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Acknowledgements
Some ten years ago the Philosophy Department of Lancaster University embarked
on a programme of teaching and research in environmental philosophy, and my
first thanks are to my colleagues in that programme for a stimulating collabora-
tion. For their help at particular points in the writing of this book I thank
Warwick Fox, Jane Howarth, John O'Neill and Vernon Pratt. I owe a special debt
to Peter Wright, the Philosophy Editor of the Open University for his help in the
preparation of the book as an Open University course textbook. In preparing this
version I have profited from detailed comments by two anonymous readers for
Routledge.
Grateful acknowledgement is made to the following sources for permission to
reproduce material in this book: G.J. Warnock (1971) The Object if Morality,
Routledge; R. Hepburn (1984) Wonder and Other Essays, Edinburgh University
Press; R. Sylvan and V. Routley (1980) 'Human Chauvinism and Environmental
Ethics', in D.S. Mannison et al. (cds), Environmental Philosophy, Australian National
University; B.G. Norton (1989) 'The Cultural Approach to Conservation
Biology', from D. Western and M.C. Pearl (eds), Conservationjor the Twentyjirst
Century, used by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.; E. O. Wilson
(1992) The Diversity if Life, Penguin Books Ltd; D. Pearce et al. (1989) Blueprint
jor a Green Economy, HMSO (Crown copyright is reproduced with the permission
of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office); D. Pearce (1992) 'Green
Economics', Environmental Values 1(1), The White Horse Press; G. Hardin (1968)
'The Tragedy of the Commons', Science, vol. 162: 1243-8, copyright 1968
American Association for the Advancement of Science; J.L. Mackie (1977) Ethics:
Inventina Riaht and Wrona, Penguin Books, 1977, copyright J. L. Mackie, reproduced
by permission of Penguin Books Ltd; J. O'Neill (1993) Ecoloay, Policy and Polities,
Routledge; J. Howarth (1996) 'Neither Use nor Ornament: A Conservationist's
Guide to Care', Lancaster University; P. W Taylor (1986) Respect jor Nature: a
TheoI]' if Environmental Ethics, copyright 1986 by Princeton University Press,
reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press; H. Rolston III (1979)
'Can and Ought We to Follow Nature', Environmental Ethics; A. Naess (1989)
Economy, Community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press; V. Plum wood
(1995) 'Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy and the
Critique of Rationalism', Environmental Ethics, Indiana University Press; W Fox
(1995) Toward a Transpersonal EcoloaT Developina New Foundationsjor Environmentalism,
Green Books Ltd, copyright 1990, 1995 Warwick Fox; P. Larkin (1988) Collected
Poems, copyright 1988, 1989 by The Estate of Philip Larkin, reprinted by
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
permission of Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Inc.; WH.Auden (1968) Collected Lanser
Poems, copyright 1937 by W.H. Auden, reprinted by permission of Curtis Brown,
Ltd.
Finally, thanks to Mary Warren for compiling the indexes.
Introduction
can value nature, in the course of which much emphasis is placed on the distinc-
tion between valuing things for what they can do for us and valuing them for
what they are.
The second issue is a closely related one: how should we, as human beings,
think of our relationship to (the rest of) nature? An idea of great antiquity is that
nature is, or should be, our teacher; that what we need to do, to act rightly, is to
follow nature. Related to that is the idea that we are a part of, not apart from
nature, and that a full recognition of that would remove any inclination to think
of ourselves as superior to and entitled to exploit nature. The two final chapters
discuss these ideas, attempting to distinguish between what is sound and useful
and what is exaggerated and misleading in them.
The book is an introduction, but does not attempt to be a survey of all the
important questions in environmental ethics, nor even of all the positions held by
reputable philosophers who have written on the two issues which are treated at
length. All the positions presented in the readings and discussed in the text are
interesting ones, but there are equally interesting ones that are not represented,
and not all workers in the area would agree with my selection. Nor does my
treatment of the positions I do discuss pretend to be neutral. Some textbooks aim
to give arguments for and against the views they expound, but do not adopt any
position of their own. This book does adopt a modest position, which ought to be
stated explicitly.
