between the Phaedo and Apology. In his
defence speech, Socrates repeatedly contrasts caring about wealth with
caring about wisdom and truth (30a7–b4, 41e2–5), and he suggests that
there is a deep tension between the two cares. As we have seen, Socrates
even associates caring about wealth with caring about the body (30a7–b2)
– an association that is so central to the Phaedo. In its proper context,
then, the claim about wealth in B2 is recognizable as a Socratic theme
emphasized in both dialogues rather than a special Pythagorean doctrine
that emerges only in the Phaedo.
Still, it might be argued that the precise nature of the philosophical remedy
for the desire for wealth is importantly different in the Phaedo – and different
in a way that makes SIT look more plausible. After all, the requirement in the
Phaedo is that the philosopher must stay away from such desires to the extent
that he can (82c2–4, 83b5–7), whereas the Apology merely requires that the
philosopher make philosophy a higher priority. This is a promising reply on
behalf of SIT, and the issues it raises are sufficiently complicated to warrant
full discussion in the next section.

2. THE LIFE OF THE TRUE PHILOSOPHER

We have just seen that there is no significant mismatch between key beliefs
of the true philosophers in the Phaedo and the beliefs of Socrates in the
Apology. In the course of that discussion, however, it was necessary to set
aside the perhaps more fundamental issue of whether the distinctive way
of life of the true philosophers diverges from the Socratic way of life
described in the Apology and exemplified in the dialogues of examination.
It is time now to address that issue directly.
Recall that on SIT, the Socrates of the Apology does not live according to
the norms of true philosophy as they are explained in the Phaedo. Specifi-
cally, Socrates does not practise the remedy for human evils proposed in
the Phaedo of refraining from association with the body as much as possible.
Rather than attributing to Socrates philosophical ideals he failed to live up to,
then, we should take those ideals to define a Pythagorean conception of the
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 829

philosophical life endorsed by the interlocutors in the Phaedo but rejected by

Socrates.
Although this line of reasoning involves some complexity, it is possible to
capture its essence in a simple, clear argument. Doing so will facilitate the
discussion below. Accordingly, the focus of this section will be the Mis-
match Argument, defined as follows:

(P1) True philosophers stay away from bodily desires and feelings as far as
possible.
(P2) Socrates did not stay away from bodily desires and feelings as far as
possible.
(C) Therefore, Socrates did not live the life of the true philosopher as it is con-
ceived in the Phaedo.

On consideration of this argument, it appears that P2 must be the focus, since

P1 simply quotes the text at 83b6–7. While my argument will ultimately aim
to undermine P2, the initial crux of the argument concerns the interpretation
of the qualifier ‘as far as possible’ which is common to both P1 and P2. It is
impossible to understand what the avoidance requirement really comes to
without supplying a clear interpretation for that clause, and other similarly
qualified claims, such as that the philosopher disdains externals, except
insofar as they are necessary (64d8–e1, 83a6–7). What is the force of the
modal terms ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ in such claims?
Although Peterson does not explicitly tether her interpretation to these
terms and the qualifications they introduce, her arguments indicate that
she takes ‘as far as possible’ to mean ‘as far as physically possible, consist-
ently with being alive’. For example, she argues that the facts that Socrates
enjoys the presence of other people and uses his ears to hear sounds indicate
that he does not disdain the body and stay away from bodily phenomena to
the degree required by true philosophy (Peterson, Socrates and Philosophy
in the Dialogues of Plato, 191).12 But if total social isolation and sensory
deprivation are among the requirements, then it seems that the ‘possibility’
in ‘as far as possible’ must mean something like physical possibility, limited
only by the prohibition on suicide. That is, the requirement thus interpreted is
that the true philosopher must stay away from bodily phenomena as far as is
physically possible, up to the point at which he puts his life in serious
jeopardy.
Although the physical possibility reading must be included among the
candidates for consideration, it faces two serious difficulties that should
motivate the search for an alternative. The first is the now familiar issue of
the inapplicability of the physical possibility reading to the Pythagoreans

