Education and Society Vol. 34, No.

1, 2016
© 2016 James Nicholas Publishers pp. 39-59

Youth of Today and the Democracy of

Tomorrow. Polish Students’ Attitudes
Toward Democracy
Radosław Marzęcki
Łukasz Stach
Pedagogical University of Cracow

Abstract

From the perspective of over 20 years into the transformation process in

post-communist countries, it seems important to be able to pose questions
about the future of democracy, and, in particular, its social foundations.
These questions become all the more significant, when we come to realize
that it is the attitudes of ‘the young of today’ that will be shaping ‘the
democracy of tomorrow’. The authors of the article aim to determine what
young citizens (especially Polish students) in selected Central and East-
ern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary
and Romania) think of contemporary democracy and to diagnose the ex-
tent to which the democratic principles and values are reflected in the
beliefs of the younger generation, especially amongst Polish students.
Their attitudes towards democracy and values are the main part of the
article and they were compared with values of the other CEEC young cit-
izens. The article also highlights their distrust towards Polish political
parties and political elites and belief, that existing Polish political parties
do not have any proper programs or ideas for young people, which may
be a chance for a new political movement in Poland.

Keywords: democracy; youth; students; post-communist societies;

Poland; European Union; transformation; political transition; political
culture

Experience of the past

The events we have been witnessing for the past dozen years make
it much easier for us today to provide answers to the questions on the
quality of our democracy. The time that has passed facilitates our as-
sessment of the effects of past actions and lack thereof. Undoubtedly,

ISSN 0726-2655 (print) / 2201-0610 (online)

http://dx.doi.org/10.7459/es/34.1.04
40 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

as post-communist societies, we have become a little wiser. For sure,

such wisdom, stemming mainly from the experience of facing chal-
lenges of a given period in time, was what societies at large, and polit-
ical elites of Central and Eastern Europe in particular, lacked at the
turn of the 1980s and 1990s. Some fundamental questions were asked
at the time, as for instance: ‘how can we capitalize on the death of com-
munism, and how do we construct an efficient system of democratic
representation?’ (Zielonka, 1998, p. 21; Rupnik, 1999, pp. 57-62). An-
other question, perhaps an indirect one, involved the possibility and
different ways of consolidating democracy in those states, where the
democratic tradition had been destroyed, where societies had fallen
victim to long-standing repression, and autonomous business activity
was non-existent (Antoszewski, 2000). Even though we have gained a
little wisdom in the meantime, we still keep posing questions on the
future of our democracy. Indeed, democracy is not to be taken for
granted, according to Philippe Schmitter, it is not necessarily ascribed
to capitalism, nor is it an ethical imperative of social evolution (Schmit-
ter, 1994). Democracy as such is the only political system with an ‘in-
built’ mechanism of self-destruction. Hence, its consolidation requires
continuous effort. It is not to say, though, that its fundaments are in
danger in contemporary Europe. Juan Linz expresses a far-reaching
acceptance of the thesis that democracy as a political regime will sur-
vive in many countries, at least in its external, facade (institutional)
form. Democracy understood as a set of particular institutions appears
to be rather safe. What raises our doubts is its quality, though, or the
ways in which people will continue to make use of the institutions to
practice democracy. Hence, one of the essential questions that a scholar
might ask is the following: will democracy be established ‘for real’, and
will it make its way towards consolidation? The question was most
valid at the time, when many Central and Eastern European countries
were breaking away from non-democratic regimes, in the wake of 1989.
However, for a present-day researcher it gives rise to an important fol-
low-up question on the quality of democracy today. No democracy – not
even a consolidated one – can guarantee that there will be no crises in
the future, or that it will always remain stable (Linz, 1997, p. 406).
What makes it prone to crisis, and hinders complete consolidation, is
first and foremost the insufficient legitimization argument that mod-
ern Central and Eastern European societies are free to invoke. The
problem has already been tackled by Claus Offe (1991) in his article
Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple
Transition in East Central Europe. In his opinion, the dilemma of si-
multaneous identity, principle and policy changes in the course of
transformation implied the establishment and stabilization of democ-
racy, as well as the introduction of the free market. At the same time,
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 41

in order for those changes to be effective, one had to answer the ques-
tion of how to convince general societies that the actions undertaken
by political elites were indeed good, just, and legitimate, serving every-
one without exception, and not only the select few who take final deci-
sions on the form of political rules and principles. The author also
emphasises the temporal structure of processes forming part of politi-
cal modernization, and the related requirement of immense patience,
trust, and faith1. It seems clear that the feeling is all the stronger,
when individuals are have a grasp of economic arguments which facil-
itate legitimization of the new system. Many Polish sociologists pointed
to economic arguments on the eve of the political transformation. For
instance, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska stressed the significance of ‘fighting
against time’, which was important from the point of view of the feel-
ings of the general public. She claimed that ‘the society was ready to
make sacrifices and renounce comforts, trusting that the new system
would soon bring about an improvement in the standard of living’.
Thus, one had to make haste to be in time ‘before the reserve of social
patience ran out, possibly hampering reform’ (Kolarska-Bobińska,
2011, p. 56)2. In 1990, in one of the expert opinions submitted by the
Team of Sociology Advisers to the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club,
Mirosława Marody reminded the politicians that ‘maintenance of the
stability of the current arrangement depended to a large extent on
whether the authorities would be able to sustain people’s conviction
that they were acting in the society’s best interest’ (Wnuk-Lipiński,
1992, chapter 21).