The position that I hold, and hope that the book gives some support for, is that
a sufficiently rich account of what is valuable to human beings is an adequate
foundation for an ethics of respect for nature. Environmental ethics does not
require a concept of value as a quality independent of human judgements, tastes,
interests, etc. On the issue described in the first paragraph of this introduction, I
do not come to any conclusion. In a later section of the introduction, I explain
why I think that the issue has been misunderstood and the controversy vitiated by
a confusion of two different distinctions.
THE METHOD
Three aspects of the method adopted in the book should be noted: the use of
readings, the inclusion of exercises as a stimulus to activity by the reader, and the
formal laying out of arguments. Substantial readings from a variety of authors
bring the reader into direct contact with the exponents of the positions being
discussed. The text is largely commentary on the readings, and one of its func-
tions is to demonstrate the way in which philosophers typically go about their
business by analysing and criticising the arguments of other philosophers. The
majority of the exercises are intended to encourage the reader to participate in
that activity for him or herself. They invite the reader to pause and think about a
question before reading what I have to say about it in the section headed
'Discussion' that follows. These are 'think' exercises. Others are intended to help
the reader to make sure that he or she has not missed or misunderstood a crucial
point in a reading or in the text. They vary in difficulty; some may appear very
obvious, others less so. The answers to these 'check' exercises are usually given at
the beginning of the discussion section, and you may need to cover them up if you
INTRODUCTION
want to give your own answers before reading mine. In a few cases, the answers
are found at the end of the chapter.
A particular feature of the book is the laying out of arguments in a way that
makes clear their structure, that is the way in which certain statements in an
argument give reasons which support, or are meant to support, the conclusion. It
is not always easy to identify the conclusion or conclusions and the reason giving
statements (premises), so it is a useful discipline to lay arguments out in this way.
It is also a useful critical tool, because it enables one to pinpoint possible weak-
nesses in an argument, asking oneself: (1) does the conclusion follow from these
premises; and (2) are the premises true? For an argument to establish its conclu-
sion the answer to each of these questions must be 'yes'. If the answer to the first
is 'yes', then the argument is valid, which is to say that if the premises are true
then so is the conclusion. But an argument may be valid even if its premises are
false, and in that case the conclusion may also be false. If however, as well as being
valid the argument has true premises, then the conclusion must be true. Such an
argument is said to be a sound argument.
This basic point of logic, with its associated terminology, is used in the analysis
of argument at many points in the book.
The first sense is extensively discussed in the book, especially in chapter 2 and
chapter 4, but the second sense is not, although some of the writers discussed use
it in the second sense, or use terms that have the same sense. The term 'inherent
worth', for example, as used by Paul W. Taylor in Reading 11, is intended to
mean value that is not only independent of human needs and purposes (non-
instrumental value), but independent of human valuing.
This second sense immediately raises a fundamental philosophical issue that
has divided philosophers throughout the ages, and now divides philosophers who
think about environmental ethics: 'Are there any such values?'
The issue has been put in various ways. An ancient way is the question, 'Do we
value good things because they are good, or are they good because we value
them?' If we say the first, then we imply that goodness is a property of good
things that they just have, which we recognize when we value them, but which
INTRODUCTION
they have even if we fail to recognize it. If we say the second, we imply that good-
ness is somehow conferred on things by our valuing them. According to the first
answer we could say that goodness is real, meaning by that, that it is part of the
world as it is in itself, independently of the way in which we experience it.
According to the second answer, the existence of goodness is a result of the way
we experience the world.
It has seemed to some philosophers important to maintain that when we find
value in nature we do not put it there, that it is not a projection of our valuing
minds. They believe that if value is not in nature, part of a mind-independent
reality, then its value depends on whether human beings care about it. If there
really are values in nature, then they are still there even if we do not recognize
them, and our failure to recognize them would be an error.
The philosophical question about the reality of value is such a difficult one, and
so much weighty philosophizing has been spent on it, that to attempt a quick
answer here would invite ridicule. But there is no need to make such an attempt
in order to discuss environmental value, because the issue is not after all the
crucial issue that it has seemed to some environmental philosophers. That it has
seemed so is due to a confusion of the two senses.