12
Similar arguments can be found in Russell (Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life, 85) and
Woolf (‘The Practice of a Philosopher’, 104–6).
830 TRAVIS BUTLER

as well. As we will see in more detail in Section 3, there were some Pytha-
goreans who condemned bodily pleasure as antithetical to philosophy. Still,
even these Pythagoreans did not require total social isolation, sensory depri-
vation, and life at the absolute limits of self-denial. If the avoidance require-
ment defended in the Phaedo is interpreted in accordance with the physical
possibility reading, then, it is not any more plausibly attributed to the inter-
locutors than to Socrates.
The most serious problem for the physical possibility reading, however, is
that it creates a textually unsupported incoherence in the account of philosophi-
cal practice as a whole. Specifically, if the norm of ascetic avoidance is inter-
preted in accordance with the physical possibility reading, it will inevitably
come into conflict with the other essential norm that defines the life of true phil-
osophy – the requirement that the philosopher zealously pursue wisdom and the
pleasures of learning through cooperative inquiry (114d8–115a3).
While the prominence of the ascetic avoidance component in the Phaedo
should not be overlooked or minimized, it is also true that statements of the
avoidance norm are almost always accompanied by statements of the zealous
inquiry norm. This is true for the avoidance norm as it is applied to conative
and perceptual states alike. In the former case, the philosopher not only frees
himself from bodily desires and pleasures, he also immerses himself in reason-
ing, following it wherever it leads, with his attention fixed on the true and divine
(84a2–b4). In the case of perception, the philosopher avoids inquiry by means of
the senses, but pursues inquiry with the soul by itself (79c2–d7). Finally, the co-
existence of the avoidance and inquiry norms is captured clearly in Socrates’s
closing speech, in which he explains his confidence in the face of death by
appeal to the fact that he renounced bodily pleasures and zealously pursued
the pleasures of learning (114d8–115a3).13
But this life that Socrates describes himself as having lived – the life in
which ascetic avoidance and devotion to inquiry exist together coherently
– is precluded by the physical possibility reading because that reading
forces the philosopher to compromise his devotion to inquiry for the sake
of living at the physical limits of ascetic avoidance. The key point here is
that the relevant kind of inquiry is conceived in the Phaedo as involving con-
versation (59a1–3), discussions of the question-and-answer form (75c10–
d5), attempts to persuade others (90c8–91c5), and cooperative examinations
of hypotheses (101d3–102a1).14 All of these methods require social inter-
action, extensive employment of the senses, the physical and mental forti-
tude required for sustained attention, and externals sufficient for life at a

13
It is difficult to see how SIT will account for this passage, since Socrates claims at least by
implication that he renounced bodily pleasures, without any indirection involving true philo-
sophers. See also 69d1–6 where Socrates claims that he did everything possible in life to
become a true philosopher.
14
Socrates explicitly associates the specific treatment of hypotheses he recommends with
being a philosopher. See 101e5–102a1.
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 831

minimally decent level. But these necessary conditions on inquiry cannot be

satisfied by someone who abides by the physical possibility construal of the
ascetic avoidance norm. Such a person may be a successful ascetic, but he
cannot be a true philosopher.
Now in the present dialectical context involving SIT, it cannot be assumed
that Plato intended to present the life of true philosophy as a coherent life. It
is possible that showing the norms of that life to be inconsistent is part of
Plato’s project of debunking Pythagoreanism. While this interpretation
cannot be dismissed out of hand, it should be embraced only if plausible
alternatives to the physical possibility reading are unavailable.
To bring my favoured alternative into view, it will be useful to reflect
further on the joint emphasis of the ascetic avoidance and inquiry norms dis-
cussed just above. While their joint emphasis indicates that they are both
necessary elements in the life of true philosophy, it does not imply that
they occupy the same status within that life. Crucially, it does not preclude
the possibility that the norm of zealous inquiry plays a defining and structur-
ing role in the philosophical life not shared by the avoidance norm. This
norm defines the philosophical life in the sense that it is by devotion to
zealous inquiry that a philosopher distinguishes his life as maximally expres-
sive of the love of wisdom and truth. It structures the philosophical life in the
sense that devotion to inquiry in both attitude and behaviour is the end which
the other elements of the life are to serve.
On this view, the life of true philosophy exhibits a broadly teleological
structure – structure that ultimately derives from the status of wisdom as
the end for the sake of which the philosopher lives as he does. In the
Phaedo, wisdom is defined as a distinctive kind of grasping of the intelligible
objects that comes about only through inquiry with the soul by itself (79d1–
7). Inquiry with the soul by itself is thus involved in the definition of the goal
sought by philosophers qua philosophers.
But if inquiry bears this intimate relation to the final end of true philos-
ophy, it is reasonable to see the zealous inquiry norm itself rather than phys-
ical possibility as providing the limiting principle for the ascetic avoidance
norm. For ascetic avoidance to retain value in the life of the philosopher,
it must not be pursued at the cost of zealous inquiry. To pursue it in this
way would be to mistake the value it has within the life of devotion to
inquiry for final value. To keep ascetic avoidance in its proper place and
to realize the value it has, the philosopher must not pursue it as far as phys-
ically possible. Instead, he must pursue it as far as ethically possible – as far
as possible for someone who is fully devoted to zealous pursuit of wisdom,
truth, and the pleasures of learning.15
The ethical possibility alternative still makes substantial demands on the
philosopher’s behaviour in the domain of bodily desires, feelings, and

