Nirvana A

NIRVANA A
BEFORE
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, LONDON
UNITED KINGDOM
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:
ADORNIA LIMITED
[CLAIMANT]
versus
EXCHEQUER INSURANCE PRIVATE LIMITED
[RESPONDENT]
MEMORANDUM for CLAIMANT
2023
XVI NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL-TRILEGAL INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION MOOT, 2023
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ V
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ IX
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................. XXIII
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................XXIV
ISSUES RAISED............................................................................................................ XXVII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS............................................................................................. 1
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.................................................................................................. 1
I. ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAW RULES SHOULD BE APPLIED BY THE TRIBUNAL TO DECIDE

THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT ............................................................................................. 1
A. THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL SHOULD APPLY ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAW RULES. ............... 1
B. APPLICABLE LAW FROM ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAW RULES IS INDIAN LAW .................... 2
[1] The applicability of Proper law Doctrine .................................................................. 2
i. Indian law is the lex loci solutinis.......................................................................... 3
II. Party autonomy must be protected ......................................................................... 4
[2] Validation Principle Supports the Application of Indian Laws ................................. 4
[3] Public Policy of India is to be Adhered ..................................................................... 5
i. In arguendo, closely connected states’ public policy is not at stake ...................... 5
II. THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VALID FOR THE WANT OF CAPACITY. ........................... 6
A. PARTIES HAVE THE REQUIRED CAPACITY TO ENTER INTO A VALID CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIP ......................................................................................................................... 6
[1] Parties derive their capacity from the proper law of the contract ............................ 7
[2] The Governing law limits the law of domiclii. ........................................................... 8
B. THE MARSHALL ISLAND ACT OF 2014 IS NOT APPLICABLE ............................................ 8
PAGE | II
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

[1] The Validation Principle Restricts the Applicability Of Invalidating Rule ............... 8
[2] Marshall Island laws are not closely connected to the dispute ................................. 9
III. IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VOID ......................................................................... 10
A. ADORNIA HAS A CLAIM OF RESTITUTION OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO RECOVER THE
PREMIUM PAID....................................................................................................................... 11
[1] The RESPONDENT was enriched. ............................................................................... 11
[2] The retention of enrichment is unjust....................................................................... 12
i. Retention of £32 million is against the principle of equity .................................. 12
ii. The money was paid under a mistake of law ....................................................... 13
B. EXCHEQUER DOES NOT HAVE A DEFENCE OF CHANGE OF POSITION ............................... 14
[1] The defence does not suffice as performance was to be rendered in exchange. ...... 14
[2] The Defence will violate the principle of equity ...................................................... 15
IV. IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS NOT VOID ................................................................. 15
A. ADORNIA IS ENTITLED TO REFER TO THE SYNDICATE 41 AWARD WITHOUT THE CONSENT

OF THE SYNDICATE 41 INSURERS .......................................................................................... 16
[1] CLAIMANT Falls Under the Exception Of SIAC Rule of Confidentiality .................. 16
[2] It Necessary to Protect the Legitimate Interest of the CLAIMANT. ............................ 17
[3] In Arguendo, the Arbitration was Never Confidential in the First Place ................ 18
B. EXCHEQUER IS BOUND BY SYNDICATE 41 TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS BY ISSUE ESTOPPEL AS

TO THE LOSSES FALL WITHIN THE INSURING CLAUSE ............................................................. 19
[1] The RESPONDENT is a Privy ...................................................................................... 20
[2] Arbitration Awards Have Preclusive Effect on Privy or Third Party ...................... 21
[3] No Violation of Fundamental Right of Due Process ............................................... 22
C. THE LOSSES FALL WITHIN THE INSURANCE CLAUSE ...................................................... 22
PAGE | III

[1] The Losses Fall Under the Insuring Clause as Per the Doctrine of Efficient
Proximate Cause .............................................................................................................. 22
PRAYER ............................................................................................................................. XIII
PAGE | IV

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS EXPANSIONS
§ Section
¶/¶¶ Paragraph/ Paragraphs
& And
£ Pound
AC Appeal Cases
AIR All India Reporter
ALL ER All England Law Reports
Anr. Another
App. Appeal
Arb. Arbitration
Art. Article
Ch Law Reports, Chancery Division (Third Series)
Ch D Law Reports, Chancery Division (Second

Series)
Cir. Circuit.
PAGE | V
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Civ. Civil
CLR Common Wealth Law Reports
Co. Company
Comm. Commercial
Corp. Corporate
DLR Dominion Law Reports (Canadian law report)
Dr. Doctor
ed. Edition
ER England Law Reports
EWCA Court of Appeal England and Wales
EWHC High Court of England and Wales
F.2d Federal Reporter Second
FLR Federal Reporter
F.Supp. Federal Supplement
HKLRD Hong Kong Law Reports & Digest
Hon’able Honourable
ICA Indian Contract Act
PAGE | VI

i.e. Id Est (that is)
Inc. Incorporation
Ins. Insurance
LCIA London Court of International Arbitration
LR Lloyd’s Register Classification Society
Ltd. Limited
Mass. Massachusetts
NC North Carolina Supreme Court
No. Number
NYC New York Convention
NYS New York Supreme Court
NZLR New Zealand Law Report
Ors. Others
Pg/p. Page
QB/QBD Queens Bench
Rep. Representative
RR Rome Regulation
PAGE | VII

SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports (Canada)
SGHC High Court of Republic of Singapore
SIAC Singapore International Arbitration Centre
SLR Singapore Law Report
SW South Western Reporter
United Nations Commission on

UNCITRAL
International Trade Law
UK United Kingdom
UKHL United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions
UKSC United Kingdom Supreme Court
US United States Reports
Vs/v. Versus
WL West Law
WLR Weekly Law Reports
PAGE | VIII

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
CITED AS FULL CITATION PAGE NO.
AAY AAY and others v. AAZ AS. [2009] SGHC 142. 17
Air Canada Air Canada v. British Columbia, [1989] 59 FLR 161. 13
Ali Shipping Ali Shipping Corporation v Shipyard Trogir [1998] 2 All 18

ER 136.
Balfour Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. 16

Ltd., [1993] 3 AC 334.
Bankers Trust Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. [1989] 5
QB 728.
Barge Corp. Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., [1992] 946 20
F.2d 1131.
Barrowclough Barrowclough v. Kidder, [1985] 752 F.2d 923. 21
Boon Insurance Co. v. Boon, [1877] 95 US 117. 23
Bourque Bourque v. Cape Southport Assocs., [2004] 60 Mass. 21

App. Ct. 271.
CvD C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282. 1, 10
Cannon Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Films Ltd., [1989] 1 12

W.L.R. 912.
Carl Zeiss Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., [1967] 1 AC 20
853.
PAGE | IX

Charron Charron v. Montreal Trust Co., [1958] 15 DLR 2d. 240. 7
Chatenay Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., [1891] 3

1 QB 79.
Chilcott Goss v. Chilcott, [1996] UKPC 17. 12, 14
Colmenares Imperial Life Assurance Co. v. Colmenares, [1967] SCR 5

443.
Compagnie Compagnie ď Armement Maritime SA. v. Compagnie 3

Tunisienne de Navigation SA, [1970] UKHL J0714-1.
Daimler Daimler South East Asia Pte Ltd. v. Front Row 16

Investment Holdings Pte Ltd., [2012] 4 SLR 837.
David David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of 13, 15

Securities Australia, [1992] 175 CLR 353.
Emmott Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2008] 18

EWCA Civ. 184.
Enka Chubb Enka v. Chubb, [2020] UKSC 38. 2, 4, 9, 10.
Enviro-legal Enviro-legal action v. Union of India, [1996] 3 SCC 212. 12
Fibrosa Fibrosa v. Fairbairn, [1943] 4 AC 32. 12
Flegon Bodley Head Limited v. Flegon, [1972] 1 WLR 680. 6
Fletcher Fletcher v. Alexander, [1915] 177 S.W. 514. 12
Fouad Fouad Bishara Jabbour v. Custodian of Absentee 3

Property, [1954] 1 All ER 145.
Gleeson Gleeson v. J Wippell & Co. Ltd., [1977] 1 WLR 510. 20
PAGE | X

Greer Greer v. Poole, [1880] 5 QBD 272. 5
Haddon Doe d. Davy v. Haddon, [1783] 3 Doug KB 310. 21
Harnam Singh Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Harnam Singh, 6
[1987] AIR 2414.
Hassneh Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel v. Steuart J. Mew [1993] 17, 19

2 Lloyd’s Rep. 243.
Heacock Heacock v. Heacock, [1988] 402 Mass. 21. 20
Henderson Henderson v. Henderson, [1843] 67 ER 313. 21
Hydro Electric Hydro Electric Commission of the Township of Nepean 13

v. Ontario Hydro [1982] 1 RCS 347.
Isidor Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs. Inc. v. Sharp Props. Inc., 21