With hindsight, we realize that the expectations addressed to young

democracies need to be examined against the background of the atti-
tudes shaped within the system of real socialism (Kolarska-Bobińska,
2011, p. 61). Marian Frybes and Patrick Michel observe that the trans-
formations which took place in post-communist countries were not
solely ‘system transformations’. They also involved ‘social redefinitions’
of the new situation, i.e. attempts at imparting new meanings, based
not only on a particular theoretical and scientific model, but on the ac-
tual experiences of individuals and social groups (Frybes & Michel,
1996). The experiences are crucial not only at the exact time of the
events in question, but also over the long term. They generate a general
assessment of the undergone changes, a so-to-say ‘generalized attitude’
towards the transformation as a whole (Synak, 1992). The post-com-
munist part of Europe wrestled with the problem of non-existent dem-
ocratic and civic traditions one could directly refer to, as well as the
absence of habits for organized social cooperation3. Trying to explain
this phenomenon, some scholars speak of a specific ‘socialist mentality’,
which stood (and in a sense still stands) in contradiction to the logic of
42 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

democracy and the free market. Piotr Sztompka describes it in terms

of ‘a product of several decades of totalitarian and semi-totalitarian
rule, which has left a strong imprint on people’s motivations and atti-
tudes’ (Sztompka, 2005, p. 228). With reference to the sphere of politics,
socialist mentality manifests itself with a common distrust of public
declarations, criticism of the mass media, and scepticism of political
appeals. Central and local authorities are still perceived as alien and
hostile, and the government is judged as an arena of conspiracy, de-
ception and cynicism, as well as ignorance and incompetence. When it
comes to people’s behaviours, one cannot fail to notice a great deal of
passivity and political apathy (Sztompka, 2005, pp. 230-232; Wnuk-
Lipiński, 1990). Sztompka writes about the ‘legacy of real socialism’,
which ‘appears to last longest in the sphere of the mind’ and tends to
‘haunt post-communist societies from beyond the grave’ (Sztompka,
2005, p. 228).

The young of today and the democracy of tomorrow

From the perspective of over 20 years into the transformation process
in post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, it seems
important to be able to pose questions on the future of democracy, and
on its social foundations in particular. The questions become all the
more significant, when we come to realize that it will be the attitudes
of ‘the young of today’ that will be shaping ‘the democracy of tomorrow’
(Forbrig, 2005, p. 7). Even though they have had no direct experience
of communism, in a sense they are its ‘mental heirs’. Their education
and socialization have been determined by two elements: firstly, the pe-
riod of early democracy was characterized by social anomie, or lack of
any cultural points of reference, in accordance with which one could
construct a new civic society4. Additionally, there were numerous eco-
nomic problems, which entailed specific adaptation strategies, entirely
different from the ones in play in highly developed societies. Secondly,
the younger generation is still to a large extent raised by the older gen-
eration, whose social habits were shaped in the period of real socialism.
The fact is not without significance for the processes of ‘social life re-
production’. One should remember that the older generations, having
adapted to life under the type of rule which forced them into non-civic
behaviours, now pass some of those cultural patterns on to the younger
generations, be it intentionally or not5. Even though Ronald Inglehart
proves it in his hypothesis of socialization that a generational change
always brings about a significant normative change, the redefinition is
never complete (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 97-99; Inglehart, 1997,
p. 33). Young people’s catalogue of values is new only in some aspects,
as the political habitus of the younger generation only partially depends
on the individual abilities and predispositions, whereas to a large extent
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 43

it constitutes a reflection of the social structure (normative, axiological,

etc.) in which one was brought up.

The question on the role of the younger generation in contemporary

democracy is at the same time a question on the permanence of social
habits consolidated over the years of the communist system. It goes
without saying that a stable democratic system requires lasting legit-
imization, or conviction on the part of the citizens that regardless of
numerous shortcomings and errors, the current political institutions
are better than any other alternative ones (Linz & Stepan, 1978, p. 16;
Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1995, p. 9; Lipset, 1960, p. 64). Therefore, the
authors of the present paper aim to determine what young citizens in
some selected CEE countries (first and foremost in Poland) think of
contemporary democracy and to diagnose the extent to which the dem-
ocratic principles and values are reflected in the beliefs of the younger
generation. Indeed, one cannot disagree with Krystyna Szafraniec,
when she says that ‘the youth is a very good starting point for observ-
ing what is happening in the whole society. It is a lens which focuses
various problems and system tensions. It also serves as a barometer of
social changes and moods (. . .). In a natural way, diagnoses of youth
compel thinking about the future and introduce an intellectual practice
which is indispensable for long-term and enlightened politics. They are
a natural point of reference for any prognosis. It is not possible to talk
about the young without talking about the future and it is not possible
to talk about the future without talking about the youth’ (Szafraniec,
2011, p. 11). Social change in terms of standards, values, ideas, or in-
terests always accelerates in between generations. Observing the state
of social awareness of the young generation of today, one can sensibly
predict the opportunities and threats for the ‘democracy of tomorrow’.