15
For discussion of a similar notion in connection to limits on the contemplative ideal in Aris-
totle’s ethics, see Lawrence, ‘Aristotle and the Ideal Life’.
832 TRAVIS BUTLER

sense perception. It is not merely a requirement on his attitudes. But the

ethical possibility reading allows and indeed requires the philosopher to
engage socially, to employ sense perception, to maintain physical and
mental health, and to possess externals at a subsistence level. In principle,
it may permit other kinds of associations with bodily phenomena as
well, if they are required by or conduce to satisfaction of the zealous
inquiry norm. Because philosophical inquiry plays this structuring and
conditional necessitating role within the life of true philosophy, that life
plausibly counts as the life that is most expressive of the love of wisdom
and truth.
If the qualifier ‘as far as possible’ is interpreted in accordance with the
ethical possibility reading, then, the two fundamental norms that define
the life of true philosophy need not be seen as inevitably in conflict. It
would be possible though not easy to live the life of true philosophy as it
is described in the Phaedo. That the life thus described could be
lived by someone makes the ethical possibility reading decisively superior
to the physical possibility reading employed by Peterson in the defence of
SIT.
But the fact that the life could be lived by someone obviously does not
show that it was lived by the Socrates of the Apology, or even that it is
close enough to Socrates’s life to raise a problem for Premise 2 of the Mis-
match Argument. This step requires further argument. The initial signifi-
cance of the shift from the physical to the ethical possibility reading in
this connection is that it opens the door to the possibility that potentially pro-
blematic non-philosophical concerns may have been present in Socrates’s
life, but not in an ethically impermissible way. On the ethical possibility
reading, the mere presence of a bodily concern or activity in a person’s
life does not by itself show that he failed to avoid such things as far as ethi-
cally possible. We must ask the further question of whether the bodily
concern was present in a way that compromised adherence to the zealous
inquiry norm. Only if it was thus present is there evidence that the person
failed to avoid bodily things as far as ethically possible.
The most straightforward way in which a bodily concern or activity can
compromise zealous inquiry is by occupying the philosopher’s time and
attention and making him too busy or distracted to inquire (66d1–3). On
the evidence presented in the Apology, however, Socrates’s devotion to
inquiry was not compromised in this way, either by public affairs or by
his own private affairs:

(T2) So even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me – and I go
around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I
do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is
not wise. Because of this occupation, I do not have the leisure to engage in
public affairs to any extent, nor indeed to look after my own, but I live in
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 833

great poverty, because of my service to the god.