Paiewonsky [1993] 998 F.2d 145.
Jacobs Martin Jacobs Martin & Co. v. Credit Lyonnais, [1884] 12 QBD 9
589.
JJ Llyod JJ Llyod Instruments Ltd v. Northern Star Insurance Co. 22

Ltd., [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 32.
Kabab-Ji Kabab-Ji SAL v. Kout Food Group [2021] UKSC 48. 4
Kleinwort Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln CC, [1996] 4 ALL ER 13

733.
Kommune Haugesund Kommune v. Depfa ACS Bank, [2010] 14

EWCA Civ. 579.
PAGE | XI

Lanasa Lanasa Fruit Steamship & Importing Co. v. Universal 23

Insurance Co., [1938] 302 US 556.
Lancashire Lancashire County Council v. Municipal Mutual 4, 9

Insurance Ltd., [1997] QB 897.
Lincoln Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v. Lincoln National 21

Life Insurance Co., [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 606.
Lipkin Gorman Lipkin Gorman v. Karpanale Ltd., [1988] UKHL 12. 15
Lloyd’s Insurance Co. v. Lloyd’s Syndicate [1995] 1 Lloyd's 18

Syndicate Rep. 272.
MacMillan MacMillan Builders Ltd v. Morningside Industries Ltd., 15

[1986] 2 NZLR 12.
Mankastu Mankastu Impex Private Limited v. Airvisual Limited, 2

[2020] SCC 301.
Milliken Milliken v. Pratt, [1868] 125 Mass 382. 8
Nippon Oxford Shipping Co Ltd v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha (The 18

Eastern Saga) (No. 2) [1984] 3 All ER 835.
Nori Holding Nori Holding & others v. Bank Otkritie, [2022] EWHC 21
871.
NTCH-WA NTCH-WA Inc. v. ZTE Corp., [2019] WL 1810776 9th 20

Cir.
Parakou Parakou Shipping Ptd. Ltd. v. Jinhui Shipping & 20

Transportation Ltd., [2011] 2 HKLRD 1.
Parklane Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, [1979] 439 US 322. 19
PAGE | XII

Re Downshire Re Downshire Settled Estates, [1953] Ch 218. 13
Re Hollis Re Hollis' Hospital and Hague's Contract [1899] 2 Ch 13

540.
Re Missouri Re Missouri Steamship Co., [1889] 42 Ch D 321. 4
Regla Re United Railways of Havana & Regla Warehouses Ltd. 3

Warehouses [1961] AC 1007.
Reischer Reischer v. Borwick, [1894] 2 QB 548. 23
Renusagar Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 5

[1994] AIR 860
Reynold Reynold v. Accidental Insurance Co., [1870] 22 LT 82. 23
Roberts Male v. Roberts, [1800] 170 E.R. 574. 6
Rodgers Rodgers Builders v. McQueen, [1985] 76 NC App. 16. 21

Builders
Rossano Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., [1963] 2 9

QB 352.
Sahakari Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd. v. Commissioner of 15

Central Excise & Customs, [2005] 3 SCC 738.
Scottish Scottish Equitable PLC v. Derby, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 14

Equitable 369.
Serling Serling v. American Airlines Inc., [1991] 946 F.2d 1131. 20
Sides Sides v. Duke University, [1985] 74 NC App. 328. 21
Simran Bedi Simran Bedi v. Montgomery, [2022] SGHC 67. 14
PAGE | XIII

Sulamerica Sulamerica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v Enesa 10

Engelharia SA, [2013] 1 WLR 102.
Sybray Sybray v. White 150 ER 504. 17
Vita Food Vita Food Products Inc v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd., 9
[1939] UKPC 7.
Watts Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., [1970] 27 NY 2d 270. 20
Whitworth Whitworth Street Estates Ltd. v. James Miller and 2, 4

Partners Ltd., [1970] AC 583.
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ICC 11061 ICC Award No. 11061 [2001]. 1
ICC 6149 ICC Award No. 6149 [1990]. 1
ICC 6474 ICC Award No. 6474 [1992]. 4
ICC 6527 ICC Award No. 6527 [1993]. 1
ICC 9771 ICC Award No. 9771 [2004]. 1
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PAGE | XXII

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Adornia Ltd., the CLAIMANT in the present case, has the honour to submit this Memorandum
and invoke the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal in London City, in pursuance of Clause 18
of the Insurance Contract between the Claimant and Exchequer Insurance Pvt Ltd., the
RESPONDENT dated 10th January 2015, which is governed by the SIAC Rules, 2016.
PAGE | XXIII
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

STATEMENT OF FACTS
PARTIES
Adornia Ltd [“the CLAIMANT”] is a subsidiary company of Priti Hotels Ltd. The company
was incorporated in Marshall Islands to operate exclusively in the luxury space.
Exchequer Insurance Pvt Ltd [“the RESPONDENT”] is an Indian insurance company which
provided the insurance cover to the CLAIMANT.
AGREEMENT
The CLAIMANTS built an ecosystem in Mumbai (India) for luxury living including vast network
of facilities, one of most luxurious hotels, a world-class golf course, a small number of luxury
apartments, a number of offices, restaurants and so on. This complex was named Adornia
Island. On 10 January 2015, the RESPONDENT and the CLAIMANT [“the PARTIES”] entered into
a property damage and business interruption insurance policy.
DATES EVENTS
Late 1990s The CLAIMANT’s company was incorporated by PHL in Marshall

Islands with a view to operate exclusively in the luxury space.
Year 2014 The Marshall Island Legislature enacted Speculative Contracts

(Restrictions) Act, 2014 [Act of 2014].
September 19, 2014 The CLAIMANT, after consulting lawyers regarding the 2014 Act,
entered into an insurance contract with the Syndicate 41 insurers
through the Lloyds market. The insurance policy provided Adornia
Island with the cover of £250 million per year.
Year 2015 Adornia Island became operational in India after receiving all the
necessary approvals. One of the biggest risk involved was that any
major disruption to one part of the island would affect all of it.
PAGE | XXIV
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] STATEMENT OF FACTS

January 10, 2015 The CLAIMANT entered into a property damage and business
interruption insurance policy with the RESPONDENT. The policy
provided for £50 Million insurance cover with a very substantial
premium of around £8 million.
April 5, 2018 Adornia Island was a great success from the day it opened, made
substantial revenues; and its net profit for the year was recorded at
£475 million.
August 15, 2018 Adornia Island had closed to the public and people were evacuated
due to a number of warnings issued about an approaching hurricane.
August 16, 2018 Hurricane Indra began in an area not far from Adornia Island.
August 23, 2018 Hurricane Indra decreased in intensity and came to a halt. Indra had
caused substantial damage to Adornia Island. Parts of the main hotel
were destroyed including a number of ancillary installations. The
total damage caused by Indra is estimated to be around US $80
billion.
February 21, 2019 All affected buildings were substantially rebuilt and Adornia Island
opened to the public.
February 21, 2019 – Adornia Island had no business as entry to the area was initially
November , 2019 prohibited and then strictly regulated by the state government. This
resulted in a visitor footfall of 99.5% due to which Adornia incurred
losses of £265 Million for which Adornia made a claim on both the
insurance policies.
November 21, 2019 Government lifted all restrictions to visitor entry and declared the
completion of all construction and repair work.
February 21, 2020 Both the insurers refused to indemnify Adornia for the loss of profit
between August 2018 and November 2019 as they considered to be
caused by government action. The CLAIMANT served notices of
arbitration to both the Syndicate 41 insurers and the RESPONDENT;
BLT LLP, the firm representing both insurers wrote on behalf of their
PAGE | XXV
MEMORIAL for [RESPONDENT] STATEMENT OF FACTS

clients through a courier inviting consent to consolidate the

proceedings.
March 2, 2020 The CLAIMANT refused to consent for consolidation but agreed to stay
of one arbitration. As the RESPONDENT refused to their arbitration to
start first, eventually the Syndicate 41 arbitration was started.
March 6, 2020 The arbitration between the CLAIMANT and the RESPONDENT was
therefore stayed by consent pending the conclusion of Syndicate 41
Arbitration. The RESPONDENT was closely involved at every stage of
the arbitration proceedings attending all procedural and substantive
hearings. Joint invoices were sent to the PARTIES by the BLT LLP
firm. Ms. Devika Ghosh’s evidence, a partner of the Forty Nine Law
& Partners who represented the CLAIMANT, is also not disputed.
December 21, 2020 The Syndicate 41 Tribunal issued an award ordering Syndicate 41 to
pay the CLAIMANT £250 million, limit of the cover under the
Syndicate 41 policy, emphasizing on the fact that the losses fall
within the insuring clause because all of them represent business
interruption suffered in consequence of the damage to the property.
Year 2020 - Year The CLAIMANT was still out of pocket by around £15 million which
2023 it sought to recover from the RESPONDENT. The CLAIMANT, after
considering the judgement delivered by the Marshall Island Supreme
Court which stated that the Act of 2014 did prevent companies from
entering into insurance contracts, applied to the Tribunal to amend its
pleadings in the PARTIES arbitration. The application was
subsequently allowed by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal framed the issues to be addressed in the forthcoming

hearings commencing from 18th May 2021.
PAGE | XXVI
MEMORIAL for [RESPONDENT] STATEMENT OF FACTS