Methodology and research problems

In the present article, the authors make an attempt at an academic
diagnosis and description of what youth support for democracy con-
sists. The problem appears to be more significant in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, as the young generation whose opinions
have been examined, has been brought up in democratic states, unlike
the previous generations of their forefathers. In the light of the adopted
research principles (Ronald Inglehart’s socialization hypothesis, among
others), external conditions, including the nature of a given political
system, have a considerable impact on the development of a political
culture.

The first part presents the international context, pointing to the di-
versification of opinions and values expressed by young Europeans
from the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States of the European Union. Taking
44 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

into account the fact that the opinions are not distributed evenly, and
that there are is distinct divergence in the societies which joined the
EU after 2004 in particular, opinions selected for analysis represent
the views of young people from five ‘new’ EU Member States: Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The source
base for the analysis has been the computer data bases of interna-
tional research projects, deposited on the ZACAT web portal: Euro-
barometer and European Values Study (EVS 2008). Two categories of
citizens have been compared on their basis, i.e. the society at large
and young people aged 15-24. The age watershed, determining ‘youth’
for the purpose of the present article is a pragmatic compromise of
sorts, and a necessary simplification. It is certainly somewhat arbi-
trary and subject to criticism. For some reasons, though, it is also
highly justified. First of all, it is due to the specific character of the
sources explored in the analysis. Quantitative data taken from opinion
polls (Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, European Values
Study, World Values Survey, and the like) deliver exhaustive informa-
tion on a given subject, but make it impossible to treat particular cases
in an individual way. What they communicate is the scale of a given
phenomenon, rather than its quality. Hence, it becomes a necessity to
categorize the population studied in accordance with some selected
criteria, such as age. For the purpose of the present comparison, the
15-24 age group has been selected.

The second part, on the other hand, presents the results of a re-
search project whose main element was an opinion poll carried out
among Polish students in mid-2012. The study sample involved 994
(full-time) students from 16 different state universities in Poland. 80%
of the surveyed students were recruited from the age range 18-24, with
an almost equal percentage of them (79%) born in 1989 or later. The
average age was 22. The main goal of the project was to offer a com-
prehensive socio-political portrayal of contemporary Polish students,
and in particular to explain certain attitudes and behaviours mani-
fested by young Poles during the 2011 parliamentary election. One of
the analysed themes was students’ attitude toward democracy, their
assessment of its operation, and identification and analysis of the fac-
tors conditioning those views and opinions. Results and conclusions
stemming from that part of the research have been presented in the
article which follows.

Young people’s values and support for democracy

Different sets of empirical data often make social researchers ad-
vance a thesis on the crisis of democracy. That way of interpreting the
political reality also involves a more critical vision of the young. What
is emphasised is lower conventional and electoral political participation
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 45

indices in the youngest age cohorts, as well as a lower level of interest

in politics, and poorer and narrower scope of political knowledge among
the younger citizens. When searching for the answers to the question
of whether contemporary democracy is indeed undergoing a crisis, one
has to refer yet again to Inglehart’s thesis on the transition of advanced
industrial societies from the so called materialist values to the post-
materialist ones. In fact, the assumption behind the thesis is that the
social conviction that traditional political institutions are valid and le-
gitimate has been dwindling among young people in particular, In his
article Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, But Increases
Support for Democracy, Inglehart (1999) proves, however, that it does
not spell a breakdown of the foundations of democracy, but does some-
thing quite the opposite. Eduardo Terrén interprets the phenomenon
in the following way: even though the postmodern normative change
undermines support for hierarchical authorities, it does not weaken
support for democracy as such (Terrén, 2002, p. 167). Inglehart, on the
other hand, directly explicates the problem: the same public that are
becoming increasingly critical of hierarchical authority are also becom-
ing increasingly resistant to authoritarian government, more inter-
ested in political life, and more apt to play an active role in politics.
Although hierarchical political parties are losing control over their elec-
torates, and elite-directed forms of participation such as voting are
stagnant or declining, elite-challenging forms of participation are be-
coming more widespread’. And finally: ‘These changes do not under-
mine democracy; they tend to make it more secure’ (Inglehart, 1999,
p. 236). Such a statement certainly offers an exhaustive explanation
of the attitudes of young people from countries of long-standing demo-
cratic traditions. In that context, it is worth posing questions on the
diversity of forms of democratic support among young people in West-
ern and Eastern Europe. The questions might take on the following
form: what is the place of democracy in the axiological system of young
citizens? Is democracy a value that should be protected and defended,
or is it largely met with indifference? Or perhaps what dominates is
curiosity and longing for other forms of government. Qualitative data
analyses lead us to a rather unambiguous conclusion, confirming the
above mentioned theses by Ronald Inglehart. Even though the opinions
on the functioning of democracy are often critical, young European cit-
izens are quite universally convinced that democracy, regardless of its
many flaws, constitutes the best possible solution.