(23b4–c1)

In this passage, Socrates introduces a theme to which he returns a number of

times in the Apology – his neglect of his private affairs for the sake of
increased devotion to examination. Although this passage explicitly men-
tions only wealth, a subsequent passage mentions household matters as
well (36b5–7). To highlight the degree of his neglect, Socrates claims in a
third passage that he expects to seem inhuman to those who sit in judgement
of him because of his single-mindedness about philosophy (31b1–5).
The fact of Socrates’s extreme neglect would be less significant if the
physical possibility reading were still in play, since the mere presence of a
home, family, and minimal wealth would show that Socrates did not avoid
such concerns to the relevant extent. On the ethical possibility reading,
however, the question is whether these concerns were present in Socrates’s
life in a way that compromised his adherence to the zealous inquiry norm. By
his own telling, they did not.
Although Socrates’s self-portrait in the Apology is not a portrait of
someone who practises self-denial for its own sake, neither is it the portrait
of someone who practises conventional moderation. He describes himself as
a zealot about philosophical examination, with the consequent almost
inhuman inattention to home, family, and wealth. These concerns were
fully subordinated to the demand to pursue wisdom and truth with single-
minded zeal. Private affairs were made to fit within a life of almost
inhuman dedication to this demand. Rather than making him too busy to
practise philosophy, Socrates’s private affairs were limited by philosophy
in just the way required by the ethical possibility reading of the avoidance
norm.
The further significance of the nature of Socrates’s neglect of his own
affairs as described in T2 is thus that Socrates’s life exhibits not only the
extreme devotion to zealous inquiry that characterizes the life of true philos-
ophy in the Phaedo, but the teleological structure that characterizes that life
as well. As we observed above, the zealous inquiry norm is conceived in the
Phaedo as the defining and structuring norm in the life of true philosophy.
Similarly in the Apology, Socrates explains his claim that he will never
cease to practise philosophy by reiterating his commitment to the life of
questioning, testing, and examining others (29d2–e5). It is his commitment
to these activities that define him and mark him out as a philosopher.
These modes of inquiry also structure Socrates’s life in the sense that it is
his devotion to them that explains the minimal presence of characteristically
human pursuits in his life, as he indicates in T2. As in the Phaedo, there is no
suggestion that Socrates views the neglect of private affairs as valuable for
its own sake; it has the value it has because of its relationship to the full sat-
isfaction of the zealous inquiry norm.
834 TRAVIS BUTLER

Socrates’s devotion to inquiry also explains the significant presence in his

life of his friendships and other associations, especially with young men of
apparent promise. Socrates explains in the Apology that these young men
enjoy watching the examinations of the reputed wise, and he affirms that
this is indeed enjoyable (33b9–c4). But this aspect of Socrates’s life is
fully consonant with the account of true philosophy in the Phaedo. As we
have seen, philosophy is conceived in the Phaedo as involving question-
and-answer inquiries, and the pleasures of learning are endorsed as an impor-
tant part of the practice (114e3–5). On the ethical possibility reading, the
social character of Socrates’s life is at least ethically permissible if not ethi-
cally required, as it is a necessary element of inquiry correctly pursued rather
than a distraction from it.
This general account of the role of the social is relevant also to some of the
specific friendships and associations that might be thought to raise a conflict
between the life of Socrates and the life of true philosophy. In the case of
Alcibiades, for example, Alcibiades complains about the fact that when he
is finally alone with him, Socrates wants only to have his usual kinds of con-
versations rather than the kinds of conversations that lovers have (Sym-
posium, 217b3–7). Socrates subsequently refuses Alcibiades’s aggressive
advances, showing the kind of sexual indifference one would expect from
a brother or a father (219c6–d2).
Socrates’s relationship with Alcibiades thus seems to fit within the bound-
aries defined by the ethical possibility reading of the avoidance component
of true philosophy.16 It is not cold or without pleasure, but the dominant
activity is philosophical conversation, and Socrates refuses bodily pleasures
when they are offered to him. Rather than being an example of friendship or
sexual desire compromising Socrates’s devotion to the zealous inquiry norm,
then, the case of Alcibiades exemplifies the role of philosophical inquiry as
the structuring and limiting end of Socrates’s life.
The question we have been focusing on is whether bodily and other non-
philosophical concerns and activities are present in Socrates’s life in ways
that would count as ethically impermissible according to the norms of true
philosophy. This question becomes central to the assessment of the Mis-
match Argument once the qualifiers in the premises are interpreted in accord-
ance with the ethical possibility reading. What I have argued so far is that
Socrates’s extreme neglect of his private affairs together with the role of phi-
losophical inquiry as the defining and structuring end of his life make it
plausible to conclude that bodily and non-philosophical concerns belong
to Socrates’s life only in ethically permissible ways – that is, only in ways
that are consistent with single-minded devotion to the pursuit of wisdom
and truth through cooperative inquiry and examination.
In making this argument, however, I have so far considered only the most
straightforward kind of conflict between bodily and non-philosophical
16
The more difficult case of Charmides is discussed in Section 3.
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 835