ISSUES RAISED
WHAT CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES (IF ANY) SHOULD THE TRIBUNAL APPLY TO DECIDE WHETHER
THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VOID FOR WANT OF CAPACITY BY REASON OF THE 2014 ACT?
II
APPLYING THOSE CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES, IS THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT VOID FOR WANT OF
CAPACITY BY REASON OF THE 2014 ACT?
III
IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VOID:
(A) DOES ADORNIA HAVE A CLAIM TO RECOVER THE PREMIUM PAID BY WAY OF RESTITUTION OF
UNJUST ENRICHMENT?
(B) IF SO, DOES EXCHEQUER HAVE A DEFENCE OF CHANGE OF POSITION?
IV
IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS NOT VOID:
(A) IS ADORNIA, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE SYNDICATE 41 INSURERS, ENTITLED (WHETHER
UNDER RULE 39.2 OF THE SIAC RULES OR OTHERWISE), TO REFER TO THE CONTENTS OF THE
SYNDICATE 41 AWARD?
(B) IF SO, IS EXCHEQUER BOUND BY ISSUE ESTOPPEL BY THE SYNDICATE 41 TRIBUNAL’S

FINDINGS AS TO WHETHER THE LOSSES FOR WHICH ADORNIA WAS SEEKING AN INDEMNITY FELL
WITHIN THE INSURING CLAUSE?
(C) IF NOT, DO THOSE LOSSES IN FACT FALL WITHIN THE INSURING CLAUSE?
PAGE | XXVII
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] ISSUE RAISED

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT
The CLAIMANTS submits that the English Conflict of Law rules are appropriate in the present
case, pursuant to the fact that the seat of arbitration is in London. The choice of law governing
the arbitration agreement is English, which infers that the tribunal should apply conflict rules
of Lex Fori i.e., English Law, for determination of the applicable substantive law. And, the
applicable law so identified, from the conflict analysis i.e., Indian Law would be a decisive
factor in the determination of the Validity of the Exchequer Contract in the present case.
Further, the application of the validation principle would restrict the application of the Act of
2014 pursuant to them being an invalidating rule. Further, the applicable substantive law needs
to be in adherence to the public policy of place of performance of the contract i.e., India. The
public policy in India is narrowly interpreted, providing a ground for non-adherence with the
Laws of Marshall Islands. Moreover, even under common law the public policy is considered
only of the most connection, Marshall Islands are closely connected to the dispute. Thus, the
tribunal should apply English conflict rules and Indian Substantive law.
II. EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VALID FOR THE WANT OF CAPACITY
The CLAIMANT submits that the Exchequer contract in the present case is valid, and is not
affected by the existence of the Act of 2014 of Marshall Islands. It is being asserted by the
CLAIMANT in two-fold arguments; firstly, the parties to the underlying contract have the
required capacity for the conclusion of the contract; and secondly, the laws of Marshall Island
are not applicable in the present case. It is further substantiated by submitting that the capacity
of the parties to contract in the present case is to be derived from the proper law of contract or
the law objectively determined by the tribunal through the conflict of law analysis i.e., Indian
Law and, not the law of Marshall Island owing for it not being the place with whom the closest
connection of the dispute exists. Moreover, the validation principle of the English conflict rules
restricts the applicability of the invalidating rule of a connected state to the contract, thereby
rendering the contract, valid rather than ineffective. Thus, the Exchequer contract stands valid.
PAGE | 1
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

III. IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VOID: (A) ADORNIA HAS A CLAIM OF RESTITUTION
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO RECOVER THE PREMIUM PAID; (B) EXCHEQUER DOES
NOT HAVE A DEFENCE OF CHANGE OF POSITION
The CLAIMANT submits that it is entitled to the restitution of £32 Million. It is being asserted
pursuant to the fact that the RESPONDENT was enriched at the expense of the CLAIMANT while
it was left with an unpaid loss of £15 million. The enrichment of £32 million in the hands of
RESPONDENT renders them in a better-off position than it would have been if the contract was
valid. Further, the retention of enrichment is unjust, against the fundamental principle of equity
and subsequently, the money was paid under a mistake of law. Even the subsequent change in
law doesn’t bar the CLAIMANT to recover the amount paid if everybody at the time considered
the agreement to be valid. Moreover, the RESPONDENT does not have a defence of a change of
position. The defence does not suffice due to the performance being rendered in exchange, any
subsequent change of position of the RESPONDENT does not bar the CLAIMANT right. Further,
the defence of change of position harms the doctrine of equity. Thus, the CLAIMANT claim is
justified in the present case, as the RESPONDENT has been enriched.
IV. IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS NOT VOID: (A) ADORNIA IS ENTITLED TO REFER TO
THE SYNDICATE 41 AWARD; (B) EXCHEQUER IS BOUND BY ISSUE ESTOPPEL BY THE
TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS; (C) THE LOSSES FALL WITHIN THE INSURING CLAUSE
The CLAIMANT submits that it is entitled to refer to the contents of the Syndicate 41 award as
the arbitration was never confidential in the first place owing to the violation of the private
nature of the proceedings. It is being asserted pursuant to the fact that parties have chosen SIAC
as the institutional rule, and their claim falls within the exception to the rule of confidentiality
on the grounds of party autonomy. The law governing the arbitration agreement also requires
the preservation of the CLAIMANT’S legitimate interests. The RESPONDENT is privy to the
dispute, and as the rule of issue estoppel applies to privies, the RESPONDENT is bound by the
findings in the Syndicate 41 award. Further, using the doctrine of causa proxima non remota
spectator, the CLAIMANT’S losses are covered by the insuring clause. The government
intervention was driven by the physical damages suffered by Adornia Island and nearby
vicinities, which should be considered as the direct cause of damage. Thus, the damage incurred
by the CLAIMANT is indemnifiable and is covered under the insurance policy
PAGE | 2
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT
[ ¶ 1 ] It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble tribunal that the conflict of law rules of the
seat that is the English conflict of law rules must be applied. Through this conflict of law
analysis, the express choice of Indian law should be the substantive law governing the dispute.
The CLAIMANT submits that, first, the English conflict of law rules must be applied [A]; and
second, the applicable law from the English conflict of rules is Indian law [B].
A. THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL SHOULD APPLY ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAW RULES.
[ ¶ 2 ] The CLAIMANT submits that the choice available to a tribunal for conflict of law rules
is the law of the forum, the law governing arbitration agreement, and the law of closest
connection if the parties have not resorted to any particular choice of Lex Fori or Lex Arbitri.1
In cases where the parties have expressly chosen an arbitral seat, any question on the choice of
law a tribunal must apply the relevant rules of the private international law of the arbitration
seat.2 Further, tribunals seated in both common law and civil law jurisdictions have applied
conflict of laws rules of the arbitral seat on the theory that this was the parties’ implied
agreement.3 English courts also held that arbitral tribunals seated in England were required to
apply English choice of law rules.4
[ ¶ 3 ] In C v. D,5 the EWCA stated that the arbitration agreement will be most closely and
significantly connected with the seat where the arbitral proceeding will be conducted, rather
than with the law governing the underlying contract, as the parties have specifically chosen to
arbitrate in that selected place.
1
HALSBURY.
2
ICC 6149; YEARBOOK 1995; ICC 6527; YEARBOOK 1993.
3
ICC 11061; Grigera Naon; ICC 9771, YEARBOOK 2004.
4
DICEY; Mann.
5
C v D.
PAGE | 1
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