Let us first take a look at the level of satisfaction with the way
democracy works in the respondents’ states, as reported in the Euro-
barometer survey. As it turns out, out of the six analysed cases, only
in two of them are there more satisfied respondents than the dissatis-
46 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

fied ones (Table 1). This is the situation reported for all of the old EU
Member States, and out of the five new EU Member States, only for
Poland. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there are nearly twice as
many dissatisfied citizens as the satisfied ones, and the number is sig-
nificantly higher in Hungary or Romania, where every fifth citizen is
disappointed with the quality of the political system. The proportions
are quite similar in the young people (aged 15-24) bracket, even though
their level of satisfaction with democracy is clearly higher on the whole.

Table 1. Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the

respondent’s country
On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all
satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?
EU-15 Poland Czech Slovakia Hungary Romania

The whole Satisfied 56% 47% 31% 34% 25% 20%

Republic

society Dissatisfied 43% 43% 67% 66% 73% 78%

15-24 years Satisfied 58% 53% 45% 38% 29% 22%
Dissatisfied 40% 40% 51% 60% 67% 73%
Source: own analysis based on the data presented in Eurobarometer 77.3.

Another confirmation of young people’s support for democracy is pro-

vided in Table 2 (data for the 15-24 population only). It appears that
only every tenth young citizen of contemporary Europe rejects the
claim the democracy-related problems have no impact on people’s gen-
eral attitude to that particular political system. Amongst the problems
reported, the ones mentioned in the first place are as follows: lack of
determination and multitude of arguments and disputes, economic
problems (more frequently observed in Hungary and Romania), and
problems related to maintaining order (reported more often in all of
the analysed new EU Member States). For a great majority of young
Europeans the democratic system has superiority over any other form
of rule. It is an expression of strong legitimization of the democratic
political system.

Table 2. Opinions on the functioning of democracy (the 15-24

cohort)
EU-15 Poland Czech Slovakia Hungary Romania

There can be different problems related to democracy, but it is better than any other form of rule
Republic

I agree 89% 92% 87% 93% 84% 90%

I disagree 11% 8% 13% 7% 16% 10%
The economic system does not work well in democracy
I agree 30% 31% 30% 28% 42% 55%
I disagree 70% 69% 70% 72% 58% 45%
There is lack of determination and there are too many disputes in a democratic system
I agree 57% 63% 37% 39% 64% 68%
I disagree 43% 37% 63% 61% 36% 32%
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 47

The democratic system fails to maintain order

I agree 26% 42% 44% 36% 36% 43%
I disagree 74% 58% 56% 64% 64% 57%
Source: own analysis based on the data from the European Values Study 2008.

A similar conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the data collected

in Table 3. In the light thereof, the diversity of attitudes is much
clearer. 92% of young citizens of the old EU believe that the democratic
political system is a good form of state governance. Among the analysed
post-communist countries, a similar opinion is expressed by 91% of
young people in Slovakia, and 85% of young Polish and Romanian cit-
izens. Young Czechs and Hungarians express the opinion somewhat
less frequently (and more of them tend to claim that democracy is an
inadequate political system). No other political system enjoys such
recognition, which is not say, though, that young people see no alter-
natives. The alternatives are there, and they result from young people’s
dissatisfaction with the actual functioning of contemporary democracy,
but they do not undermine the legitimization of the existing system.
49% of young citizens from the EU-15, but also more and more of them
from the former socialist countries (Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
Hungary in particular) believe that classical democracy might give way
to a system ruled by experts from outside of the government circles,
who would be having the country’s best interest in mind, when taking
binding decisions. The high level of approval of such a form of gover-
nance might stem from the fact that the proposal is a commonsensical
one, and the solution might potentially counteract one of the greatest
problems of democracy, i.e. the ceaseless arguments and disputes,
which hinder taking swift and effective decisions. Non-democratic so-
lutions, such as the rule of a strong leader, who ignores the parliament
and the electorate (the exception here being Romania), and military
rule (a slightly higher percentage of positive answers to be observed
among young Poles and Romanians), enjoy a significantly smaller sup-
port.

Table 3. Perception of democracy and its alternatives (the 15-24

cohort)6
EU-15 Poland Czech Slovakia Hungary Romania

Rule of a strong leader, who can ignore the parliament and the electorate
Republic

Good 23% 15% 29% 14% 31% 74%

Bad 77% 85% 71% 86% 69% 26%
Rule of experts from outside of the government circles, who have the country’s best interest in
mind, when taking decisions
Good 49% 78% 59% 76% 85% 72%
Bad 51% 22% 41% 24% 15% 28%
Military rule
Good 7% 15% 7% 7% 8% 29%
48 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

Bad 93% 85% 93% 93% 92% 71%

Democratic political system
Good 92% 85% 82% 91% 75% 85%
Bad 8% 15% 18% 9% 25% 15%
Source: own analysis based on the data from the European Values Study 2008.