The view that nature must be valuable in the second sense of intrinsic value is
encouraged by the failure to make a clear distinction between it and the first
sense. The confusion sets up a false dichotomy between instrumental value and
value as a real, mind-independent property of things. What seems to happen is
this. One begins by objecting to some of the ways in which human beings use
nature, and is then moved to protest that it has value that is independent of the
purposes for which human beings use, consume and manipulate it: value beyond
instrumental value. One then concludes that nature has value which is indepen-
dent of its being valued. But this is to confuse independence of our purposes and
independence of our va]uin8. What the false dichotomy leaves out is the whole
range of values that are revealed to the contemplative gaze, the values that are
discovered in the activities that exercise the human capacity for disinterested
attention. These include the scientific study of nature for its own sake and
aesthetic appreciation, and also such physical activities as walking, climbing,
sailing, which involve selfless absorption in nature. Whether or not these values
are independent of our valuing them, they are values for us, and, it is argued in
this book, importantly different from 'merely' instrumental values. And if values
are real, valuer-independent properties of things, it is only in experience of them
that values reveal themselves, either to our thinking or to our feeling. It is diffi-
cult to see what philosophers who insist on the independence of value from
valuing hope to gain over and above what is gained by the recognition of these
non-instrumental values. What environmental ethics needs is to uncover reasons
that can weigh in the deliberations and decisions of human beings in their dealings
with nature, reasons that go beyond the (also important) reasons for conserving
resources, and preserving the natural world as our life support system. It does
not help us to decide what these reasons are to know that they are independent of
our valuing.
That is why I set aside the issue of the reality of values, and have instead
emphasized the contemplative values in contrast to instrumental values. In doing
INTRODUCTION
FURTHER READING
A good, clearly written and up to date introduction to environmental ethics,
which is much more comprehensive than this one, is ].R. Des Jardins,
Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (Wadsworth, 2nd
edn, 1997). Two big, comprehensive, collections of readings representing a wide
variety of views and problems are Environmental Philosophy, edited by Michael E.
Zimmerman (Prentice Hall, 2nd edn, 1998) and The Ethics ifthe Environment,
edited by Andrew Brennan (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995). Two smaller
collections of articles, mostly good and all in some way relevant to this book, are
Environmental Ethics, edited by Robert Elliot (Oxford University Press, 1995),
and The Philosophy if the Environment, edited by T.D.]. Chappell (Edinburgh
University Press 1997).
Environmental philosophy is not only environmental ethics. An introductory
book that places environmental ethics in a wider context of modern thought
about individualism and the nature of science is Environment and Philosophy by
Vernon Pratt with Jane Howarth and Emily Brady (Routledge, 2000).
Helpful concise articles on various theories of normative ethics can be found
in A Companion to Ethics, edited by Peter Singer (Blackwell, 1991: Part IV). Part
VI of the same volume contains articles on metaethical questions.
The view that natural values are independent of human valuers is defended by
Holmes Rolston III in 'Values in Nature and the Nature of Value' in Philosophy and
the Natural Environment, edited by R. Attfield and A. Belsey (Cambridge University
Press, 1994). Robert Elliott in 'Facts About Natural Values', in Environmental Values
5 (1996), argues that environmental ethics does not need a realist metaethical
foundation.
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c hanter
1 Environments and
environmental ethics
OBJECTIVES
After reading this chapter you should :
ENVIRONMENTS
There is no such thing as the environment. As its derivation suggests (see any
standard dictionary) the term is a relative one, meaning 'surroundings'. There is
always to be understood some thing that is surrounded. An environment is always
the environment of ... Consider the environment of a domestic cat. Its imme-
diate environment is the household in which it spends most of its time, awake or
asleep (when vets recommend environmental flea control they mean spray the
house, not just the cat), but its environment is, more accurately, the area over
which it ranges and the features of that area that affect the cat in some way,
providing sources of food, opportunities for mating, challenges (rival cats, cars),
safe places to sleep, and exciting places to prowl, skip and generally brisk about
the life. 1 Strictly speaking, two cats in the same area do not have identical envi-
ronments because each is part of the other's. Less strictly they can be said to
share an environment because most of the features of the area affect each of them
in the same way.
To speak of an environment in this way is to speak of it as a set of resources.
That is to emphasise one side of a two-way relationship. The other side is the
ENVIRONMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
What is environmental ethics? Ethics is concerned with individuals and groups as
subjects and objects of actions, that is as doers and as things to which things are
done. Traditionally, it has been most concerned with human beings as subjects and
objects of doings. Many accounts present recent developments as extending this
concern in stages, first to non-human animals, next to living things generally, and
on to wholes such as populations, plant communities, ecosystems, lakes, streams
and mountains; the move to each stage being more radical and problematic than
the last. On this account environmental ethics begins where the ethics of concern
ENVIRONMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
for animals leaves off. But that is somewhat arbitrary: are not animals part of
one's environment? Is it not more sensible to say that environmental ethics incor-
porates the ethics of animal concern?