[ ¶ 4 ] Moreover, the choice of seat is often made to ensure neutral proceedings. 6 Therefore,
conflict of laws rules of the arbitral seat is appropriate,7 as they provide the parties with a
predictable, neutral and fair choice of law.8 This makes the seat of the arbitration supremely
significant as it is often used to determine the applicable law, the arbitration procedure as well
as the judicial review over the award.9
[ ¶ 5 ] In the present case, the parties have chosen London, United Kingdom the seat of the
arbitration thereby subjecting themselves to English Law as the Lex Fori.10 Additionally, the
law governing the arbitration agreement expressly chosen is also English Law. 11 The arbitral
tribunal thus seated in London must apply English conflict of law rules as it is the law
governing the arbitration agreement and the law of the seat in order to determine the laws
applicable to the dispute. Thus, the RESPONDENT requests the Tribunal to apply the English
conflict of law rules.
B. APPLICABLE LAW FROM ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAW RULES IS INDIAN LAW
[ ¶ 6 ] The CLAIMANT submits that English conflict of law analysis supports the application of
Indian law as the substantive law governing the dispute. The conflict rules of the law of the
seat would govern the applicability of law in the present case which would act as a decisive
factor in determining the validity of the Exchequer Contract. The CLAIMANT submits that the
substantive law would be determined by, first, the applicability of the Proper Law doctrine [1];
second, the validation principle should be invoked [2]; and third, the public policy of India is
to be adhered.
[1] The applicability of Proper law Doctrine
[ ¶ 7 ] The choice of the parties is of paramount importance in determining the proper law of
the contract.12 The proper law is the law chosen by the parties, the choice being expressly made
6
Enka Chubb; Ramona Cirlig.
7
Croff.
8
BORN.
9
Mankastu.
10
Case Study, Annexure 3.
11
Case Study, Annexure 3
12
Whitworth.
PAGE | 2

in the contract or to be inferred from the terms and nature of the contract.13 Under common law
jurisdictions, contracts of insurance are governed by the proper law of the contract.14
[ ¶ 8 ] Dicey,15 states that the proper law of a contract is the one that the parties intended in
the contract to be governed by.16 Even in English law, the general rule is that the applicable
law will be the one that is chosen by the parties and only if no choice has been made, by the
law with which the transaction is most closely connected. 17
[ ¶ 9 ] In the present case, the choice of law governing the substance is expressly provided to
be the law of India.18 This express choice falls under the definition of the proper law of the
contract and the contract is to be governed by such choice. Thus, the underlying contract
between the parties of India and the Marshall Island, both a common law jurisdiction, is subject
to Indian law in accordance with proper law doctrine Further, it is submitted that Indian Law
is the Proper law as, first, Indian law is the lex loci solutionis (i); and second, party autonomy
must be protected (ii).
i. Indian law is the lex loci solutinis
[ ¶ 10 ] The proper law is presumed to be the law of the country where performance of contract
takes place i.e., lex loci solutionis.19 In Fouad,20 it was held that the law of the country where
the contract is to be performed wholly or partly is presumed to be the proper law of the contract.
This theory has been advocated on the ground that the place of performance usually is of greater
significance to the contract than is the place of making and that the parties can therefore be
presumed to have intended the lex loci solutionis to govern validity. 21
[ ¶ 11 ] In the present case, the place of performance of the contract is India as both the parties
have their principal place of business in India. The lex loci solutionis is the Indian law which
13
SETALVAD.
14
DICEY.
15
DICEY.
16
CHESHIRE.
17
SETALVAD.
18
Compagnie.
19
Chatenay.
20
Fouad.
21
Regla Warehouses; STUMBERG.
PAGE | 3

further justifies its application as the proper law of the contract. Thus, Indian law must the
proper law governing the dispute.
ii. Party autonomy must be protected
[ ¶ 12 ] Party autonomy is central to an arbitration as it protects the interests of both the

parties.22 The autonomy of party parties is said to be respected only when the tribunal applies
the laws that the parties have chosen to govern such an agreement and the seat of arbitration.23
Further, A tribunal can only move away from such autonomy when the choice made by parties
is not a reasonable one or the same is contrary to the public policy.24
[ ¶ 13 ] In the present case, both parties willingly chose the Indian Laws to be applicable to the
policy in all respects.25 The choice is made exercising the party autonomy and such autonomy
must not be undermined by a tribunal. Thus, the tribunal must give effect to the choice of law
of the parties and apply the Indian law as the substantive law
[2] Validation Principle Supports the Application of Indian Laws
[ ¶ 14 ] The CLAIMANT humbly submits that as per the validation principle of English conflict
of law rules, the governing law must be the law which leads to the interpretation of the contract
in such a way that it must not affect the validation of the contract. 26 The principle emphasises
that the applicable law must leads to the best possible interpretation of the contract, 27
[ ¶ 15 ] In Kabab-Ji,28 the UKSC held that the validation principle is an established principle
of contractual interpretation. The law which interprets and upholds the validity of the contract
will prevail and it must not lead to invalidation of the contract.29
[ ¶ 16 ] In the present case, the validation principle will be applicable as the English conflict of
law rules recognises such a principle to be applied. The invocation of principle disallows the
application of any such law which undermines or invalidates the contract. Thus, the Indian law
22
ICC 6474 of 1992; YEARBOOK 2000; Reuben.
23
Fagbemi.
24
Whitworth.
25
26
Enka Chubb.
27
Lancashire.
28
Kabab-Ji.
29
Re Missouri.
PAGE | 4

must apply in the present case as it upholds the validity of the contract and laws of Marshall
Island which invalidates the contract must not be applied.
[3] Public Policy of India is to be Adhered
[ ¶ 17 ] The Renusagar,30 it was established that the premise for an award to be considered
unenforceable in India is that it must violate public policy as defined by Indian laws and not
by any other law, setting down a limited view of what constitutes public policy (including the
applicable law in the jurisdiction in which the agreement, or award, was made).
[ ¶ 18 ] Further, no court will apply such a foreign law or foreign judgement if the result of such
application would be manifestly contrary to the public policy. 31 Recognising foreign laws
passed by that foreign state would be contrary to independent sovereignties of the other states.32
[ ¶ 19 ] In the present case, the recognition of the Act of 2014 is against the substantive law of
India will violate its public policy as insurance contracts are valid under the Indian contractual
law. Recognition of Marshall Island law will invalidate a contract generally valid in India.
Thus, the Act of 2014 cannot be a ground for rendering the invalidity to the insurance contract
in the present case.
i. In arguendo, closely connected states’ public policy is not at stake
[ ¶ 20 ] The CLAIMANT submits that the principles of natural justice, fairness and equality, are
encompassed under transnational public policy. 33 The laws of the place of contract, place of
performance and place of close connection are given due importance in English
Jurisprudence.34 The contract needs to be interpreted in light of all the circumstances and apply
the law with which it appears to have the closest and most substantial connection.35 Under
common law, the public policy is respected if a close connection of that state is established. 36
[ ¶ 21 ] Further, the applicable law will be the law with which the transaction is most closely
connected with. The general presumption is that the country with which an insurance contract
30
Renusagar.
31
G Paulsen.
32
DICEY.
33
F Mantilla.
34
Bankers Trust; DICEY.
35
Colmenares.
36
RR, Art. 3(3). RR, Art. 3(4). RR, Art. 9(3); Restatement (1972)
PAGE | 5

is most closely connected is the place where the insurer has his principal place of business
unless it appears that the contract is affected at another place of business. 37 Moreover,
according to the "territorial" concept of law, the legal consequences attached to the parties’
conduct depend upon where such conduct transpires, irrespective of the domicile of the
parties.38
[ ¶ 22 ] In the present case, Marshall Islands is not a place of performance and nor the express
choice of parties which signifies that it is just the lex patriae i.e., the law of nationality of
CLAIMANT, thereby has little effect on the contract. Further, the lex loci solutionis, the principal
place of business as well as the substantive law is Indian law.39 Marshall Island is not the closest
connection and its public policy does not restrict the tribunal to avoid the § 9 application of the
Act of 2014. Thus, the public policy of a closely connected state is not violated as Marshall
Island is not a closely connected state to the dispute.
II. THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VALID FOR THE WANT OF CAPACITY.
[ ¶ 23 ] It is humbly submitted that capacity to contract is the legal competence of a party to

enter into a valid contract, the capacity is either derived from the proper law of contract or with
the law of the domicile of the parties.40 The contract of insurance between CLAIMANT and
RESPONDENT in the present case is not void for the want of capacity as, first, parties have the
required capacity to enter into a valid contractual relationship (A); and second, the Marshall
Island Act of 2014 is not applicable (B).
A. PARTIES HAVE THE REQUIRED CAPACITY TO ENTER INTO A VALID CONTRACTUAL

RELATIONSHIP
[ ¶ 24 ] The CLAIMANT humbly submits that the question of capacity is governed by the proper
law of contract. 41 In Franco, it is stated that “a tribunal's examination of applicable law to
determine the capacity is governed by the law designated as the proper law by the rule of
37
DICEY; Greer.
38
Columbia Review.
39
Case Study, Statement of Facts ¶ 3.
40
Harnam Singh.
41
Roberts; Flegon.
PAGE | 6

conflict which it deems appropriate.” 42 Further, Dicey and Morris’ Rule 182,43 states that the
capacity of parties should be governed by the proper law of the contract.
[ ¶ 25 ] It is further submitted that in the present case, the party’s capacity to enter into
contractual obligation is in question for the reason of the Act of 2014 which may possibly
render the contract void with the interpretation of its § 9 as substantiated in the judgment of
Zebra Plastics ltd.44 However, the parties’ capacity to be in the insurance contract is not vitiated
as, first, parties derive their capacity from the proper law of the contract (A); and second, the
governing law limits the law of domiclii.
[1] Parties derive their capacity from the proper law of the contract
[ ¶ 26 ] The contracting parties derive their capacity from the law governing the transaction or
the proper law of the contract as per Dicey and Morris’ Rule 182. 45 The interpretation of the
contract states that the capacity derived under either the lex domicilii, the law of habitual
residence, or the proper law of the contract is sufficient to validate a contract. It is imperative
to consider the choice of proper law to determine the capacity of the parties and further the
validity of the contract.46
[ ¶ 27 ] Moreover, the application of the substantive law determined by the conflict of law
analysis confers capacity to the parties, and with such application of that law, the parties are
not incapacitated even in cases where the Lex Domicilii places a restriction on one of the parties
to enter into the contract on a particular subject matter.47
[ ¶ 28 ] In the present case, the habitual residence of the CLAIMANT is India and the Proper law
of the contract is Indian Law. Indian law decides the capacity of the contract and the insurance
contract is valid under the law. Therefore, even, if the CLAIMANT’S Lex Domicilii places
restrictions on its capacity Dicey’s Rule 182 confers the CLAIMANT the capacity to contract.
Thus, the parties are competent to contract in the present case as the proper law upholds the
validity of the insurance contract. 48
42
FRANCO.
43
DICEY.
44
45
DICEY; REPORT 58
46
Charron.
47
Fredericks.
48
DICEY.
PAGE | 7