At the end of that part of the paper, it is worth focusing on how

young people assess democracy in the European Union. A closer look
at the problem leads one to the conclusion that young people are much
more favourably disposed towards democracy in contemporary EU, and
more frequently identify the European Union itself with democracy.
Interestingly, if we examine societies at large, there appear to be more
dissatisfied people in the countries of the old ‘EU-15’, as well as in Slo-
vakia and Hungary (Table 4). The differences are not significant, but
they are there to be observed. On the other hand, both in Poland, and
in Romania, there are significantly more people who report their sat-
isfaction with the current system. Amongst the youngest citizens, those
satisfied with the quality of democracy in the EU prevail. Importantly,
the highest percentage of satisfaction is reported for Poland, and
amounts to 66%, with the EU-15 average totalling 51%.

Table 4. Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at all
with the way democracy works in the EU?
EU-15 Poland Czech Slovakia Hungary Romania

The whole society Satisfied 41% 58% 44% 45% 45% 50%
Republic

Dissatisfied 47% 22% 44% 48% 46% 32%

15-24 years Satisfied 51% 66% 50% 47% 53% 54%
Dissatisfied 39% 22% 41% 45% 37% 30%
Source: own analysis based on the data presented in Eurobarometer 77.3.

The European Union is also significantly more often identified with

democracy by the young. Table 5 contains data referring to the per-
centage of times democracy was indicated as a value, and to the posi-
tion occupied by democracy among other values listed7. Out of the
analysed post-communist countries, only in Hungary and Romania
were young people less inclined to choose democracy as EU’s designate.
Still, it is worth observing that the percentage of times democracy was
selected as a value in those countries is nonetheless very high. From a
statistical point of view, young people associate the European Union
with democracy more often than societies at large in the entire old EU,
as well as in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

Table 5. Understanding the EU

What does the European Union mean to you personally?
Results for the answer: DEMOCRACY
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 49

EU-15 Poland Czech Slovakia Hungary Romania

Republic
The whole society 19% 20% 16% 15% 21% 39%
6. position 3. position 10. position 10. position 3. position 2. position
15-24 years 24% 23% 17% 16% 19% 30%
3. position 2. position 7. position 6. position 4. position 3. position
Source: own analysis based on the data presented in Eurobarometer 77.3.

Democratic values are also an extremely important component of

the European identity. In that case, opinions of the societies at large
match those of the youngest citizens. The percentages of respondents
pointing to democratic values are high and similar everywhere. It tes-
tifies to the fact that modern Europeans, regardless of their dwelling
place, or the political history of their home countries, consider democ-
racy and its constituent values as an inseparable element of the Euro-
pean identity (Table 6).

Table 6. Democratic values as an element of the European

identity
The European identity might consist of several elements. Which of the following ones
do you believe to be the most important elements shaping the European identity?
Results for the answer: DEMOCRATIC VALUES
EU-15 Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Romania
The whole society 42% 25% 44% 29% 38% 42%
2. position 2. position 1. position 3. position 1. position 2. position
15-24 years 40% 26% 31% 23% 33% 41%
2. position 2. position 2. position 4. position 3. position 2. position
Source: own analysis based on the data presented in Eurobarometer 77.3.

Study results – the Polish case

The above presented international context reveals considerable di-
versity of opinions among the societies whose attitudes were analysed.
Still, one can assume that democracy remains largely unthreatened as
values in the contemporary (both ‘old’ and ‘new’) European Union. A
more serious problem, which might give rise to current tensions and
conflicts, including those political ones, involves opinions on the way
and effects of operation of different democratic institutions. Results of
the study carried out among Polish students, who are to be treated as
an important case, but not a representation of the youth in ‘new’ EU,
make it possible to specify young people’s attitude to the matter in
question. Polish students are certainly disenchanted with their first
experience of democracy, even though democracy as a value is indis-
putable to them. Detailed data taken from the authors’ own survey will
be presented in the section which follows.

Democracy as a value in the lives of Polish students

In the light of the study results, there are no doubts as to the fact
50 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

that it is extremely important for the young generation of Polish stu-

dents to be living in a democratically governed country (Table 7).

Table 7. Importance of democracy for Polish students

How important is it for you that the country you live in is governed in a democratic way?
Very important 64.6%
Quite important 25.4%
Quite unimportant 2.2%
Completely unimportant 1.7%
Don’t know 6.2%
Source: own study.

For over 90% of them democratism is either a very important or

quite important requirement of a modern state. On the other hand,
just under 4% of them express a different opinion. It is worth observ-
ing, though, that the students’ opinions do not correspond strongly with
the social practice. If it is imperative for democracy that citizens par-
ticipate in the rule making8, then it is immediately noticeable that the
respondents quite consciously give up their possibility to shape the
socio-political reality. Indeed, it turns out that only slightly over one
fifth (21.9%) of the respondents truly care about participating in the
rule making. Most of them (58.3%), however, only go as far as to de-
clare that they wish to be governed well9. It only testifies to the fact
that the potential of youth remains unfulfilled. As in any society, young
people constitute its greatest capital. One should have it in mind that
the more strongly young people are represented within a society, the
more valuable the capital. Even though in the space of the coming
twenty years their share in the Polish population will continue to drop,
citizens aged 18-24 will still constitute around 10% of all those entitled
to vote in 2030 (Population Forecast). Given the available turnout in-
dicators from the entire period of the Polish political transformation,
it can clearly be seen that young people are an untapped potential or
better still, a true ‘political niche’ (Marzęcki, 2013b) (Table 8).