Having accepted that, one might be struck by the thought that other human
beings are also part of one's environment. Does that mean that environmental
ethics incorporates the ethics of human concern? If so, environmental ethics
becomes indistinguishable from ethics. But in practice it is convenient to recog-
nise a sub-division of the field of ethics that is concerned with the rights and
wrongs of our treatment of the non-human.
There is, however, another point that is worth bearing in mind. We have
become in the recent past increasingly aware of the way in which living things
form intricate relationships of interdependence within their shared environment.
The saying, 'it is impossible to do only one thing', draws attention to the often
unpredictable ramifications of the effects of our actions. The implication for
ethics that I want to point out is this: an environmentally informed ethics is one
that takes full account of the fact that an individual organism, of whatever kind, is
embedded in its environment, and gives full weight to this in deliberating about
actions that are likely to affect the organism.
Thus environmental ethics considers not only natural but also urban environ-
ments: how human beings are affected physically, mentally and spiritually by the
design and materials of the buildings in which they live and work, the layout of
cities, provision of public services, and so on. Cities, it should be remembered,
are not only human environments, so a more comprehensive environmental view
considers their effect on foxes and plane trees.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
The variety of environments is matched by the variety of problems that can be
termed 'environmental'. Someone playing loud music near by can be an environ-
mental problem if it is heard as an unwelcome intrusion. It is a problem because
it causes distress and prompts the question, 'what is to be done about it?' For
there to be a problem there needs to be some feature of an environment that is
seen as undesirable, and someone for whom it raises the practical question, 'how
can it be removed?' The spread of bracken on the Cumbrian fells is a problem (at
least in part) because it reduces the area that can be grazed, and because it raises
the question, 'how can it be halted or reversed?'
Environmental problems can be quite local, like that one; indeed, even more
local, like a loose slate that allows unwanted rainwater to spoil the fabric of my
house. They can also be far-reaching, like the smog produced by large-scale forest
fires. And, at the extreme, they can be global in extent like the effects on the
earth's atmosphere of the emission of carbon dioxide. Such far-reaching prob-
lems constitute problems because of the harmful effects on human beings,
though not only on human beings. Other species may be, and almost certainly
will be in most cases, adversely affected, and that may be seen as part of the
problem. Many of the most threatening environmental changes are brought
about, intentionally or otherwise, by human agency. Intentional changes include
such things as the rerouting or damming of rivers, the drainage of marshes, forest
ENVIRONMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
clearance for agricultural purposes, and so on. Unintentional changes include the
pollution of air, soil and water by industrial emissions (where the act of emitting
certain substances into the atmosphere or into a river is intentional, but its conse-
quences not intended, or even foreseen), and the destruction of animal and plant
populations (by forest clearance, for example). But changes not brought about by
human activity at all can be seen as undesirable from some point of view.
Whatever brought about the destruction of the dinosaurs - some cataclysmic
change in their environment - was certainly a bad thing from the dinosaur point
of view. It is debatable how much effect human activities have on climate changes,
but certainly there are large-scale environmental changes, of which climate
changes are one kind, which are independent of human activity. Such change may
none the less raise problems for human beings. The causal origin of a change -
whether or not it was brought about by human action - is irrelevant. 2 The rele-
vant considerations are whether a change has harmful effects on human (or
non-human) beings, and whether human beings can do something about these
effects. It is important to note here that the problem consists of three questions:
(a) are the effects really harmful? (b) can we do anything about them, either by
controlling the changes or by remedying their effects? (c) if we can is it morally
incumbent on us to do so?