[2] The Governing law limits the law of domiclii.
[ ¶ 29 ] The law of nationality is referred to by the parties in deciding the questions pertaining
to their capacity, which is generally derived from the lex domicilii.49 Deviation from this
general rule is possible in the event of a conflict.50 In such events of conflicts, the contracting
party might carry the incapacity in terms of the law of domicile with them in order to escape
liability in other jurisdictions.51 Therefore, a tribunal should resort to the law governing the
transaction which is the proper law, as “the capacity is not status, but merely an accompaniment
or result of status, and it should therefore be governed by the law that governs the
transaction”.52
[ ¶ 30 ] In the present case, while the CLAIMANT speculates to be incapacitated by its lex
domicilii due to the Act of 2014 and the subsequent judgment of the Court, it obtains its
capacity to enter into insurance contracts by the law governing the transaction i.e., choice of
proper law.53 The proper law is Indian Law which validates the CLAIMANT’S capacity. Thus,
the law of domicilli does not affect the capacity of the contract as it is not the proper law of the
contract.
B. THE MARSHALL ISLAND ACT OF 2014 IS NOT APPLICABLE
[ ¶ 31 ] The CLAIMANT humbly submits that the Act of 2014, of the Marshall Island pursuant
to the interpretation of its § 9, does not apply to the Exchequer contract in the present case. The
said law does not affect the capacity of the insurance contract as, first, the validation principle
restricts the applicability of invalidating rule [1]; and second, Marshall Island laws are not
closely connected to the dispute [2].
[1] The Validation Principle Restricts the Applicability Of Invalidating Rule
[ ¶ 32 ] The validation principle of the English conflict of law rules applies when the law of a
connected state if applied would render the contract ineffective in part or whole. 54 The principle
49
WALKER; JANET.
50
MORTENSEN.
51
Milliken; MCDOUGAL; SCOLES; SYMEONIDES.
52
Sykes.
53
Case Study Para 24.
54
Enka Chubb.
PAGE | 8

derives its basis from the maxim namely, ‘verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat quam
pereat’, which means that “the contract should be interpreted so that it is valid rather than
ineffective”.55
[ ¶ 33 ] In Jacobs Martin,56 Where a contract was governed by the English law, a law at the
port of shipment prohibiting the shipment of goods did not excuse the seller for failing to
perform the contract fully. It was held that the governing law determines whether a contract
cannot be performed because of subsequent legislation, or impossibility. 57
[ ¶ 34 ] Moreover, the invalidating rule of a connected state would not be applicable when
there exists a proper law containing a validating rule to the contract. 58 The principle is that the
validity of a contract is governed by the proper law selected by the parties always to hold that
the parties have not selected the law which would render their contract void.59
[ ¶ 35 ] In the present case, the parties have not expressly subjected themselves to the laws of
the Marshall Islands, which implies their intention of entering into a valid contractual
relationship the validation principle is applicable by the virtue of English conflict of law rules.
The application of the invalidating rule would render the contract void violating the validation
principle and the proper law i.e., the Indian law will determine the validity of the contract.
Therefore, the Marshall Island invalidating Act of 2014 will not be applicable and Indian law
makes the Exchequer contract valid as insurance contracts are valid in India. 60 Thus, subjecting
the contract to the invalidating rule of Marshall Island would be contrary to the party’s choice
and must be avoided.
[2] Marshall Island laws are not closely connected to the dispute
[ ¶ 36 ] An arbitral tribunal will generally decide that the contract is to be governed by the law
of the country with which it is most closely connected. It is presumed that the most closely
55
Lancashire.
56
Jacobs Martin.
57
Jacobs Martin.
58
Rossano.
59
Vita Food.
60
ICA, § 10, ICA, § 124.
PAGE | 9

connected is the country which is the place of business that affects the performance of the
contract.61
[ ¶ 37 ] In Enka Chubb,62 it was held that the main contract was governed by Russian law i.e.,
the law applicable to substance, due to the close connection of the main contract with Russian
law. This was decided citing the leading authorities, Sulamerica,63 and C v D,64 in which it was
stated that ‘the default rule is that the law which is most closely connected with the arbitration
agreement will be the curial law, the law most closely connected to substance would be law of
place of performance.’
[ ¶ 38 ] Further, the governing law renders the laws and public policy of the closest connection
applicable, even if it is a mandatory law, it does not apply if not closely connected to the
dispute.65 Only the mandatory laws of the closest connection need to be respected, 66 which is
rather important if the connection is the place of performance of the contract. 67
[ ¶ 39 ] In the present case, the laws of Marshall Island are not applicable as Marshall Island is
not the state with the closest connection to the dispute. The Marshall Islands is neither a place
of performance nor the substantive law as the place of performance is India. The only
connection that it holds to the contract is being a place of incorporation of one of the parties
i.e., the CLAIMANT.68 Since the governing law respects the laws of closest connection, the Act
of 2014 even if asserted to be a mandatory law, does not apply to the case at hand. 69 Thus,
Marshall Island laws are not applicable to the contract as it is not closely connected to the
dispute.
III. IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VOID
[ ¶ 40 ] It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble tribunal that the CLAIMANT has the right to
recovery of £32 Million premium paid under the insurance contract to the RESPONDENT.
Therefore, if the Exchequer contract is considered void, first, Adornia has a claim of restitution
61
REDFERN; RR, Art. 4
62
Enka Chubb.
63
Sulamerica.
64
C v D.
65
P Mayer.
66
SICEY.
67
STUMBERG, CCC. § 1646.
68
69
P Mayer.
PAGE | 10

of unjust enrichment to recover the premium paid [A]; and second, the RESPONDENT does not
have a defence of change of position [B].
A. ADORNIA HAS A CLAIM OF RESTITUTION OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO RECOVER THE

PREMIUM PAID
[ ¶ 41 ] The CLAIMANT submits that a restitution claim is meant to put the CLAIMANT into the
position in which it would have been if the contract had been performed. 70 Proof of a party’s
unjust enrichment at the expense of the other party constitutes a prima facie obligation to make
restitution.71 It is submitted that the CLAIMANT is entitled to restitution of £32 Million from the
RESPONDENT as, first, the RESPONDENT was enriched [1]; and second, the retention of the
enrichment is unjust [2].
[1] The RESPONDENT was enriched.
[ ¶ 42 ] In P. Birks, money was described as the very measure of enrichment. It is nearly

impossible to deny that a receipt of money is not enriching.72 Unjust enrichment is the
fundamental ground for liability in restitution. Enrichment at the expense of the CLAIMANT
establishes a prima facie liability for unjust enrichment as long as such an enrichment was
unjust.73
[ ¶ 43 ] In Fibrosa, while expounding on the doctrine, it was held that law must provide
remedies for cases of unjust enrichment to prevent one party from retaining the money or some
benefit derived from another which is not just to keep.74 Further, the doctrine of nemo deved
locup letari ex aliena jactura states that no one should enrich himself at the expense of others.75
[ ¶ 44 ] In the present case, the RESPONDENT received a total payment of £32 Million as
premium under the insurance contract till 2020. 76 The Contract was subsequently discovered
70
Pearce.
71
Paul Key.
72
P. BIRKS.
73
PETER BIRKS.
74
Fibrosa; Cannon; Chilcott.
75
Fletcher; TETTENBORN; PETER.
76
PAGE | 11