Table 8. Voter turnout in the years 1997-2011

1997 2001 2005 2007 2011
18-25 years 38.1% 47.2% 44.2% 55.8% 47.1%
Rest of the society 61.4% 61.7% 53.98% 69.04% 48.73%
Source: Polish General Election Study/OBOP

What kind of democracy do Polish students seek then? The answer

to the question will help us at the same time to account for the causes
behind the above mentioned general disenchantment. Firstly, one has
to note that Polish students do perceive certain shortcomings of democ-
racy itself, which are revealed in the political practice of many contem-
porary states. Inasmuch as the superiority of democracy over any other
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 51

form of governance is well established in the students’ opinions, more

than one third of them believe that at some moments a non-democratic
government might prove more adequate (Table 9).

Table 9. Polish students and their opinions on democracy

Democracy is always superior over any other form of government 42.6%
At times, non-democratic forms of government might be more adequate than democracy 33.2%
For people like myself it is of no significance, whether the government is a democratic 2.8%
one or not
Democracy is a bad form of government 2.0%
Don’t know 19.3%
Source: own study.

It seems important, though, not to be too hasty in treating the above

results as an expression of anti-democratic attitudes. It would be dif-
ficult to treat the group as a real threat, especially in the light of their
decisive disapproval of opinions such as ‘democracy is a bad form of
government’. The fact that they allow for non-democratic forms of gov-
ernance should rather be interpreted as a reaction to those features of
democracy which are of negative character and tend to accompany
young democratic political systems in particular. It has already been
pointed out that approval of a ruling system which is not entirely dem-
ocratic, under some specific conditions (e.g. ‘heavy-handed rule’, ‘tech-
nocratic/expert government’, etc.), can be a manifestation of longing
for an efficient and able state apparatus, capable of defining and solv-
ing the most urgent problems of different social groups. It appears,
though, that Polish students associate democracy with the positive idea
of ‘personal liberty’ much more often than with the negative qualities
such as ‘chaos and mess’ (Table 10).

Table 10. Polish students and their associations with

democracy
Democracy is first and foremost chaos and mess 13.2%
Democracy is primarily about personal liberty 59.8%
Don’t know 27.1%
Source: own study.

Sources of disappointment
It has been emphasised earlier on that in Poland, unlike in the other
four analysed ‘new’ EU states, there are more people who are generally
satisfied with how democracy works in their country than those dis-
satisfied with it. The ratio has been claimed to be even more favourable
for the 15-24 age bracket. Our studies, however, involving a larger
sample of young citizens, suggest a greater balance of opinions, or even
a slight advantage of the dissatisfied ones (Table 11).
52 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

Table 11. Polish students and their opinions on the way

democracy works in Poland
Are you generally satisfied with the way democracy works in our country?
Absolutely satisfied 1.3%
Quite satisfied 36.7%
Quite dissatisfied 36.1%
Absolutely dissatisfied 11.3%
Don’t know 14.6%
Source: own study.

What is the source of such critical attitudes then? It is impossible to

provide answer to the question without referring to a more concrete
context of the matter. At the level of axiology, pro-democratic attitudes
prevail. On the other hand, when asked about the specificity of the sys-
tem, respondents express greater criticism. Our survey included ques-
tions pertaining to more general issues so as to prevent answers
motivated by particular political sympathies (e.g. the respondents’ sat-
isfaction with the current government or lack thereof). One of the ques-
tions was related to the most significant problems of Polish democracy.
The results presented in Figure 1 point to the fact that the problems
include a variety of matters, subject to the responsibility of a series of
consecutive Polish governments, both the left-wing and right-wing
ones.

Figure 1. The most significant problems of Polish democracy according to

the younger generation. Source: own study.
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 53

Over a half of Polish students believe the greatest ‘ill’ of democracy

to be the bickering of politicians. It is quite symptomatic that all the
other dysfunctions are mentioned nearly twice less frequently. Over
30% of respondents criticize Polish democracy for economic problems,
including unemployment, but also for other aspects, such as corruption,
passivity of citizens or marginalization of the society by the political
elites. Politicians are believed to be the main players responsible for
the way democracy works in the country. A number of charges are lev-
elled against them by Polish students, including cynicism and ineffi-
ciency of their decision-making processes. Politicians themselves are
unanimously evaluated in very negative terms. What dominates is the
opinion that they are dishonest (69.2%), unreliable (78.4%), take care
of their own interests solely (78.9%), and are motivated by a strong de-
sire to make money (26.1%), and a craving for power (37.2%). 70% of
the students enquired claim that none of the politicians is an authority
for them10.