concerns and adherence to the norm of zealous inquiry – the power of those
concerns to take time and attention away and make one too busy to practise
philosophy.
While this is the most straightforward kind of conflict, it is not the only
kind that must be considered. Although the account of true philosophy men-
tions the power of bodily concerns and activities to occupy the philosopher’s
time and attention, it identifies a different threat posed by bodily desires and
feelings as the greatest and the one to which the philosopher adverts in his
own justifications of his ascetic avoidance: the power of intense bodily
desires and feelings to bring about changes in the philosopher’s crucial eva-
luative beliefs – beliefs about which objects matter most (83b5–e3).17
When we ask whether the Socrates of the Apology abides by the norms of
true philosophy, then, we must consider not only the question of time and
attention but also the question of intense bodily desire and feeling. Even if
it is true that Socrates neglected his private affairs to an inhuman degree
and was absolutely single-minded about inquiry, it is possible that the life
of Socrates diverges from the life of true philosophy because of his failure
to avoid intense bodily desires and feelings to the extent ethically possible.
If we find the Socrates of the Apology and early dialogues failing to avoid
ethically unnecessary intense bodily pleasures and pains, this may be evi-
dence of the kind of significant mismatch between lives posited by SIT.

3. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOUL’S GREATEST EVIL

We have seen that important aspects of Socrates’s self-portrait in the

Apology support the hypothesis that his life exemplified the same kind of
teleological structure and single-mindedness about inquiry that characterize
the life of true philosophy as described in the Phaedo. Socrates’s home,
family, and minimal wealth did not compromise his devotion to zealous
inquiry because he neglected them to an almost inhuman degree.
As Premise 1 of the Mismatch Argument makes clear, however, the norms
of true philosophy require not merely that the philosopher pursue philosophi-
cal inquiry in a single-minded way; they further require that the philosopher
avoid bodily desires and feelings, especially intense ones, as far as ethically
possible.18 Moreover, the justification of this requirement is not the general
concern about distraction and becoming occupied with non-philosophical
activities; it is the quite specific concern that intense bodily desires and feel-
ings have the power to force the soul into false evaluative beliefs about the
17
For helpful discussion of this passage, see Beere (‘Philosophy, Virtue, and Immortality in
Plato’s Phaedo’) and Woolf (‘The Practice of a Philosopher’).
18
Pace Rowe (Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing, 120) this kind of language is not
exclusive to the Phaedo. In the Republic, Socrates claims that the philosopher abandons or
forsakes bodily pleasures (485d10–e1).
836 TRAVIS BUTLER