to be void and the claim was also repudiated by the RESPONDENT.77 Thereby, the RESPONDENT
was enriched with £32 million at the expense of the CLAIMANT while the CLAIMANT was left
with an unpaid loss of £15 million. Thus, the enrichment of £32 million in the hands of
RESPONDENT renders them in a better off position than it would have been if the contract was
valid and rejecting the claim of restitution will put the CLAIMANT in an even more
disadvantageous position.
[2] The retention of enrichment is unjust.
[ ¶ 45 ] Unjust retention occurs when the defendant wrongfully secures or passively receives a
benefit, which would be unconscionable to retain.78 In Enviro-legal,79 unjust retention has
been defined as gaining benefit from the loss of another or retention of money of another
against the fundamental principles of equity. Therefore, in the present case, it is submitted that
there has been unjust retention of £32 Million as, first, the retention of £32 Million is against
the principle of equity (i); and second, the money was paid under a mistake of law (ii).
i. Retention of £32 million is against the principle of equity
[ ¶ 46 ] The principle of equity states that a case of unjust enrichment should be corrected such
that no one is deprived of their own money. 80 A person is unjustly enriched if he unjustly retains
the received benefit against the principle of equity. 81 In the present case, the RESPONDENT was
unjustly enriched by £32 Million paid by the CLAIMANT in the form of Insurance Premium. In
the light of the fact that the CLAIMANT already suffered enormous losses due to hurricane, 82 the
retention of the aforesaid premium combined with the non-payment of claim due to the
agreement being void puts the CLAIMANT at a combined loss of £47 Million. Thus, the retention
will result in violation of the Principle of Equity.
77
78
BIRKS.
79
Enviro-legal; MOSES.
80
MICHAEL; Roscoe.
81
Enviro-legal action; MOSES.
82
PAGE | 12

ii. The money was paid under a mistake of law
[ ¶ 47 ] In Klienwort, the House of Lords ruled that the money is not recoverable in restitution
on the ground that it was paid under a mistake of law is no longer part of English law now.83
There is a prima facie entitlement to recover the monies paid when a mistake of fact or law has
caused the payment. 84 The retention of the money so paid would represent an unjust enrichment
of the payee, which is a necessary condition for the money given under mistake of law to be
recovered. The payer's mistake at the time of payment is what counts as the unjust factor. 85
[ ¶ 48 ] In certain areas of laws which are sparsely covered by judicial decisions, the
commercial world acts and has to act, on the generally held view of lawyers skilled in the
field.86 The practice of the profession in these cases is the best evidence of what the law is,
indeed it makes the law.87 Moreover, in Ontario Hydro,88 it was held that Once a doctrine of
restitution of unjust enrichment is recognized, the distinction as to mistake of law and mistake
of fact becomes simply meaningless.
[ ¶ 49 ] In the present case, RESPONDENT is enriched at expense of the CLAIMANT by way of

insurance premiums that were paid to them under a mistake of law. The CLAIMANT even sought
advice from leading City firm and King’s Counsel in London and was told that it was entitled
to enter into insurance contracts notwithstanding the provisions of the Act of 2014.89 Further,
the judgement came in contrary to the generally accepted view on § 9 of the Act.90 Thus, the
subsequent change in the legal position should not bar the CLAIMANT to recover the amount
paid under the contract if everybody concerned thought at the time of the agreement that it was
valid.91
83
Kleinwort.
84
David Securities.
85
David Securities.
86
Re Hollis.
87
Re Downshire.
88
Hydro Electric; Air Canada.
89
Case Study, Statement of Facts ¶ 6; Case Study, Clarification No. 18.
90
91
Klienworth.
PAGE | 13

B. EXCHEQUER DOES NOT HAVE A DEFENCE OF CHANGE OF POSITION
[ ¶ 50 ] The CLAIMANT submits that the recovery of money in restitution is not a matter of
discretion for the court and a claim to recover is made as a right. 92 The defence of change of
position should not disintegrate into a case by case discretionary analysis of individual facts. 93
The Respondent is unjustly enriched and does not have the defence of change of position in
respect of the premium received by them as, first, the defence does not suffice as performance
was to be rendered in exchange [1]; and second, the defence will violate the principle of equity
[2].
[1] The defence does not suffice as performance was to be rendered in exchange.
[ ¶ 51 ] In Kommunes, a contrast was drawn between a defendant who gained money under
circumstances where he reasonably believed it was his to retain and a defendant who at the
time the money was received, believed he would need to repay it at a later stage. 94 In such a
case where the party was aware of the fact that they would have to repay money back and still
subsequently change their position, the risk lay completely with that party and not the
CLAIMANT. This entitles the Payer to recover the full amount it had paid to the payee.95 The
defence of change of position does not suffice as performance was to be rendered in exchange
and only applies where the enrichment was irretrievably lost.96 A party should not be allowed
to rely on the change of position defence in circumstances when he pays away money that he
knows he received subject to an obligation of performance on his part.97
[ ¶ 52 ] In the present case, the RESPONDENT was aware of their obligations under the insurance
contract and of the fact that the enrichment would otherwise have to be paid back to the
CLAIMANT in case a claim arises. Any subsequent change of position of the RESPONDENT does
not bar the CLAIMANT to recover the amount it had paid to the RESPONDENT. The RESPONDENT
92
Scottish Equitable.
93
BURROWS.
94
Kommune; Edelman.
95
Chilcott.
96
MITCHELL.
97
Simran Bedi.
PAGE | 14

had received the amount under an obligation and not as a gift. Thus, RESPONDENT cannot claim
the defence of change of position.
[2] The Defence will violate the principle of equity
[ ¶ 53 ] The restitution can only be rejected if the RESPONDENT would otherwise suffer a net
detriment.98 In Lipkin Gorman, it was stated restitution can be denied if the circumstances had
so changed that it would be inequitable to require the defendant to make full restitution.99 The
purpose of the defence of change of position is to balance the relative equities between the
parties.100 A right of recovery under the doctrine of equity arises where retention of a benefit
is considered contrary to justice and equity. 101
[ ¶ 54 ] In the present case, granting the RESPONDENT the defence of change of position would
harm the doctrine of equity as it would put the CLAIMANT out of pocket by £32 Million worth
of premiums as well as the loss of £15 Million incurred due to the hurricane.102 This will put
the RESPONDENT at a total loss of £47 Million. Whereas, the RESPONDENT would be enriched
by £32 Million if they are allowed to retain the enrichment by way of defence of change
position even though the RESPONDENT did not suffer any detriment let alone a net detriment.
Thus, the retention of enrichment would be contrary to the doctrine of equity and would put
the CLAIMANT at a double loss.
IV. IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS NOT VOID
[ ¶ 55 ] It is humbly submitted that the if the Exchequer contract is not void for the want of
capacity, first, Adornia is entitled to refer to the contents of Syndicate 41 award without the
consent of Syndicate 41 insurers [A]; second, Exchequer is bound by Syndicate 41 Tribunal’s
findings by issue estoppel as to the losses fall within the insuring clause [B]; and third, the
losses fall within the insurance clause [C].
98
MacMillan.
99
Lipkin Gorman.
100
David Securities.
101
Sahakari.
102
PAGE | 15

A. ADORNIA IS ENTITLED TO REFER TO THE SYNDICATE 41 AWARD WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF

THE SYNDICATE 41 INSURERS
[ ¶ 56 ] The CLAIMANT submits the arbitration agreement is hybrid in nature, 103 i.e., it governs
both, the substantive rights and obligations of the parties and has a procedural nature that deals
with the mechanism of resolution of disputes. 104 While international commercial arbitration
proceeding is not a public proceeding and is a private process sustaining a confidential
process,105 this confidential nature is subject to exceptions.106 The CLAIMANT is entitled to refer
to the content of the Syndicate 41 award as, first Claimant falls under the exception of SIAC
rule of confidentiality [1]; and second, it is necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the
CLAIMANT and third, in arguendo, the arbitration was never confidential in the first place.
[1] CLAIMANT Falls Under the Exception Of SIAC Rule of Confidentiality
[ ¶ 57 ] The CLAIMANT submits that though confidentiality has been regarded as an intrinsic
component of arbitration, it is not absolute. 107 The principle of party autonomy authorizes the
parties to decide upon the procedural laws or institutional rules. 108 The adopted institutional
rules shall then govern all the procedures including the issues relating to confidentiality.109
[ ¶ 58 ] Rule 39 of the SIAC governs at all times and all matters relating to the proceeding and
the award as confidential. 110 Rule 39.2(c) of SIAC provides the exception to confidentiality of
the party to enforce or pursue a legal right or claim.111 The notion of a "claim" or "cause of
action," is defined to include all claims or rights of legal action that arise out of a single set of
facts or a single transaction. 112
[ ¶ 59 ] Further, the arbitration award itself can be considered as a statement of facts of the
respective legal rights and liabilities of the parties. 113 It is possible to rely upon the award as
103
Berger.
104
BORN; Balfour.
105
REDFERN.
106
CHOONG.
107
Rosell.
108
Daimler.
109
Alastair.
110
SIAC, Rule 39; CHOONG.
111
SIAC, Rule 39.2(c).
112
Restatement (1982); BARNETT.
113
AAY.
PAGE | 16