I think it is fair to say that environmental ethics has been unduly crisis-
oriented. Its growth in recent years has certainly accompanied rising
consciousness of, and anxiety about, the serious threats to human well-being and,
on the part of many, to the well-being of other species, posed by pollution and
the destructive exploitation of natural resources. At least in the public conscious-
ness, there has been a tendency to concentrate on supposedly imminent
catastrophes. (But not only global catastrophes; there is also gloom at the degra-
dation of the countryside, the encroachment of concrete, as expressed in Philip
Larkin's despairing poem 'Going, Going' (see Reading 17).) It is certainly good
that people should become more aware of the ways in which humans and other
beings can be harmed by actions which in themselves may be beneficial, but
which disturb the unobvious mechanisms by which living things are supported. It
may be a good thing that people should be scared into changing their behaviour
by the threat of catastrophe (though there are dangers in crying wolf). But envi-
ronmental ethics, though stimulated by crises, is not fundamentally concerned
with what ought to be done in critical situations. What then is it concerned with?
Miscellaneous Oneself
God
(Midgley (1983) in Elliot, R. (ed.) (1995: 97))
This list of objects regarding which we may have duties, or have some sort of
responsibility to treat as if they matter in some way and for some reason, raises a
question that is answered in different ways by different parties within the ranks of
those interested in working out the principles of environmental ethics (not
confined to professional philosophers). The question is: 'Which of these kinds of
thing have a claim to be considered in their own right?'
for you, and I undertake to do it, I have a duty to post the letter, but not because I
have a duty to the letter. It is to you that I have a duty. One might explain this by
saying that the letter matters only because it matters to you. Now for an example
that comes much closer to the subject of this book. In the past many philosophers
discussing the morality of our treatment of animals, while conceding that we have
duties regarding animals, such as the duty not to treat them with cruelty, have
denied that these duties are straightforwardly to animals. In some way they can be
derived from our duty to other human beings. Thus, for instance, we have a duty
not to be cruel to our fellow humans, and consequently a duty not to do anything
that will nourish a cruel disposition. Treating animals cruelly may nourish a cruel
disposition, and so is a failure of our duty to our fellow humans.
The point of such an argument is to show that animals can enter the moral
arena only on the back of human beings, not on their own feet. In the absence of
some relationship to human beings, letters and cats would not claim my attention
from a moral point of view. The point may be made in this way: when I contem-
plate some action there is a whole array of other beings which it may affect. Some
of these other beings matter: that is, how they are affected determines whether
the action is right or wrong. Beings of some sorts matter in a way that can be
explained only by reference to the way in which beings of some other sort are
affected; but some matter in a way that requires no such further reference to
explain why they matter: they matter in themselves. A list of the beings I need to
consider in deciding whether to go ahead need include only items of the second
sort, for in considering them I will automatically take account of what matters
about the way my action affects beings of the first sort. The beings in this neces-
sary list - those whose claim to be considered is independent of the claims of any
other beings - are the ones that have a claim to be considered in their own right.
Philosophers use various quasi-technical, and slightly portentous, phrases to
describe such beings, they may be said to be 'morally considerable', to have
'moral standing', or have 'independent moral status'.
The first two of the phrases I have just mentioned have some currency and you
may well come across them in your further reading on the subject, but both have
drawbacks. Take 'considerable': if you say that something is a considerable weight
or has considerable importance, you imply that it is really quite heavy or of more
than slight importance. To call a being morally considerable however is not
intended to convey any degree of importance, but only to identify the being as
one to be considered in a particular way. 'Considerable' means 'eligible for
consideration', or perhaps more strongly, 'deserving of consideration'. Since this
distinction is an important one, it is a pity to use a term that blurs it. 'Standing'
has gained currency, I believe, because of the work of the American lawyer and
philosopher Christopher Stone (Stone 1974). The term has a particular use in the
legal parlance of the USA. To have standing is to be recognised by the court as
entitled to make pleas in person or through a representative. Stone argues that it
would be a good idea to grant legal standing to natural objects, for then it would
not be necessary to show, for example, that other users of a stream are harmed in
order to get a court to grant an injunction against someone who was polluting it.
The notion of 'moral standing' is a metaphorical application of this legal term. It
has the merit of suggesting that a being is an independent source of claims; it has
ENVIRONMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Consider the duties someone has as a farmer. Let us suppose that these
include the duty to maintain the fertility of the soil, not to reduce biodiversity by
grubbing up hedges, not to spoil the quality of the landscape by removing old
buildings or erecting structures that are not in harmony with it (a list that would
perhaps appeal more to conservationists than to farmers). If we ask what are the
grounds for these duties, it is apparent that the reasons for concern are different
ENVIRONMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
and not all related to human interests in the same way, or perhaps not at all.