reality of bodily things (83c5–8). True philosophers view this effect on the
soul’s beliefs as the greatest (megiston) and most extreme (eschaton) evil
that the soul can suffer (83c2–3).
The focus on the avoidance of intense bodily desires and feelings in the
Phaedo complicates the assessment of the Mismatch Argument first
because the early dialogues provide equivocal evidence on the issue of
Socrates’s avoidance of intense bodily phenomena, and second because
the emphasis of the intensity of bodily experience in the justification of
ascetic avoidance arguably has a clear Pythagorean antecedent. If the identi-
fication of the true philosopher’s own justification of his ascetic avoidance is
a product of Pythagorean influence, this would obviously be an important
piece of ammunition for SIT.
Before turning to consider the equivocal evidence about Socrates, then, it
will be useful first to take up the question of Pythagorean influence. Doing so
will allow us to draw the justification of the avoidance norm in the Phaedo
into sharper focus in advance of the discussion of Socrates.
As mentioned above, the account of the true philosopher’s justification of
his ascetic avoidance is striking in its specificity. Intense bodily desires and
feelings are to be avoided because they force the soul to believe, while it is
affected, that the affecting thing is most clear (enargestaton) and most real
(alēthestaton) (83c5–8). In each case of this kind of belief-influence, the
resulting belief is false because its object is a visible thing and such things
are in fact among the least clear and least real. They merit disdain (64d8–
e1) and rejection (114e1–3) rather than attention and pursuit. Intense
bodily desires and feelings thus threaten the philosopher with the greatest
evil: systematically false beliefs about what is most real.
The intensity of bodily experiences plays a key explanatory role here, as it
helps to explain both the soul’s being necessitated and its coming to believe
that the affecting object is most clear and most real. By adverting to intensity
in this way, the philosopher’s justification arguably shows signs of Pythagor-
ean influence, as there is some evidence that the Pythagorean Archytas of
Tarentum offered an influential critique of bodily pleasure that emphasized
the power of extreme or intense pleasure to interfere with and even preclude
rational thought.
On Cicero’s account of the critique in Cato Maior De Senectute, Archytas
condemns bodily pleasure as the enemy of reason and virtue because no
thought of any kind is possible while in its grips. As an illustration, Archytas
asks us to imagine someone in the grips of the greatest pleasure and then to
observe the incompatibility between this experience and any rational
thought.19

19
I focus on this specific case of possible influence because (i) it would bear directly on the
account of philosophical practice in the Phaedo and (ii) the influence of Archytas on
Plato’s thought is widely acknowledged. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of defenders of
SIT to identify the specific loci of influence on which they want to rest their case.
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 837

The general idea that bodily pleasure is opposed to rational thought and
especially the specific focus on great or intense pleasure make Archytas’s
critique worth considering as a Pythagorean antecedent.20 There is a real
question, however, about the independence of Cicero’s account of the cri-
tique from his own familiarity with the Phaedo and his desire to portray
Plato’s thought as derivative from Pythagorean philosophy.21
But even if the independence of Cicero’s account could be established, the
similarity between Archytas’s critique and the discussion of the soul’s great-
est evil in the Phaedo is quite general: both critiques identify a way in which
intense bodily experience is an anti-philosophical force in the soul; but the
ways identified and consequently the entire substance of the two critiques
are different and perhaps even in tension.
Archytas claims that thought is impossible during intense affection while
Socrates claims that intense affections force a certain kind of thought upon
the soul – a belief that the affecting thing is most clear and most real. The
crucial point that intense bodily affections threaten the soul with false
beliefs that encode ethically disastrous values is entirely missing from Arch-
ytas’s critique. But the focus on the effects on belief not only distinguishes
Socrates’s critique au fond from Archytas’s, it also clarifies the concern at
the heart of the true philosopher’s justification for ascetic avoidance.22
Unlike the concern raised by Archytas, the concern raised by Socrates in
the Phaedo is not primarily about the cognitive incapacitation that the soul
suffers during moments of intense affection. Rather, it is about the down-
stream consequences for attention, action, and ultimately ways of life of
repeated episodes of belief-influence brought about by intense desires and
feelings. This is indicated by the claim in the immediate sequel that the
soul regularly subject to belief-influence comes to share in the nurture and
way of life (homotropos) of the body (83d7–9).23
The ethical point of the philosopher’s ascetic avoidance is thus not to guar-
antee that he never experiences intense bodily affection, if such a thing were
possible. Instead, the point is to protect the soul against the kind of repeated
belief-influence that reinforces and stabilizes the false belief about reality in

20
Strictly speaking, Archytas (according to Cicero) focuses on the greatest amount of pleasure
it is possible to perceive (voluptate corporis quanta percipi posset maxima).
21
The case against independence is made forcefully by Powell (Cicero Cato Maior De Senec-
tute, 182–4). Huffman argues for the independence of Archyas’s critique from the Phaedo, but
he considers only the initial diagnosis passage. He overlooks the discussion of the role of
intensity in the soul’s greatest evil. See Huffman, Archytas of Tarentum, 324–37.
22
The focus on effects on belief also connects this passage in the Phaedo to the famous dis-
cussion of akrasia in the Protagoras. In that discussion, Socrates claims that appearances of
pleasure do not override beliefs but shift them, causing ignorance (356d1–357e3). Ignorance
is subsequently defined as false beliefs about matters of great value (357c5–6). Socrates’s
concern about the influence of feelings on beliefs is thus common to the Phaedo and Prota-
goras, and so not plausibly attributed to Pythagorean interlocutors.
23
This may be an instance of appropriation of the Pythagorean emphasis of different ways of
life. See Cornelli, In Search of Pythagoreanism, 60.
838 TRAVIS BUTLER