having conferred a right or determined a fact. 114 The award itself conditions the obligation of
confidentiality, especially where disclosure is required to establish or safeguard a legal right in
relation to a third party by giving rise to a claim or defence.115 In these circumstances,
disclosure of the arbitral award, including its reasoning, will not be a breach of the duty of
confidentiality.116
[ ¶ 60 ] In the present case, the arbitration of syndicate and RESPONDENT both are governed by
same intuitional rule i.e., SIAC as chosen by the parties. 117 The CLAIMANT wishes to refer to
the findings of tribunal in the Syndicate 41 arbitration to pursue its claim and legal right against
exchequer and pursuant of such a claim falls under the exception Rule 39.2(c) of the SIAC
rules. This is further substantiated by the fact that there was a belief that decision in one
arbitration would be determinative of the decision in the other. 118 Thus, the CLAIMANT is
exempted from the duty of confidentiality under the exception and is entitled to refer the award
without consent in present arbitration with RESPONDENT.
[2] It Necessary to Protect the Legitimate Interest of the CLAIMANT.
[ ¶ 61 ] The CLAIMANT submits that the parties’ obligations of confidentiality under

international arbitral proceedings are usually defined by the law governing the respective
arbitration agreement. The existence and scope of the party’s confidentiality obligations is
therefore also governed by the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. 119
[ ¶ 62 ] English courts have held that arbitration agreements impose implied obligations of
confidentiality on the parties. 120 However, there exist acceptable grounds for overriding this
implied duty. If the disclosure of the award along with the materials was reasonably necessary
to establish the causes of action, then it falls under such overriding ground.121 Regardless of
the difficulty or expense, the Court shouldn't demand that the party requesting disclosure
demonstrate necessity.122
114
Sybray.
115
REPORT 108.
116
REPORT 108.
117
118
119
BORN
120
G. BORN
121
Hassneh.
122
Lloyd’s Syndicate
PAGE | 17

[ ¶ 63 ] In Emmott,123 disclosure in further proceedings of the arbitration is allowed as

disclosure being protective of the legitimate interests of the arbitrating party. Similarly, In Ali
Shipping Corp,124 it was held that arbitration-related documents may be disclosed as an
exception to the obligation of confidentiality where disclosure is necessary for legitimate
interests of a party to the arbitration vis-à-vis a third party in order to find a cause of action
against that third party or to defend a claim brought by the third party.
[ ¶ 64 ] In the present case, the CLAIMANT is already under a unpaid loss of £15 million which
puts them in a disadvantageous position further, In pursuant of their legal right against the
RESPONDENT and relitigating the same factual issue puts undue burden and cost onto them.
Moreover, the CLAIMANT consented to stay of one of the proceedings as that would in practice
be determinative of the outcome of the other one.125 This is one of the key reasons it did not
seek to exclude the RESPONDENT from the Syndicate 41 arbitration. 126 Therefore, in order to
protect the legitimate interest of the CLAIMANT, disclosure becomes necessary, an exception to
confidentiality. Thus, the CLAIMANT is entitled to protect its interest and refer the award in the
present arbitration.
[3] In Arguendo, the Arbitration was Never Confidential in the First Place
[ ¶ 65 ] The CLAIMANT submits that the concept of private arbitrations demonstrates that the
parties have consented to submit to arbitration a specific issue that has arisen solely between
them.127 The private nature of arbitral proceedings is well-established and the concept of
privacy would have no meaning if participants were required to arbitrate privately by day while
being free to pontificate publicly by night. 128
[ ¶ 66 ] It is undeniable that transparency, privacy remains the rule in arbitration and publicity
the exception.129 "Privacy" refers to concealment of vital information of any particular case
from third parties.130 In addition to barring parties from permitting third parties to attend arbitral
123
Emmott.
124
Ali Shipping.
125
126
127
Nippon.
128
Fortier.
129
Wautlet.
130
NOUSSIA.
PAGE | 18

proceedings, the obligations of confidentiality and privacy also forbid disclosing hearing
transcripts, written pleadings, and other rulings to third parties. 131
[ ¶ 67 ] In Hassneh,132 it was stated that the disclosure of materials prepared in contemplation
of an arbitration “would be almost equivalent to opening the door of the arbitration room to a
third party,” violating the sanctity of privacy in arbitration proceedings. It means that no third
party can attend arbitral case management meetings and hearings. 133 Confidentiality is an
obligation on the part of the parties “to not disclose information concerning the arbitration to
third parties or the public”. 134
[ ¶ 68 ] In the present case, the RESPONDENT was closely involved at every stage of the
Syndicate 41 arbitration attending all substantive and procedural hearings of the same, also
giving necessary voluntary disclosures.135 It also contributed proportionately to the costs
incurred by the Syndicate 41 insurers in defending the claim against the CLAIMANT and also
received joint invoice of the same.136 After the final award was passed, the RESPONDENT were
also provided with the order of the tribunal in the Syndicate 41 arbitration. 137 The CLAIMANT
submits that as the basic purpose of arbitration being privacy was already compromised and
never existed absolute in from the beginning. Thus, as there was no confidentiality in the first
place, there remains no further duty to comply with the confidentiality with regards to why the
CLAIMANT could not refer to the contents of the Syndicate 41 arbitration.
B. EXCHEQUER IS BOUND BY SYNDICATE 41 TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS BY ISSUE ESTOPPEL AS

TO THE LOSSES FALL WITHIN THE INSURING CLAUSE
[ ¶ 69 ] It is humbly submitted that common law jurisdictions recognize issue preclusion also
known as ‘issue estoppel’. 138 Collateral estoppel’s purpose is to protect parties from the burden
of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or their privy. 139 The RESPONDENT is bound
by issue estoppel as to the findings of tribunal as first, The RESPONDENT is a privy, second,
131
MUSTILL.
132
Hassneh.
133
Rajoo.
134
BORN.
135
136
137
Case study, Annexure 4.
138
BORN.
139
Parklane.
PAGE | 19

Arbitration awards have preclusive effect on privies and third, There is no violation of
Fundamental right of due process.
[1] The RESPONDENT is a Privy
[ ¶ 70 ] The CLAIMANT submits that "estoppel" refers to when a party is prohibited by

considerations of good faith and equity from acting inconsistently with its own declarations or
actions.140 Issue preclusion prevents relitigating of the identical issue determined in an earlier
action, between the same parties or their privies. 141 The concept of "privies" is wide, and has
been utilised to allow collateral estoppel to be invoked against a variety of parties that did not
take part in the arbitration. 142 The flexibility of the concept of privy indicates that parties are in
a connection such that a decision concerning one of them may legitimately have an impact on
the other.143
[ ¶ 71 ] In Gleeson v Wippell, 144 it was established that ‘privies’ includes third parties that are
sufficiently closely connected to a party. In order to be a privy, it required a relation of “blood,
title or interest”.145 In Parakou Shipping 146 while considering such related interest, it was stated
that the required commonality is a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation or a
parallel or corresponding interest in that particular subject matter. Moreover, privity also arises
from a non-party's active participation in or control over a lawsuit. 147
[ ¶ 72 ] In the present case, the RESPONDENT was closely involved at every stage of the
Syndicate 41 arbitration, represented by the same team of solicitors and counsel. 148
Representatives of Exchequer attended all procedural and substantive hearings. The
RESPONDENT’s active participation and control over the proceedings is further highlighted by
the fact that Exchequer contributed to the costs incurred by the Syndicate 41 insurers in
defending the claim. The RESPONDENT and the Syndicate 41 paid these cost in a proportion of
the invoice that corresponded to the share of their respective risks. Moreover, the statement of
140
COOKE.
141
Heacock; Restatement (1982).
142
NTCH-WA; Barge Corp.; Serling.
143
Shell.
144
Gleeson.
145
Carl Zeiss.
146
Parakou.
147
Watts.
148
PAGE | 20

Ms. Devika Ghosh also states that Exchequer was privy to all the details and that there was a
reflection of a collective interest in which a common position was taken by both Syndicate 41
and Exchequer.149 The statement is not disputed. 150 Thus, the RESPONDENT was a privy as they
are sufficiently connected by way of related direct interests in the subject matter of the previous
arbitration.
[2] Arbitration Awards Have Preclusive Effect on Privy or Third Party
[ ¶ 73 ] The CLAIMANT humbly submits that English courts have long recognised that the
principle of issue estoppel to apply to arbitration awards.151 In Henderson,152 it was held that
issue estoppel applies to both arbitrations and litigation. Recently, in PJSC National Bank Trust
and others v Boris Mints and others,153 it was stated that arbitral proceedings can give rise to
an issue estoppel claim against a non-party who is a privy of a party to the arbitration. An award
generally has collateral estoppel effects only as to the parties to an arbitral proceeding, or their
privies.154 Rodgers Builders v. McQueen,155 stated that a judgment entered on an arbitration
award is conclusive of all rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies,
and thus constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action arising out of the same cause of
action or dispute. In Sun Life Assurance, 156 it was stated that all relevant determinations of an
award can be relied upon by and against a third party in subsequent proceedings.
[ ¶ 74 ] Moreover, even United States courts have widen the collateral estoppel past the parties
and their privies, termed as “non mutual offensive collateral estoppel”. 157 Further, United States
appellate courts held that a non-signatory was bound by an arbitral award because it had
"related and congruent interests" with the parties.158 These common law doctrine of issue
estoppel have developed similarly in both English and the United States Courts. 159
149
150
151
Haddon; MERKIN.
152
Henderson.
153
Nori Holding.
154
Bourque.
155
Rodgers Builders; Sides.
156
Lincoln.
157
BORN
158
Isidor Paiewonsky; Barrowclough.
159
BARNETT
PAGE | 21