Maintaining the fertility of the soil is important because soil is a human resource,
preserving landscape character is important for our sense of the historical conti-
nuity of a lived-in place. Biodiversity: why is that important? Does the
maintenance of diverse animal and plant communities serve some interest of
human beings (because of the possibility, for instance, that some inconspicuous
plant species may turn out to have medicinal properties)? That such reasons are
often urged against actions that result in loss of biodiversity implies that
concluding something ought to be done because it benefits human beings has
sufficient force to make it a justifying reason that will be widely recognised as
such. But some conservationists would claim that we should care about biodiver-
sity independently of its benefits to human beings, and this seems to imply that
such non-human communities are owed consideration in their own right.
So it is not enough to say that speaking of duties to things merely expresses
that there are suitable and unsuitable ways of behaving in given situations. This is
to overlook the fact that behaviour can be suitable or unsuitable in different ways.
Mary Midgley makes the point herself two paragraphs later when speaking of the
duties one has to one's country:
Here the language of fatherland and motherland, which is SO widely employed, indicates
rightly a duty of care and responsibility which can go very deep, and which long-settled
people commonly feel strongly. To inSist that it is really only a duty to the exploiting human
beings is not consistent with the emphasis often given to reverence for the actual trees,
mountains, lakes, rivers and the like which are found there.
(Midgley 1983: 102; my italics in the final sentence)
So it seems that it does matter that we not only have a duty not to pollute a lake -
that this is unsuitable behaviour - but that it is to the lake that we owe this duty.
If this distinction between beings that have and beings that lack independent
moral status were not important, it would be difficult to understand the fact that
philosophers and activists within the environmental movement have divided over
the question whether our responsibilities towards our environments are ulti-
mately responsibilities to human beings or are to non-human entities directly.
One important reason for this division is that there is a division over what entities
have independent moral status.
SHADES OF GREEN
We will now look at this division within the environmental movement. In 1973
one of the founding fathers of environmental philosophy, the Norwegian philoso-
pher Arne Naess published a short paper called 'The Shallow and the Deep,
Long-Range Ecology Movement' (Naess 1973).
As a result of Naess's influence, the terms 'shallow' and 'deep' have become
common currency amongst environmentalists. A shallow position is one that
reduces concern for the environment to concern for the interests of human
beings. A deep view is one that is committed to 'the equal right to live and
blossom' of all forms of life. The use of this pair of terms is unfortunate. As
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quel poco almeno che era sopravvissuto alla rovina di Cartagine —
era passato ai mercanti romani: i mercanti romani che
commerciavano con l’Africa avrebbero potuto risiedere in Africa
meglio che a Roma. Molti infatti si erano stabiliti a Cirta. Non si
poteva riedificare, sulle rovine della punica, una nuova Cartagine
romana che si chiamasse Giunonia? Egli propose di fondare a
Squillace, a Taranto, a Cartagine tre colonie, non di poveri però,
come in antico, ma di persone benestanti, a cui, per invogliarle ai
lasciare Roma, sarebbero date vaste terre [73].
Anche queste proposte furono approvate, sebbene, a quanto
sembra, a fatica, perchè lo sfollamento di Roma noceva a molti. Ma
Caio prese ardire ad esprimere alla fine la idea suprema,
lungamente meditata in silenzio: concedere, come già aveva
proposto il suo amico M. Fulvio Flacco, la cittadinanza romana a tutti
gli Italiani; rinforzare la piccola oligarchia di Roma, che rassomigliava
a una esile colonna consunta dalle intemperie e dagli anni, sulla
quale architetti improvvidi ingrandivano la mole già pesante di una
fabbrica immensa. Tale era il disegno di Caio Gracco: posare
l’impero non sulla cupidigia e l’orgoglio della piccola oligarchia
romana, ma sulle solide e semplici virtù della classe rurale di tutta
l’Italia; restaurare le antiche sedi del commercio distrutte o decadute;
sollevar Roma dalla congestione di ricchezze e di uomini, che la
soffocava.
Roma non aveva ancor visto, e non vedrà più un riformatore dal
pensiero così organico, profondo e creativo. Se un uomo potesse
addossarsi l’opera che sole le generazioni possono compiere, Caio
Gracco avrebbe rigenerato Roma, e sciolta la tragica contradizione
in cui Roma si dibatteva. Ma Caio era un grande uomo, non un Dio.