the soul. If the belief that bodily things are most real settles in the soul, it
becomes the motivational and justificatory ground of an anti-philosophical
way of living – a pattern of attention and action focused around bodily
things.24
When we turn to the consideration of the evidence about Socrates and
intense bodily affection, then, it is important to remember that the ethical
threat emphasized in the Phaedo is the power of repeated intense experiences
to impose and then reinforce false beliefs about the reality and significance of
bodily things. It is not primarily a threat posed by the kinds of isolated or
occasional intense bodily experiences that are inevitable in any active and
socially engaged human life.
Still, it might be argued that Socrates is portrayed in the early dialogues as
having more than the isolated or occasional intense bodily experience. He is
portrayed in the Symposium as an accomplished drinker and in the Char-
mides as admiring Charmides’s physical beauty and even burning with
desire for him (155d1–e1). These examples might be taken to indicate a
different view about intense bodily affection from that defended by the
true philosophers. In their full detail and context, however, these examples
tell a different story.
The portrayal of Socrates as an accomplished drinker in the Symposium
includes the crucial detail that he does not experience the typical effects of
heavy drinking. Indeed, it is said that Socrates did not really even desire
drink (220a1–5). In Socrates’s special case, then, the behaviour of drinking
alcohol was simply not accompanied by intense desire, pleasure, or con-
fusion. He did not experience the kind of feelings that influence beliefs
and turn values away from philosophy. This point is dramatized at the end
of Symposium with Socrates seeing the others off to sleep and heading
immediately to the Lyceum to spend the next day in his usual way
(223d8–12).
The case of Charmides is more difficult but no less instructive.25 It is more
difficult because there is no doubt that what Socrates experiences in this case
is intense bodily desire; it is not love inspired by Charmides’s potential for
wisdom. It must thus be conceded that in the Charmides, Socrates fails to
avoid an avoidable intense bodily desire. In its full context, however, the
Charmides episode coheres well with the account of the danger posed by
bodily desires and feelings in the Phaedo.
In the first place, Socrates is not portrayed in the Charmides as experien-
cing intense bodily desire in a cost-free way or without consequence for his
soul. Instead, his attention is commandeered by the desire and he is beside
himself, almost unable to continue the discussion. The case of Charmides
thus demonstrates the power of bodily desire and its objects to divert

24
It is anti-philosophical because those engaged in bodily practice come to hate, fear, and
avoid intelligible things (81b1–c2).
25
Here I have benefited from Tuozzo (Plato’s Charmides, 103–10).
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 839