[ ¶ 75 ] In the present case, the RESPONDENT is a privy to Syndicate 41 in the previous

arbitration proceedings. Thus, the RESPONDENT, even though a non-signatory to the agreement,
involved extensively in the previous arbitration is bound by the preclusive effects of the
arbitration award.
[3] No Violation of Fundamental Right of Due Process
[ ¶ 76 ] The CLAIMANT submits that a third party is merely affected by special determination of
previous award rather than being bound by it as a whole wherein a third party will not lose the
opportunity to defend itself. This disregards any objection to the violation of fundamental rights
of due process. Rather than being a matter of due process, this negative impact on the third
party is a legal consequence of how closely the two sets of actions are related. 160 Moreover, in
the event that the parties to the initial arbitration committed fraud or collusion, a third party
will always have a right of appeal against that initial verdict.. 161 This provides a safety net to
the third party against binding effect or award in case of serious violation of due process.
[ ¶ 77 ] In the present case, the CLAIMANT is requesting to refer the previous arbitration award
for determination as to losses suffered fell within the insuring clause of the contract. 162 Thus,
as the tribunal in the Syndicate 41 arbitration determined the same issue and referring the same
in the present arbitration does not violate the right of due process of the RESPONDENT.163
C. THE LOSSES FALL WITHIN THE INSURANCE CLAUSE
[1] The Losses Fall Under the Insuring Clause as Per the Doctrine of Efficient
Proximate Cause
[ ¶ 78 ] JJ Llyod Instruments Ltd v. Northern Star Insurance Co Ltd, stated that the insurer is
liable under English law if the loss is concurrently caused by an insured risk and an uninsured
risk.164 A claim is granted in both the cases of insured risk and uninsured risk if they are
concurrent in nature and as long as there is no excluded risk. In cases where there is more than
160
STAVROS.
161
Restatement (1982); STAVROS.
162
163
164
JJ Llyod; Zhao.
PAGE | 22

one proximate cause of a loss, the insured will be eligible to receive compensation if one of
these causes is covered under the policy and none of the others are specifically prohibited. 165
Furthermore, if the proximate cause is a peril insured, insurers are liable for the entire loss,
even though its extent was not inevitable, as long as its extent was not too remote. 166
[ ¶ 79 ] The doctrine of proximate cause or causa proxima non remota spectator is of particular
importance in property insurance as it aids in determining the peril that caused an effect. 167 An
insurer must provide coverage whenever a covered peril is the efficient proximate cause of the
damage or loss.168 The question under the doctrine is not what cause was the nearest in time or
place to the catastrophe but rather if the proximate cause is the efficient cause and the one that
sets the other causes in operation. 169 The efficient proximate cause is not necessarily the one
that acted last in time. 170 In Reynold v. Accidental Insurance Co., 171 it was state that if the final
cause is a mere probable and reasonable consequence of the peril insured against without any
novus actus interveniens, that peril will have to be treated as the real and efficient cause and
the insurer will be liable.
[ ¶ 80 ] In the present case, the insured risk was physical damage to the property and its
subsequent result in business interruption . 172 Both physical damage and government action
following on from the hurricane are proximate causes of the loss incurred by the CLAIMANT.
The covered peril, i.e. physical damage is the efficient proximate cause of the loss due to
business interruption and the government actions that followed the physical damage were
merely effects of the actual peril. 173 Physical damage set out government action in operation
and was therefore a probable and reasonable consequence of the peril insured against without
any novus actus interveniens. Thus, even though it was the one that acted last in time, it could
not be considered as the effective proximate cause. In the absence of government action being
the effective proximate cause, the losses incurred by the CLAIMANT fall under the insurance
clause.
165
HALSBURY.
166
Reischer.
167
KEETON.
168
LEE RUSS.
169
Boon.
170
Lanasa.
171
Reynold.
172
Case study, Annexure 2.
173
PAGE | 23

PRAYER
In light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, the Counsel
for the CLAIMANT, respectfully requests the Hon’ble Arbitral Tribunal to find and declare that:
I. ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAW RULES MUST BE APPLIED BY THE TRIBUNAL TO DECIDE THE
VALIDITY OF CONTRACT.
II. THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS NOT VOID FOR WANT OF CAPACITY.

III. CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE PREMIUM BY WAY OF RESTITUTION OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT AND RESPONDENT DOES NOT HAVE A DEFENCE OF CHANGE OF POSITION.
IV. CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO REFER TO THE CONTENTS OF THE SYNDICATE 41 AWARD.

V. RESPONDENT IS BOUND BY ISSUE ESTOPPEL BY THE SYNDICATE 41 TRIBUNAL FINDINGS
AS TO LOSSES FALL WITHIN THE INSURANCE CLAUSE.
VI. CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO BE INDEMNIFIED FOR THE LOSS OF £15 MILLION AS IT FALLS
WITHIN THE INSURANCE CLAUSE.
And award the CLAIMANT any other relief to which it may be entitled.
All of which is most humbly & respectfully prayed.
Place: London, United Kingdom Sd/-
Dated: 21/03/2023 Counsel for CLAIMANT
PAGE | XIII
MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] PRAYER

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NIRVANA A

THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, LONDON

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:

EXCHEQUER INSURANCE PRIVATE LIMITED

MEMORANDUM for CLAIMANT

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ V

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ IX

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................. XXIII

STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................XXIV

ISSUES RAISED............................................................................................................ XXVII

I. ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAW RULES SHOULD BE APPLIED BY THE TRIBUNAL TO DECIDE

[1] The applicability of Proper law Doctrine .................................................................. 2

i. Indian law is the lex loci solutinis.......................................................................... 3

II. Party autonomy must be protected ......................................................................... 4

[2] Validation Principle Supports the Application of Indian Laws ................................. 4

[3] Public Policy of India is to be Adhered ..................................................................... 5

i. In arguendo, closely connected states’ public policy is not at stake ...................... 5

A. PARTIES HAVE THE REQUIRED CAPACITY TO ENTER INTO A VALID CONTRACTUAL

[2] The Governing law limits the law of domiclii. ........................................................... 8

B. THE MARSHALL ISLAND ACT OF 2014 IS NOT APPLICABLE ............................................ 8

MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

III. IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS VOID ......................................................................... 10

A. ADORNIA HAS A CLAIM OF RESTITUTION OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO RECOVER THE

[1] The RESPONDENT was enriched. ............................................................................... 11

[2] The retention of enrichment is unjust....................................................................... 12

i. Retention of £32 million is against the principle of equity .................................. 12

ii. The money was paid under a mistake of law ....................................................... 13

B. EXCHEQUER DOES NOT HAVE A DEFENCE OF CHANGE OF POSITION ............................... 14

[2] The Defence will violate the principle of equity ...................................................... 15

IV. IF THE EXCHEQUER CONTRACT IS NOT VOID ................................................................. 15

A. ADORNIA IS ENTITLED TO REFER TO THE SYNDICATE 41 AWARD WITHOUT THE CONSENT

[2] It Necessary to Protect the Legitimate Interest of the CLAIMANT. ............................ 17

B. EXCHEQUER IS BOUND BY SYNDICATE 41 TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS BY ISSUE ESTOPPEL AS

[1] The RESPONDENT is a Privy ...................................................................................... 20

[3] No Violation of Fundamental Right of Due Process ............................................... 22

C. THE LOSSES FALL WITHIN THE INSURANCE CLAUSE ...................................................... 22

MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................. XIII

MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

¶/¶¶ Paragraph/ Paragraphs

AIR All India Reporter

ALL ER All England Law Reports

Ch Law Reports, Chancery Division (Third Series)

Ch D Law Reports, Chancery Division (Second

MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CLR Common Wealth Law Reports

DLR Dominion Law Reports (Canadian law report)

ER England Law Reports

EWCA Court of Appeal England and Wales

EWHC High Court of England and Wales

F.2d Federal Reporter Second

FLR Federal Reporter

F.Supp. Federal Supplement

HKLRD Hong Kong Law Reports & Digest

ICA Indian Contract Act

MEMORIAL for [CLAIMANT] INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

i.e. Id Est (that is)

LCIA London Court of International Arbitration

LR Lloyd’s Register Classification Society