The above mentioned feeling of marginalization is quite distinct. It

relates both to the political, as well as the economic issues. When asked
the question of ‘whether young people’s interests and problems are suf-
ficiently represented in public debate’ as few as 5% of the respondents
answered in the affirmative, with 80.8% of them being of a different
opinion11. Young people feel largely excluded from the public sphere,
which gives rise to their conviction that they are not capable of shaping
the reality around them (Table 12).

Table 12. Opinions on the entities which can influence the

authorities
To what extent do you believe the following groups to have impact on the Average on
most important state matters in a contemporary democratic country? a 1-5 scale
Politicians 4.06
International organizations (e.g. the EU institutions) 3.74
International corporations 3.26
Clergy 2.83
Particular social and professional groups (e.g. miners, doctors, etc.) 2.79
All citizens 2.77
Specialists, experts, academics 2.66
Source: own study.

On the other hand, they are also convinced that as average citizens
they are simply not ‘taken into consideration’ by politicians (Table 13).
54 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

Table 13. Polish students and their opinions on the addressees

of political actions
Whose interests, problems, and opinions are most frequently taken into Yes No
consideration by politicians during their decision-making processes?
Only their own 63.7% 11.5%
Their voters 31.2% 40.1%
All of the citizens 11.3% 61.6%
Interest groups (e.g. business, professional groups) 68.9% 12.3%
Those of other countries 33.8% 37.1%
Those of the Church 27.8% 41.7%
Source: own study.

It is related to the conviction that none of the Polish political parties

sufficiently represent the interests of the younger generation (Table 14).

Table 14. Polish students and their opinions on how their

interests are represented by political parties
To what extent do political parties represent young people’s interests? (1 Average on
– not to the least extent, 5 – to the greatest extent) a 1-5 scale
Congress of the New Right (KNP) 2.46
Civic Platform (PO) 2.65
Poland Comes First (PJN) 2.27
Polish Labour Party (PPP) 1.99
Polish People’s Party (PSL) 2.07
Law and Justice (PiS) 2.20
Palikot’s Movement (RP) 3.33
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 2.60
United Poland (SP) 2.10
Source: own study.

The table contains average values calculated from a 1-5 scale, with
‘1’ meaning ‘does not represent at all’, and ‘5’ having the meaning of
‘fully represents’. Hence, value 3.00 stands for the neutral standpoint.
The more the values deviate towards ‘1’, the greater the conviction that
a given political party does not represent the interests of the younger
generation. As can clearly be seen, nearly all of the parties have aver-
aged below the midpoint of the scale. Where does one locate young peo-
ple’s interests, though? Students themselves emphasise it very strongly
that problems pertaining to social security and the labour market come
first for them in the hierarchy of problems. When answering the open
question of ‘what the biggest problem for young people is at the mo-
ment’, most of them (90%) point at the incertitude and lack of security
on the labour market and in the economic zone, e.g. lack of work for
the well-educated, unemployment, difficulty purchasing an apartment,
general lack of prospects. Young citizens are indeed highly critical,
when assessing their (current or potential) situation on the labour mar-
ket. 93% of them believe it to be ‘poor’ or ‘quite poor’, and only 1% of
them are of the opinion that it is ‘good’ or ‘quite good’ (Table 15).
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 55

Table 15. Priority issues for Polish students

Which of the following issues do you believe are the most important for Average on
young people? a 1-5 scale
Please, arrange them on a scale of 1 (the most important) to 5 (the least
important)
Economic issues (unemployment, employment, salary, taxes, etc.) 1.73
Social issues (health care, education, transportation, culture, etc.) 2.41
World views (state-church relationship, abortion, civil unions, legalisation of drugs, 2.47
etc.)
Political issues (vision of state, financing of political parties, foreign policy, etc.) 3.72
Historical issues (assessment of the past, historical policy, etc.) 4.39
Source: own study.

On the one hand, politicians are believed to be the ones to blame for
the high unemployment rate among young people (according to 39.5%
of students12), and on the other hand, it is stressed that political parties
have no ideas as to how to counteract the effects of economic crisis
(Table 16).

Table 16. Students’ opinions on the ideas of political parties as

to how to solve the economic crisis
Which of the political parties has the best solution for the economic crisis?
Congress of the New Right (KNP) 5.4%
Civic Platform (PO) 11.9%
Poland Comes First (PJN) 1.6%
Polish Labour Party (PPP) 0.7%
Polish People’s Party (PSL) 1.2%
Law and Justice (PiS) 7.6%
Palikot’s Movement (RP) 5.4%
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 2.6%
United Poland (SP) 0.6%
Other party 0.6%
Neither 62.4%
Source: own study.

The described repertoire of accusations needs to be treated in a con-

structive fashion. Indeed, it reflects young people’s expectations with
regard to politicians. It also delivers a partial answer to the question
of ‘how to improve the Polish (and not only) democracy’. Table 17 lists
the students’ proposals of solutions which might help intensify young
citizens’ involvement in political activity.