Proponendo di accordare la cittadinanza agli Italici, egli aveva
oltrepassato il limite, che non poteva essere superato neppure da lui,
che pur era un grande uomo. L’opposizione, che aveva disanimato
Fulvio Flacco, rinacque: senato, cavalieri, agricoltori, proletariato
urbano si trovarono questa volta uniti contro Caio Gracco. Il
misoneismo, l’orgoglio, l’egoismo prevalsero su ogni altra
considerazione. L’oligarchia romana non intendeva far getto dei suoi
privilegi. Quando il tribuno Livio Druso oppose il suo veto, quel
popolo, che aveva deposto Ottavio, scoppiò in un applauso caloroso.
La popolarità di Caio Gracco incominciò a vacillare. Per maggior
disgrazia Caio aveva accettato di far parte della commissione che
dedurrebbe a Cartagine la nuova colonia; e quindi dovè lasciar
Roma, proprio allorchè la sua presenza sarebbe stata più
necessaria, e sebbene la legge vietasse a un tribuno della plebe di
uscire dalla città. Egli cercò di far presto, non restò assente più di
settanta giorni: ma di questa sua assenza approfittò il partito a lui
nemico, per screditarlo del tutto. Strumento di questo partito fu il
tribuno Livio Druso; che con perfida abilità propose tre rogazioni
assai più generose ancora di quelle di Caio: una, che prometteva al
popolo non tre colonie miste di benestanti e di poveri, ma dodici
addirittura e tutte di soli proletari; un’altra, che liberava le nuove
assegnazioni di agro pubblico dal tributo allo Stato, voluto dalla
legge Sempronia; una terza, che prometteva agli Italici la
soppressione delle pene corporali, anche sotto le armi. Il volgo,
volubile e sciocco, cadde nella pania; si persuase che il senato e il
partito oligarchico, a cui Livio apparteneva, si erano ravveduti ed
erano diventati migliori amici suoi che Caio. Quando Caio tornò
dall’Africa il favor popolare lo aveva abbandonato al punto, che i suoi
nemici già preparavano il pubblico alla abrogazione della legge sulla
colonia della nuova Cartagine, sussurrando di prodigi minacciosi,
che avevano atterrito la prima schiera di coloni: indizio sicuro
dell’empietà di coloro che avevano voluto fondare una colonia sul
suolo maledetto di Cartagine!
Non fa quindi meraviglia, che le elezioni per l’anno 121 siano state
sfavorevoli a Caio. Caio non fu rieletto: invece fu eletto console L.
Opimio, uno dei più accaniti tra i suoi nemici. Incoraggiati dalle
elezioni, i suoi nemici si decisero a vibrare il primo colpo. Il tribuno
Minucio Rufo propose l’abrogazione della legge sulla colonia di
Cartagine. Caio non poteva non raccogliere la sfida. Il giorno del
voto si presentò al popolo nei comizi, per difendere, almeno con la
parola, quella che era una delle più nobili, alte e feconde iniziative
della sua politica. Ma gli spiriti erano irritati; anche questa volta un
tumulto nacque; e anche questa volta il partito avverso ripetè nel
senato al console l’esortazione e l’invito, che dieci anni prima gli
aveva vanamente rivolti Scipione Nasica. Ma console era questa
volta L. Opimio, che non si fece pregare. Il senatus consultum
ultimum fu decretato; rinnovando, dopo circa 263 anni, un
provvedimento che nelle future turbolenze della repubblica doveva
prendere il posto dell’antica dittatura. In forza del decreto un piccolo
tumulto dei comizi passò per un tentativo di rivoluzione; Caio e i suoi
seguaci furono assaliti e trucidati; egli medesimo, visto precluso ogni
scampo, si fece uccidere da uno schiavo fedele.
Note al Capitolo Dodicesimo.
66. Sui Salassi e sulle miniere aurifere dell’antico Piemonte, cfr. Polyb., 34,
10, 18; Strab., 5, 1, 12; Plin., N. H., 33, 4, 78.
67. Per una illustrazione della legge agraria di Tiberio, cfr. E. De Ruggiero,
Agrariae leges, in Enciclopedia giuridica italiana, 1, 2, pp. 798-808.