attention from the things that really matter onto bodily things, temporarily
viewed as most vivid and real.
Moreover, the case further exemplifies the capacity of the philosopher
to mitigate the power of intense bodily affections by refusing to indulge
them further and returning as soon as possible to zealous inquiry about
the things that really matter. The episode with Charmides occurs at the
beginning of the dialogue; what follows Socrates’s brief incapacitation
is a long and difficult discussion of the nature of moderation, with
Socrates recovering and maintaining his typical zeal and persistence. In
its full context, then, Socrates’s interaction with Charmides dramatizes
the danger posed by intense bodily affection and the remedy provided
by the refusal to indulge further and the insistence on returning to philo-
sophical inquiry.
When we focus clearly on the fact that the ascetic avoidance norm is
not intended to guarantee immunity from intense affection but rather to
protect against value-change caused by repeated episodes of belief-influ-
ence, neither Socrates’s drinking at symposia nor even his intense
desire for Charmides is decisive evidence of departure from that norm
as applied to bodily desires and feelings. The former simply does not
involve intense affection, and the latter involves it in a way explicitly con-
templated in the Phaedo: even the philosopher’s soul is vulnerable to
intense affection, but his way of life protects him against a lasting
change in values.26
These key examples from the early dialogues thus do not provide convin-
cing support for Premise 2 of the Mismatch Argument, and so do not consti-
tute compelling evidence for the truth of SIT. Socrates obviously did not
avoid bodily desires and feelings as far as physically possible, but he may
have done so as far as ethically possible for a zealous inquirer.
To conclude this essay, it will be useful to return briefly to the central
question of the relation between Socratic philosophy in the Apology and
true philosophy in the Phaedo. For it might be objected that notwithstanding
the foregoing arguments, there remains the crucial fact that Socrates in the
Apology never indicates that avoidance of bodily phenomena is a necessary
element of the philosophical life, focusing instead on the requirement to care
for wisdom, truth, and the soul before (prin, proteron) the body, wealth, and
other things (30a7b–2, 36c5–d2).
This is an important challenge, not least because it draws attention to the
centrality of the notion of care in the Apology. It is clear that urging others to
care about the right things is an essential part of Socrates’s conception of his
own philosophical practice in the Apology (29c6–30a2). While it might be
thought that this element of philosophical practice is missing from the

26
Note that the passage explicitly states that belief-influence occurs in the soul of every person
(psuchē pantos anthropou) when it is intensely affected (83c5).
840 TRAVIS BUTLER

account in the Phaedo, attending to Socrates’s definition of mistaken caring

in the Apology indicates a crucial connection.
In the key passage, Socrates explains the mistake made by those who
claim to care about the right things but in fact give no thought to wisdom
and truth: such people attach least value to the most important things and
more value to the baser things (30a1–2). In the Apology, then, caring
about things essentially (though not exclusively) involves attaching value
to them, or deeming them worthy of attention and concern. The philosopher
succeeds where others fail because his attachments of value correspond to
the objective merit of the objects.
Let us now recall the true philosopher’s justification of his ascetic
avoidance in the Phaedo. The philosopher avoids intense bodily desires
and feelings because they force the soul to believe that the things that
are in fact least clear and least real are actually most clear and most
real. The gravest threat posed by bodily desires and feelings is thus that
they force the soul to attach value to the wrong things – to believe of
things that actually merit disdain (64d8–e1) and rejection (114d8–e2)
that they deserve the soul’s attention and concern because of their surpass-
ing clarity and reality.
Although Socrates does not employ the concept of care in this passage in
the Phaedo, it seems to me reasonable to interpret the passage in the light of
the account of caring as attaching value in the Apology.27 On this interpret-
ation, true philosophers avoid intense bodily desires and feelings because
they force the soul into mistaken attachments of value in their beliefs
about what is most real. What Socrates describes in the greatest evil
passage, then, is the psychological mechanism by which intense bodily
desires and feelings lead people to care about the wrong things. In the
absence of the philosopher’s ascetic avoidance, the mechanism of belief-
influence transforms people who have bodily desires and feelings into
people who care about the body, wealth, and other bodily things. This
kind of care provides the motivational and justificatory ground for a
bodily, anti-philosophical way of life.
The foregoing interpretative outline suggests a new way of envisaging
the relation between the discussions of philosophy in the Apology and
Phaedo. Although Socrates does not explicitly defend the ascetic avoid-
ance norm in the Apology, he does consistently contrast and oppose the
life of philosophy and care of the soul to the life that expresses care of
the body, where the latter results from systematically mistaken attach-
ments of value. The ascetic avoidance norm as it is defended in the
Phaedo then emerges from reflection on the role of bodily desires and
feelings in forcing those mistaken attachments on the soul.28 The true

27
For the importance of care in the Phaedo, see 107c1–d5.
28
Here I agree with Notomi’s claim (‘Socrates in the Phaedo’, 52–3) that the Phaedo deepens
the conception of philosophy defended in the Apology.
 SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 841

philosopher avoids bodily desires and feelings as far as ethically possible

because this is required for realizing the ideal of caring most about
wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of the soul.

Submitted 5 June 2014; revised 30 November 2014 and 9 April 2015;

accepted 22 April 2015
Iowa State University

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