Table 17. Students’ ideas on how to change the current

situation
What do you think would need to change in order for young people to be more
motivated to vote?
Political parties must be willing to take notice of the problems affecting young people 59.8%
Politicians need to start taking decisions with a view to solving problems affecting young 56.0%
people
Promotion of young people within political structures should be made easier 22.9%
56 Education and Society Vol. 34, No. 1, 2016

Famous people should urge to vote 5.7%

There should be greater freedom of voting outside of one’s place of permanent residence 42.6%
(e.g. via Internet)
Voters should be able to select the following option: ‘I choose not to vote for anyone’ 20.3%
Citizens should have the right to dismiss a politician they have previously elected 26.5%
Source: own study.

Conclusions
To summarise, democracy is an important value for Polish students,
but mainly at the level of declarations. It is not a great stimulus for
action, though. Inasmuch as the study results do not reveal evident
criticism towards democracy per se as a form of governance, what be-
comes problematic is the lack of trust for political elites, as well as
young people’s poor involvement and readiness to participate in the
rule-making. Young respondents express highly negative opinions on
politicians (which largely corresponds with the opinion of the majority
of Poles, who are equally distrustful towards the political class), accus-
ing them of unnecessary quarrels, and failure to perceive the real eco-
nomic and social problems. What is self-evident is a deep crisis of trust
between young Poles and the country’s political elites. Paradoxically,
though, the respondents tend to expect that the same political elites
they are so critical of will heal the existing situation. A different idea,
the idea that change can be a grass-root and social initiative is poorly
ingrained in the minds of the respondents. They emphasise the fact
that average citizens have no considerable impact on politics, and the
conviction is reflected in practice in their political passivity, low voter
turnout, and poor index of participation in political organizations.
Their criticism of politicians does not go hand in hand with their readi-
ness to participate more actively in political life, which is undoubtedly
a serious failing of the Polish democracy, and one of the consequences
of the fact that problems important for young people rarely become the
subject of public debate, not to mention specific political decisions.
Moreover, their lack of readiness and willingness to participate in the
rule-making results in a situation where young Poles remain an unde-
veloped political segment. Their problems are never discussed in terms
of challenges for the Polish democracy, and the general feeling of inef-
ficiency makes it difficult for the younger generation to become actively
involved in the initiatives aimed at healing the existing situation.

Notes
1 Following Łukasz Stach, post-communist states, since 1989, have been
heading in a similar direction, towards liberal democracy and market
economy. While the political transformation, as seen from the procedural
and institutional perspective, was relatively easy to carry out by means of
enacting a sufficient number of legal acts, what proved more problematic
was the change of social awareness, which required enough time more than
anything else (Stach, 2011, pp. 29-54).
 Marzęcki & Stach, Polish Students’ Attitudes towards Democracy 57

2 Originally, the text was published in the journal Studia Socjologiczne

[Sociological Studies] of 1991.
3 Geoffrey Pridham believes that a positive consolidation of the system must
provide for instilling democratic values on two levels: that of the political
elites and that of the social masses, which is why it requires a
reconstruction of the democratic political culture (Pridham ,1995, pp. 166-
203).
4 The socialization context is immensely important for a comprehensive
explanation of people’s attitudes towards democracy. At the early stages of
life, people acquire particular habits or patterns of political activity or
passivity, determining their attitudes later on. Hence, one can say that the
quality of today’s political socialization determines the quality of democracy
tomorrow (Marzęcki, 2013, pp. 21-22; Mannheim, 1952).
5 In his paper on the role of young citizens in contemporary Europe,
Radosław Marzęcki also pays attention to the fact that ‘the ways of thinking
and acting, established over the previous political system, continue to shape
our attitudes in different spheres of life’ (Marzęcki, 2013, p. 136). Piotr
Sztompka, on the other hand, writes about ‘the legacy of real socialism’,
which ‘appears to last longest in the sphere of the mind’ and tends to ‘haunt
post-communist societies from beyond the grave’ (Sztompka, 2005, p. 228).
6 The category ‘good’ results from the combination of answers ‘very good’ and
‘fairly good’, while the category ‘bad’ is a result of combining answers
‘rather bad’ and ‘very bad’.
7 Possible options to be selected: freedom to travel, Euro, cultural diversity,
democracy, stronger say in the world, peace, economic prosperity, waste of
money, bureaucracy, not enough control at external borders,
unemployment, social protection, more crime, and loss of cultural identity.
8 Which is to be broadly understood as any type of influence on what the
ruling elites do and decide upon. Such an interpretation is significant
especially in the context of frequently voiced opinions that the drop in
young people’s involvement in the traditional forms of political influence
(voting in elections, membership in political parties, etc.) does not
necessarily mean complete withdrawal. Indeed, young people tend to
participate in the political life in an unconventional way (Bennett, 1998;
Eliasoph, 1998; Lichterman 1996).
9 19.9% have no opinion on the matter whatsoever.
10 18.2% of them can point at a politician whom they consider an authority.
11 14.2% have no opinion on the matter.
12 The second element to blame is the education system (32.2%), followed by
young people themselves (4.1%), and their parents (0.5%). 23.8% of
repondents have no opinion on the matter.

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